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TARNAK FARM BOARDOF INQUIRY

Final Report

COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTEDE TARNAK FARM

Rapport Final

Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry – Final Report

Letter from the President

Minister of National Defence (via Chief of the Defence Staff) National Defence HeadquartersMajor-General George R. Pearkes BuildingOttawa, ON K1A 0K2

19 June 2002

Minister, Please find enclosed the Final Report for the Board of Inquiry convened to investigate the circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident of April 17, 2002 at Tarnak Farm, Afghanistan.

Building upon the Interim Report submitted to your office on May 13, 2002, and having completed its formal proceedings, the Board now submits for your consideration a comprehensive response to all finding objectives assigned within the Terms of Reference. Given the extensive amount of information required to arrive at these findings, it was neither possible nor desirable to include all examined documents and material with the Final Report. Please be assured, however, that all evidence gathered has been catalogued and will be submitted for proper archival storage.

As previously indicated to the Chief of the Defence Staff, much of the supporting material is classified for operational security reasons, as is the main text of the Final Report itself. Nevertheless, to facilitate open and transparent communication with the affected families, the men and women of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, and the greater Canadian public, the included Executive Summary has been crafted to communicate the essential elements and findings of the investigation in an unclassified manner.

I hope you will agree with me that the unsevered release of this portion of the investigation will reaffirm the commitment of this Board and the Canadian Forces to submit the particulars of this tragic event to the broadest possible public scrutiny, consistent with operational imperatives. I trust also that this approach will balance the need of the families to understand what befell their loved ones with the desire of the wider public for information on this important national issue, in the most compassionate yet pragmatic manner.

In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the excellent administrative support that has been provided by all of the staffs with which we have come in contact. I would also like to highlight the outstanding nature of the cooperation provided to the Board by our comrades-in-arms in the military of the United States of America. Their sensitivity and compassion in the face of this incident has again demonstrated the unique and valuable quality of our close relationship with our Southern neighbour.

Finally, I wish to express to you in the strongest possible terms the enduring sense of pride that I have in the men and women of the Canadian Forces. It is truly in times of adversity that the military is most tested, and this investigation has reconfirmed to me that it is often only the strength of character and purpose that is bequeathed upon soldiers by their families and friends that allows them to carry the day. If there is any good to come of such a sad occurrence, it is surely this: that the personnel of the Canadian Forces remain unbowed, strengthened by the remembrance of those fallen, and ever committed to the service of our country.

Original signed by General Maurice Baril (Retired)President, Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry

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Executive Summary

Introduction

Late on the night of 17/18 April 2002, a section from “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry BG (3 PPCLI BG) were conducting a live-fire exercise in the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, when they were mistakenly engaged by two American F-16 fighter aircraft.

At the time of the attack, the two aircraft were returning to their home base in the Arabian Gulf area after a long patrol over Afghanistan. As they transited through the Kandahar region, ground fire from the Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range Complex (hereafter abbreviated as the Tarnak Farm Range) attracted their attention. This site, formerly one of the main Al-Queda training installations, had been partially converted into a multi-purpose firing range. In this regard, it was used regularly by local coalition forces to conduct much-needed training, both during the day and at night.

As part of the planned night exercise, “A” Company personnel were conducting a variety of firing drills, encompassing a range of weapons from personal side arms up to and including shoulder-fired anti-tank munitions. Though visible from the air, the armament being employed was of no threat to the aircraft at their transit altitude. Nevertheless, one of the F-16s invoked the right of self-defence and released a Mark 82 500-lb Guided Bomb Unit (GBU-12) Laser-Guided Bomb (LGB) on the soldiers’ firing position. The resulting blast killed four soldiers and injured eight others, one very seriously. Following their attack, the aircraft recovered at their home base without further incident.

Formation of the Board of Inquiry

From the outset, it was clear that this was the most serious case of fratricide or “friendly fire” to have been experienced by the Canadian Forces (CF) in Coalition operations since the Korean War. Accordingly, at the direction of the Minister of National Defence, a five-member Board (referred to as the Tarnak Farm Board of Inquiry) chaired by General Maurice Baril (retired) was formed. Board members initially included Brigadier-General Marc Dumais, Colonel Greg Matte, Colonel Mark Hodgson, and Chief Warrant Officer Denis Levesque. The Board was augmented by specialist advisors in air operations (including an F-16 pilot from the United States Air Force), legal, medical, and police personnel, as well as public affairs, support and administrative staff.

In parallel, an American investigation (eventually called the Coalition Investigation Board or CIB) was initiated to probe the incident from an American perspective. it was determined that the work of the American Board would be greatly facilitated with Canadian participation. Consequently, in an unprecedented move, Brigadier-General Dumais was seconded to the American group in the position of co-president, with rank and position equivalent to the senior American officer. This reduced the Canadian Board to four members, but provided a degree of visibility for Canadian authorities into the

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proceedings of the CIB, commensurate with the coalition nature of the incident and the need to maintain a high level of public confidence in the proceedings.

Conduct of the Investigation

As quickly as possible following its formation, the Canadian Board traveled to the theatre of operations and commenced its work. This early initial visit to the area, undertaken to establish the exact nature of the ground situation in as comprehensive a fashion as possible, was characterized by tremendous support by local American military authorities. During visits to deployed Canadian forces in Kandahar and Bagram, the Board recorded testimony from 14 Canadian witnesses. It also received voluntary sworn statements from five American service personnel, including the Commander of Task Force (TF) Rakkasan, to which 3 PPCLI BG is attached. In addition to receiving verbal and physical submissions of evidence, the Board made an extensive inspection of the incident site at the Tarnak Farm Range.

While working in the Arabian Gulf area, the Board established and maintained regular contact with the American CIB, primarily with respect to process and travel issues, but also in terms of transfer of collected evidence. Concerns over how best to maintain the autonomy of both investigations while dealing with the same evidentiary sources were addressed by direct Board-to-Board legal consultations. This resulted in the enactment of a rigorous protocol for the exchange of raw, unanalyzed evidence, thereby enabling both boards to ensure that all analysis was completely independent, that any findings would be made without prejudice or influence of the other Board.

Since the American CIB had begun its investigation from the air side and was dealing mainly with US service personnel and military assets, it was able to amass a preponderance of technical data relatively early in the process. With the nature of events on the ground rapidly becoming clearer to the Canadian Board, it was evident that early access to this body of technical data would be critical for purposes of the Interim Report, due to the Minister of National Defence on 13 May 2002. Accordingly, through an intense effort by the CIB to process and collate the required material, the Canadian Board was delivered a very comprehensive collection of data prior to departing the theatre of operation.

Upon its return, Board staff focused their attention on producing the Interim Report, while Board members and some advisors continued to Edmonton to conduct the first of two planned visits, which consisted of a series of interviews with injured personnel in the region. During the initial Edmonton visit, and shortly after his return to Ottawa, the Board President was able to meet with all of the victims’ next-of-kin (NOK), following through on his personal pledge to pass them information on the progress of the Board in as timely a fashion as possible. After roughly a week in Ottawa, the Board again returned to Edmonton to conduct its second set of interviews. This period coincided with the acceptance and partial release of the completed Interim Report by the Department of National Defence, and the Board was able to make some of its findings public from the Edmonton Garrison, the home station of 3 PPCLI.

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Following the submission of the Interim Report, the Board began a methodical re-examination of all information received to date to determine the degree to which the interim findings would need additional documentation or evidentiary support to be rendered final. Continued liaison with the American CIB supported this effort, and a number of additional information exchanges took place. By now, it had become clear that the Board still lacked sufficient evidence and information to accurately reconstruct all aspects of the air picture.

In particular, a number of questions concerning the doctrinal and functional controls over theatre air operations remained unresolved. Some of these might have been addressed through interviews with the pilots involved, but it was not yet evident whether these individuals would consent to appear before the Board. Accordingly, the Board elected to gather as much supporting information as possible from in-theatre sources. This necessitated a return to the Arabian Gulf region, with the intent of conducting additional interviews and fact-finding visits to key locations.

The Board returned to Ottawa on 4 June 2002 and commenced drafting the Final Report, which was due to the Minister on 21 June 2002. During the course of its investigation, the Board conducted 26 direct interviews, received sworn testimony from 65 others, and independently generated over 800 pages of information and transcripts. Through the assistance of the American CIB, it was provided with imagery and technical data of the most sensitive nature, including , recorded radio transmissions, and all applicable orders and directives surrounding the conduct of the relevant air and ground operations in the Afghanistan campaign.

To gather additional information, the Board intended to visit the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in the Arabian Gulf region, but were not issued with visas by the appropriate national authorities within sufficient time to conduct the visit. On return to Canada, the Board was able to arrange for a video-teleconference with CAOC members that adequately met the requirement.

The sole area where the Board was ultimately unable to gather direct evidence was from the two F-16 pilots. By virtue of their nationality, these individuals could not be compelled to appear before the Canadian Board; in fact, they chose not to testify before either the Canadian Board or the CIB. The pilot who actually dropped the bomb did make a limited written response to questions posed to him by the Board, but the Board members would have preferred a direct interview.

Even so, the Board membership is collectively satisfied that the evidence and testimony received over the past 60 days is entirely sufficient to allow an accurate reconstruction of the events prior to, during, and after the incident. This has permitted the Board to make conclusive findings in all areas as assigned by the Terms of Reference, and to make recommendations that both seek to prevent recurrence and to highlight other areas for improvement for future coalition operations.

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Board Findings

In accordance with the Terms of Reference the Board makes the following findings:

What were the circumstances surrounding the injuries and deaths? Beyond the introductory narrative included here and the extensive detail contained within the full report, the Board has concluded that the members of 3 PPCLI BG who were undertaking live-fire training at the Tarnak Farm Range on the night of the incident had done nothing wrong by way of coordination procedures or safety regulations.

From an air operations point of view, however, the F-16 pilots involved were not aware of the Tarnak Farm , nor the planned live-fire exercise. There were a number of reasons why this was the case. Lacking this critical information, it seems clear that the F-16 pilots mistakenly interpreted the live fire as a threat to their formation, and engaged upon a decision-making process that led to the declaration of self-defence and the release of a weapon on friendly troops.

What caused the injuries and deaths? All injuries and deaths have been attributed to the blast and shrapnel effects created by the explosion of a Mk-82 500-lb GBU-12 LGB dropped by an American F-16 fighter plane. The seriousness of each injury was relative to several factors, such as proximity to the explosion, position within the Eastern wadi (drainage ditch) and surrounding area, and degree of protection from flying shrapnel. In general, those members who were in closest proximity to the point of impact received the gravest of injuries; certainly, had the bomb impacted in even a slightly different location, many more casualties might have been incurred.

Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members on duty at the time the incident occurred? It has been confirmed that all of the deceased and injured non-commissioned members were on duty at the time of the incident.

Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members to blame for the injuries or deaths? None of the deceased, injured or other members of the 3 PPCLI BG who planned, coordinated or participated in the subject live-fire exercise at the Tarnak Farm Range can be blamed in any way for the injuries or deaths that occurred as a result of the subject incident.

Were any other person(s), to blame for the injuries or deaths? The Canadian Board has determined that the actions of the Coffee 51 Flight are the primary cause for the injuries and deaths. Despite the initial misinterpretation of the live-fire exercise as a threat to their formation, there exists a series of related disturbing contradictions between their perceptions, their actions and accepted procedures.

It is the conclusion of the Board that the pilot’s actions were not consistent with either the expected practice for a defensive threat reaction or the existing published procedures, including the SPINS. This represented a failure of leadership, airmanship and technique. Furthermore, their actions contravened the published Commander’s direction with respect to

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reaction to AAA and employment of ordnance outside of engagement zones. Finally, even though it is reasonable to believe that the ground firing exercise at Tarnak Farm might have been perceived as enemy surface to air fire, a longer, more patient look from a safe altitude and range, combined with a good knowledge of the airspace and the threat in the area, should have confirmed that the event observed was neither a direct threat to their formation or enemy activity of a significant nature.

Were the injuries and deaths attributable to military service? The injuries and deaths resulting from the incident were entirely attributable to military service. At the time of the accident, the individuals involved were on continuous duty in a theatre of operations and were undertaking authorized and necessary continuation training in preparation for an upcoming mission, as part of ongoing Coalition operations.

What was the nature and quality of the planning and conduct of the live fire exercise? The planning of the exercise was appropriate for the established objectives (section level night fire training) and the simulated tactical scenario. The planning and subsequent conduct of the live fire exercise was entirely consistent with established regulations and coordination procedures, as directed by the CF and the Commander of TF Rakkasan.

Were the safety procedures applicable to the exercise properly followed? In general, the safety procedures considered and employed during the conduct of the live fire exercise on the evening of 17 April 2002 were in accordance with CF directives. Minor procedural irregularities regarding the use of ricochet danger area templates and the drills during preparation of the were noted by the Board, but these had no bearing on the incident and immediate recommendations have been made to address these shortcomings. In fact, precautionary measures taken with respect to in-place accident response were particularly commendable.

What was the nature and quality of the co-ordination between Canadian and United States authorities surrounding the exercise? Use of the range for night, live-fire exercises was common practice within TF Rakkasan, and was coordinated through a variety of scheduling, communications, and procedural measures. These measures included a dedicated communications net and the stationing of a sentry in the Kandahar Airfield Facility (KAF) control tower. The conduct of the training at the Tarnak Farm Range on the night of the incident was entirely in accordance with all established procedures for the TF.

What was the nature and quality of the co-ordination between ground and air forces surrounding the incident? It is clear to the Canadian Board that a number of systemic shortcomings existed in the quality and nature of the co-ordination between ground and air forces, as well as between the CAOC and the tactical flying units. Had they been corrected, the incident might have been prevented. In light of these deficiencies, the Board submitted several corrective recommendations with the Interim Report, some of which have already been implemented; further recommendations are included in this Final Report.

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What was the quality of in-theatre post-incident response and incident reporting? In all respects, the medical response to the incident was exceptional, and saved the life of at least one of the injured. From the initial actions taken in the field through to the medical evacuation of some of the injured out of theatre to American hospital facilities at Landstuhl, Germany, the Coalition medical response was appropriate. The reporting of the incident by the 3 PPCLI BG to the Canadian and the Coalition chains of command was timely and adequate, complete with follow-up reports as additional, relevant details became known.

Are there any other issues of relevance to this investigation? As part of its investigation, the Board has commissioned a study on the current and evolving state of air-ground combat identification (CID) technologies. This study has produced a number of pertinent recommendations and is available to the public at the Board Web Site.

The Board also noted a worrisome trend with respect to operational security surrounding the details of the incident. Specifically, in the days and weeks following the event, several of the troops communicated openly on the internet and to the media about the existence and tactical use of in the close-quarter ground environment. In the future, the chain of command must place additional emphasis on identifying and protecting the release of classified information and procedures, particularly while operations are ongoing.

Conclusion

Until the bomb struck their position, the troops involved had no idea that they were being targeted or that they were in serious danger. Though demanding, the training undertaken that evening was of a routine and well-understood nature, was being carried out in a known location under controlled conditions, and had been organized and authorized properly through the local chain of command. While Afghanistan remained a combat zone under conditions of Coalition air supremacy there was no apparent need for ground troops of any nationality to indulge in exceptional force protection activity to prevent air attack, either from friendly or enemy forces.

Notwithstanding the chain of events leading to the decision to deviate from the homeward transit and the eventual reaction to perceived events on the ground, it remains a fact that highly qualified and experienced pilots, in continuous contact with an airborne controller, made the fateful decision to escalate an essentially benign but ambiguous situation to the point that a weapon was released and Canadian troops were killed.

Accordingly, it is the overall conclusion of the Board that the proximate fault for the outcome of the attack lies with the two F-16 pilots of Coffee 51 Flight. Furthermore, there are a number of secondary deficiencies that, if corrected, may have prevented the accident. These are largely but not limited to systemic shortcomings in air coordination and control procedures, as well as mission planning practices by the tactical flying units. The effects of these shortcomings are compounded by expectancy on the part of both ground and air authorities that all Airspace Control Measures would be understood and applied.

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Corrective action has already taken place in a number of instances; other proposed changes will require additional study to address, and some areas of weakness may only be resolved in the long-term. What is certain, however, is that this event has opened a new chapter on the study and understanding of the mechanisms and preconditions surrounding fratricide. Furthermore, it is a study that is being undertaken in the context of ongoing joint and combined operations, wherein Coalition forces of vastly differing capabilities and methods of operation are coming face to face with both the vast potential and the great peril implied by high-speed, high-technology warfare in a fluid and uncertain environment.

Many observers have called “friendly fire” a military fact of life – some argue that it is inevitable, especially in the evolving “network centric” style of modern Western warfare. These opinions aside, the Board strongly recommends that Canada must continue to actively engage her allies in a concerted effort to understand why and how fratricide incidents occur, with the aim of prevention and with the ultimate goal of preserving our scarce and increasingly valuable operational resources.

Reaffirmation of Intent

From its inception, the Board set and demonstrated a strong commitment to the highest standards of openness and transparency, consistent with operational imperatives and the sensitive nature of the incident. This approach, consistent with the current operating philosophy of the Department of National Defence, was taken to ensure that the families of the deceased and injured, the personnel of the CF, and the people of Canada were sufficiently informed as to the circumstances and causes of this unfortunate event.

