CMR DA

CMR DA.........................................................................................................................................................................11NC........................................................................................................................................................................1Overview................................................................................................................................................................1

Uniqueness......................................................................................................................................................................1Extensions..............................................................................................................................................................1

Links...............................................................................................................................................................................1Alliances: 1NC.......................................................................................................................................................1Bases: 1NC.............................................................................................................................................................1Bases: Extensions...................................................................................................................................................1NATO: 1NC...........................................................................................................................................................1NATO: Extensions.................................................................................................................................................1Japan/South Korea..................................................................................................................................................1Japan: 1NC.............................................................................................................................................................1Japan: Extensions...................................................................................................................................................1Okinawa: 1NC........................................................................................................................................................1South Korea: 1NC..................................................................................................................................................1South Korea: Extensions........................................................................................................................................1Unilateral Decisions: 1NC.....................................................................................................................................1Perception: 1NC.....................................................................................................................................................1Plan Snowballs: 1NC.............................................................................................................................................1

Internal Links..................................................................................................................................................................1JCS Chairperson.....................................................................................................................................................1

Impacts............................................................................................................................................................................1Peacekeeping: 1NC................................................................................................................................................1Weak States: 1NC..................................................................................................................................................1Pakistan: 1NC.........................................................................................................................................................1Afghanistan: 1NC...................................................................................................................................................1Counterinsurgency: 1NC........................................................................................................................................1Military Failures: 1NC...........................................................................................................................................1Hegemony: 1NC.....................................................................................................................................................1Democracy: 1NC....................................................................................................................................................1Democracy: Extensions..........................................................................................................................................1Irregular Warfare: 1NC..........................................................................................................................................1Terrorism: 1NC......................................................................................................................................................1Coups: 1NC............................................................................................................................................................1Readiness: 1NC......................................................................................................................................................1Strategic Disasters: 1NC........................................................................................................................................1Global Instability: 1NC..........................................................................................................................................1Refugees: 1NC.......................................................................................................................................................1Refugees: Extensions.............................................................................................................................................1Modeling: 1NC.......................................................................................................................................................1Modeling: Extensions.............................................................................................................................................1Rights: 1NC............................................................................................................................................................1Moral Obligation: 1NC..........................................................................................................................................1Military Spending/Recruitment..............................................................................................................................1

Answers To.....................................................................................................................................................................1Non Unique: Generic.............................................................................................................................................1Non Unique: Decrease in Civilian Control............................................................................................................1Non Unique: Trump kills CMR.............................................................................................................................1Non Unique: Using Force on Protesters.................................................................................................................1Non Unique: Civil-Military Gap............................................................................................................................1Non Unique: Milley’s Apology..............................................................................................................................1

No Impact: No Spillover........................................................................................................................................1No Impact: CMR is Resilient.................................................................................................................................1Turn: Breaking Norms Saves Them.......................................................................................................................1

1NC

Civil military relations are on the brink but the Rubicon hasn’t been crossed yet Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute Resident Fellow, 6-5-20(Giselle, “The Looming Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” accessed 6-15-20, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2020/06/05/the-looming-crisis-in-civil-military-relations/) JFN

President Trump’s decision to use force, and, most notably, members of the Army National Guard, to clear the way across Lafayette Square for a Bible-waving bit of absurdist theater at St. John’s Episcopal Church—where every president since James Madison has worshipped—has brought the long-simmering cauldron of American civil-military relations to a boil. It may be a long time before the waters return to a healthy temperature. A first response to the Trump stunt came from retired Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2007 to 2001. Writing in The Atlantic magazine, Mullen declared, “I cannot remain silent” as “military members are co-opted for political purposes.” He suggested that the president, following his impulse to “dominate” the situation, might issue unlawful orders. “Our fellow citizens are not the enemy, and must never become so . . . . This is not the time for stunts. This is the time for leadership.” If Mullen’s piece was a shot across Trump’s bow, the subsequent statement by retired Marine General—and Trump’s original Secretary of Defense—James Mattis was a full-on, four-decker broadside. To begin with, he goes beyond Mullen in calling Trump out by name, and in stark terms: “Donald Trump is the first president in my lifetime who does not try to unite the American people—does not even pretend to try,” he said in a statement also first released to The Atlantic. “Instead, he tries to divide us. We are witnessing the consequences of three years of this deliberate effort.” Such language is but the opening salvo, for Mattis goes on to analogize Trump’s divisiveness with Nazi propaganda in World War II: “Instructions given by the military departments to our troops before the Normandy invasion reminded soldiers that ‘The Nazi slogan for destroying us . . . was “Divide and Conquer.” Our American answer is ‘In Union there is Strength.’” Mattis urged Americans to hold those who “make a mockery of our Constitution” to account. In the wake of Mattis’s attack, another retired Marine general, John Allen, once commander of all U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, followed up with a somber article in Foreign Policy by speculating that Trump’s photo-op and preceding speech in the White House Rose Garden may have marked “the end of the American experiment.” The affair “was awful for the United States and its democracy,” wrote Allen. “The president’s speech was calculated to project his abject and arbitrary power, but he failed to project any of the higher emotions or leadership desperately needed in every quarter of this nation during this dire moment. And while Monday was truly horrific, no one should have been surprised. Indeed, the moment was clarifying in so many ways.” Coming from a politician—Joe Biden or even Mitt Romney—such charged language would be acceptable, appropriate, and even righteous. But coming from the most senior retired military officers—and Mullen, Mattis and Allen are among the most distinguished leaders of their generation, rightly honored for their valiant leadership through the darkest days of Iraq and Afghanistan—it carries unexpected, and in the long run, troubling baggage. It is almost certain to initiate a new level of disharmony and politicization in civil-military affairs, a step-change in the loss of trust between soldiers and statesmen that has been growing for the last three decades, and a serious blow to the ideal of above-the-fray “professionalism” that has been the at the core of the officer-corps ethos since the days of George Marshall. The increase in politicization of civil-military matters is inevitable and already apparent, and who is ultimately responsible should not be danced around. The dilemma is due to Trump’s cult of personality—the Leader is never wrong. Republican lawmakers quickly followed in lockstep. Senator Lindsey Graham, once a Mattis booster but increasingly a Trump loyalist, told CNN, “It’s just politically fashionable to blame Trump for everything—and I’m not buying it. And he jumped into politics—General Mattis did. And I think he’s missing a lot about what’s going on in America politically.” A second-order effect of the affair has been the suspicion that the current defense secretary, Mark Esper, and JCS chairman, Army General Mark Milley, are quasi-quislings and, having followed Trump on his ramble to St. John’s—Milley in battle-dress uniform—propaganda stooges for the President. Their post-facto “we-didn’t-know” complaint only made things worse: Are you a collaborationist, or, after seeing Trump for three years, just that dumb? Esper tried to get the toothpaste back in the tube by later declaring that he did not support the invocation of the provisions of the Insurrection Act—a measure intended by President Thomas Jefferson in 1807 to forestall the threat of a rebellion led by Aaron Burr—contemplated by Trump. Esper has no doubt angered Trump but done little to bolster his own reputation. The reason all of this is so troubling is that it is badly eroding the kind of trust that is necessary for a constructive and productive partnership between civilians and the military. As much as Trump is a real threat today, his exacerbating already-festering problems will certainly long outlast him. From General Colin Powell’s smack-down of President Clinton’s plan to lift the “don’t-ask-don’t-tell” policy in regard to permitting openly gay men and women to serve, to the vocal objections to then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s approach to Iraq to the bureaucratic infighting over the Obama Administration’s surge-and-run strategy for Afghanistan (with Joe Biden, incidentally, playing a key role), the relationship was already in a bad place. The lesson that politicians—of all stripes—are likely to learn from this moment is that independent-minded commanders should be avoided at all costs, lest they either themselves become political opponents or simply tools for their political opponents. They will test senior leaders for their political reliability. Officers are likely to learn the inverse lesson: humor the boss, keep your mouth shut, and minimize the damage. Indeed, the current contretemps calls into question the very American model of civil-military relations most closely associated with the great political scientist and Harvard professor Samuel Huntington. In his magisterial 1981 work, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Huntington saw officership as a “profession,” marked by technical expertise in the management of violence, a strict of ethical responsibility and a “corporate” culture that enforced these norms. He thus distinguished between the dangers of “subjective” civilian control of the U.S. military—when civilian factions co-opt and corrupt the professional officer corps—and “objective” control, wherein professionalism is granted a limited but independent scope for its expertise, but remains subordinate to its political masters. Huntington’s theory has long been attractive to the American military leadership, especially since the creation of an all-volunteer force. While a number of other writers, and several of Huntington’s own students, have tried to modify and introduce nuance in the debate, this simple-yet-powerful model has remained dominant, at least in military professional education. Subject to Donald Trump’s depredations and the reactions of the retireds, this model is tumbling off its pedestal like a statue of a Confederate general. Trump has no qualms in the matter; he seeks but the triumph of his will. Mattis, for his part, has argued, since the moment of his resignation, that there was a kind of statute of limitations on his silence: “When you leave an administration over clear policy differences, you need to give the people who are still there as much opportunity as possible to defend the country,” he once said. He also warned that his silence would not “be eternal.” Mattis is a deeply learned man, and is certainly aware of the parlous state of civil-military relations. That he chose to take the step he did tells us of how dangerous a situation he sees America slipping into. But

despite all that, what he has just said, too, will live on and have consequences that last beyond the current moment. Mercifully, the Rubicon—that is, an incendiary comment by a currently-serving active-duty general—has yet to be crossed. But, as Caesar proved, that was a shallow stream, no real obstacle to the chaos on the far bank.

Reducing our foreign military commitments leads to a massive backlash that destroys civil-military relations Kohn, UNC History Professor, 08(Richard, “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” accessed 8-26-15, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/coming-soon-crisis-civil-military-relations)

The ways out of this jam all invite some sort of conflict. Least controversial would be to tackle that old bugbear, Pentagon waste. Several of the presidential candidates have vowed to do exactly this. But the gold-plated weapons systems always survive. And, clichés notwithstanding, the actual savings would be minimal in any case. Another perennial favorite is centralization or consolidation, an impulse that led to the creation of the Defense Department in 1947 and something attempted regularly ever since. Certainly, there are more opportunities here. Are six war colleges really still necessary? Does each service really need its own weather, chaplain, medical, and legal corps? Do both the navy and Marine Corps need their own air forces, since they fly many of the same aircraft, all of them integrated on aircraft carriers? Are military academies a necessity? A larger percentage of ROTC graduates than of West Pointers stay in the army past the ten-year mark. Yet imagine the outcry any one of these proposals would provoke, and the resistance it would generate from the services, agencies, and congressional committees whose ox was being gored. The delegation or defense company about to lose a base or a weapons contract would certainly howl—and mobilize. Organizational change in any bureaucracy provokes enormous and almost always successful resistance. In the Pentagon, the battles have been epic. The world has a say in all this, too. The next administration will take office nearly twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet the American military establishment is essentially the same one created in the 1940s and 1950s to deter the Soviet Union. The United States today boasts four independent armed services with the same weapons, upgraded and more capable to be sure, as those known to George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, and Curtis LeMay. Not only are the ships, planes, tanks, vehicles, and guns similar, but they are organized similarly, performing virtually the same roles and missions assigned them in the late 1940s. The United States after 1989 did not demobilize. It “downsized.” Successive administrations cut the budget by ten percent and the size of the force by about 25 percent, while the Pentagon substituted regional threats for the Soviet menace in its planning. Even in the midst of a “Global War on Terrorism,” neither the generals nor their bosses in the White House and Congress have been able to rethink the purpose, organization, command and control, or even operation of the armed forces. Two decades is a long time. The decades between 1895 and 1915, 1935 and 1955, and 1975 and 1995 all involved paradigm shifts in America’s role in the world and in its national security requirements. Today’s security situation differs no less radically from the Cold War for which today’s military establishment was devised. Are these the armed forces we really need? Bitter fights over strategy, budgets, weapons, and roles and missions dating back sixty-plus years suggest the question may not be answerable in any practical sense. To understand fully just how difficult it will be to raise fundamental concerns about defense policies, consider the recent confusion over what exactly the role and purpose of the National Guard and reserves ought to be. A week before 9/11, I participated in a roundtable discussion of the subject for the Reserve Forces Policy Board. There was general agreement that reserve forces should concentrate more on homeland defense and less on backstopping active duty forces on the battlefield. Yet the former head of the National Guard Bureau insisted, without evidence and in the face of great skepticism, that the Guard and reserves could do both. The past five years have proved him wrong; reserve forces are underequipped and stretched thinner than the active duty army and Marine Corps.

Strong CMR is key to US military strength and preventing multiple scenarios for flashpoints escalating to great power conflict Panetta, Former Secretary of Defense, 4-25-19(Leon, “CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A CONVERSATION WITH THE HON. LEON E. PANETTA,” accessed 9-26-19, States News Service, p. Nexis Uni) JFN

Leon Panetta: The issue we're kind of discussing is civil-military relations. And I think it gives us an opportunity to look at the strengths of America's military capability, but to also look at the dangers that are out there that can potentially threaten our strength. Leon Panetta: We are, without question, the world's most powerful military on the face of the earth. And we're that for several important reasons. One is obviously the quality of the force, our capabilities, our first in the world, really, in terms of the capabilities we've developed, our weapon systems, and the ability of those weapon systems to operate on land and sea and air and space, and the technology, the fact that we are on the cutting edge of technology in our research, in the things that we are doing, to look to the future. Leon Panetta: Secondly, because of the outstanding quality of the men and women in uniform that serve this country. They are, without question, the best-trained, the best-equipped, and have the best leadership of any fighting force in the world. And I was proud, as secretary of defense, to be able to have the men the young men and women in this country be willing to put their lives on the line in order to protect our security. Leon Panetta: Thirdly, civil-military

relationship is unique to democracy, to our democracy. And George Washington is really the one who made that happen when he resigned his commission in order to become president of the United States, making very clear the differences between civilian leadership and the military. That portrait hangs in the Capitol, and it's one that I saw often as a member of Congress, that he did that. Leon Panetta: I remember Karzai, as president of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai once asked me what is the secret to our military success. And I remember because he thought he was kind of the George Washington of Afghanistan. I said it was it's because of George Washington. And George Washington defined the fact that civilian leadership is critical in this country, and that it's important to have that civil-military relationship, and we have that. Leon Panetta: And fourthly, because that relationship works well. It works well. And it isn't it isn't one that I think you know, Huntington in his work kind of defined these kind of strict lines between what the military what the civilians do in providing objectives, and then the military provides the options to deal with it. But the reality is we've moved beyond that. It is very much a deliberative process now between the civilian side and the military side. And in many ways it's important because it's a relationship of trust. It's a dialogue that has to take place. The military these days have to have to understand the political environment that we're dealing with. And at the same time, the civilian authorities have to understand what war is all about and what the consequences of war are all about. So it really requires that mix of capabilities working together in a deliberative process to decide, you know, what kind of strategy, what kind of goals that we want to achieve, and how we intend to achieve those goals. And the reality is that it has worked well in terms of protecting our national security and protecting our nation. Leon Panetta: But there are dangers that are lurking out there that can undermine those strengths I just talked about. One is that we're living at a time when there are a large number of what I call flashpoints in the world, probably more flashpoints since the end of World War II, that in many ways are there and yet my fear is we're not paying enough attention to the potential of any one of these flashpoints turning into a major confrontation. I've commented that it reminded me a lot of that period before World War I, and there were some of the same factors: territorial disputes; alliances that were not working as well as they should; terrorism; and, frankly, failed statesmanship, failed leadership in dealing with that, and thinking that somehow none of those flashpoints would suddenly turn into World War I. Leon Panetta: Today we've got a series of those flashpoints. Terrorism is still a very real threat. We just saw what happened in Sri Lanka. ISIS remains a real threat, along with al-Qaida, along with Boko Haram, along with al-Shabaab. These are real threats to our to our security. Leon Panetta: Secondly, failed states in the Middle East. We've seen what happened in Syria. We've seen what happened with Libya, with Yemen. These become the breeding grounds for terrorism in the future as well, and instability in the Middle East. Leon Panetta: We have rogue nations North Korea, Iran representing threats to stability. Leon Panetta: We have Russia, much more aggressive Russia with Putin, seeking not only control of the Crimea, impacting on the Ukraine, deploying forces to Syria, and conducting probably one of the most bold and sweeping cyberattacks on our own election process in this country. Leon Panetta: China asserting its militarization of the South China Sea, developing its capabilities, and frankly, filling a lot of the vacuums that the United States has made through its whole Belt and Road Initiative. Leon Panetta: And cyber. Cyber is the battlefield of the future and has the potential to literally destroy our country. You don't have to use an F-35. You don't have to send a B-2 bomber. You don't have to put boots on the ground. You can simply sit at a computer and deploy a sophisticated virus that could literally paralyze our computer systems, our electric grid, our financial systems, our government systems, our banking systems anything that runs by a computer. That's a reality.

