wealth and inheritance (in the long run)
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Wealth and Inheritance (in the Long Run). Thomas Piketty Paris School of Economics Handbook of Income Distribution Conference April 6 th 2013. This chapter: how do wealth-income and inheritance-income ratios evolve in the long run, and why? - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Wealth and Inheritance (in the Long Run)
Thomas Piketty
Paris School of Economics
Handbook of Income Distribution Conference April 6th 2013
• This chapter: how do wealth-income and inheritance-income ratios evolve in the long run, and why?
• There are two ways to become rich: either through one’s own work, or through inheritance
• In Ancien Regime societies, as well as in 19C and early 20C, it was obvious to everybody that the inheritance channel was important
• Inheritance and successors were everywhere in the 19C literature: Balzac, Jane Austen, etc.
• Inheritance flows were huge not only in novels; but also in 19C tax data: major economic, social and political issue
• Question: Does inheritance belong to the past? Did modern growth kill the inheritance channel? E.g. due to the natural rise of human capital and meritocracy?
• This chapter answers « NO » to this question: I find that inherited wealth will probably play as big a role in 21C capitalism as it did in 19C capitalism
• Key mechanism if low growth g and r > g
• Chapter based upon: - literature survey (Kotlikoff-Summers-Modigliani controvery during 1980s-1990s, etc.)
- new work: • « On the long-run evolution of inheritance: France 1820-
2050 », QJE 2011 • « Inherited vs self-made wealth: theory & evidence from a
rentier society » (with Postel-Vinay & Rosenthal, 2011)• « Capital is back: wealth-income ratios in rich countries
1700-2010 » (with Zucman, 2013)• On-going work on other countries: • « Wealth & inheritance in Britain from 1896 to the present »
(Atkinson, 2012) • « Inheritance in Germany 1911-2009 : a Mortality Multiplier
Approach » (Schinke, 2012) • Sweden (Roine-Waldenstrom); US (Alvaredo); etc.
Figure 1: Annual inheritance flow as a fraction of national income, France 1820-2008
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40%
1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Economic flow (computed from national wealth estimates, mortalitytables and observed age-wealth profiles)
Fiscal flow (computed from observed bequest and gift tax data, inc.tax exempt assets)
Figure 2: Annual inheritance flow as a fraction of disposable income, France 1820-2008
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1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Economic flow (computed from national wealth estimates,mortality tables and observed age-wealth profiles)Fiscal flow (computed from observed bequest and gift tax data,inc. tax exempt assets)
• An annual inheritance flow around 20%-25% of disposable income is a very large flow
• E.g. it is much larger than the annual flow of new savings (typically around 10%-15% of disposable income), which itself comes in part from the return to inheritance (it’s easier to save if you have inherited your house & have no rent to pay)
• An annual inheritance flow around 20%-25% of disposable income means that total, cumulated inherited wealth represents the vast majority of aggregate wealth (typically above 80%-90% of aggregate wealth), and vastly dominates self-made wealth
• Main lesson: with g low & r>g, inheritance is bound to dominate new wealth; the past eats up the future
g = growth rate of national income and output r = rate of return to wealth = (interest + dividend + rent + profits
+ capital gains etc.)/(net financial + real estate wealth) • Intuition: with r>g & g low (say r=4%-5% vs g=1%-2%)
(=19C & 21C), wealth coming from the past is being capitalized faster than growth; heirs just need to save a fraction g/r of the return to inherited wealth
• It is only in countries and time periods with g exceptionally high that self-made wealth dominates inherited wealth (Europe in 1950s-70s or China today)
This chapter: two issues
(1) The return of wealth (Be careful with « human capital » illusion: human k did not
replace old-style financial & real estate wealth)
(2) The return of inherited wealth(Be careful with « war of ages » illusion: the war of ages did not replace class war; inter-generational inequality did notreplace intra-generational inequality)
1. The return of wealth
• The « human capital » illusion: « in today’s modern economies, what matters is human capital and education, not old-style financial or real estate wealth »
