war comes home

8/9/2019 War Comes Home

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June 2014

WAR COMES HOMEThe Excessive Militarization of American Policing


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

METHODOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

SPECIAL REPORT: SWAT Raid Ends with Toddler in Medically-Induced Coma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Policing and Militarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Use of Military Equipment by SWAT Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Military Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Legality of Forced Entry Into Peoples Homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Federal Incentives to Militarize Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Mission Creep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Lack of Transparency and Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Limitations of Data Collection on SWAT Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Lack of State and Local Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Lack of Federal Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

The Purpose of SWAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Use of SWAT to Search for Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Lack of Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Accuracy of Assessing Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Some Appropriate Uses of SWAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Race and SWAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Race, SWAT, and Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Racial Differences in Use of SWAT for Search Warrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Use of Violent Tactics and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Use of Violent Tactics to Force Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Use of Armored Personnel Carriers During SWAT Raids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Consequences of Using Violent Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39Use of Violent Tactics With Children Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

ENDNOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

CONTENTS

War Comes Home:The Excessive Militarization of American Policing


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2 American Civil Liberties Union

Across the country, heavily armed Special Weaponsand Tactics (SWAT) teams are forcing their way intopeoples homes in the middle of the night, often deployingexplosive devices such as ashbang grenades to temporarilyblind and deafen residents, simply to serve a search warranton the suspicion that someone may be in possession ofa small amount of drugs. Neighborhoods are not warzones, and our police ofcers should not be treating uslike wartime enemies. However, the ACLU encounteredthis type of story over and over when studying themilitarization of state and local law enforcement agencies.

This investigation gave us data to corroborate a trend wehave been noticing nationwide: American policing hasbecome unnecessarily and dangerously militarized, inlarge part through federal programs that have armed stateand local law enforcement agencies with the weaponsand tactics of war, with almost no public discussion oroversight. 1 Using these federal funds, state and local lawenforcement agencies have amassed military arsenalspurportedly to wage the failed War on Drugs, thebattlegrounds of which have disproportionately been incommunities of color. But these arsenals are by no meansfree of cost for communities. Instead, the use of hyper-aggressive tools and tactics results in tragedy for civiliansand police ofcers, escalates the risk of needless violence,destroys property, and undermines individual liberties.

This report provides a snapshot of the realities ofparamilitary policing, building on a body of existing workdemonstrating that police militarization is a pervasiveproblem. Analyzing both existing secondary source

materials and primary source data uncovered through theACLUs public records investigation, this report examinesthe use of SWAT teams by state and local law enforcementagencies and other aspects of militaristic policing. 2 Asexplained in the Methodology section, our statisticalanalysis included more than 800 SWAT deploymentsconducted by 20 law enforcement agencies during the years2011-2012. 3

SWAT was created to deal with emergency situations suchas hostage, barricade and active shooter scenarios. Overtime, however, law enforcement agencies have moved awayfrom this original purpose and are increasingly using theseparamilitary squads to search peoples homes for drugs.

Aggressive enforcement of the War on Drugs has lostits public mandate, as 67 percent of Americans thinkthe government should focus more on treatment thanon policing and prosecuting drug users. 4 This waningpublic support is warranted, as evidence continues to

document how the War on Drugs has destroyed millionsof lives, unfairly impacted communities of color, madedrugs cheaper and more potent, caused countless deathsof innocent people caught up in drug war-related armedconict, and failed to eliminate drug dependence andaddiction. The routine use of heavily armed SWAT teamsto search peoples homes for drugs, therefore, means thatlaw enforcement agencies across the country are using thishyper-aggressive form of domestic policing to ght a warthat has waning public support and has harmed, muchmore than helped, communities.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Source: Data provided by local law enforcement agencies for ACLUinvestigation.


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3War Comes Home:The Excessive Militarization of American Policing

SWAT raids are undoubtedly violent events: numerous(often 20 or more) ofcers armed with assault riesand grenades approach a home, break down doors andwindows (often causing property damage), and scream forthe people inside to get on the oor (often pointing theirguns at them). During the course of this investigation,the ACLU determined that SWAT deployments oftenand unnecessarily entailed the use of violent tactics andequipment, including Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs),and that the use of these tactics and equipment oftenincreased the risk of property damage and bodily harm.Unnecessarily aggressive SWAT raids can have disastrousconsequences, including injury and death. The ACLU alsouncovered numerous instances in which SWAT teamsdeployed when there were children present (and some inwhich the SWAT team knew in advance that children wouldbe present).

To scale back the militarization of police, it is important todocument how law enforcement agencies have stockpiledtheir arsenals. Law enforcement agencies have becomeequipped to carry out these SWAT missions in part byfederal programs such as the Department of Defenses 1033Program, the Department of Homeland Securitys grantsto local law enforcement agencies, and the Department ofJustices Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant(JAG) Program, each of which is examined in this report.

De-escalating militarized policing will also requireanalysis of how the presence of these weapons and tacticshas impacted policing culture. Our analysis shows thatthe militarization of American policing is evident in thetraining that police ofcers receive, which encourages themto adopt a warrior mentality and think of the peoplethey are supposed to serve as enemies, as well as in theequipment they use, such as battering rams, ashbanggrenades, and APCs. This shift in culture has been buoyedby the U.S. Supreme Courts weakening of the Fourth

Amendment (which protects the right to privacy in oneshome) through a series of decisions that have given thepolice increased authority to force their way into peopleshomes, often in drug cases.

Additionally, solving the problem of police militarizationrequires discussion of how SWAT teams should be

appropriately used and when their deployment iscounterproductive and dangerous. Even thoughparamilitary policing in the form of SWAT teams wascreated to deal with emergency scenarios such as hostageor barricade situations, the use of SWAT to execute searchwarrants in drug investigations has become commonplaceand made up the overwhelming majority of incidents

the ACLU reviewed79 percent of the incidents theACLU studied involved the use of a SWAT team to searcha persons home, and more than 60 percent of the casesinvolved searches for drugs. The use of a SWAT team toexecute a search warrant essentially amounts to the useof paramilitary tactics to conduct domestic criminalinvestigations in searches of peoples homes.

Militarization of policingencourages ofcers toadopt a warrior mentalitand think of the people theare supposed to serve asenemies.

In the ACLUs study, SWAT teams forced entry intoa persons home using a battering ram or otherbreaching device in 65% of drug searches.

Photo: Keep Columbia Free via FIO/Sunshine request.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng6mfpZ2kR4


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have guns, use of a SWAT team could almost always be justied if the presence of a rearm was the sole factordetermining whether to deploy. 5 However, because the useof SWAT increases the likelihood that the occupants willuse weapons to defend themselves, which increases therisk of violence, presence of a weapon alone should not

automatically result in a SWAT deployment.

These problems have been allowed to occur in the absenceof public oversight. Data collection has been sparse andinadequate: among the law enforcement agencies studied,the ACLU found that data collecting and reporting in thecontext of SWAT was at best sporadic and at worst virtuallynonexistent.

In addition, there is typically no single entity at the local,state, or federal level responsible for ensuring that SWAT isappropriately restrained and that policing does not becomeexcessively militarized. Maryland passed a law in 2010requiring local law enforcement agencies to submit regularreports on their use of SWAT, but that law will sunsetthis year. Utah passed a similar law this year, which lookspromising, but much more oversight is needed.

Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., has announced broadcriminal justice reforms, including guidelines to curtailthe use of mandatory minimum sentencing laws by federalprosecutors in certain drug cases and a $4.75 millionproject funded by the federal government and designedto ease mistrust between local police departments andminority communities by collecting and studying data onsearches, arrests, and case outcomes in order to help assessthe impact of possible bias. These developments have realpotential to reduce Americas excessive reliance on overlyaggressive approaches to policing and punishing drugcrimes, but there is a danger that these federally-fundedefforts could be undermined by the federal governmentsrole in subsidizing the use of paramilitary weapons and

tactics in localities, particularly in many communitiesof color. Without rethinking its role in militarizing localpolice departments, the federal government may end upsabotaging the very same reforms it is championing.

