WASHINGTON

Was George Washington a greatmilitary strategist?

Viewpoint: Yes. Washington was an innovative yet prudent commander whotailored his tactics to meet the changing circumstances of war. His keenunderstanding of leadership and power enabled him to inspire his troops andaided him in dealing with Congress.

Viewpoint: No. Washington was an inflexible, conventional commander whomade frequent blunders and endangered the Continental Army.

According to some historians, George Washington was the "indispens-able man" of the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), without whom the UnitedStates would not have achieved its independence from Great Britain. How-ever, more-skeptical observers consider him an ordinary man living inextraordinary times who stumbled into military greatness largely through luckand British mismanagement of the war. The truth of Washington's perfor-mance during the conflict probably fits somewhere between these twoextreme views.

Washington's military experience prior to 1775 certainly did not revealsigns of future greatness. Although the Virginian lusted after fame and fortuneas a youth, his command of a Virginia militia unit during the French andIndian War (1754-1763) brought him mostly bitterness and disappointment.He lost his first battle in July 1754 to a force vastly outnumbering his own.During the remainder of the war British officials excluded Colonel Washingtonfrom leadership in the major campaigns, and he resented his inferior statusas a provincial officer. Still, he gained valuable experience in drilling his roughrecruits, maintaining discipline, procuring supplies, and learning the politicalmachinations of military command.

Nevertheless, his lack of military experience did not matter to the Conti-nental Congress, which unanimously nominated him in 1775 to command theragtag Continental Army. Indeed, it appears that his appointment was mademore for political reasons than military ones, as Congress believed theappointment of a Virginian to military command would bolster support for theAmerican cause within the most populous colony. Further influencing Con-gress's decision was Washington himself, who campaigned for the top mili-tary post by attending Congress dressed in his militia uniform. The six-foot-three-inch Virginian certainly looked and comported himself like a general.Beneath this pretense, however, was a middle-aged man who lacked bril-liance and self-confidence. Upon learning of his appointment as commanderof the Continental Army, he admitted that "I do not think myself equal to thecommand I am honored with." Washington had legitimate concerns about hisability to command American forces, as his previous military experience—which did not include organizing, training, and leading large armies—was notsuited to the needs of his time. Still, Washington possessed good judgmentand the ability to learn from his mistakes.

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Viewpoint:Yes. Washington was an innovativeyet prudent commander whotailored his tactics to meet thechanging circumstances of war. Hiskeen understanding of leadershipand power enabled him to inspirehis troops and aided him in dealingwith Congress.

"War," nineteenth-century Prussian mili-tary theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "ismerely the continuation of policy by othermeans . . . a true political instrument," whilegrand strategy was "the use of engagements forthe object of the war." From the beginning ofthe War for American Independence (1775-1783), George Washington grasped that hisobjective was to secure the independence of arepublic. To achieve this goal, he had to keepthe support of colonial leaders and build anarmy out of a disparate body of civilians—pros-perous farmers to rootless young men. Turningthese recruits into superb soldiers, he wontheir loyalty through a combination of charac-ter, example, and discipline. He oversaw cam-paigns that caused Britain to lose severalarmies and abandon the fight. That Washing-ton at times erred in battles cannot be doubted,but in achieving his objectives he proved him-self to be an astute strategist.

Washington was not a professional soldier.His service in the French and Indian War(1754-1763) and his quest for a British Armycommission make it easy for one to forget thisfact. For provincials of modest background andno means the military offered a promisingcareer. Yet, Washington initially looked else-where; putting aside dreams of military glory,he became a land surveyor, speculator, andplanter—a typical Virginia gentleman—by the1770s. In contrast, Roman general Julius Cae-sar and French emperor Napoleon Bonapartetrained for military glory from their youth(and half of England's generals had well-thumbed copies of Caesar's Commentaries intheir libraries). America's elite strove for wealthand political status, and like many of them,Washington, though no scholar, imbibed therepublicanism of Cato, Cicero, and JohnLocke. Americans demanded the same rights ofself-government as English gentlemen. Thus,relatively light British taxes in the 1760s didnot greatly upset Washington, but he wasangered by measures in the 1770s threateningAmerican self-determination. Colonial leaderscame to see themselves as the last line indefense of liberty, and they believed Provi-