General Maurice Baril (Retired), PresidentColonel Greg Matte, MemberColonel Mark Hodgson, MemberChief Warrant Officer Denis Levesque, Member

Ottawa, June 19, 2002

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Table of Contents

Letter from the President iExecutive Summary iiTable of Contents ixReader’s Guide to the Final Report xPart I - Conduct of the Investigation 1

Chronology of Investigative Activities............................................................................1The Coalition Investigation Board..................................................................................3Collected and Received Evidence..................................................................................3

Part II - Chronology of Events 6Part III - Narrative Analysis 11

Land Events.................................................................................................................11Air Events....................................................................................................................20Post-Incident Events....................................................................................................31

Part IV - Detailed Findings 35Circumstances.............................................................................................................35Proximate Cause..........................................................................................................36Duty Status of Members..............................................................................................38Blame..........................................................................................................................38Connection to Military Service.....................................................................................41Planning and Conduct..................................................................................................42Safety Procedures........................................................................................................42Canadian - American Coordination...............................................................................43Air - Ground Coordination............................................................................................44Post-Incident Activities.................................................................................................47Other Relevant Issues..................................................................................................48

Part V - Recommendations 49Previously Submitted Recommendations.....................................................................49Additional Recommendations......................................................................................51The Leggat Study.........................................................................................................54

Annexes 1Annex A - Terms of Reference.......................................................................................1Annex B - Visual Timeline Chart (21:16Z to 21:36Z)......................................................3Annex C - Time Interpretation Table..............................................................................4Annex D - Area Map of Kandahar Airfield Facility and Tarnak Farm...............................5Annex E - Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range Complex..................................................6Annex F - Tank Stalk Range Photos................................................................................8Annex G - Troop Disposition and Wadi Profile at Bomb Impact....................................11Annex H - Flight Path Reconstruction...........................................................................12Annex I - Transcript of Air to Air Radio Communications..............................................14Annex J - Relevant Air Orders and Instructions............................................................19Annex K - The Leggat Study.........................................................................................20

Glossary 1

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Reader’s Guide to the Final Report

Though the unfortunate events of 17 April 2002 took only a few minutes to unfold, the multifaceted nature of modern military operations renders any investigation of such an incident extremely complex. When describing and analyzing events, any investigation of this sort must consider not only the direct operational activities of individuals involved, but also such elements as equipment, command and control organizations, doctrine and training, environmental factors, and even attitudes and beliefs. It is a difficult task to bring these elements together in such a way as to paint an accurate and compelling picture of what happened, yet remain accessible to a broad military and civilian readership.

To accomplish this goal, in the face of upwards of 2200 pages of verbal testimony, over 40 exhibits, and numerous supporting submissions, the following interpretive structure has been adopted:

To account for the very substantial quantity of evidence and testimony developed by the Board, elements of the above structure are expanded across 13 volumes to support the content of the Final Report. Specifically;

Volumes 1 to 7 - TestimonyVolumes 8 and 9 - ExhibitsVolumes 10 to 13 - Supporting Material

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Narrative Analysis Of Ground Events

Narrative AnalysisOf Air Events

Chronology of EventsFactual elements only, no interpretation beyond that required to understand the ongoing activities

Predeployment Phase

Preparation for Live-Fire Exercise

Live Fire Exercise

Post-Incident Activities

Mission Preparation

Phase

Mission Execution Phase


Summary of Causal FactorsIncluding identification of standards of performance, degree of breach(es) of standard

Findings & Conclusions IAW Terms of Reference (Annex A)

RecommendationsIn addition to other areas for future consideration


Part I - Conduct of the Investigation

Chronology of Investigative Activities

On 19 April 2002, at the instruction of the convening authority, the Minister of National Defence, a Board of Inquiry was formed to investigate the injury and death of Canadian Forces personnel during live fire training at or near Kandahar, Afghanistan on or about 17:21:40Z 17 April 2002. The initial terms of reference are included at Annex A.

The Board conducted its first formal meeting at 0800 hours on 22 April 2002 in the Chief of Staff J3 Conference Room, at National Defence Headquarters. The Board was provided copies of the Air Tasking Order (ATO), the Airspace Coordination Order (ACO), Special Instructions (SPINS) and various documents. Later in the day, J3 International staff provided a theatre situational awareness briefing, which included the following areas:

a background brief on Afghanistan;

an intelligence brief; and

a review of the pre-deployment training, deployment and mission of 3 PPCLI BG in Afghanistan.

During the ensuing days, an initial work plan was developed and refined in preparation for the first overseas deployment. The Board departed late on 24 April and arrived in on 25 April. After receiving a series of orientation briefings on the morning of 26 April in , the Board moved to the location of the National Support Unit at to view and set up its base of operations for staging into Afghanistan. Major S. Schrieber, Officer Commanding (OC) Administration Company, 3 PPCLI BG provided the Board with background information on the following aspect of the BG’s mission:

pre-deployment training;

the mission;

the deployment; and

operations to date.

On 27 April, Captain J. MacEachern, Officer Commanding Canadian Forces National Investigative Service (OC CFNIS) Detachment Kandahar, provided an overview of his ongoing investigation into the friendly fire incident. The next day, Major , an F-16 pilot from the 27th Fighter Wing, United States Air Force (USAF), arrived to join the Board. Major role was to assist the Board in its understanding of the procedural and technical aspects of the F-16 operations and to aid in effecting liaison with American units.

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On 29 April, the Board departed at 09:00 hours (local) by C-130 for the Kandahar Airfield Facility (KAF) in Afghanistan. Of note, all times are expressed in Greenwich Mean Time and abbreviated as “Z”; a chart to aid in interpretation of “Z” versus local times in Kandahar, Ottawa and Edmonton is included at Annex C. Upon arrival at the 3 PPCLI BG lines in KAF, the Board received a general brief on the Camp including force protection measures. An initial 15-minute orientation brief was also provided by Major , the TF Rakkasan Safety Officer. From 11:35Z until 17:56Z, four witnesses were interviewed by the Board.

Early the next morning, the Board proceeded under armed escort to the Tarnak Farm Range, the site of the friendly fire incident. Starting at 04:00Z, the Board commenced a walk through of the site with testimony provided by Captain J. Jasper, the Range Safety Officer on the night in question. After returning to the KAF at about 06:30Z, the Board resumed its proceedings by taking additional evidence from Captain Jasper in order to clarify observations made at Tarnak Farm. Before adjourning later that day, sworn testimony was taken from another eight witnesses.

The Board’s proceedings recommenced the next morning 1 May at 06:00Z. Sworn testimony was taken from three more witnesses after which the Board members traveled by air to Bagram Air Base, near Kabul. The trip to Bagram was necessitated by the fact that key witnesses from the 3 PPCLI BG had deployed to Bagram in preparation for other operations. In addition to the re-examination of Captain J. Jasper, a total of five witnesses were interviewed that same day.

The Board interviewed its last witnesses in the theatre of operations on 2 May in Bagram. Returning to later that day, the Board remained there until departing for Canada in the early hours of 6 May.

Upon its return to Canada, the Board and several advisors traveled to Edmonton and interviewed four of the injured servicemen on 8 May. Unfortunately, the health of Sergeant L. Ford necessitated a later return of the Board. This took place on 14 May, the day after the Board submitted its Interim Report.

While work continued on the writing of the Final Report, preparations were made to return to the Middle East to interview Major (the Mission Control Commander aboard the AWACS at the time of the incident) and to visit the Coalition Air Operations Centre (CAOC) at the . While the Board traveled to and interviewed Major on 2 June, it was prevented from entering when visas could not be arranged within the time constraints of the Board’s tight schedule for completion of the Final Report. The Board returned to Canada on 03 June. The last of the sworn testimony was taken by the Board on 12 June, with the attendance of Lieutenant-Colonel M. Simpson in Ottawa.

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The Coalition Investigation Board

Both Canadian and American authorities ordered separate, independent investigations of the friendly fire incident. While the activities of the American investigation board, known as the CIB, was concurrent with the Board, the CIB was governed by different rules and served different purposes. The primary role of the CIB was to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the friendly fire (fratricide) incident so as to obtain and preserve all available evidence for later use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action or adverse administrative actions. United States (US) personnel must appear when called to testify under oath unless they assert the privilege, under the US law, against self-incrimination. In that event, they may exercise the right to remain silent and decline to testify once sworn under oath. This protection is afforded in all such investigations which may lead directly to disciplinary or criminal proceedings.

US authorities cooperated to the fullest extent possible, within the limits of their national legal restrictions, throughout the course of their investigation. The convening order and initial guidance for the CIB are contained in two source documents dated 24 and 26 April 2002 respectively (see Vol 10, Tabs 4 and 5). Canadian participation on an American investigation board was unprecedented. In addition to the appointment of Brigadier-General M. Dumais as Co-President, seven other Canadian servicemen were assigned roles on the CIB. Direction to the CIB provided for the following:

the American Co-President was to collaborate with the Canadian Co-President on opinions as to the cause of the incident and was to seek his recommendations as to the corrective measures to the extent the measures address combined or Coalition military activities;

the possibility of individual findings of fact, opinions, or reserved concurrence on specific matters as deemed appropriate;

the assessment of fault or neglect and recommendations concerning administrative and disciplinary actions involving US personnel were only to be made through American Board members; and

the Canadian Co-President was authorized to act as a liaison with the Canadian Board.

Collected and Received Evidence

The Board examined the chronology of circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident from two different perspectives; first from the ground and second from the air. Initially, the Board focused its efforts and activities in examining the sequence of events on the ground that led to the tragic events on 17 April 2002. As part of its investigative activities, the Board availed itself of the opportunity to visit the site of the incident and took testimony from individuals in the theatre of operations. Having completed the initial examination of

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circumstances at the ground level, the Board turned its attention to determine the facts and sequence of events from the air perspective.

Although the Board had already interviewed American witnesses during its visit to the KAF in the late April time period, a message issued by United States Commander in Chief Central Command (USCINCCENT) on 01 May 2002 (enclosed as Vol 10, Tab 6) specified the terms of the protocol concerning the passage of information from the CIB and access by the Board to American witnesses. In particular, the following key points were established:

all information requested by the Board was only to be released through the CIB;

the testimony of any US witness requested by the Board was to be provided through the transfer of sworn affidavits or transcripts of sworn testimony;

information released to the Board was not to be publicly disclosed or provided to Canadian officials outside of the Board and reviewing chain without the prior written consent of the US Government;

classified information released to the Board was to be safeguarded in the same manner and to the same degree as corresponding Canadian classified information; and

the American CIB Co-President could prescribe such conditions and restrictions deemed appropriate, consistent with and subject to US laws and regulations.

The Board’s first written request for specific information was forwarded to the CIB on 2 May. The Board received the first delivery of documentation on 5 May. Additional information was forwarded on 17, 27 and 30 May with the final acceptance of information and transcripts of testimony occurring on 7 June.

By way of explanation, a board of inquiry may receive any evidence that it considers is sufficient to establish any relevant fact either taken alone on consideration with other evidence. Direct evidence is preferred and in this regard witnesses who have first hand knowledge should normally be called to testify. The testimony of a number of American servicemen was initially considered essential in order to fully appreciate the events of 17 April 2002. With the knowledge that the Board would eventually have access to the transcripts of testimony given before the CIB, the Board initially considered it essential to request the voluntary attendance of certain American service personnel in order to properly weigh the testimony and draw the most appropriate conclusions.

Outside of Canada, the Board had no statutory authority to compel the attendance of American citizens. By letter dated 12 May, the Board requested the voluntary attendance of

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the following persons from the AWACS aircraft crew:

Requested Crewmember PositionMajor (Canadian Exchange Officer) Mission Crew CommanderCaptain Senior Director1st Lieutenant Air Weapons Officer (Site Controller)1st Lieutenant Air Weapons Officer (Strike Assist)1st Lieutenant Air Weapons Officer (Check-in Controller)Technical Sergeant Weapons Director (Tanker Controller)Staff Sergeant Communications TechnicianSenior Airman Communications System Operator

At the same time, the Board requested the voluntary attendance of the two F-16 pilots involved in the incident. In response, the CIB reiterated its intention to provide the transcripts of all testimony taken before the CIB. As the two F-16 pilots had already attended before the CIB and declined to answer questions, the CIB did provide contact information for the legal counsel representing the two American service personnel. A written request to attend was subsequently forwarded to each of the respective counsel.

By letter, dated 5 June, counsel for Major advised that his client was unwilling to testify but would consider responding to any written questions. A list of questions was forwarded by facsimile on 12 June. A facsimile response was provided by Major on 14 June. A copy of the written questions and Major response are enclosed at Vol 13, Tab 48. Major the second pilot involved, declined the invitation to be interviewed or respond to written questions.

Lastly, in order to thoroughly and accurately analyze the sequence of events leading to the incident on 17 April 2002, the Board also needed to develop an understanding of the air coordination and control procedures in effect at the time. To do so, the Board was interested in visiting CAOC at and receiving an information brief on applicable air coordination procedures in the theatre of operations. While American authorities granted permission to visit the CAOC, the Board was not able to make arrangements to travel to the CAOC during any of its visits to the Middle East due to difficulties encountered in obtaining entry visas for . However, the Board did benefit from a video teleconference (VTC) brief provided by military authorities from the CAOC on 12 June. Later that same day, Board members heard sworn testimony from Lieutenant-Colonel M. Simpson describing the procedures in place at the CAOC.

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Part II - Chronology of Events

The following is a chronological breakdown of the significant events leading up to and after the impact of the bomb at 21:26:01Z on 17 April 2002. The narrative is restricted to a basic explanation of factual events only; much more detailed analysis is included in Part III of the report; a visual representation of the key timeline can be found at Annex B. All times are expressed in Greenwich Mean Time and abbreviated as “Z”; a chart to aid in interpretation of “Z” versus a local times in Kandahar, Ottawa and Edmonton is included at Annex C.

The primary participants are as follows:

“A” Company - one of three companies within the 3rd Battalion of the PPCLI, attached to the American-led TF Rakkasan

3 Section - the element of 3 Platoon, “A” Company conducting the tank stalk portion of the night’s range; accompanied by Sergeant Leger

Coffee 51 - call sign of the lead F-16 in the two aircraft element; also, the collective call sign of Coffee 51 and Coffee 52 (Coffee 51 Flight)

Coffee 52 - call sign of the wingman F-16 of Coffee 51

- call sign of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft providing tactical and administrative direction to Coffee 51 Flight

- call sign of the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC); the unit responsible for overall airspace control in the region, under command of the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC)

Time Unit (s) EventEarly April, 2002

6 -14 Apr 02

approx 1 wk prior to exercise

Commander TF Rakkasan

Commanding Officer 3 PPCLI

Training Officer 3 PPCLI

“A” Company 2 I/C

Transfers security task at from a US Company to 3 PPCLI, to commence 20 April 2002.

“A” Company is selected for the airfield defence task, training begins.

Request to use Tarnak Farm Range for purposes of night live-fire training is submitted and approved.

Completes range booking and planning requirements as specified in TF Rakkasan Range Standing Operating Procedures for the Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range.

17 Apr 02

Approx

“A” Company A convoy of five trucks plus an ambulance and escorting armoured units departs the KAF en route for the Tarnak Farm Range (4.5km south).

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Time Unit (s) Event15:05Z

15:20Z Coffee 51, 52

Coffee 51 Flight departs in for a planned mission ( transit, hours on station) over the northeastern part of Afghanistan. The mission is classified as “On-Call Interdiction” wherein the aircraft provides an on-station presence for unforecast close air support requirements.

15:30Z “A” Company Company arrives at the range, begins preparations.

16:01Z “A” CompanyLive-fire exercise begins; weapons are grouped and zeroed, followed by simultaneous use of a Close Quarter Battle range and a Tank Stalk range.

20:35Z KAF Control Tower

Control tower imposes a “check fire” at the Range to allow for incoming aircraft. This is carried out by radio, through a Control Tower Sentry. The “check fire” is cancelled at 20:51Z and firing resumes.

Approx 21:00Z Coffee 51, 52

The F-16 sortie departs its area of operations in northeast Afghanistan, heading south-west towards Kandahar, en route to a rendezvous with tanker aircraft.

Approx21:15Z 3 Section

3 Section begins its exercise on the Tank Stalk range, moving up the drainage ditch (wadi) under the command of MCpl Clark (Section 2I/C), monitored by Sgt Ford (Section I/C) with Sgt Leger acting as Range Safety Officer.

Approx21:21Z Coffee 51, 52 The transiting F-16 aircraft observe ground fire and

report it to .

21:22:38Z Coffee 51, 52 Aircraft – in both aircraft.

21:22:52Z Coffee 52Coffee 52 attempts to “mark” (determine target location thru a sensor) the target and send this information to the lead aircraft.

21:23:34Z Coffee 52 Coffee 52 makes his initial request to attack the target with 20mm cannon.

21:23:42Z tells Coffee 51 Flight to “standby” while relaying the initial details of the situation and the request to .

21:23:45Z Coffee 51 Coffee 51 reminds Coffee 52 of the need to ensure that the target is not a friendly force.

21:24:48Z Coffee 51,52Both aircraft align their and laser designators to the same position on the ground, roughly on the centre mass of individuals in the wadi.

21:24:50Z 3 SectionThe fifth and last round of the anti-tank weapon is fired; firing plume is visible on the targeting pod video from Coffee 51.

21:25:00Z passes Coffee 51 Flight direction to “hold

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Time Unit (s) Eventfire” and requests additional details for the SAFIRE (surface - air fire) report to .

21:25:04ZCoffee 52

Coffee 52 calls that he has sighted men on a road and a piece of artillery that is firing at them. He immediately invokes self-defence and initiates his attack.

21:25:14Z acknowledges Coffee 52’s transmission.

21:25:17Z Coffee 51 Coffee 51 assists Coffee 52 by reminding him to verify his weapons settings.

21:25:39Z Coffee 52Coffee 52 releases one GBU-12, 500-lb bomb. Post-release, his aircraft descends to an altitude of 13,210 ft MSL (10,550 ft above ground).

21:26:01Z 3 Section

Bomb impacts on the Western edge of the wadi, close to the lip of the ditch and slightly to the left of the group comprising Sgt Leger, Corporal Dyer, and Pte Smith.

All three are killed, as is Pte Green, whose body is thrown to the southeast. All of the six remaining 3 Section personnel within the wadi are injured, as are two other soldiers waiting in an adjacent area near the support vehicles.

Remaining troops disperse from vehicles in case of a re-attack by the aircraft, which is heard to pass overhead.

21:26:11Z directs Coffee 51 Flight to disengage, stating “Friendlies Kandahar”; Coffee 51 acknowledges.

21:26:44Z directs Coffee 51 Flight to depart the area to the south; Coffee 51 Flight departs the area.

21:27Z

“A” Company

Ctrl Tower Sentry, 3 PPCLI CP

Range reports to 3 PPCLI Command Post that it has been attacked by fast air. Uninjured troops begin to triage casualties, administer first aid, and account for personnel.

Simultaneously, the tower (acting through the 3 PPCLI command post) attempts to impose a “check fire” for an incoming transport aircraft.

21:27:15Z

requests coordinates of target and asks whether any weapons were expended. Coffee 52 confirms that one bomb was dropped, and passes an estimated position (actually 5-6 nm from Tarnak Farm).

21:28:01Z Coffee 52Coffee 52 asks whether he would like him to return to the target site to get the correct position; declines.

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Time Unit (s) Event

Approx 21:28 - :29Z Coffee 51, 52

The two pilots discuss what they saw on the ground. At the close of the discussion Coffee 52 states “I hope that was the right thing to do;” Coffee 51 agrees.

21:29:10Z Coffee 51 Coffee 51 confirms that it was a GBU-12 that was dropped, and partially updates his SAFIRE report.

