wang shang theory practice of political warfare

8/8/2019 Wang Shang Theory Practice of Political Warfare

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/wang-shang-theory-practice-of-political-warfare 1/102

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL W A R F ~

BY

WANG SHANG

GENERAL, CHINESE ARMY

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

PROFESSOR HSIN KWANG-HSU

\.J IQ I tt

j l 0

),""'.

{

2

ty no

'yde-

. tica

go thE

:-8",

it i1

ane

re

tt y

In

is

1



(.FOREWARD

After the debacle en the Chinese mainland, President Chiang

Kai-shek, layi.ng emphasis more on poli t ica l ac tions than on

military operations and more on spiritual strength than on materi

alforces in the wa r against communism, coined the term "political

warfare" in 1953, and subsequently published a series of f i v ~articles on t he s tudy of political warfare, in which th e s ix major '

types of operations were listed a s its contents.

To President s i llstructions into practice th e Political

StaffCol lege, in an attempt to systemat ize and t ~ e o r i z e the study

of political warfare, had compiled materials for inst ruc t ion in

1952, After two years of continuous efforts, th e Political Warfare

ReSf'arch Class was optmed. Hence the courSe in political war

fare was extended from the military schools at various levels to

th e armed forces. Iv1eanwhile, the 'General Political Department

of the l\1inistry of National Defense had also ...ssued the outlines,

the tenets, thEl chessboards and. films, al l pertaining to political

warfare J as supplements fo r instruction and training. among.

servicemen of a ll l ev el s. From that t ime, t he political. work of

th e armed forces ha s centered around poli t ica l warfare, ~ n d . allservicemen have to undergo SU9h training, aside f rom the regular

::ourses in political science. In 1963 the President decided: that

the General Poli t ica l DE:partme!1t be changed into General Pol it i

ca lWarfare Department , with i t b r a n c h ~ s l i k e w ~ s e renamed,. andthat the Political Staff College be changed into the Political War-

and

of the mean-

va . lU lI .H i"" ' ' ' blocs,

National Defense

IJUJ..U.L\. .CClJ. warfare into operation.

of the Minis try

• And so , i t is decided to have the

thE) communists IJVJlJ.I,J, ,-a.J. .J. .Y

Communist and

to

a brief and concise

way to

book

the author ha s a ~ e ~ l y s e d the

it book form.

Chieh Shou

Chiang.Chien-jen.

9 1959.

who study i t with care wil l b e able to forge ahead and march

on th e road to .. ~ , r ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

dwelled in deta i ls on

warfar6 as

IJ V ..... ".LV<.LJ.warfare. It also provides

historical lessons with concrete facts as illustrations • In ad -

Genera l pol it ica l

in various

andthe Command and General Staff , he ha s

lectured on political' war fa re i n recent yearf:: and has received

very comment,s. read the of his lec

tures , I found i t to be invaillable both as r e f e r e n c ~ in theof warfare and as mater ia ls for ins truct ion in thi s

II III



the present wri ter had taught the Cambodi an th e officers same

subject and found many parts of th e book should have undergone

thorough r evi s ion becau se of the chang ing worl d situations.

AV'ailing himself of . the two official v i si ts t o Kinmen, tlfe present

author had been able to f in ish the revision work i the Nien Chih

Hall of the o f f ~ · s h o r e island. It is hoped that this book ca n con....

tribute to ou r anti-Communist efforts, bu t there might sUUbe in

i t much to be d ~ : l s i r e d . the present wri ter wants to quote

from the Forewiord of th e Revised Edition of the book which runs

in part: "Poli t ical warfare is a new sort of knowled,ge which is

t o mee t th e demands of th e National Revolution. It is also a 'war

fare of crucial importance to be waged againstthe enemy.I t

ishoped that when this book undergoes ;revision, any fruitful sug-

gestions o r co rr ect ion s from ou r revolutionary leaders and ad

vanced experts wil l b e appreciated" •on

sev-eral

warfare

National

VUI>.L.LILt;:;;:, of

institute devoted to the study

liTom the highest

the whole

years of oriep,a:r.:Hl.on

n n · . ,.."{Tor! the

warfare is se t up Acc or di ng to th e Presiden t ,

search Class, tock pains to it in order.

months of first edition came

The present book lectures delivered first at

the Army Command. and General Staff College upon the

ot Comrade Wang an d then at the Warfare He:-

, bu t th e h ad not b ee n pUblic-

ation 1958 when Professor 11a then a student in the Re-

o f

a special corps in

fare College, in 'Nnich a

13, with more than [CIOOO copies . Favorab le comments

were r ec ei ved from many s o u r c e ~ , . It was revised on November

17 of the same year , and third and fourth of

this book consisted of more than 100,000 copies. ' Due to pressure

of work, the present had not been able to revise i t until

t h in • Now, it h as i ts ' Chinese,

Wang Sheng.

Nien Chih Hall, Kinmen,

June 19, 1973.

the Vietnamese

Cambodian andietnamese,

th e presen t wr it e r received order to

th e armed forces

Koreoan,

Span i sh ve rsions.

visit Vietnam to u t : : . l . i J ' · . ~ i C ' l ; A · I J . L J I . ; : ' l l the system of I J V . i . " - ~ . L " " ' G " ' " w'? rfare in ....

I t is conceivable

servicemen have aware of the si x of I J V . l l ~ . L " " ' C l . ' "

warfare in the years no less than th e Chinese. Of late

VI v



CONTENTS

Chap te r I I . Histor ical Lessons 0' " 0 • 0 ••••••••• 0 0 ••••••• 19L II I d E ~ o l o g i c a l Conquest lt

- - Tactics in

Communist Ideological Warfare .....•• 00. 0 • • • 20

2. " P E ~ a c e f u l Coexistence" - - Tactics in

Communist Strategical Warfare ...••.•.. 0 • 31

3. nThree Great Weapons" - - Tactics in

Communist Organizational Warfare . • 0 0" • • • • • • 42

4. Temptation an d Intimidation - - Tactics

in Communist Psychological Warfare. . . 0 0 • • • 51

5. Cloak and Dagger - - Tactic s in

Communist Intelligence Warfare . . . 0 • • • • • • • • • 58

6. Thl3 Exploitation of the Masses - - Tactics

in Communist Mass Movement Warfare . . • • . . . . • 0 66

Chapter III. Th e Present Status of Glo'bal Political

Warfare ..... 0 •• • 0 0 ••••••• 0 ••••• 0 . . . . . . 0 • • 77

L On th e Part of Chinese Communists •. 0....... 78

2. On the Part of Democratic Countries ...•.... 84

3. On th e Part of the Republic of China . . . 0 , 0 0 0 0 88

- -1-



Chapter IV . Communism VElrsusFreedom • • . . . • . . . . • • . • • . 99

Love Hate - - Contrast

• " • " •• • ' •• 4 ill It • " 41 I; .. $ • i • I • ., 100

Warfare in Operat ion .•....••.. 0. 171

6. The Voice of t he P eo pl e Is th e Voice of God

Mass Movement Warfare in Operation • . • • • . . . • 177

2.

Contrast

- - A

........... 09

. VI. Conclusion0 ••••••••••••••••••••••• 185

3

4.

A Contrast Ka.u..L:'!)Q.I-J.U!.l<:l. .L Warfare •

Lies - - A Contrast

116

\;U'VJ.I. 'K.L'l. '<::LJ. Warfare 24

5. Science in

6.

.L .L .L I l (v l l . C' Warfare

.... .....,.. " , Versus .LIA. I J . . V . . . .· ...

.Mass Movement Warfare

131

Contrast

136

•••••••••• 0 143

L T he Faith in

People

Three of the

• . • • • • . . • • . • 146

2. Calculations behindth e

• • o •••• 0 ••••• 152

3.

4.

an d Affection

Warfare in Operation ..•.... o. 159

Is Our Comrade"

• •••• 0 •••• 165

5. - - t h l ~ Price of



subjugating the other and rendering it helpless. During the

course of conflict both sides employ violence and weapons to

seek use every means at their disposal to develop

th e maximum efficiency of this violence. But at times they do not

need to resortto

violence and are ye t able to achievePolitical warfare i s this type of warfare.

The epithet !! polit1cal ll in political warfare covers many

factors and is therefore vague as \vell a s b ro ad in implicationsare

s affairs,

l IU ' lLJl l_" or

are also those ·of

of the affairs of the mass of the

admlnistra tion of th e

of th e state affairs

the

one

chih

it . al s0-involves

The affairs of th e mass

th e state

in a state; -one ha s s warfare is dictated by historical expe r ience and

ma:rks the pot icy-makjng, ideology the cause ,trategy

demands of the time, President Chiang Kai-shek, the living

symbol of anti-communism of the world, has listed under

poiitical warfare. "six types t1 namely, s tr at eg ica l wa rf a re ,

ideological warfare, organization"!l warfare, psychological

warfa.re, intelligence warfare, a nd mass movement warfare.

in

symptoms

is

affairs; buts the conduct of

which arises

warfare is

or one may

realities while

threat f rom wIthin present conflict of

organization the, layout, mass. movement the basis psychology

the direct operation, and intell igence the covert operations of

poli t ica l warfare G warfare is the last resort of political

is under

means as

administration and the

when th e CCimmunists

the

th e

occur

i n ~ u r r e c t i o n warfare.

to create divisio'n and chaos in national and international

is forced rise 2. Political Warfare-Its Contents

the forms of the batLles of tongue

Warfare: Ideo log ical war fa re i s the warfare.

of ism versus ism. It

As stated in the prec'eding se ct io n, p ol iti ca l w ar fa re

includes warfare of strategy, ideology, organization,

psychology, intelligence, and ma.ss movement. Each of these

si x types can be explained as follows:

whe!.l.nd

I

of defeating,

each opposing

ideology versus

the

violence

versus

force.

preserve freedom and

necessary,

War is

'Side exerts maximum

or

-2 -_.- 3 --



field l

warfa:esults th us a ch ie ve d w ill be g re at . S tr at eg ic al

therefore the role of policy-maker in the

political warfare.

3. Organ iz at iona l War fa re : Th e precise meaning

organization is to closely correlate man, place, t ime,' ar

physical prowess with major plans an d immediate objectives e

that maximum ca n be developed. President Chiar

K al-shek ha s pointed out: tl No matter how well aJ

advanced is science, and how correct an d ra tiona l i s ideolog:

science an d will remain a caput mortuum without tt

effective employment of both by a wholesome ,organizat, lon 1

Organizational 'warfare is devotedto

the us eof

organized pow

to crush the enemy I s organiza tion so as to dissolve i t fo r gOal

Just as it is necessary t o h av e well-knit organization of U

a rmed f or ce s in th e military operat ion, so it is in politic;

warfare .. Wherever the organized force ha s explored, that i

th e strategical point for political advancement. B

organization its elf is by no means perfunctory an d must 1

guided by strategy, preceded by ideological atta,ck ar

supported by mass movement.

the

were

since

wa.r'aims

th e cause

to tactics.

that leads to

is

!JV.L......L- <J.... belief,

are affected

warfare is the

...."" ....."",......"" the enemy

of

exhorted hi s senior

communism will dominate ..

warfare"

th e

I f success in ......., ~ .. vF . ,............". .. warfare is

commanders were as much concerned

where

from !J v ...... " ....... c.. J

VJl . 'o ; " " J . " '< J.. . . difference is

Warfare:

is shatter th e enemy I s

an d seek win ove:r the masses

ideas betwE!en two

conflict

the ' enemy is dE!feated at i ts r oo t

cause of. I . u . ~ : ; v ~ , V I : : : . . . L ' - ' C ; l . ...

2.

in th e last W'ar,

actual ..... Fi, ...." ......... of armed forces

officers to engage themselves

with

President

to commit u .... >J" . . ~ n . < : , . . . , so as to facilitate the realization

of .... "'Ju. .....' . "" ... bu t also that of

Communists seek a

democracies 'want a states where

by the enemy's

I t is this marked differEmce in

democratic ideas and tree way of life ca n be preserved, the

an d pen.

break i t s

th e

of

4. Psychological Warfare: Quite obviously, psychologic;

warfare is means other than mi li ta ry to subdile tht: enen

psychologically, causing i t s will to b re ak and i ts organlzatlC

to collapse. It is essential to political warfare. N e v e r t h e l e s ~the psychotogical wa r operation must also be guided by well

planned strategy, carried out ideological weapons, anI

and

to allied

be pnnnlrCT'O

"".L.A.,""""_"" i ts e lf i n the other

it sarfare

five of warfare When strategy

in t he c on du ct

in 1-'''' " warfare because often

with . larger

forces economic

- 4 -supported well-founded ~ a , " , - " . L ' - " ' ; : ; us e of Var IOUS \Va}

- 5 -



-1 - '

6. Mass Movement Warfare: Mass movement warfare is a.

basic factor in supporting the war-effort,a·tirl in winning the.wa.r.

Victory or defeat in wa r hinges on th e inclin<tlim! .... 1 . '. VI masses

and the development of th e war' situations. The main functIon or.

mass movement warfare i s to st ir up , to win

organize, a nd to lead the masses 'behind the ' e n ~ m y line to

under one's banner. T h u ~ one ca n destroy t he ' enemy' s

efficienc¥ and cripple the enemy in due c o u r s ~ of a'ction.

of tIle enemy on the one hand, and to prevent the s tea ling o r

leaking of secrets on the other. The loss of Chinese mainland

in 1949, it should be confessed, was largely du e to the failure

to know the enemy Is situations on th e of the National

Goverment of the Republic of China . Fo r t h is r ea so n, P re si de nt

Chiang Kai;...shek ha s specifically directed first

and collection of information foremost...." In-the world Of ,

' al l ma jor nat ions have their intelligence service. In ih e United

States, therE! are the Central I n t ~ l l i g e n c e A.gency and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, both of w h i ~ h are

esteemed intHUigence agencies. The collection and e Y ~ l u a t i o nof informationtoday has become a highly specialized science and

an art The end and aim of intelUience warfare ca n be summed

up as this: th e less the enemy knows one IS secret and themore

one knows the: enemy I s secrets , th e b e ~ t e r will be . The former

belongs to counter-intell igence, ' and, the latter to offensive

intelligence. Be it counter-intelligence or offensive intelligence

i t involves secrecy. Hence, inte l ligence warfare- is the covert

operation in th e whole fi'eld of political w ' ~ r f a r e .

remedy'

means

no way to

one kumys

a ~ ' t h o r i t i e s .

