~A brilliant survey of the history of warfare ... the best yet produced anywhere--B.H.Liddell Hart HISTORY ~ F a randaway thebestof thehistoriesof militaryaffairs." - AmericanPolitical ScienceReview KCont ains succi nct accounts of significant wars, campaigns, and ballics, as well as descriptions of changing concepti ons and methods of land, sea, and airwarfare .. .. Surpasses any other generalhistory of the subject." - libraryJournal " Lea yesthereaderastonishedbyits combination of brevity, clarity,and accuracy." - TheTimes littrarySupplemenl , London "We've never seen anything qui te as well calculated to guide the beginner in furt her expl oration of t he subjector toserveas a quick-referenceforthe experiencedanalyst." - NewYorkHeraldTribune&ok Review ~ A noutstandingwork likelytobereadfor yearstocome. " - JohnBarkham, The Saturday Reyiew Syndicate "Outstandingandpenetratingoutlineoftheprocessesof warandthe means of lighting from1415onward. " - ChicagoTribune War in theModernWorld, a t houghtfuland well-documentedhistory of the wars of Western civilization from1415 to the present , has been praised by crit ics everywhere for its Oowing narrativeand itscomprehensiveness. It anaiyz.cs t hesocial andpolitical implicat ions of modern warfare as well asthetechnological andmilitaryaspects. TheodoreRopp,historyprofessoremerit usofDukeUniversity,has lectured at variousmilitary academics worldwide and has been amember of the Secretary of the Army's Advisory Commillee onMilitaryHistory. Heiscurrent lyChairmanoft heBoardofDirect orsof theHistorical EvaluationandResearchOrganizati on inWashington,D.C. ISBN0-02-03b390-7 War intheModernWorld WAR INTHEMODERNWORLD THEODOREROPP NEW,REVISEDEDITION COLLIERBOOKS MacmillanPuhlishing Company NewYork COLLI ER\1 AC ~ 1 ILLA NP II B LI S HERS London 1959, 1962,DukeUniversityPress All rzghtsreserved.Nopartof thisbook may be reproduced or transmitted in anyfonn or by any means,electronic or mechanical includ!ngphotocopying,recordingor by' anyInformationstorageand retrieval system,withoutpennission in writingfrom thePublisher. MacmillanPublishing Company 866 Third Avenue,New York,N.Y.10022 CollierMacmillanCanada,Inc. Library of CongressCatalogCard Number 62-11020 FirstCollierBooksEdition 1962 20191817 ThisCollieredition ispublished by arrangement withDukeUniversityPress Macmillanbooks areavailableatspecialdiscounts forbulkpurchasesforsalespromotions,premiums fund-raising,or educational use.' Fordetails,contact: SpecialSalesDirector MacmillanPublishingCompany 866ThirdAvenue New York,N.Y.10022 Printed in the United States of America Preface TIns BOOK is the result of nearly twenty years of teaching naval and military history. It iswritten for civilians with some knowl-edge of history and formilitarymeninterestedin the waysin whichtheirprofessionhasbeenchangedbypolitical,social, andeconomicdevelopments.Theworksofthegreatmilitary writersarequotedinsomedetail;thisbookisinsomeways anintroductiontothemajormilitaryclassics.It stressesthe warsofthetwentiethcenturyandAnglo-Americanconcepts ofsea,land,andairwar,becausebothcivilianandmilitary readersmaybeparticularlyinterestedintheirownageand their own countries' military traditions.Campaignsand battles are used only to illustrate more general trends. Such studies must be very detailed to be meaningfulandcannotbe incorporated easily in ageneral history.Ihave indicated the most important andreadableof suchstudiesinthehopethatreaderswillbe ledfartherinto thefascinatingandcrucialsubjectof military history. The long footnotesare largely bibliographical.Though these bibliographies cannot be exhaustive,it ishoped that they containallof theclassicsandthoseworkswhichtheauthor andhisstudentshavefoundinteresting.Themountainsof military literature have not recently been surveyed.The author hopesthat hisshortbibliographicalintroductionsto the many subjects which relate to thevast subject of modern warfare are anoriginalcontributiontoscholarship.Thebibliographiesof personalaccountsandwarnovelsaremattersofindividual