21:31:05Z Coffee 51

Coffee 51 asks to confirm that there was no

in effect in the area. agrees with this assessment.

21:31:30Z Coffee 51, 52Aircraft recording systems deactivated; Coffee 51 Flight proceeds to waiting air refueler and continues on to home base .

21:35Z TF RakkasanTF Rakkasan vvv confirms that the coalition aircraft had felt threatened and had dropped ordnance in self-defence.

21:36Z TF Rakkasan Air Medical Evacuation (Air Medevac) helicopter is ordered to launch.

21:56Z Medevac Medevac helicopter launches.22:03Z Medevac Medevac helicopter arrives at Tarnak Farm Range.

22:20Z Medevac Helicopter departs Range with most seriously injured patients; arrives at the KAF in four minutes.

22:24Z “A” CompanyCommanding Officer of “A” Company stops the search of the incident site, owing to danger from unexploded ordnance.

22:48Z “A” Company All “A” Company personnel are accounted for.

23:05Z “A” Company Remaining injured are transported to the KAF via armoured ambulance.

23:45Z 3 PPCLICanadian Forces National Investigative Service (CFNIS) personnel arrive at incident site to begin investigation.

18 April 02,00:26Z

TF Rakkasan

“A” Company

US personnel dispatched from TF Rakkasan arrive at Tarnak Farm to secure the site and relieve “A” Company.

Decision is made to redeploy all junior “A” Company personnel; key leaders remain to control the incident site.

01:30Z TF RakkasanUS Disaster Mortuary Affairs Response Team (DMART) arrives at site to begin forensic investigation.

05:44Z TF Rakkasan US Criminal Investigation Division is dispatched to support CFNIS investigation.

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Time Unit (s) Event

06:39Z “A” Company All remaining “A” Company personnel depart Tarnak Farm for KAF

11:32Z TF RakkasanAll casualties requiring additional medical treatment depart from KAF via US Air Medical Evacuation for US facilities in Landstuhl, Germany.

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Part III - Narrative Analysis

Land Events

General

This section presents a detailed analysis of ground activities prior to, during, and after the 17 April 2002 incident. The analysis will briefly describe pre-deployment preparation, review the ground situation in Afghanistan at the time, and then will explore relevant aspects of troop disposition and command and control in and around the KAF, the main operating base of TF Rakkasan. The narrative will then address pre-exercise preparation and training, the conduct of the live-fire exercise up to the bomb impact, and ground activities in the immediate aftermath of the event. Content of this section is based upon evidence collected by the Board, testimonies received under oath, exhibits submitted, and information supplied by the CIB according to formal protocol.

Pre-deployment Preparation

At the time of the September 11 terrorist attack, 3 PPCLI was already tasked as the Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)) BG, maintaining a high level of readiness at all times. The Key Company was at 72 hours notice to move and the Main Body was at 10 days notice to move. In October and early November, plans were initiated for the deployment of the IRF (L) BG to Afghanistan. The potential employment options were for security or combat tasks. Several missions were considered, with the final decision made in late December, to deploy the 3 PPCLI BG for potential combat tasks.

Prior to the BG’s deployment to Afghanistan, Level Four/Five/Six Collective Training was conducted from September-December 2001. The 3 PPCLI BG was declared “Operationally Ready” by the Commander Land Force Western Area, on 31 October 2001. Specifics of this process can be found in the supporting material under Director Land Force Requirements (Plans) Training Summary dated 19 April 2002 (Vol 12, Tab 47).

The BG Reconnaissance Party departed Ottawa en route to Afghanistan on 11 January 2002, arriving in Afghanistan on 14 January. The BG began deployment to Kandahar on 3 February 2002, while “C” Company deployed to Kandahar on 8 March. The BG, less C Company, was declared “Operationally Ready” by the 3 PPCLI Commanding Officer on 12 February 2002. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) authorized full employment on 15 February. “C” Company would be declared “Operationally Ready” later in March.

The 3 PPCLI BG was placed under “Operational Control” of an American Brigade, Task Force Rakkasan. Initially the BG was employed as the KAF Security Force. The BG participated in combat operations from 2-18 March, with elements participating in Operation ANACONDA and the BG (less one infantry company and the reconnaissance squadron) participating in Operation HARPOON. During Operation HARPOON, 3 PPCLI personnel

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engaged in a very arduous, high-altitude reconnaissance in force to clear Al Quaida and Taliban forces.

Afghanistan Ground Situation

After the completion of Operation ANACONDA on 23 March 2002, the Commander of TF Rakkasan elected to rotate his battalions (including 3 PPCLI) through the brigade tasks of Early in April 2002,

During the previous four to six weeks the had encountered a series of hit and run night attacks (small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars). Therefore night fighting skills would be of great importance to the deploying Canadian troops. In order to develop and refresh acquired night fighting skills, “A” Company planned and coordinated, a section level, night live-fire training exercise on the Tarnak Farm Range, 17 April 2002 (see Annex D).

The primary intent of the Night Live Fire Exercise was to build on the existing night-fighting skill sets to ensure soldiers were comfortable with using their equipment to its full extent. Using battle simulation targeting (pop-up targets), the range included a tactical scenario to build on section level instinctive shooting techniques, and incorporated section and platoon support weapons in an anti-armour role from a completely separate range for added realism. 3 PPCLI BG soldiers were equipped with

It is normal practice for military units in an operational theatre to conduct training that will enhance or maintain required skill sets. A six-month tour (or longer) is an extremely long period to deploy without incorporating a plan to refresh skills that can deteriorate over time. This practice is common in all modern armies; Canadian soldiers trained this way during the Second World War and have conducted training in the Balkans operational area for over a decade (Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, OMM,CD (ret’d), Training To Fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army, 2nd ed. May 2001).

Pre-Exercise Preparations

The Tarnak Farm Range (Annex E) was a former Al Qaeda training area, and had been used by Coalition Forces since late 2001. The range was established to provide a venue for tactical training scenarios, including live-fire manoeuvre using small arms, heavy machine guns, anti-armour weapons, and mortars. This was not the first time the 3 PPCLI BG had used these ranges - they had been conducting safe, comprehensive, realistic training, consistent with the tactical realities of the theatre, since February.

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In accordance with the Tarnak Farm Range Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), the 3 PPCLI Training Officer submitted the Range Request Form for consideration at the weekly Resource Planning Conference. In addition, the “A” Company Second in Command (2 I/C), Captain Jasper, completed the requirements listed in the Range Planners Check List, details of which can be found in the Tarnak Farm Range Standing Orders. The Range SOPs do not delegate any responsibility to the unit for coordination higher than the Task Force, or with the Coalition Force Air Component Command; this was and is, clearly a US responsibility. The Task Force had established a and was confident that proper Airspace Control Measures had been coordinated with the Air Component. (Testimony of 29 April 2002 and Colonel 30 April 2002).

The exercise planners developed the range practices based on the “A” Company operational tasks and the Commanding Officer’s guidance to OCs (Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Stogran, 29 April 2002). The subsequent conduct of the live fire exercise was consistent with established regulations, as directed by the Canadian Forces (Canadian BGL 381-018-001-TS/000 DAT 2001) and Task Force Rakkasan Tarnak Farm Range SOPs.

Conduct of the Exercise

At approximately 1505Z, 17 April 2002, “A” Company departed Kandahar Airfield (KAF) en-route to the Tarnak Farm Range, 4.5 km to the southwest. The convoy consisted of five Medium Logistics Vehicles, an ambulance and escort vehicles. The convoy arrived at the range at approximately 1530Z, at which time “A” Company began to prepare the range.

The night live fire exercise was to be conducted on two separate and independent ranges running simultaneously. In the Corral area, a Close-Quarter Combat Range had been established, with the approach through Wadi South. Wadi East (the site of the incident) was both the line of approach and the firing line for the Tank Stalk Range. The Officer In Charge (OIC) of both ranges was Major Hacket, Officer Commanding (OC) “A” Company. The Range Safety Officer (RSO) for the Close-Quarter Combat Range was Captain Jasper, 2 I/C “A” Company, while the RSO for the Tank Stalk was Sergeant Leger, from company headquarters.

The Company Sergeant Major, Master Warrant Officer Whitehall, supervised the Administrative Area. He was responsible for controlling the form-up of relays and the movement of soldiers forward to meet up with the RSOs to start the range process. The Company Quartermaster Sergeant, Warrant Officer Boland, was responsible for ensuring that all participants had the required amount of ammunition to conduct the range activity.

Overall, the conduct of both live-fire ranges was in accordance with Task Force Rakkasan Tarnak Farm Range Standard Operating Procedures. Training also adhered to the Canadian publication BGL 381-001-TS/000 DAT 2001 (Training Safety), with two minor exceptions. During the preparation of range traces, Weapon Ricochet Danger Area Templates were not utilized when range arcs were prepared. Secondly, during preparation of the at the ammunition point, electric detonators were inserted before

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moving forward to the range and remained inserted during the conduct of the range. The detonator should not be inserted in the until the time that the weapon will be used (BGL 320-010 FP-001 Mines and Booby Traps, Vol 13, Tab 55). These omissions played no role in the incident itself.

The Close-Quarter Combat Range

The Close-Quarter Combat Range incorporated primary and secondary weapons allocated to each individual within “A” Company, depending on their position within a section. These included the . All engagements were conducted in Wadi South, a drainage ditch traveling east to west parallel with the perimeter wall of the former Al-Queda terrorist training camp.

Under the supervision of Captain Jasper, two to five soldiers would move through the ammunition collection point to a designated start line in Wadi South. From this point the soldiers would engage targets as they appeared while moving west through the wadi and up to the Corral. The RSO was there only to intervene in case of safety violations; not to control fire. The pop-up targets were installed in the wadi and the Corral, and incorporated small explosive charges to simulate enemy fire. Once the tactical movement from the wadi into the Corral had been completed and all targets had been engaged and weapons were cleared, soldiers were debriefed, and returned to the administrative area. This process took about 30 minutes.

The Tank Stalk Range

Under the supervision of the RSO, Sergeant Leger, the Tank Stalk Range employed heavier platoon and section weapons,

.

The range was conducted in Wadi East, the drainage ditch running north to south and intersecting with Wadi South at the ammunition collection point. Sergeant Leger controlled the movement of the section weapons detachment from the administration area, through the ammunition collection point, to the start line in the Wadi East, facing north. The total ammunition allocated for each serial of the Tank Stalk Range was:

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Upon being directed to commence, sections were to move north in the wadi until the first target was presented. This was a “Figure 11” (man-sized) target at the top of the wadi, which simulated a guard detecting and firing upon the detachment. The first man in the detachment was to engage the target. The position of the target indicated that the section had advanced as far as safety allowed up the wadi. The section would then climb the sloping walls of the wadi, tactically deploy as laid out previously by the section 2 I/C, adopt firing positions, and await fire orders (see Annex F). Orders would then be passed, indicating target, weapon selection, and rates of fire.

Targets were engaged according to standard operating procedures using night vision sights. For weapons without night sights, targets were designated with tracer from machine gun fire. At the end of each serial, the RSO would clear all weapons. would then be set to cover the section’s withdrawal down the wadi to the south. The detonation of the marked the end of each section’s participation. The section was then debriefed and returned to the administrative area. The entire Tank Stalk exercise was planned to take about 35 minutes per serial.

Conduct of Live Firing

One communications were established between the range and the 3 PPCLI Command Post, the TF Rakkasan Tactical Operations Centre, and the KAF Tower Sentry at approximately 16:01Z, permission was granted for the ranges to start live fire. The exercise began with a weapons zeroing practise to confirm the accuracy of the troops’ prior to beginning the simultaneous conduct of the Close-Quarter Combat Range (15 serials planned) and the Tank Stalk Range (7 serials planned). The serials participating on the ranges were all part of “A” Company.

The exercise proceeded without interruption until 20:35Z, when the KAF Control Tower imposed a “Check Fire” through the Control Tower Sentry due to an inbound transport aircraft. The “Check Fire” was cancelled at 20:51Z, after the transport aircraft had landed, and firing resumed. At 21:15Z, the Close-Quarter Combat Range had just completed the current serial and personnel were in the process of moving off the range.

On the Tank Stalk Range, 3 Section, 3 Platoon, “A” Company were moving to their firing positions under the command of Master Corporal Clark, 3 Section 2 I/C. Allowing the 2 I/C to direct section fire is normal practice, providing him with valuable experience should he have to assume the command role. Sergeant Ford, the actual Commander of 3 Section, accompanied the section on the range.

The 3 Section Tank Stalk range began at approximately 21:15Z with Corporal Paquette firing approximately three or four bursts from his into the “Figure 11” target. These rounds would have been fired from the bottom of the wadi toward the top of the wadi;

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the tracer would have traveled at a sharp angle into the sky. The section then deployed along the top of the wadi, facing west according to the diagram at Annex G, and began engaging the near tank target with anti-armour weapons and machine gun fire. For those section weapons without night sights, the tank target position was indicated with tracers.

During the next ten minutes, 3 Section would fire one

Between 21:10Z and 21:20Z, a flight of two American helicopters approaching Kandahar Airfield from the east observed weapons at the Tarnak Farm Range, approximately six miles from their flight path. The fire was described by the helicopter mission commander, Major , as small arms fire, with two bright flashes, approximately two seconds apart, followed by more small arms fire. The fire was described as “surface to surface” ground fire and the rate of small arms fire was described as constant. Some ricochets were observed with the highest burnout between 500ft and 1000ft Above Ground Level (AGL), as estimated by the TF Rakkasan helicopter pilots.

Analysis of the weapons systems being utilized, as well as witness testimony indicated that the range would likely have appeared very active initially, with the rate of fire tapering off after the first few minutes. The range would have been clearly visible from the air, however the weapon systems used presented no threat to high-flying aircraft. The maximum burnout for the tracer rounds used is . The maximum range for the and machine guns, even in an anti-aircraft role, is , respectively. The and the would display a flash signature when fired, as well as upon impact with the tank target. The maximum templated ranges of these weapons are respectively. The anti-tank weapons would not display what could be described as a tracer. It should be emphasized that all weapons were being fired in the surface-to-surface mode, not surface-to-air.

The rate of fire was reduced during the latter minutes leading up to the incident to conserve ammunition and ensure target indication for the . During the last two minutes prior to the bomb impact, the rate of fire on the range had slowed dramatically and could be described as sporadic. Range participants stated the above in their testimony.

At approximately 21:21Z, at the same time the transiting F-16s were observing and reporting the ground fire to the AWACS, some members of “A” Company reported hearing jets fly overhead. 3 Section continued to fire, not knowing what was transpiring in the skies above them.

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Bomb Impact

3 Section fired its fifth round at 21:24:50Z, Less than 15 seconds later, Coffee 52, now manoeuvring less than five nm to the south of the firing, that he had sighted men on a road and what looked like an artillery piece on the road and was under anti-aircraft fire. Invoking the right of self-defence, he initiated his attack almost immediately, releasing the weapon less than 35 seconds after invoking self defence Rules of Engagement (ROE).

The bomb impacted at 21:26:01Z, just as Sergeant Leger was climbing up the west wall of the wadi behind Corporal Dyer and Private Smith, the crew of the . When the bomb exploded, the 3 Section firing position was engulfed by a large flash, followed by a blast/heat wave and a cloud of smoke and dust. Some members of “A” Company reported hearing a jet fly at low level over the company position immediately after or coinciding with the impact of the bomb. Personnel standing in the administrative area and near vehicles took immediate cover to avoid a possible second attack.

The bomb struck near the Western lip of the wadi, heading roughly 055 degrees at an impact angle of at least degrees from the horizontal. The impact point was to the left of the crew and to the right of Private Green. Sergeant Leger, Corporal Dyer, and Private Smith were killed in place; the force of the blast threw Pte Green’s remains some distance to the southeast. The rest of the section as well as two other members of the company received blast and shrapnel-related injuries; specific details can be found in the Findings portion of the report.

Post-Impact Activities

Immediately following the explosion, company personnel assessed the situation and began taking appropriate action. Triage, first aid, and accounting for personnel were the priorities. A radio report was sent at 21:27Z to the 3 PPCLI Command Post, stating that fast air had attacked the company position. Simultaneously, the KAF Control Tower Sentry imposed a “Check Fire” with Call Sign Zero attempting to pass the order to “A” Company. This second tower-initiated “Check Fire” was in fact related to an outbound C-130 transport aircraft, departing from KAF, and not to Coffee 51 Flight.

At 21:35Z, the Task Force Rakkasan confirmed on its net that the F-16 aircraft had felt threatened and had dropped ordnance on Task Force Devil (the brevity codeword for “A” Company, 3 PPCLI). During this period “A” Company continued to provide updates on the casualty situation.

At 21:36Z, TF Rakkasan initiated call-out of the Air Medical Evacuation helicopter; they would be airborne and en-route within 20 minutes of notification. Around this time, the first reports of fatally injured casualties were transmitted to the 3 PPCLI Command Post. The Air Medical helicopter arrived at Tarnak Farm at 22:03Z, and an additional ground ambulance

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was dispatched from KAF at 22:14Z. Air Medical Evacuation departed Tarnak Farm with two priority 1, one priority 2 and two priority 3 patients at 22:20Z and arrived at KAF by 22:24Z. The OC of “A” Company stopped the search activity by his troops of the incident site due to the danger from unexploded ordnance at 22:24Z. His intent was to secure the site in preparation for the investigation. At 22:35Z, OC “A” Company reported that there were a total of four priority “4” casualties, and that all casualties were from 3 Platoon. Note that the 3 PPCLI BG consistently used “priority 4” to refer to a fatality; this is technically not correct (see Glossary). The decision was then made to redeploy all “A” Company personnel to KAF, except for key leadership, who would remain at the Range to control the incident site.

By 22:48Z, the OC “A” Company was able to confirm that all “A” Company personnel are accounted. The remaining 3 priority 3 patients were moved to KAF by Bison ambulance at 23:05Z. The casualties were reported as follows:

2 x priority “1” (critically injured) - Sergeant Ford, Corporal Paquette;1 x priority “2” (seriously injured) - Master Corporal Hollister;5 x priority “3” (slightly injured) - Master Corporal Clark, Corporal Perry,

Corporal Declare, Corporal Brennan, Private Link

4 x priority “4” (fatality) - Sergeant Leger, Corporal Dyer, Corporal Smith, Private Green.