'collect valuable

facts and secrets

and scholars to take

one can

DSVcn010,IlH : a1 warfare

ormation had succE3ecled

1 . J . 1 . ~ . " " ' U ' V " " the center fo r the

welL one need not fear the,

In a war in

J.UIIUt'U.LC::a.I.o '=' action

had suffered s etbacks a t the

minds pf men. But before

S armed forces sla ck in the

as t o wage the

the enemy These facts

of w ~ r f a r e in the

As soon as U. S

the.

fo r

This i:::. one of t he mos t

the second World

the British

organizational tactics and Gropaganda

I , . ; U , V J . ' U l i t . . L I , . ; < ; ~ . L war opera tion can reach themasses

....a . u o J ...u.«O them

sa1<1. hi s monumen ta l War, l l I f

t he m is ta ke ,

the

Warfare:. As fa r back as 600 13 C., SUfr .

the. foremost world ever

5

means

one knows. oneself and the

cnlirg;re of t h , p i a n n h i ~ o f

Korean. War ill-

in

I n l c ~ ' m a t i o n 'and tJ S Office ~ o War

in

of

- 6 -



2 .. u aJ

- 9 -

in Czechoslova.kia and the Russian bloakade of Berlin, both in

1948. The Southeastern Asia TreatyOrganizcHion of 1 95 4 was'

intended to prevent the expansion of Chinese Communist influence

in this of' the world. On the Communist side, t he War saw

Pact of 955 was signed when Russ ia t r ied to tighten it s control

of Eastern European countries politically and • These

alliances were the evidence of diplomatic w a r f ~ , r e , which had

been waged between the two blocs. These last two types of

warfare, howev-er important, are not included because they can

e as il y bes ub summed unde r t he s ix e ss en ti al s of political

warfare. If the si x types are mastered, the theories ca n be

applied and extended to economic and diplomatic fields.

I t .goes without saying that political warfare and mil it ar y

warfare are closely related, but military warfare alone cannot

achieve sustained power a nd ensure ultimate victory. The

integration of t he se s ix types of warfare is the decisive fac

This is reflected in t he t hi nk ing of Karl Von Clauswitz of

Prussia, acknowledged as the father of modern strategical

study, when he asserted that "War is a continuation of 1l

I f war i s a body, then political warfare is thG soul of the

In modern tim€!s, wars were invariably total, to ta l in the sense

that all natural resources and manpower of a country were used

fo r war purposes. Pres iden t Chiang Kai-shek s statement that

today's wa r ~ a total wa r f ideological in nature, which centers

around militarypower everything. By ideological total

war, i t means but the si x types of warfare. When

employment of political means ha s reached the highest extent

that

other

of power

Economic

is a

because a strong

impose it s p o l i t i c a l ~countries

1.1'-'.1....".'-'"... warfare.

Western nations

or

on mass movementwarfare.

and

of the vUtUllUU1.J..l .;;:)

blocs have used economic power

new weapons The y

nations. While

is

a nation convince others that it s system

use economic ai d and assistance

ua ......v'u; ; , and win friends among

mentioned above are the s ~ and

warfare. To these one- may add t : "V l , l .UU l J .V

should also be

type of

economic

by

UUl lUl i . l . l l jL ,;;:)!- bloc useS economic power

which

th e

headed by th e Unit ed States ases eCOn()ffiJlC

nations their defences a . " , , , , , , . u . ~ " ' ~

warfare these two blocs i s s ti ll from

both sides .the p \u 'l od had used d ip loma ti c

each other The North Atlantic

democratic and

to tr y to

the neutralor

is

economy is able

have stressed

warfare

Therefore, ULJ . LLL J ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

movement warfare ensureS the

the battlefield of the army is that of t he air force is

th e and that of navy is the sea, lhe battlefield of

warfare is the of of masS



Political warfare, ' as c an be seen, plays the decis ive role

in the vic tory or defeat in a' war. Th e a n c ~ e n t Chinese saying

hasH that "The ~ l a n n i n g inside a tent determines the victory a

thousand Ii (each 11. is about one third of a mile) away." Herein

the planning in:sidea tent apparently ba s an overtone of political

warfare. Another Chinese sayingruns like this , "To subdue,

enemy without fighting, l:which simply means th e subjugation of

t he hos ti le forces through political weapons • President Chiang

Kai:-shek speaking of wa r efforts has re.peated ly stressed

"Thirty percent military a ~ seventy percent poli t ical , "Thir ty

percent in front of the enemy and seyenty percent in rear th e

enemy, an d lIThirty percent p hy si ca l and s ev en ty percent

psychical.!l Though the ratio of thirty to seventy is not,necessarily a pure mathematical. one, i t obviously indicates

that the political factor is more important than the milita;ry. The'

emphasis on the rear rather than the front o f th e enemy and on

t he p sych ical rather -th an t he p hy sic al s ~ d e is in the main

politicalinnature. The significance of political warfare, caq,not

be overstressed.

Generally speaking, the , na tu re o f wa r consists of two

factorsin operation,

the spirtnalan d the

materiaLThe f.ormer

includes politicalprincip t es and strategy and military d i s c i p l i ~ e san d etllics, which are essential to political warfare' . -The latter

includes economic resources , we'apons, and equipments,

are essentia.l to military warfare. ! twil l be difficuJt to achieve

victory in awar i f either factor is lacking. I f both ~ r wanting?

th e f o r c e ~ will surely be destroyed.

are

of

total war.

wa r can' be

end at any

Here are the

fixed ta ttle-

not

and bloodshed.

.,.t-.,"'o•.,t'l"l·n whereas

to

ca n

warfare

warfare

warfare

as f ron t and rear

military warfare,

the same

overall victory of wa r ..

such

should be

u. ...,.'-=,.... "" ., is th e

the

is ' largely 1 . 1 1 ' , " " U ' E > " " V " ' ~

I - 'V .u . . _L'- . ... warfare without ; : )u ,: ; .....,........ JE> a

and

in' terms of combatants, there are the requirements

conditions of frontline

There are

age, · se x

and the rear area production workers Besiaes t ~ . ehave the required uniforms equipm ents,

warfare there are no such· requirements.

terms of the nature of war,

to determine

are

close

Fourth or la st,

Political warfare and

won

However,

warrare has to go

c

time.

fo r the

in term

and demobilizat ion have their clear demarcation,

Hnes i while in I - 'V . lU . " ·L .... ~ ~ warfare

differences:

First i n t erm of spacEl,

front and rear; while

Warfare-Its Significance



conceived in political status and stimulated by political motives , '

and that w ar , t he re fo re , is "a political act. 11 He went on

further: ilWar is not merely a political ac t bu t also really a '

political a continuation of policy carried out by

other means. Il Thi,s marks the be-gin,ping of the conception of

modern political warfare. Since it s publicat ion in lB27 j

Clauswitz On War had received widespread at ten tion and ha6

had a t remendous impact on the Eolshevist!L

The by their o r ig in were a group or groups or

d i s g r u n t l ~ d persons with distinctive polit ical background. Since

then. they have cons id e red s trugg le a normal pattern and

themselves the vanguards of th e oppressed. wan t to go on

to fight against wha t t he y call the capitalistic, imperialistic

oppressors andt ry t o app ly the Marxist theory of class

in a world-wide scale. By adopting the basic concept d

,"constant struggle" with the annihilation of th e enemy as

objective, they have formulated the f ra nt ic i de a of l lBe my

friend or enemy" and "To destroy or be destroyed. II

regard ir. ' )s t h ighly the theory and practice of C lauswitz.

Marx, Friedrich Engels, Nikolai Len in , and many other Soviet

an d l1ilitary leaders had devoted themselves to the

study of Clauswitz 1 treatise 011 War with extreme enthusiasm,

Engels once cal led Clauswi tz lithe bright s tar in the sky. II

Lenin, in disregard of historical facts t anachro

nist ical ly considered Clauswit7 a }v1arxist and remarked that

C lauswltz in his writings had understood the Marxist

cpncermng· the intim8.te relationship between :vvar and

do

19th

war

means.

destroy

people

the

par

must be

a nd t he

should

with th e

made

in th e

wa r not

declared that liThe

ha s been transformed

actions, the whole

of total war effor t .

some

say,

and the armed f O : ' ~ e s are

• On t he o ne

,.." i<2.LllUU.Cl battlE ield and

nation have " " " ," t" " " ' -UJLUc<

time and

have become CUI l J :U .U l " ; a .

efforts sLould

the conditions

This is

and rae tors are both

different ways Things

and ar e not restricted time and

which are

can the re be

b e t w t ~ e n ciirilizedar

reverse is

war itself.

will

the enemy s lines

se a j on the other

In his treatise

Since Wor ld War I Gene.ral E r ic h F r ie dr ic h

the

necessary but

In a conflict, the

s

-12 - - 1 3 -



as to realize their object ives in aggression When Lenin read

the passage in the treatise On. War that a conqueror was always

llpeace-loving!! and hoped to march into the country subject to

invasion without bloodshed, he made special not at ions and

acclaimed it a brilliant passage, because Clauswitz, he said,

had expressed what w as in hi s qUnd. Therefore, when th e

Russians start a war, they usual ly have a slogan Which is II No

battle will be fought without the assurance of . !l.In

conquering an' enemy , as a rule will first to succeed in

poli t ical warfare before coll ec ting the spoils by th e military

power. In many places they need not resor t tpmilitary force

but employ such means as . strategy, oragnization, ~ g i t a t i o nand others to annihilate their enemy. They maintain and develop

their milita.r:y strength only as a support in their conquests

through poli ti cal means and fo r the purpose of attaining thei.r

final objective of aggression.

It is unfortunate that the freedom-loving countries of

worl d wer e b ela te dly b.ware of the s ignif icance of political

warfare" They began to comprehend gradually the implications

of the new environment which had arisen out the post-war years.

T he revolutions in technology had changed the arts of war. To

the growing arsenal of powerful new weapons begun with the

invention of the atomic bomb wa s added the hydrogen bomb _ a

bomb that could wipe out a whole city. Now development's such

as atomic-powered air and navy craft , atomic artillery ,guided

missiles that could cross oceans· arid continents, chemical

b iologica l , and radio logica l weapons , supersonic speed s, and

of

on

so

and

Boris

wa r and

t he same

actions t

minor

would

Russians would

• Therefore

in the extent

which was IJV,LLJ.>JL" '' ' ' '

to the use of

would

than

felt that the

No matter who ar e in power in

will be made to

likewise a continuation

continuation of politics As matter of

. ,UJLU1J. . . . . . .,e; w as n ot the sa.me asClauswitz I"

to ' the realm of international

ultima te end.

means

on IJ'J,..... ~ ' ........., on the part of

but that

every

difference

the conflict.

a

Quite he was -referring to the concept of

tha t IJv ..... "J•...,.... Droa.uC'en war and wa r w as t he m ea ns .to

of Lenin and his fCtllowers, there "vas no difference

Communists

expounaea thE' same idea more C:;J \o. jJ ,U," ' ;a , '...

was unnecessary

L en in h el d that wa r was the continuation

The t :HJ l f , JU ' a .OJ l ; : : l

Lenin asserted tha t the nucleus oC wa r was "" ......... '.",,'" and that

whilst wa r wa s a continuation of

' - t 4 -

the

between war and peace "

conc,eal their war in ten tions .

rather use IJV,U."\,.L ' -' ,,,, ... means 1:0 destroy their

actions

and other Communist leaders has affected Soviot

th e a..u ...a . ~ { U ! , U . 0 1 U between the V l J , U ~ : : L ! . I I I ! J

another means f peace

MikhaHovich

Soviet

front and

-15 -



talks .11 But peace in the eyes of !he Communists is bu t a con ..-

tinuation of war. employing math h '1'.e ns o. er t an illl Itary

Communists throughout the world are hoping to attain

the table whatthey cannot attain in the battlefield. I t is a lesson

that the Free World c an le arn f rom the dict.um of Lenin tha t

there is no difference between peace and'war. The era of peace

talks is nothing b u ~ a n era of prot racted st ruggle . High

had been pai d i n peace talks with ChineseComrnunists immedi

ately a.fte,r the last war, i n peace talks with North Koreans

Panmunjon, and presumably in peace ta lks with Hanoi. Peace

talks ha ve b ee n employe d by t he Communi st s as political

tactics.I t takes

t.hose specializedand exper ienced in political

warfare to ta lk p ea ce with the Commllnists. The study of

political warfare, both in theory and in practice, is therefore

al l th e more necessary and important judged from the

ence of the. past, demands of t he t ime, and. the the

-w-orld.

be

that

of po -

of so-called

. The future

in their theory

to

and

e,very

were

means. P r e p a r e d n e s ~ on al l

of space

Tn,.,,,..,·,, a,nd

as wide as, if not

forms and intensities. More

communication and transpor

science of war. Beyond

of the earthbound world arena

. It was fel t that warfare should be

Communism during the present nuclear

wars, and

of total

more attention will be given to the

warfare would

warfare in al l

Both Ludend orff

stalemate.

Utical

and

out er s pa ce , which

b ru sh -f ir e wa rs , of

the

other

fronts and alertness

attention

tation

reckoned w it h. T he

warfare '. The

belief seemed the

. The aim of warfare

without

thend it s

national and international

defence and survival of

Vietnam and

of sort armistice in Middle East,

world is now entering an er a of what h as b ee n ca ll ed "peace

--1 6· -

-17



- 1 8 -

Chaptor ]I .

Historical··lessons .

llWhile we read history I we make history. !l

-,.... G .. WIi Curtis •.

llHistory is philosophy teaching by examples .. tl

of Halicarassus ..

The pri=vious chapter is a general description of th e

meaning, the contents, and the significance of pQlitical W a r " ~

fare. A few faets have been presented for t he salte of theora;..tical ana!lysis, bu t no t in details . If one does not examine t he

theory of political warfare wlth detailed facts, he might be

misled info bel ieving thatpolitical warfare is a mere catchword.

Most of t h E ~ people of the world are still unfamiliar w it h t he

above-mentioned six of political warfare in which

have already engaged themsebres consciously or unconsciously.

It is the re fore neces sa ry to relate more historical facts

adequate analysis of them so as to help visualize the

learned in blood, to ~ i n d out bases fo r the principles of

ca l warfare, and to put int o effect to the ful le st extentthis

of crucial international struggle ..

There have been numerous facts and bit ter lessons involYed

with political warfare that one can learn f rom the is

regrettable that in t he decades of . ha rd s tr ug gl e aga in st

- 1 9 -



one of the most significant steps laken by the Communists in

their is what ha s been called "ideological conquestll.