preference.The author canonlyhopethatselectionsfromhis own favoriteswillleadreaderstofurtherexploration. Geographyisthebonesof strategy;theterrainand linesof communicationhavegovernedthecourseof manycampaigns andbattles.Picturesanddiagramsofweaponstellmorethan manyparagraphs,butonlydetailedmapsandpicturesare really meaningful. Since adequate illustrations and maps would beprohibitivelyexpensive,theauthormustassumethatthe readerwillhaveaccesstostandardmapsandthathewill dependonthemapswhichmustaccompanyanyscholarly study of campaignsor battles. Any generalintroduction tosovastasubjectisbuilton the work of many other scholars.Richard A.Preston of the Royal 5 6/Preface Military College of Canada and Jay Luvaasof Allegheny Col-lege read the entire work.The latter corrected proof whilethe author was traveling on another research project. Harry Stevens of OhioUniversityandHaroldT.Parkerof Dukereadmost of themanuscriptandofferedmanysuggestions.Earlierver-sionsandtheearlierchapterswerereadbyAlanK.Man-chester,WesleyWilliams,andFrederickandMaryBernheim of Duke,Alexander De Conde of theUniversity of Michigan, William T.Jonesof Pomona College,by ViceAdmiralRalph Earle,Jr.,andCaptainClydeJ.VanArsdall,UnitedStates Navy, and by Richard M.Leighton and George F. Howe of the OfficeoftheChiefofMilitaryHistory,Departmentofthe Army.Manyother suggestionsweremadebyJohnR.Alden, JohnS.Curtiss,ArthurB.Ferguson,IrvingB.Holley,Fred-eric B.M.Hollyday,and Richard L.Watson, Jr.,of the Duke UniversityDepartmentofHistory.TheDukeUniversity ResearchCouncilprovidedclericalhelpandsubsidizedpub-lication.My wifetypedmuch of themanuscript and displayed anadmirabledegreeofpatiencethroughoutthewholelong process.MostofCaptainLiddellHart'scommentsarrived afterthebookwasinpress.Thesecondprinting incorporated manyofhissuggestionsandsomeadditionalbibliography.1 amdeeplygratetultortheinterestandadviceofoneofthe world's greatest military criticsandhistoriansandforthesug-gestionsofthestudentsonwhomthisworkhasbeentried. None of these personsisin any wayresponsible for the errors of commission and omission which surely remain in awork of thisnature. Numerousnewtitles,apersonallistforserious-mindedbe-ginnersinthisfield,andapersonallistofnovelsof theFirst WorldWarhavebeenaddedtothisedition.Butsomeim-portantworkshavesurelybeenleftout,andIameagerfor additionalcommentsfromreaders.ForsuchcommentsIam mostgratefultoG.A.Hayes-McCoyofUniversityCollege, Galway,RobinD.S.HighamoftheUniversityofNorth Carolina,ArthurMarderoftheUniversityofHawaii,Walter MillisoftheCenter fortheStudyofDemocraticInstitutions, Charles P.Stacey of the University of Toronto, and Ian Wards of theNewZealandWarHistoryBranch. Contents Introduction THEAGEOFTHEGREATCAPTAINS 1. Land Warfare fromthe Renaissanceto the Neoclassical Age(1415-1789) NewTechniquesandTypesofMilitary Organization The Wars for Italyand the Rise of Spain(1494-1559) The Army of the SpanishHapsburgs Spain'sDecline(1559-1659) The AgeofLouisXIV(1643-1715) The Age of Frederick theGreat: Neoclassical Warfare The Common Soldier inthe Neoclassical Age 2. Naval Warfare fromthe Renaissanceto the NeoclassicalAge(1417-1789) The Command of the Sea PortugueseandSpanishSeaPower The Riseof English SeaPower Navies in the Neoclassical Age 3. The Anglo-AmericanMilitaryTradition The Weaknessof the Standing Army Problemsof ImperialDefense TheBreakwithBritain The Continental Army and Navy The British in the American Revolution 4. The French Revolution and Napoleon French Military Reformers The Revolution The Organizer of Victory The Napoleonic Empire The Opposition to Napoleon:The Peninsula The Opposition to Napoleon in Eastern Europe 11 19 19 25 29 37 40 44 53 60 60 62 66 70 76 76 80 86 88 93 98 98 102 107 117 124 132 1 8 I Contents ContentsI 9 THEINDUSTRIALREVOLUTIONANDWAR 10.The Second WorldWar314 The OpeningBattles314 5.The First Half of theNineteenth Britain, the Mediterranean,and the Atlantic321 Century(1815-1853)143 TheRusso-German War333 Britain and the Long Peace143 AlliedDeployment: Austria, Russia, and France147 DecisioninWesternEurope345 Prussia152 The EastAsianandPacificWars: The JapaneseRaid359 6.TheWarsof theMid-Nineteenth The AlliedCounterattackinthePacific371 Century(1854-1871)161 The War forEast Asia382 The New Weapons of the Industrial Revolution161 Epilogue 393 The Crimean andItalianWars164 TheRiseof Germany169 The AmericanCivilWar:Men and Tactics175 Index 405 The American CivilWar:Strategy184 7.The Yearsof UneasyPeace(1871-1914)195 Military Organization:The Spread of Prussian Doctrine195 MobilizationandIntellectualPreparation of theMassArmy200 The RaceforColoniesand Sea Power206 Land Tactics with theNewFire Weapons215 The War Plans of the Continental Powers222 British Participation in aContinental War230 THEAGEOFVIOLENCE 8.The First World War239 The Opening Battles(1914)239 Deadlock in the West(1915-1916)245 German Victory in the East(1915-1916)251 The United States and the War(1917)257 YearsofDecision(1917-1918)261 9.The Long Armistice(1919-1939)275 The Peace Settlements275 The Totalitarian State:Bolshevik Russia285 ItalianFascismandtheTheoriesof Giulio Douhet290 The Military Recoveryof Germany294 The ThreeDemocracies303 Introduction IN1933thegreatBritishmilitarycritic,B.H.LiddellHart, endedtheLeesKnowlesLecturesatTrinityCollege,Cam-bridge,withacallforthewiderstudyofwarasasocial phenomenon. Weliveinatimewhen'war'isoneveryone'slips;whenevery-thingcontemporary isdatedinrelationtothelastwar;whenthose, whodislikethesubjectmost,talkaboutitmost-iftheirtalkbe onlyaboutthepreventionofwar. That volume of talkisproof oftheirsubconsciousrealizationof the part that war has played in ... their lives,and the life of modern Europe.Subconscious,becausetheygiveastoundinglylittlerecog-nition,inapracticalsense,totheimportanceofthesubject.They talkmuch about war,butrarelydotheytalkof it-as asubject so seriousastobeworththeseriousstudyof everythinkingmanand woman.They appear to regard it asadisturbanceof Nature similar toanearthquake,... ratherthanasadiseasethatmightbepre-vented,... andthedangerof whichmightat leastbecurtailedby scientifictreatment .... Forthefailuretotreatitasabranchofscientificknowledge, responsibilityliesasmuchonmenoflearningasonmenofwar. Bythenatureoftheirprofession,soldiersarepractitioners,not detached researchers.... They are general practitioners, so occupied inadministeringimmediateremediesandcompoundingdrugs,that theyhavenotthefreedomforresearch,ifperadventuretheyhave the bent for it.Even a Staff College training ismore akin to walking thewardsthantoworkinalaboratory. The studyof waras abranch of knowledge,requiresthe method of work that prevailsin aUniversityaswellastheattitude of mind whichisinculcated there.But it isnot likelythat these needs willbe fulfilleduntil men of learning change their attitude of mind towards war,andlearntoregarditasabranchofknowledgeworthyof exploration.1 1TheGhostofNapoleon(London,1933),145-147.TheclassicworkisHans Delbriick,GeschichtedesKriegskunstimRahmenderpolitischenGeschlchte(7 vols.,Berlin,1900-1936).Forcampaignsandbattles,GeneralJ.F.C.Fuller', brilliantandprejudicedAMilitaryHistoryoftheWesternWorld(3vola., NewYork,1954-1956)andLynnMontross,WarThroughtheAges(3ded., NewYork,1960)aregood.SoareHenriBernard,LaGuerreetsonIvolution a traverslessiecles(2vots.,Brussels,1955-1957),RichardA.Preston,Sydney F.Wise,andHermanO.Werner,MeninArms:AHistoryofWarfareand ItsInterrelationshipswithWesternSociety(NewYork,1956);TheodoreA. Dodge,GreatCaptains(Boston,1895),andOliverL.Spaulding,Hollman Nickerson,andJohnW.Wright,Warfare(Washington,1937).GordonB. 