An Explosive Ordinance Demolitions (EOD) Team was requested through the chain of command at 23:24Z. The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) Officer, Capt MacEachern, arrived at Tarnak Farm at 23:45Z, escorted by Coyote reconnaissance vehicles. In addition, TF Rakkasan dispatched additional American troops to secure the site and to relieve “A” Company of this task. These personnel arrived at Tarnak Farm at 00:26Z on 18 April 2002. The EOD Team and an American Disaster Mortuary Affairs Response Team (DMART) arrived at approximately 01:30Z and immediately began forensic investigation work under the control of the CFNIS Officer. At 05:44Z an American Criminal Investigation Division Team departed KAF to support the CFNIS Team.

At 06:39Z, all remaining “A” Company personnel departed Tarnak Farm, escorting the remains of the four priority “4” casualties. Other Canadians who remained at Tarnak Farm Range were either conducting or supporting the investigative work. By 11:32Z on 18 April 2002 all of the priority “1”, “2”, and “3” casualties (less Corporal Brennan and Master Corporal Clark, who remained in Kandahar) had departed KAF via US Air Medical Evacuation, en-route to Landstuhl, Germany.

Summary

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The Tarnak Farm Range was a former Al Qaeda training area, and had been used by Coalition Forces since late 2001. The range was established to provide a venue for tactical training scenarios, including live-fire manoeuvre using small arms, heavy machine guns, anti-armour weapons, and mortars. This was not the first time the 3 PPCLI BG had used these ranges - they had been conducting safe, comprehensive, realistic training, consistent with the tactical realities of the theatre, since February.

The 3 PPCLI BG completed all required coordination procedures. The Range SOPs do not delegate any responsibility to the unit for coordination higher than the Task Force, or with the Coalition Force Air Component Command, this was and is, clearly a US responsibility. The Task Force had established and was confident that proper coordination had been completed with the Air Component.

The Range SOPs were appropriate and consistent with Canadian regulations for the conduct of a live fire range. Further, the actions taken by “A” Company and the BG Staff leading up to and during the conduct of the live fire training were in accordance with the Range SOPs.

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Air Events

This section presents a detailed analysis of the flight operations that took place within the Afghanistan Combined Operations Area (COA), as related to the events that occurred at the Tarnak Farm Range near the KAF, in Afghanistan, on 17 April 2002. The analysis will deal mainly with the activities of the key Coalition aircraft involved in the incident, and will touch briefly on mission preparation issues, rules, regulations, and special instructions that existed at the time. Content of this section is based upon evidence collected by the Board, testimonies received under oath, exhibits submitted, and information supplied by the CIB according to formal protocol.

Aircraft and Units Involved

Based on the material reviewed, the events that took place in the airspace above the KAF including the Tarnak Farm Range involved the following significant Coalition members (of the call signs shown below) on the air side:

Callsign Unit Type DetailsCoffee 51Coffee 52 F-16 Fighter Aircraft Each armed with four GBU-12 Laser-LGBs

E-3B/C AWACS Airborne Warning and Control platform; controlling authority for Coffee 51 Flight

KC-135 TankerAwaiting Coffee 51 Flight in a pre-designated area to conduct air-air refuelling (AAR)

Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) located at

Central controlling authority for all airspace in the region; under command of the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC)

Although other airborne assets were present in the vicinity, none of them were involved in the events that took place at Tarnak Farm.

Coffee 51 Flight was under the tactical control of prior to, during and after the events that took place in the Tarnak Farm area. This E3-B/C AWACS platform was on-station approximately nautical miles (nm) east-southeast of the KAF. The tanker controller, responsible for the coordination between fighter aircraft and air-to-air refueling (AAR) assets, was aboard this aircraft and was in direct communications with Coffee 51 Flight.

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Collectively called Coffee 51 Flight


Pre-Incident Mission Details

, 17 April 2002, Coffee 51 Flight took off from tasked to conduct an on-call interdiction mission in the northeastern section of Afghanistan. In this role, Coffee 51 Flight was to transit to the assigned area, loiter for hrs, and then return to its home base. A KC-135 tanker aircraft call sign was assigned to support this mission with pre- and post-strike AAR. The refueling was to take place in an area located approximately nm southwest of the Tarnak Farm / KAF area.

Evidence and mission logs confirm that Coffee 51, after its pre-strike AAR, proceeded deep into Eastern Afghanistan to an area approximately northeast of Kandahar. At 21:16Z, Coffee 51 Flight was returning from their tasked area of operations and was approximately 32 nm east-northeast of the Kandahar area. The formation was at approximately proceeding in a southwesterly direction. At that point, Coffee 51 Flight was preparing to rendezvous with its fueling aircraft, , then located approximately from their position. By that time, the two F-16s had been airborne for approximately

In preparation for the planned AAR, the formation switched from a tactical Strike Control frequency to an administrative Tanker Control frequency, primarily used for traffic and air-to-air refueling coordination. This is significant because it marks a transition from the combat phase to the transit phase of the mission, both physically in terms of communications used, and psychologically in terms of the pilots’ expectation of the nature of activity they would be facing. From that point onwards, all significant action that was captured by various on-board recording devices occurred on two frequencies; frequency used for administrative Tanker Control activities, and frequency used by the two F-16 aircraft for cockpit to cockpit communications that was not monitored by anyone else involved.

Kandahar Area Events

To better describe the air events that took place around the Kandahar area, a detailed diagram of the F-16 flight paths has been created based on radar returns and of both F-16’s involved. This reconstruction can be found at Annex H and will aid in interpretation of the following events. In addition, Annex I contains the transcript of all the radio communications made by the stations involved taken from the audio portions of the above tapes.

At 21:20Z, the radar picture shows Coffee 51 Flight roughly nm to the southeast of the KAF. At around 21:21Z, based on the testimony of Major , Coffee 51 Flight made an unrecorded radio call to stating that they had observed some form of ground fire. The aircraft commander of , listening on the same frequency, stated in his personal written account that Coffee 51 Flight had reported that they saw tracer fire, and that they asked if they should turn back and mark the position. As confirmed by

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account and by the testimony of the AWACS Mission Crew Commander’s (MCC) in charge of the mission aboard , the marking of the position was acknowledged and duly authorized. This meant that had received the initial report of a visual contact of interest, and that they had cleared Coffee 51 Flight to alter its course to more precisely identify the position of interest on the ground. According to , during that same time period, Coffee 51 also informed that they had ordnance available to drop. The exact wording of that statement is unknown.

By 21:22:38Z, the time at which the recording equipment was turned on in both F-16’s, the two aircraft had already turned toward the north and evasively split themselves approximately four to five nm apart. Coffee 51 (the lead aircraft in the F-16 formation) established himself in a Of note, there was little ambient or artificial light in the surrounding area. The moon had already set, creating a very dark night environment. The sky was clear with excellent visibility in all directions and very little ambient moisture was present. Consequently, the tracer fire originating from Tarnak Farm was visible to Coffee 51 Flight at the altitude they were transiting the area (Testimony, CIB interview with Master Sergeant , Vol 12, Tab 36).

At that same time, Coffee 52 (the wingman aircraft in the F-16 formation), having received implied authorization from to deviate from the original track, was in the process of visually marking the target Once the target designation was complete, Coffee 52 initially began to establish himself in a pattern similar to Coffee 51.

During the next four minutes, Coffee 51 remained in a shallow right hand turn at an average speed of Knots Indicated Airspeed (KIAS) and an average altitude of No extraordinary maneuvers or any type of evasion were performed. Throughout the entire engagement, the lead pilot remained busy discussing the situation with his wingman and trying, with the use of his targeting pod, to identify a location on the ground that matched what his wingman was describing. During that four-minute period, Coffee 51 basically flew a single arcing orbit around the Tarnak Farm range area, at an average range of nautical miles from the point on the ground where the soldiers were firing on the Tank Stalk range.

Coffee 52s flight path over same time interval is irregular, flown at a slower average speed and a lower average altitude than his lead. Like Coffee 51, Coffee 52 did not maneuver his aircraft in an aggressive fashion (that would reflect defensive threat reactions) at any time during the subsequent three minutes. Judging by the flight inputs, the work being done with the targeting pod, and the radio calls made, it seems apparent that Coffee 52 spent considerable time focusing his attention outside the cockpit at the observed ground fire below (which was in fact the planned night live fire exercise).

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A few seconds after his transmission at 21:25:04Z, Coffee 52 initiated a sharp right-hand turn His starting speed was , with an altitude of with the bomb release occurring at the very limit of the release envelope. The lowest altitude he reached during this process was as measured by Coffee 52’s The recovery was to level flight, with no clear attempt to gain additional altitude.

For the 45 seconds following the explosion of the bomb, Coffee 52 arced around the point of impact in a shallow right hand turn with his to the target area. During this time he was in a slow climb, which placed him just above by the time the “Scram South!” directive call was passed by . Prior to this transmission, no real attempt was made by either of the F-16 aircraft to leave the target area in an expeditious manner.

This is surprising, considering the pilot’s earlier assessment that the perceived threat necessitated invoking self-defence. As per the testimonies of other F-16 pilots from senior members of the CAOC and the CFACC’s instructors, Coffee 51 Flight should have immediately sought to distance themselves from the perceived threat, both in range and altitude as soon as possible after the GBU-12 LGB had guided to impact. By contrast, it is only when ordered by the AWACS to depart the area, nearly five minutes after initially entering the perceived threat area, that Coffee 51 Flight finally starts building separation between them and the Tarnak Farm range.

At 21:27Z, after approximately five minutes of maneuvering above the Tarnak Farm range, the formation steered to rendezvous with to begin AAR. Once the refueling phase was completed, Coffee 51 Flight returned to its home base without further incident.

Documents and Special Instructions

In order to get a clear understanding of all the planning and coordination elements involved in the air campaign part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), a thorough review of key documents was completed very early in the inquiry. These included the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and the Airspace Control Order (ACO) in effect at the time, and the supporting Special Instructions (SPINS). These are the main documents used by aircrew in the operational theatre for purposes of mission tasking, planning, coordination and execution.

Air Tasking Order - ATO for 17 Apr 02 (Vol 10, Tab 8), contained all of the details required by Coffee 51 Flight to carry out their mission, and was valid for the period of 18 April 2002. After its initial release (most likely around 17:00Z on 16 Apr 02 to allow for mission planning and to update any SPINS), ATO underwent up to seven changes, each affecting the ATO version currently in effect. Change number 4 (Vol 10, Tab 8), although the most significant amendment for Coffee 51 since it changed the mission from Close Air Support (CAS) to On-call Interdiction, (XINT), had no impact on the incident.

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Airspace Control Order - ACO for 17 Apr 02 (Vol 10, Tab 9) contained all airspace control details that had to be used or considered by all participating aircrew in order to effectively and safely carry out their mission. Published daily to adapt to the ongoing ATO-tasked missions for the particular period, the ACO is a living document that needs to be consulted in order to safely and effectively adhere to the numerous Airspace Control Measures (ACMs) in effect. Similar to the ATO process, up to three changes were released modifying that original ACO none of any significance to Coffee 51 Flight’s mission.

Within ACO the following important information was available for mission planning by all Coalition aircrew prior to their missions:

A Terminal Movement Area (TMA) was in effect for the Kandahar area for the period. It extended to Aircraft operating within this area were to contact the KAF tower in advance of entry;

A was in effect for Tarnak Farm at location 31 27 18 N, 65 49 39 E. Its size was The was identified as a “Small Arms Range” and was quoted as “not continuously active”. Kandahar tower was to be contacted for status: and

A Terminal Control Area (TCA) was in effect for the Kandahar area at the beginning of Feb 02. It consisted of a around the airport of Kandahar, extending from

No details were given on the radio procedures to be applied.

Special Instructions: The SPINS, updated regularly, were also available to all aircrew to guide them in the conduct of their mission. SPINS are theatre-specific and were written specifically for OEF. Updated daily via the ATO and Weekly SPINS Updates, they contain essential information indispensable for the conduct of the mission. The following aspects of the 17 Apr 02 SPINS were significant:

The SPINS remind aircrew that information on would be published in the daily

ATO/ACO or promulgated by a variety of other means, including alerting by AWACS or other C2 agencies.

would be published in the daily ACO;

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The SPINS explain in detail how Surface-to-Air Fire (SAFIRE) sightings will be reported. Since the events around the Tarnak Farm area were triggered by a SAFIRE occurrence, the article is reproduced in Annex J;

They explain in detail the rights and the conditions under which aircrew may use armed force in self-defense. Again, the relevant article is reproduced in Annex J;

The SPINS cover defense against Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), stating that aircraft always have the right of self-defense against AAA,

The SPINS also deals with the minimum operating altitude in Afghanistan for fixed wing aircraft.

It discusses how friendly positions would be transmitted in situation where Close Air Support (CAS) would be required. This portion indicates that specific land force entities were responsible for providing friendly positional data updates on a daily basis for inclusion into the ATO or as required as the ground situation changes. It also describes the procedure by which changes would be provided to the CAOC Director of Combat Operations (DCO), and communicated to AWACS

Appendix 4 of the SPINS discusses procedures to follow with the airfields in

Afghanistan. For the KAF, the traffic procedures listed confirm that all aircraft transiting Kandahar area are to maintain two-way radio contact with Ground Control Approach (GCA) when operating between of the airfield, and that they are to contact Kandahar Tower directly if intending to operate within and

Mission Planning

From the testimonies reviewed, it quickly became evident to the Canadian Board that AWACS and F-16 aircrew knowledge about the presence of the Tarnak Farm Range near the Kandahar Airport was lacking. In the case of the 170th Fighter Squadron, the F-16 unit deployed to to which the F-16 aircrew belonged, a Mission Planning Cell (MPC) was in charge of the mission planning process. Led by aircrew

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from the unit and manned according to a rotation schedule, the MPC had the responsibility of reviewing and consolidating the information from the ATO, the ACO and the SPINS in order to create mission data readily available to the aircrew. The MPC was assisted in this process by the unit intelligence section, who also contributed to the preparation of the mass briefings given to the aircrew prior to each mission.

Various testimonies received by the CIB revealed disturbing information concerning the quality of the MPC process. As an example, it is evident (based on testimonies by intelligence and MPC personnel from the 170th Fighter Squadron) that the ACO breakdown responsibilities were not clearly understood by the individuals involved in the mission planning process. This led to an inefficient process and significant oversights.

Since everyone in the unit involved with the ACO felt the document was cumbersome and difficult to work with, the unit relied very heavily on a software package called to graphically brief the ACO content to the users, and prepare the maps that were carried by the aircrew in their Smart Packs. Many testimonies have confirmed that, although facilitates the representation of the ACO, the volume of the information is often unmanageable and can lead to confusion. For this reason, several witnesses have confirmed that all the information on the airspace below was intentionally removed from the mission data given to the aircrew in order to simplify the information provided in their mass briefs and flight maps.

This fact alone contributed significantly to the lack of knowledge of the Tarnak Farm range and its associated . Pilots flew their missions with no depicted on their tactical map mainly because “the MPC cell decided that you cannot plot all those and have it be usable” (as per the testimony given by Captain , Vol 12, Tab 34). Although the Tarnak Farm range was the area of interest for this inquiry, the same lack of knowledge applied to most of the ranges located in Afghanistan.

The mission planning process used by the AWACS detachment was similar to that used by the fighter forces. Because of very long mission duration and the limitations imposed by the crew duty day, the aircrew and controllers on board the AWCS had to rely on the support of a mission planning team to prepare the data required for their mission. Again, software was used extensively, albeit with the text versions of all pertinent documents carried aboard the aircraft for consultation. As acknowledged by the AWACS MCC (Major ) the mission planning team would filter some of the airspace coordination to make it a little bit more user friendly for the mission. As in the previous case, testimonies received confirms that most of the AWACS crew members were not aware of the Tarnak Farm Range, or the activity that was taking place at the time.

It is common knowledge that ACOs and ATOs have never been easy to work with. Their size and the intricate airspace coordination that is contained within, reflect the complexity of modern airspace battle management requirements, a fact of life that has to be dealt with in

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modern aerial conflict. Nevertheless, it is clear that in this instance, a possibly arbitrary decision within the MPCs of disparate units to filter information led to the unintended consequence of excising critical mission data. Regrettably, such unintended oversights were not detected due to the lack of a feedback loop to ensure that key elements did not slip through the cracks.

In addition to the deficiencies in the mission planning process described above, the Board noted other factors that led to the F-16 aircrew flying combat missions with incomplete knowledge of the mission area. With respect to crew rest and mission planning, several testimonies have confirmed that due to the extreme mission length the aircrew never prepared their own missions. Rather, the MPC prepared and briefed the mission to the aircrew, who would only arrive at the unit in time to attend their mass brief. This practice resulted in the aircrew only having a minimal amount of time to study the mission and brief themselves on key points before proceeding to their jets. Consequently, many F-16 pilots adopted the practice of attempting to digest the mission material during their transit to the mission area (often under night conditions).

With respect to general mission and document knowledge, a scheduled familiarization visit to the CAOC for new aircrew in theatre was not common practice. The purpose of this visit, as seen in other operations such as in the Balkans, is to increase the individual’s knowledge of the theatre, his understanding of the various mechanisms in place to support him, and to give the CAOC leadership the chance to reinforce the key messages such as the Commanders Intent and the ROE. From the testimonies received, the board members suspect there was no procedure in place, either at the unit level or above, to ensure that all aircrew were familiar with or clearly read all the documents at their disposal to effectively carry out their missions.

Aircrew Pre-Flight Training and Medical Status

After reviewing the various documents describing the training and qualifications of both pilots of Coffee 51 Flight, the board members have no doubt that these individuals were fully qualified to execute the missions expected of them. Major (Coffee 51) was an experienced command pilot with over 3100 hours of military flying time, 1700 of which were on F-16 fighters. His qualifications included Instructor Pilot, Mission Commander, Supervisor, and Supervisor of Flying in the 183rd Fighter Wing. By way of responsibilities, he was the Commanding Officer of the 170th Fighter Squadron based at Armed with a very solid background, his wingman, Major , (Coffee 52), was seen as a key individual who possessed above average flying capabilities as well as outstanding qualifications and fighter experience. With over 3000 total hours of military flying time, Major had completed both the United States Navy Top Gun Course as well as the United States Air Force Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, for which he later became an instructor. In addition to these impressive qualifications, he also had over 200 contingency hours to his credit. Consequently, he had been assigned as the Chief of the MPC.