The essense of "ideological conquest" is th e direct attack upon

~ h human mind as by Karl Marx and Nikolai Lenin . S ince

Mao Tse-tung i t through the publication of "New Demo-

,::racy" , t he COlnmunists I attempt to . c o n q ~ e r China

ideology had reached it s climax. 'Let us now discuss Marxism,

Leninism and Maoism one o·ne and call the bluff of t b e i l ~ re -

in

this im -ased

work

have no t

is an i nval uabl e document in

years Hence

warfa.re

is i t that

of political warfare has been

u.c/;!.u.OI.C'u . "' . Since President Chiang'

on J. . , :v ..

of IJv -

Kai--:-shek

China in

connection with this " "n ih ; . :....... '

a comp1lel:'€

Communists even the

and nature.

us take up Marxism first,

During the between the end of the nineteenth century

and the of the twentieth century, iv1arxism had been

glossed over it s followers as the ir re l igious scripture tinged

with deep mysticcolorse The youths who h ad not studied i t

carefully fell i nt o t he trap of the Communist propaganda and

mistook communism fo r a lofty ideal. That, of course, is a

fateful blunder f or a ll credu lous fanat ics even now. As Pres i

dent Chiang pointed ou t in hi s S01tiet Russia in

China, 'Thoughts on Communist sys tems began with Karl Marx

and Friedrich , had undergo considerable modifications

at the hands of Lenin. Lenin claimed that the OctoberH e Y o l u ~

Hon which succeeded in overthrowing the provisional go .:XI1-

ment an d replacing i t with a Soviet regime was conversion

of a democratic revolution the bourgeoisie into a social re

vOlution by th e proletariat". Lenin also lauded the sa'ld re

volution as Hth€3 emanciption of th e proletariat", which, to

him, was th e same as lithe emancipation of t he mas and.

tried to create the that the Bolsheviks to

many s tra

and

themselves in

the content::s of

historical

studie s one ca n realize that

In ancient

a.lso

the

extensive and th e

s indicated

warfare are

Communist Ideological

1•

victories. is both difficult and im-

" ' U . ' ~ " ' ' - L ' " ' ' ' ' al l such historical facts in this discussion.

is advisable select Communist of

fo r t r e a t m e n t ~ One instance lead to

The present writer that al l

their resources in the of

as are rww compelled to engage ourselves

in whether we like i t

facts are

1 , . 1 - ~ . l . > : > t . i : ) such as S untse,

others were well-known

And in

-- 20- - 21-



I t may be r ~ ~ c a l l e d that Communist Russia at first launched

it s aggression of Chi na t hr ough i deol og ic al i nf il tr at ion. . A

"Marxism Research I ns ti tu te " was s et up in China prior to the

inception of Chinese Communist Party. It attempted to change

the thinking of Chinese youths and intellectuals

initiate i tem in to the Communist fold. There were then some

naive persons who had been l ed by the nose. While

on the people I s livelihood of th e Three Principle-s of the Peo

pIe, Dr .. Sun Yat-senrefuted the fallacies of Marx ism" It was

a substantial evidence that during hi s lifetime Dr .. S un had al

ready waged an ideological war agains t _the Communists.

Leninism we s also known as Bolshevism. Acc ording

Joseph Sta lin and his followers, Leninism was the

phase of Marxism the_product of Marxism when

the Russian Revolution.' By ana lysing the se words of

and hi s follow€!rs , one can ,see that the' strate5 ea l eharae -

Next, le t us take up Leninism"

absolutely reactionary direction.When he witne SSWi. th e A U " ~ ~ ' . A ~in the B ri ti sh s oc ia l r el at io ns , he deemed it necessary

to overthrow capitalism. If allowed to continue, the situation

could only become more aggregating. ~ u c h thinking on hi s part

was largely due to t he bel ie f t ha t cap it al ism was re

fo r al l soaial evilsex.isting at hiS time t view s as such were

fully reflected .in hi s work On Capital an d led him toward the

reactionary l i n ~ * He perceived only the pathological rather

than the physiological aspect of so ci et y. T hat was hi s

thoughts had ru n the J;'isk of leading the reactionary bloc to the

destruction of the whole world.

r;o to an

increased

In

elopm,ent of

ideo-"" ...."" \ 'H l 'N which

of

th e of

th e pre-

The

Marxism

the social ills in " - ' J . j ' ~ . t " " ' . u . u and the

which himondition of

i t is

proCl.ucea such a

In order to understand

, - , a , ' j J A . ' ~ Q , , & , J . ; ; ; : " ' U had caused t h E ~ European coun t ri es to

p r ' e c ~ e a l : m t ; e a . .... u " " ' J . J . ~ < ; ; O in economy. rich became richer

ahd th e poor poorer as an old Chinese goes:

own miles While the destitute own

HV"U.A.Ul\I f at aU;;P Under sUlch circumstances various branches of

" U . \ J ' ' ' ' ~ ' ! . . l U . ; ; ; ) spraQ.g up . This accounted fo r the

i d e ~ s on hand and t ha t of socialism on the other. Be-

doubt the sa had exerted influence

one encounters

comnlUfLism and one nn ,rI 0'" "'1"

diction of Marx did no t come true

ItC!<: :1._i" ' l i l " " I "Oy, t in tide of democratic revolutions which

m Q T ' I I " " ~ at the time .. It s and aim was to

democratic and to

These invaluable remarks made

the s most n .... '''' . . . . . ' ' ' '

that communism was the of the world

social ideals. As a matter of Marxism was at it s very

outset a which had 'made it s

-22 - - 23--



Likewise, Lenin s concept of world revolution also came

from Marxism. When discussing Leninism, Joseph Stalin stated'

that th e concept had it s basis on thedevelopment of internation

al reali t ies and was not pecul larto Russia only. He went on to

s ay t ha t since Lenin was a typical Marxist, hi s Weltanschauung

was beyond doubt Marxistic. As Marx thoug.ht of capitalism as anational phenomenon and predicted that the Communist· r e v o l u ~-Han would proceed fr:om one country to another, Lenin, in

order ~ find an excuse fo r wor ld revolut ion and at the s a 1 ~ l e

time to cover up the pan -S lav ism based lipon' th e "Russian

spirito labelled capitalism as a wor ld-wi de s ys tem of

perialism ll, and calle-d fo r the overthrow of this systein through

the movements of Communist revolution in countr ies capita lis t

- 2 5 -

Marx ism? The answer is that Lenin, havmg taken hi s cue from

Marxism, substituted the Russian fo r German spiri t . In adapting

Marxist communism to Russia, Lenin left unchanged it s

general philosophical and theoretical bases 1 but decisively

altered Marx l s concept of communism as a strategyachieving the proletarian revolution. Leninism was the system

of Marxist communism as it had been modified and adapted by

Lenin to the requirement of revolution in Russiaand elsewhere.

Take the concept of "class" fo r example. Marx had only rough

ly divided the proletariat f rom the capitalist class , and advo

ca ted " th e dictatorship ()f the proletariat ll • . I n f 1 u ~ n c e d by th e

Tsarist despotism, Lenin went further to dlv ide the proletariat

i nt o t he progressive, the awakened 1 the backward,and the u n . awakened, an d replacedthe dictatorship of the proletariat by

the dictatorship of the Communist Party, which finally became

virtually "one-man dictatorship".

of

from

must

of the

a matter

Marxism,

factor is

than those of

of Com-

from Marxism

Marxism as a tool

Tsarist

may have

in n a t u r e ~on which the Marx s

the human mind is

believe that Marxism is

is it that Lenin s

from

characteristic s that Leninism

made

Leninism.

even. more

of the world

wa s based was

Leninism is nothing but a mixture of sadistic

and insatiable exapnsionism.

of

the

it inherited the Russian

and al l the characterIstic s

and terrorism handed down

this is

it s followers

_ .What ar e th e

been

In the hands of .....""u ...1 . 1 . .

xism

the c o : n c ! ~ n t of world of the

Marxist of class struggle, worldrevolution and

cal conquest is the main Mar-

IJ . JCO ' \ , c u . from Marxism?

On the one

Th.en what is Leninism? In brier, is

which with dialectic

th e

reasons fo r the worldwide cata:stI'oplhe

made clear at the outs,et is that th e most

made

of Leninism

Marxi sm . Tho se

theorie soften



Leninism began to barge into China in 1923 when the Kuo

mintang , the ruling party, adopted the policy of alignment with

Russia and t ak ing in Chinese Communists as party members e

Fully aware of Lenin I s underhand intrigues of.ideological in

f i l t rat ion,Dr. Sun Yat-sen made i t clear in a joint statement

with Adolf J,offe, an envoy sent by the Russian government,

issued on January 23, 1923 that:

understand these does not ,understand at

al l Marxism and mordern scientific soc

ialism. It

This serves as a footnote to and explains the n a t u r ~Lenin I s p o l i t i c ~ l chicanery. In order to "defeat the powerful

enemy", the Coo'lfnunists would employ every means available

without asking whether it is right or wrong, ethical orunethlca.l,

If this be a "principle", is .there any grain of "truth" in it ?

to

meet

areas

no

Marxism

enemy it

there

necessary to take advan-

€lXert the bes t effort pos

the us e of al l (DeanS

liTo defeat the

So that

sible

Meanwhile it

Suffice say that i t ha s been derived from Mar-

hi s the Problems of Leninism" Stalin ha(l,...thi5 to

Lenin's

;:at and shed blood f or t he c au se . F or f ea r

out that Leninism was·the i:11J1J.L.I·'-'i:1 Lo, l ,VU

condi tion under th e specific c ircumstances

Russia.

""J.•u. ,......,,"'- of Lenin's

" , n ~ ' T ' c . n no words

say:

e ~ a b o T a t e

would

As

.Stalin

" D r ~ SUl l Yat-sen holds that the Com

munistic o rd er o r even the Soviet system

cannot actually be introduced into China 9

because there do not ex is t he re the con

ditions fo r the successful establishment

of e i ~ h e r communism or Sovietism. II

be it even thehatever

smallest, enemy through the most

most attentive, most care -

ful and utilize

the clashes among the

list cla.sses different countries, and

tage

This statement dealt a havey blow on the attempt to in

troduce Leninism into ChLl1a.

Fu rt he r , l et us take up the so--cal led "New democracy. II

and

kinds or groups of

any country

of all ies

, be it the smallestse

secure the

among

these allies'may be tem-ven

porary,

and conditional. does not

The so-called "New Democracy" is a stratagem rat.her than

a theory. It is a pli:.w. fo r the Communist insurrection on the

-1.7 -



Mao as full aware of hi s critical situation 's when cornered

in the d <;:avern in Shen si , th e northwe stern province of

China. During war against LJapan which gave him a breathing

Now, why doe .s Mao cloak Marxism and Leninism

under the flNew Democracy? II The reason is quite s impl e: t he

seizure of power. As is wel l-known, China does nC't

have the conditions fo r Marxism and Leninism; and meanwhile,

th e h i sto ri c al t r ad i tion, cu ltu ra l he ri t age and social order of

China are entirely incompatible with what Marx an d Lenin have

predicted. Ther ef or e, eve r since Gregori Voitinsky , ch ief of

th e Eastern Division of th e Cori1munist International underLenin

and Chen Tu-hsiu. the main architect of Chinese Communist

Party, se t up the lltvlarxism Research Institute II in China

1920, till Mao released hi s pamphlet , the "New Democracy" ,

in 1 neither Marxism no r Leninism had in t h e ~ e tW0 de

cades found any suppor t f rom th e Chinese people .. As a matter

of J\·larxism an d Leninism as peddled by th e Chinese Com

munists were re je c ted everywhe re . In th e vast ter r i tory of

Chinfl there have been places where the Communists could

engage themselves in c landes ti ne deal ings and have "room to

turn around", bu t they could find no more base fo r movement

and beaded into a blind al ley after the long siege by the govern

ment in 934. Had i t no t been f or th e Japanese aggres-

sion of China Mao 5e-tung and hi s followers wou ld have

perished long ago.

"New Democracy!' is bu t a scheme to push a c r o ~ s th e united

front.

a

of

Mao

discre-

order to

across hi s

be u s e l e s ~

the so-called

the northern

entitled

Affairs C om

stated: "Mao Tse-

for the sol e purpo se

and Lenin.

same time, he

him se i f in th e

down three different tenors:

Ame:ricans can telL

with

alldifferent ll • The same ... ~ , ~ ~ ..... went on:

comml.mism

is

I S line

function is to se t forth a " , ~ " " r ....... fo r actions more suitable

or last the tenor to ease the anti-Com

communism in the sweete st

same time to it s

Such. an made the U.S. is correct .

The first herein exposes th e tlNew bu t a

o.f Marxism and Len in ism. The second and the third

third reveal th e

munist sentiments

resources and

to realities.- Thus

tenor of orthodox communism second tenor of the

st to lead the way fo r the Com-

J U U ~ l l J . . ' : : > l - ; : ' to seize th e al l available

"Communism

Marxists. It is

to

- 29-



2. "Peaceful Coexistence"

- Tactics in Communist St rategi ca I Warfare

"New Democracy'! - - commUllism - - made it s appearance and

that the members of the "four classes" c ou ld o nl y repent "in

dust an d ashes tl• This is indeed too s ad f or t e a r s ~

began to realize that in an era of the·

Chinese and were in in favor of

way of life and t ha t the best waywasto c l o a k ~ A a r x -ism and d,emocracy. Hence he advanced the

"New with vi ew to the

both at home and a br oa d. T his is a well-known pro-

p a ~ a . l . 1 . a device called trant:iference. To cover communism

of their ba si cn point ing out the Communist s I

s tr at egy P r es id en t Chiang sa id .

By strategy we mean here pOlitical is to

conceal one 's real intent ion and to pretend to meet the sire

of the opponent so as to cause him to commi.t mistakes an d rea

lize one I s political schemes.

with

to win

for his programs. Thus addition to

he crowm,ed it the word intlrder to

those young students and the democrat ic groups and

the time. Mao 1 s 1 that

" , a J L n . ~ . H F ; about was de -

Mao tried to attract the Chinese adherents

words which had a positive

After meeting with reverses in war

the Communists always turn around and

as k fo r peaceful coexistence • Upon re

gaining strength, they break off negotia

tions and resort to insurrection again"

While negotiating peace, they. rnake -secret

s for a rmed revolts . In their dialec-

ti c s, this is what is tueant llunity in

contradict ions!1 and 11 shifts of things il l

oppositionsH• Therefore, in combatting

Communists, we must understand their

military thinking al1d rhythm of actions lola-

fore we can tell whether ou r st rate

gy ;3..nd tactics have been correct . From.

ou r th ir t y years of experience in dealing

of

He

also economic

he advanced was

Chinese

" ' U " V . " . L \ . , u . ~ bulwark of

so-called

the hands of

chaoe: The

wha t he called "four clas

w o r k € ~ r s , pear-ants 1 small and national

won the f i r ~ J t round

debacle when al l adherents of Mao IS

fell into than the

and tha t

becuase it ",,,,mT""";