Overview

The impact is short term because CMR is fluid and can change quickly Dejonge Schulman, Deputy Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, 2-22-19(Loren, “POST-CHAOS HOMEWORK ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS,” accessed 9-26-19, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/post-chaos-homework-on-civil-military-relations/) JFN

Civil-military relations often attracts process-minded people who value the clear assignment of responsibilities and a script for problem solving. The reality of this relationship is far messier. The Trump administration and the appointment of Mattis as secretary of defense did not fundamentally alter these dynamics; rather, they surfaced potential and opportunity that already existed beneath a veneer of roles and rules. Civil-military relations are constantly being rewritten; until these last two years, few paid attention. Now that Mattis has departed, the civ-mil field should continue to do its homework.

Great power war accesses every impact and ensures runaway climate change, nuclear war, cyber-attacks, bioweapons use and reckless AI development Klein, Vox Editor at Large, 5-18-20(Ezra, “The president’s job is to manage risk. But Trump is the risk,” accessed 5-19-20, https://www.vox.com/2020/5/18/21251370/donald-trump-risk-coronavirus-2020-reelection-nuclear-china) JFN

But the most important argument Ord makes is this: Risks, even across vastly different spheres, are correlated. There are forces, events, and people that simultaneously raise — or lower — the risk of runaway climate change, nuclear war, pandemics, and reckless AI research. The simplest way to raise all of them at once, Ord suggests, would be a “great-power war.” Take a war between the US and China. It would raise the chances of nuclear launches, engineered bioweapons, and massive cyberattacks. And even if it never got to that point, the increase in hostilities would impede the cooperation needed to slow or stop climate change, or to regulate the development of artificial intelligence. And yet, increasing hostilities with China has been the hallmark of Trump’s foreign policy. Even prior to the coronavirus, the US-China relationship was “at the worst point since the forging of the relationship in 1972,” says Evan Osnos, who covers China for the New Yorker. Now the situation is much worse.

Uniqueness

Extensions

CMR is on the brink now Brooks, Marquette University Political Science Professor, 4-13-20(Risa, “Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States,” accessed 6-4-20, International Security, Volume 44, Issue 4, Spring 2020, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00374#authorsTabList) JFN

Ten years after the review, U.S. civil-military relations are once again displaying some concerning features, this time relating to civilian control of the military and partisan politics under President Donald Trump. Trump has ceded a remarkable degree of operational autonomy to U.S. military commanders and sanctioned a significant reduction in transparency in the conduct of the United States’ armed conflicts, raising serious questions about the adequacy of civilian oversight and control of military activity in his administration. Trump also often casts the military as his political ally, suggesting that the military backs him in electoral politics. His actions include direct references to service members voting for him and use of the military as a backdrop in partisan speeches and settings.5 For their part, U.S. military leaders lack an effective approach for responding to these actions and, as a result, risk enabling the military's politicization. Leaders in the military are also facing problems related to its apolitical stance in U.S. politics more broadly. Surveys reveal that a significant number of military personnel do not believe that they should be apolitical or nonpartisan.

Civil military relations have not reached crisis level Joyner, Marine Corps Univ. Command and Staff College Professor, 6-5-20(James, “This is Not a Civil-Military Crisis,” accessed 6-16-20, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/06/not-civil-military-crisis/165946/) JFN

Predictably, members of Congress, the press, the general public, and current and former members of the armed forces are reacting to a condemnation of the President by General Mattis, not Secretary Mattis or Mr. Mattis. Still, while I would strongly prefer Mattis refrain from mocking the commander-in-chief—an inherently partisan act—a single, murky case is hardly an indication of a crisis of civil-military relations. That defenses of the First Amendment and our founding principle that all men are created equal are seen as an indictment of the sitting President and his party is a sad state of affairs. But there has been no suggestion from any officer, active or retired, that the military should solve that for us. If that changes, we will indeed be in a crisis.

Trump is lowering civil military tensions Bender, Politico Reporter, 6-15-20(Bryan, “Tensions ease between White House, Pentagon,” accessed 6-15-20, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-defense/2020/06/15/tensions-ease-between-white-house-pentagon-788485) JFN

WILL THE CEASEFIRE HOLD? The anxiety was palpable ahead of Trump’s Saturday commencement address at West Point after the recent public rupture in civil-military relations over the role of the military in protests and the fate of bases named for Confederate generals, as your Morning D correspondent reported on Friday. But the commander in chief stuck to his script in front of more than 1,000 socially distanced cadets on the storied Plain, imparting an uplifting, even conciliatory tone to the new Army officers, Evan Semones reports. Trump addressed the legacy of the Civil War, but instead of doubling down on his defense of Confederate generals, he gave a nod to the victors of the war who hailed from West Point, not those who abandoned the Union to defend slavery. "It was this school that gave us the men and women who fought and won a bloody war to extinguish the evil of slavery within one lifetime of our founding,” Trump said, encouraging the cadets to embrace the example set by past graduates such as Union commander and future President Ulysses S. Grant. The speech also came after Trump appeared to lower the temperature in an interview with Fox News Channel on Friday, during which he said it was “fine” that Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley a day earlier said he regretted participating in the controversial June 1 photo op with the president after peaceful protesters were violently cleared outside the White House. The president also repeated his enduring pledge to wind down America’s seemingly endless post-

9/11 conflicts, insisting, “We are not the policemen of the world” and “the job of the American soldier is not to rebuild foreign nations” or “to solve ancient conflicts in far away lands that many people have never even heard of.”

CMR tensions are lowering because Pentagon officials are learning to manage Trump New York Times, 11-14-19(“Trump and the Military: A Dysfunctional Marriage, but They Stay Together,” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/14/us/politics/trump-military.html) JFN

Senior military and Defense Department officials say that in some cases, it is simply a matter of talking in a way that will appeal to Mr. Trump, while prosecuting a similar national security policy as they did under President Barack Obama. “The Pentagon has figured out that they can couch things to manage Trump’s biases in some ways,” said Derek Chollet, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Obama administration. “Don’t make it about saving the Kurds, make it about saving the oil.”

Links

Alliances: 1NC

JCS Chairperson Milley supports and advocates for strong US military alliances with allies like NATO, Japan, and South Korea Garamone, DOD News Reporter, 19(Jim, “Chairman Aims to Reassure Allies in Middle East,” accessed 6-14-20, https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/2029166/chairman-aims-to-reassure-allies-in-middle-east/) JFN

Army Gen. Mark Milley is meeting with national and military leaders to assure allies and partners in the region and deter Iran from malign behavior. Milley is carrying an important message to U.S. allies and service members on a whirlwind trip around the world. "I think that's an important message to always remind people that the United States of America is a global power, and we remain committed to our responsibilities throughout different regions," Milley said. Last week, the chairman visited the Indo-Pacific region, meeting with Japanese and South Korean leaders. Yesterday, he visited his Israeli counterpart in Tel Aviv before traveling to Jordan. Now, he is heading to Bahrain to meet military leaders and visit with U.S. service members based in the strategic Persian Gulf nation. Later this month, he will visit European allies. He also getting into specifics with his counterparts, building the military-to-military relationship that he has said is important to interoperability and cooperation. "Each country is unique," he said. "So, I talked about all the various issues, you know, whether it's training and interoperability or whether it's broader contingency planning and national security decision-making within the region."

Bases: 1NC

Key U.S. military officers support maintaining foreign bases Vines, American Univ. Associate Anthropology Prof., 14(David, ““We’re Profiteers”,” Monthly Review, accessed 8-26-15, http://monthlyreview.org/2014/07/01/were-profiteers/)

The perks of overseas base life are far greater for the generals and the admirals who often enjoy personal assistants and chefs, private planes and vehicles, and other benefits. Beyond the authorized perks, there are cases like former Africa Command commander General William “Kip” Ward. Pentagon investigators found Ward “engaged in multiple forms of misconduct” including billing the government for hundreds of thousands of dollars of personal travel and misusing government funds on luxury hotels, five-car motorcades, and spa and shopping trips for his wife.50 He also accepted free meals and tickets to a Broadway musical from an unnamed “construction management, engineering, technology and energy services company” with millions in Pentagon contracts.51

Bases: Extensions

Military officials oppose reducing our overseas military presence Vine, American Univ. Associate Anthropology Prof., 15(David, Base Nation, accessed 8-26-15, http://thekojonnamdishow.org/shows/2015-08-26/base-nation)

Since the end of World War II, the idea that our country should have a large collection of bases and hundreds of thousands of troops permanently stationed overseas has been a quasi-religious dictum of U.S. foreign and national security policy. The opening words of a U.S. Army War College study bluntly declare: “U.S. national security strategy requires access to overseas military bases. The policy under lying this deeply held belief is known as the “forward strategy.” These two words, this wonky term of art, have had profound implications. Cold War policy held that the United States should maintain large concentrations of military forces and bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union, in order to hem in and “contain” supposed Soviet expansionism. Suddenly, as the historian George Stambuk explains, “the security of the United States, in the minds of policy- makers, lost much of its former inseparability from the concept of the territory of the United States.” Two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, in a world without another superpower rival, people across the political spectrum still believe as a matter of faith that overseas bases and troops are essential to protecting the country. At a time when bipartisanship has hit all- time lows, there are few issues more widely agreed upon by both Republicans and Democrats alike. The George W. Bush administration, for example, pro-claimed that bases abroad have “maintained the peace” and provided “symbols of . . . U.S. commitments to allies and friends.” The Obama administration, for its part, declared that “forward- stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required” as they “provide a stabilizing influence abroad.” And these are just two prominent examples. The forward strategy has been the overwhelming consensus among politicians, national security experts, military o ffi cials , journalists, and many others. It’s hard to overestimate how unquestioned this policy has been and remains. Any opposition to maintaining large numbers of overseas bases and troops is generally pilloried as peacenik idealism, or isolationism of the sort that allowed Hitler to conquer Europe.

High ranking military officers support maintaining our foreign bases Vines, American Univ. Associate Anthropology Prof., 14(David, ““We’re Profiteers”,” Monthly Review, accessed 8-26-15, http://monthlyreview.org/2014/07/01/were-profiteers/)

Others have also benefitted—financially, politically, and professionally—from the huge collection of bases overseas. High-ranking officials in the military and the Pentagon bureaucracy, members of Congress (especially members of the armed services and appropriations committees), lobbyists, and local and national-level politicians in countries accommodating bases have all reaped rewards.

U.S. military is committed to maintaining large foreign bases Vine, American Univ. Associate Anthropology Prof., 12-14-12(David, “How US taxpayers are paying the Pentagon to occupy the planet,” accessed 8-26-15, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/20121213122226666895.html)

During the Cold War, such bases became the foundation for a "forward strategy" meant to surround the Soviet Union and push US military power as close to its borders as possible. These days, despite the absence of a superpower rival, the Pentagon has been intent on dotting the globe with scores of relatively small "lily pad" bases, while continuing to build and maintain some large bases like Dal Molin.

Plan causes controversy because the military wants to hold on to all the bases they currently have Vine, American Univ. Associate Anthropology Professor, 7-9-15(David, “US military’s ‘lily pad’ expansion may prove costly,” Boston Globe, accessed 9-2-15, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/07/09/military-lily-pad-expansion-may-prove-costly/xrsDhm7wMpJj4eEMFljSQK/story.html)

Indeed, bases of all sizes prove notoriously difficult to close — whether there’s a strategic need for a base or not. This helps explain why the military still has hundreds of Cold War bases in Europe and East Asia despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union and any rival to US military power. In Afghanistan, despite the official end of US

combat operations, the military has rights to occupy nine or more major bases through at least 2024. In Iraq, lily pads could provide the Pentagon with a second chance at creating a de facto permanent presence.

NATO: 1NC

JCS Chairperson Milley is a strong supporter of NATO Garamone, DOD News Reporter, 1-14-20(Jim, “NATO Nations Cannot Be Complacent, Milley Says,” accessed 6-14-20, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2056782/nato-nations-cannot-be-complacent-milley-says/) JFN

Army Gen. Mark A. Milley said people need to remember why NATO began in 1949. The defensive alliance was put in place to prevent the outbreak of great power war, and that's still a valid task, the chairman said. "Sometimes, people can become complacent and assume that peace is the state of nature," he added. "Peace doesn't happen by accident: It happens because of effort, resources, commitment, allies banding together … to maintain a strong, cohesive alliance." The chairman said it has been obvious for a long time that Russia wants to divide NATO and make it weaker, if not destroy it. "That would be to their advantage," he said. "It's to the disadvantage of Europe and the United States if NATO would just collapse and fall apart." It's worth noting that there were two big periods of continental peace in Europe before NATO, Milley said. "One was following the Treaty of Westphalia [in 1648)] after the 30 Years War, where Europe tore itself apart," he said. The great power peace following it lasted about 100 years. Great power wars returned with the Napoleonic wars that ended in 1815, Milley pointed out. The countries of Europe put in place a balance of power so no great power fought another great power, he explained. “That lasts 100 years until 1914, and it breaks down,” he said. The world faced great power wars through World Wars I and II, slaughtering between 145 million and 155 million people around the world, the chairman said. "NATO was put in place, and the structures of the international order were put in place, at the end of World War II to prevent a great power war," he said. "They weren't put in place to prevent terrorism. They weren't put in place to prevent Vietnam or Korea. They were put in place [to prevent] that great power war." The chiefs of defense spoke with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Milley said the NATO leader spoke about the situation in the Middle East and his conversation with President Donald J. Trump about increasing NATO support to the training mission in Iraq. The chairman said he saw support from his counterparts for the alliance doing more in the Middle East. The NATO Military Committee has to come up with capabilities that would be needed, the general said. "I think you've got to look at what capabilities nations can provide," he added. "So, one for example, kind of an obvious one, would be maybe some ballistic missile defense support, because there are NATO allied troops at these various camps that just took Iranian ballistic missiles. So that's a possibility." He said he also can see providing logistics support, and possibly additional military training teams, to increase the volume and capacity of the Iraqi security forces. "Right now, the NATO mission in Iraq is somewhere around 500 guys," Milley said. "It's a noncombat train, advise, assist role ... building [Iraqi] capacity to secure themselves. The United States still thinks, and NATO still thinks, that's a valid mission and will continue that mission. We have no intention of not continuing that mission." NATO is a force for peace, Milley said. "This alliance is important," he said. "It's important to Europe, it's important in the United States and we should not become complacent about it. And things like defense spending and working together and interoperability and maintaining commitments to each other is important for preventing a great power war and in order to maintain peace and stability."