From our review of both primary and secondary sourcematerials, we are able to present two sets of ndings: oneset of general ndings based on our review of the existing

The use of SWAT teams to serve search warrants couldperhaps be justied if there were reason to believe thatthese situations truly presented a genuine threat to ofcersafety, but that did not appear to be the case from thedocuments that the ACLU examined; of the incidentsin which ofcers believed a weapon would be present,a weapon (typically a rearm such as a handgun butrarely an assault rie) was actually found at the scenein only 35 percent of cases. Even when ofcers believeda weapon was likely to be present, that belief was oftenunsubstantiated. Unfortunately, reasonable standards fordeploying SWAT teams appear to be virtually nonexistent.Further, given that almost half of American households

An estimated 500 lawenforcement agencies havereceived Mine ResistantAmbush Protected (MRAP) vehicles built to withstandarmor-piercing roadsidebombs.

SEARCH WARRANT 79%

OTHER 1 7%UNKNOWN 4%

Majority of SWAT Deployments forSearch Warrants (2011-2012)

Source: Data provided by local law enforcement agencies for ACLUinvestigation.


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research, which our data supports, and one set of time-bound specic ndings from our statistical analysis of theraw data we collected in connection with our investigation.

Our general ndings, based on our review of existingresearch and supported by our data, are the following:

1. Policingparticularly through the use of paramilitaryteamsin the United States today has becomeexcessively militarized, mainly through federalprograms that create incentives for state and localpolice to use unnecessarily aggressive weapons andtactics designed for the battleeld. For example, theACLU documented a total of 15,054 items of battleuniforms or personal protective equipment receivedby 63 responding agencies during the relevant timeperiod, and it is estimated that 500 law enforcement

agencies have received Mine Resistant AmbushProtected (MRAP) vehicles built to withstand armor-piercing roadside bombs through the Department ofDefenses 1033 Program. 6

2. The militarization of policing in the United States hasoccurred with almost no public oversight. Not a singlelaw enforcement agency in this investigation providedrecords containing all of the information that theACLU believes is necessary to undertake a thoroughexamination of police militarization. Some agencies

provided records that were nearly totally lacking inimportant information. Agencies that monitor andprovide oversight over the militarization of policingare virtually nonexistent.

Our more specic ndings from the statistical analysis weconducted of time-bound raw data received in connectionwith this investigation are the following:

3. SWAT teams were often deployedunnecessarily andaggressivelyto execute search warrants in low-level

drug investigations; deployments for hostage orbarricade scenarios occurred in only a small numberof incidents. The majority (79 percent) of SWATdeployments the ACLU studied were for the purposeof executing a search warrant, most commonly in druginvestigations. Only a small handful of deployments (7percent) were for hostage, barricade, or active shooterscenarios.

CASUALTY REPORT

LIMA, OHIO JANUARY, 2008

SWAT Ofcers Kill 26-Year-Old Mother HoldinInfant Son

Tarika Wilson wasntthe suspect. She diedwhen SWAT ofcers brokedown her front door andopened re into her home.Ms. Wilson was holding her14-month-old son whenshe was shot. The baby wasinjured, but survived. The

SWAT team had been looking for Ms. Wilsonsboyfriend on suspicion of drug dealing whenthey raided Ms. Wilsons rented house on theSouthside of Lima, the only city with a signicantAfrican-American population in a region offarmland.

4. The use of paramilitary weapons and tactics primarilyimpacted people of color; when paramilitary tacticswere used in drug searches, the primary targets werepeople of color, whereas when paramilitary tacticswere used in hostage or barricade scenarios, theprimary targets were white. Overall, 42 percent ofpeople impacted by a SWAT deployment to executea search warrant were Black and 12 percent wereLatino. This means that of the people impacted by

deployments for warrants, at least 54 percent wereminorities. Of the deployments in which all the peopleimpacted were minorities, 68 percent were in drugcases, and 61 percent of all the people impacted bySWAT raids in drug cases were minorities. In addition,the incidents we studied revealed stark, often extreme,racial disparities in the use of SWAT locally, especiallyin cases involving search warrants.


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Reform must be systemic; the problems of overly aggressivepolicing are cultural and cannot be solved by merelyidentifying a few bad apples or dismissing the problem asa few isolated incidents.

To begin to solve the problem of overly militarizedpolicing, reform must happen at all levels of governmentthat have contributed to this trend.

The federal government should take the lead by reining

in the programs that create incentives for local policeto engage in excessively militarized tactics, especiallyin drug cases. The federal government holds the pursestrings, and easing the ow of federal funds and military-grade equipment into states and localities would havea signicant impact on the overuse of hyper-aggressivetactics and military-grade tools in local communities.

Additionally, state legislatures and municipalities shouldimpose meaningful restraints on the use of SWAT.SWAT deployments should be limited to the kinds of

scenarios for which these aggressive measures wereoriginally intended: barricade, hostage, and active shootersituations. Rather than allow a SWAT deployment inany case that is deemed (for whatever reason the ofcersdetermine) to be high risk, the better practice wouldbe for law enforcement agencies to have in place clearstandards limiting SWAT deployments to scenarios that aretruly high risk.

Reform must be systemic; tproblems of overly aggressi

policing are cultural andcannot be solved by merelyidentifying a few bad applor dismissing the problem aa few isolated incidents.

INCIDENT REPORT

HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIAOCTOBER 14, 2011

SWAT Team ThrowsFlashbang into Homeof Pregnant Woman

Knowing there would likely be a pregnantwoman inside, a SWAT team still opted tobreak down the door of a home and throw aashbang grenade inside in order to executea search warrant in a drug case. Once insidethe home, SWAT ofcers found one man,one pregnant woman, and a four-year-oldchild. While this particular report containedno information about the race of the peopleimpacted by the deployment, the majority ofthe Huntington SWAT deployments the ACLUstudied were conducted in connection with druginvestigations, and the majority of the peopleimpacted were Black.

5. SWAT deployments often and unnecessarily entailedthe use of violent tactics and equipment, includingarmored personnel carriers; use of violent tactics andequipment was shown to increase the risk of bodilyharm and property damage. Of the incidents studiedin which SWAT was deployed to search for drugs ina persons home, the SWAT teams either forced orprobably forced entry into a persons home using abattering ram or other breaching device 65 percent

of the time. For drug investigations, the SWAT teamsstudied were almost twice as likely to force entry intoa persons home than not, and they were more thantwice as likely to use forced entry in drug investigationsthan in other cases. In some instances, the use ofviolent tactics and equipment caused property damage,injury, and/or death.


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SWAT teams should never be deployed based solely onprobable cause to believe drugs are present, even if theyhave a warrant to search a home. In addition, SWAT teamsshould not equate the suspected presence of drugs with athreat of violence. SWAT deployment for warrant serviceis appropriate only if the police can demonstrate, before

deployment, that ordinary law enforcement ofcers cannotsafely execute a warrant without facing an imminent threatof serious bodily harm. In making these determinations, itis important to take into consideration the fact that use ofa SWAT team can escalate rather than ameliorate potentialviolence; law enforcement should take appropriateprecautions to avoid the use of SWAT whenever possible.In addition, all SWAT deployments, regardless of theunderlying purpose, should be proportionalnot allsituations call for a SWAT deployment consisting of 20heavily armed ofcers in an APC, and partial deployments

should be encouraged when appropriate.

Local police departments should develop their owninternal policies calling for appropriate restraints on theuse of SWAT and should avoid all training programs thatencourage a warrior mindset.

Finally, the public has a right to know how law enforcementagencies are policing its communities and spending itstax dollars. The militarization of American policing hasoccurred with almost no oversight, and it is time to shine

a bright light on the policies, practices, and weaponry thathave turned too many of our neighborhoods into warzones.


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Whether forcible entry was made Whether a ashbang grenade or other distraction

device was used

The purpose of the SWAT deployment (e.g., toexecute a search warrant, in response to a barricade,hostage, or active shooter scenario, etc.)