• Technocractic model : Parsons, Galbraith, Becker (unidimensional class structure based upon human K)• But the share of old-style capital income (rent, interest,
dividend, etc.) in national income is the same in 2010 as in 1910 (about 30%), and the aggregate wealth-income ratio is also the same in 2010 as in 1910 (about 600%)
• Today in France, Italy, UK: β = W/Y ≈ 600%Per adult national income Y ≈ 35 000€Per adult private wealth W ≈ 200 000€ (wealth = financial assets + real estate assets – financial liabilities)(on average, households own wealth equal to about 6 years of income)
Wealth-income ratio in France 1820-2010
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1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Aggregate private wealth as afraction of national income
The changing nature of national wealth, UK 1700-2010
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1700 1750 1810 1850 1880 1910 1920 1950 1970 1990 2010National wealth = agricultural land + housing + other domestic capital goods + net foreign assets
(% n
atio
nal
inco
me)
Net foreign assets
Other domestic capital
Housing
Agricultural land
The changing nature of national wealth, US 1770-2010
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600%
1770 1810 1850 1880 1910 1920 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
National wealth = agricultural land + housing + other domestic capital goods + net foreign assets
(% n
atio
nal
inco
me)
Net foreign assets
Other domestic capital
Housing
Agricultural land
What We Are Trying to Understand: The Rise in Private Wealth-National Income
Ratios, 1970-2010
From Private to National Wealth: Small and Declining Government Net
Wealth, 1970-2010
National vs. Foreign Wealth, 1970-2010 (% National Income)
1. An asset price effect: long run asset price recovery driven by changes in capital policies since world wars
1. A real economic effect: slowdown of productivity and pop growth:
– Harrod-Domar-Solow: wealth-income ratio β = s/g– If saving rate s = 10% and growth rate g = 3%, then
β ≈ 300%– But if s = 10% and g = 1.5%, then β ≈ 600%
How Can We Explain the 1970-2010 Evolution?
Countries with low g are bound to have high β. Strong effect in Europe, ultimately everywhere.
In very long run, limited role of asset price divergence
– In short/medium run, war destructions & valuation effects paramount
– But in the very long run, no significant divergence between price of consumption and capital goods
– Key long-run force is β = s/g
How Can We Explain Return to 19c Levels?
One sector model accounts reasonably well for long run dynamics & level differences Europe vs. US
BU: Bequest-in-utility-function model Max U(c,b)=c1-s bs (or Δbs)c = lifetime consumption, b = end-of-life wealth (bequest)s = bequest taste = saving rate → β = s/g
DM: Dynastic model: Max Σ U(ct)/(1+δ)t
→ r = δ +ρg , s = gα/r, β = α/r = s/g ( β ↑ as g ↓) ( U(c)=c1-ρ/(1-ρ) , F(K,L)=KαL1-α )
OLG model: low growth implies higher life-cycle savings
→ in all three models, β = s/g rises as g declines
Three models delivering the same result
• Low β in mid-20c were an anomaly– Anti-capital policies depressed asset prices– Unlikely to happen again with free markets– Who owns wealth will become again very important
• β can vary a lot between countries– s and g determined by different forces – With perfect markets: scope for very large net foreign
asset positions– With imperfect markets: domestic asset price bubbles
Lesson 1a: Capital is Back
High β raise new issues about capital regulation & taxation
• In 21st century: σ > 1– Rising β come with decline in average return to wealth r – But decline in r smaller than increase in β capital shares
α = rβ increaseConsistent with K/L elasticity of substitution σ > 1
• In 18th century: σ < 1– In 18c, K = mostly land– In land-scarce Old World, α ≈ 30%– In land-rich New World, α ≈ 15% Consistent with σ < 1: when low substitutability, α large
when K relatively scarce
Lesson 1b: The Changing Nature of Wealth and Technology
2. The return of inherited wealth
• In principle, one could very well observe a return of wealth without a return of inherited wealth
• I.e. it could be that the rise of aggregate wealth-income ratio is due mostly to the rise of life-cycle wealth (pension funds)
• Modigliani life-cycle theory: people save for their old days and die with zero wealth, so that inheritance flows are small
• However the Modigliani story happens to be partly wrong (except in the 1950s-60s, when there’s not much left to inherit…): pension wealth is a limited part of wealth (<5% in France… but 20% in the UK)