NATO: Extensions

US military officers support NATO Overhaus, German Institute for International and Security Affairs Senior Associate, 7-26-19(Marco, “US security commitments to NATO: Trump is just one factor among others,” accessed 6-12-20, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/point-of-view/2019/us-security-commitments-to-nato-trump-is-just-one-factor-among-others/) JFN

Marco Overhaus: On the one hand, there is Trump, who has repeatedly questioned the value of NATO and other alliances in which the United States is a member. On the other hand, large sections of the Trump administration – including Trump’s foreign policy advisors, diplomats in the State Department, military officers in the Pentagon – as well as both parties in the US Congress clearly support NATO. However, one should not feel too comfortable: After all, in US security and defence policy, it is always the US president who counts.

Japan/South Korea

U.S. military is committed to maintaining status quo foreign bases in Asia and would forcefully oppose the plan Vine, American Univ. Associate Anthropology Prof., 7-27-15(David, “Don’t Just Close Bases at Home, Close Them Overseas,” NYT, accessed 8-26-15, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/opinion/dont-just-close-bases-at-home-close-them-overseas.html?_r=0)

Unfortunately, many inside and outside the military are committed to maintaining a large and extravagant system of bases abroad. In Europe, for example, the Pentagon has spent billions building new bases at the same time it’s been closing others. President Obama’s “Pacific pivot” has meant billions more in spending in a region where the military already has hundreds of bases and tens of thousands of troops. Billions of dollars have likewise gone to building a new and permanent base infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.

Japan: 1NC

JCS Chairperson Milley is a strong supporter of the US-Japan military alliance Garamone, DOD News Reporter, 11-13-19(Jim, “Milley Describes Indo-Pacific Region as U.S. Military's 'Main Effort',” accessed 6-14-20, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2015053/milley-describes-indo-pacific-region-as-us-militarys-main-effort/) JFN

Milley noted that the National Defense Strategy puts the Indo-Pacific region front and center. The region is home to the four most populous countries in the world: China, India, the United States and Indonesia, and it has the largest military forces in the world. The return of great power competition as a threat to the United States is played out in the Pacific, with China and Russia both trying to change the rules-based international order that has served the region so well. ''It is the No. 1 regional priority for the United States military,'' Milley said. The United States is a global power, he said, capable of doing more than one thing at a time. In Europe, the United States counts on the NATO alliance to help guard American interests, Milley said. In the Pacific, the bilateral treaty allies — Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand — are the bedrock for U.S. diplomatic, economic, political and military efforts, he added. The purpose of U.S. efforts in Europe and Asia is to maintain peace and security, the chairman said. ''The bumper sticker for Indo-Pacific is 'a free and open Indo-Pacific,''' Milley said. ''That has been a U.S. policy … in one way or another for well over a century.'' All of the nations of the region have benefitted from the rules-based international order since it was put in place at the end of World War II, he said, and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is the military component of the policy. U.S. Central Command is much in the news today for its fight violent extremist organization terrorist organizations and its dealing to deter Iran — a regional malign actor. But with more than 300,000 service members and Defense Department civilians, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command dwarfs Centcom, the chairman said. The U.S. Pacific Air Forces alone is the second largest air force in the world. By itself, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be the largest Navy in the world. The Army has a division in Hawaii and another in South Korea, as well as a significant presence in Alaska, the general said. ''We've got a Marine division forward-based west of the [international date line] in Okinawa,'' he said. ''There is no other region in the world that has the amount, the capacity and the ... military capability like we do in the Indo-Pacific.'' Great power competition in part of the calculus with China in the Indo-Pacific region. ''We need to continue to engage with China,'' the general said. ''China is a strategic competitor to be sure, [but] it doesn't necessarily mean that China becomes an adversary in the military sense of the word, or an enemy. ''But having said that, it's important that the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other friends and allies in the region remain unified,'' the chairman continued. ''We have a common set of values, and we have a common set of national security interests.''

Japan: Extensions

U.S. military opposes leaving Japan Meyer, Former Marine Corps Officer, 09(Carlton, “Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan,” accessed 8-25-15, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm)

However, American Generals and Admirals resist change because they enjoy the imperial flavor of "their" bases in Japan. They stall political efforts to close outdated bases by insisting on years to study proposed changes, and then years to implement them. A recent example occurred when U.S. Army Generals quietly defeated Donald Rumsfeld’s attempt to downsize Army bases in Germany. If President Obama expects results, he must dictate changes and insist on rapid action. Closing and downsizing foreign military bases requires no congressional approval. The first steps are to close the American airbases at Futenma and Atsugi, and transfer the aircraft carrier battle group based near Tokyo to the USA.

Okinawa : 1NC

U.S. military opposes leaving Okinawa Japan Times, 2-16-15(“Readers split over issue of U.S. military presence in Okinawa,” accessed 8-25-15, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2015/02/16/voices/readers-split-issue-u-s-military-presence-okinawa/#.Vd0d70Y9mQU)

Most of the expenditure of the U.S. military in Okinawa comes from Japanese taxpayers’ money — the so-called sympathy budget or “host nation support.” That is why U.S. Marines and other divisions want to stay in Japan: Because it is a lot cheaper. This is especially true for the Marine Corps, which has been shrunk by the U.S. government: Okinawa is the only place to stay. If they have to leave, they would just lose jobs. The marines might be absorbed into the ground forces because these days there is no need for such a function.

South Korea: 1NC

JCS Chairperson Milley is a strong supporter of the US-South Korea military alliance Office of the JCS, 11-14-19(“CJCS, ROK Chairman Meet, Discuss Stronger Alliance, Military Readiness,” accessed 6-14-20, https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/2016370/cjcs-rok-chairman-meet-discuss-stronger-alliance-military-readiness/) JFN

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley met with Chairman of the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hanki Park during the 44th Republic of Korea and U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM) today in Seoul. The Republic of Korea delegation was represented by Chairman of the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hanki Park and Chief Director of the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Strategic Planning Lt. Gen. Seong Yong Lee. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander Adm. Phil Davidson joined Milley as the U.S. delegation and Gen. Robert B. Abrams represented the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command as the bilateral commander. During the discussions, Gen. Milley and Gen. Park received updates on the security of the Korean peninsula and the region and addressed measures to strengthen the Alliance's defense posture and efficient transition of wartime operational control from a U.S.-commanded to a ROK-commanded Combined Forces Command. The two leaders recognized the importance of holding the United States-Republic of Korea Military Committee meeting during this crucial time, demonstrating the strength and credibility of the military alliance. Gen. Milley reiterated the United States' firm and unwavering commitments to the Republic of Korea and its continued commitment to providing extended deterrence. He reaffirmed that the U.S. remains prepared to respond to any attack on the Korean Peninsula, using the full range of U.S. military capabilities. Gen. Milley and Gen. Park acknowledged the critical nature of multinational partnerships and agreed to further strengthen efforts for regional peace and security.

South Korea: Extensions

U.S. military opposes leaving South KoreaMeyer, Former Marine Corps Officer, 11(Carlton, “Cut Army Fat in Korea,” accessed 8-25-15, http://www.g2mil.com/daegu.htm)

As a result, a second Korean war is highly unlikely, and if it did erupt, South Korea could easily win without any help from the USA. Therefore, a bold American President should order all American troops out of South Korea to save billions of dollars a year, which the U.S. Army can invest in new equipment, and free enough base manpower to form another combat division. Unfortunately, such a proposal would result in screams of betrayal from traditionalist American Generals and major corporations that benefit from the long-standing North Korean threat business.

Unilateral Decisions: 1NC

Unilateral military decisions hurt civil military relations Owens, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 6-12-20(Mackubin Thomas, “How Military Leaders’ Trump Criticism Can Damage Civil-Military Relations,” accessed 6-15-20, https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/military-leaders-criticism-president-trump-can-damage-civil-military-relations/) JFN

Healthy civil-military relations — and by extension, effective policy, good decisions, and positive outcomes — require mutual respect, candor, collaboration, cooperation, and ultimately subordination. Nothing would undermine that relationship more than a resignation by a senior military officer. The role of the military is to advise and then carry out lawful policies and orders, not to make them. In the end, the threat to resign, thereby taking disagreement public, directly undermines civilian control of the military. There is a final aspect to consider. As citizens, retired officers such as General Brooks are entitled to voice their opinions. However, they should be circumspect in how they go about it. Even though retired officers claim to speak only for themselves and not for the military, they are, as Richard Kohn once observed, akin to the cardinals of the Catholic Church. Thus their statements carry weight. Accordingly, they should take into account the public impact of their statements. They need to realize how such public statements undermine trust between the military and civilian authorities. And finally, they must answer this question: Is it proper for unelected military officers to undermine duly elected officials, especially when they use the sort of contemptuous language that would be impermissible were they still active-duty? The key to healthy civil-military relations is trust, which is necessarily based on mutual respect and understanding between civilian and military leaders. Trust requires the exchange of candid views and perspectives between the two parties as part of the decision-making process.

Perception : 1NC

Even the appearance of micromanagement will cause substantial military backlash Johnson and Metz, 95 (Douglas and Steven, Strategic studies Institute, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems, 1995)

The military must also recognize that it can inadvertently intimidate civilians. This is a common phenomenon in the world of politics. Americans, for instance, are often perplexed when friendly or allied nations are alarmed by U.S. influence in world affairs. This can be called the “paradox of unintended intimidation” as the ability to impose power receives greater attention that statements of good intent or even benign behavior. The same paradox applies to military involvement in policymaking. While military leaders fully know they have no intention of seizing power or playing a praetorian role in politics, the fact that they could is sometimes a source of anxiety. The warfighter ethos amplifies this distrust. The military professional is a useful but alien being to mainstream America. He not only dresses, talks, and behaves differently, but also seems driven by unusual goals and values. Steps to foster communication and understanding between military professionals and the civilian mainstream – outreach programs, the reserve system, civilian education for commissioned and noncommissioned officers, military involvement in domestic disaster relief, the Army’s emphasis that it is “America’s Army” – are useful, but not ultimate solutions to the problem of unintended intimidation. Promoting the image of obedience to civilian authorities is a never-ending task. Damage from even murmurs of disobedience is disrespect, much less what historian Richard Kohn depicted as the “ridicule and contempt expressed openly” about President Clinton within the officer

Plan Snowballs : 1NC

Disruptions in CMR snowball – the plan causes complete meltdownArthur, Retired U.S. Navy Admiral, 96 (Stanley, retired Admiral of the US Navy, "The American Military: Some Thoughts on Who We Are and What We Are", Civil Military Relations and the Not-Quite Wars of the Present and Future, 10/30/1996, pgs. 16-17)

As we shrink the size of the armed forces while maintaining the high quality of our forces, and at the same time encourage them to turn inward, how can we ensure that they will not see themselves as superior to the American people they serve? We need to think hard about this because the more those in the ranks think of themselves as elite, the less likely they are to be concerned with the attitudes, needs, and demands of the nation. There is a real problem when the armed forces do not respect the values of the society at large. The recent troubles with hate groups and skinheads could be, in part, attributable to this dynamic. Superficial remedies, like banning Nazi flags or watching for certain kinds of tatoos, address symptoms more than causes. The problem occurs more at the lower levels of the service hierarchy than with the leadership. But if allowed to develop, it will inevitably migrate upward. People are aware of the culture of promotions and education in the military and what will and will not be tolerated. If these attitudes develop among the privates and lieutenants, they will inevitably develop among sergeants and majors, and then among sergeants major and colonels. When they reach the flag officer levels, there is potentially a threat to civilian control.

Internal Links

JCS Chairperson

JCS Chairperson is key to robust CMR Inhofe, US Senator, 7-11-19(James, “SASC Chairman Inhofe Remarks at Nomination Hearing for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-OK) News Release,” accessed 9-26-19, p. Nexis Uni) JFN

The Chairman plays a unique and influential role in U.S. national security policy. And so, the Chairman has an outsized impact on the state of civil-military relations. Appropriate civil-military relations are essential for a healthy democracy. We look forward to your views on this critical subject.

Impacts

Peacekeeping: 1NC

Strong civil-military relations are vital to effective peacekeeping and peace building efforts Schirch and Cortright, 3-24-14(Lisa and David, “Civil-Military Interaction in Peacebuilding,” accessed 8-28-15, http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2014/03/24/civil-military-interaction-in-peacebuilding/)

In recent decades, international peacekeeping missions have become more robust and multi-dimensional, involving diverse civilian and military actors. In many cases, civilian peacebuilding and development actors are on the ground throughout the conflict, sharing operational environments with military forces that increasingly engage in civilian activities. In these complex environments, civil society and military actors often have competing or conflicting goals and approaches — or they may miss opportunities for coordinated action. The blurring of roles and responsibilities between civilian and military actors in conflict and post-conflict settings is an important dimension of peacebuilding and development policy. WHEN PROBLEMS ARISE Managing the sensitive relationship among civil society actors and military forces is especially important for security system reform and for enhancing military accountability to civilian government. Problems arise when military units take on traditionally civilian development missions, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, or when security forces view humanitarian missions as a way of gathering military intelligence. The challenges of civil-military interaction also surface during disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the wake of armed conflict. A recent report from the Brookings Institution argues that security cooperation and training programs should include support for democracy and human rights. But military officers do not have expertise in these areas and often fail to address them in security assistance programs. Civil society actors have the necessary expertise, and in some regions they are helping military officers understand democratic principles and human rights practices. These examples are rare, however, and international military training programs too often ignore civil society perspectives. A growing number of policymakers and scholars are recognizing the urgent need for standards, guidelines, and best practices for civil-military relations in peacebuilding and development activities. Civilian and military specialists share the goals of avoiding tensions and conflicting purposes and maximizing the potential for cooperation in order to achieve more effective and timely peacebuilding interventions. EXISTING GUIDELINES The UN-mandated Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which includes the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs as well as nongovernmental organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, already provides guidance for civil-military interaction in humanitarian operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and InterAction, the humanitarian organization network, offer country-level humanitarian civil-military guidelines in the U.S. These guidelines call on military forces and civilian agencies to respect the integrity of humanitarian assistance programs and to avoid actions that conflate military operations and humanitarian efforts and jeopardize aid workers and civilian populations. They are based on International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, which require military actors to discriminate between combatants and civilians and to avoid actions that endanger civilian populations. The guidance documents provide aspirational principles for how civilian and military actors should interact. They can serve as a template for the development of similar principles to guide civil-military relations in peacebuilding and development policy. DESIGNING MISSIONS Standards for civil-military interaction in peacebuilding and development missions should be based on support for democracy, human rights, and accountability to local populations. The following principles could serve as the basis for designing missions that meet those standards: Protection of civilians. Recognize that when military units provide direct assistance and engage in civilian activities they blur the lines between civilians and military targets and can place civilians at risk. Integrity of civilian activities. Do no harm, and avoid duplicating development and peacebuilding activities that are best performed by local civilians. Coordination. Assure channels of communication between military and civilian agencies and provide accessible and timely information to affected populations, with opportunities for feedback. Participation. Enable affected local populations to play an active role in conflict assessment and decision-making; guarantee that the most marginalized and affected populations are represented and heard. Policymakers and scholars increasingly recognize that security cannot be achieved through military means alone and that sustainable peace depends on good governance, economic development, and the protection of human rights. These are tasks that require the involvement of civil society and principled standards to guide civil-military interaction in peacebuilding.