In search warrant cases, whether the warrant was ano-knock warrant

Whether the deployment was in connection with adrug offense

Whether weapons were believed to be present

Whether weapons were found

Whether drugs and/or other contraband werefound

Whether the deployment resulted in propertydamage

For weapons transfers and federal grants, we considered thefollowing:

The amount and type of equipment received

The type of grant program being applied for

The amount of funding requested/received

Whether the justication provided for the grant wasrelated to drugs or terrorism

Some SWAT incident reports specically include someform of check box or tick box allowing for a simple yes-or-no answer to one or more of the above questions (e.g.,the incident report indicated whether a distraction devicewas employed by expressly requiring law enforcementpersonnel to check a box indicating Yes or No).When reports include such boxes, it is straightforwardto transform the information contained in the incident

This report is intended to provide a snapshot ofthe militarization of policing, a little-understoodphenomenon that has not been adequately studied.It includes analysis of both existing secondary sourcematerials and primary source data uncovered through theACLUs public records investigation, which is describedbelow.

On March 6, 2013, the ACLU sent public records requeststo more than 260 law enforcement agencies in 25 states(we later added the District of Columbia and a number

of cities in a 26th

state).7

We asked the law enforcementagencies to produce all incident reports (or other records)documenting each time a SWAT team was deployedbetween 2011 and 2012 8with such incident reportsbreaking down SWAT deployments by suspected crime,requesting agency, and purpose for the deploymentaswell as any post-deployment documents relating to theuse of no-knock warrants in conjunction with the SWATdeployment or the use of force during the deployment,including documentation relating to any injuries/deathsat the scene of the SWAT operation. As of September 30,

2013, we had received 3,844 records in response to theserequests. 9

In order to analyze the information contained in theserecords, we rst identied the type of document (e.g.,SWAT incident report, training document, grant request,1033 record, etc.). For each document type, we identiedseveral individual data points to collect.

For each SWAT deployment, we considered the following:

The number, race, ethnicity, and sex of peopleimpacted

The number of children present, if any

The number of mentally ill civilians impacted,if any

The number of ofcer deaths/injuries, if any

METHODOLOGY


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incident reports considered, then the relevant categoricalvariable is coded as Unknown. No inferences are drawnin this instance. In the discussion that follows, data that wascaptured as Likely Yes or Likely No is described as beingprobably or probably not true.

To ensure that certain results are not merely a function

of a small number of observations, the analysis considersonly those law enforcement agencies that produced morethan 15 incident reports in response to the original publicrecords requests, with the exception of the Bay CountySheriffs Ofce, which was included in the analysis for thepurpose of greater geographic diversity. It is importantto note that the data analysis in the report does not seekto make statistical estimates about the larger universe

reports received into a coherent categorical variablerepresenting the various responses of law enforcementpersonnel to the above questions.

The vast majority of the incident reports considered,however, did not consistently and systematically document

information in such an easily transcribable manner, insteadcommunicating or expressing answersif any at alltothe above questions in a textual narrative (often located atthe end of the incident report). It is, of course, relativelymore difcult to generate a categorical variable from purelynarrative text, and, in particular, one must decide howto deal with narratives that are silent or ambiguous withrespect to one or more of the questions posed above.

For these types of incident reports, the following codingprocedure was employed: If the narrative afrmativelyanswers one of the preceding questions, then the relevantcategorical variable is coded as Yes (e.g., if the narrativeexplicitly indicates that a ashbang grenade was usedduring the SWAT operation, then the Was a DistractionDevice Used variable is coded as Yes). Likewise, if thenarrative explicitly answers one of the above questions inthe negative, then the relevant variable is coded as No.Further, if the narrative strongly suggests a positive answerto one of the preceding questions (e.g., with respect to thequestion of whether forcible entry was made, the incidentreport refers to extensive damage to the front door),then the variable is coded as Likely Yes. Importantly,if the narrative is silent or ambiguous with respect toone of the above questions, then the relevant variableis coded as Likely No, based on the theory that policeofcers are unlikely to afrmatively state in an incidentreport that a particular action was not undertaken. Withrespect to the use of a distraction device, for instance,police ofcers are unlikely, arguably, to expressly writedown or indicate in the incident report that a distractiondevice was not used (when a distraction device was, in

fact, not used at any point during the SWAT operation).It is simply too time-consuming or otherwise costly forpolice ofcers, in creating a post-deployment narrative,to mention all of the possible actions not undertakenduring the SWAT operation; i.e., the narrative will containmainly a description of what was done as opposed towhat was not done. Finally, if the narrative is simply leftblankoccurring with surprisingly high frequency in the

CASUALTY REPORT

FRAMINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS JANUARY, 2011

SWAT Ofcer ShootsGrandfather of Twelve

Eurie Stamp was in hispajamas, watching abaseball game, when SWATofcers forced a batteringram through his front doorand threw a ashbanggrenade inside. Stamp, a

68-year-old grandfatherof twelve, followed theofcers shouted orders to

lie facedown on the oor with his arms abovehis head. He died in this position, when one ofthe ofcers guns discharged. Stamp wasntthe suspect; the ofcers were looking for hisgirlfriends son on suspicion of selling drugs. Thesuspect was arrested outside the home minutesbefore the raid. Even though the actual suspectdidnt live in Stamps home and was already incustody, the SWAT team still decided to carry outthe raid. Framingham has since disbanded itsSWAT team.


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For the most part, the data analysis consists of one- andtwo-way tabulations of the variables discussed above.Notably, the analysis treats missing values like othervalues, denoting missing or unknown values as U.Rather than drop missing values from the calculations,missing values are explicitly recorded in the tabulations

in order to highlight the substantial degree to which largesections of the incident reports received from the local lawenforcement agencies are incomplete or simply left blank,with no explanation or additional reason given for themissing information.

Also, a signicant component of the data analysisinvestigates racial disparities in the use and impact ofSWAT deployments. To consider this issue, it is necessaryto classify the race of a SWAT deployment in terms of therace of individuals impacted by SWAT operations (notethat the challenge posed in doing so is that there may bemultiple individuals of varying races impacted in a singleSWAT deployment). This classication is accomplishedin one of two distinct ways. Under the rst approach, wecreate a variable called Minority. Minority is denedhere as referring only to Black or Latino individuals; ourdenition does not include other minority groups (e.g.,Asian, Arab, and so forth). Any given SWAT incident isthen described as All White, meaning that all of thoseimpacted by a given SWAT deployment were white; AllMinority, meaning that all of the individuals impacted bya given SWAT deployment were either Black or Latino; orMixed, meaning that the SWAT incident involved a mixof minority and non-minority individuals.

Under the second approach, we count the total number ofindividuals impacted by a given SWAT incident who wereeither white, Black, or Latino. That is, three numbers arecalculated for each SWAT incident: (1) the total numberof whites impacted by the SWAT operation, (2) the totalnumber of Blacks impacted by the SWAT operation, and

(3) the total number of Latinos impacted by the SWAToperation. Tabulations are then run, not with respect tothe total number of individual SWAT incidents as above,but, rather, with respect to the total number of individualsimpacted by SWAT operations. So, for example, whencalculating the frequency of SWAT deployments by racein a given jurisdiction, under this second approach, wecalculate the percentage of the total number of individuals

of SWAT deployments nationwide. Rather, the analysisis descriptive in nature, providing a general pictureof SWAT deployments for this small cross section ofotherwise randomly chosen law enforcement agenciestheinformation contained in the documents received is notused to make more general, broader statements about the

use and impact of SWAT nationwide.