• Bequest flow-national income ratio B/Y = µ m W/Y(with m = mortality rate, µ = relative wealth of decedents)
• B/Y has almost returned to 1910 level, both because of W/Y and of µ
• Dynastic model: µ = (D-A)/H, m=1/(D-A), so that µ m = 1/H and B/Y = β/H (A = adulthood = 20, H = parenthood = 30, D =death = 60-80)• General saving model: with g low & r>g, B/Y → β/H → with β=600% & H=generation length=30 years, then
B/Y≈20%, i.e. annual inheritance flow ≈ 20% national income
Figure 10: Steady-state cross-sectional age-wealth profile in the dynastic model with demographic noise
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A=20 25 H=30 35 I=40 45 50 55 60 65 D=70
(average wealth of agegroup)/(average wealth ofadults)
Figure 8: The ratio between average wealth of decedents and average wealth of the living in France 1820-2008
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1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
excluding inter-vivos gifts
including inter-vivos gifts intodecedents' wealth
The share of inherited wealth in total wealth
• Modigliani AER 1986, JEP 1988: inheritance = 20% of total U.S. wealth
• Kotlikoff-Summers JPE 1981, JEP 1988: inheritance = 80% of total U.S. wealth
• Three problems with this controversy: - Bad data - We do not live in a stationary world: life-cycle wealth was
much more important in the 1950s-1970s than it is today- We do not live in a representative-agent world → new
definition of inherited share: partially capitalized inheritance (inheritance capitalized in the limit of today’s inheritor wealth)→ our findings show that the share of inherited wealth has
changed a lot over time, but that it is generally much closer to Kotlikoff-Summers (80%) than Modigliani (20%)
Figure S11.1. The share of inherited wealth in aggregate wealth, Paris 1872-1937
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160%
1872 1882 1912 1922 1927 1932 1937
Capitalized inherited wealth (KS1)(Kotlikoff-Summers, r=3%, 30yrs)
Partially capitalized inherited wealth(PPVR definition)
Non-capitalized inherited wealth(Modgliani)
Figure S11.2. The share of inherited wealth in aggregate wealth, Paris 1872-1937
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1872 1882 1912 1922 1927 1932 1937
Capitalized inheritance (Kotlikoff-Summers, observed r)
Capitalized inheritance (KS1) (Kotlikoff-Summers, r=3%, 30yrs)
Partically capitalized inheritance (PPVRinheritance)
Non-capitalized inheritance (Modgliani)
Figure S11.3. The share of inherited wealth in aggregate wealth, France 1850-2100 (2010-2100: g=1,7%, r=3,0%)
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1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090
Partially capitalized inheritance(PPVR definition)
Non-capitalized inheritance(Modigliani)
Figure S11.4. The share of inherited wealth in aggregate wealth, France 1850-2100 (2010-2100: g=1,7%, r=3,0%)
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1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090
Capitalized inheritance (KS1)(Kotlikoff-Summers, r=3%, 30yrs)
Partially capitalized inheritance(PPVR definition)
Non-capitalized inheritance(Modgliani)
Figure 11.12. The inheritance flow in Europe 1900-2010
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1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
France
United Kingdom (Atkinson)
Germany (Schinke)
Back to distributional analysis: macro ratios determine who is the dominant social class
• 19C: top successors dominate top labor earners
→ rentier society (Balzac, Jane Austen, etc.)• For cohorts born in1910s-1950s, inheritance did not matter too
much → labor-based, meritocratic society• But for cohorts born in the 1970s-1980s & after, inheritance
matters a lot
→ 21c class structure will be intermediate between 19c rentier society than to 20c meritocratic society – and possibly closer to the former (more unequal in some dimens., less in others)
• The rise of human capital & meritocracy was an illusion .. especially with a labor-based tax system
What have we learned?
• A world with g low & r>g is gloomy for workers with zero initial wealth… especially if global tax competition drives capital taxes to 0%… especially if top labor incomes take a rising share of aggregate labor income
→ A world with g=1-2% (=long-run world technological frontier?) is not very different from a world with g=0% (Marx-Ricardo)
• From a r-vs-g viewpoint, 21c maybe not too different from 19c – but still better than Ancien Regime… except that nobody tried to depict AR as meritocratic…