V U ' . ~ H 1 . U . A J l l : { wa s divided and then broken

The entire rhainland

the Communists

intellectual circles wa s

ses":

workers and peasants wa s

claim tha t the

- 31-



Since the adopted the polley of aligning with

Russia and admitting Chinese Communi st s i nto th e , th e

Communist elements immediately seized the control of the De.-,

partment 01 Organization and other pa rty organs , and manipula-

te d the Federation of Unions and it s branches in

districts. The y went further to label the Kuomintang mq-;mbers

as lithe left ists", lithe rightists" and nthe neutralists"" In or

de r to drive a wedge between th e various factions of the Party ,

they shouted the slogan: !I al l revolut ionaries to th e

left". Shortly after the ret.urn ofMichael Borodin. ,ine Russian

emissary, to i\/Ioscow, Kissanka , h ead of the Russianrnilitary

rnissjon, doggedly the defeatist thoughts among

sulates in China, and return to China the Russian portions at

the Indemnitv Funds. What is more, the' Soviet Government111 .' t

also would return to-the Chinese people, without demanding any

kind of compensa t ion , the Chinese Eastern Railway'in M a n c h u r i a ~Such a gesture wa s indeed a tour de force the Com

munist s tr a te g ic a l wa rf ar e. In thG meantime, the Chinese

Communists took steps to t he Kuomint ang as individuals

upon the order of th e Kremlin. In hi s memorandum 1, i Ta-:

chao, one of. the founders of the Chinese Communist

behalf of those who j oi ne d t he Kuomi nt an g, saidin part

"Therefore, it is necessary that we join this Party Kuo

'''''''''''-''"',:;1 and allow ourselves to be organizedinto one t eam so

that in coordinated steps we ca n t a k f ~ in ou r National Re

volution und er D r e Su n Yat-sen I s leadership and t he uni fi ed

discipline of ou r Party.. II

Hence, their plots ofinfiltration and 'subversion were ent i rely covered Upe

to

in

war-

ou t in -

the fact

it s first

cover. Its

and still less

under varlOUS

Russian com-

UVJJJ . . . . . . . .u 'UF ; or-

and to create the

s ta ti oned i n Russian con-

under

coexistence between

warfare

of dialectic s and t ake

their

a

for decent human

from 924 to 1927 Aware

the in

and subversion, I t then tried

masses th rough the

this , the Russian Communist

cover up their ugly face

attitude

J , .CJ ,JU . ' ; : lHJ• .., towards Chinat

to renounce al l financial burdens im-

was to se t

full grasp

terror in the course of China I s nationalrevolution and

Soviet Russia

From the above i t ca n be seen tha t the

the Communists is based upon materialistic

with the C o ~ m u n i s t s we have learned

first of al l their

. The Communist

China dates back to 924. As

the first

tried

come forth with

declaration of

it s

onthe Chine se

war

gans and to stir up

that communism wa s

suitable to th e Chinese climate this off:-:hoot

munism in it s formative had to

filtration

- 32- - 3 3 -



Upon Stalin I s directive, th e Chinese Communists issued on

A ~ g u s t I, 1 a d e c l a r a t ~ o n from t he ir h id e- ou t, Mao-erh..,.

kai , p ropo si ng t ha t a n IIAnti-tJapanese United Front of th e

People" be formed and demanding tha t a so-called s

Col;tlition Government" be established. On 5, 936, the

Chinese Communists again issued a circular

fo r cessation of in terna l hos ti l it ies and holding of peace nego-

When encircled during the fifth campaign launched by the

government forces, the Chinese Communists had come to the

end of their tether, mI"litarily speaking.. The remnants

in small groups to th e inland province of Shensi in the North':"

west. On seeing that their military actions could only meet ut..;,

te r failure, the Communis ts brewed up new plots . I t happened

that the Communist International 's Seventh Congress was held

in Moscow sometime between July and August of 1935, during

which, Georgi Dimitrov, in hi s report on th e llUnited Front ll,

suggested that a " c o m p l ~ e h e n s i v e anti-Japanese and anti-Imper:

ialist United Front ll b e f ormed i n China.. As this Stalin l s

p.olicy decision, i t became a Cangre S8 resolution as a matter of

course and on this th e Chinese Communists based their subse

quent actions. As we can see la ter , this suggestion made at

the time proved to be th e most treacherous an d hideous

ever worked out b y Russian and Chinese Communist s hand in

hand.

foreign a gg re ss io n. F irm adherence to this policy contributed

much to th e success, in the strategical sense, of the fifth

major campaign of the government fo rce s agains t th e

Chinese Communists.

th e

th e

con-

forces

herself

Inci

indicated

Academy

the

th e !!Nan-

because th e

with

up further up

t he Kuo -

res1

their

forces.

urban areas ..

f re edom cou ld made secure ..

Chinese Eastern was set-

Government decided

Government in

!llocal incident ll, China still

warfare

The Chi ne s e Eastern

lVII'''-'''''''" Incident of 1

fires, had

th e

Communists

in Canton and

directed th e Chinese Communists to

undert ake an a ll ou t purge of Communists from the Par ty .

tied tenlOClya:I'l

between th e R

tinued

dent of

th e officer s arid

Chinese

that the then

th e Nationalist armed forces "would certainly result in failure " ..

And :when the forces advanced to

Chinese Communistsformented th e

and Hankow.

subversive activities were

-35 -



in '

of

I n

ac ti vitie s.hinese Communists Ihe way fo r

ment and inf lu ence the united States I policy on China

violation

Furthermore,

Urianghai.

ternational,

th e Chinese Government.. On th e

, they sigaed a neutra l ity pact with

and reCOilD,lzea the Japanese-manufactured

f)f th e previously signed with

invaded Outer Mongolia and ..~ u . ' L \ . ' . J ' > . ' C, t hrough the efforts of the

their utmost to defame the Chinese

intrigue

Russian

into

the

of

as

Kai-shek orders

and to have

and

soviets and have them

four

. .Afternumerous talks, th e Chinese Communists

local r;:o'veJrnrnerlts

the National

Generalissimo

to abolish th e "Red

4

ment:

abide

tiations

a C C A ! n t ~ H i th e

, and, the i r

to dealing with th e Nationa.l

to .... ~ : ; H l _ . J . l . i ~ against the Japanese" II Time andpansion,

On the part of th e Chinese Communists they had all

regarded th e Sino-Japanese war as lithe best

build up their strength 1I . The policy they had laLi down

th e war was devote 7000 1of their effort to their own ex-

18th and the so-call 'ed N ' F t l Rw our.1 out.e

disobeyed orders and. acted on their own to attack "'''' . rr. , ....''

forces, thereby undermining the war e ffo rt s

The funds appropriated to them fo r their army by t"he National

Government had b ee n u sed the Communists as subsidies to

their front and other civic and cultu't l i l\ lQits un

der the i r control to undermine th e national ~ t y , to split th e

anti-Japanese wa r c amps a nd t o support thgirac t imie s of

paganda, inf.iltration and s ubver sion 9

as a

con-

a non-

coexlst-

ussia pro

The Marco

Rus::;ia. On

Russia as their

succeeded Yen

hJ.L1.1 .U-VCHJCHJ.< : : 58 on

and their

to Moscow with

the Chinese CommunIsts

the than

accelerated

t he s ame year China and Russia

Once Sovi et Huss ia

China under the

to an d

the Government

drive, with China I

In the October

In th e of 1945, at th e YaHa Conrt::rence attended

the United S tat e s, G rea t B l'itain and Sov ie t Russia, Stalin

seized China I s in Outer an d up

Communists

as covers fo re

l issia and the

ollaboration

used such

,ang CUlll"""Ii!.

- 37 -



Upon receipt of Japan IS decl&.rat ion of surrender f the

National :rvli.litary C o u n ~ i l of the Chinese Government immediately

instructed all armed forces in t he coun try to await orders per

taining to theacc:eptance of surrender in accordance with Allied

agreements. In an order to t he 18th Group Army of the.Com

munists, th e Council specifically ins truc ted al l it s units to re.:..

main where they were until further ordLrs; an d fox those com

mitted to combat operation 8 , to abide by orders of their

respect ive war area c:::>mmanders. Under no circumstances

were they to make any unauthorized move 4 Bul the Communis ts

flatly disobeyed the Council's order , and Chu Teh, in the name

of"Yenan Headqua r te r s! ', i s sued on August 10 "Seven Orders

of the , directing Communist forces in various places to

resort to all-out violence. On Aug ust 17 , t he Chinese Com

mun is ts , i n the name of Chu Teh, presented a $et of siJt. de.

mands to t.ne Gov ernment . Th e purpOSe behind Chu Teh s

"Seven Ordersof th e Day'l and the si x demands was extrem

clear. Militarily, the Communists were to take free a c t i o n ~ to

disarm th e Japanese and their puppet troops, and to OCC,1.py

of August 9, which was only one day before Japan I s offer to

surrender. Russian Red Army entered the nor theastern pro

vinces and the provinces of Jehol and Chahar only t h r e ~ days

before the Japan,ese laid down thei r a rms . However , t he Allied

H e a d q u a r t ~ r s assigned to Soviet Russia ~ h duty of accepting

th e surrender of Japanese troops in t he northeastern provinces..

This initiated a new phase in Russia! s aggression against China

and in the Communists I subversion agajnst th e Chinese Govern

ment i n t he post-,war period.

war-

on'the

engineered

v p ' a ~ , " " U ' u . a , materials by

th e

the Communist

as

the ir fe l low-travel lers

the Chinese Government of II

...." '.. n<: ' r1 as i l lustrationsiare.

The last of strategical warfare the Com-

continent wa s dated from 949.

On when Japan announced unconditional

th e China area surren-

der covered the mainland it s

and lndo-Chinal north of th e 6th

north should be noted that 8, ~ o v i e tRussia declared that a state of wa r with would exist as

warn and in the United States send-

; : ) U I . J Y , J . . J . ~ ' i : ) to This worldwide Communist con-

"'ro, ...."',,,",,,' had about t remendous di ff icul ties China's

and domes tic affairs in the last

wa'r and the init ial after V-J Al l these may be

the Communists

States in ...."'''' .... ,,., .... i'i:

China s administrative in th e Northeastern provinces,

In th e June of the same year, when China and ;:;;oviat Russia

were a friendship alliance th e Peace

Shunhua in the northern of Shensi

""'.... ,...vi;n 4:lI, upon Communi:51 instigation th e

...... l ' lni ' v seat, and a t t a c k E ~ d the the

meantime Communist forces in eastern and western parts of

U . ~ , I ' I . J . C l . U . ~ and in southern. and northern of

apart from each renewed th(;jir

t here ., S uch incidents

- 3 8 - -39 -



In the December of 1946, th e Unit ed States announced. the

termination of it s mediation effort in C hina and shortly ?tfter=

wards General Marshall, the special envoy, left fo r home

Whereupon, the Chinese Communists rose in open ::rebelli.on ,.

Nevertheless in the following year both Sov'iet Russia and

the Chinese Communists had directly and indirectly kept on

asking the Chinese Governmen t t o t al k p ea ce . Owing to hi s

longtime experience in dealing with the Russian Communists,

President Chiang Kai-shek had discerned the· motive behind:

directives fo r the Chinese Communists to subvert the National

Government had been exposed. Th e atrocities committed

the Russian Red Army against the Chinese people· in the

northeastern p rovinces canno t be overstressed.. On

negative s ide , S ta lin sought to disrupt China I s relations

the United States; on the pos it iv e s id e,h e a t t e m p ~ ~ d

to manChina's f or eig n a nd domestic policies, hoping to turn

the Chll lese Government f rom neutrality to i solation and

to make China a satellite of Russia,. As the-""-

Communists, despite lithe" basic polky on peaceful national ::re-

constructions" and the. "minutes conversations" with the

Government delegates, they [nade use of their front

Hon , th e "Democratic Alliance}' as a tool to plot internald1s-

sention and d is rupt ion. § in ce the l\1ay of 1 , t he Chinese

Communist forces, in response to their military operations in

the Northeast, launched offensive in Jehol, Chahal', Hop,ei, and

Shantung provinces, violatingthe ceasefire agreement arranged

the United States. By this t ime t he Chinese Communist re-

bellion erupted everyw here l ik e bush fire s .

with the

into the

moves with

as

d e . l e Q - a U ~ S and the

of which

< a . ~ Q . . " ' ~ O ~ the Gove::rn-

their . 111 ........ '''''''"''''

communication

the Government

Chaha r and ' _ . , .u" . "

Ul:;;.Ult:l,llU.Ul/:f. the formation of a "coalition

A ~ " " " " " ' , " ' C J I , . despite a of

wa s in existence two

her

, Chaha-r and the and

provinces and

areas of contrCtl and enable them

then

meul

cratization. Al l these the C,)mmunist orr,rHr"r_

Government renewed

talks with find a formula

home .. On October the

ment"

this t i m ~ ~ , both the Russian and Chinese Com-

.u..,'u"",......... still b c ~ h i n d the mask of coexiste-

of and Alliance of

a desire to

Soviet Russia,

I J " ' ..........."""" ........ warfare and

m ~ e ' areas and

--40 ---4 1



The Third In ternat ional is,W fact the Communist Inte.r-t t

nitional, or fo r short, th e "Gominun:"n U • Leftin (If?n!'talJUY Md

something else in mind when he gave the name the Third Inter

national. Since Marx organized the Firs t Internatioftal and

Karl J. Kautsky the Second International 1 Lenin na"ned th e

Communist International as the ThirdInternational to show that

he fol lowed the orthodox line of Marx.. It should recalltld

that as early as April, 1927 when expelled. from Ge:rman.l t£>

Russia, under poli ce surveil lance on a traint

Lenin maPt>ed Ollt

h i s so -ca ll ed "polotical platform" r in which he called fo r the.

setting up, of a new international organization to put i nto prac

t ise wha t h e called the hworld-wide proletarian retrolutionu s

By t he time he seized th e power after th e October Revolution,

Lenin claimed barefacedly that the Bolsheviks had fo r th e world

revolution established a central base. In hi s ambition to com

munize the world, urged al l the Communis t "fol lowers in

Western European countries to start a ser ies ofbloddy up

r i s i ~ g s fo r the purpose of grabbing political power in their

respect ive countr ies so as to support th e "Soviet Regir,e ll in

R u s ~ i a . However , a ll t he se urpisings ended in failure.. And

so in March 1 19 , through his intensive prepartions, th e Third

International was formally established in Moscow .. As a matter

of fact , the new only wiped out t he Second lnter-

-43

Fi rs t of all 1 le t us study th e Third Inte.rnational

flowering and ~ a r k s th e beginning of Communists' SUbjugation

of the people.. In studying the Communists t diabolism1 o . n ~ h a sto see through the ir organizational warff..re.a

have

it s

warfare

number of

t he f al l of

realize in

warfare as

the Chinese

of

time confounded

warfare,

favor of th e

th e enemv s st ra-

which led

China fai led

c ;>.u . ...""."'"J!,vu are

Their actions

of the

an d

,...,....Ol"'\lrDn, China

O m t m \ l m l S t - a ' O m l W t : i L ~ ~ U coaHion crn ' ro ....nm"'n

hastened th e

to mediate an d it s consequences. Had Soviet"

and

.Lu<:;;v . Vlt'. ... ' - < . ~ . conquest, organization

th e Communists.

...struggle a.head o m ha s to be wary

warfare

The above are

warfare on the other .. It is also hoped that in th e anti-Como.

3 ree Geat W e ~ o n s f 1

in Comnunist Organizational reo

th e mainland in 949. In repeating these historical

the present writer wants to point out th e wickedness in

the Communis t warf ar e aga in st th e democratic

countries on th e on e hand, and th e

Communist3

t ime tha t had fallen i nt o t he trap of

se t th e Russian and Chinese " ' - ' \ . . IUIJlUU'U ... """.. .....