Successful peacekeeping is key to prevent global instability and multiple existential threats Enholm, Citizens for Global Solutions, 11(Robert, “U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping,” accessed 8-30-15, http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf)

The United States supports international peacekeeping because it is the right thing to do and because peacekeeping is effective and serves the interests of the United States. The effectiveness of peacekeeping is evidenced in the growing demand for peacekeepers. Since 1999, the number of U.N. peacekeepers has grown from 12,000 to over 120,000. International peacekeeping serves fundamental national interests of the United States in maintaining peace and promoting the establishment of stable nations around the globe. International peacekeeping missions have succeeded repeatedly in tamping down violence and providing the space in which disputants can resolve their differences politically. In the absence of peacekeeping, hostilities may simmer and flare up. Nations may devolve into failed states, creating problems that the United States cannot ignore. Failed states are associated with illegal drug and weapons trade, human trafficking, and contraband nuclear materials. They increase risks of famine, piracy, and pandemic. Failed states increase

the danger of armed conflict within one country spilling into other countries, and their failures create migrations of internally displaced persons and trans-border refugees and attendant international instability and humanitarian risks.

Weak States : 1NC

Successful peacekeeping is vital to preventing global instability and weak states Enholm, Citizens for Global Solutions, 11(Robert, “U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping,” accessed 8-30-15, http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf)

It is trite, but true, that we live in an increasingly interconnected world. Cooperation is required to create and maintain safety and security for all. Conflict and instability anywhere in the world can imperil our nation and the globe. International peacekeeping missions are effective in restoring calm in zones of war and hostility, allowing societies to rebuild, communities to mend, and economies to flourish once again.

Weak states spark great power competition and warGrygiel, Johns Hopkins Univ. Professor, 7-1-09(Jacob, “Vacuum Wars,” The National Interest, accessed 8-31-15, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/07/01/vacuum-wars/)

This prevailing view of failed states, however, though true, is also incomplete. Failed states are not only a source of domestic calamities; they are also potentially a source of great power competition that in the past has often led to confrontation, crisis and war. The failure of a state creates a vacuum that, especially in strategically important regions, draws in competitive great-power intervention. This more traditional view of state failure is less prevalent these days, for only recently has the prospect of great power competition over failed “vacuum” states returned. But, clearly, recent events in Georgia—as well as possible future scenarios in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as southeastern Europe, Asia and parts of Africa—suggest that it might be a good time to adjust, really to expand, the way we think about “failed states” and the kinds of problems they can cause. The difference between the prevailing and the traditional view on state failure is not merely one of accent or nuance; it has important policy implications. Intense great power conflict over the spoils of a failed state will demand a fundamentally different set of strategies and skills from the United States. Whereas the response to the humanitarian disasters following state failure tends to consist of peacekeeping and state-building missions, large-scale military operations and swift unilateral action are the most likely strategies great powers will adopt when competing over a power vacuum. On the political level, multilateral cooperation, often within the setting of international institutions, is feasible as well as desirable in case of humanitarian disasters. But it is considerably more difficult, perhaps impossible, when a failed state becomes an arena of great power competition.

Great power wars result in planetary extinction Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation Policy Analyst, 14(Andrew, “Looking forward, looking backward: World War I, today’s risk of great power war, and nuclear disarmament,” accessed 8-28-14, http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Lichterman%205-3-14%20Text.pdf)

The risk of war between nuclear armed great powers, and particularly involving the nuclear armed adversaries of the Cold War era, has been largely absent from arms control and disarmament discourse for two decades. Nuclear weapons often are represented as dangerous anachronisms

whose continued presence is almost inexplicable, or at most as driven by the narrow pecuniary interests of arms contractors. Yet we are in a moment characterized by the rise of new economic powers and the relative decline of old ones. In the past, these have been the times when great power wars occurred. As one international relations theorist put it, “Crisis scholars observe a critical fact: states often accept high risks of inadvertent war when initiating crises in order to

mitigate an otherwise exogenous decline in power.” At the same time, countries with the most powerful militaries still deploy nuclear arsenals large enough to destroy most of human civilization and to do catastrophic, long-lasting damage to the environment. No nuclear armed state has proposed any disarmament plan that would bring nuclear stockpiles down below country -destroying numbers any time in the foreseeable future. All the nuclear armed countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals to a greater or lesser degree. The United States has plans to modernize its nuclear weapons and the facilities that produce them so that they will last past the middle of the 21st century. Those who believe that the risk of nuclear catastrophe resulting from wars among the most powerful states is a thing of the past must, then, feel confident predicting history a quarter or a half century out —something that has never proved terribly successful.

Pakistan : 1NC

Strong civil-military relations key to prevent instability in PakistanFrederick and Unger, CSIS and Brookings Institute Analysts, 09(Frederick and Noam, “Civil-Military Relations, Fostering Development, and Expanding Civilian Capacity,” April 2009, accessed 8-26-15, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090421_brookingscsiscivmil.pdf)

The security rationale for stability and development in poor and fragile states is based on the understanding that strengthening the economy of states and ensuring social equity are in the short and long term interests of the United States. Stable states pose the United States with far fewer security challenges than their weak and fragile counterparts. Indeed, stable states with healthy economies offer the United States opportunities for trade and represent potential partners in the fields of security and development. In contrast, weak and failing states pose serious challenges to the security of United States, including terrorism, drug production, money laundering and people smuggling. In addition, state weakness has frequently proven to have the propensity to spread to neighboring states, which in time can destabilize entire regions. While the group acknowledged that the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are particular in scope and complexity (and may not be repeated in the near future by the U.S.), participants broadly concurred that the lessons of these challenges are that the United States must improve and expand its stabilization and development capabilities. In particular, cases such as Pakistan and Nigeria, huge countries with strategic importance, make clear that a military response to many internal conflicts will be severely limited. As such, increased emphasis on civilian capacity within the U.S. government and civil-military relations in general, will greatly improve the United States’ ability to respond to such crises in the future.

Pakistan instability sparks global war and use of nuclear weapons Ricks, Washington Post Reporter, 10-21-01(Thomas, “At Pentagon: Worries Over War's Costs, Consequences,” Washington Post, accessed 8-26-15, http://www.hindunet.org/hvk/articles/1001/275.html)

The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games. Having both the United States and India fighting Muslims would play into the hands of bin Laden, warned Mackubin Owens, a strategist at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. "He could point out once again that this is the new crusade," Owens said. The next step that worries experts is the regional effect of turmoil in Pakistan. If its government fell, the experts fear, other Muslim governments friendly to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, might follow suit. "The ultimate nightmare is a pan-Islamic regime that possesses both oil and nuclear weapons," said Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ullman argued that the arrival of U.S. troops in Pakistan to fight the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan could inadvertently help bin Laden achieve his goal of sparking an anti-American revolt in the country. Andrew Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University, said it is possible "that we are sliding toward a summer-of-1914 sequence of events" -- when a cascading series of international incidents spun out of control and led to World War I. Eliot Cohen, a professor of strategy at Johns Hopkins University, agreed. "We could find ourselves engaged in a whole range of conflicts, from events you can't anticipate now," he said.

Afghanistan : 1NC

Strong civilian-military relations are key to successful counterinsurgency operations; Afghanistan is one example Lassan, 14(Scott, “The Importance of Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” accessed 8-28-15, https://ramenir.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/the-importance-of-civil-military-cooperation-in-stability-operations.pdf)

While at first glance, the military pillar could be assumed to be the sole responsibility of the armed forces, certain tasks necessitate a civilian element. Joshua W. Welle argues in favor of civil-military integration within US and coalition operations in Afghanistan. He claims that in coalition operations, “consensus-building to ensure compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels between partners is key.” In order to have a successful coalition, Welle recommends that there needs to be not only unity of effort, but also unity of command. Applying this to the military’s counterinsurgency operations, Welle claims that the success of counterinsurgency operations begins “with the authority to coordinate operations of all assigned or attached civilian and military assets through a common strategy.” Counterinsurgency operations go across several pillars requiring security as well as governance and development. In order to accomplish the shape, clear, hold, build strategy of counterinsurgency, there needs be an integrated civilian-military strategy from “start to finish” which includes civilian input at the security level. A specific area within the military pillar that requires more civil-military integration is the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) campaigns. Often seen as a security issue, DDR campaigns still require lots of input from civilians. The Disarmament stage poses certain challenges to the military. It can be extremely difficult to get combatants to give up their weapons to international forces. Fighters may feel uncomfortable giving their weapons to heavily armed foreigners conducting the disarmament. In order to build trust, a civilian agency may need to take charge of the disarmament process. For the US, a potential candidate in being the civilian lead for disarmament is the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) within the State Department who specializes in arms control both at conventional and nuclear scales. International NGOs can also be helpful in the DDR process; GTZ, the German technical assistance agency, became a key partner in setting up demobilization centers within the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early 2000s. The reintegration stage also requires better civil-military coordination as reintegration is the process under which combatants are reintroduced to civilian life. In fact, Dobbins asserts that the reintegration component may be better suited to civilian agencies. When conducted properly, reintegration programs should assist ex-combatants in returning to civilian life through social and economic integration so that they do not return to violence.

Afghanistan instability causes nuclear terrorism, loss of hegemony, and Asian instability Miller, National Defense Univ., Assistant Prof., 12(Paul, “It’s Not Just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region,” accessed 8-30-15, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it%E2%80%99s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region)

It was, of course, al-Qaeda’s attack on the US homeland that triggered the intervention in Afghanistan, but wars, once started, always involve broader considerations than those present at the firing of the first shot. The war in Afghanistan now affects all of America’s interests across South Asia: Pakistan’s stability and the security of its nuclear weapons, NATO’s credibility, relations with Iran and Russia, transnational drug-trafficking networks, and more. America leaves the job in Afghanistan unfinished at its peril. The chorus of voices in the Washington policy establishment calling for withdrawal is growing louder. In response to this pressure, President Obama has pledged to withdraw the surge of thirty thousand US troops by September 2012—faster than US military commanders have recommended—and fully transition leadership for the country’s security to the Afghans in 2013. These decisions mirror the anxieties of the electorate: fifty-six percent of Americans surveyed recently by the Pew Research Center said that the US should remove its troops as soon as possible.But it is not too late for Obama (who, after all, campaigned in 2008 on the importance of Afghanistan, portraying it as “the good war” in comparison to Iraq) to reformulate US strategy and goals in South Asia and explain to the American people and the world why an ongoing commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan and the region, however unpopular, is nonetheless necessary. The Afghanistan Study Group, a collection of scholars and former policymakers critical of the current intervention, argued in 2010 that al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan and is unlikely to return, even if Afghanistan reverts to chaos or Taliban rule. It argued that three things would have to happen for al-Qaeda to reestablish a safe haven and threaten the United States: “1) the Taliban must seize control of a substantial portion of the country, 2) Al Qaeda must relocate there in strength, and 3) it must build facilities in this new ‘safe haven’ that will allow it to plan and train more effectively than it can today.” Because all three are unlikely to happen, the Study Group argued, al-Qaeda almost certainly will not reestablish a presence in Afghanistan in a way that threatens US security. In fact, none of those three steps are necessary for al-Qaeda to regain its safe haven and threaten America. The group could return to Afghanistan even if the Taliban do not take back control of the country. It could—and probably would—find safe haven there if Afghanistan relapsed into chaos or civil war. Militant groups, including al-Qaeda offshoots, have gravitated toward other failed states, like Somalia and Yemen, but Afghanistan remains especially tempting, given the network’s familiarity with the terrain and local connections. Nor does al-Qaeda, which was never numerically overwhelming, need to return to Afghanistan “in strength” to be a threat. Terrorist operations, including the attacks of 2001, are typically planned and carried out by very few people. Al-Qaeda’s resilience, therefore, means that stabilizing Afghanistan is, in fact, necessary even for the most basic US war aims. The international community should not withdraw until there is an Afghan government and Afghan security forces with the will and capacity to deny safe haven without international help. Setting aside the possibility of

al-Qaeda’s reemergence, the United States has other important interests in the region as well—notably preventing the Taliban from gaining enough power to destabilize neighboring Pakistan, which, for all its recent defiance, is officially a longstanding American ally. (It signed two mutual defense treaties with the United States in the 1950s, and President Bush designated it a major non-NATO ally in 2004.) State failure in Pakistan brokered by the Taliban could mean regional chaos and a possible loss of control of its nuclear weapons. Preventing such a catastrophe is clearly a vital national interest of the United States and cannot be accomplished with a few drones. Alarmingly, Pakistan is edging toward civil war. A collection of militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), among others, are fighting an insurgency that has escalated dramatically since 2007 across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan. According to the Brookings Institution’s Pakistan Index, insurgents, militants, and terrorists now regularly launch more than one hundred and fifty attacks per month on Pakistani government, military, and infrastructure targets. In a so far feckless and ineffectual response, Pakistan has deployed nearly one hundred thousand regular army soldiers to its western provinces. At least three thousand soldiers have been killed in combat since 2007, as militants have been able to seize control of whole towns and districts. Tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians and militants—the distinction between them in these areas is not always clear—have been killed in daily terror and counterterror operations. The two insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. Defeating the Afghan Taliban would give the United States and Pakistan momentum in the fight against the Pakistani Taliban. A Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, on the other hand, will give new strength to the Pakistani insurgency, which would gain an ally in Kabul, safe haven to train and arm and from which to launch attacks into Pakistan, and a huge morale boost in seeing their compatriots win power in a neighboring country. Pakistan’s collapse or fall to the Taliban is (at present) unlikely, but the implications of that scenario are so dire that they cannot be ignored. Even short of a collapse, increasing chaos and instability in Pakistan could give cover for terrorists to increase the intensity and scope of their operations, perhaps even to achieve the cherished goal of stealing a nuclear weapon. Although our war there has at times seemed remote, Afghanistan itself occupies crucial geography. Situated between Iran and Pakistan, bordering China, and within reach of Russia and India, it sits on a crossroads of Asia’s great powers. This is why it has, since the nineteenth century, been home to the so-called Great Game—in which the US should continue to be a player.

Counterinsurgency : 1NC

Strong civilian-military relations are key to successful counterinsurgency operations; Afghanistan is one example Lassan, 14(Scott, “The Importance of Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” accessed 8-28-15, https://ramenir.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/the-importance-of-civil-military-cooperation-in-stability-operations.pdf)

While at first glance, the military pillar could be assumed to be the sole responsibility of the armed forces, certain tasks necessitate a civilian element. Joshua W. Welle argues in favor of civil-military integration within US and coalition operations in Afghanistan. He claims that in coalition operations, “consensus-building to ensure compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels between partners is key.” In order to have a successful coalition, Welle recommends that there needs to be not only unity of effort, but also unity of command. Applying this to the military’s counterinsurgency operations, Welle claims that the success of counterinsurgency operations begins “with the authority to coordinate operations of all assigned or attached civilian and military assets through a common strategy.” Counterinsurgency operations go across several pillars requiring security as well as governance and development. In order to accomplish the shape, clear, hold, build strategy of counterinsurgency, there needs be an integrated civilian-military strategy from “start to finish” which includes civilian input at the security level. A specific area within the military pillar that requires more civil-military integration is the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) campaigns. Often seen as a security issue, DDR campaigns still require lots of input from civilians. The Disarmament stage poses certain challenges to the military. It can be extremely difficult to get combatants to give up their weapons to international forces. Fighters may feel uncomfortable giving their weapons to heavily armed foreigners conducting the disarmament. In order to build trust, a civilian agency may need to take charge of the disarmament process. For the US, a potential candidate in being the civilian lead for disarmament is the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) within the State Department who specializes in arms control both at conventional and nuclear scales. International NGOs can also be helpful in the DDR process; GTZ, the German technical assistance agency, became a key partner in setting up demobilization centers within the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early 2000s. The reintegration stage also requires better civil-military coordination as reintegration is the process under which combatants are reintroduced to civilian life. In fact, Dobbins asserts that the reintegration component may be better suited to civilian agencies. When conducted properly, reintegration programs should assist ex-combatants in returning to civilian life through social and economic integration so that they do not return to violence.