dence would bless their struggle. In the Revo-lution, then, victory was not enough; theprinciples for which America fought must tri-umph. It is easy to overlook this intent in thedrama of battle, but Washington knew the warto be a political struggle, so how he defined itsobjectives was crucial.

Civilian rule was one of these goals. Wash-ington saw himself as an American Oliver Crom-well fighting corrupt British officials. Yet, herepresented not only his class (as had Cromwell)but also the Continental Congress. According toWillard Sterne Randall in George Washington: ALife (1997), Congress was "like Cromwell's Par-liament, opposed to a wicked ministry and itsarmy by putting its own powerful army in thefield." At the same time, Washington knew theAmerican Army "must be subservient to thewishes of the elected politicians. The peoplevoted for the congressional delegates," not forhim as military commander. Imperfect as it was,Congress spoke for republicanism and theUnited States. Never did Washington forgetCongress was the "master" and he was its "ser-vant." He affirmed this relationship upon accept-ing his commission and then surrendering it atthe end of the war. He accepted the "political"generals that Congress chose (even when he pre-ferred others). A consummate diplomat, hepressed Congress to do justice to his leadingcommanders, but he would not interfere withCongress's prerogative of making decisions (aswhen he would not summarily defend MajorGeneral John Sullivan in the latter's disputeswith that body over a foreign officer's promo-tion). He bowed to its request that he submitbattle plans to a military council and even to itsrefusal to abandon and burn New York City.Washington did not hesitate to exhort Congress-men and even subtly manipulate them. While herespected their authority, he kept the reins ofmilitary command tightly in his own hands,demanding obedience from his subordinates andallowing little outside interference in basic strat-egy. However, that strategy had to reflect Con-gress's policy if republicanism was to triumph.

A Napoleon bound by this ideal is unimag-inable. Indeed, historian John Shy in "GeorgeWashington Reconsidered" (1986) insisted thatWashington "reflected the past, not the future,"as he "showed only a limited understanding ofthe strengths and weaknesses of the society hewas leading in war," and he saw the "good" soci-ety as an orderly one led by aristocrats such ashimself. He wished his command to be disci-plined and obedient, not a fervent, democraticarmy loyal to a visionary leader. To a point, thisobservation is true. As a Virginia gentleman, hewas appalled by the "leveling" spirit of someNew England militia officers who personally

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shaved their men. Upon assuming command ofthe troops around Boston, Washington sawthem as undisciplined and disorderly. He was abeliever in the "politics of deference": one listensto men of all stations, treats them fairly (butnever descends to their level), and expects themto defer to one's judgment. Despite his Enlight-enment attitudes, Washington was a curiouscombination of elitism and republicanism.

Shy concedes, however, that a leader must"behave as his followers think he should—that helook, act, and sound like the leader they want."In that sense Washington had the measure of hismen. Commanding a volunteer army that wasoutnumbered by its enemy, Washington had tohave an innate sense of how to inspire men andto generate power within a republican setting. Ashistorian George F. Scheer noted in "Washing-ton and His Lieutenants: Some Problems inCommand," (1976), Washington possessed pru-dence and great integrity. With these qualitiesand concern for his men, Washington exuded apersona that not only won Congress's coopera-tion but in the process also helped weld thestates together and instill awe in those whoserved under his command. This comportmentwas reflected when he quieted potential muti-neers among his officers in Newburgh, NewYork, in 1783. Douglas Southall Freeman inGeorge Washington: A Biography (1952) listedWashington's strategic skills as courage, adminis-trative skill, and a respect for civil authority.These qualities tell us much about Washington'scharacter. As U.S. general and president DwightD. Eisenhower observed, in leadership, characteris "everything." In Washington's case, it surelyequaled several regiments. No wonder biogra-phers of more-recent heroes have found parallelsto Washington. General George C. Marshall wassaid to have shared Washington's temperamentand the value he placed on soldiers' needs; Eisen-hower shared with the revolutionary leader hismanagerial skills and his ability to keep conten-tious men working in tandem.