11 12IIntroduction Whensoldiersspeakofthe"principlesofwar,"theyare referring to thoseprinciplesofactionwhichcanbeillustrated bythemilitaryeventsofanyhistoricalperiod,themaximsof thesoldier's trade.The United StatesArmy listsnineof them: the Objective,the Offensive,Mass,Maneuver, Surprise,Secur-ity,EconomyofForce,UnityofCommand,andSimplicity. MostofthemwereboileddowninNathanBedfordForrest's famous phrase, "fustest with the mostest." They lie in the back-groundofmilitaryhistoryastheprinciplesofpoliticsliein the background of political history. Though he must be familiar withthem,thehistoriandoeswelltofocus,however,onthe process of change. In the case of this outline, we are particularly interestedinthosechangeswhichhaveoccurredinmodern times,roughlydefinedasthelastfivecenturies.Thefactors producing these changes can be roughly classified as(1)politi-cal,(2)technological,and(3)organizational,institutional,or administrative.2 Since awar by definition-to distinguishitfromother kinds ofsocialviolence--isaviolentconflictbetweenstates,many problems can beapproached firstfromthe politicalangle.The political factors include those matters which were once grouped underthebroadheadingof"politicaleconomy":theaimsof theopposingstatesandtheresources-social,economic,and diplomatic-whicheachhasatitsdisposal.Thesewerethe factorsstressedbythenineteenth-centuryPrussianmilitary philosopherKarlvonClausewitzinhisfamousdefinitionsof thenatureofwar,itsmeans,itsobject,andthegradations betweenlimitedandtotalwarfare. We shall not begin here with a clumsy,pedantic definition of war, butconfineourselvestoitsessence,theduel....Eachtriesby Turner,ed.,AHistory01MilitaryAtJairsinWesternSociety(NewYork, 1953)isagoodsourcebook.OnmilitarythoughtuseEdwardMeadeEarle, ed.,Makers01ModernStrategy(Princeton,1943).ThefineWestPointAtlas ofAmericanWars,ed.VincentJ.Esposito(2vols.,NewYork,1959)covers thatfieldonly.ThemostdetailedencyclopediaisHandbuchderneuzeitltchen Wehrwlssenschaften(4vols.,Berlin,1937). 2TheItalianstrategistGiulioDouhetdefinedtheprinciplesofwaras"the rulesofthegame."They"remainedunchanged,becausetheplayerswereal-waysalikeand thegamealwaysthesame,eventhoughtheformsofthepawns changed.Butevenif themainprinciplesdidnotchange,theirapplicationin specificcasesdependedontheplayer."TheCommandoftheAir,trans.Dino Ferrari(London,1943),122.Thebestrecentshortsummariesoftheseprin-ciplesandsomeoftheproblemspresentedbythemareD.K.Palit,The EssentialsofMiUtaryKnowledge(Aldershot,1950)andEdgarJ.Kingston-McCloughry,TheDirectionofWar(London,1955). IntroductionI13 physicalforcetocompeltheothertodohiswill;hisimmediate object is to overthrow his adversary and thereby make him incapable ofanyfurtherresistance. Waristhusanactofforcetocompelouradversarytodoour will . ... Force,thatistosayphysicalforce(fornomoralforceexists apartfromtheconceptionofastateandlaw),isthusthemeans: toimposeourwillupontheenemyistheobject.Toachievethis object with certainty wemust disarmtheenemy,and thus disarming isbydefinitiontheproperaimof militaryaction. If wewanttooverthrowouropponent,wemustproportionour efforttohispowersof resistance... expressedasaproduct of two inseparablefactors:theextent of themeans at his disposaland the strengthof hiswill.Theextentof themeansat hisdisposalwould be capable of estimation, asit rests(though not entirely)on figures, butthestrengthof thewillismuchlesssoandonlyapproximately tobemeasuredbythestrengthof themotivebehindit.... To avoid underestimatingthe valueofthesevarious shorter ways to our aim ... wehave only to bear in mind the diversity of political objectswhich may causea war,or ... thedistance which separates adeathstruggleforpoliticalexistencefromawarwhichaforced or totteringalliance makesa ... disagreeableduty .... If wereject oneof thesegradations,wemightwithequalrightrejectthemall, thatisto say,losesightoftherealworldentirely.3 Thesecondsetoffactorsistechnological-"Forcearmed withtheinventionsofartandscience."Theincreasingim-portance of technologyisamajorfeatureof modern warfare, asitisofmodernlife.Competitioninweaponsisolderthan recordedhistory,butonlyinmoderntimeshastechnological innovation been so rapid,so conscious,and so continuousthat scientistshavebecomeasimportantinwarfareaspoliticians orsoldiers.Oneofthechangeswhichmarkedthebeginning ofthemodernperiodwastheincreasingutilizationofgun-powder.Thereinforcementofthenationalstatebythenine-teenth-centuryIndustrialRevolutionandtwentieth-century appliedscience-inAlexanderHerzen'sphrase,"Ghenghiz Khan with the telegraph"-now threatens to obliterate Western civilization. Destruction, in the words of General H. H. Arnold, 8OnWar,trans.O.J.Matthjis Jollis(New York, 1943),3-6,24.Afineconden-sationisTheLivingThoughtsofClausewitz,ed.A.O.Mendel(NewYork, 1943).Fortherelationsbetweeninternationallawandmilitaryhistory,see QuincyWright,AStudy01War(2vols.,Chicago,1942)andLotharKotzsh, TheConceptofWarInContemporaryHistoryandInternationalLaw(Ge-neva,1956).ArecentsociologicaltreatmentofwarisGastonBouthow.Les Guerres,IUmentsdepoUmologie(Paris,1951).LaGuerre(Paris,1953)is acondensationofthelargerwork. 