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Copies of the medical and dental records of the pilots of Coffee 51 (Major ) and Coffee 52 (Major ) were thoroughly reviewed by the CIB Medical Advisor (Lieutenant-Colonel - Vol 13, Tab 41). He reported that for both pilots there were no significant pre-existing medical, dental, or mental health conditions and both had current flight physicals at the time of the incident. Both pilots were medically qualified to fly. There was no evidence that human factors (personal habits and behaviour patterns) contributed to the incident. Blood and urine tests and a drug screen done after the incident were normal for both pilots, with the only remarkable result being a low level positive in Major drug screen that confirmed his stated use of “Go Pills”. “Go Pills” or Dexedrine have been in use by the United States Air Force for over 30 years to manage fatigue and increase alertness in pilots. The use of “Go Pills” is strictly regulated and requires thorough ground testing to evaluate the benefits that each pilot derives and to determine if there are any side effects that would negate the benefits of using the this pharmaceutical. In accordance with set policies, Major and Major were ground tested and both were without side effects and were medically cleared for operational use of “Go Pills”.

It was the assessment of the CIB Medical Advisor that the operational use of the “Go Pill” had no adverse effect on the Coffee 51 Flight aircrew (Vol 13, Tab 41). Along with this it was stated (Vol 13, Tab 42) that acute fatigue may have been a minor contributing factor in the incident but that cumulative fatigue did not appear to be a factor.

The medical and dental records of Major (AWACS Mission Crew Commander), Captain (AWACS Senior Director), and Technical Sergeant (AWACS Weapons Director) were examined by a flight surgeon at Tinker Air Force Base who concluded that none of the three had any significant pre-existing medical, dental, or mental health conditions, all had current flight physicals, and all were medically qualified to fly as AWACS aircrew. Mission Execution - Coffee 51 Flight

When both pilots observed the ground activity near the Kandahar airport, the weather conditions were very favorable for an air-to-ground mission with no obstructions to visibility. At approximately 21:21Z (Major testimony), Coffee 51 Flight initiated the report of a SAFIRE event to AWACS. With no recording available at that time, the communication that took place for the following minute or two is unclear. What is certain from the testimonies received is that a request to mark the location of the activity by Coffee 51 Flight was granted by

A thorough review and analysis reveal information that conflicts with the testimonies of the pilots. In written testimonies, (twice by Major ), it is clearly stated that the actions taken by the pilot were because he felt himself and his flight lead (Major

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, call sign Coffee 51) felt threatened by what appeared to be surface-to-air fire from below. That said, neither aircraft was flown as if there was any threat below.

For example, the area of interest was approached in a routine fashion with the lead aircraft establishing himself in a at approximately Although the SPINS permitted him to descend below 15,000 ft AGL to perform the “mark”, such a descent is considered highly imprudent (as indicated through several testimonies) given the nature of the perceived threat. If indeed a plausible threat had been present under his position, would not have been a safe maneuver to undertake, as this would have unnecessarily exposed him to a greater degree of threat. Rather, he should have achieved either increased separation from the perceived threat to perform the designation by moving outside the probable, maximum threat range and altitude, or instead used another designation technique to achieve the “mark” as had been accomplished by his lead, Coffee 51.

After the attempt at marking the target was completed, both aircraft maneuvered around the observed SAFIRE location in a calm and relaxed fashion. Coffee 51 remained above while Coffee 52 remained at approximately During the final few minutes preceding 21:25:10Z, time at which Coffee 52 claimed self-defense, no calls with regards to a ground threat, muzzle flashes or missile firing were made by either pilot. Similarly, the aircraft radar warning receivers remained quiet. Both aircraft continued to circle the observed area and no attempts were made at creating a safe distance between what was observed on the ground and their location. No chaff or flares were used and no directive calls were made by either pilot to instruct the other to leave the area or to defend against possible enemy fire. In general, no attempts were made by any of the aircrew to evade the perceived threat they were observing. As confirmed by the testimony of Col David C. Nichols (Commander of the 332nd Air Expeditionary Group), should there have been a situation of enemy fire below Coffee 51 Flight, it is certain that Coffee 52 exacerbated the situation by his maneuvering, and would have forced himself into a self-defense situation (an endangered? situation) had there been a real threat.

During the period of time the flight remained in the Tarnak Farm area, several other aspects are worth discussing. With respect to SAFIRE reports, testimonies confirm that, prior to weapon release, the aircrew most likely failed to complete the report as per the format described in the SPINS, section 5 paragraph 9.4 (S). The category of the SAFIRE was never transmitted and the exact position of the SAFIRE and the F-16 aircraft (Coffee 51 Flight) were never clearly stated. Consequently, very little or sporadic information was available to to help in the decision making process.

The SAFIRE report was partially completed after the event. In that incomplete report (category of SAFIRE missing), the aircrew reported that the top of the observed trace was in the vicinity of 10,000 ft AGL. Testimony provided by a KAF-based helicopter pilot flying in

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the local vicinity at the time of the night live fire exercise estimated that, at most, the top of the ricochets observed went no higher than 1000 ft AGL. Many testimonies received from individuals experienced with the use of night vision goggles confirmed that ranges and heights are very hard to evaluate at night, and that a great deal of experience is required to accurately estimate the height of observed phenomena. It is very likely that the apex of the tracers observed by Coffee 51 Flight appeared much higher than reality. That said, since neither aircraft took evading action, that height was still most likely well below their comfort level for observed AAA.

Mission Execution -

The radio communications transcript at Annex G depicts the involvement of in the process. Transcripts of the communication between and (the CAOC) on

reveal that there were multiple communication exchanges between them from 21:22:40Z and the time of impact. These exchanges reveal that , according to its prescribed responsibilities, was reporting the event to higher authorities in order to get the proper clearances for the requests made by Coffee 51 Flight. Testimony by the night time CAOC Director (Brigadier-General Wood) confirmed that in such cases

On the night of 17 April, this request process was ongoing between and . Unfortunately, the call made by at 21:26:11Z relaying direction to Coffee 51 to “disengage” from the area came in ten seconds after the bomb impacted, and only two minutes after was made aware of the SAFIRE report. The MCC on board the AWACS repeatedly limited the actions of Coffee 52, even in the face of multiple requests to employ weapons in the observed area. Based on a “hunch” that there were “friendlies” in the area of Kandahar and the fact that the described threat was inconsistent with his impression of the threat level and usual tactics, the MCC negated all requests for weapon employment until the self-defence call was made. The instant that call was made, the MCC, with good reason, felt he could not influence the issue any further, or at least until the self-defence situation was resolved.

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Post-Incident Events

For clarity, this portion of the narrative is broken into sections covering immediate command response and reporting, medical response, and post-incident response and investigative activities.

Command Response and Reporting

All levels of command were quick to respond and were very effective following the incident. As Range Safety Officer (RSO), Captain Jasper quickly assessed the situation and began to take control, aided by Master Warrant Officer Whitehall and Warrant Officer Bolan. He sent the Casualty Situation Report to the 3 PPCLI BG Command Post; ordered a helicopter medical evacuation request to be sent (it had already been done); gave instructions for the security perimeter that was then set up around the area; organized searches to identify remains and equipment; and stayed behind to take charge of the personnel who were completing the search and recovery. Within TF Rakkasan , a Crisis Action Team was convened within three hours of the incident. Prior to that, various levels of command had already made arrangements for explosives ordnance disposal personnel, the DMART, the CFNIS, and site security.

With respect to notification of the chain of command, it is the judgement of the Board that correct and expeditious procedures were followed. Almost immediately, the 3 PPCLI Rear Party was notified by direct call from the theatre alerting them to the general nature of the incident. The Commanding Officer of the Rear Party, Major S. Bland, was immediately informed, as was the Land Force Western Area (LFWA) Headquarters and then the Commander 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG), Colonel S. Beare, who was on exercise at Canadian Forces Base Suffield.

At 22:43Z, TF Rakkasan Commander, Colonel , notified the Commander of Coalition Joint Task Force Afghanistan, Major-General Hagenback, of the incident. Subsequently, the Coalition Force Land Component Command Headquarters, based in , was notified. They then notified Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida.

Shortly after 01:00Z on 18 April 2002, the names of the casualties were transmitted to the Rear Party, with a temporary hold on releasing the names to the NOK, until the Commanding Officer of the BG had spoken to the Commander 1 CMBG. As the details on each deceased and injured soldier were being confirmed by Rear Party staff, the Commanding Officer of the Rear Party formulated a plan to inform all NOK of both the injured and deceased. Given the emotional and time-sensitive nature of this task, a notification team was quickly assembled at Rear Party Headquarters.

News of the incident was known by media sources and as a direct result, there was increased pressure on the Rear Party to complete all notifications. The LFWA Public Affairs Officer announced that a news release would be forth coming at 22:00 hrs Mountain Daylight Savings Time. Shortly before 02:00Z 18 April (20:00 hrs on 17 April 2002 in Edmonton,

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approximately 4 ½ hrs after the bomb explosion), authority was granted to the Rear Party to commence notifications of the NOK.

Concurrently, the 3 PPCLI BG made its formal notification to the Canadian and Coalition chains of command by including the Op APOLLO National Command Element (Tampa), the Commander of Op APOLLO (Tampa) and the NDCC as addressees on a Significant Incident Report (SIR 004). This SIR was transmitted at 03:37Z, 18 April, approximately 5 hours after the bomb explosion. A copy of the same SIR was sent to LFWA at 03:58Z on 18 April.

Generally, each notification team consisted of a senior officer (from the PPCLI where possible) and a Padre. All notifications were conducted in person, which ensured a caring, sensitive approach to impart the news of the tragedy. Within the Edmonton area, the Commanding Officer of the Rear Party performed two notifications of death, while the Commander of LFWA and the Area G1 Management (LFWA Personnel Branch) each performed one notification of death. Within the Edmonton area, a regimental officer from the LFWA Headquarters conducted notification of injury with the assistance of the Senior Brigade Chaplain. Outside of the Edmonton area, notifications of death or injury to both primary and secondary NOK were conducted by regimental officers or RCMP officers with padre support where possible.

The notification process was complete at approximately 09:00Z 18 April (03:00 hrs local Edmonton time), 11 hours and 34 minutes after the incident.

Medical Response

The on-site medical response was exceptionally good. As part of the pre-deployment training, all soldiers had received first aid training. Immediately after the explosion, non-injured soldiers began to provide “buddy first aid” in a timely and effective manner. Dedicated medical support to the live-fire exercise was provided by three Medical Assistants (Med As), operating from a Light Support Vehicle Wheeled (LSVW) ambulance. Within approximately 90 seconds, two of the Med As were providing the injured with advanced first aid and life saving measures in order to prepare them for evacuation. The third Med A brought the ambulance closer to the casualties and then quickly began taking care of patients.

In particular, Corporal De La Bourdonnaye (Med A) has been credited with saving the life of Sergeant Ford by using a tourniquet when pressure dressings were not sufficient to stop bleeding. Sergeant Wilson (Med A) checked the treatment provided by the other Med As and by the first aiders, treated patients himself, triaged patients for both treatment and evacuation priority, and provided information to the chain of command for the casualty report. The bodies of the deceased were covered and guarded to ensure that evidence was protected and, more important to all of the soldiers, to treat their fallen comrades with respect and dignity.

In witness statements there is some difference of opinion as to whether the helicopter casualty evacuation was timely. The helicopter medical evacuation (medevac) was requested

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10 minutes after the explosion. It was on site at Tarnak Farm 27 minutes later and after 17 minutes on the ground it departed with five patients. Three patients on stretchers and two ambulatory patients were transported to the US surgical facility at the KAF. The Board considers this response time to have been within the expected standard.

Ground casualty evacuation was carried out using a Bison armoured ambulance, escorted by two Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) Coyotes. Following the helicopter evacuation, this ambulance evacuated the remaining three casualties to the 3 PPCLI BG Unit Medical Section at the KAF. The LSVW ambulance remained at the Tarnak Farm Range with two Med As while a sweep of the area was being conducted. The ground ambulances were used in a manner that was organized, well thought out and timely. Transport of the three priority 3 casualties by ground ambulance was completely appropriate.

A review of the medical documentation showed that the medical care that was given at the KAF was timely, appropriate and of a very high standard. Of those patients evacuated by helicopter to the US surgical facility, two went directly to surgery and three were assessed, treated and admitted. Surgical specialists in the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) in Landstuhl, Germany credit the US surgeon in Kandahar with saving Sergeant Ford’s leg by performing a technically difficult vascular procedure. The remaining three patients evacuated by ground ambulance went to the Canadian Unit Medical Station, where they were seen by a Medical Officer. Two of the patients were treated and returned to duty and the third was sent to the US Surgical Facility for further tests and treatment.

All patients seen at the US military Surgical Facility were medically evacuated to the LRMC in Germany on 18 April 2002. The patients were transported by an American C-17 Globemaster aircraft which had an Intensive Care Unit configuration. The American aeromedical evacuation team included a physician. A review of the medical records showed that the in-flight medical care was both appropriate and thoroughly documented. A Canadian Medical Assistant (Corporal De La Bourdonnaye) also attended the patients as a medical escort.

The patients arrived in Ramstein at approximately 2200 hours local, on 18 April. They were met by Major McLeod (the Medical Officer at the Canadian Forces Support Unit Europe in Geilenkirchen, Germany), a US vascular surgeon, and specialized medical teams. Sergeant Ford underwent surgery for vascular and eye injuries, Corporal Paquette went to the Intensive Care Ward, and the rest of the patients went to the ward. Treatment was provided by specialists in the areas of Anaesthesiology, Surgery, Neurosurgery, Orthopaedic Surgery, Internal Medicine, Ophthalmology, and Ear Nose and Throat Surgery. The process was very thorough and all the patients were extremely well cared for.

Patients were monitored for their psychological well-being, and underwent Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD). Throughout this period, Major McLeod was able to keep both the families and the chain of command up to date as to the soldier’s condition. On 23 April 2002, the patients were discharged to the care of Canadian Forces Aeromedical Evacuation

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personnel and were medically evacuated to Canada aboard a Canadian Forces CC-150 Polaris aircraft.

Within the 3 PPCLI BG at Kandahar, the CISD Peer Support Response Team was immediately activated, meeting “A” Company personnel when they returned to camp at about 23:30Z. Personnel were provided with the information that was known at the time and a brief overview of the range of normal reactions following a traumatic event. One peer was assigned to the FST and one to the morgue in support of the casualty collection teams and soldiers concerned about their friends. They were assisted by two US Mental Health Specialists.

The personnel of “B” Company and “C” Company were debriefed early on 18 April 2002. Individual and group defusing was done with the personnel who had been involved in the “clean-up” at Tarnak Farm. Then, 48 hours after the incident, peer support personnel were debriefed and reassigned as required for further defusing and debriefing activities.

Post-Incident Response and Investigative Activities

With respect to on-scene investigation, a Canadian Forces National Investigative Service (CFNIS) representative, Captain J. MacEachern, was on-scene within three hours of the incident and began a taped, on-site interview with the RSO (Captain J. Jasper). By coincidence, the United States Army Europe Disaster Mortuary Affairs Team (DMART) was in Kandahar on an unrelated investigation. By 24:00Z 17 April 2002, two DMART team members, the Armed Forces Regional Medical Examiner (Dr. ) and DMART Chief of Search and Recovery Team (Mr. ), were in discussion regarding a formal request from the Canadian Forces for medical legal and forensic investigation support at the scene to conduct a scene investigation and search and recovery of the remains.

With the immediate approval of Commander TF Rakkasan, the DMART team deployed to the range to conduct an on-site investigation under control of the CFNIS Officer. By all accounts, the support provided by the DMART was exemplary, independent of the fact that their proximity allowed them to be on-scene by 01:30Z 18 April 2002.

In addition to the DMART investigation, 3 PPCLI BG quickly identified the requirement for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support. After the casualties had been evacuated, it was identified that damaged explosive portions of the and fragmented had been found. Because of this hazard, the final sweep of the area was stopped. Again, support was provided in a very timely manner by TF Rakkasan, and an EOD Team completed the clearing process by 03:32Z on 18 April 2002.

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Part IV - Detailed Findings

This section provides extensive amplifying detail surrounding the Board’s primary findings, according to the assigned Terms of Reference attached at Annex A. Each finding consists of a narrative summary leading to one or more concluding statements.

Circumstances

What were the circumstances surrounding the injuries and deaths?

Beyond the introductory narrative included here and the extensive detail contained within the full report, the Board has concluded that the members of 3 PPCLI BG who were undertaking live-fire training at the Tarnak Farm Multi Purpose Range on the night of the incident had done nothing wrong by way of coordination procedures or safety regulations.

By contrast, it has been determined that a number of issues were involved in this incident. In particular, it was determined that the mission planning process used by the 170th Fighter Squadron was deficient, in that it unnecessarily filtered ACM material which, had it been present for Coffee 51’s mission, might have prevented fratricide from occurring. Furthermore, it was determined that the manoeuvres performed by Coffee 51 Flight, in reaction to the perceived threat caused by the live night fire exercise at Tarnak Farm, was directly causal to the fratricide incident.

Perhaps most central to the tragedy was the simple, initial fact that Coffee 52 did not recognize the observed ground fire event as a surface-to-surface training exercise, instead perceiving it as enemy surface-to-air fire. This failure of perception was the initiating factor that started the ensuing sequence of missed cues and hasty, imprudent actions that led to the premature release of the weapon. Expectation appears to have played a significant role, in that Coffee 52 incorrectly identified elements of a dismounted infantry section as an AAA weapon system, when in fact no such system actually existed at that location of Coffee 52 at Vol 10 Tab 14). Although impossible to confirm, it would seem by the testimonies received by the CIB that there was some discrepancy in the briefed threat levels (see testimony of Captain Lieutenant Colonel and Brigadier General Wood). Regardless, given the complex nature of the ground order of battle and the widely dispersed friendly forces aircrew should have erred on the side of caution in attempting to discern the type and source of observed ground fire.

Additionally, the failure of Coffee 51 Flight to transmit the required information for the SAFIRE event to either prevented or delayed a more accurate decision by controlling authorities. In particular, due to poor technique, Coffee 52 failed to properly “mark” the target area during his designation, and was thus unable to relay the coordinates of the observed ground fire in his SAFIRE report. This lack of information impeded the AWACS and CAOC from potentially correlating the SAFIRE report with the night live fire exercise being conducted at Tarnak Farm.

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The incomplete mission planning information provided to Coffee 51 Flight and exacerbated the deteriorating situation. Specifically, neither the F-16 nor the AWACS aircrew were aware of the Tarnak Farm Range. The result was that the crew of , lacking or unaware of this essential data, did not transmit this vital airspace coordination information to Coffee 51 Flight in order to enhance their decision-making process.