No question, Washington was aloof. Somescholars attribute this behavior to his awarenessof his own inexperience and poor education;they suggest that he stood apart to avoid detec-tion of these faults. They further claim that hecalled military councils to hide his ignorance.Ambitious, vain, and perhaps paranoid, he culti-vated those above him and relaxed only withjunior officers posing no threat. Even the Mar-quis de Lafayette initially thought Washingtonsurrounded himself with flatterers. Potentialrivals—such as Generals Charles Lee and Hora-tio Gates—were pushed aside. In all fairness,though, neither Lee nor Gates could havereplaced Washington. Lee, who eventuallybecame insubordinate, would not have lasted as

commander of the army, given his tendency toignore Congress and abuse underlings. Gateswas shrewder, but he lacked judgment and therespect of many of his troops.

More than any other American militarycommander, Washington possessed an acutepolitical acumen, which explains many of hisactions as commander in chief. As Edmund S.Morgan observed in The Genius of GeorgeWashington (1980), "Washington's genius layin his understanding of power, both militaryand political. . . . At the simplest level Wash-ington's understanding of power showed itselfin the ability to take command. . . . His aloof-ness had nothing to do with arrogance. It hadto do with command." He shunned familiar-ity, as a certain remoteness and mystique wasvital to leadership. The calling of militarycouncils was commonplace among generals ofthat era, and if Washington benefited fromadvice, he was never its puppet. The New Yorkcampaign of 1776 reveals that the final deci-sions were his alone. If he was sometimes trou-bled by self-doubt, he "displayed splendidself-confidence." Washington's power, accord-ing to Scheer, lay in his ability "to inspire andpersuade, as well as simply to order men to dohis will."

Morgan concludes that this ability was truein political matters as well, for "he understoodthe political basis of military power." However,his national and republican goals laid additionalresponsibilities on him. Indeed, Washingtonreached the conclusion that the Thirteen Colo-nies must be independent long before Congresscame to this realization, but he publicly fol-lowed America rather than lead it in that direc-tion. A superb diplomat, he constantly wroteletters to both national and local officials,acknowledging their primacy while pressingthem for additional supplies and troops. Heaccepted Congress's choice of his subordinategenerals but carefully maneuvered those hetrusted to the forefront. He avoided beingpulled into disputes between subordinates, as inthe Horatio Gates-Philip Schuyler clash overthe Northern command in 1777, as such inter-ference always caused political contention.

Washington's deference to Congress andavoidance of mediating disputes help to explainhis ability to rid himself of troublesome officersand political generals whose only skills lay intheir connections. That attribute was critical, forWashington was creating a "new modeled army"by replacing older, less flexible officers withyounger ones capable of leading an unorthodoxstrike force. In building this army, Washingtonconsidered three elements essential: discipline,cleanliness, and colonial unity.