Narrowing the set of local law enforcement agencies thatwe considered as described in the preceding paragraph,the total number of SWAT incidents analyzed is 818, andthese SWAT incidents are distributed over 20 local lawenforcement agencies located in the following 11 states:Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washingtonand West Virginia. The agencies were diverse in terms oftype (including municipal police departments, county

sheriffs ofces, a police department covering multipleunincorporated areas, and a state patrol), size of populationcovered (ranging from 35,000 to 778,000), region (coveringthe Mid-Atlantic, Appalachian, Northeast, South, West,and Northwest regions of the United States, with the Southmost heavily represented), and racial composition (withBlack percentage population ranging from two percentto 42 percent). The SWAT incidents considered span thefollowing time period: July 20, 2010, to October 6, 2013,with the vast majority of incidents occurring in years 2011and 2012.

In the ACLUs study, SWAT teams were morethan twice as likely to force entry into a personshome when searching for drugs than for otherdeployments.



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14/98


Imagine that you are at home with your family, sleepingsoundly in the early morning hours. You awaken suddenlyto a loud explosion and the sound of glass shattering. Abright light blinds you and there is a terrible ringing in yourears. You cannot see anything, but through the ringing youhear the harrowing sound of your front door being brokendown as your children begin to scream in the next room. As you come to your senses, you look outside your window andsee what appears to be a tank in your driveway. Suddenly,peopleyou have no idea how manybreak through your bedroom door. In the darkness, all you can see is thatthey are wearing black and carrying assault ries, and theirfaces are masked. You hear people yelling at you and yourpartner to get on the oor and put your hands behind yourback. Your children are still screaming in the next room and your dog is barking loudly. The people lead you, wearingwhatever you wore to sleep that night, into the living room,pointing assault ries at you the entire time. You are orderedto sit, and someone quickly handcuffs you to the chair.More people then bring your partner and your children intothe living room at gunpoint. Your dog is still barking, and

one of the people shoots it, killing it instantly, in front of you and your children. They then proceed to ransack yourhome, breaking down doors and shattering windows. Youcan see that the explosion you heard earlier came from agrenade that now lies near your feet, scorch marks coveringthe oor from the blast. They hold you and your family atgunpoint for the next several hours, refusing to answer anyquestions about why they are there or what they are lookingfor. Once they have nally left, you nd your home inshambles. Broken glass litters the oor, and doors are brokenfrom where the police kicked holes in them. Your dog liesbreathless in a pool of its own blood. Tables are overturned,papers are strewn about, and electronic equipment has beenripped from the walls and left on the oor. Your partner isdesperately trying to calm your hysterical children.

Unfortunately, this is not a scene from an action movie, andit did not happen during the course of a protracted battle inan overseas war. This is the militarization of our state andlocal police, and events like this are happening every day inhomes throughout America.

INTRODUCTION



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SWAT Raid Ends with Toddlerin Medically-Induced Coma

After the Phonesavanh familys home in Wisconsinburned down, they drove their minivan to stay with

relatives in a small town just outside of Atlanta, Georgia.On the back windshield, the family pasted six stick gures:a dad, a mom, three young girls, and one baby boy.

This van, containing several car seats, was parked in thedriveway of the home where they were staying when, justbefore 3:00am on a night in May of 2014, a team of SWATofcers armed with assault ries burst into the room wherethe family was sleeping. Some of the kids toys were in thefront yard, but the Habersham County and Cornelia policeofcers claimed they had no way of knowing children mightbe present. One of the ofcers threw a ashbang grenadeinto the room. It landed in Baby Bou Bous crib.

It took several hours before Alecia and Bounkahm, thebabys parents, were able to see their son. The 19-month-oldhad been taken to an intensive burn unit and placed intoa medically induced coma. When the ashbang grenadeexploded, it blew a hole in 19-month-old Bou Bous faceand chest. The chest wound was so deep it exposed his ribs.The blast covered Bou Bous body in third degree burns. Atthe time of this reports publication, three weeks after the

raid, it was still unclear whether Baby Bou Bou would live.Bounkahm spent this Fathers Day in the hospital with hisson.

The SWAT team was executing a no knock warrant to

search for someone who did not live in the home that wasraided: Bounkahms nephew, who was suspected of makinga $50 drug sale. After breaking down the door, throwingmy husband to the ground, and screaming at my children,the ofcersarmed with M16sled through the houselike they were playing war, said Alecia. The ofcers did notnd any guns or drugs in the house and no arrests weremade. Bounkahms nephew was eventually arrested without

This is about race. You dosee SWAT teams going ina white collar community throwing grenades into thhomes.

Alecia Phonesavanh

My three little girls are terried of the police now. They dont want to go tosleep because theyreafraid the cops will kill them or their family.

Alecia Phonesavanh

The crib where Baby Bou Bou was sleeping, damagedby an exploding ashbang grenade.


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Bounkham Phonesavanh, nicknamed Baby BouBou, loves French fries, the theme song fromFrozen, and playing with his three older sisters.

Bounkahm and Alecia spent the three weeksfollowing the raid at the hospital. At the timethe report was published, their son was still in amedically-induced coma.

incident at another location, holding a small amount ofdrugs on him.

Bounkahm, the babys father, was born in Laos duringwartime. He remembers communist soldiers breaking down

the door of his childhood home. It felt like that, he said.This is America and youre supposed to be safe here, but youre not even safe around the cops.

The Phonesavanhs have three daughters who are now scaredto go to bed at night. One night after the raid, their 8-year-old woke up in the middle of the night screaming, No, dontkill him! Youre hurting my brother! Dont kill him. Aleciaand Bounkahm used to tell their kids that if they were ever introuble, they should go to the police for help. My three littlegirls are terried of the police now. They dont want to go to

sleep because theyre afraid the cops will kill them or theirfamily, Alecia said.

When asked about the prevalence of SWAT raids to ghtthe War on Drugs, Alecia told us, This is all about race andclass. You dont see SWAT teams going into a white collarcommunity, throwing grenades into their homes.

Learn more at www.justiceforbabyboubou.com.

After breaking down the door, throwing myhusband to the ground,and screaming at mychildren, the ofcersarmed with M16sled through the house like

they were playing war. Alecia Phonesavanh


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It is inappropriate for the U.S. military to be activelysupporting the domestic War on Drugs, which hasdestroyed millions of lives, unfairly impacted communitiesof color, made drugs cheaper and more potent, causedcountless deaths of innocent people caught up in drugwar-related armed conict, and failed to eliminate drugdependence and addiction. Even if an argument could bemade that providing local law enforcement with militaryequipment for counterdrug purposes ever made sensewhich is dubiousthere is no way to justify such policiestoday. Indeed, the U.S. Attorney General has suggested thatthe drug war has gone too far. Beginning in August 2013,Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., announced plans tocurtail the use of mandatory minimum sentencing lawsby federal prosecutors in certain drug cases, agreed not tochallenge state laws allowing the medicinal or recreational

use of marijuana, and supported a move by the U.S.Sentencing Commission to reduce many drug sentences.

The DOJ plays an important role in the militarization ofthe police through programs such as the Edward ByrneMemorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program.Established in 1988, the program, originally called theEdward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement

American policing has become unnecessarily anddangerously militarized. 10 For decades, the federalgovernment has equipped state and local law enforcementagencies with military weapons and vehicles, as well asmilitary tactical training, for the (often explicit) purpose ofwaging the War on Drugs. Not all communities are equallyimpacted by this phenomenon; the disproportionateimpact of the War on Drugs in communities of color hasbeen well documented. 11 Police militarization can result intragedy for both civilians and police ofcers, escalate therisks of needless violence, cause the destruction of personalproperty, and undermine civil liberties. Signicantly, themilitarization of American policing has been allowed tooccur in the absence of public discourse or oversight.