In summary, with respect to the circumstances of the incident, it is the overall conclusion of the Board that had Coffee 51 Flight transmitted a complete and accurate SAFIRE report, and had either the F-16 or the AWACS aircrew known of the existence of the Tarnak Farm Multi Purpose Range Complex and this knowledge may have dramatically altered the decision making process thereby precluding the fratricide incident.

Proximate Cause

What caused the injuries and deaths?

All injuries and deaths that occurred at the Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range on 17 April 2002 have been attributed to the blast and shrapnel effects created by the explosion of a 500-lb GBU-12 LGB, which impacted near the firing position of 3 Section, 3 Platoon, “A” Company at 21:26:01Z.

Primary Evidence Reference DetailsSignificant Incident Report 004Capt B. Hynes, Comd LO JTFSWA

Vol 8, Exhibit 4 Initial significant incident report passed via TITAN to NDCC, Comd OP APOLLO.

Statement of MaintenanceCapt USAF, CIB F-16 Advisor

Vol 13, Tab 57 Maintenance review package detailing the state of the F-16 aircraft involved (Tail # 87-0324) upon inspection following mission.

The GBU-12 LGB is designed primarily to produce a blast/fragmentation effect rather than an evenly distributed pattern of small pieces of shrapnel. As a result of this, both the size and the distribution pattern of the shrapnel produced can be unpredictable. For each person killed or injured in this incident, the extent of injury was determined by numerous variables including, but not limited to: proximity to the explosion; the individual’s location within Wadi East or surrounding area; whether the individual was standing, kneeling or prone; the direction the individual was facing; and the degree of physical protection (both equipment and terrain) from shrapnel and concussive effects.

In general, those members who were in closest proximity to the point of impact received the gravest of injuries; certainly, had the bomb impacted in even a slightly different location, many more casualties might have been incurred.

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The following table describes the effects of the blast on the personnel involved, in approximate order of severity:

Personnel Injury Sustained / Effect

Primary Evidence Reference DetailsStatement of Events - 17 Apr 02Capt J. Jasper

Vol 8, Exhibit 6 Describes casualty sitreps - of note, Pri “4” used consistently to describe fatality.

Statement of EventsSgt W. Wilson (Med A)

Vol 8, Exhibit 15 Describes personal and medical team activities in the immediate aftermath of the blast.

Examination Reports - 19 Apr 02US DMART Team

Vol 8, Exhibit 24 Details medico-legal examination process and findings, including death certificates.

NIS Investigative SynopsisCapt J. MacEachern

Vol 9, Exhibit 36 Summarizes particulars of casualty reporting and identity determination process.

Coroner’s Report, cases 2002 - 14, 15,16,17A, Chief Coroner Ontario

Vol 13, Tab 50 Reports post-mortem examination results for deceased members.

Testimony - 01 May 02WO W.A. Bolen

Vol 3, Page 439 Details immediate post-impact actions, including casualty assessment.

Testimony - 01 May 02MCpl S. Clark

Vol 3, Page 504 Describes effects of the explosion.

Testimony - 01 May 02Maj D. Vouriot (3 PPCLI MO)

Vol 3, Page 452 Describes participation in medical treatment.

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Duty Status of Members

Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members on duty at the time the incident ocurred?

All of the deceased and injured non-commissioned members were on duty at the time of the incident and were present at the Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range on 17 April 2002 at 21:26:01Z.

Primary Evidence Reference DetailsSignificant Incident Report 004Capt B. Hynes, Comd LO JTFSWA

Vol 8, Exhibit 4 Initial Significant Incident Report includes details of personnel involved.

Statement of Events - 17 Apr 02Capt J. Jasper

Vol 8, Exhibit 6 First paragraph confirms the timing and location of the live fire exercise.

Testimony - 01 May 02MCpl S. Clark

Vol 3, Page 504 Describes personnel composition of section.

Diagram of Tank Stalk TeamMCpl S. Clark

Vol 9, Exhibit 40 Depicts lineup of Tank Stalk Team as they were engaging the targets.

Testimony - 08 May 02Cpl R. Paquette


Diagram of Tank Stalk TeamCpl R. Paquette


Diagram of Tank Stalk TeamCpl B. Decaire


Testimony - 14 May 02Sgt L. Ford


Testimony - 08 May 02Pte N. Link


Blame

Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members to blame for the injuries or deaths?

None of the deceased, injured or other members of the 3 PPCLI BG who planned, coordinated or participated in the subject live-fire exercise at the Tarnak Farms range can be blamed in any way for the injuries or deaths that occurred as a result of the subject incident.

Were any other person(s), to blame for the injuries or deaths?

The Canadian Board has determined that the actions of the Coffee 51 Flight are the primary cause for the injuries and deaths. Despite the initial misinterpretation of the live-fire exercise as a threat to their formation, there exists a series of related disturbing contradictions between their perceptions, their actions and accepted procedures. These are outlined in the following table:

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Disturbing Contradictions

Observations/Facts Board’s Conclusion

Approximately 4 minutes prior to invoking self-defence, and prior to splitting the formation, Coffee 51 Flight informs that they have ordnance onboard.

It is unusual for a fighter formation to make such a comment to the controlling authority given the fact that they were proceeding home out of the mission area. This comment is inappropriate and the reason for it is unclear.

Approximately 90 seconds prior to invoking self-defence Coffee 52 requests permission to employ his gun against the observed ground fire location.

Based on the SPINS as well as numerous testimonies, such a request seems to contravene accepted logic and procedures. Combined with the previous call to Coffee 52’s intentions are suspect. In addition neither of the aircraft in the formation had taken appropriate evasive action to counter the perceived threat.

Coffee 51 Flight’s description of the ground fire depicts significant rapid fire activity up towards their position at altitude.

Actual ground fire consisted of anti-tank rounds being fired individually every 30 to 45 seconds for a total of 6 rounds. This was supported by small arms fire which included tracers. All ground fire was directed in a level plane in a westerly direction towards a single target about 200 meters away.

Both pilots of Coffee 51 flight were highly qualified pilots with previous combat experience, which included seeing hostile surface to air fire.

As testified by a TF Rakassan helicopter pilot flying in the local vicinity just prior to the incident, the few ricochets that did occur never exceeded an altitude of approximately 1000 feet AGL. Given the unrestricted visibility and experience of these pilots, it is surprising that their perceptions (rate, direction and angle of ground fire) would be so inaccurate.

Coffee 52 not only remains within the immediate vicinity of the perceived threat, but increases the risk by descending lower to the threat while allowing his airspeed to occasionally decrease below optimal maneuvering speed.

It is quite surprising and contrary to both SPINS and accepted defensive reactions that Coffee 52 would willingly allow himself to be exposed to a higher threat envelope through such actions. While the altitude minimums published may have permitted him to get this low to accomplish a “mark”, better airmanship would have dictated remaining at altitude or performing the designation at a greater distance from the perceived threat.

Throughout the 4 minute period prior to invoking self-defence, neither pilot’s voice reflect concern for their own safety.

In reviewing their submitted statements as well as their post-flight testimony, it seems very clear that the perceived threat was both immediate and grave (perceived to be under ambush), that would have warranted concern in their voice, directive defensive calls and aggressive defensive maneuvers.

Coffee 51 Flight remains in the perceived threat area for an unusually long time, both It is particularly alarming that neither of these experienced

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before and after bomb release, without ever attempting to escape the perceived envelope.

fighter pilots ever initiated a defensive reaction after the bomb had impacted, but rather continued to circle within the perceived threat area until AWACS directed to “Scram South”.

Coffee 52 invokes self-defence ROE based on his assessment that Coffee 51 was in imminent danger.

Such an assessment defies the documented facts. Coffee 51 remains at a safe altitude and distance from the perceived threat throughout entire incident. Furthermore, Coffee 51 is in visual contact with the ground fire, yet never demonstrates (through calls or maneuvers) that he feels personally threatened. Finally it is doubtful that Coffee 52 truly had continuous visual contact with his lead considering the relative position of Coffee 51 to him (an average of above and over behind his aircraft) as well as the other tasks he was performing ( visually monitoring ground fire and flying his aircraft).

Coffee 52 never provides a defensive directive call to his lead after deciding that self-defence of the formation was essential.

Despite repeated claims that the invoking of the self-defence ROE was necessary to protect his lead, Coffee 52 never provided his lead with a directive call to take defensive action (ie: break L/R) or provide description of the threat direction and range.

Both on and in recorded statements, Coffee 52 attests to the existence of an artillery piece firing towards them.

Once Coffee 51 and Coffee 52 have focused their on the ground fire location, only a few men are ever seen and no attempt is made by either pilot to positively discern and identify the perceived artillery piece.

It is common knowledge amongst the F-16 pilots, reinforced by their mission briefs, that KAF was an active Coalition airfield with a large concentration of friendly troops Coffee 51 becomes aware of the formations proximity to KAF over 1 minute prior to the bomb release.

It is unusual that Coffee 52 would not have visually acquired the KAF given the significant artificial lighting at the camp on the runway. Given the close proximity of the ground fire to this significant feature should have given concern to the probable presence of “friendlies” (TF Rakassan personnel, and Afghanistan Military Forces) in and around the general area. Further complicating the issue was the lingering concern amongst the F-16 pilots about the uncertain location of “friendlies” in Afghanistan.

Throughout the period prior to and immediately after the bomb release Coffee 51 does not take positive control of the formations actions.

Not only is Coffee 51 the flight lead for the mission, he is also the Commanding Officer of the 170th Fighter Squadron. Despite the extended period of exposure to the perceived threat, the calls and maneuvers by his wingman, and his knowledge of their position relative to KAF, Coffee 51 fails to take control of the situation. Given his position throughout the incident, in reference to the perceived threat and Coffee 52, he should have either directed the formation away from the threat or queried

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Coffee 52’s maneuvering into the higher threat envelope.

17 seconds after the bomb impacts, Coffee 51 queries as to whether the perceived ground threat was “shooting at us?”

It is extremely unusual that a fighter aircraft would make such a request of an AWACS that was over away from the scene of the incident, and could not have possibly seen the ground fire. Furthermore, given the fact that Coffee 52 was so convinced that his lead was being fired at that he invoked self-defence ROE, this request demonstrates a significant difference in appreciation of the perceived threat between the two F-16 pilots, and is inconsistent with Coffee 51’s post flight statements.

It is the conclusion of the Board that the pilot’s actions were not consistent with either the expected practice for a defensive threat reaction or the existing published procedures, including the SPINS. This represented a failure of leadership, airmanship and technique. Furthermore, their actions contravened the published Commander’s direction with respect to reaction to AAA and employment of ordnance outside of engagement zones. Finally, even though it is reasonable to believe that the ground firing exercise at Tarnak Farm might have been perceived as enemy surface to air fire, a longer, more patient look from a safe altitude and range, combined with a good knowledge of the airspace and the threat in the area, should have confirmed that the event observed was neither a direct threat to their formation or enemy activity of a significant nature.

Connection to Military Service

Were the injuries and deaths attributable to military service?

The injuries and deaths resulting from the incident were entirely attributable to military service. At the time of the accident, the individuals involved were on continuous duty in a theatre of operations and were undertaking authorized and necessary continuation training in preparation for an upcoming mission, as part of ongoing Coalition operations.

Primary Evidence Reference DetailsStatement of Events - 17 Apr 02Capt J. Jasper

Vol 8, Exhibit 6 Describes casualty sitreps - of note, Pri “4” used consistently to describe fatality.



Examination Reports - 19 Apr 02US DMART Team

Vol 8, Exhibit 24 Details medico-legal examination process and findings, including death certificates.


Vol 9, Exhibit 36 Summarizes particulars of casualty reporting and identity determination process.

Coroner’s Report, cases 2002 - 14, 15,16,17A, Chief Coroner Ontario

Vol 13, Tab 50 Reports post-mortem examination results for deceased members.

Testimony - 01 May 02WO W.A. Bolen

Vol 3, Page 439 Details immediate post-impact actions, including casualty assessment.

Testimony - 01 May 02 Vol 3, Page 504 Describes effects of the explosion.

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Primary Evidence Reference DetailsMCpl S. ClarkTestimony - 01 May 02Maj D. Vouriot (3 PPCLI MO)


Planning and Conduct

What was the nature and quality of the planning and conduct of the live fire exercise?

The planning of the exercise was appropriate for the established objectives (section level night fire training) and the simulated tactical scenario. The planning and subsequent conduct of the live fire exercise was entirely consistent with established regulations and coordination procedures, as directed by the CF and the Commander of TF Rakkasan.

Primary Evidence Reference DetailsDCDS Directives for International Operations, Chapter 4 Trg

Vol 10, Tab 47 In theatre training guidance Section 4, 404.

TF Rakkasan Range SOPs – Range Planner’s Check List

Vol 9, Exhibit 34 All planning requirements for the conduct of a live fire range at Tarnak Farm.

Testimony - 29 Apr 02 LCol P. Stogran

Vol 1, Page 2 Explains requirement for training.

Testimony - 30 Apr 02 Maj S. Hackett

Vol 2, Page 213 Explains range requirement for training.

Testimony - 30 Apr 02, 1 May 02 Capt J. Jasper

Vol 2, Page 144Vol 3, Page 378

Explains range preparation.

Testimony - 30 Apr 02 Capt T. Walshaw

Vol 2, Page 283 Explains how battalion submitted range request to TF Rakkasan.

Testimony – 30 Apr 02 Col

Vol 2, Page 322 Explanation of coordination measures ground/air.

Safety Procedures

Were the safety procedures applicable to the exercise properly followed?

In general, the safety procedures considered and employed during the conduct of the live fire exercise on the evening of 17 April 2002 were in accordance with CF directives. In fact, precautionary measures taken with respect to in-place accident response were particularly commendable. Minor procedural irregularities regarding the use of ricochet danger area templates and the drills during preparation of the were noted by the Board, but these had no bearing on the incident and immediate recommendations have been made.

Primary Evidence Reference DetailsBGL 381-001-TS/000 DAT 2001 Vol 13, Tab 54 Training Safety. BGL381-001/TS-000DAT2001-01-15

Vol 13, Tab 54 Ricochet Danger Area Template Procedures.

BGL 320-010/FP-001 Chap 5 Vol 13, Tab 55 Mines and Booby Traps – Proper procedure

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Primary Evidence Reference DetailsAnnex B Appendix 3 for preparation of C-19 ADW.TF Rakkasan Tarnak Farm Range SOPs

Vol 9, Exhibit 34 Safety procedures, communications and coordination measures.

Range Trace, RSO Brief 17 Apr 02 Vol 9, Exhibit 25 Used by Capt Jasper on 17 Apr 02.Testimony - 30 Apr, 1 May 02 Capt J. Jasper


Explanation of how ranges were conducted.

Testimony - 2 May 02 Maj S. Hackett

Vol 3, Page 500 Explanation of the chain of command for the live fire range 17 Apr 02.

Testimony - 2 May 02 MCpl S. Clarke

Vol 3, Page 504 Explanation of conduct of Tank Stalk range by 3 Sect, 3 Pl, “A” Coy on 17 Apr 02.

Testimony - 8 May 02 Cpl Paquette

Vol 4, Page 533 Review of his role on the range and use of C-19 ADW.

Canadian - American Coordination

What was the nature and quality of the co-ordination between Canadian and United States authorities surrounding the exercise?

Use of the range for night live-fire exercises was common practice within the TF, and was coordinated through a variety of scheduling, communications, and procedural measures. These measures included a dedicated communications net and the stationing of a sentry in the KAF control tower. The conduct of the training at the Tarnak Farm Range on the night of the incident was entirely in accordance with all established procedures for TF Rakkasan.

Primary Evidence Reference DetailsTestimony - 30 Apr 02 Col

Vol 2, Page 322 Review of coordination measures implemented by TF Rakkasan.

Testimony - 29 Apr 02 Capt

Vol 1, Page 70 Review of control measures around KAF and Tarnak Farm.

Testimony - 30 Apr 02 Capt T. Walshaw

Vol 2, Page 283 Review of actions and coordination between 3 PPCLI and the TF Rakkasan for utilization of the range on 17 Apr 02.

Testimony - 30 Apr, 1 May 02 Capt J. Jasper


Review of coordination and submissions by “A” to 3 PPCLI Trg O.

Testimony - 30 Apr Cpl C. Laroque

Vol 2, Page 250 Review of duties of KAF Tower LO.

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Air - Ground Coordination

What was the nature and quality of the co-ordination between ground and air forces surrounding the incident?

Air operations in the modern battlespace are extraordinarily complex by any measure, and require constant coordination between line operational aircrew and their chain of command at all levels. In this particular instance, as much as the F-16 pilots bear final responsibility for the fratricide incident, there existed other systemic shortcomings in air coordination and control procedures, as well as mission planning practices by the tactical flying units, that may have prevented the accident had they been corrected. In light of these systemic deficiencies, the Board has submitted several corrective recommendations, some of which have already been implemented

In this regard, the Board has concluded that oversight of a number of factors implicated in this incident properly reside within the existing command structure. For example, at the level of the 170th Fighter Squadron, it appears that failures with regard to leadership in terms of training, standards, and expectancy occurred, in that no process appeared to have been in place to confirm that all aircrew read and understood all applicable documents prior to mission execution. This shortfall extended as far as the CFACC organization, which did not appear to have a defined process in place to familiarize incoming aircrew with the theatre organization, the existing command and control facilities, or the overall Commander’s Intent. These processes, important in any operation, were even more critical in this case, given the relatively short (six week) rotation period for units (reserve and regular) moving in and out of the theatre.

Additionally, the 170th Fighter Squadron is implicated in regards to leadership, organization and expectancy, in that some confusion existed with the mission planning responsibilities of the mission planning Chief, or his representatives, and those of the Intelligence section of the unit. Such confusion led to significant differences in opinions regarding the surface-to-air threat level in Afghanistan between the following key individuals: the Commander of the 332nd Fighter Wing , the Expeditionary Operational Support Squadron Commander , and the Intelligence Officer of the 170th

Fighter Squadron .

The general nature of this shortfall is revealed by the gap between what aircrews in the region were ultimately briefed, and the actual air control measures that had been properly requested by the airspace managing authorities of TF Rakkasan.

As is now clear, much of the information concerning ground force movements, perceived spans of airspace control, and live fire intentions were edited or truncated from flight briefings and mission packs in an effort to keep the air and ground picture manageable.