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It was not chance that led Washington tolist discipline first. Of course, that objectiveincluded training, for without skill an army islittle more than a mob. Soon after arriving atBoston in 1775, he began drilling his soldiers.However, as Stuart L. Bernath maintained in"George Washington and the Genesis of Ameri-can Military Discipline" (1967), this early train-ing was confused, inept, and hampered by thefact that a rapid turnover of soldiers requiredthe training of successive armies. Longer enlist-ments and the help of German-born inspectorgeneral and drillmaster Baron Frederich vonSteuben in 1778 made possible the develop-ment of a skilled army that could match theBritish redcoat. Washington also knew that anundisciplined force was a weak reed, for oftenhe would have to strike quickly and effectively,which required obedience. Yet, he knew disci-pline without justice or reason would weakenthe political strength of the Revolution. Wash-ington imposed a sliding yardstick of punish-ment. He adopted light sentences for fighting, aharsh flogging for stealing, and capital punish-ment only when threatened by treason ormutiny. While many mutinous soldiers werepardoned, several hundred men were con-demned to death during the war, such as thosewho were executed for the uprising at Morris-town, New Jersey (1780). However, if judgedharsh by twenty-first-century standards, Conti-nental discipline was more restrained than thatof Britain or the German principalities. Forexample, in the Continental Army the maxi-mum number of lashes a wayward soldier couldreceive from a cat-o'-nine-tails (a whip with nineknotted cords) was one hundred; in the BritishArmy the total was frequently several hundredand more. Washington's continued popularitywith his troops suggests that his decisions werenot viewed as unreasonable.

The Revolution was also a civil war, whichplayed into Washington's fear of division and dis-union. His response to this situation was to con-solidate Rebel support. In this respect he usedthe army in the struggle for men's minds. InGeorge Washington in the American Revolution,1775-1783 (1967), James Thomas Flexner con-tended that Washington sensed "that the funda-mental objective was not to foster division butincrease unity. Every man imprisoned or drivento the British was a loss." He strove to treat civil-ians honestly by offering cash or warrants forsupplies, guarding private homes, and insistingsoldiers show respect to civilians. Washingtonunderstood that the war for men's loyalty was ascrucial as battlefield victories.

Once a republican army was organized andtrained, however, strategy demanded some mili-tary victories. In 1775 it seemed the Continen-

tals might take Boston. Finding the citysurrounded by a host of brave but untrainedmen, Washington turned them into an army. Hetook Dorchester Heights (the commanding geo-graphical position) and cut off land access to thecity. Washington also wanted to attack if hiscouncil agreed, but it did not. When ColonelHenry Knox arrived with cannon from FortTiconderoga, New York, however, Washingtonacted boldly. He placed his guns on DorchesterHeights, thus forcing Sir William Howe tochoose between a costly frontal attack or a hastywithdrawal. The latter handed Washington andhis army a major propaganda coup by evacuatinghis forces to Halifax, Nova Scotia.

His defense of New York City (1776) is dis-missed as an error. In retrospect, he blundered,though his worst mistake was not abandoningFort Washington after New York City fell. TheBritish landed the largest invasion force in theirhistory; Washington commanded a much smallerarmy of green troops. He lacked a strong defen-sive position, and the city he was protecting wascut through by several waterways, forcing him todivide his army. Defending such a location givenBritain's naval superiority was risky. His errorwas thinking the guns of Forts Washington andLee, along with impediments to navigation onthe Hudson River, could stop the ships. Theycould not—a misstep born of inexperience. Yet,Washington's purpose reflected his grand strat-egy. Tories abounded in New York and New Jer-sey, and failure to act would have spurred theminto rising up and perhaps turning these statesover to the British. In addition, Congresswanted New York defended, and Washingtonwas bound to try. Most important, he hoped toprevent enemy control of the Hudson River, lestthe union be split. As a result he attempted adefense and barely escaped a disaster.

Abandoning New York, the Continentalsretreated across New Jersey with Lord CharlesCornwallis in pursuit. This retreat was no "foxchase" of a panic-stricken mob. Washington leda measured and orderly withdrawal (thoughexpiring enlistments thinned his ranks). Hechose the more risky path across the state toavoid exposing Philadelphia directly becauseCongress wanted it defended and because itsloss would embolden the Tories while slowingPatriot enlistments. After leaving New Bruns-wick, Washington planned a retaliatory blow.This undertaking was a perilous move, but thearrival of reinforcements gave him a chance. OnChristmas night he crossed the Delaware tocapture Trenton the next day and to defeat anenemy detachment at Princeton (3 January1777). Neither victory was critical militarily,but the raids proved his innovative daring-while reviving American unity and recruiting.