Successful counterinsurgency efforts are key to future U.S. military success and power U.S. Army Self Study Program, 14(“Why Does COIN Matter to Maneuver Leaders?,” http://www.benning.army.mil/mssp/Counterinsurgency/)

Even though U.S. forces have left Iraq and there is a planned reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the era of counterinsurgency is far from over. Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare—it long predates the rise of conventional armies in ancient Mesopotamia around 3000 BC. Irregular warfare has been ubiquitous throughout history and is more important than ever today, at a time when conventional warfare is growing increasingly rare. America's enemies understand that to fight the U.S. armed forces with conventional forces in the open field is tantamount to suicide—as Saddam Hussein discovered for himself. Irregular-warfare tactics, on the other hand, have shown a far higher likelihood of success against American military forces. Our enemies study, and are inspired by, the examples of Vietnam, Beirut (1983), Somalia (1993), Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflicts where irregular forces have inflicted significant setbacks and even defeats on American forces. Moreover the conditions for the growth of insurgency—chiefly a lack of effective governance—exist in many areas of the world, especially in Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia. For all these reasons irregular warfare will continue to be prevalent.

Successful counterinsurgency efforts are vital to preventing global instability O’Neill, 12-10-09(Mark, “Counter-insurgency: Our military future,” accessed 8-30-15, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/12/10/Counter-insurgency-Our-military-future.aspx)

While the idea of a 'strategic' preference for where one may like to fight future wars merits detailed comment, I'll focus on the issue of conflicts 'closer to home'. These, and most of the violent security challenges within our immediate region, are insurgency-related. Consider the ASEAN states. Nine out of ten have had at least one insurgency within their borders during the last century; many of them have had

two or more, some of which are still going. From Irian Jaya to Mindanao and Songkhla to southeastern Myanmar, insurgency is endemic. In the globalised era, there is no guarantee that the problem of insurgency within states will not affect their bilateral and regional relationships. The immediate by-products of insurgency are diverse and serious. They can include terrorism, human insecurity (encapsulating issues such as poverty, hunger, ethnic cleansing and refugee flows) and the conditions for transnational crime. In the longer term, nothing less than state failure and regional destabilisation are possibilities. This is the environment in which the ADF will conduct such 'military operations closer to home'. It suggests that our eventual exit from Afghanistan will not be the end of our association with counterinsurgency, but a preview of our future.

Military Failures : 1NC

Low civil-military relations ensures disjointed strategies that lead to lost wars and strategic failures Owens, Foreign Policy Research Institute Senior Fellow, 13(Mackubin, “What Military Officers Need to Know about Civil-Military Relations,” accessed 8-26-15, http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/07/what-military-officers-need-know-about-civil-military-relations)

Seventh, patterns of civil-military relations affect military outcomes. As Richard Kohn has written, “In effect, in the most important area of professional expertise-the connecting of war to policy, of operations to achieving the objectives of the nation-the American military has been found wanting. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics, tactics, weaponry, and battle has been manifest for a generation or more. Not so with strategy.” He is echoed by Colin Gray who observed that: “All too often, there is a black hole where American strategy ought to reside.” The problem here is that Huntington’s objective control, which reinforces the military’s desire for autonomy leads it to focus on the operational level of war and not on strategy. As Hew Strachan has observed, “The operational level of war appeals to armies: it functions in a politics-free zone and it puts primacy on professional skills.” Herein lies the problem for US strategy making: the military’s preference for focusing on the operational level of war creates a disjunction between operational excellence in combat and policy, which determines the reasons for which a particular war is to be fought. In other words, the combination of the Huntington’s objective control and the US military’s focus on the non-political operational level of war means that all too often the conduct of a war is disconnected from the goals of the war. As two writers recently observed, “rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art—practiced as a ‘level of war’—assumed responsibility for campaign planning. This reduced political leadership to the role of ‘strategic sponsors,’ quite specifically widening the gap between politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, producing ‘a way of battle’ rather than a way of war.” They continue: “the political leadership of a country cannot simply set objectives for a war, provide the requisite materiel, then stand back and await victory. Nor should the nation or its military be seduced by this prospect. Politicians should be involved in the minute-to-minute conduct of war; as Clausewitz reminds us, political considerations are ‘influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.’”

Military failures are the easiest and fasted way to lose hegemony and perceptions of strength and credibility Cockburn, Middle East Reporter for The Independent, 11-12-11(Patrick, “Wars without victory equal an America without influence,” The Independent, accessed 8-29-13, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/patrick-cockburn-wars-without-victory-equal-an-america-without-influence-6275461.html)

In reality, America's failure to get its way in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade, despite deploying large armies and spending trillions of dollars, has been extraordinarily damaging to its status as sole superpower. Whatever Washington thought it wanted when it invaded Iraq in 2003, it was not the establishment of Shia religious parties with links to Iran in power in Baghdad. Similarly, in Afghanistan, a surge in US troop numbers and the expenditure of $100bn a year has not led to the defeat of 25,000 mostly untrained Taliban fighters. Great powers depend on a reputation for invincibility and are wise not to put this too often to the test. The British Empire never quite recovered in the eyes of the world from the gargantuan effort it had to make to defeat a few tens of thousand Boer farmers. What makes the US inability to win in Iraq and Afghanistan so damaging is that US policy-making has been progressively militarised. Congress will vote the Pentagon vast sums, while it stints the State Department a few billion dollars. "The Department of Defense is the behemoth among federal agencies," noted the 9/11 Commission Report. "With an annual budget larger than the gross domestic product of Russia, it is an empire." But it is an empire that has failed to deliver in recent years, though without paying a political price. A senior US diplomat asked me plaintively several years ago: "Whatever happened to popular scepticism about what generals say that we had after Vietnam? People seem to assume they are telling the truth ... they are usually not." This is equally true of the British Army, though the British military record in Basra and Helmand was even more dismal than that of the Americans. (The system of embedding the media with the Army has played an important role in safeguarding the military from well-earned criticism.) For all Mr Obama's agonising about sending more troops to Afghanistan in 2009, he never had much choice. Leon Panetta, then CIA chief and now Defense Secretary, was contemptuous about the time spent by the White House debating troop reinforcements. He said the political reality was that "No Democratic president can go against military advice, especially if he asked for it. So just do it." Mr

Panetta believed that a decision on the extra 30,000 troops for Afghanistan should have been taken in a week. The killing of Osama bin Laden and the failure of the military to defeat the Taliban has improved the administration's ability to disengage from Afghanistan. It does not look likely that in a presidential election year, after getting out of Iraq and hoping to do the same in Afghanistan, the US will launch a war against Iran. In the US and Israel there are few votes to be lost in talking tough about Iran, but voters are much less enthusiastic about actually going to war with a stronger opponent than the US ever faced in Iraq or Afghanistan, or Israel in Lebanon. In the worst economic crisis since the 1930s, the rest of the world is not going to thank the US or Israel for starting a conflict that would close the Strait of Hormuz and send up the price of oil. It would also be difficult to de-escalate such a confrontation because it serves domestic electoral purposes in Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran alike. Americans, Israelis and Iranians all define their self-image in terms of opposition to demonic enemies. Any compromise is vulnerable to being sabotaged by domestic political rivals as a deal with the devil. Overall, US influence is ebbing in the Middle East. For all Mr Biden's talking up, the Iraq war was a disaster for the US. Similarly in Afghanistan, massive military force has produced meagre political dividends. Washington may rejoice that Muammar Gaddafi is gone and Bashar al-Assad may follow him. But the US has lost or is losing its paramount position in Turkey and Egypt as the military establishments of these countries lose control.

U.S. hegemony is vital to preventing great power war and decreasing overall levels of conflict and violence globally Kagan, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow, 12(Robert, The World America Made, page 48-51)

We now know this judgment, which seemed so sensible at the time, was mistaken. The outbreak of World War I, the most deadly and destructive war in history, a mere four years after Angell’s best seller, revealed a failure of imagination on the part of an entire generation. They simply were not able to imagine that national leaders would behave irrationally, that they would sacrifice economic interests, even bankrupt their treasuries, out of a combination of ambition and fear, that they would view territory as a worthy object of war, that they would use all the horrible weapons at their disposal without a second thought—in violation of international agreements whose ink had barely dried—and that in all this they would have behind them the enthusiastic support of their people stirred by a very un-cosmopolitan nationalist pride. Today we suffer from a similar lack of imagination. Once again the conventional wisdom is that great-power conflict is “literally unthinkable.” Even the arguments are the same: economic interdependence, globalization, the irrelevance of territory, the spread of democracy, the unthinkable destructiveness of war in the nuclear age, the belief that nations and peoples have become “socialized” to favor peace over war, that they value life more and feel greater empathy for others—all these have made great-power war irrational and therefore impossible. And, adding force to these arguments, once again, is the long peace we have enjoyed, the remarkable six decades without great-power conflict. Yet we have less excuse than our forebears to believe that humankind has reached a new level of enlightenment. The optimists of the early twentieth century had not witnessed two world wars, the genocides, and the other horrors of our supposedly advanced era. They had not witnesses the rise of Nazism and fascism. We have seen it all and, in historical terms, quite recently. It was just seven decades ago that the United States was at war with imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy. It was just thirty-five years ago that Henry Kissinger asked Americans to accommodate themselves to the permanent reality of Soviet power, with its thousands of nuclear warheads aimed at American and European cities and thousands of American warheads aimed at Russia. The twentieth century was the bloodiest in all history, and we are but a dozen years into the twenty-first. It is premature for us to conclude, after ten thousand years of war, that a few decades and some technological innovations would change the nature of man and the nature of international relations. People are right to point to the spread of democracy and the free-market, free-trade economic system as important factors in the maintenance of great-power peace. Where they err is in believing these conditions are either sufficient or self-sustaining. In fact, these are more the consequence of great peace than the cause. In 1914, democracy and prosperity did not put an end to great-power war, but great-power war certainly helped put an end to them. Pinker traces the beginning of a long-term decline in deaths from war to 1945, which just happens to be the birth date of the American world order. The coincidence eludes him, but it need not elude us. The power of the United States has been the biggest factor in the preservation of great-power peace. It has also been a major factor in the spread of democracy and in the creation and maintenance of a liberal economic order. But America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers in the system to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war. It is hard to measure events that don’t happen, to guess what wars might have broken

out had the United States not played the role it has played during the past sixty-five years. The only guide we have is history and a general understanding of the way great powers normally behave. We know, for instance, what Europe and Asia looked like before the United States entered the picture and changed the power equations in both regions. Germany after its defeat in World War I sought to rearm, to regain lost territory and lost honor, to protect itself against former enemies, and to restore itself as a great power. Japan from the late nineteenth century onward sought regional hegemony and coveted territory on the Asian mainland. But when American power was added to these equations after World War II, both nations took entirely different paths, as did the nations around them. Had the American variable been absent, the outcome would have been different. American power also shaped Soviet behavior throughout the Cold War. The extent of the Soviet reach into Europe was determined by the disposition of military forces at the end of World War II, not nu the modesty of Soviet ambitions. Soviet probes in Berlin from 1948 through 1961, had they not been met by the implicit and explicit threat of American force, would have changed the situation in Germany profoundly. The lack of Soviet aggressiveness in Europe thereafter, as well as in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, was a response to red lines drawn by the United States and its allies. Even today, the continuing large gap in power between the United States and the other great powers tends to dampen natural competitive rivalries and deters attempts to establish regional hegemonies by force.

Great power wars result in planetary extinction Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation Policy Analyst, 14(Andrew, “Looking forward, looking backward: World War I, today’s risk of great power war, and nuclear disarmament,” accessed 8-28-14, http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Lichterman%205-3-14%20Text.pdf)

The risk of war between nuclear armed great powers, and particularly involving the nuclear armed adversaries of the Cold War era, has been largely absent from arms control and disarmament discourse for two decades. Nuclear weapons often are represented as dangerous anachronisms whose continued presence is almost inexplicable, or at most as driven by the narrow pecuniary interests of arms contractors. Yet we are in a moment characterized by the rise of new economic powers and the relative decline of old ones. In the past, these have been the times when great power wars occurred. As one international relations theorist put it, “Crisis scholars observe a critical fact: states often accept high risks of inadvertent war when initiating crises in order to mitigate an otherwise exogenous decline in power.” At the same time, countries with the most powerful militaries still deploy nuclear arsenals large enough to destroy most of human civilization and to do catastrophic, long-lasting damage to the environment. No nuclear armed state has proposed any disarmament plan that would bring nuclear stockpiles down below country -destroying numbers any time in the foreseeable future. All the nuclear armed countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals to a greater or lesser degree. The United States has plans to modernize its nuclear weapons and the facilities that produce them so that they will last past the middle of the 21st century. Those who believe that the risk of nuclear catastrophe resulting from wars among the most powerful states is a thing of the past must, then, feel confident predicting history a quarter or a half century out —something that has never proved terribly successful.

Hegemony : 1NC

Strong civil-military relations are key to U.S. hegemonyKohn, UNC History Professor, 99 (Richard, U.S. Commission on National security, FDCH, 11-4-1999)

My focus on the relationship of the military to society. Civil-military relations are critical to national defense. If they armed forces diverge in altitude or understanding beyond what is expected of the military profession in a democratic society, have less contact, grow less interested in or knowledgeable about each other, the consequences could be significant. Each could lose confidence in the other. Recruiting could be damaged. Military effectiveness could be harmed. The resources devoted to national defense could decline below what is adequate. Civil-military cooperation could deteriorate with impact on the ability of the United States to use military forces to maintain the peace or support American foreign policy.

U.S. hegemony is vital to preventing great power war and decreasing overall levels of conflict and violence globally Kagan, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow, 12(Robert, The World America Made, page 48-51)

We now know this judgment, which seemed so sensible at the time, was mistaken. The outbreak of World War I, the most deadly and destructive war in history, a mere four years after Angell’s best seller, revealed a failure of imagination on the part of an entire generation. They simply were not able to imagine that national leaders would behave irrationally, that they would sacrifice economic interests, even bankrupt their treasuries, out of a combination of ambition and fear, that they would view territory as a worthy object of war, that they would use all the horrible weapons at their disposal without a second thought—in violation of international agreements whose ink had barely dried—and that in all this they would have behind them the enthusiastic support of their people stirred by a very un-cosmopolitan nationalist pride. Today we suffer from a similar lack of imagination. Once again the conventional wisdom is that great-power conflict is “literally unthinkable.” Even the arguments are the same: economic interdependence, globalization, the irrelevance of territory, the spread of democracy, the unthinkable destructiveness of war in the nuclear age, the belief that nations and peoples have become “socialized” to favor peace over war, that they value life more and feel greater empathy for others—all these have made great-power war irrational and therefore impossible. And, adding force to these arguments, once again, is the long peace we have enjoyed, the remarkable six decades without great-power conflict. Yet we have less excuse than our forebears to believe that humankind has reached a new level of enlightenment. The optimists of the early twentieth century had not witnessed two world wars, the genocides, and the other horrors of our supposedly advanced era. They had not witnesses the rise of Nazism and fascism. We have seen it all and, in historical terms, quite recently. It was just seven decades ago that the United States was at war with imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy. It was just thirty-five years ago that Henry Kissinger asked Americans to accommodate themselves to the permanent reality of Soviet power, with its thousands of nuclear warheads aimed at American and European cities and thousands of American warheads aimed at Russia. The twentieth century was the bloodiest in all history, and we are but a dozen years into the twenty-first. It is premature for us to conclude, after ten thousand years of war, that a few decades and some technological innovations would change the nature of man and the nature of international relations. People are right to point to the spread of democracy and the free-market, free-trade economic system as important factors in the maintenance of great-power peace. Where they err is in believing these conditions are either sufficient or self-sustaining. In fact, these are more the consequence of great peace than the cause. In 1914, democracy and prosperity did not put an end to great-power war, but great-power war certainly helped put an end to them. Pinker traces the beginning of a long-term decline in deaths from war to 1945, which just happens to be the birth date of the American world order. The coincidence eludes him, but it need not elude us. The power of the United States has been the biggest factor in the preservation of great-power peace. It has also been a major factor in the spread of democracy and in the creation and maintenance of a liberal economic order. But America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers in the system to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war. It is hard to measure events that don’t happen, to guess what wars might have broken out had the United States not played the role it has played during the past sixty-five years. The only guide we have

is history and a general understanding of the way great powers normally behave. We know, for instance, what Europe and Asia looked like before the United States entered the picture and changed the power equations in both regions. Germany after its defeat in World War I sought to rearm, to regain lost territory and lost honor, to protect itself against former enemies, and to restore itself as a great power. Japan from the late nineteenth century onward sought regional hegemony and coveted territory on the Asian mainland. But when American power was added to these equations after World War II, both nations took entirely different paths, as did the nations around them. Had the American variable been absent, the outcome would have been different. American power also shaped Soviet behavior throughout the Cold War. The extent of the Soviet reach into Europe was determined by the disposition of military forces at the end of World War II, not nu the modesty of Soviet ambitions. Soviet probes in Berlin from 1948 through 1961, had they not been met by the implicit and explicit threat of American force, would have changed the situation in Germany profoundly. The lack of Soviet aggressiveness in Europe thereafter, as well as in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, was a response to red lines drawn by the United States and its allies. Even today, the continuing large gap in power between the United States and the other great powers tends to dampen natural competitive rivalries and deters attempts to establish regional hegemonies by force.