ChineS€ ........,""..... ~ " the Communists

freedom and

, s mediation offer been

way of a.

second Poland as al!i, in 1947 ..

leader the Russia.n

t ab le t ha t th e American friends



Moscow wa s designated a s it s permanent site, the

Third International, when organized by Lenin, did, take on

more or less an international complexion. After the death

Lenin, when Stalin succeeded , the Third In ternational was

longer in ternational , having been r e ~ u c e d to be a tool of the

dictator with it s chairman appointed or deposed at w i l l ~ It s

leaders such l;lS Zinoviev a nd N ikol ai Bukharin were execu ted

by th e order of Stalin. Those in charge of th e branches of the

Third In ternational in va rious coun t ri e s h ad in turn become

Stalin I s a nd b on afid e traitors to the ir re spect ive

the idea of employing the raovement: of national salvat ion in the

East to strike the western countries" Then h e decided on the

use of an indirect approach to carry out hi s world r e v o l u t i o n ~

As a result of t he c ha ng e in t hin ki ng t Lenin had tried hi s

best to extend hi s tentacles to the East s At the Second

Congress" of th!3 Third Int erna ti onal i n 1928, t he nCommittee

on Nat iona li sm and Co loni al ism II and the lIEastern Division l!

were formed under the Th ird Int e rna ti ona l r es po ns ib le f or

'formenting th e !lanti-imperialist movements!lamong the OriE::ntal

peoples. Besides, an Eastern University and a Labor Univer-

were established i n Moscow, wit h t he express purpose of

training student from Asia and the Far East so as to h av e t he

branches of the Third International se t up in various countr ies

through the .ideological \<conquest of these trainees c This is abrief account oJ how Lenin began to wage an

warfare agains t the free warid through the Third International

he hlmeself had organized.

line a

conceived

called

to Soviet Russia

under the banner "Proletariat

t he Communi st s an

been

t r ies

the Third International

one of it s rounders had the

establishment of th e Third Internationalin 19 an international

come in1 . However did

materialize Lenin I s intervention

the t ime, Lenin concen t rated h is at ten tion

to start the world con-

revolution, 'andtherefore the Third International laid

the industrializE!dWe,st United States

When stablished' in

it s comrades claim ed: the

This indicated th e

Communists' as Com-

failed one another, i t

those highly industrialized coun-

too weak to its Marxist

vvorld revolution wa s dissolved in the Lenin

< l o f ' r ' Q r Y ~ n f ' to break he tu rn ed h is ey e the

National in

down or-

- 45



fatherlands. This was confirmed the fact that

th e Third International wa s dissolved Stalin in 943 f

al l the Communists the world had been under the

direct control of their comrades in Moscow is th e true

characteristic of the Third International..

L i L i- sa n and others ; the Germany branch byKao Yu-han p Chu

Teh and o ther s; . t he R l issia branch by Chu Chiu-pei and others

"By such wide spread network, ' there could be no doubt that

Voitinsky had se t the Communist o rg an iz atio na l p atte rn fo r

China on a world-wide baS1:'5. I t vias indeed a Chinese

munist International in miniature 0

Now, le t us se e how the Chinese Communist Party came to

be e s t a b l i s h e d ~

Soon after the establishment of the "Marxism Rese ar ch In

stitute ", the "Chinese Socialist Youth Corps" wa s also org.an

ized i n t he Augus t of th e same y ea r f or t he pur pose of

more youths as membe rs an d s en din g them to theEastern Uni

versity in Moscow to undergo fu r the r t rain ing . In the Septem

ber, Chen Tu-hsiu, as directed by Voitinsky, called into order

th e "preparatory Committee of th e Formation of the Chinese

Communist Partyll 0 He a ls o a cc ep ted Voitinsky f s invitation to

visit. \<10 scow. And so th e Thirdtxl ternat ional had laid the

foundat ion-s tone in it s organizat ional work and spread th e

Comrnunist s eeds i n China.

L i Ta-chao ,ranchi Han-chun and others; the

The inclJrsionof th e Thi:rd I n t e ' t ' ~ a . t i o n a l into China

back t o the ot 1920 when th e "Marxism Research Institute"

wa s set. up.. • chief Eastern

Division of the International the institute itself in

academic organizing the

various in It s sponsors and active members in -

c luded Chen Tu-hsiu Shen Hsuan-lu, Chou Fu-hai Shao Li-

ts e Li Li Ta-chao

tao Shen and I t

wa s located at No.. Yu Lane, Avenue Joffre in the

French Concession of Shanghai. Since it s establishment, the

institute had se t up branches in various both at home

and abroad, to contact with it s young The

u.GUF,' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' branch wa s headed Chen Tu-hsiu

Upon hi s arr ival wHb Voi ti ns ky i n Moscow, Chen Tu-hsiu

wa s il troduced to se e Leon Trotsky, th e Russian leader 1 who

urged him to organize the Communis tParty in China an d invited

him to the Third Iriternational. Chen consente@ an d recei -

ved a allowance of U. S . ,000 fo r activities.. In

the of 1921 , Chen returned to China, accompanied by G"

Maring Secretary of the "Cbnunittee Oi l Nationalismn-lai ,

branch wa s

Shen Hsuart-lu

f 'rance branchhal;eaded

Li u and others; the Shansi branch

and others; the Shantung branch Hsu-

and others; the branch

chi u and others th e Hunan branch Mao Tse-

tung and the

Pal and others; and the branch

and others . In th e overSgeLS areas the

46- - 47-



Government. If weve can realize that t.he

ltthree Tse-tung were tactics

in warfare.

with the Communists.. Such tactics obviously had yielded 1'e-

sults r Most of the C h i n e s ~ people, cowed by -the Communist

atrocities or enticed by their sweet talks, were compelled to

take a fatalistic point of v iew and II go with the stream ", so to

speak.. The Government forces fighting in the southwest am;l

northwes t were rendered helpless.. And the Chinese Govern

ment had to abandon the mainland and move to Taiwan in 1 9 5 0 ~

the

em-

attributable

but the

Of cour se there were

their rebellion

the

than those ::stated above

force

was

the Communist seizure of

most crucial

overran the Chine se mainl and in

- Tactics in Communist Psychological Warfare.

Both the Russian . and Chinese Communists are specialized

in the art of psychological warfare, a type of warfare with hu

man ~ i n d s as i t s ba t tle fie ld . To strike their enemy

gically, the Comnll'mfsts have made a penetrating analysis ,-,f

human weaknesses. By E'xpoiting these w e a k n e ~ s e s , they ha

tr ied to keep the under controL. The political witchcraft

4. Temptation' and intimidation

Organizations are largely exclusive in nature, and ar e

of u se in the political struggle. The Chinese Communist Party

at the t ime of it s formation was too small an organization to

deser"9"e mention. It was not supported by the Chinese people.

But through it s tactical maneuver8, th e Party had ever reor

ganized and expanded i ts el f. . A single sparkmaybecome a

p ra ir ie f ir e, a s the Chinese proverb says. The fall of the

Chinese mainland and the enslavement of the 70 0 million people

were partly dueto the Communist organizational tactics ..

that time

aimed to de -entioned.

~ d . J L U . : t : l d . l . . lV l ld . l . tactic s ..

hand in

claimed to have

Soviet Russia commanded !Viaa

in on October I ,

extended it s recognition This show s

C h i n e s E ~ Communists h ad hand in

recalled that. in the autumn

next

should

which

classes of the

seize the

munists worked hand

tactics into full

that th e Russian

in the a ~ ......vQ."" 'VU

moralize the Government forces f ight ing in the southwes-

tern and northwestern en the one hand and dlspell

th e worries in the mind those Chinese who work

th e Government south-

western and northwestern whilst

in th e southeastern overrun the Reds;

which were the most and most prosperous on th e

anti-C ommunist sentiments . In order

the Russian and Chinese Com-

Chinese Communist armed forces overran north China ana

and

50 - 51-



th e

their

the

from

I S morale' and-

the pf

shatter

the reflexes, conditioned or otherw is e 1 to exerc ise thei r con

trol of human beings. The Chinese Reds l e arned th is ~ e t h o dfrom th e Russians and had gone further to practise brain

washing, a sort of indoctrination, in the mo st diabolicalmanner

Another employed the Bolsheviks in

the human psychic response is the traditional dogma handed

down by the Oriental Orthodox Church. In order to drive away

from the minds of it s believers th e sexual desire, the mammon

worship and the assertion of the wil l, t h is creed used

such r it u al s a s "repentence", "confession", and th e lIfinal

ment". Under t he supreme authority of their I.hurch leaders

and dogmatism, t he se r el ig io us z ea lo ts f el t they wer e a ll the

more s in fu l and humble t ha t t hey would willingly con

fess, an d accept t he f inal or any other judgments .. There

be nothing wrong wit h t he Ch urch in the employment of these

methods, becausEl it aimed at s t rengthening t he fai th of it s fol

lowers and making them do good deeds. This f rom the

Marxist-Leninists in that the Communi st s t end t owar d doi ng

evilS. To control human mind and actions; they h a v ~ turned

Marxism-Leninism into a sort of religion g similar to the

Oriental Orthodox Church. Th e Chinese Communists .have

inherited th e Russian t echniques in fu ll , obse rved their dogmas

and adopted t tei r methods with further elaborations.

from "repentence" , "confess ion", and "people! s trials",

have appl ied to the mainland people the theory of psychical con-

trol in the mo st atrocious and terrifying manner , unprecedented

in Chinese history.

the

was

renown,

called

naiPPEm€!n that

that i t was men.

control the men

human

a Russian

Lenin, had

hi s

bu t

at the sound of the

of dishe s in pre-

a nd a t the of bell the

of th e conditioned reflex,

the saliva

t he cue from the theory be -

r,eflex control, human would

Animals and beasts a circus ar e

complete control of the trainer f s , fo r uu -

of t he condi ti oned follow the movement of

Q . . u u v ~ m , in a. mechanical Likew is e ,

Lenin can learn to the

th e stimuli such as This the

the Bolsheviks had of

animalS would

person

a ls o a t

human

under

der the

the

-- 52- - 53-



Of th e above-mentionedtwo-types of psychic one is

temptat ion, the purpose of whidh is to deprive human beings of

It soul" ; and the ' other I is i nt imidat ion, t he of

'which Is to deal w-ith their "b ody ". The Communist DSlfcn ,OlCI

warfare largely takes; the form' of these two types. Here

Al'9 concrete illustrations.

Next, le t us se e how the Communists had controlled the hu':"

man mind by t he method of intimidation I

There is no. dEmying tlie fact that the Communists liS. {e ~ m

\

The Chinese l(eds followed the Bolsheviks to the las t le t ter e

They deceived the peasants by the s logan, " la nd r e f o r ~ and

equal distribution of the land ownership". They dEiceived the

workers by the ~ l o g a n , liThe workers should have the right

m a n a g ~ th e factory". They deceived th e businessmen the

slogan: "Benefits t o bot h lapor and the management .. II

dece.ived th e soldiers by the Slogans: "The Chinese won I t t ight

among themselves" and l IReturn hometo engage in production'l

, As a result, all the lands on tlle mainland. forcibly seized

the Communists 'under the name of ,the .state, became ,the "peo:",

pIe I s communes", with al l th e peasants turned out, to be 'mere

s ~ r f s under the Red yoke. All the factories on the mainland

were seized by the Communists unc.ferthe name of Itjointly owned

the State and the private'lI, with workers and businessmen

turned into mere slaves. Worse still, most of thesoidier,s W l : ~ . ·del ' t he t hen Gov03rnment,. who were either lured into the Redft!

"peace trap" or went home to. "engag,e in production" ,we r e

persecuted or liquidated in the end. The f ac t t ha t t he Com

munis ts could easily overrun themaiq.la,nd andgain"'Control

th e peo.ple there wa s largelydue to the tactics in the psycholo

gical warfare, because empty_ words a ~ false promise could

easily sway the minds of the people. Therafore temptation or;

induc,ement is bne of the tactics adroi t ly employed by t he Com-

)munists in the psyc,hological ~ a r f a r e .

th e

mone-

should-be recalled' th at the Bolsheviks succeeded inthe

001:(1)91" Revolution. of 1917 i n o v e r t h r o w i ~ g t h e t h e n provisioqal

gcv6.rnmentand i n ~ e i z i n g power at one largely due to·

;Use of m o n e t ~ ' temptation in psychological warfare,

1Ilcpns they shouted Wtere: "land to the peasants, factory

the 'workers, an d peace to the ~ m e d f o r c e s " How could

t .be. - tbreeBlogans exercise so gre'at an influence upon the

~ the Russian people? It was only that the common

p.yohos.i:s of th e people had been obsessed with selfishness.

Tbe Bolshevik bigwigs took advantage ot the common weakness

t h Russian peopl e and baited them,with they desired.

Were' there peasants who did not want to own the they

Were there workers who dId not want to in

the m.an.agement of the factory inwhiQh they worked? to the'

t t l e ~ . c e n & : t ' y troops, did not like to fight. And so Rus-

........ ·........11"" and the Tsa ri ls t t roop s f el l as easy into the-

As a r e : 3 u l t , w h a ~ they

oonUscatedby th e Bolsheviks•

First of le t us cite some the facts to show

C d f o m u n 1 ~ t s ha d ,wavered the minds. of the people

temptation.

. 54-'-- 5 5 ~ '



At it s early stage, the Cheka had concentrated it s activitlsa

in ,suppressmg the tlcounter-revolutionaries" at home, with its

~ x p a n s i o n ' abroad much delayed. By 1919 when Lenin ~ s t a ~bUshed th e Third International, th e Ch eka ~ e g a n to . set up.it!;

.branches throughout the world and Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chili

. minh, and the P olish IIPresidenttl

Boieslaw Bierut were

sUb$equently it s agents. When the Russian clvil.warended on

February 11 , 1922, the' Cheka was renamed the Sta t' e

,Admmistration or fo r short, the OGP\] , which worked in cp-

ordination with the Corrimimist International in th e espionage

operation$ abroad. Both organizations had also se t up one

"International Seamen I s Alliance" with VlkoCherl(enkov. as it s

first secretary, who later became th e first "premier" ot'Gom...

munist Bulgaria , charged with the miss ion of smuggling special

agents and firearms to var ious s po ts all, over the world" Be

tween 1922 and 1935, ~ should b recalled, agents and f·ire-·

arms had been s E ~ c r e t l y smuggledinto China to step up th e

murrist r eb el li on . Thi s niarksthebeginning of th e intelligencl8

activities in China.

had

take

us e

have attAched

other

exile in Western

in

have

expert·' on ' this line,

nobleman, F OlE"

a much Harger one" And so he

seized power

.And so tradition

WlientheBolsheviks se ized

The COJmmmust$

6. Cloak and Dl1Wtr

.....Tactics in Corrmuflist hltelligence Warfare'

experience in ttle espllonage operations learned. and

p r a c ~ $ e d duririg thei r years undergroundactlvities against

r eg ime" Len in - cons id er ed that the ,Tsarmaintained hi s despotic rule a secret

the Bolsheviks should

chase a Persian nobleman

charge of th e

was a veteran L,;OmOlillUStJ

espionage UUC; .L 'CU •. I,VAJ:'"

mUQh more i m p o r t ~ ~ c e to ...u,: .c ........ l " ~ ' V ........ '"

VU·U UI . l J . " ' . " ' c to Combat Counter ...revolution and

Now, le t us vite two facts as examples to testify how Soviet

Russia had employed th e intelligence warfare in her aggression

upon China ..