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In addition, using mostly militia under Lieu-tenant Colonel Joseph Vose and BrigadierGeneral William Maxwell, Washington builtAmerican strength in northern New Jersey,secured Morristown for a base, and maneu-vered the British into withdrawing from mostof New Jersey by early 1777. No simple Fabianeffort to tire the Crown, Washington's opera-tions in New Jersey revealed a cunning grasp ofhis opponents' thinking.

Military maneuvers in New York drovehome an important lesson for Washington: notto allow his army to be isolated and outflanked.His effort to defend Philadelphia at Brandy-wine Creek (11 September 1777) might seem tobelie this lesson. Yet, not making a gesture toprotect the city—even a failed one—would havedemoralized the Patriots. There were other rea-sons, too. Attacking Howe kept the BritishArmy divided and prevented his aiding MajorGeneral John Burgoyne's army in Upstate NewYork. Acting offensively also helped Washing-ton to protect important sources of iron andfood west of Philadelphia. In these goals he suc-ceeded, although by ignoring civilian warningshe again let his army be outflanked.

Another lesson taken from the New Yorkcampaign was that as long as the Americanarmy remained in the field harassing the Brit-ish, the Revolution survived. Washingtonwisely fashioned a defensive strategy that wasmore than withdrawal and wearing out one'sfoe. From protected bases Washington struck indifferent directions at isolated enemy units,pounced on supply lines, and probed for weak-nesses. He also used cavalry, sensing its role in

an unconventional war. As head of the Virginiamilitia in 1775 he insisted that maneuverabilitycould overcome a shortage of arms, but limitedwinter forage hampered the Revolutionaryhorse units.

Using a protracted strategic defense formost of the 1770s, Washington built a disci-plined Continental Army, though he often usedmilitia and partisans. A professionalized armyprovided a center around which Patriots couldrally and was a symbol of nationhood. Somehistorians suggest that Washington yearned fora traditional eighteenth-century army and thatthis desire—and the longer enlistments hesought—explain the decline in Continental vol-unteers after 1776. Yet, that reduction wasequally the fault of recent defeats and a waningof enthusiasm after the initial rage militaire.Other scholars argue that Lee and Gatesgrasped the militia's potential better than Wash-ington, who lost an opportunity to create ademocratic army as in Revolutionary France (ormore recently, Israel). However, lacking a trulynationalized or a self-motivated soldiery, Amer-ica was unprepared for (and Washington couldhardly create) levee en masse (mass conscription).

He could, however, move beyond a defen-sive strategy. At the Battle of Germantown (4October 1777), overly elaborate plans, and tar-rying too long at an enemy stronghold, deniedhim success. However, his men's skillimpressed Europeans (especially the French)—and even modern critics concede his tirelessattention to administration and miraculousability to hold his army together. At Mon-mouth Court House (28 June 1778), the last

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major clash in the North, the Continentalsfought the British regulars toe-to-toe and con-trolled the field after the battle.

Some historians also question Washing-ton's remaining in the North after 1778 andsending his best subordinate, NathanaelGreene, to the Carolinas in late 1780. HadWashington failed to see Britain's shift to aSouthern strategy? On the contrary, he under-stood it well. While Cornwallis could occupyport cities, he lacked the men to garrison ruralareas. Greene—with a core of Maryland and Del-aware regulars—could hurl irregulars and militiaagainst Britain's Southern posts in a war ofattrition. Yet, this type of campaign did not callfor a sizable army, whose potential (and sym-bolic importance) would be lost were it dividedinto isolated guerrilla bands. Besides, Congresswanted the British penned up in New York. IfWashington left, Loyalists in the Middle Statescould hardly be kept at bay, and Sir Henry Clin-ton (the new British commander in chief) couldsend reinforcements Southward.