Democracy : 1NC

Strong CMR is key to global democracyPerry, Former Secretary of Defense, 96 (Former Secretary of Defense, Foreign Affairs, December, pg. 64, 1996)

The defense department has a pivotal role to play in that effort. In virtually every new democracy – in the former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, and in Asia – the military is a major force. In many cases it is the most cohesive institution in the country containing a large percentage of the educated elite and controlling important resources. In short, it is an institution that can help support democracy or subvert it. Societies undergoing the transformation from totalitarianism to democracy may well be tested at some point by a crisis, whether economic, a reversal on human rights and freedoms, or a border or an ethnic dispute with a neighboring country. If such a crisis occurs, the United States want that nation’s military to come down on the side of democracy and economic reform and play a positive role in resolving the crisis, not a negative role in fanning the flames or using the crisis as a present for a military coup. This administration has sought to exert a positive influence on these important institutions through regular working contacts with the U.S> military and civilian degense personnel, a task made easier by the fact that every military in the world looks to the U.S> armed forces as the model to be emulated. Multinational training exercises in peacekeeping, disaster relief, and search-and-rescue operations are an invaluable tool in promoting trust and reducing tensions among nations that have been at odds. In addition, they enable forces from different countries to operate together more effectively, a vital benefit given the increasing frequency of combined peacekeeping operations.

Democracy prevents multiple scenarios for extinction Diamond, Hoover Institute Fellow, 95 (Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution – “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Democracy: Extensions

Strong CMR is key to US democracy Laich and Wilkerson, Retired US Army General and US Army Colonel, 4-8-20(Dennis and Lawrence, “When duty goes AWOL: Military leaders must take a stand on civil-military relations,” accessed 6-4-20, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/491708-when-duty-goes-awol-military-leaders-must-take-a-stand-on-civil) JFN

Recent events have shone a bright light on civil-military relations and the profession of arms. Sound civil-military relations are fundamental to our democracy, and fundamental to such relations in that the military is subject to civil authority. The profession of arms recognizes that authority and upholds morale, discipline and good order while serving as stewards of the traditions and values of the profession.

Irregular Warfare : 1NC

Strong CMR is key to irregular warfare, Iraq and Afghanistan stabilityCronin, 08(Patrick M. Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, September 2008, “Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations,” http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdf)

Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience. Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an “unequal dialogue” between civilian and military leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into “military” affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare— which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort. One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress. While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed—namely, outputs or results. A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfare and stability and reconstruction operations. How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier’s Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one’s superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks. A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

Irregular warfighting is key to prevent escalation from inevitable conflicts---accesses every major impact Bennett, 08 (John T. Bennett, Defense News, December 4, 2008, “JFCOM Releases Study on Future Threats,” http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3850158)

The study predicts future U.S. forces' missions will range "from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons." Some of these missions will be spawned by "rational political calculation," others by "uncontrolled passion." And future foes will attack U.S. forces in a number of ways. "Our enemy's capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile attacks," the study said. "The threat of mass destruction - from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks." The document also echoes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. military leaders who say America is likely in "an era of persistent conflict." During the next 25 years, it says, "There will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world's economy." The study gives substantial ink to what could happen in places of strategic import to Washington, like Russia, China, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Extremists and Militias But it calls the Middle East and Central Asia "the center of instability" where U.S. troops will be engaged for some time against radical Islamic groups. The study does not rule out a fight against a peer nation's military, but stresses preparation for irregular foes like those that complicated the Iraq war for years. Its release comes three days after Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed a new Pentagon directive that elevates irregular warfare to equal footing - for budgeting and planning - as traditional warfare. The directive defines irregular warfare as encompassing counterterrorism operations, guerrilla warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations. Leaders must avoid "the failure to recognize

and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s," the study said. "The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War." Irregular wars are likely to be carried out by terrorist groups, "modern-day militias," and other non-state actors, the study said. It noted the 2006 tussle between Israel and Hezbollah, a militia that "combines state-like technological and war-fighting capabilities with a 'sub-state' political and social structure inside the formal state of Lebanon." One retired Army colonel called the study "the latest in a serious of glaring examples of massive overreaction to a truly modest threat" - Islamist terrorism. "It is causing the United States to essentially undermine itself without terrorists or anyone else for that matter having to do much more than exploit the weaknesses in American military power the overreaction creates," said Douglas Macgregor, who writes about Defense Department reform at the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. "Unfortunately, the document echoes the neocons, who insist the United States will face the greatest threats from insurgents and extremist groups operating in weak or failing states in the Middle East and Africa." Macgregor called that "delusional thinking," adding that he hopes "Georgia's quick and decisive defeat at the hands of Russian combat forces earlier this year [is] a very stark reminder why terrorism and fighting a war against it using large numbers of military forces should never have been made an organizing principle of U.S. defense policy." Failing States The study also warns about weak and failing states, including Mexico and Pakistan. "Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons," said the study. "That 'perfect storm' of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used."

Terrorism : 1NC

Strong civil-military relations is key to effective military intelligenceBoraz and Bruneau, 06 (Steven C. and Thomas C., , US Naval Intellegence officer and Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, “Reforming Intelligence DEMOCRACY AND EFFECTIVENESS,” Journal of Democracy Volume 17, Number 3, July 2006)

Because of the secrecy that necessarily surrounds intelligence activities and budgets, the third question borrowed from the field of CMR is hard to answer with anything like a credible analysis of costs and benefits. The first two questions, however, may be usefully asked not only about militaries but about civilian intelligence agencies. Whether the spies answer to elected civilians is often fairly easy to say. From our personal observations we know that they do in Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, and Romania, to mention just a few countries. The question of whether the spies are good at what they do will usually be murkier (with the lion’s share of case data coming from established democracies), but there are usually enough leaks and failures to offer reasonable insights into the matter across a range of countries. While it is regrettable that only two-thirds of the CMR framework applies to matters of intelligence, CMR remains more useful than any competing alternative with which we are familiar, and hence is still the best choice as an intellectual guide to the problem of democratic intelligence control.

Intel is key to fighting terrorismDahl, 05 (Erik J., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2005, DA: 7-16-2010, http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5527)

Scholars and analysts of terrorism generally agree that good intelligence is critical: the National Commission on Terrorism, for example, concluded that ‘no other single policy effort is more important for preventing, preempting, and responding to attacks’ than intelligence.17 But terrorism analysts tend to share several assumptions regarding intelligence that are not all held by traditional scholars of intelligence failure. First, there is agreement that terrorism presents a particularly difficult problem for intelligence (as well as for policy and operations). Because terrorist groups are often small, dispersed and do not rely on the large infrastructure of a conventional state-based threat, intelligence is limited in its ability to use traditional tools and techniques to gain insight on terrorist intentions and capabilities. The Failure of Intelligence Against Terror 35 Second, the primary limitation for intelligence is believed to be its lack of Humint capability. For example, terrorism experts still today frequently complain that decades ago, then-Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner turned the community away from Humint and toward technical intelligence. The importance of Humint in the fight against terror, in fact, is one assumption that unites analysts of intelligence, such as Richard Betts, and of terrorism, such as Paul Pillar.18 Third, terrorist attacks are not likely to be preceded by tactical warning. This has been the finding of several official investigations following terrorist attacks, such as the Crowe Commission that studied the Kenya and Tanzania US Embassy bombings and criticized the intelligence and policy communities for having relied too much on tactical intelligence to determine threat levels.19 And fourth, in a point related to the stress on human intelligence, writers on terrorism tend to pay relatively little attention attention to the importance of intelligence analysis. They focus instead on the need for better collection, particularly from human sources, and for increased counter-terrorist operations in the form of counter-intelligence and covert action.

Terrorism causes extinctionAlexander, 03 (Yonah, Director, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Jerusalem Post, 8-25-2003, Lexis)

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically the international community's failure, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threat to the survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to

regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than as a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned to witness the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al-Qaida terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military centers. Likewise Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Accords of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack. Why are the US and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism, continually shocked by terrorist surprises? There are several reasons: * A misunderstanding of the manifold factors contributing to the expansion of terrorism, such as the absence of a universal definition of terrorism; * The religionization of politics; * Double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear that we have entered an Age of Super-Terrorism - biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, and cyber - with its serious implications for national, regional, and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism strategy can be developed; for example, strengthening international cooperation. THE FIRST illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social, and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism used by "oppressed" people seeking to achieve their goals is justified.

Coups : 1NC

A collapse of CMR causes coups and endless warsFeaver, 03 (Peter D., prof. of pol. science and pub. policy, Duke University, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, pgs. 203-04, 2003)

On the other hand, the military must conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy or prey upon the society it is intended to protect. Because the military must face enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power often gives the holder the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it. A direct seizure of political power by the military is the traditional worry of civil-military relations theory and has been consistent pattern in human history. Less obvious but just as sinister is the possibility that a parasitic military could destroy society by draining it of resources in a quest for ever greater strength. Yet another concern is that a rogue military could involve the polity in wars and conflicts contrary to society’s interests or expressed will. And, finally, there is the simple matter of obedience: even if the military does not destroy society, will it obey its civilian masters, or will its latent strength allow it to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests?

Unstable regimes result in nuclear warCimbala, 98 (Stephen, prof. of political science at Penn State, "The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence", pg. 21, 1998)

In particular, the quality of political regimes and the extent to which they successfully hold their military establishments accountable will do much to determine whether a world without nuclear superpowers is more or less stable than the world we are leaving behind. Unaccountable praetorian governments holding small nuclear arsenals could provide scary moments, visions of hell at the regional level with ethnic, religious, and national wars abetted by weapons of mass destruction.

Readiness : 1NC

Loss of Civil Military Relations kills readinessPhilbrick, 03(LTC Christopher R. Philbrick, Civil-Military Relations: Has the Balance Been Lost?, Strategy Research Project, 3/31/03, DA: 7-18-2010 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415730&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The TISS study offered that when the civil-military balance is lost and the military develops a culture that is distinctly unique from the society at large, military readiness will be influenced. The baseline requirements to recruit quality members into the force could suffer as a result of this shift in balance. Taken to an extreme, this culture could lead to a questioning of civilian decisions, possibly leading to outright disobedience. While the likelihood of a military coup is dismissed by the authors of the TISS study, it is a possible that military leaders may disobey or disregard directives or weaken enforcement of those policies in question. The public opposition to President Clinton’s homosexual policy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell brought this issue center stage.15 While there were a host of reasons behind the timing and questioning of this civilian decision, one explanation is that military leaders were not prepared to live within the letter and spirit of the policy. This conclusion is supported by the TISS survey, where nearly one fifth of the military population surveyed stated they would expect the military to attempt to avoid compliance with orders they disagreed with “some” of the time”; with five percent increasing that assessment to “most” or “all” of the time.16

Loss of readiness leads to failure and global conflictFeaver, 99 (Professor of Political Science at Duke, Peter D., Armed Services: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, pg. 213, 1999, http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/rkraemer/lehre/Lehre%20SS_10/Feaver%20civil%20military%20relations.pdf)

The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war. One purpose behind establishing the military in the first place is the need, or perceived need, for military force, either to attack other groups or to ward off attacks by others. Like an automobile.s airbag, the military primarily exists as a guard against disaster. It should be always ready even if it is never used. Moreover, military strength should be sized appropriately to meet the threats confronting the polity. It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed, an inadequate military institution may be worse than none at all. It could be a paper tiger inviting outside aggression .strong enough in appearance to threaten powerful enemies but not strong enough in fact to defend against their predations. Alternatively, it could lull leaders into a false confidence, leading them to rash behavior and then failing in the ultimate military contest.

Strategic Disasters : 1NC

Low civil-military relations leads to military disasters and strategic catastrophes Saideman, 4-23-14(Steve, “Coding Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” accessed 8-26-15, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/04/23/coding-crisis-in-civil-military-relations/)

Why? Because I care about foreign policy and outcomes in the field. The frustration with the NYT column is important, to be sure, and we need to be careful about overreacting and under-reacting to the challenges of reintegrating those who engaged in combat (as well as those who served in other capacities) back into civilian life. Part of the problem here is that we often get confused about what we mean by civil-military relations. While the general issue of how do the civilians in a society relate to the military can be important, scholars and analysts of defense issues are more concerned with how civilians in government manage the military. Government officials have to manage all kinds of government agencies, but traditionally the armed forces are the most critical because they are the most misunderstood and because they happen to have the ability to remove the government. In advanced democracies, we don’t worry much about coups d’etat. Indeed, it is a defining characteristic of stable democracy. Still, managing the military is important and difficult because bad military performance can be catastrophic. Just as the French in 1940. The challenge is that militaries consider themselves experts at the use of force and everyone else as amateurs. This may be mostly true (less true than it used to be with the development of civilian expertise). However, because war is politics by other means, to rely on a classic quote by Clausewitz, the decisions made during wars have great political significance. Which leads to another maxim: war is too important to be left to the generals. The traditional division of labor of the civilians deciding when to fight and with whom and the military deciding how simply does not work that well in practice. This can lead to all kinds of tensions between the civilians and military officers, and that is actually quite normal. The question is how to handle the tensions, which leads us back to Ricks and what he misses.