Experts on Rus'sian and Chinese Communist affairs

have known Vasili Blucher and .Michael Borodin .. Both of

were none other than Russian special agents s(3nt to China

carry out Kremlin's intelligence warfare against

Government and @ In the "Unpublished Documents

th e

an acronym fo r the

I t was this organization which

extending f ro rn 1 7

strikes th e period

The Bolshevik s had used

terro:r. The Cheka was in fact the first

h ~ J l l d , ( ] u : a r l ~ e : r ' s of Russian secret agents.

1:4'",...." ...."" fo r many years and was well-versed intelligence as

J J . . I l = ...... . & p ' ~ v u , ' " ' ' " ' works. On December 7

- 5 8 - - 59-



In t he war time both Russian and Chinese Communists con

ducted their intelligence warfare under the command and the .

cover of Panyushkin. I ns id e t he Embassy there were officers

in charge of investigation ~ n i n t e l l i g ~ n c e i n Gpina . Chou En

1ai , t hen the central figure of the Chinese Communists in

Chungking, had kept constant contact with an d wa.s under the

d i r ~ c t i o n of Pany· ush kin . A t that time the intelligence men of

The bi tter lesson t ha t t he Chinese had learned in their

longtime s truggle agains t the Communis ts was tha t the

diplomatic personnel almost invariably played the l ead ing roJ 3

in the intel ligence warfare . . For ins tance, during China I s war

of resistance against Japan, th e Soviet Embassy in the wart ime

capital of Chungking was t he headquarters of Communist con

spiracy in China. I t was at once· the policy-making and

espionage organ.in t he Chinese Reds I intelligence warfare

against the Chinese Government. A .. S. Panyushkin, the then

Soviet Ambassador to China, wa s an outstanding special ser

vice agent,and had since 1952 when transferred to Moscow

served as the director of the Second Bureau of the Russian

NKVD or Ministry of Internal A f f a i r ~ . As is now known, the

Second Bureau of NKVC is none other t han the Committee of

State Secur ity (KGB), under which there ar e several divisions

devoted to investigation, propaganda, kidnapping, assassina

tion, and control of their henchmen in Russian satell i tes.

Eventually Bluecher had to go to the United States again, while

Borodin fled to R u s ~ i a and later served as a new spaper editor

in Moscow

Nevertheless, the RussianCommunlsts' tactics in the intel-

. l . J l . l I l ~ C . u L \ . # C warfare failed Since the death of Dr.

Borodin had tried to court the favor of Generalissimo " - ' U , . L a . . l . J b ~

But when the Russian andChinese Communists' con

""n11" 'O,A" ' l : r to subvert the Kuom:intang was e xp os ed , the first step

taken b was to purge those Communist in -

fi l trators ou t of the Taking Soong

s support and the vacuum created

the Northward the NationalRevolutionary

the Chinese Reds seized power at Wuhan

a.tt:errmtlnl.! to establish a that could be control led

the Russian Communists.. Since the purge was under

way these Russian could no have a

Aggression upon China II , an

name of WUlkie pointed out that as fa r back

B.nd other card-carrying Communists

,had a lready in fi lt rat ed into the Kuomintang as Dr s Sun

After Dr. Sun I in

in turn served as Dr . Sun s widow

s advisor!. or proteges. In minds of many

Americans_ Bluecher wa s a , .,ery notorious Communist. -Borodin

was t hen a dealer in smuggling and wa s among

the first batch of secret agents sent t o t he Uni ted States

the Communist InternatioI1tal. Both Bluecher and Borodin

had themselves in e:spionage work in China as well as

in th e United States. From this one caB read i ly see tha t

Russia had spared no effort waging her intelligence warfare

- 61-



At Ib,etime-,the chief ' of t he C hi ne se Red secret service

was Ku Shun-chang. He disguised himself as a professional

magician living somewhere on Bubbling' WellRoa.d in Snanghai

and performed on stage at the roOf garden of ·the Sincere Com

p any, o ne of th e f ou r largest department stores in the .Inter

national Settlement there He used the profession as a coyer

to enlist more members fo r the Party and at t he s ame time. to

align himself with local thugs and secret societies .. Things Rent

well fo r a time, with networksextended. Under him there wa s

in Shanghai'a so-called "Red Squad" specialized in assassina

t ion and sabotage. In 1931, the Chinese Government was abl e

to p la ce a n a ge nt in th e s pe ci al squad o'rganized by Ku.. How

ever, he was uncovered and th e Communists decided to liquidate

him. Arrangement .was made fo r him to go to a certain hoteL

Not knowing this was a mousetrap, he went as scheduled, and

knocked at the door u s i ~ g a prearranged signal.. No sooner he

entered t he r oom t ha n h e was shot, and the assassin fled in

haste.. i t was later ~ o u n d ou t that th e killer was a novice the

Red squad , and that, being too tense, he f ai le d to kill the

tended victim.. After the shoot ing , the wounded was s en t i nt o a

time of the Sixt.h Coqg:ress of the Communist Party, held in 1'928

in Moscow, the internal r i f t and par ty b icke ri ng s among the

Chinese Reds became even more seriou,<::.. The Central Com

mittee of the RedPartv thus moved to Shanghaiand took shelter

in th e foreign settlement there. HQweyer, their position was

still precarious.. With a ~ r i e w to warding off the attack of their

hypothetical"enemyll, the Chinese Communist Party

secreJ service on the pattern' of th e Russian OGPU ..

the

and

'The Chinese Reds inaugurated their ser-

vice sOll1etime in after t hey had been from

the ~ u o m i n t a n g and went underground engaging themselves in

clandestine activit ies a r m E ~ d uprisings, and Soviet movement ..

Since then their organization h ad b ee n ever ex

the Seventh

ence" of the Central Committee of the Communist

decided resort to violencls, started the

.. . L' ... "" ... -· . . . . . lHJ .." ... Autumn Harvest Upris ing,

Kiangsu-Chekiang

Canton but al l of them failed. The

wa s lost and many it s members to

, le t us cite a fewmo re e xamp le s show how the

Chinese Communists e m p l o ~ r e d the intelligence warfare against

the National Government..

Government kept track of the Russian envoy,

but he 'was rather fn 'action and often left thetu in

the dark.. As he suspec ted tha t hi s chauf feur was in. COntclCT;

with Chinese plain-clothesmeL.,he took no action .. Butsoori

he made a test 'by tile chauffeur to 'him t he out -

o f t he wartime when be reached the destinal."

Hon dir the car hi s hat, gloves, B.nd p e r l c ~ a l I C a J . Sbehind.. After a few m i n u t i ~ s he returned to car and

found these ar ti c le , s had b ~ ' e n somewhat as an

excuse he fired hi s From t,l:11s incident one can'See

how wary the Russian intelligence had been

even of trivial matters ..

- 63-



movement in the hands of the Commurii.sts is a means , not an end.'"

They start the mass movement no t fo r th e interests of the

masses but to use the violence of the masses fo r the prom9tion

of th e Communist cause. They e:x.ploit the masses and treat the

masses as their tools.

The w i t c h c r a f ~ or the Communist mass movement warfare,

like that of other types of political warfare, is nothing but

intimidation and temptation.

There were two- outstanding -examples which ca n bf::) used t o

i ll us tr at e ' he RuSsian -aggression ,upon Ch ina: one is th e

encroachment upon Outer Mongoliat ali i th e other is tbJ1.t uppn

Tannu Tuva. As regards Outer Mong<?lia, t h nowaProgateq.

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance s aid in

"In view of Outer Mongolia I s desire fo r indepe¢ence f . t h ~Chinese _government has a p p r ~ v e d the holding of a plebisclf\e

after the war. If. such a- desire-ls p:r.oV'ed g e n u i n ~ t approval fO:J,!

it s independence_will be granted •."Base4 upon this provision,

Sdviet Russia need not resort toa-rms i ,nher at tempt to annea:

OuterMonogolia·t bu t sh e had· to exert p ressu re upon the masseS

because i t was th e plebiscite which would determine the status.

of that region. Bence, the Russian Communist employed to

fullest exttlnt their tactics: in t he mass ,movement warfare. On

October 6, 1945, when the 'plebiscite took place, the Chinese.

Government s en t Vice -min is te r of the Interior Lei Fa-eha.ng.

an d Director Chu' Ming-chuan of the Mongolian Affairs Divisi,On

of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission to Ulan Balon

supervise the balloting. The total population of Outer Mongolia

67-

Communistshould Qe made clear: the mass

66-

and luan.. JJ1< : use or the maSSes Their

. . . . . . . .JJ. 'u"',u. through the of th e

tha t t he p ib it ica l attacks aim at where

thifl epigram ohe c an s ee that he has

masses as. the battlefield of

rule has been

Lenin has

6. The Exploitation of the Masses

Tactics in Communist Mass Movement Wa

. The- Communists, w h e t h 4 ~ r Russian or Chinese are the

the important defenSE! lines of the forces,

th e Chinese Reds often high-ranking officers with

money, s e x or false , causing them and their men. to

surrender en masse The case of Ta l Jung.....kuang, commander

of Kiang-yin Fort at mouth of the Yangtseriver was an

out st and ing one. There were many factors that le d the Com....

munists seizure of the mainland but the comparatively

tant onawas their waging of the intell igence w" " ....t·f:l, ....O

regLt"ded



.invaded Kiakhta and Ulan Bator , i ts contingent made inroads

at the same t ime into Tannu Tuva in the southeastern part

OuterMongolia. Apart f rom the armed aggression, the Russians

chairman wa s a pro-Russian Mongolian trai tor named Uianfu

who also acted as the secretary of Inner Mongolia Work

Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. A graduate of the

Chinese :rvulitary Academy and an agent of Moscow, he was sent

to Yenan, Shensi, on a special mission to communize In'her

Mongolia. Since 't,he establishment of t he p up pe t regime,

liquidation, struggle, public t r ia ls , counter-Kuomintang-agents

movements, and o t h e ~ measures ha d been s y s t e m a t i c ~ l l y carried. ou t by Ulamu. This wa s how Russia,n ha d employed the mass

bovement warfare in the region of Inner Mongolia. Meanwhile,

t he s ho ck in g massacre took place in Chunli , Chahar. I n J un e

1946, there emerged an a'rmy of the so-called Autonomol1s

Eastern Mongolia, numbering a t f ir s t some 30 , 000 compos' ed

chiefly of c aval rymen, and la ter . expandihg it s number f rom

70,000 to 80,000. With Uredo a s its commander, th e army was

subordinate to Chinese Communist Northeastern Democratic

AHied Forces. All these were fact s of Russian aggression upon

Mongolia through the employment of mass movement warfare.

Then, le t us se e how the Russian Communists employed the

same type of warfare in t he ir a gg r es si on upon Tannu Tuva

Since th e O cto be r Revolution i n R uss ia , Tannu Tuva had

followed th e major policies of Outer Mongolia. WbGn the lattBr

declared it s a ll eR'i ance to the Repablic of China, the former

also alienated itself from Russia. In 1919; when t he Red

was

cast a

that means,

North a.nd

Inner, with it s

well known

, but

and the va gue name

CJHJ.HL"ev, with a

socialism. It s

and

the disabled and sick persons,

into t he Out er and

systems. These

of Outer HIU'H/i. ::.V.U.""

aLll adults had cast

v ..............«' .......... its: establishment

of Russ ian brand

had been divided into the

it s 'Voters

But the

the "" . ~ ~ : n ••. ~ •• - •• of th e word 11

.U H ...U . . . . . ."" and

e nvoy c ame to

Chinese Government and the Communist He went up

Lushan Mountian .seven times aha' the Government five

ceasefire orders . On January IO, 1946 th e first. order was

which gave the Chinese Reds fifteen to fulfil the

of the truce agreement. It was more than coincidence

that on t he s ame a sio-called 11 of Eastern

11 of Mongolia

dark shadow upon the minds of th e people of InneT ! nv ' ..... ~ .....""

In , Ge.neral George C. S

with a mis sio n to mediate between the

modern times, it is

own a d l m i n i s t r a t i ~ e and

Russia.

which w as made possible Russian

tactics of mass movement Under the Communist intimidation, over

95 of th e , as , had voted fo r

Since Outer Mongolia h as h ad a name -

s ot Mongolia" . This new name t.hat

still further plots Since ancient times,

was estimated between 000 and 900

aside from the

68- - 69-



tunity to have the sma ll "Hu rul dan" con vened t hr ou gh the

maneuver of he r agents, at which a rseolution on the incorpora

tion . of Tannu Tuva i nt o Sov ie t U .ion was approved. In

appearancethe Kremlin profe ss ed she would "absolutely respect

the sovereignty of Tannu Tuva but in f ac t s he had annexed i t in

complete.

In M:l.rch, 1948 when the Supreme Soviet was convened to

amend the' constitution, a resolution was apuroved to

integrate the "People! s Republic of Tapa \l as one of th e si x

autonomous states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

On l ea rn ing t h is , the Chinese Government instructed it s am

bassador in Moscow to lodge a strong protest but Russia made

no reply. Thus, Tannu Tuva was finally swallowed up by Russia.

The principaltactics employed by th e Chinese Reds in their

subvers ive activi ties against the N a t i o n a ~ Government , l ike

those employed by Russia, were tactics of the mass mov'ement

warfare. In 1924 when the Kuomintang adopted the policy o f

aligning with Ii ussia and tak ing in Communists as it s members, '

th e First Central Executive Committee of the rul ing party had

eightdepartments .in charge of o r g a n i z a t i o ~ , information,

movement, workers, peasants, military affairs, and overseas

Chinese affairs respectivel*T. Later added to the se were two

more departments ' , those of commerce and industry. When the

candidates to head each of these depar tment s were under con

sideration, th e Communists were part iculariy interes ted in the

departments of organization, workers, and peasants Ascan

be seen now, the se th ree departments could provide fo r them

of

Sino-

defend

it s so

on e of th e

an attempt

Tannu

Tannu

herself of

included the

of China and

7, 1937, Rl.lssia,

a II military

V,:l.IU.l.I(a..I.J.VU of "constitutional govern

of great and smal l l IHuruldans"

f,or the emergence of the so-called

I S Republic of

did not stop at that. When

relations, Tannu Tuva

, which was \ J.u ,. v, . ..., .. ""' ....L.y

Russians in their Etntire war fa re R eso -

terri tories

the same

most critical stage and China did no t have time

J . J .U .U l " 'U " as that in Outer Mongolia. Since

the

l n c l e ~ ) e l l U E ~ n c : e .. and the

VI1 IJa .uvoo wa r broke out

she had the right to station he r armed forces

the area. In when the war against had reached

had been renamed: the

ment

tactics

called

greememt, when the

res umed their

s and Y outh ..... v .... _v

Tannu Tuva A 11 these were steps taken

their mass movement warfa re in the target areas

conclusion of. the Sino-Soviet A-

control. This

such activ it ies were intended to provide cover fo r their secret

service agents to orientate masses and them under

their mass movement warfare their

dispatched

teams organized to collect of minerals

and fo r experiments in Moscow in fact

7 0 - 71-



as channels fo r keeping contacts with the peasants an9. orgam.ze,

them so as .to carry out what was called "programs Cor rural

areas If and to forment t h upeasants' revolution", The ,objective

was to organize a military force through peasants I riots 'and thus

.t o E;stablish a Soviet regime. The Chinese Reds d.id' succeed in

stirringup

riots in some,ru:r'al

areasby

employing t he mass

movement tactics, but when' the Kuomintang and the National

Government b e c a m E ~ aler t and purged the Communist infiltrators·

from th e Party , the Reds fo r the first time suffered a setback

the mas s movement warfare ..