Washington found it difficult to coordinatewith the French, his allies after 1778. Wanting theFrench to help take New York (a major blow tothe British), Washington was upset when AdmiralFrancois de Grasse and General Comte deRochambeau declined. Yet, they were right: NewYork would have been tough to recapture, espe-cially as French naval superiority proved tempo-rary. Again, however, Washington's goals madesense. Aside from Congress wanting New York,Clinton's presence was a constant threat (as Bene-dict Arnold's treachery at West Point revealed).While Washington realized any triumph would bea great stroke, he could not know London'swar-weariness. He embraced a plan for the alliesto converge on York Town (1781) and executedthe maneuver flawlessly—while initially the Britishremained in the dark. After that event, it remainedonly to keep his army intact (no easy task) untilpeace was achieved.

Washington had played his hand well.Though sometimes erring in tactics, he heldsteadfast to his main objectives. Upholdingrepublican ideals embodied by Congress, hegradually united more Americans behind thePatriot cause. Outnumbered, he usually chosea defensive strategy, though always hoping fora chance to pounce on a part of his enemy'sforces. Keeping an army in the field, heinspired it to whittle away at British troopsand supporters, destroying the resolve of theCrown. Washington, an admirer once wrote,was the "indispensable man" of the Revolu-tion; true or not, that assessment certainlyapplied to the strategy he followed.

-EVERETT W. KINDIG,MIDWESTERN STATE UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:No. Washington was an inflexible,conventional commander who madefrequent blunders and endangeredthe Continental Army.

To achieve victory in the War of AmericanIndependence (1775-1783), the ContinentalArmy needed to remain a viable military force inthe field. It did not need to win every battle, oreven most; it simply needed to survive. As com-mander in chief of American forces, GeneralGeorge Washington had to devise a militarystrategy that accomplished this objective. Unfor-tunately, the Virginian had limited military train-ing and a tendency to make rash decisions,overestimating the abilities of his men and plac-ing them in dangerous situations. When Wash-ington assumed command of the ContinentalArmy in the summer of 1775, he recognized theimportance of a Fabian strategy that avoided thedestruction of his inexperienced army by themuch better trained, better led, and veteran Brit-ish forces. Despite this knowledge he made sev-eral serious mistakes.

One of the first instances of misreading a sit-uation occurred during the siege of Boston. Brit-ish forces under the command of GeneralThomas Gage, and later General Sir WilliamHowe, held the city while American forces gath-ered in Cambridge and the surrounding area.After spending the fall and winter of 1775 work-ing to professionalize the Continental Army andlocal militia forces, Washington believed he hadto drive the British out of Boston before enemyreinforcements arrived. The strategy Washingtondeveloped to accomplish this end, however,revealed his tendency to overestimate the qualityof his army and place it in unacceptably danger-ous situations. On 16 February 1776 Washing-ton called a Council of War to explain his plan.He would send his Continentals and militiamen,totaling just more than sixteen thousand men fitfor duty, across an ice bridge that had formedbetween Lechmere Point and Boston. He esti-mated that the British had only five thousandfoot soldiers defending the city and that theAmericans, protected by the cover of darknessand supported by small-arms fire (he lacked suffi-cient artillery to cover the assault), would sweepinto Boston and overwhelm the enemy with asurprise attack.