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. In this particular instance, the information supplied to Coffee 51 Flight regarding the existence of the Tarnak Farm Range, as well as its projected use on the night in question (as duly requested and authorized through TF Rakkasan) was either completely lacking, or was not presented in such a way as to alert the aircrew of a potential area of interest.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan has only two significant airfields, so it is not unreasonable to assume that transiting aircraft (even those not able or expected to recover at the field in question) would have at least a passing familiarity with the region.

In essence, there were multiple airspace control measures in place in and around the KAF. Though the aircraft were unlikely to penetrate the established Terminal Management Area (TMA) which was topped at , the fact that a TMA existed should have been a reminder of the proximity of transiting aircraft to friendly ground forces. There was a that was permanently established and was identified as “in effect” in the ACO . This should have caused the pilots to question at least their weapon employment, if not their positioning.

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Primary Evidence Reference DetailsAir Tasking Order (ATO) Vol 10, Tab 8 ATO / April / CHG

Airspace Coordination Order (ACO) Vol 10, Tab 9 ACO / April / CHG

Testimony - 3 May 02Col D. Nichols (Comd 332nd AEG)

Vol 12, Tab 32 Describes theatre at the time of the incident.

Testimony - 11 May 02LCol (Comd Exp. OSS)

Vol 11, Tab 27 Describes theatre , which is as briefed to Coffee 51 Flight prior to the incident.

Testimony - 28 Apr 02Capt (IntO, 170th EFS)

Vol 11, Tab 28 Describes theatre at the time of the incident.

Special Instructions (SPINS) – Section 1 Commanders Guidance

Vol 10, Tab 10 This section details CFACC’s guidance to all aircrew participating in OEF. Such guidance addresses operational objectives, commanders intent and mission tasks and priorities.

Special Instructions (SPINS) – Section 3 Communication Article 8.6.2

Vol 10, Tab 10 This article explains the Surface-to-air Fire (SAFIRE) reporting requirements.

Special Instructions (SPINS) – Section 4 Airspace Article 4.3

Vol 10, Tab 10 Defines and provides the details on where information on will be published.

Special Instructions (SPINS) – Section 5 ROE Article 5.2.2

Vol 10, Tab 10 This article describes the concept of self defence and how it will be applied in theatre.

Special Instructions (SPINS) – Section 5 ROE Article 9

Vol 10, Tab 10 This article provides the details on how ROE will be applied for defence against SAM’s and AAA threats.

Special Instructions (SPINS) – Section 5 ROE Article 10

Vol 10, Tab 10 This article provides the details on how ROE will be applied in the case of Air to Ground Attacks. It includes details on the right to Self Defence.

Special Instructions (SPINS) – Section 6 Operations Article 2.6

Vol 10, Tab 10 This article provides details on the minimum operating altitudes in Afghanistan for fixed wing aircraft.

– Coffee 51 Vol 10, Tab 14 for Coffee 51 from 212238Z to 213130Z.

– Coffee 51 Vol 10, Tab 14 for Coffee 51 from 212238Z to 213130Z .



Testimony - 29 Apr 02Capt

Vol 1, Page 70 Review of control measures around KAF and Tarnak Farm.

Kandahar IAP Airspace PresentationCapt

Vol 8, Exhibit 5 Explains the air control measures for TF Rakkasan.

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What was the quality of in-theatre post-incident response and incident reporting?

In all respects, the medical response to the incident was exceptional, and certainly saved the life of at least one of the injured (Sergeant Ford). From the initial actions taken in the field through to the medical evacuation of some of the injured out of theatre to American hospital facilities at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) at Landstuhl, Germany, the Coalition medical response was very timely and appropriate. The reporting of the incident by the 3 PPCLI BG to the Canadian and Coalition chains of command was timely and adequate, complete with follow-up reports as additional, relevant details became known.

Primary Evidence Reference DetailsTestimony - 30 Apr 02Capt J. Jasper

Vol 2, Page 144 Vol 3, Page 378

Describes initial command response, casualty situation report, other coordinating actions.

Duty Officer’s Log, TF Rakkasan17 - 18 Apr 02

Vol 8, Exhibit 26 Event and casualty reports, with timings.

Significant Incident Report 004Capt B. Hynes, Comd LO JTFSWA

Vol 8, Exhibit 4 Initial significant incident report passed via TITAN to NDCC, Comd OP APOLLO.

Letter from Maj Bland, OC Rear Party dated 10 May 02

Vol 13, Tab 51 Next of Kin notification process.

Testimony - 30 Apr 02Major S.A. Hackett

Vol 3, Page 500 Details supervisory activities for casualty care and evacuation.

Testimony - 29 Apr 02LCol P. Stogran

Vol 1, Page 2 Describes on-scene medical response.

Testimony - 01 May 02Maj D. Vouriot (3 PPCLI MedO)


Email from Captain N. Deringer 5 May 2002

Vol 13, Tab 53 Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) details (local area).

Email from Major S. McLeod 12 June 2002

Vol 13, Tab 52 CISD debriefing details, LRMC, Germany.


Vol 13, Tab 52 Details of medevac from Kandahar, including in-flight medical care.


Vol 13, Tab 52 Details of care at LRMC, including surgical interventions.



Statement of Events - 17 Apr 02Capt J. Jasper

Vol 8, Exhibit 6 Describes state of incident site with repsect to unexploded ordnance.

Duty Officer’s Log, TF Rakkasan17 - 18 Apr 02

Vol 8, Exhibit 26 Request for EOD clearing team is logged.


Vol 9, Exhibit 36 Summarizes casualty reporting process as well as activities of EOD team.

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Other Relevant Issues

Are there any other issues of relevance to this investigation?

As part of its investigation, the Board has commissioned a study on the current and evolving state of air-ground combat identification (CID) technologies. This study has produced a number of pertinent recommendations and is available to the public at BOI Web Site (http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/boi/)

At no time during the course of its proceedings did the Board receive information that any of the injured or representatives of the deceased had received, been offered, claimed or intended to claim compensation from any of the persons at fault in the fratricide.

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Part V - Recommendations

The following represents the various recommendations the Canadian Board of Inquiry would like to submit for consideration. Varying from the specific to the general in nature, they are based on the received evidence and testimonies, the analysis performed with the help of the Board specialist advisors, and are presented according to the categories previously covered.

Previously Submitted Recommendations

The following recommendations were identified during the course of the investigation and submitted to the DCDS for immediate consideration prior to the completion of the Final Report:

Airspace Coordination Issues (submitted 13 May 2002)

It is the opinion of the Board that current procedures between Coalition Ground Forces and Coalition Air Forces require review. More specifically, the way in which activation and deactivation procedures are dealt with during combat operations need to be reviewed. If such procedures are currently in place, it would appear from the evidence collected to date that their use was incomplete. The Board believes that if the procedures had been more stringently enforced, the chain of events that led to the incident at Tarnak Farm on 17 April 2002 could possibly have been avoided. If such measures are not sufficient to the task, then a review of those procedures should address in detail the following:

The Coalition Air Forces Command and Control (C2) nodes and how they are informed of the activation and deactivation of by Friendly Coalition Ground Forces during the course of extended Combat Operations in a timely and accurate manner;

If this activation/deactivation process exists, a review of the Live Fire information transmitted to include calibre/type of munitions as well as duration and expected concentration of fire;

The communication links (if any) that are available to aircrew to expedite critical information during wartime operations and if those communication links are available to aircrew within the theatre of operations; and

As change in location and use, the process by which the information is updated and passed to ensure accuracy and timeliness of the information.

If not already put into effect, and until the procedures related to are closely reviewed, the Board recommends the following immediate actions:

Section 4 (Airspace) to the existing Special instructions (SPINS) to Operation Enduring Freedom should have an additional section named COALITION FORCES

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RANGES IN AFGHANISTAN. That section should explain all the pertinent details related to the existence and the use of all the small arms ranges currently in use by Coalition Forces in the Afghan theatre of operations;

All future Airspace Coordination Orders (ACO) should contain a detailed list, including but not limited to timings, weapons to be used, altitude restrictions and coordinating agencies, of all the live firing exercises scheduled to take place, on any given day, on any of the existing small arms ranges currently in use by Coalition Forces in the Afghan theatre; and

Daily, through Air Tasking Orders (ATO) Special Instructions/Banners, the details of all live firing exercises scheduled to take place in the Afgan theatre of operations during the ATO period need to be reported in order to increase the awareness of all those involved in that theatre.

Ricochet Danger Area Templates (submitted 23 May 2002)

During the conduct of the investigation it became evident that Ricochet Danger Area Templates had not been utilized during the production of safe arcs of fire for the ranges (Captain J. Jasper, 30 April 2002). This omission did not result in an unsafe range, but future live fire ranges, especially those utilizing a variety of weapons, should follow the procedures directed in Canadian Land Force BGL 381-001 /TS-000 DAT 2001-10-15. This observation was brought to the attention of the DCDS/J3 International Staff, who directed that Ricochet Danger Area Templates shall be utilized during future live fire training events, 23 May 2002.

During testimony it was learned that the electric detonator for the was inserted during preparations at the ammo point. The soldier carrying the then moved forward with the section and waited for the end of the serial to complete wiring and attachment of the Clacker.

The proper procedure as per BGL-320-010/FP-001 Chapter 5, Annex B, Appendix 3 (Mines and Booby Traps) states that the weapon preparation is to be completed at the time of use. Detonators should not be inserted ahead of time. This procedure was confirmed with Directorate of Army Training (Pioneers and Engineers).

It is clearly understood that the 3 PPCLI BG is in a combat zone and that some procedures need to be modified to allow training to be as realistic as possible. Therefore, following an appraisal of the procedure for the use of the , the BOI recommends that the procedures currently in use be reviewed to ensure that requirements of both combat and safety are being met appropriately and equally. This procedural observation had no impact on the actual incident of 17 April 02.

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Additional Recommendations

The following recommendations are submitted for immediate consideration, and are in addition to the previously submitted recommendations detailed above.

Personal Emergency Notification (PEN) Forms

There were some issues that surfaced during the days that followed the initial notification process to the families. As background, the notification process was carefully studied on an earlier occasion with the unit adjutants of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. During that conference, it was decided that the military was responsible to notify the individuals that the member had listed as the primary and secondary Next of Kin (NOK) as well as the emergency contact listed on the PEN form. The initial notification on all cases was to be the person identified as the emergency contact followed by the primary and then the secondary NOK. In some occasions during the notification process by the teams it was determined that the person being notified wished to inform the rest of their families. Those wishes were of course honoured. However, when this course was followed, some family members were upset that they were not also notified by the military.

There was at least one instance in which a member’s parents were not included on the PEN as other people had been listed under “Emergency Notification” and “Primary” and “Secondary” NOK. The Rear Party was not at liberty to guess the member’s wishes or relationships. They acted on the information available which is strictly based on the PEN form that the member completes prior to deployment. There is no other document available that provides further information on their family members (e.g. address and phone number of both parents).

Given the changing nature of the modern family structure in which separated parents are not uncommon it is suggested that the PEN form be revised to allow for additional NOK entries for notification.

Operational Security (OPSEC)

The Board was in a fact-finding/analysis mode for over two months, during which time the membership became concerned with specific security of information issues. In particular, there seemed to be a lack of consideration given to OPSEC. As an example, was included on a CF member’s personal web site. One site named snipers and their home units. Another offered information on in- theatre procedures, CF Immediate Operational Requirements (IORs), delivery timelines, deployment numbers, procurement problems for deploying units, costs, and even deployment strategies.

Much of this information is not classified in a military sense, but when summarized by an authoritative source and published on the Internet, formerly innocuous information can

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become an operational liability. With the threat of terrorist activities today and for the foreseeable future, a tighter rein on OPSEC matters is required within the CF.

Members of the CF who assemble or operate a personal website on the Internet must be educated as to the OPSEC issues associated with discussing military related matters in such a public forum.

Tactical Air Mission Planning Process

It is the opinion of the Board that the existing mission planning procedures at the F-16 unit (170th Fighter Squadron) and the AWACS squadron (960th Airborne Air Control Squadron) need to be reviewed. More specifically:

If not already in place, a system needs to be developed whereby all aircrew flying combat missions in OEF are briefed on the valid ACO and on all the subsequent changes that could potentially apply to their missions. Associated with that process, a “Read File” applicable to ACOs, ATOs and SPINS, with clearly defined reading requirements (every mission, every day, or every edition) and customers (all aircrew, all controllers, tasked individuals or any combination thereof), needs to be reviewed for improvement at the unit level to ensure better information dissemination.

If not already in existence, a control and standardization method needs to be developed to ensure that all aircrew fly with accurate airspace coordination information. More specifically, the information that aircrew will have with them while flying, as well as the format in which the information is presented (maps, diagrams, briefing cards) needs to be clearly defined.

On the same topic, aircrew need to be better informed on the or any other ATO-visualization software, and need to be reminded of its limitations.

Finally, aircrew need to be reminded by the chain of command (CAOC on down to the unit level) that a thorough knowledge of the elements of the ATO and ACO applicable to their mission is ultimately their responsibility. This can only be guaranteed through careful mission preparation and study.

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CAOC Awareness Briefing

The reviewed testimonies have confirmed a certain lack of knowledge by the aircrews of the functions of the CAOC, its capabilities and its limitations. It is the opinion of the Board that air-fighting units at all levels would be better served if an initial familiarization briefing of the CAOC was mandatory for all aircrew arriving in theatre. This briefing could take place at the CAOC (ideally) or could be given by CAOC representatives at the various deployed locations in the theatre.

CAOC Supervision

It is the opinion of the Canadian Board that the CAOC needs to introduce measures that ensure adequate supervision of the quality of mission planning and execution by the tactical units authorized to fly OEF missions. In particular, the CAOC leadership should insist on periodically reviewing mission briefs (perhaps by VTC) to ensure that flight leads are properly interpreting the Commander’s intent, the theatre threat, and the various flying orders.

Procedure Verification Process

Although most likely already in place, the board strongly feels that a higher priority needs to be given to the verification process in theatre. More particularly, this inquiry has revealed a definite lack of knowledge or familiarity, at all levels, of basic ACMs (Airspace Control Measures). Methods of control and verification have to be refined to ensure that the information required for a safe and effective air campaign is passed and clearly understood, from the planner to the flyer.

Combat Identification Briefing

Staff from Directorate Land Requirements, Directorate of Air Requirements and the Directorate of Artillery Systems Project Management provided the Board with an overview of current capabilities and an overview of future technology developments with respect to “Combat Identification”.

In the short term, the Board recommends that a concerted effort be made to develop simple but effective solutions for combat identification,

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The Leggat Study

Almost immediately following the incident, once it was determined that a Board of Inquiry was to be convened, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Science & Technology (Adm (S&T)), Dr. J. Leggat, offered the services of his organization to assist the work of the Board in any way possible. Upon consultation, it was determined that Dr. Leggat’s Group was ideally positioned to conduct a scientific study of the current technical challenges, ongoing initiatives, and potential new technologies surrounding air-to-ground combat identification systems. These systems and the emerging technologies associated with their use are viewed as a key component of the future CF approach to enhanced force protection and fratricide prevention.

This study is included in whole at Annex K. Notwithstanding the security classification of the rest of the Board of Inquiry Final Report, it is unclassified. Specific recommendations that support or inform the Board’s findings are included in the “Other Relevant Issues” section.

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Annexes

Annex A - Terms of Reference

The following is the original terms of reference, as submitted for the consideration of the Board President on 19 April 2002. These original terms were subsequently modified slightly to reflect the reassignment of BGen Dumais from “Board Member” to “Specialist Advisor” to permit his attachment to the American CIB.

Annex 1/20


Annex 2/20


Annex B - Visual Timeline Chart (21:16Z to 21:36Z)

Under leaf is a graphical representation of the air and ground events that transpired at the Tarnak Farm Range on the night of 17/18 April 2002.

Annex 3/20


Annex C - Time Interpretation Table

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Annex D - Area Map of Kandahar Airfield Facility and Tarnak Farm

The above map details the location of the Tarnak Farm Range, in relation to the position of Kandahar Airfield Facility (KAF), the main operating base of coalition ground forces in the theatre.

Visible in the Tarnak Farm Multi Purpose Range Complex is the main camp area in green.

The main range is bounded to the south by the north wall of the main camp area, just below the circular structure (commonly called “the corral”), and to the east by the Wadi East (drainage ditch). The Tank Stalk range was stationed along this wadi, firing in a Westerly direction.

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Annex E - Tarnak Farm Multi-Purpose Range Complex The following diagram shows key details of the Tarnak Farm Range, including:

Drainage Ditch (Wadi East) - location of the firing point for the Tank Stalk rangeDrainage Ditch (Wadi South) - location /approach path for the Close-Quarter Combat rangeAdministrative Area - location of waiting troops, support vehiclesAmmunition Point - area where individual relays received ammunitionCorral - part of the Close-Quarter Combat rangeTank Targets (close / far) - primary targets for Tank Stalk range firingTraining Compound - southern limit of range area

Annex 6/20


Of note are the relative locations of the two simultaneous ranges being conducted that evening, as well as their arcs of fire. Depicted on the right of the photo below is the Tank Stalk range, which moved north from the Ammunition Point; at the bottom, running east-west, is the Close-Quarter Combat range, which moved west and then up towards the corral.

These two ranges were designed to be conducted simultaneously to allow for maximum training value in terms of immersion in the tactical scenario. Accordingly, they have intersecting arcs of fire at and beyond the northern edge of the corral structure. Additional safety arcs were built into the scenario by a process called “templating” to ensure that troop positions were not impinged upon by friendly fire.

Annex 7/20


Annex F - Tank Stalk Range Photos

To aid in visualization, this sectioncontains a series of four photographs,detailing the specifics of the Tank Stalkrange, roughly from north to south.

Each photo includes a small interpretivediagram similar to the one on the right.These diagrams show the approximatelocation of the camera and the rough fieldof view for each photo. Note that photoswith a long field of view (ie photo 4) tendto distort depth, making distant objectsappear considerably closer than theyactually are.

Photo 1 - Wadi East, looking roughlynorth. The Tank Stalk firing position wasalong the west side of the wadi, firingwest, as depicted at the extreme left of the photo.

Annex 8/20

Photo 1


Annex 9/20


Photo 4 - Depicts the extreme left side of the Tank Stalk range, showing the leftmost point of the field of fire looking towards the far tank target. The north edge of the corral is visible, marking the right hand extremity of the field of fire for the Close-Quarter Combat range which was being conducted in and along the southern drainage ditch (Wadi South).