14/Introduction theheadoftheUnitedStatesArmyAirForcesduringthe Second World War, hasbecome"too cheapand easy."4 The institutional,administrative,andorganizationalfactors inmilitary historyarerelatedtobothpoliticsandtechnology. Theyaretheparticularconcernoftheprofessionalsoldier,a specialist who,inClausewitz'view,"islevied,clothed,armed, trained,sleeps,eats,drinks,and marchesmerelytofightatthe rightplaceandtherighttime."Gettingthesoldiertodo this hasrequiredan increasinglycomplexsocialorganization.The organizational factors cover a host of specialties-strategy, tac-tics,logistics,communications,andtraining.Strategymaybe definedroughlyastheartofbringinganenemytobattle. Tacticsisthemeansofdefeatinghiminbattle.Alltactical systems,ithasoftenbeennoted,ultimatelyreston thedomi-nant weapon in use. Troops are,or should be, trained to exploit their dominant weapon's strong points and to minimize its weak ones. War is a chess game in which both the values of the pieces andthenatureoftheirpossiblemovesvarybothwiththe trainingofthepiecesandtheskilloftheindividualplayer. Logistics,atermwhichcameintocommonuseonlyinthis century,hastodealwithmovementandsupply.Anarmyis composedoforganismswithstomachs.Oneofthemostim-portantof militarygifts,inthewordsof LordWavell, iswhattheFrenchcallIesensdupracticable,.. areallysound knowledgeof the'mechanismsof war,'i.e.topography,movement, andsupply.Itisthelackofthisknowledge... whichputswhat wecallamateurstrategistswrong,nottheprinciplesofstrategy themselves,whichcanbeapprehendedinaveryshorttimebyany reasonableintelligence.... Ahomelyanalogycanbemadefrom contract bridge.Thecalling isstrategy,theplayof thehandtactics . ...Callingistoacertaindegreemechanicalandsubjecttocon-ventions;soisstrategy .... Thereis,ofcourse,widescopeinboth forjudgment,boldness,andoriginality .... Butintheenditis theresultofthemannerinwhichthecardsareplayed... thatis '''Air ForceintheAtomicAge"(OneWorldorNone,ed.DexterMasters andKatharineWay,NewYork,1946),26.OntheToolsofWar,see lames R. Newman'sworkof thattitle(GardenCity,1942).Anothersoundsummaryis StantonH.Coblentz,FromArrowtoAtomBomb(NewYork,1953).Tom Wintringham,WeaponsandTactics(London,1942)and1.F.C.Fuller, ArmamentandHistory(NewYork,1945)arewrittenfromoppositeendsof thepoliticalspectrum.FullerisheavilyindebtedtoLewisMumford,TechnlcI andClvlU1.atlon(NewYork,1934)andtoWernerSombart'sfamousKrieg undKapitalismul(3vols.,Munich,1913).Unfortunately,10hnU.Nef,War andHumanProgrelll(Cambridge,1950),hasdemolishedSombart.Seealso Nef'sbrilliantpaperonmilitaryhistory,"LaGuerre"(IX- Interna-tionaldellSciencesHlstoriques,I,Rapports,Paris,1950,595-606). Introduction/15 put downonthescore sheets .... ThereforeIrate theskilfultacti-cianabovetheskilfulstrategist,especiallyhimwhoplaysthebad cardswell.6 Military histories have been written tostress .the importance of oneor the other of thesegroupsof factors-political,tech-nological,or organizational.Militaryhistoryhasbeen toldas a tale of great states, key inventions, or great captains. But such partialviewsofacomplexsocialphenomenonareusually false.War,asClausewitz put it,"isaveritable chameleon,be-causein each concrete caseit changessomewhatitscharacter ... composed of the original violence of itsessence,..the playofprobabilitiesandchance,...andofthesubordmate characterofapoliticaltool,throughwhichitbelongstothe provinceofpureintelligence."Forthisreason,"theworkof war,plainandsimplethoughitappears,canbe .c