Washington's generals unanimously opposedthe operation as too risky, unnecessarily exposingthe men to excessive casualties, and suggestedthat the commander in chief was seriously under-estimating the British strength. The Council ofWar argued that the Continental Army should

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focus instead on fortifying Dorchester Heightsbefore the British managed to seize this advanta-geous position. Fortunately, Washington lis-tened to his officers and was aided in thisdefensive strategy by the arrival of fifty-nine artil-lery pieces from Fort Ticonderoga, New York.Once the Americans had the guns in position,Howe, not wanting to relive the Pyrrhic victorythe British had experienced on Breed's Hill inJune of the previous year, hesitated in sendinghis army against such strong defensive works.The timely arrival of a hurricane convincedHowe to abandon the city and set sail for Hali-fax, Nova Scotia (17 March), where he preparedfor the next phase of the war. Had Washingtonmaintained his plan to cross his forces using theice bridge or in open boats (another idea heentertained that spring), he could have lost hisarmy and the war.

In the summer of 1776 the Virginian madea similar mistake in his attempt to hold NewYork City. Washington supervised the finalstages of the construction of defensive works onManhattan and Long Island as he prepared tomeet the British attack. Once again he overesti-mated the ability of his men and underestimatedthat of the British. To be fair, it should be notedthat Washington was not entirely in favor of theidea of defending the city, whose geographiccharacteristics gave the British, with their navalsuperiority, a tremendous advantage. Consider-ing this strength, a better military strategy wouldhave positioned the Americans further inland inWestchester County to take advantage of therough terrain to slow the British advance. Astrong American force at a well-fortified WhitePlains or West Point, for example, would ensurethat New England was not isolated from the restof the colonies.

Instead, Washington tried to defend Man-hattan and Long Island by splitting his forceswith the East River between them. The Britishfleet could have divided and conquered theAmericans had the British shown more initiative.In addition, while planning the defense of LongIsland, Washington left the security of theJamaica Road to five inexperienced officers, whowere promptly captured when the British Armyflanked the Americans through the Jamaica Passand secured a devastating defeat of the Rebels inthe Battle of Long Island (27 August 1776). TheVirginian, recognizing that his men were toodemoralized to hold their positions, directed aretreat under cover of darkness and fog to the rel-ative safety of Manhattan Island.

Over the next few weeks Howe made upfor his mistake of allowing Washington and hisarmy to escape by defeating the Americans atKip's Bay (15 September) and White Plains (28October) and capturing Fort Washington (16

THE TOASTAmerican lawyer, poWciao, satirist, ami poet Francis Hopkinson <?0m~poswt 'The Tfcasf during &m R&vokttion In horwr of George WmhifigiMi:

*Tis Washington's health—fill a bumper arotmd,For he is our glory and pride;Our arms shall in battle with conquest be crowned,Whilst virtue and he's on our side.

HFis Washington's health—and cannons should roar,And trumpets the truth should proclaim;There cannot be found, search the world all o*er^His equal in virtue and fame*

Tis Washington's health—our hero to bless,May Heav'n look graciously down!Oh! long may he live our hearts to possess.And freedom still call him her own.

Source; Francis Hopkinson, Jhe Miscellaneous Essays and Occa-sional Writings of Francis Hopkinson, Esq., volume 300&S0/*, f 702A p. 17&

November) and Fort Lee (20 November).Indeed, Britain's New York campaign of 1776nearly devastated the American army, whichbegan operations with 23,000 men but retainedonly about 2,400 soldiers fit for the Battle ofTrenton (26 December). New York is a clearexample of Washington's failure to devise anappropriate military strategy that sufficientlyconsidered his objectives and the limits of hisarmy. Instead, Washington, hoping his soldierswould rise to the challenge they faced in NewYork, placed them in an impossible situationand nearly lost the war when they failed to meethis lofty expectations.

Washington returned to a defensive strategyfor much of 1777, appearing to have learned hislesson from the defeats and small but significantvictories of the previous year. After his devastat-ing loss to the British at the Battle of Brandy-wine (11 September) and their occupation ofPhiladelphia (26 September), however, Washing-ton returned to a rash offensive strategy. In Octo-ber he devised a plan for a surprise attack on theBritish forces at Germantown, a quiet commu-nity north of Philadelphia. The plan might haveworked except that Washington developed a fartoo complex strategy for his army, whichrequired four columns of Continentals and mili-tia to converge on the enemy simultaneously. Itwas a fascinating plan but still too complicated

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for the inexperienced Americans to executeagainst a veteran, professional enemy force. Onceagain, Washington nearly lost his army becauseof a poor decision.