Annex 10/20

Photo 4


Annex G - Troop Disposition and Wadi Profile at Bomb Impact

The above diagram details the relative positioning of the various personnel engaged in the Tank Stalk portion of the range, at or near the moment of impact. When correlated with the injury list, it is evident that proximity to the impact point was a primary factor in determining the severity of the harm sustained.

Sergeant Leger, Corporal Dyer and Private Smith, closest to the blast, sustained the bulk of the concussive effect, although their body position along the upward slope of the wadi did not vary significantly. Private Green, however, was at or above the lip of the ditch in a crouched position. This may explain the fact that he was thrown some distance by the force of the blast. Sergeant Ford was comparatively sheltered, though his proximity means that he sustained significant injuries. On the other side of the section, Master Corporal Hollister and Corporal Paquette were both seriously injured, while Master Corporal Clark, further down the slope of the wadi, received only a minor fragmentation injury. To the north, Corporal Perry and Corporal Decaire were slightly exposed, though distant, and both received shrapnel injuries.

Annex 11/20


Annex H - Flight Path Reconstruction

The following diagrams show the initial approach and subsequent tactical manoeuvring of Coffee 51 Flight as it was transiting in the vicinity of the KAF on 17 Apr 02, between approximately 21:15Z and 21:28Z.

Annex 12/20


During the engagement phase, data frequency for altitude, speed, heading, pitch angle, roll angle, and position (relative to impact point) has been extracted from supplied materials with a sampling frequency of one iteration per second. This yields a reconstruction of very high positional fidelity.

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Annex I - Transcript of Air to Air Radio Communications

The following transcript is derived from recordings made aboard the two F-16 aircraft in Coffee 51 Flight. This accounts for the short gap at the beginning of the transcript, between the time the initial contact report is sent to the AWACS, and when the aircraft move into the engagement phase.

This is the only recorded evidence of the radio calls that were exchanged between and Coffee 51 Flight between 21:22:38Z and 21:31:30Z, 17 Apr 02. At the time of this report, no evidence was provided that could clearly identify the exchanges that occurred via between and . Reference to is made twice in the overall exchanges between and Coffee 51 Flight indicating that there is command and control interaction between the AWACS and the CAOC. All the testimonies reviewed by the Board confirm that fact.

For ease of interpretation, entries have been colour coded according to the transmitting unit:

Coffee 51Coffee 52

TIME (Z) FREQ C/S TRANSMISSION REMARKS

21:22:38 51 Do you have good coordinate for a mark or do you need me to roll in?

In the previous minute, Coffee 52 has made his initial contact report. Coffee 51 is asking whether he has input the position into his computer to allow aircraft-aircraft transfer, or whether he personally should turn to identify the target coordinates.

21:22:42 52 Euh, standby. I’ll mark it right now. Coffee 52 tells Coffee 51 to wait; the requested info will be forthcoming.

21:22:47 52 I’m in from the south-east.Coffee 52 attempts to update his position to preserve his lead’s situational awareness.

21:22:52 51 At 21:52:56, Coffee 52 recovers from his designation to mark the target.

21:23:22

21:23:29Euh, I suppose we might as well make a left hand turn and stay in until 51 is ready.

recognizes that this situation will delay the refuelling and manoeuvres to stay in his assigned area.

21:23:34 52

Euh, Okay . This Coffee52. I’ve got a TALLY on the vicinity. Euh, request permission to lay down some 20 mike-mike.

Coffee 52 is in a shallow right hand turn, going through a heading of .

Annex 14/20



21:23:42 Standby is likely making initial contact with to request information.

21:23:45 51 Let’s just make sure that euh, that it’s not friendly, that’s all.

21:23:51 51 When you got a chance, put on the if you got a good hack on it.

Coffee 51 again requests the exact position to be transmitted via air-air data link.

21:24:39 52 I’m gonna flow down here to the south west.

Horizontal range from the target area to Coffee 52 is slightly less than 2.5nm shortly after this call.

21:24:42 52 from Coffee 52. Do you want us to push to a different freq?”

21:24:48 51 Check my sparkle, check my sparkle to see if it looks good.

Shortly after this transmission, sensors from both aircraft are synchronized by data link and are looking at the same area on the ground.

21:24:55 51 Yeah, I’m contact your sparkle as well. Coffee 51 confirms that both laser spot trackers are on the same target.

21:25:00 Coffee 51. HOLD Fire, I need details on SAFIRE…(the rest of the sentence unconfirmed)…”for …”

denies Cofee 52’s request to open fire using 20mm cannon with a call to the collective C/S og Coffee 51 Flight (Coffee 51). The AWACS clearly requires additional SAFIRE information to relay to and the MCC is acting on a “hunch” to deny weapon employment until the situation clears up somewhat.

21:25:04

52

Okay, I have got some men on the road and it looks like a piece of artillery firing at us. I am rolling in in SELF-DEFENSE”.

At 21:25:11, Coffee 52 initiates a sharp right hand turn to initiate weapon delivery. Starting speed is starting altitude is

21:25:04 copies

21:25:17 51 Check Master Arm, Laser Arm, and check you are not in mark.

Coffee 51 supports Coffee 52s attack by confirming his weapons release settings.

21:25:23 52 I’m in from the southwest. Situational awareness call.

21:25:37 51 Do you show him on a bridge?Coffee 51 is still trying to correlate what he sees on his with what Coffee 52 is reporting.

21:25:39 52 Bomb’s away, cranking left.

Bomb release time.

The recovery is to level flight with no clear attempt to get altitude separation from the ground.

21:25:49 51 Check (unrecognizable term, “LIVE?”), deedle, deedle.

21:25:52 52 I am fine.21:25:54 52 Laser’s on.21:26:01 52 Shack ! Bomb impact time. 21:26:07 52 ….

Annex 15/20



21:26:11 Coffee 51, Disengage. “Friendlies Kandahar”.

By thies time has issued clear direction for Coffee 51 Flight to clear the area due to their proximity to KAF and friendly troops.

21:26:16 52 Copy… euh. Disengaging south.

21:26:18 Coffee 51, . How copy? Is not sure whether Coffee 51 Flight has received the last call.

21:26:21 51 Copy euh… Can you confirm that they were shooting at us?

This question does not make sense; Coffee 51 knows that is distant from the action and in any case has no sensors that would be able to corroborate his picture of the tactical situation.

21:26:31

Coffee 51, . You are cleared Self-Defence… wants you to work south …(some unrecognizable words)…Kandahar.

This call reflects the confusion in the AWACS over what has transpired since the “self defence” call – it is worth noting that none of the communications surrounding the weapon setup or release was transmitted on .the primary AWACS controlling frequency.

21:26:42 51 Okay. One is coming back left, steer 82.

All times extrapolated from this point on.

21:26:44 Coffee 51, Scram south!21:26:47 51 , Coffee 51 scramming.

21:27:15Coffee 51, . I need coordinates when able and I to know if any rounds were fired.

21:27:23 51 Go ahead.

21:27:25 52

Yeah, I had one bomb dropped… in the vicinity of euh, 31 24 N, point 78, 65 43 point 522. That’s an estimate euh, if you are our general vicinity.

The coordinates repeated in this transmission correspond to a point approximately 5 to 6 miles away from the Tarnak Farm area.

21:27:4521:27:55 Coffee 51. Repeat east coordinate.

21:28:01 52

Yeah. I am not so sure it’s that accurate. I don’t have an accurate coordinate right now. Do you want me to go back and get you one?

21:28:07 , negative.21:28:13 51 Let’s go back safe.

21:28:26 52 Yeah! They were definitely shooting at you.

21:28:29 52

It sure seemed that they were tracking around and everything, and euh, trying to lead.

21:28:35 51 Yeah. We had our lights on and it wasn’t helping I don’t think.

21:28:42 52 I had a group of guys on a road around a

Annex 16/20



gun and it did not looked organized like it would be our guys”.

21:28:49 51It seems like it was right on a bridge. That’s kind of where I was at.

21:28:52 52 Yeah, not quite. (pause) I hope that was the right thing to do.

21:28:53 51 Me too…21:29:02 Coffee 5121:29:03 51 Go ahead.

21:29:04 Yeah> I need type of bomb dropped.Result, and, type of SAFIRE

Even this late in the engagement. Coffee 51 Flight has still not completed the requirements for the SAFIRE report.

21:29:10 51

That was a single GBU-12 dropped. It was a direct hit on euh the artillery piece that was firing. As far as the SAFIRE,

Coffee 52. 51, what do you have on that.

21:29:27 52

I’d say the same. It was euh, sort of continuous fire, and euh… it appeared to be leading us as we were flying by and then as we came back around.

21:29:46 Do you get a top altitude of the SAFIRE?

21:29:52 51 Negative. They were burning out before here.

21:29:55 52

I would estimate the top a approximately 10,000 ft. And just to let you know. We split in azimuth, sending 51 to the south and 52 went to the northeast. And euh, one of the guns turned back around to the east firing at 52, euh, as well.

21:30:15 copies. And if we could, could you give me a routh longitude.

21:30:24 52 Yeah. I did not take a mark at the time.21:30:29

21:30:36 52 Was that definitely the airfield that was closer?

21:30:40 51 Yeah.

21:30:40 Coffee 51. Could you just repeat the coordinate that you passed earlier?

21:30:43 51 He wants the coordinate again.

21:30:45 52 Yeah. I do not have the proper coordinate for that

21:30:49

21:30:52 52 Would you estimate… I’d estimate about 3 miles to the south, maybe a 150…

21:31:00 Coffee 51,

21:31:05 51Yeah euh… There was no effective in that area tonight as far as our brief was concerned? Do you concur?

Only now is the possibility of a missed being considered.

Annex 17/20



21:31:12

21:31:19

agrees that there is no but in the time interval between the question and the response, it is doubtful that he had time to check the paper copy of the ATO.

21:31:28 52 Yeah. Standby for the microscope huh!21:31:30 51 Yeahhh.

Annex 18/20


Annex J - Relevant Air Orders and Instructions

Description of the SAFIRE reporting requirement

Annex 19/20

Self-defence includes the action of a U.S. forces unit in defending itself, sub-units and other U.S. forces in the vicinity, or, for national self-defence, the U.S., U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their property, U.S. commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. [Coalition] forces, foreign nationals and their property, against a hostile act or hostile intent.

As to both unit and national self-defence, the right to use armed force in self-defence depends upon two elements: necessity and proportionality. The requirement of necessity, or present danger, normally arises when a hostile act occurs. The right and obligation of self-defence may also involve using armed force against hostile intent. In either case, proportionality requires that the use of force be limited in intensity, duration, and magnitude to what is reasonably required to counter the hostile act or hostile intent.

Under the concept of self-defence in peacetime, force may NOT be used with a view to inflicting reprisal or retaliation for acts already committed. Where acts already committed reflect a pattern of hostile acts which can reasonably be expected to continue based on all valid indications, actions in self-defence may be taken to eliminate the continuing threat.

It is critical, however, that coalition forces plan and execute such that they minimize the chance of a self-defence situation. (emphasis added)


Annex K - The Leggat Study

As described in the “Recommendations” section, under leaf is a scientific study of the current technical challenges, ongoing initiatives, and potential new technologies surrounding air-to-ground combat identification systems conducted by Adm (S&T) personnel at the request of the Board.

Annex 20/20

Glossary

AAA: Anti-Aircraft Artillery. Ground based weapons system designed to shoot down aircraft using rounds or exploding shells. Small Arms fired at aircraft are commonly included within this definition.

AL-QUEDA: An Arabic word meaning “the base”. In approximately 1989, Osama bin Laden and Muhammad Atef founded “Al Qaeda”, an international terrorist group dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence.

ATO: Air Tasking Order. A representation of the Joint Air Operations Plan. Details how joint forces will be integrated and tasked, including specific mission details.

AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System. An aircraft that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control and communications capabilities to US, NATO and other allied air defence forces.

BAGRAM AIR BASE: Located in the Parvan Province, Afghanistan, approximately 47 kilometres north of Kabul.

BATTLE GROUP (BG): A temporary grouping of sub-units under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.

BISON ARMOURED AMBULANCE: Is an 8X8 wheeled armoured ambulance for casualty evacuation manufactured by the Diesel Division General Motors; it entered service with the Canadian Forces in the early 1990's.

C-130 HERCULES: Considered to be one of the most versatile tactical transport planes, it is used to airlift troops, equipment and cargo, conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) operations and in air-to-air refueling of fighters certain helicopters.

CAOC: Combined Aerospace Operations Center. It is the primary theatre command and control facility responsible for orchestrating an air campaign for a coalition effort.

CASUALTY PRIORITY SYSTEM: The four categories of casualty triage are color-coded and are recognized as follows:

Category I IMMEDIATE (RED TAG) includes all compromises to a patient's Airway, Breathing and Circulation. If immediate medical attention is not provided, the patient will die.

Category II DELAYED (YELLOW TAG) includes any injuries that may be serious and potentially life threatening. They may require extensive and intensive treatment.

Category III MINIMAL (GREEN TAG) also called the "walking wounded." These individuals have injuries that will still need treatment, however, are unlikely to deteriorate over the next few days.

Category IV EXPECTANT (BLACK TAG) this category is comprised of patients whose treatment would be time consuming and extremely complicated coupled with a low chance of survival.

CFACC: Coalition Force Air Component Command.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: Air action by fixed or rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces.

COLLECTIVE TRAINING: Training that focuses on producing cohesive, combat-capable tactical groupings and involves the simulated execution of battle tasks in realistic training scenarios. Levels 4, 5, and 6 denote training at the Company, Combat Team and BG levels respectively.

COYOTE: An 8x8 light armoured vehicle. This highly mobile, well-armed, and well-protected reconnaissance variant of the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) family is employed in the conduct of battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance missions at the battle group and brigade levels.

DMART: Disaster Mortuary Affairs Response Team. In the US Army it covers the search for, recovery, identification, preparation and disposition of remains of persons for whom the Services are responsible by status and Executive Order.

E3-B/C SENTRY: Airborne Early Warning aircraft. The E-3 Sentry is a modified Boeing 707/320 commercial airframe with a rotating radar dome. It contains a radar subsystem that permits surveillance from the Earth’s surface up into the stratosphere, over land or water.

EOD TEAM: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team. Responsible for the detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance.

F-16 FIGHTING FALCON: is a compact, multi-role fighter aircraft. It is highly maneuverable and has proven itself in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack.

FLIR: Forward-Looking Infrared camera. It is a high-resolution, thermal-imaging system.

FRATRICIDE: The employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment that results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel.

GBU-12 (LGB): Guided Bomb Unit-12 Laser Guided Bomb. It utilizes a 500-pound general-purpose warhead. The operator illuminates a target

with a laser designator and then the munition guides free fall to a spot of laser energy reflected from the target.

IRF(L): Immediate Reaction Force (Land). It is a light, fully mobile force designed to respond quickly to overseas missions, and highly suitable for evolving operations.

KC-135 STRATOTANKER: Based on the Boeing 367-80 its principal mission is air refueling. This unique asset greatly enhances the USAF’s capability to accomplish its primary missions of global reach and global power.

KC-10A EXTENDER: An Air Mobility Command advanced tanker and cargo aircraft designed to provide increased global mobility for US armed forces. Using either an advanced aerial refuelling boom, or a hose and drogue centerline refuelling system, the KC-10A can refuel a wide variety of US and allied military aircraft within the same mission. The aircraft is equipped with lighting for night operations.

KANDAHAR: Capital of Kandahar province in Southern Afghanistan, with a population of 250,000. The country’s second largest city and chief trade center is the main base for Canadian, US and Coalition military operations in the area.

MLVW: Medium Logistic Vehicle Wheeled. The backbone of the land force logistic support, these vehicles are used throughout the battlefield in command and control, troop and cargo transport, maintenance and administrative functions.

MSL: Mean Sea Level. Reference height system in which the altitude of an aircraft is given to its height above sea level.

NAUTICAL MILE (NM): Commonly used for ships at sea and aircraft in flight. A nautical mile is 6080 ft long as opposed to the more commonly used statute mile, which is 5280 ft long.

OPERATION ANACONDA: During March 2002, members of the 3 PPCLI BG were in the mountains of Paktia Province east of Gardez on a US-led Coalition effort to search for Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, capture them, and destroy their

OPERATION HARPOON: On 13 March 2002 a joint Canadian–American assault using land and air forces to eliminate a specific pocket of Taliban and Al-Qaeda resistance. The land component was a battalion-sized mixed Canadian and American force under the tactical command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran, the commanding officer of the 3 PPCLI BG. Operation HARPOON was completed on 19 March 2002.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): The US nickname for the military phase of the campaign against terrorism which began on 7 October 2002. Operation APOLLO is Canada’s military contribution to this international campaign and includes the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry BG.

RSO: Range Safety Officer. An individual specifically appointed by the commanding officer to ensure that range exercises are conducted safely.

SAM: Surface-to-air Missile. Rocket propelled, ground based system designed to shoot down aircraft. Such systems may be small and mobile

(shoulder launched) or large and stationary. Guidance systems vary from optical through infra-red (IR), laser to radar.

TALIBAN: Emerging from the disparate bands of anti-communist Islamic militia known as the Mujahideen they rapidly took control of most of the country, including the capital Kabul, which was taken in September 1996. Their tough interpretation of Islamic law has attracted widespread criticism.

TARNAK FARM: A multi-purpose range complex located south of the Kandahar Airfield Facility routinely used by the members of Task Force Rakkasan.

TASK FORCE DEVIL: Brevity code word for “A” Company, 3 PPCLI Battle Group during its range exercise on 17 April 2002 at the Tarnak Farm Range.

TASK FORCE RAKKASAN: Brevity code word for the brigade combat team based on the 3rd

Brigade (187th Infantry Regiment) of the 101st (US) Airborne Division (Air Assault) and is so named in honour of the 187th’s regimental nickname. It is a Coalition formation based at that includes 3 PPCLI BG.

TOC: Tactical Operations Centre. In the US Army it serves as the unit’s command and control hub, assisting the commander in synchronizing operations. The TOC is the location where the majority of the planning, staff coordination, and monitoring of key events occurs.

TRACER ROUND: A tracer round contains a pyrotechnic charge that permits visible observation of a bullet's in-flight path to the impact point.

UHF: Ultra High Frequency.

VHF: Very High Frequency. Frequencies from VHF signals are widely employed for television and radio transmissions.

WADI: Rocky watercourse, dry except in rainy season.

ZULU: Military standard time reference system that is based on the global time zone division

commonly referred to as the Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) reference system. Zulu time system is universally applied by all Coalition members involved in OEF.