Among those employed by the Chinese Reds as tools of mass

movement, apart from peasants and workers there were young

students. As early as August' 1920, and prior to the tormal

inception of th e Chinese Communist Party, Li Ta-chao and Chen

Tu-hsiu had already organized the so-called "Chinese Socialist

Youth Corps" , with young students as its major constituents. It

was once dissolved bu t later reorganized .. By 1925, i t was

renamed the "Chinese Communist Youth Corps". In AugustI928,

when the Chinese Communist Youth Corps held it s "Fifth

Congress" in Moscow, it s new program was to II tu rn the

students I organizations i nto the young workers I and peasants'

organizations", making them complete tools of Red mass

movement warfare. After the lv1anchurian Incident, the Chinese

Reds took actions to dissolve their Youth Corps and replaced it

with " the Chinese Youth Ullited Front" •

Under the banner of t.he sa id "Chinese Youth United Front ll

t he C hin ese Red s se t up two organizations: one was llChineset il i ze the government organs and n . u . v U J . L U I , a u . ~ machinesed s

grounds to wage t he mass movement warfare Subse

a Communist, became the department h ~ a dof peasants.. in order to detract the attention of the

members he recommended Pal al so a.

as the d ~ p a r t m e n t before he

tendered his own Despite repeated changes .of hands

at the ' had. remained 1n control of al l the activities of

th e department. The classes se t up fo r peasants were

the Reds, ~ m t&e t rainees admlttedwere either

CC)mlmunilsts or members of their front organizations ..

the peasants unions and th,e peasants'volunteer corps in

localities were a ls o in the ir handS.

Shorttv when the Chinese Nat iona l',l.'tt

the Kuomintang advanced to Wuchang

Nanchang in Northward Expedi tion, the Seventh

Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist

in \. Moscow, adopted a resolution on the situation of

China which stated in b r i E ~ r that the committee had t aken not ice

of the rapid prog ress in the Northward Expedit ion and the warm

response of th9'Chinese p o e p l ~ , which marked lithe third stage

revolut.iJeon m o v ( ~ m e n t . " At this stage, the resolution

went on, Uthe national liberation movem.ent should pass on to

n13w situEltions ll • This was, in Communist

s emant ic s, ano the r way o! saying that lithe national liberation

movement and the peasants revolution should merge into one

• To more this was to instruct the

- 73-



children to engag'e in such activities as propaganda, message

transmission, guide, sabotage, sentry and patroL The children

had also taken part in the "three check movement," "struggle

aga inst th ree capi ta l is t classes", "landreform", "liquidationto

V-Jn the early phase after

CLLI,CU,II.JL to save their

and t h other was !lNorthwest

" ' ' ' ' ~ J . V J , ..aJ . Salvation Federation!! , both of which aimed

recruit more

National

ChinaYouth

(

of the Kuomintang agents l! and other activities. Besides, the

1I eavesdropping squads" and "food-smelling squads" were organ

ized to serve as Red •Al l these facts show that th e Chinese

Communists had exhausted al l available resources in

exploitation of the masses.

stepped up the " " H ' ~ . 1 . - r > - H ' C

winter of 945. On

Communist official in , " " ,UU, " I : : .n. .LH/ : :

the New , openly called the

firms to stage anti-war and anti-tax

strikes, When these failed, th e Chinese :Keds engineered.

the Incident. In May and June, 1974 incited the

students to stage anti-hunger and anti-civil-war

in with their armed rebellion The Chinese R ed s

ca n and

extend their "",.-.1,,,,,,,,,,,

called t hese s tuden ts I d e m C l n s t r a t i o n ~ " th e s econd war front".

actions were maneuvers in the C ~ m m u n i s t mass

wa r the Government.

In their mass war ons f even women and children were

Women had be'en forced to peddle se x to lure th e

officers and leaders in the and to

the assigned t o them such

as "the

women" and "the

of women" , lithe

of women! s

r o l ~ e c t l a m of

Chinese Reds incited fair sex to engage in sabotage and

subversive activities. The Communist "Young Children" formed

their mass mmrement. They were on the

pattern of Russian outh Vanguar d" Dur ing their rebellion

the Government, the Chi ne se Red s had forced th e

- 74-



Chaptor ][ .

The Present Status of Global Political Warfare

!!If one knows h imse lf and hi s enemy 1

he need not fear th e result of on e hundred

battles" .

Suntse.

"The ha ft of th e arrow had been

feathered. with one of th e eagle I sown

plumes. We o fte n g iv e bu r enemies th e

means of ou r own destruction".

Aesop.

"Wise men learn much from their enemies!!.

ArJ.3tophanes.

<;::ommunism is a political creed.,It is the revolutionary 1

materialistic ideology on the basis of Marxism-Leninism used

by it s adherants , whether Russian or Chinese., to justify their

s ~ i z u r e of political power by all means at their disposal for th e

f or ci bl e e st ab li shment o f a world-wide t ot al it ar ia n s oc ia l

order. As communism is a creed political in nature, with world

domination as it s ultimate objective, the warfare that it s

advocates havewaged against the free world iI i the pas t a s well

as a t p re se nt i s i n t he main political warfare. It IS more so at

present than in the past because df t h ~ n u c l e a r stalemate.

Therefore, an analysis of the present status of political

- 71-



o f t he game of the Warsaw talk and is now trying to return to th e

old brazen trick of seeking ceasefire and pl:etending to sur

render which he has been playing fo r the pa s t thirty years II •

This message was a penetrating analysis of th e Chinese s trate

gy at that time, The Peiping regime, in the face of internal

strife and Russian military p l ~ e s s u r e , has changed in recent

years its stratagem in the international politics, In order to

tide OYer it s cris is , the regime go t it s seat in the United Nations

through it s 11 smiling offensive", The device of th e Chinese Reds

is an attempt to sow internal dissention in the Chinese Govern

ment and to isolate Taiwan in the diplomatic field. Free nations

might be duped by such Communist intrigues fo r a time but

historical facts and grim realities prove tha t any nation which

establishes whatever relations with the Chinese Communists will

su ff e r i n the long run. Thi s wil l be veri fi ed in time to come.

The present Chinese Communist ideological warfare is waged

on tw'o major fronts, namely, the Chinese mainland an d the free

areas . The so-caned "Great Cultural Revolutionl! broke out

largely due to the collapse of the Communist ideology and the

spread of , ant i-Mao and anti-Red thoughts among the Chinese

pe op le in general and the rank and file of th e Red

forces in partiCUlar, Since the publication of Communist leader

Yao Wen-yuan 1 s article in the Wen WeiPao, a Shanghai daily $

in 1965 1 this greatest ideo log ical s t ruggle of m a ~ n i t u d e and

profundity, unprecedentedin Chinese or perhaps world history

has been carried on and t he re i s no end t o i t. Bloody purges

and hUfian degradation have been the order of the day. The

fire

com-

, Soon

after

in 1956,

actions.

battlefield

of China

to save his

on the

been weary

government

. They

1958, but Peng

u a . L A . t ; ; l l l ~ t ; ; l as posed by

colors. Nevertheless,

the game

bet\veen the

Ch inese Communis ts

battlefield to the

,seems that the enemy ha s

President

to drive a

we had taken

shift ;from military to

engaged in

"" .. , au ,uc : : defenses to make a last

between the CNY""'\unist a nd t he democrat ic world will

to meet

<:'IJUU.I. .I.C of China

of K inmen on August

, the then Defence lvullle" .

the Kinmen ......... 'UlJ' .. A

ba ttlef ie Id

remain as treacherous as

Third Communist

En-Ial expressed his d'9sire to

an

in

Chinese Reds have been

even

Since the debacle on the Chinese mainland

hinese Reds have come off with

the foes to freedom.

resumed

doom. On the

and States and shake the morale

armed forces so as achiErve what he failed

-79 ' -



certain that will be more contradictions and conflicts

inside the Party. 'There h ad b ee n in th is is land bastion of the

Republic of China some Communist underground cells, bu t due

t o t he constant vigilance of the Government and t he smash-up of

many of these by the authorities, t he Chinese Reds dare no t

come into the open. I t is believed however that th e RedS will

never give up or stop 'their organizational activities and infil

trat ions. They may t end t o direct the remnant agents to change

their tactics and preserve their strength by taking mor cautions

and subtler steps on th e one hand, and engage themselves in

struggles, legitimate or iilegitimate, by setting up such anti

Government or traitor organizations as "Independence movement

f or Ta lwan" on the other. But in either way; they wil l li e low

awaiting their opportune time to s tart rebellion the

Government. The free Chinese in Taiwan are o n th e alert.

The smil ing offensive is at present the principal tactic

employed by the Chinese R eds i n their psychological warfare

a.gainst the free world. By tactics as such, the Peiping regime

tries to hook the appeasers, confuse the neutralists, f:l.nd isolate

the anti -Communists . With the "nuclear tests I!, ' "a population

of s even hundr ed mil li on s" , and "intensive preparations fo r

war" as w ea po ns i n their arsenal, the Chinese tr y to

exer t psychological pressure upon the neighboring countries

and t he free world. In the meantime, they utilized such " ' ' ' ' ~ t ' ; 0 c u " ,

as "identification", "return to the motherland", '''unification of

China" and tlpeaQe talks" as baits to lure the overseas Chinese

toward their fold. In th is is land fortress of Taiwan, the Chineses

after

can be

letup.

ha s

structure

anti-Mao and

to seize

things go on

ever on the increase.

in an

the mainlandfiv;6'years ago

has been completely u. ...., ........ ""f<,kUO

and relentless

structure on different levels has

under

t : : 0 UU l : t ' U . t ha t purges

anti-C ommunis t

been of women ~ a n d youths. She makes it. a rule

that organizations the and

of each unit numbers should women. seems

sh e wants he r woman leaders to thes.e

ultural

of the Communist

deification of Mao and the popularization of his thought are

absurd and fanatical. In such free a re as a s Hongkong,

Macao and the Southeast Asia, the Chinese Communists andtheir

aCrUates have done the utmost i n i deolog ioal aUena ti on and

the free and world with

the of and democracy. these

areas a re thus rendered unable to distinguish friends from foes ,

from wrong , and many nations have become self-contra

in their official state!ments and do not what actions

take. free man or eve ry f ree mus t

alert the tactics as employed the Chinese

R ed s in their warfare.

s regards the present organizational warfare by the

Chinese Reds f should be since the Great

- 80- - 8 '-

areas on the borders. Meanwhile the rural work corps ar e, oftenthe discontent ofto



under order to enter the colleges and schools to persecute the

intellectuals including teachers and students. Armed forces are

redeployed to keep the peasants and workers under controL At

the same t ime, t he mas s movements are reorganized to deal with

the mi li tary commanders who tend to se t up warlord f iefdoms in

the area$ under their c'ontrol. Apart from. their secret service

agents, the Chi ne se Red s in their mass operations against

Taiwan, are using the indigenous segregationists,self-professed

liberals, th e discontented bureaucrats, and the political never

do-wells as thei r tools of mass mOvements. I n th e past, t he Reds

established their operation frontal base at Hongkong and Tokyo,

bu t recently they open a new front i n t he United S t a t ~ s ,to exert pressure on Taiwan from abroad. The Red Chinese

conspiracy is to .utilize .the "radical elements" to start students

movement· in colleges and Jschools fo r the Communist cause and

exter\d such a movement to the J;ural areas. Tak1e Tiao Yu

I nc id en t f or examp le , which was originally an expression of

Chinese students 'patriotic sentiments. However, in the hands

of the Reds, it turned out to be the tactic of "killing three birds

with one stone ll• Fortunately, a large majority of Chinese

youths both at home and. abroad, having seen through the

Communist cpnspiracy, nipped in the bud. But a free men must

take precaution lest the Communists should seize the discontent

and radicalness of the young intellectuals an d abuse the frgedom\

of th e fourth estate to organize the unsuspecting students into

anti-government movement, thus serving the Communist cause.

and

the

cases

the rural

utilized

the ' - - ' H . I . . u " ' : i : l ~ Reds have

their back

the

GoV"ernment and officials,

as IIgraft and

G u ~ r d s they

e arn t he ir own

the

bas.tion of Taiwan as a thorn

th e ears

seizure of the ..."'. UJ 'CUJU

th e

and

such abusive

SinCe

which must be 8V\"8.re of t he r ac

invasion against t his i sl and will involve too

resor t

the Chinese discovered that the Reds

utilized persons of different social strata from

different direc tions them information or

otherwise Very dis-

overed that the Chinese agents, l urking in the

and cultural fields had \I\Tormed i nt o t he c onLdence

government off ic ia ls and stolen to the detr iment of

of Chinese Reds have launched the

most formidable warfare against the free world and

that has relations with the Peiping regime is invite

trouble upon as the Chinese commonplace saying gges •

Th e Chi ne se Red s ar13 relentless in their mass movelTient

warfare. warfare is at present waged most on

th e mainland

Great Revolution I'v6.0 f s arch 0ppOltlellts

These Red Gua rd s have since. then turned be anti-Red

Thousands these school youths ar e now down--

- 82- - 83-

forces of Communist conspiracy had made appalling advances inThe above is of the warfare as waged at



the pos t-wa r y ea rs L the United States began to awaken to theJ,

deadly manace. In additioh, th e fall of Chinese mainland into the

hands of the Reds added to the burdens of th e United States in

the Communists the free world

and the of China in may also

serve the p ur po se " un der sta nd ing the the

ou t of counter-measures

2. Pair! of Democratic

Asia. That was why the wary Americans , fully aware of the

Communist threat,· had actually intensified their political

warfare.

of international communism is as well

in the en ti re f ree world. In the f ac t t ha t

h ave been d if fe re n. ce s in the c t j J j J .u . ... aLJ . vu

the varia t ion of tactics employed, in the

theories,

or conflicts of interests anlOng the Communist

th e ultimate is in common - - to communize the free

world and to bury the democra tic countries.

Al l nations of the free wo rld h ave doubt le ss suf fered

or f rom the Communist of infil-

tration and ' ; ' = · I JV "C l . ! l : :C in forms visible or invis ible . Especia l ly

th e United States of America, the leading power' of the demo-

cratic is the main target of international communism.