The militarization of American policing has occurred asa direct result of federal programs that use equipmenttransfers and funding to encourage aggressive enforcementof the War on Drugs by state and local police agencies. Onesuch program is the 1033 Program, launched in the 1990sduring the heyday of the War on Drugs, which authorizes

the U.S. Department of Defense to transfer militaryequipment to local law enforcement agencies. 12 Thisprogram, originally enacted as part of the 1989 NationalDefense Authorization Act, initially authorized the transferof equipment that was suitable for use by such agenciesin counterdrug activities. 13 In 1996, Congress made theprogram permanent and expanded the programs scope torequire that preference be given to transfers made for thepurpose of counterdrug and counterterrorism activities. 14 There are few limitations or requirements imposedon agencies that participate in the 1033 Program. 15 Inaddition, equipment transferred under the 1033 Program isfree to receiving agencies, though they are required to payfor transport and maintenance. The federal governmentrequires agencies that receive 1033 equipment to use itwithin one year of receipt, 16 so there can be no doubt thatparticipation in this program creates an incentive for lawenforcement agencies to use military equipment.

BACKGROUND

The detection and counteriof the production, trafckinand use of illegal drugs is ahigh-priority national securimission of the Departmentof Defense. Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 1989 17


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prevention-related law enforcement activities, thoughthat phrase does not appear to be clearly dened. 21 Thestated justication for DHS grants to state and locallaw enforcement is to support efforts to protect against

terrorism, but even the DHS acknowledges that it has alarger mission, which includes ordinary law enforcementactivities. In 2010, the DHS announced a new anticrimecampaign, which appears to have a minimal nexus toterrorism prevention. 22

By invoking the imagery of war, aggressively fundingthe enforcement of U.S. drug laws, and creating an over-

Assistance Program, provides states and local units ofgovernment with funding to improve the functioning oftheir criminal justice system and to enforce drug laws. JAGfunding can be used for any of the following purposes:

Law enforcement

Courts (prosecution and indigent defense)

Crime prevention and education

Corrections and community corrections

Drug treatment and enforcement

Program planning, evaluation, and technology

Crime victim and witness programs

However, JAG grantees spend much more of their fundingon law enforcement than on other program areas. BetweenApril 2012 and March 2013, JAG grantees spent 64 percentof their JAG funding on law enforcement. In contrast,grantees spent 9 percent on courts, including bothprosecution and indigent defense, and a mere 5 percenton drug treatment and 6 percent on crime preventionand education. 18 Grantees use a portion of JAG fundsallocated to law enforcement to purchase numerous typesof weapons. In 2012-2013, state and local agencies usedJAG funds to purchase hundreds of lethal and less-lethal

weapons, tactical vests, and body armor.19

The militarization phenomenon has gained even greaterzeal since the events of September 11, 2001, the creationof the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and thedeclaration of the so-called War on Terror. Since the early2000s, the infusion of DHS money and assistance to stateand local law enforcement anti-terrorism work has led toeven more police militarization and even greater military-law enforcement contact, and DHS grants have allowedpolice departments to stockpile specialized equipment in

the name of anti-terror readiness.

The main source of DHS funding to state and local lawenforcement is the Homeland Security Grant Program(HSGP) and its two main components, the State HomelandSecurity Program (SHSP) and the Urban Areas SecurityInitiative (UASI). 20 Both grant programs require recipientsto dedicate at least 25 percent of grant funds to terrorism

CASUALTY REPORT

TUCSON, ARIZONA2011

SWAT Team Shoots Vete22 Times

J ose Guerena, a 26-year-old Iraq war veteran,returned home and crawledinto bed after working thegraveyard shift at the AsarcoMission mine. Around9:30am, his wife becamenervous when she heardstrange noises and saw the

outline of a man standing outside her window.She woke Guerena, who asked his wife to hidein a closet with their 4-year-old son. Guerenapicked up his rie, with the safety on, and wentto investigate. A SWAT team red 71 shots atGuerena, 22 of which entered his body andkilled him. Guerena died on his kitchen oor,without medical attention. The SWAT ofcersraided multiple homes in the neighborhood,and in another home they did nd a smallbag of marijuana. No drugs were found in theGuerenas home.


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Some fully embrace militarism in policing: We trainershave spent the past decade trying to ingrain in our studentsthe concept that the American police ofcer works abattleeld every day he patrols his sector. 23 The mostcommon rationale put forth to support the notion thatthe police in fact should be militarized is to protect life:

A warrior cops mission is to protect every life possibleand to only use force when its necessary to accomplishthat mission. 24 Others suggest that policing has in fact notbecome militarized at all: Advocates from every cornerof the political compass have produced a mountain ofdisinformation about the militarization of American lawenforcement. 25 Still others express concern that Americanpolicing has become too militarized; Salt Lake City policechief Chris Burbank recently stated, Were not the military.Nor should we look like an invading force coming in. 26 Diane Goldstein, a retired lieutenant, agrees. Speaking ofthe drug war zeal of the 1980s, she stated that [The] ever-increasing federalization of what traditionally had beena state and local law enforcement effort received massivefunding as politicians, presidents and the Drug Czarincreased the rhetoric of war. Even the U.S. Departmentof Justice has questioned the wisdom of militarizing localpolice departments: According to the U.S. Departmentof Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Report on State andLocal Law Enforcement Training Academies (BJS Report),the majority of police recruits receive their training inacademies with a stress-based military orientation. Thisbegs the question; is this military modeldesigned toprepare young recruits for combatthe appropriatemechanism for teaching our police trainees how to garnercommunity trust and partner with citizens to solve crimeand public order problems? 27

One of the more dramatic examples of police militarizationis the use of SWAT and other paramilitary teams toconduct ordinary law enforcement activities. 28 SWATteams were created in the late 1960s as quasi-militaristic

squads capable of addressing serious and violent situationsthat presented imminent threats such as riots, barricadeand hostage scenarios, and active shooter or snipersituations. 29 The rst SWAT team, at the Los Angeles PoliceDepartment, was developed in the wake of a series ofemergency situations in which local police felt unable torespond as swiftly or as effectively as was necessary. 30 SWATteams have since expanded in number, and are used with

hyped fear of siege from within our borders, the federalgovernment has justied and encouraged the militarizationof local law enforcement. The ACLU found throughout thecourse of this investigation that the excessive militarismin policing, particularly through the use of paramilitarypolicing teams, escalates the risk of violence, threatens

individual liberties, and unfairly impacts people of color.In addition, because use of unnecessarily aggressivetechniques has a documented impact on public condencein law enforcement, there is reason to be concerned thatexcessive militarization undermines public trust andcommunity safety as well.

Interestingly, members of the law enforcement communityare far from unied on the topic of police militarization.

INCIDENT REPORTGWINNETT COUNTY, GEORGIA JUNE 23, 2012

Full SWAT Team Deployed,Despite Presence ofChildren and Elderly

In a search for marijuana, a SWAT team raideda home at 6:00 in the morning. Despite the factthat the department had previously decided thata SWAT deployment was unnecessary in thiscase, ofcers used the fact that one of the peoplethought to be in the home had been convictedof weapon possession in 2005 in another stateas the basis for concluding people inside theresidence might be armed. Therefore, thedepartment changed its mind and deemed a fullSWAT deployment necessary, despite knowingthat there were likely to be children and anelderly woman present in the home when theyexecuted the warrant. There is no indication asto whether any guns or weapons were foundafter the home was raided. All but one of thepeople thought to be involved were Black.