Global Instability : 1NC

Loss of civil-military relations has massive impacts and sparks global instability Cohen, 02 (Eliot, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002, http://www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/06.CivilMilitaryRelations.Cohen.pdf)

Left uncorrected, the trends in American civil-military relations could breed certain pathologies. The most serious possibility is that of a dramatic civil-military split during a crisis involving the use of force . In the recent past, such tensions did not result in open division. For example, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the United States invade North Africa in 1942, though the chiefs of both the army and the navy vigorously opposed such a course, favoring instead a buildup in England and an invasion of the continent in 1943. Back then it was inconceivable that a senior military officer would leak word of such a split to the media, where it would have reverberated loudly and destructively. To be sure, from time to time individual officers broke the vow of professional silence to protest a course of action, but in these isolated cases the officers paid the accepted price of termination of their careers. In the modern environment, such cases might no longer be isolated. Thus, presidents might try to shape U.S. strategy so that it complies with military opinion , and rarely in the annals of statecraft has military opinion alone been an adequate guide to sound foreign policy choices. Had Lincoln followed the advice of his senior military advisers there is a good chance that the Union would have fallen. Had Roosevelt deferred to General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King there might well have been a gory debacle on the shores of France in 1943. Had Harry S. Truman heeded the advice of his theater commander in the Far East (and it should be remembered that the Joint Chiefs generally counseled support of the man on the spot) there might have been a third world war. Throughout much of its history, the U.S. military was remarkably politicized by contemporary standards . One commander of the army, Winfield Scott, even ran for president while in uniform, and others (Leonard Wood, for example) have made no secret of their political views and aspirations. But until 1940, and with the exception of periods of outright warfare, the military was a negligible force in American life, and America was not a central force in international politics. That has changed. Despite the near halving of the defense budget from its high in the 1980s, it remains a significant portion of the federal budget, and the military continues to employ millions of Americans. More important, civil-military relations in the U nited S tates now no longer affect merely the closet-room politics of Washington, but the relations of countries around the world. American choices about the use of force, the shrewdness of American strategy, the soundness of American tactics, and the will of American leaders have global consequences. What might have been petty squabbles in bygone years are now magnified into quarrels of a far larger scale, and conceivably with far more grievous consequences. To ignore the problem would neglect one of the cardinal purposes of the federal government: “to provide for the common defense” in a world in which security cannot be taken for granted.

Refugees : 1NC

Strong civil-military relations is key to effective refugee management Craig, 12(Joyce, U.S. Army Major, “The Importance of Civil-Military Relations in Managing Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons,” accessed 8-27-15, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_12-21_ch04.htm)

Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) affect nearly every country in the world. Whether caused by a natural disaster, civil strife, or war, their situation is normally dire. This vulnerable population will need assistance from either the host nation government if they are internally displaced or the government of the country to which they are fleeing if they are refugees. Even a first world country like the United States faced an internally displaced population crisis when Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast region. This crisis left thousands of Americans without a home and, in many cases, left them entirely dependent on the government for assistance. This is an issue that affects everyone and that requires a combined civil-military effort to determine the best possible solutions to solve the problem. A commander entering or assigned to an area that has a significant refugee or IDP population must understand the importance of ensuring that population group is not neglected. A neglected refugee or IDP population can cause additional security and logistic problems and can hinder the mission. They will leave their camps searching for additional provisions if there is not an adequate supply, which could interfere with the operation. If the camp security situation is not acceptable, they could also leave or band together and form an insurgency, which could cause problems in the future. Commanders need to understand the impact that refugees and IDPs can have on their mission. Operational Environment For commanders assigned an area with a high number of refugees or IDPs, understanding the operational environment and knowing who is working alongside them in their operational environment are critical. Numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) specialize in refugee and IDP issues and may already be working within their area of operations (AO). Prior to conducting operations, commanders should meet with these organizations. They are experts in their field and understand the situation on the ground and the needs of the affected population. Commanders are not mandated to work with these outside agencies, but the wealth of knowledge these civilian organizations possess will only enhance the commanders' situational awareness and their understanding of how to solve various issues. NGOs often possess cultural knowledge of the area and most likely have gained the trust of the people in the camps. Role of Civil Affairs Within their military organization, commanders may have civil affairs personnel who specialize in civil-military coordination and can greatly assist in managing IDP and refugee issues. Commanders who have civil affairs personnel within their organization have an advantage. The civil affairs officer, the G-9 or S-9, can be the focal point for civil-military coordination within the organization. The G-9 and his staff should ensure each course of action (COA) effectively integrates civil considerations (the "C" of METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations ). The G-9 and his staff consider not only tactical issues but also logistics support issues. Core Tasks Civil affairs personnel have several core tasks, but one in particular focuses on managing refugees and displaced persons.1 Civil affairs officers understand the importance of civil-military coordination and have the background and training to conduct key engagements with NGOs. "Civilian agency involvement in overseas operations is one of the most decisive factors in mission success... U.S. civil affairs forces repeatedly illustrate the importance of military assets working closely with the U.S. Department of State and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] to coordinate emergency response and longer-term reconstruction efforts."2 Populace and resource control is a civil affairs core task that spells out how to work with dislocated civilians (DCs) and enables civil affairs personnel to understand the intricacies of working with this vulnerable population. DC operations include planning and managing DC routes, assembly areas, and camps in support of the host nation's and intergovernmental organizations' efforts. DC operations also include foreign humanitarian assistance support to the affected populace. The military police corps is a key component to the successful planning and execution of DC operations, and their involvement should be sought early in the planning process.3 Figure 4-1, from Field Manual (FM) 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, illustrates the core missions of civil affairs personnel. Establishing a Civil-Military Operations Center A civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a critical structure that allows the military and civilian agencies to meet on neutral ground. A CMOC is a clearinghouse from where civil-military coordination can be conducted. Civil affairs personnel can host regular meetings with representatives from various NGOs and host nation military or state agencies operating in the area. Extensive civil-military coordination can be conducted during these meetings. CMOCs help to promote unity of effort and, more importantly, reduce duplication of effort. Even if a brigade does not have an assigned civil affairs officer, the commander should still establish a CMOC and engage with the interagency community in the brigade's assigned area. These meetings will allow the commander to understand who is operating alongside him in his operational environment. Even if there are no organizations specifically dedicated to refugee operations assigned to this specific area, there may be some NGO organizations that can assist in providing medical care or other supplies. The CMOC meeting will push all of this information out. Figure 4-3, from Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, shows this relationship. Building Trust There may be hesitancy and sometimes distrust within the NGO community when it comes to working with the military. CMOC meetings can help alleviate some of that mistrust. The NGOs will better understand the military mission, whereas the military will see how best to support the civil organizations and their operations. Each group can discuss their capabilities and goals and begin to build the trust necessary to work with each other. NGOs have extensive cultural knowledge of the area and can prove to be very helpful. Their knowledge of the people, language, and the different tribal groups is good information that can help a commander determine the best COA. Additionally, the military has extensive lift capabilities and may be able to move needed humanitarian supplies. NGOs sometimes lack this capability. They have access to vital lifesaving supplies but cannot always transport them. These are all issues that can be addressed during the CMOC meetings. Conclusion Civil-military coordination during refugee and displaced person operations is an important part of mission success. Civil affairs officers and noncommissioned officers already understand the importance of coordinating and integrating the efforts of various organizations and can be an asset to a commander. However, even if an organization does not have a civil affairs officer, there are still tools a commander can use. Establishing a CMOC and providing a neutral space for NGOs and other agencies to meet and coordinate while working toward unity of effort will begin this dialogue.

Improved refugee management is a moral obligationBloomberg News, 6-6-15(“The Crisis Every Country Must Face,” accessed 8-28-15, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-07-06/the-crisis-every-country-must-face)

There are now more refugees in the world than at any time in recorded history. Yet this global crisis is mostly unrecognized as such; instead, it is seen as a collection of regional crises, from the Syrian border to the southern U.S. to coastal Myanmar. Every refugee crisis is distinct, of course, in cause and remedy. At the same time, the consequences of war and persecution are not merely local. This is a man-made catastrophe that affects every nation on earth -- and the world's richest countries have a practical and moral obligation to do more about it. The United Nations' latest refugee report, released in mid-June, is bracing. Wars and other conflicts have displaced almost 60 million people. The number of forcibly displaced people rose by more than 8 million in 2014. More than 30 million are children. Yet too many in America and Europe see themselves as under siege from economic migrants (or worse, Islamist terrorists) posing as asylum seekers, fueling an anti-immigrant mood that makes it difficult for governments to address the problem. So the first order of business for the developed world is to change perceptions. Most of the world's displaced -- 38 million people -- are stuck inside their own countries. And of those who manage to escape, 86 percent go to the mostly poor and often fragile countries nearby. Images of refugees crossing the Mediterranean suggest a human wave crashing on Europe, but their numbers -- about 100,000 so far this year -- are small relative to the wider crisis, and to Europe's population of 500 million. Lebanon, meanwhile, hosts one Syrian for every four of its own citizens. Turkey, population 75 million, has at least 1.6 million. The poverty-stricken sub-Saharan neighbors of Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea have taken in 3.7 million people from nearby states. Another misunderstanding concerns the meaning of the word "refugee" itself. The old definition, contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention, is based on the binary certainties of the Cold War: someone "forced to flee because of a threat of persecution and because they lack the protection of their own country." In the 1970s, for example, large numbers of Vietnamese and Cambodians fled their homes and the U.S. willingly took them in, with no fear that some of these immigrants might go on to bomb U.S. shopping malls. Today it's harder to distinguish true refugees from economic migrants and would-be terrorists. Resettling tens of millions of refugees in richer nations is not the answer. Yet neither is closing off immigration altogether. Resettlement can play a role in regulating the flow, and rich countries could be more creative by developing categories of temporary visas. Refugees would be given shelter on the understanding that they would return home if and when they can do so safely. Meanwhile, more needs to be done to make it possible for the displaced to remain in their own regions. That means providing the shelter, schools and medical care that refugees need. It also means putting civilian boots on the ground to help countries such as Lebanon and Jordan -- already straining to create jobs for their own people -- with infrastructure and development. Yet at a recent conference, donor countries pledged less than half the $8.5 billion that the UN said was needed this year to give food and shelter to 12 million Syrians scattered across the Middle East. Some countries have been far more ungenerous than others: While the U.S. and Britain have together delivered more than 40 percent of the UN-solicited aid for Syrian refugees this year, Saudi Arabia has pitched in only 0.5 percent of the total. Russia contributed 0.1 percent; China, zero. There is no single or permanent solution to the world's refugee crisis, which will endure as long as there are wars and persecution. That's no excuse, however, for failing to do what's possible. This will require more help and attention from the more stable and prosperous parts of the world. It will also require more action at the source, as future editorials will explain -- country by country, region by region, and, in many cases, refugee by refugee. In either case, progress can be made.

Refugees: Extensions

Strong civil-military relations are key to effective disaster management and humanitarian assistance Marret, 08(Jean-Luc, “Complex Emergencies: Disasters, Civil-Military Relations, and Transatlantic Cooperation,” accessed 8-28-15, http://www.disastergovernance.net/fileadmin/gppi/RTB_book_chp18.pdf)

This chapter examines approaches taken by the European Commission (EC) and the U.S. Government regarding civil-military relations in the area of disaster relief and preparedness. It analyzes EC and U.S. policies and strategies, as well as operational activities in the field. Military engagement in humanitarian assistance is often controversial. Yet more effective civil-military relations can mean better division of labor and more fruitful cooperation. The result could be greater efficiency in humanitarian assistance and disaster management.

Strong civil-military relations are key to effective peacekeeping efforts Franke, 06(Volker, “THE PEACEBUILDING DILEMMA: CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN STABILITY OPERATIONS,” accessed 8-28-15, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf)

Of course, the military is the logical partner for security provision. However, military functions are steadily increasing in complexity and oftentimes overlap with those of civilian aid providers. For instance, military officers have successfully participated in negotiating cease-fires and peace settlements in Mozambique, Angola and Bosnia (Guttieri, 2004). In addition, armed forces have monitored cease-fires and elections, enforced no-fly zones and demobilization efforts, secured relief convoys and supported civilian actors by providing logistics support, establishing camps for displaced persons, and lending engineering expertise to reconstruction projects (Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz, 2004; Rana, 2004; VENRO, 2003; Gordon, 2001; Minear et al., 2000). Civil-military cooperation can effectively bridge the gap between the intervention force and the relief organizations and civil institutions, and can become an effective force multiplier (Mockaitis, 2004). The effects, challenges, and problems of this approach can be illustrated by briefly recounting the CIMIC experience during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Strong civil-military relations are vital to effective peacekeeping operations Franke, 06(Volker, “THE PEACEBUILDING DILEMMA: CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN STABILITY OPERATIONS,” accessed 8-28-15, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf)

Effective peacebuilding requires a unity of effort and a coherent response from civilian and military actors alike. Nevertheless, irrespective of how long a conflict endures the civilian population must be provided basic protection including humanitarian aid. Clearly, stability operations in response to complex emergencies present significant challenges and humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts may at times be at odds. Effective peacebuilding becomes a management challenge on the ground that requires civilian and military, as well as local and international actors to work together, anticipate differences that may arise, attempt to avoid conflicting approaches, communicate clearly, share information and undertake common analysis, and, in a best-case scenario, agree on a strategy. How can this be accomplished?

Modeling : 1NC

US CMR is modeled globally – collapse domestically would result in disruption globally and simultaneous military coups. Perry, Former Secretary of Defense, 96(William, former secretary of defense, Federal News Service, 5/13/1996)

America has long understood that the spread of democracy to more nations is good for America's national security. It has been heartening this past decade to see so many nations around the world come to agree with us that democracy is the best system of government. But as the nations of the world attempt to act on this consensus, we are seeing that there are important steps between a world-wide consensus and a world-wide reality. Democracy is learned behavior. Many nations today have democracies that exist on paper, but, in fact, are extremely fragile. Elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for a free society. It is also necessary to embed democratic values in the key institutions of nations. The Defense Department has a key role to play in this effort. It is a simple fact that virtually every country in the world has a military. In virtually every new democracy -- in Russia, in the newly free nations of the Former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, in the Asian Tigers -- the military represents a major force. In many cases it is the most cohesive institution. It often contains a large percentage of the educated elite and controls key resources. In short, it is an institution that can help support democracy or subvert it. We must recognize that each society moving from totalitarianism to democracy will be tested at some point by a crisis. It could be an economic crisis, a backslide on human rights and freedoms, or a border or ethnic dispute with a neighboring country. When such a crisis occurs, we want the military to play a positive role in resolving the crisis, not a negative role by fanning the flames of the crisis -- or even using the crisis as a pretext for a military coup. In these new democracies, we can choose to ignore this important institution, or we can try to exert a positive influence. We do have the ability to influence, indeed, every military in the world looks to the U.S. armed forces as the model to be emulated. That is a valuable bit of leverage that we can put to use creatively in our preventive defense strategy.

Modeling: Extensions

Strong US CMR is modeled globally CSIS, 6-6-20(“Strength Abroad Begins With Healing, Unity at Home,” accessed 6-16-20, Targeted News Service, p. Nexis Uni) JFN

3. Leaders at all levels must repair the damage to civil-military relations we have seen in recent years as the military has been drawn increasingly into American politics. The United States military and our nation's strong civil-military ethos have been models for countries around the world seeking to build just, stable democracies. Remaining faithful to our own constitutional principles and assuring military excellence requires the military to stay out of partisan politics, including ensuring uniformed service members are not seen to stray outside of their operational expertise to endorse the political opinions of leaders or candidates for public office. We must also keep rare and circumscribed the instances in which we contemplate deploying federal military units on American soil in support of state national guard and domestic law enforcement. We must recognize that the standard we set for law enforcement in our country is an important factor in how others measure the validity of the democratic values we espouse.