Some historians—including John E. Fer-ling, Marcus Cunliffe, and Don Higginbotham—have argued that while Washington made mis-takes early in the war, he learned from theseerrors and consequently operated in a mannerthat was largely successful in the final years ofthe conflict. However, this conclusion tends toignore Washington's planning in 1781 when hedesigned a strategy that sought to use a com-bined Franco-American force to recapture NewYork City. Even with so many years of experi-ence, Washington had to be dissuaded from thisrash plan by French and American commanders.Comte de Rochambeau and others argued thatthe British were too strong at New York and thata much better target for an attack was the iso-lated British Army of Major General CharlesCornwallis in Virginia. Washington eventuallyyielded to these arguments and went on to win agreat victory at York Town (19 October 1781)with French assistance and advice.

Throughout the Revolutionary War, Wash-ington demonstrated this tendency toward anoverly aggressive strategy that placed excessivefaith in the abilities of American forces. On eachof these occasions he nearly lost his army, whoseexistence was essential to the survival of theAmerican struggle for independence. In the end,one wonders how the Americans emerged victo-rious with such a flawed military strategist lead-ing the army. Perhaps the answer lies inWashington's true strength as a commander. Hemight not have had the military mind of Alex-ander the Great or Napoleon Bonaparte, but hewas unquestionably one of the finest republicangenerals the world has ever seen. Indeed, as his-torian James Thomas Flexner has argued, in criti-cizing Washington as a military commanderscholars have overlooked one essential fact:Washington was not a military man. His lettersand speeches were not filled with references tothe glory of battle and cries of bloody revenge tomotivate his men. Instead, Washington wrote ofhis beloved Mount Vernon and called on hismen to stay and fight for liberty from a sense ofhonor. Indeed, Washington's greatest strengthwas the tradition he set not as a strategist but as aCincinnatus (the Roman general regarded as themodel of simplicity, ability, and republican vir-tue). He set a standard for the American militaryto accept the supremacy of civilian politicalauthority. He led by example and demonstratedhis willingness to expose himself to the hard-ships that his men endured, including takingonly one ten-day leave of absence during theentire course of the war. Washington insisted

upon a system of promotion through meritrather than nepotism and favoritism, again estab-lishing a republican military tradition. And whenthe war reached its victorious conclusion, Wash-ington, like Cincinnatus, relinquished his powerand returned home. Thus, while Washingtonmight not have been an outstanding military strat-egist, he used his role as a military leader to securenot only independence for the new nation butalso a lasting republican tradition for the Ameri-can military.

-SUSANNAH URAL BRUCE,SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY

References

Stuart L. Bernath, "George Washington and theGenesis of American Military Discipline,"Mid-America, 49 (April 1967): 83-100.

George A. Billias, "Commentary on DavePalmer's 'American Strategy Reconsid-ered,'" in Military History of the AmericanRevolution: The Proceedings of the 6th MilitaryHistory Symposium, United States Air ForceAcademy, 10-11 October 1974, edited byStanley J. Underdal (Washington, D.C.:Office of Air Force History, 1976), pp. 68-73.

R. Arthur Bowler, "Logistics and Operations inthe American Revolution," in Reconsidera-tions on the Revolutionary War: SelectedEssays, edited by Don Higginbotham (West-port, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp.54-71.

Josiah Bunting III, "George C. Marshall: AStudy in Character," in The John Biggs Cin-cinnati Lectures in Military Leadership andCommand, 1986, edited by Henry S.Bausum (Lexington, Va.: VMI Foundation,1986), pp. 109-116.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited by MichaelHoward and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince-ton University Press, 1976).

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