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that the police would not be violating their constitutionalrights, but the fact that the Chief of Police felt comfortableannouncing a plan for police ofcers on routine patrolto stop and question residents without justicationwhile dressed in SWAT gear and carrying AR-15s is aforeboding sign. While unquestionably of grave concern,

routine patrols using SWAT gear, stop-and-frisk, 32 andother aggressive policing tactics are beyond the scope ofthis report. Another important area is the use of militarysurveillance equipment and other forms of intelligencegathering, which also falls outside the scope of this report. 33 Finally, the militarization of the U.S. border is a criticallyimportant issue; we touch on this in our discussion of theenormous caches of weapons Arizona law enforcementagencies have received through the 1033 Program, but thebroader issue of border militarization is also outside thescope of this report. 34

This report builds on a body of existing work establishingthat police militarization is indeed a problem. For example,Dr. Peter Kraska, Professor of Justice Studies at EasternKentucky University, has surveyed police departmentsacross the country on their use of SWAT teams andestimates that the number of SWAT teams in small townsgrew from 20 percent in the 1980s to 80 percent in themid-2000s, and that as of the late 1990s, almost 90 percentof larger cities had them. He also estimates that the numberof SWAT raids per year grew from 3,000 in the 1980s to45,000 in the mid-2000s. 35 David Klinger and Jeff Rojek,both at the University of Missouri-St. Louiss Departmentof Criminology and Criminal Justice, conducted a studyusing SWAT data from 1986 to 1998 and found that theoverwhelming number of SWAT deployments studied werefor the purpose of executing a warrant (34,271 for warrantservice, in contrast to 7,384 for a barricaded suspect and1,180 for hostage-taking cases). 36

Some scholars have proposed additional analytic

frameworks for examining the militarization of policing.For example, Abigail R. Hall and Christopher J. Coyne,both in the Department of Economics of George MasonUniversity, have developed a political economy of themilitarization of policing. 37 In addition, Stephen M. Hilland Randall R. Beger, both professors in the PoliticalScience Department at the University of Wisconsin-EauClaire, place the issue within an international context,

greater frequency and, increasingly, for purposes for whichthey were not originally intendedoverwhelmingly toserve search warrants in drug investigations.

Of course, aggressive policing tactics extend well beyondthe scope of this report, and examples of particularlyaggressive policing, in which police ofcers appear moreas an invading force than as protectors of a community,abound. Take Paragould, Arkansas, where at a December2012 town hall meeting, Chief of Police Todd Stovallannounced that police conducting routine patrols wouldbe in SWAT gear and have AR-15s around their neck. 31 He also asserted that the police would be stopping anyonethey wanted to and that the fear of crime in Paragould

gave his ofcers probable cause to stop anyone at anytime, for any reason or no reason at all. Chief Stovall laterissued a statement reassuring the residents of Paragould

Salt Lake City police chiefChris Burbank recently

stated, Were not the military.Nor should we look like aninvading force coming in.

It is not unusual for family pets to be shotunnecessarily.

Photo: Keep Columbia Free via FIO/Sunshine requesthttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng6mfpZ2kR4


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This report should not be read as an indictment of thepolice generally or of any individual police ofcers. It is alsonot an argument against the use of SWAT in appropriatecircumstancessome scenarios undoubtedly merit anemergency response, and SWAT teams are often the bestequipped to handle those scenarios. Finally, the report

should not be understood to suggest that the incidentsuncovered during the course of the ACLUs investigationdid not necessarily merit some form of law enforcementresponsemany did. Instead, we argue that American lawenforcement can reverse the militarization trend in a waythat promotes safe and effective policing strategies withoutundermining public condence in law enforcement.

arguing that the militarization of domestic policing is partof a broader paramilitary policing juggernaut. 38 JournalistRadley Balko discusses the issue of police militarization atlength in his recent book Rise of the Warrior Cop andthe topic has received considerable, if episodic, attentionin the mainstream media. 39 Our analysis adds to this body

of work by incorporating an analysis of raw dataactualSWAT incident reports collected from numerous lawenforcement agencies across the country.

From our review of both primary and secondary sourcematerials, we are able to present two types of ndings: oneset of general ndings based on our review of the existingresearch, which our data supports, and one set of time-bound specic ndings from our statistical analysis of theraw data we collected in connection with our investigation.As explained in more detail below, our more generalndings are that policing in the Unites States has becomeexcessively militarized and that this militarization hasoccurred with almost no transparency, accountability, oroversight. We also found, based on our analysis of the rawdata we collected, that of the SWAT deployments studied,(1) the overwhelming majority were for the purpose ofsearching peoples homes for drugs, (2) troubling racialdisparities existed, and (3) the use of violent tactics andequipment often resulted in property damage and/orbodily harm.

American law enforcement canreverse the militarization trendin a way that promotes safe and

effective policing strategieswithout undermining publiccondence in law enforcement.


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distract the occupants of a building while a SWAT teamis attempting to secure the scene. 42 Flashbang grenadesproduce an extremely bright ash of light that temporarilyoverstimulates the retina and causes temporary blindness(lasting 5 to 10 seconds). They also make a deafeningnoise that makes people feel disoriented and can cause alingering ringing. Although they are generally considered tobe nonlethal, they have been known to set homes on re 43 and induce heart attacks, 44 both sometimes resulting indeath. In 2010, 7-year-old Aiyana Stanley-Jones was killedwhen, just after midnight, a SWAT team threw a ashbang

grenade through the window into the living room whereshe was asleep. The ashbang burned her blanket and amember of the SWAT team burst into the house, ring asingle shot, which killed her. 45

Both battering rams and ashbang grenades can causeextensive property damagehalf of the incidents theACLU reviewed involved property damage such as damageto doors and/or windows (in another 30 percent of cases,it was impossible to know whether there was propertydamage in connection with a SWAT deployment, so the

Policing and MilitarismFINDING #1

Policingparticularly through the useof paramilitary teamsin the UnitedStates today has become excessivelymilitarized, mainly through federal

programs that create incentivesfor state and local police to useunnecessarily aggressive weapons andtactics designed for the battleeld.

Use of Military Equipment by SWAT TeamsIt is clear from this investigation and other research 40 that

American policing has become excessively militarized.We can see this in the use of military-style equipmentweapons and tactics designed for the battleeldtoconduct ordinary law enforcement activities. Police ofcersuse these weapons routinely, across the United States, toforce their way into the peoples homes, disrupting livesand destroying communities.

One such weapon is the battering rama large and heavypiece of wood or other material that is used to hit andbreak through walls and doors 41which is nearly always

carried on deployments, and the primary tool used tobreach doors and windows (though explosive breachingthe use of explosives to cut through doorsseems to begaining popularity).

Another device often used by SWAT teams is theashbang grenade (sometimes referred to generically as adistraction device), an explosive device that is used to

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

Aiyana Stanley-Jones

Photo: Family of Aiyana Stanley-Jones


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less as civilians and more as enemies, what effect does thathave on police-suspect interactions?

Legality of Forced Entry Into People

HomesGenerally speaking, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.Constitution prohibits the police from entering a personshome without a warrant. Historically, if the police had awarrant to search a persons home, they were required bylaw to knock on the door, announce their presence, andwait for someone to answer. 55 When a person answered

terrorist camps. It further states that police agencies arentused to thisWe deal with acts of a criminal nature. Thisis an act of war, but because of our laws we cant dependon the military to help us[T]he U.S. in [sic] the onenation in the world where the military is not the rst lineof defense against domestic terrorist attack. By law, you

the police ofcer are our Delta Force. It provides 4 Dsfor Thwarting Terrorists Plans to Massacre Our SchoolChildren and concludes with an admonition to Build theright mind-set in your troops. 54

Even if there were merit to the argument that trainingSWAT teams to think like soldiers in the context of a schoolshooting would provide them with the skills that they needto respond effectively, it appears that training in how todevelop a warrior mentality is pervasive and extends well

beyond hostage situations and school shootings, seepinginto ofcers everyday interactions with their communities.For example, the Cary, North Carolina, SWAT teamprovides a training session explicitly titled WarriorMindset/Chemical Munitions for all Emergency ResponseTeam personnel. A PowerPoint training presentation sentby the National Tactical Ofcers Association urges traineesto Steel Your Battlemind and denes battlemind as awarriors inner strength to face fear and adversity duringcombat with courage. It is the will to persevere and win. Itis resilience. Neither of these training documents suggests

that SWAT teams should constrain their soldier-like tacticsto terrorism situations. Additionally, in the documentsreviewed for this report, the majority of SWAT raids tookplace in the context of serving search warrants at peopleshomesnot in response to school shootings or bombings.