US civil military relations are modeled worldwideCairo, 01 (Michael, PhD, University of Virginia, “Civilian Control of the Military,” State Department Documents, 2001)

The American experience may provide valuable lessons to countries struggling with the challenges of an emerging democracy. Perhaps the most obvious of these challenges is the treat of military commanders seizing power. There aer two important principles that can reinforce civilian control. First, a newly emerging democracy would do well to establish solid constitutional foundations as the basis for civilian control of the military. Despite some ambiguities the U.S. Constitution divides military power between the legislature and the executive, a division aimed to preventing abuses of power. Also, the Constitution clearly establishes the president, a popularly elected civilian leader, as commander in chief of the armed forces. The curcial element here is that the president’s powers are defined and limited as a whole. And that Congress, the U.S. courts, and the electorate, have substantial power. Thus, the president’s command of the military does not lead to command of other sectors. The president’s primarily civilian status has been home out through the country’s history. Only four presidents – Washington, Jackson, Grant, and Eisenhower – had significant careers in the military prior to becoming president. Each of them understood the need to keep military and political functions separate and distinct. General Dwight Eisenhower carried the principle so far while he was commanding Allied forces in Europe during World War II that he did not vote. The second key principle requires that the military serve in an administrative, not a policy- making, role. Eisenhower’s refusal to vote while in the army is representative of his belief that military decisions must not be clouded by political decisions. Generals should not be involved in the political decision-making process. Instead, they should prefer advice regarding the use of the military in achieving policy-makers’ goals, and as to the probable success of the military outcome. It should be left to the political leaders to decide if the military option should be pursued.

Rights : 1NC

War and loss of security ensures mass loss of civil liberties, rights, and freedoms Kohn, UNC History Professor, 10-12-05(Richard, “Civil-Military Relations in the United States Today,” accessed 8-26-15, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives05fall/kohn.htm)

Nearly every war in US history has involved infringement of civil liberties and freedoms. The PATRIOT Act, though modest, shows a public willingness to support and even call for suspensions of freedoms when security seems precarious. War generates a powerful mass psychology and the United States public often lets fear and fury to get ahead of it. A large WMD attack may lead to a request for a radical tilting of freedom and security.

Moral Obligation: 1NC

Upholding strong CMR is a moral obligation during times of war and conflict like todayDubik, 10-19-15(James, “Civilian, Military Both Morally Obliged to Make War Work,” accessed 11-1-15, http://www.armymagazine.org/2015/10/19/civilian-military-both-morally-obliged-to-make-war-work/#sthash.gHk577zi.dpuf)

Some posit that in the civil-military relationship, senior civilian leaders have a “right to be wrong.” I disagree. War-waging decisions always put lives at risk: the lives of the innocent in a war zone as well as the lives of citizens who are also the soldiers who carry out the orders. In some cases, war-waging decisions may even put the life of the political community itself at risk. When the stakes of a decision are this high, no final decision authority has the right to be wrong. Rather, the decision maker has an obligation to be as right as is reasonable to expect, given the nature and realities of war. Those involved in the process leading up to a consequential decision—whether in uniform or in a suit, whether in the executive or legislative branch—have an obligation to ensure that any decision is as fully vetted as it can be. Finally, civilian and military leaders have three further responsibilities. First, they are responsible for aligning the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. In this way, they help ensure that individual military and nonmilitary tactical actions are nested within an operational scheme that is tied to the strategic political aims the war seeks to attain. Second, they are responsible for making bureaucracies work well enough to execute decisions. Then, they are responsible for adapting decisions to the realities of war as it unfolds. Execution of these responsibilities requires that senior political and military leaders establish some kind of reality-based feedback system and coordinative body (or bodies) to ensure they can constantly assess and adapt to the uncertainties, opportunities and obstacles that invariably arise in any war. Those who ultimately execute decisions on the battlefield that senior leaders make in the capital are owed this conceptual alignment and organizational coherence. In waging war, civilian and military leaders need each other. Both perspectives are necessary. Neither alone has a corner on relevant knowledge, and both are co-responsible for results. Americans would be unpersuaded by a senior flag officer who says, when testifying about a consequential wartime decision, “I just executed the policy decision I was given”—as if he or she had no responsibility for the quality and substance of that decision. Americans would find equally unsatisfying a senior political leader who, when talking about the same decision, says, “I just make policy, others execute it”—as if policy and execution can be disconnected in war, or as if waging a war is solely a military affair. “Wars are fought not to be won,” Peter Paret reminds us in The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806, “but to gain [some political] objective beyond war.” Simply put: A functional civil-military relationship is essential in war if a nation is to prosecute the war well enough to attain its strategic aims and use well the lives it puts at risk. Civilian leaders must push, probe and question their military and nonmilitary subordinates—even to the point of annoyance and discomfort—to ensure that strategic aims are actually achievable within acceptable costs and risks; and to ensure the strategies, policies and campaigns designed to attain those aims are as well-crafted and aligned as possible. Similarly, subordinate military and non-military leaders must respectfully push, probe and question their civilian seniors to ensure the means used in war are nested within, and instrumental to, well-reasoned policy and to ensure strategic aims are actually “doable.” Disagreement is not disrespect. Such pushing, probing and questioning lies at the heart of what Eliot A. Cohen calls “the unequal dialogue” in Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. Both senior political and military leaders must understand the outcomes they are co-responsible to attain, and why those outcomes are worth the potential costs and risks. The dialogue that Cohen describes increases the probability of such understanding. The dialogue is unequal, however, because senior political leaders retain final decision authority. But the participants in the dialogue are functionally and morally equal. They are functionally equal because both civilian and military perspectives are necessary to ensure any final decision concerning aims, strategies, policies or campaigns has the highest probability of success, and because both are needed to execute initial decisions and adapt as the realities of war present themselves. And they are morally equal, for both are co-responsible for the lives that are risked and used in execution of war-waging decisions. This kind of dialogue can only occur under the conditions of mutual respect, trust and understanding—for example, the Lincoln/Grant and Roosevelt/Marshall relationships. In those cases—like much of Vietnam and periodically during our post-9/11 wars—where senior political or military leaders either disrespected one or mistrusted one another, sought to dominate or control rather than understand each other, or deceived one another, the probability of success reduced significantly and thus, the nation was poorly served. Waging war is hard because of the ambiguities, uncertainties, fog and friction that is part of war’s nature at the

tactical and strategic levels. It is made harder when those responsible for making and executing war-waging decisions, then adapting as the war goes on, are in dysfunctional relationships. The cost of a dysfunctional wartime relationship is paid in lives: of the innocent; of the citizens who are the soldiers whose lives are risked, used and forever changed by war; and in damage to the political community—especially in unnecessarily long wars or lost wars. No relationship is perfect, but all participants in a war-waging civil-military relationship have a moral obligation to make it work. The stakes of war are simply too high to operate otherwise.

Military Spending/Recruitment

Robust CMR is key to support for military spending and successful military recruitment effortsGordon, Wall Street Journal Reporter, 6-14-20(Michael, “White House Ties With Military Face Major Test; Respect for military could be imperiled by embroiling it in domestic politics, retired generals have warned,” WSJ, accessed 6-17-20, p. ProQuest) JFN

Such respect could be imperiled if the military is embroiled in domestic politics, including being deployed to maintain order in U.S. cities during a time of widespread, mostly peaceful protests against racism and police brutality, said Mr. Votel and other retired officers. Among the potential consequences, they cited, are a loss of the generally bipartisan support in Congress for military spending and programs as well as difficulties in recruitment for the all-volunteer force. Racial tensions within the armed forces could become a prominent problem once again.

Answers To

Non Unique: Generic

Current civil-military tensions are not structural and just temporary Owens, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 6-12-20(Mackubin Thomas, “How Military Leaders’ Trump Criticism Can Damage Civil-Military Relations,” accessed 6-15-20, https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/military-leaders-criticism-president-trump-can-damage-civil-military-relations/) JFN

Tensions between civilian authorities and the uniformed military are nothing new in American history. Indeed, civil-military tensions can be traced to the very beginning of the republic and have occurred during both times of peace and war. So we should not be surprised that civil-military tensions have flared in the wake of the recent rioting, arson, and looting across the United States. In the current case, one focus of these civil-military tensions is the proper relationship between federal and state authority during a domestic emergency. Is it proper to use regular troops to curtail domestic disorder? Under what circumstances?

Non Unique: Decrease in Civilian Control

There’s been no erosion in civilian control over the military Shinkman, 9-30-19(Paul, “The Joint Chiefs’ Power Surge,” accessed 10-1-19, https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2019-09-30/how-joe-dunford-quietly-changed-the-joint-chiefs-role-in-preparing-for-war) JFN

Issues of civilian oversight of the military arose during Defense Secretary Mark Esper's confirmation process to become the current Pentagon chief. In his written responses to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee, the former Army officer and Raytheon lobbyist denied any troubling trends in that regard, disagreeing with the National Defense Strategy Commission's findings. "Civilian leaders within the department continue to exercise their necessary authorities and responsibilities for U.S. defense and national security policy, while working closely with the military leadership. If confirmed, I will continue to stress the importance of close collaboration between civilian and military personnel," he wrote. Responding to a specific question about the global force integrator position, he stressed that he would serve as the "ultimate approval authority" for those decisions. His response and subsequent public statements to the same effect prompted praise from Karlin, the former Pentagon strategy planner, and others who worked at the Pentagon in recent months, urging Esper to do more.

Non Unique: Trump kills CMR

Trump hasn’t destroyed CMR; things are repairable Nichols, 1-2-19(Tom, “Trump Escalates His Assault on Civil-Military Relations,” Atlantic Online, accessed 9-26-19, p. Nexis Uni) JFN

But it is the president, not the generals and admirals, who have made this unthinkable situation part of the new normal in the Age of Trump. No modern president has been so reckless in his criticism of both active and retired military professionals. When Trump said he knew more than the generals-a laughable claim from almost any civilian when it comes to military affairs-he apparently meant it. And that means he has no respect for military advice, from any direction. This, more than any personal clash, was the clear message in Mattis's resignation. If Trump continues on this path-and he will-we could face the most politicized and divided military since Vietnam, or even since the Civil War. Generals and admirals could be faced with betraying their professional code either by giving the advice they know will keep them in the good graces of the president or by ignoring the president's orders and protecting their troops in the field as they think best. The rank and file, meanwhile, will become accustomed to showing up at political rallies where their commander in chief will pander to them and air his grievances against other elected officials, all while they wave banners in uniform and cheer for a growing cult of personality. I remain optimistic. The oath of the professional officer, like the oath of the federal servant, is to the Constitution. The men and women of the armed forces have withstood greater temptations than the empty praise and illusory bribes of a desperate president. But in civil-military affairs, as in so many other areas of our national security, we shall have much damage to repair before this business is over.

Non Unique: Using Force on Protesters

Claims of Trump “politicizing” the military are wrong Owens, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 6-12-20(Mackubin Thomas, “How Military Leaders’ Trump Criticism Can Damage Civil-Military Relations,” accessed 6-15-20, https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/military-leaders-criticism-president-trump-can-damage-civil-military-relations/) JFN

Concerns about the politicization of the military require some unpacking. High-ranking military positions are inherently “political.” Military officers are expected to offer their advice on matters of strategy and policy. That advice may be accepted or rejected. But the military has no right to “demand” that its advice be accepted. Accordingly, it is inevitable that military leaders will be linked to the policies that they advocated and/or executed, whether they agreed with them or not. General William Westmoreland will be forever linked to Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam policy. General David Petraeus will always be inextricably bound to George Bush’s Iraq policy.

Non Unique: Civil-Military Gap

Their cards on a huge civil-military gap are all media driven hype and not based on actual studies; the best research indicates the civil-military gap is not wide and has been getting smaller Ender, 5-28-14(Morten, “Morten Ender on Millennials and the Military,” accessed 11-1-15, http://ciceromagazine.com/interviews/362/)

One reason we wrote the book is we thought we [America] had, since 9/11, moved into a new, post-9/11 era in the public’s attitude toward the military. There’s been this ongoing debate about a civil-military gap among pundits. On one hand, many, indeed most, suggest the gap is widening, especially in the past 12 years. Our view, based on 12 years of data collection, is that this is not a wide gap; that the gap has been getting narrower in many areas. We wanted to test the civil-military gap hypothesis in particular. Millennials are the most studied group ever, but not many questions are asked of them about military matters. We wanted to fill this knowledge gap and study the civil-military gap. What are some of your big takeaways? The biggest takeaway is there’s not a big difference between military millennials and civilian millennials. They view sociopolitical and domestic issues fairly similarly. At a time when we have an all-volunteer force and young people self-selecting into the military, including the officer corps, one would think there’d be a huge gap between these groups. But that’s not necessarily the case, more generally, based on our findings. But there are some issues with signs of divergence: ROTC and military academy cadets are much more global in their orientation than their civilian peers. Cadets are concerned about global nuclear war, international terrorism, and think the military should be used to primarily focus on these types of missions. They think these are the most significant issues in the 21st century. Civilian college students, on the other hand, don’t think see these necessarily as the priorities for the U.S. armed forces. They view domestic issues as more important. They give preferences to use the military to manage U.S. social problems. Civilian [millennials] are more isolationist than their military cadet peers.

Non Unique: Milley’s Apology

Trump wasn’t offended by Milley’s apology Chalfant, Reporter for The Hill, 6-12-20(Morgan, “Trump shrugs off apology from top US general over St. John's photo-op,” The Hill, accessed 6-16-20, https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/502417-trump-shrugs-off-apology-from-top-us-general-over-st-johns-photo-op) JFN

President Trump on Thursday said that he didn’t believe it was significant that the top U.S. general apologized for his role in the president’s photo opportunity outside St John’s Church last week. Trump, who defended the controversial appearance as a “beautiful picture” during an interview with Fox News's Harris Faulkner, did not criticize Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley or Defense Secretary Mark Esper for speaking out following last Monday’s events but he shrugged off their statements in the comments, portions of which aired Friday morning. “No,” Trump said when asked if he believed their statements were significant. “If that’s the way they feel, I think that’s fine.”

No Impact: No Spillover

Broken CMR norms do spillover Lee, US Air War College Assistant Professor, 6-3-20(Carrie, “Dear Civ-Mil Community: The (Retired) Generals Are Speaking & We Should Listen,” accessed 6-17-20, https://duckofminerva.com/2020/06/dear-civ-mil-community-the-retired-generals-are-speaking-we-should-listen.html) JFN

Civil-military relations are full of behavioral norms; indeed, very little about how civilians and the military are supposed to interact is written into law or otherwise codified. Norms are useful for two distinct reasons. First, they provide the unwritten guidelines to behavior and generate a set of general expectations for “healthy” civil-military interactions. But perhaps even more importantly, the breaking of norms acts as a kind of alarm bell that signals to both the community and the broader public that something is terribly amiss. Deliberately undermining establish norms, especially norms that we think of as critical to the health of the profession, serves as a way to “break glass in case of emergency.” Seen in this light, norms are made to be broken—but only as a last resort.

No Impact: CMR is Resilient

CMR is not currently resilient due to tensions between Trump and the JCS. The 1NC Donnelly evidence indicates CMR is on the brink of collapse and that a collapse wouldn’t be difficult to achieve. Even if CMR has been resilient in the past, it’s not exhibiting resilience right now. One more significant blow to CMR will ensure relations cross the Rubicon and trigger the DA impacts.

CMR tensions are on the brink nowGordon, Wall Street Journal Reporter, 6-14-20(Michael, “White House Ties With Military Face Major Test; Respect for military could be imperiled by embroiling it in domestic politics, retired generals have warned,” WSJ, accessed 6-17-20, p. ProQuest) JFN

Mr. Trump and the Pentagon have had differences over policy in Syria, the administration of military justice and Afghanistan. But the new tensions this month threatened to undo decades of effort by the military to repair its reputation and status in American society after the conflict in Vietnam—a war the U.S. lost with high casualties and that spawned doubts about the Pentagon's credibility.

Turn: Breaking Norms Saves Them

The Lee evidence doesn’t apply to the DA scenario. First, it assumes retired officers speaking up against the President, not officers serving currently. Second, it assumes retired officers speaking up in response to racial and societal injustice, not purely military policies like the plan. And third, it assumes this course of action as an absolute last resort and to happen very rarely. There’s no indication that Lee views the plan as meeting the criteria for breaking CMR norms in order to save them.