Training programs like these impact how some SWATofcers view the people in their communities. For example,in one of the cases examined for this report, a SWAT teamdrove a BearCat APC into a neighborhood for the sole

purpose of executing a warrant to search for drugs. Oncethe SWAT ofcers arrived at the home, they drove the APCto the residence, broke down the front and back doors,destroyed a glass table, deployed a distraction device,and pried a lock off a shed, all to nd the house empty.One of the ofcers noted in his report that the house wasempty of suspects and civilians. The distinction betweensuspects and civilians is telling. If police see suspects

INCIDENT REPORT

BURLINGTON, NORTH CAROLINANOVEMBER 13, 2012

SWAT Ofcers Shoots DDuring No-Knock Raid

At 6:00 in the morning, a SWAT ofcer shot adog during a no-knock raid and search of ahome. The suspect was a single Black male whowas suspected of selling marijuana at his home.Solely on the basis of information providedby a condential informant (which is oftenunreliable), the SWAT team believed that theman possessed rearms. No information wasprovided about what kind or how many rearmsthe man was believed to possess. The teamdeployed a distraction device and broke down thedoor, causing damage and surprise. They foundtwo unarmed men inside, along with a dog thatbit one of the ofcers. The ofcer was carryinga shotgun, against the teams own policy. Usingthis shotgun, the ofcer shot the dog. Seventypercent of the people impacted by the BurlingtonSWAT deployments the ACLU studied wereBlack.


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do not offer robust protection from police use of aggressiveequipment and tactics to execute search warrants inpeoples homes.

Federal Incentives to Militarize PolicinThe Department of Defense operates the 1033 Programthrough the Defense Logistics Agencys (DLA) LawEnforcement Support Ofce (LESO), whose motto isfrom warghter to crimeghter. According to LESO,the program has transferred $4.3 billion worth ofproperty through the 1033 Program. 61 Today, the 1033Program includes more than 17,000 federal and state lawenforcement agencies from all U.S. states and territories.The amount of military equipment being used by local and

state police agencies has increased dramaticallythe valueof property transferred though the program went from $1million in 1990 to $324 million in 1995 and to nearly $450million in 2013. 62

The 1033 statute authorizes the Department of Defenseto transfer property that is excess to the needs of theDepartment, 63 which can include new equipment; infact, 36 percent of the property transferred pursuant theprogram is brand new. 64 Thus, it appears that DLA cansimply purchase property from an equipment or weapons

manufacturer and transfer it to a local law enforcementagency free of charge. Given that more than a third ofproperty transferred under the program is in fact new, itappears that this practice happens with some regularity.

A statistical analysis of the transfer of equipment underthe 1033 Program is beyond the scope of this report, butwe uncovered numerous examples of transfers that givecause for concern. For example, during the years coveredby the investigation, the North Little Rock, Arkansas, policeobtained at least 34 automatic and semi-automatic ries,

two MARCbots (robots designed for use in Afghanistanthat are capable of being armed), several ground troophelmets, and a Mamba tactical vehicle. 65 The Arkansasstate coordinator found that the LESO application forparticipation and the state memorandum of agreementwere outdated, in addition to many weapons beingunaccounted for in the inventory. Despite this, thecoordinator signed off on a form that said all the inventory

the door, the police were required to show the warrant andwere then entitled to demand entry to conduct a search.

Although the knock-and-announce rule still exists,today police executing a search warrant need not followthe rule if they have reasonable suspicion that the

circumstances present a threat of physical violence or thatevidence would be destroyed if advance notice were given. 56 Further, if they believe in advance of executing the searchwarrant that either of these circumstances will exist, theycan obtain a no-knock warrant, which allows them toenter a persons home without knocking. In either case,the police are permitted to force their way into a personshome. As a consequence, even though the police are notallowed to barge their way into a persons home simplybecause they believe drugs are present, 57 given that anytime they have reasonable suspicion that knocking and

announcing their presence would inhibit the investigationof the crime by allowing the destruction of evidence, 58 the reality is that drug cases often provide police withvast discretion to use forced entry into a persons hometo execute a search warrant. Even when a court nds thatthe police have violated the knock-and-announce rule,the Supreme Court has held that the prosecution can stilluse the evidence seized as a result of a subsequent searchat trial, signicantly diluting the knock-and-announcerequirements value as a deterrent to police overreach. 59

While search warrants authorize the police to search agiven place for a particular item or items, they rarelydelineate the tactics the police may use in executingthe warrant (other than no-knock warrants, which, asexplained above, authorize the police to enter withoutknocking or announcing their presence, and sometimesspecically authorize use of a night-time search). Andthough the Supreme Court has held as a general matterthat the method of police entry into a home is a factorto be considered in assessing the reasonableness (and,hence, constitutionality) of the search, 60 there is no per se

prohibition on the use of any particular method . Therefore,the fact that the police obtained a warrant in a given casedoes little to constrain their broad discretion to decidewhether to deploy a SWAT team, break down a door with abattering ram, deploy a distraction device, etc.

In sum, while courts can at times provide recourse toviolations of Fourth Amendment rights, by and large they


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increased the likelihood that local police departments, not just in Gwinnett County but across the country, will deploymilitary weapons and tactics in drug investigations whenpossible.

Mission CreepIt is clear that local law enforcement agencies use DHSfunds ostensibly obtained for the purpose of ghtingterrorism to conduct ordinary law enforcementactivities. In New Hampshire, for example, three policedepartmentsin Concord, Keene, and Manchester (citiesthat are separated from each other by approximately 30miles)each used DHS grants to fund the purchase of anarmored BearCat (the amount of grants received by these

agencies ranged from $215,000 to $286,000). Justicationsoffered for these grants included prevention, protection,response, and recovery activities pertaining to weapons ofmass destruction and the threat of terrorism. The Keene,New Hampshire, police department, for example, statedin its application for DHS grant funding to purchase anAPC that [t]he terrorism threat is far reaching and oftenunforeseen. Terrorists [sic] goals, regardless of afliation,

forms were accurate. Bay County, Florida, received severalmilitary-style ries, a forklift, and several utility trucks.The same county also has on inventory numerous M-16s,M-14s, sniper ries, submachine guns, and ballistic shields,though it is not clear from the records whether Bay Countyobtained those items through the 1033 Program, fromanother federal source, or otherwise. Gwinnett County,

Georgia, received nearly 60 military-style ries, as well asnumerous combat vests and Kevlar helmets.

In addition, agencies are permitted to transfer equipmentobtained through the 1033 Program between each other.The ACLU uncovered numerous examples of state andlocal law enforcement agencies transferring equipment thatthey had obtained through the 1033 Program. There do notappear to be any limitations on or oversight of this practice.

As the saying goes, if all you have is a hammer, everything

looks like a nail.66

Likewise, if the federal government givesthe police a huge cache of military-style weaponry, theyare highly likely to use it, even if they do not really needto. Gwinnett County, Georgia, for example, received atleast 57 semi-automatic ries, mostly M-16s and M-14s,through the 1033 Program during the relevant time period.A third of Gwinnett Countys SWAT deployments were fordrug investigations; in half of them, the SWAT team brokedown the door to get inside, and there was no record inany of the reports that weapons were found. In several ofthese cases, damage resulted to peoples homes; in one case,

the SWAT team deployed tear gas into a home in order toserve an arrest warrant, knowing there were people insidewho were not subjects of the warrant. It is not possible toprove denitively that the weapons procured through the1033 Program incentivized these deployments in Gwinnett.However, it is reasonable to infer that the programthevery purpose of which is to equip local police ofcersto use military equipment in drug investigationshas

Our application talked abo the danger of domestic terrorism, but thats justsomething you put in the grapplication to get the mone

What red-blooded Americacop isnt going to be exciteabout getting a toy like this Thats what it comes down

Keene, N.H. Citty Councilmember


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from the DHS and DOJ during the time period studied.The city of Austin, Texas, for example, received $2.2 millionin federal grant funding from August 2010 through January2012. Fort Worth, Texas, received $1.2 million in 2011 and2012 combined. Similarly, since August 2013, the Salt LakeCity Police Department has received almost $2 million in

federal grant awards. However, awards are not limited tolarge cities. In Montana, the Helena Police Departmentreceived $733,000 in DHS grants, and the MontanaDepartment of Justice received more than $1 millionin DHS grants. Likewise, Gastonia, North Carolina, hasreceived more than $180,000 in federal funding since 2009,while the Bay County, Florida, Sheriffs Department hasreceived approximately $360,000 in federal funding sincelate 2011. In 2011, the Raleigh Police Department received$120,000 as part of the 2011 State Homeland SecurityProgram.

A 2004 classied memo all but conrms the blurring ofthe lines between the drug war and the U.S. military bycalling the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) The OtherWarghter and stating that the War on Drugs has all therisks, excitement, and dangers of conventional warfare. 74

Simply put, American policing has become excessivelymilitarized.

usually encompass the creation of fear among the public,convincing the public that their Government is powerlessto stop the terrorists, and get immediate publicity for theircause. The application goes on to cite Keenes annualpumpkin festival as a potential terrorism target in need ofprotection with an APC. 67

Not even Keene city ofcials believed that the city actuallyneeded the BearCat to thwart terrorism. To explain why thepolice included the word terrorism on their applicationfor federal funding for this purchase, a city councilmembersaid, Our application talked about the danger of domesticterrorism, but thats just something you put in the grantapplication to get the money. What red-blooded Americancop isnt going to be excited about getting a toy like this?Thats what it comes down to. 68

The police chief in San Diego, California, expressed thesame sentiment when asked about his agencys decisionto purchase an armored personnel carrier: If we had totake on a terrorist group, we could do that, said WilliamLansdowne, the police chief in San Diego and a member ofthe board of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Thoughhis force used federal grants to buy one of those fancyarmored vehiclescomplete with automatic-gun portalshe said the apparatus was more useful for traditionalcrime-busting than counter-terrorism. 69

It is equally clear that the DOJs Byrne JAG funding is beingused to conduct unnecessarily aggressive activities in drugcases. Approximately 21 percent of all law enforcementJAG funds go to task forces, the majority of which are drugtask forces, which routinely employ paramilitary tactics indrug investigations. 70 Byrne JAG drug task forces have beenwidely criticized for incentivizing unnecessarily aggressive,often militarized, tacticsparticularly in communitiesof color. 71 As of 2011, 585 multi-jurisdictional task forceswere funded through the JAG program. 72 JAG funds oftensupport drug task forces by paying for the salaries or

overtime hours of task force ofcers as well as for vehiclesand equipment; in 2012-2013, more than 680,000 lawenforcement overtime hours were paid for using JAGfunds. 73

According to documents uncovered by the ACLU, local lawenforcement agencies often received substantial funding


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It strains credibility to believe that the informationcontained in SWAT incident reports contains tradesecrets. A trade secret is a commercially valuable plan,formula, process, or device. It is a secret, commerciallyvaluable plan, formula, process, or device that is usedfor the making, preparing, compounding, or processing

of trade commodities and that can be said to be the endproduct of either innovation or substantial effort. 76 A police report is not a commercially valuable plan.Furthermore, most law enforcement agencies contacteddid in fact provide some records, belying the notion thatthe records requested did not constitute public records,that there were legitimate concerns about law enforcementeffectiveness, or that the request was overbroad andvoluminous. These are simply excuses to avoid complyingwith the ACLUs request. In fact, the public should noteven have to resort to public records requests to obtain

information about policing practicesthis informationshould be readily available.

The records that were produced revealed an extremelytroubling trend: that data collecting and reporting inthe context of SWAT was at best sporadic and at worstvirtually nonexistent. Not a single law enforcement agencyin this investigation provided records containing all ofthe information that the ACLU believes is necessary toundertake a thorough examination of police militarization.Some agencies (e.g., Tupelo, Mississippi) provided

records that were nearly totally lacking in importantinformation. Others (e.g., Salt Lake City, Utah) providedrecords that were quite lengthy, though still incompleteand extremely difcult to analyze because of their lack oforganization. Others (e.g., Fort Worth, Texas) provide fairlycomprehensive information, though often in narrativeform, making statistical analysis difcult. This variationhas two immediate results: (1) any analysis of the datawill necessarily have to contend with a large number of

Lack of Transparencyand OversightFINDING #2

The militarization of policing in theUnited States has occurred withalmost no public oversight.

Limitations of Data Collection on SWAT UseData concerning the prevalence of SWAT is difcult tocollect.75 The ACLU led public records requests withmore than 255 law enforcement agencies during the courseof this investigation. One hundred and fourteen of theagencies denied the ACLUs request, either in full or in part.Even if the ACLU had received and examined responsivedocuments from all 255 law enforcement agencies thatreceived public records requests, this would represent onlya sliver of the more than 17,000 law enforcement agenciesthat exist throughout the United States, and thus would

shine only a dim light on the extent of police militarizationthroughout the country.

The agencies that refused to comply with our requestsoffered various justications for the refusals, including thefollowing:

The requested documents contained trade secrets.

Concerns about jeopardizing law enforcementeffectiveness.

The requested documents did not constitute publicrecords.

The request was overbroad and voluminous.

The costs associated with producing the documentswere simply prohibitive.

Data collecting and reportin the context of SWAT was asporadic and at worst virtuanonexistent.


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agency failed to comply with the reporting provisions, thefact of noncompliance by that particular agency would bereported to the state legislature. 79 Utah enacted a similarbill this year. 80

The Maryland law did not come out of nowhere. The year

before, the Prince Georges County Sheriffs SWAT teamhad raided the home of Cheye Calvo, the mayor of a smallPrince Georges County municipality. The county policedepartment then held Calvo and his family at gunpoint forhours and killed his two dogs, on the basis of a misguidedinvestigation in which Calvo and his wife were wronglysuspected of being involved in a marijuana transaction. 81 Calvo responded by drafting legislation, securing billsponsors, attracting media, organizing grass-roots support,coordinating with other SWAT victims, knocking on doors,and personally appealing to the governor to sign the newlaw (over the objection of law enforcement), all a testamentto the concerted efforts that must be taken to bring aboutSWAT reform. Although in the end the law did not containeverything he wanted, Calvo hoped that the law wouldbring change. He testied before the state legislature: Thisbill is an important rst step that doesnt restrict [police]use [of SWAT teams]. It merely brings transparency.Hopefully, it will ensure that the people who fund andauthorize these SWAT teams have the information theyneed to set good public policy. 82

The Maryland law resulted in some fairly robust reportingon SWAT use by local law enforcement. The GovernorsOfce of Crime Control and Prevention was able tocollect, aggregate, analyze, and report on this data annuallyfor the years 2010-2012, and more reports should beforthcoming. 83 Highlighting the importance of thoroughdocumentation and transparency, these reports, which areavailable to the public, demonstrated that in Maryland,SWAT deployments are used principally for searchwarrants, focus on nonviolent felonies and misdemeanors,

and typically result in forced entries, regardless of whetherthe warrant is standard or no-knock. Unfortunately, thestory seems to end there, at least in Maryland. The statelegislature has not used the information contained in thereports to enact any meaningful policy reform, as Calvohad hoped, and the law is scheduled to sunset this year,with no indication that it will be extended (though boththe Prince Georges police and the Prince Georges Sheriff s

unknowns (as demonstrated above) and (2) it makessystematic, thorough, and uniform collection of SWATdata, at any level of government, impossible.

Lack of State and Local OversightThere is almost no oversight of SWAT at the state or locallevel. Maryland is the exceptionin 2009, Marylandenacted a law requiring law enforcement agencies thatmaintain a SWAT team to report, semi-annually, specicactivation and deployment information. 77 The law requiredthe Police Training Commission, in consultation with theGovernors Ofce of Crime Control and Prevention, todevelop a standardized format for each agency to use inreporting data. 78 It also provided that if a law enforcement

INCIDENT REPORT

BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA JANUARY 6, 2011

SWAT Team Shatters

war comes home

Documents