Since th e end of the Second World War, th e government and the

of the States, failing to se e the outer

veneer of h ' tTnn i " ' T ' n r t " l T into th e inner co re of deceit and terror of

th e Communi st s, have suffered many setbacks but have also

measures counter th e Red menaCe in th e fie ld of

warfare.

first counter -measures taken the United

tates was sometime and after Korean War. As the

- 85-

tactics, the United States committed in the . L " ' ' ' ' V ' ~ U J L ' ' < : ' ' ' ' ' ' : ;commu-idetaken to turnand oth er nations were



battlefield more or less t he same mistakes· i n major ~ J V " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' a.s

t he Chine se Government had committed on th e mainland.

without her knowing , t he Uni ted States fell into a stalemate inI t indeed had it s

had been a tt ached

in t he Uni te d States. Take

..... ""....,,'", ... in North Carolina fo r CA'' ' ' lUi!J ,1.v

nism. Much

warfare by the

United States, th e most. wealthy and prosperous pnIIU' I t ·T '1: / ' of

Vietnam. She was thrown irito an awkward predicament because

of t he p olicy s he h ad advocated to light without th e .........QM. . . . . . \ J ' .u

win the wa r there. Due to the Communist conspiracy, t.he

on the front had not been lost, but t he policy-makers in

Washington were unable to come to an agreement on Vietnam on

account of divergence of opinion. I t seemed that th e

doctrine from the neutralization of Vietnam War to the 'cess

ation of hostilities should ba tactically revised in certain

aspects,. From th e standpoints of mili tary and political C l ? ,..." i ' -o -

gYt whe th er s uch a doctrine would lead to roads open

communism, and whether i t would' make friends and foes loms

tinguishable,remains a question the seriousness of which

could not be minimized. I t was most puzzling and shocking

aee the Communists had in a short period been ab"le to stir, ~ l th e t idal waves of appeasement and anti-war, the mass move

ment not against communism but against anti-communistn in

mass

oper

i n t he

warfare f

surpassed

Q,LJLJ .U . l , l l5 and organ-

and after t he Korean War.

Reds had taken more extensive and

strategical

is the years prior to and after the Viet-

What deserves special mention was

As mentioned above, duri,ng the Korean

had taken' several effective measures in ",VA."'''''',",,''''''

and tacts I n th e field of nQ1r rn ! " , r .

;:'VIII1<::::1.1U,l lK to be desired - - the lack oforgani za ti onal and mass m f ' , v " " m e ~ n f

the United S t a t E ~ s GovernmenlJo. had made remarkable

ten years

actions in

The s econd

11 in

th e

namese

s uc ce ss in: political warfare ,and r ea pe d c ro ps in turning

wl,lrfare, ·but she still lagged, behind the Communist..

th e tide of communism

mt1,vc,m.:)nr oparations throughcivU defense

izations, which were t h ! ~ b u l w a r k s against

we11... laid

there was

among

-ations but in 'intelligence and

employment of. ~ c i e I 1 l t i f i c methods,

Vietnamese War 1n the Southeast Asia and created

wor ld . T he re are reasons toworry about if bne sees how

Communists have' ) l V o r m ~ d their way into th e school campuses ,

the inte l lec tual f ield , th e ne'wspapers, and other mass media,

and what i s more, i nt o the various departments o f th e

inot

stirred up th e

nfC)rrna1t!on theft and in mass .... ,.. ... """,,...'...

in o rgan izat iona l inf il trat ion, in

si a but also toward the United States.

attacks, in

Statestates Government. In more than a decaf' '3 , the

ha s made au tstanding achievements in science,

What ,worrieshe

to the Communists

serious chaos. in

- 86- - 87-

policy is mainland recovery and reconstruction. In theand i n w e a p o n . : r ~ r , but i t is to sa y tha t in



the Chinese Government has shattered the Communist d r ~ a mt1bloodwashing Taiwan" by the policy of "bolstel"ing Taiwan",

I t has also defeated the Red plot of tldemolishing Taiwan"

programs of "reconstructingT aiwan" In recent years , theChinese

Government has thwarted theRed conspiracy of "dividingTaiwan'

by measures of "consolidating Taiwan" In m o r ~ tpa.n two

decades, the Chinese Communists have exhausted their means

to destroy Taiwan but every time they have failed. The only

way fo r them to do is to dupe and make fool of th e free world ..

As re·gards ideological warfare waged by the Chinese:

Government against the Reds, the authorit ies in Taiwan have

fol lowed the instruction of Presidint Chiang who pointed out in

hi s speech delivired on October 2; 1960 at theYangmingshan

Institute: tlIn the past years the failu re in ou r campaign

agaiQ,st the Reds may be attributed at least partly to a few lines

o f Communi st slogans through their propaganda .machlne • The

Reds smeared our pUblic-spirited and law-abiding Kuomintang

m em bers then in the government service by calling them

t diehards ,and those feeble-minded and. weak-kneed pJU'sons,

fo r fear of being called die hards 1 , t hus g ave up their original

faith and patriotic responsibility and defected to the Communist

camps in u t te r d i srega rd of national interests. Not only the

common people bu t also the revolutionary cadres and intel

lectuals .had, consciously or unconsciously, intentionally or

unintentionally b een d ecei ved by Communist propaganda.,As a result, th e mainland was lost with their faith lost. H At

of the Republic of. On the

Under the of President the

Government and the of the Republic of China have

th e of warfare and have 1..1so

seen the Communi:st politlcal stratagems from

prepared fo r a c ~ e p t i n g greater by reorgan-

and moderniz ing the armed forces, the Government and

the are working togHther in intensifying their fJV .L . l . l.......'"

warfare communism. The following a brief a.ccount

various aspects of such warfare

As fa r a s strategy i concerned, the Chinese Government

ha s aside i ts of,suppressing the Red rebellion and

relentless It s ua! •.LVJ.J" ' -.L

Communist conspiracy, instead of

intensive study and progress, the United States has

gone like a b E ~ l l t : ' i O n without air. It is by no means .

incredulous that, i f there emerges no statesman as great as

and Abr aham Lincoln save the

States and the free wortd ou t of the present cr isis , .and t he

s i tuations remain the s ~ m e as at present , there are indeed

we have belief in th e

national strength of the United States f in the Amexican silent

masses who ar e anti-Communist and sentiment.

themost critical pElriod is also the time fo r the United

States t o wake up

,...,. 89-

warfare against th e Reds.theofSeventh



, to capture the enemy! s

-91 -

remember especially the

In the o rgan izat iona l f ie ld , the Chinese Government in

T aiw an ha s i n th e past two decades spared no effort in re

establishment and consolidation of its organizations. In 1949 the

PresIdent advanced the catchword" Organization'First",

was substantiated by his exhortation in 1951 on "The

and Functions of Organi za ti on ". The Kuomintang, the

party, underwent reorganization at first, followed by the

establish!J1ent of administrative organs. These two steps were

imperative in waging the organizational warfare against the

Reds, with considerable merits achieved. As fo r the

reorganization, though the result was not entirely ..) 'CLl ' . ...," ...........

past practices of membership cards without party m e m b ( ~ : r smembers without cells f and cells without acttvities had r.>eEm

corrected. In regard to the strengthening of the

tablishments and the establishing of the political

armed forces, the battles in the Formosan Straits and the

offshore islands had wel l testified to the :efficacy of the

i z a t i o n ~ l efforts . Meanwhi le , the set tiRg up and the

of organizations behind th e Communist front ,

encountered many difficulties, had been pushed throl.1 is

believedthat once the people in the enemy's rear

against the Red , the foundation of mFlinland recovery

laid.

In the field of the psychological warfare, the President'

given instructions on various occasions.", He said. "We

in

liThe

ussia

wan.

Problems in

ra l

on th e r.:ainland

sorry to say

"" ..., ..v ..... u,"'"". I regret

on my part had constituted

• Since the President

G o ~ e r n m e n t moved

and Methods", have

infbonce,in the employment ideoloQ"ical

centiments

the cause of

of thoughts

r e i D C ~ ~ l l l , ) I P , n with a d m i n i s t r a t i ~ e and u .... ' L ,L ..........

theoretical

~ x e r t e d the

L I ~ ~ ' a , U l u . 1 l with th e \..dJlrmnUJJlS

(he Reds has

re s l1 l.ted in that al l the alert and Chinese citizens

able the f rom the wrong, the friends

the foes AH them have learned a biUer from

the mainland in their minds t th e

an d t he ant i· -C ommunist re':'"

the' ,lost mainland have taken mong the

armed forces i t is al l t he more

·fruits Devoted Presi-

two articles: 'liThe Revolutionary and The

both of which had aroused

tha t such a UVc:A.J'U""lJ.L

loss of the mainland to the

l! united front", the Chinese Government and t he p eop le havecomes nex t. Thi sis walled



strong belieHn recovering the mainland and wiping out t he Red s,

No matter how chaotic and complicated the world situations

might be , the Chinese people i n t he i sl and bas tion of Taiwan

under th e leadership of President Chiang "remain calm in the

face of chal lenge" and work hard in order "to be seH-reliant

dignityfl .

In the field of intelligence warfare, the organization con

cerned in Taiwan had streamlined and strengthened

structure in accordance with the President I s instruction of 1949

It called fo r "revitaiizin&" the organizations, unifying the

command, distinguishing bet\'Veen authority and responsibility"

and strictly executing the reward and punishment in dealing with

merits and demerits so as to keep the personnel doing their

utmost through division of htbor and cooperation.!! In recent

years , the security and progress of Taiwan should be attributed

at least partly to the outstanding achievements of t he intelligence

work. Al l the Communist underground organizations have been

s mashed with their secret service agents arres ted. These were

the major feats accomplished by the Government intelligence

men. Most of them having heavy responsibilities to shoulder

have suffered many hardships and worked under adverse

conditions. They deserve one r S admiration. However,

intelligence warfare waged by the Chinese Government in

Taiwan is largely on the defens ive . How to develop the intelli

gence warfare in the rear of the enemy and how to turn

fensive into offensive ar e the most pressing problems a t p resent .

in our operations th e Reds but

l lso in a ll wa rs . We must subjugate ou r enemy

odds are- against him so that

defeated even b€'fore the wa r breaks out Thus 9 no

matter numerou s soldiers he possesses

out with a inferior force. However

th e e nemy s mind we have to s trengthen our to

th e enemy s wil l to we have to bolster ou r own.

In recent years, the Chineso Government has ...._ .. ,.,. .,...,

up it s efforts in t he f ie ld of ·warfare Such works

as th e of principles,

textbooks and other materiall; fo r educational purpose the 1."e-

and and the of

U " ' I - J l U ~ ; ' H L as well as , al l related to the psychological

warfare, have p roducep. substantial results. Particularly

c ommendableis the achievement of the frontline

offensive and that of the airdropping of leaflets in the enemy IS

rear The C hin es e Re ds had confessed that the Great

Cultural Revolution many Communist top officers and cadres

turned out to be anti-Red and anti-NRo

becaUSe had been influenced by the broadcasts and leaflets

of the Government in Taiwan. It can be presumed

on th e , though under the Comn;lUnist

, might also have b l ~ e n influenced to certain extent.

A the defence against th e Communist

attacks, the tricks of talk!' and intrigue of

--92-

a nd has a chieved 'some results, but under careful onetha t theto the mass movement,n



offact to forgjve the

enemy the President r-e:'"s a

ca n sti l l find several defects an d loopholes, in it s operations.

The President once lamented over th e fact that th e strategi9a1

warfare had not been due emphas is and tha t mos t

failed to know how to f ight the in t he f ie ld of

last war, es -he last stage

when the war- weary

had failed to realize it s ;:) ... , i, J . ,U, . . . . . . .,Q.J.J. '--

Reds

the

suppress the Communists over-all rebellion.

realize thH importance of mass movement on the

f or ce s t ri ed

marked, is to be cruel to onese !! . Take the warfare

for ins tance. The Chinese in general have not established

faith in the Three of the People on which the Chinese

nation is built. It is doubtful where public officials in of

culture and education have a thorough understanding and absolute

faith in Dr. Sun Yat-sen s trilogy. In co lleges and high schools,

students who can transform the thoughts contained in th e

principles into a spiritual fOyce 'rery limited in numberI t

deeply regrettable that, under the mask of and l iber

alism, th e devlationist and thedecadant existentialism

have in r ec en t y ea rs found their vvay i nt o t he academic circles

which are ye t to be clarified and rectified. At new

administration have pus h thro ugh many reforms and a fevy

radical elements who do not work with their hands and se e

their eyes have in a smear campaign become without their

knowle1ge tools of the enemy. This casts a shadow on the ideo

log ical warfa re waged by th e Government. In

warfare, the Chinese Government in Ta lwan is s ti lt with

many problems The general do not fully understand

nature of th e programs launched the ruling vvhich is

Kuomint ang. The organizations in the stratum

of

the

the

serve

Youth

strict

armed

moved

differ-

masses

cultural

and Women

organization

the Government

the

land - t 0 - the- tiller

"' ...., : II 'f . r t , . , ' - '" ' . : '1 from

achievement

. The world-known

, the " l J L I . ~ J . ' - - C ' L . 1 .

the Communists

movement launched

1s ever

' and f rom the

labor l aw have benefited

Similar rt , :L l } l l l l I

Anti-Communist

. rv1easures taken

mainland t o t he

armed forces and t he

relief and rehabilitation

avail LJ'''''''",,:;'r:

of

Chinese Government has t aken

most

between

from t he l and rent

I welfare to

• The Chinese armed forces are

of Chinese Government had resulted

mass movement

caused the loss of

Workers ssociation.

forces Serve the

reaChed the

- 9 5 -

trend eventual ly wi ll further alienate th e relationship of th ein the election of repre-Thear e



masses of the people. Atthou gh the popular bases have fo r years

been well laid the ruling party, ye t they a,re still want ing in

magnitude and depth. To sum up in a nutshell, the Chinese

Government has to launch it s drive simultaneously in the stra te

g ica l, i deolog ical , o rgani za t iona l , p sycholog ical , i n te ll ig ence

and mass movement ~ r f a r e before the ult imate objective of

mainland recovery and national reconstruction ca n .be attained ..

organize

over the Chinese mainland are

What is more, how

have been due t o t he weaknes s in

in th e rear of the enemy is the

the present administration is nowwarfare the radio

levels of legislative ·UVU. . . l t l ; : ) needs to be

Al l these

relevant organizational

an ti -Red and anti-Mao

faced

s entatives to

insufficient The works in the Lt;l.l.."lHl'LJ.\)J.J.<:Ll. f ie ld need

both

United States

and in UUQ.1J .L . . l L

present writer

to

t ha t i n most of

l ibraries , the Chinese Reds propaganda is devil s

Free China are almos none. ac-

counts

China

the

in the

and anti-war sentiments among the

States. In ......,':-...,,...n

warfare there is of and im-

the material of the Government ...'-',_"' .......1.1,:<:;1......

men. As in the past

C ouditions fo r

and o ff ic er s Bes id es , the

the intelligence warfare are found

, the mass movement warfare is

Redf such warfare a ~ G l U . 1 . 1 ; : ) Lot to say

on the U!<:L.l.Hjl<:L.LlU

the concern of the ,-,11.1.11r::.::>1:: Government

th e ha s so fa r moulded the younger generation

the same pattern of marshalling toward officialdom aca-

demle

an eYE:? to

The intl:3Uectuals thus up ca n only

intE!rests and s oc ia l s ta nd in gs Such a

96 - -91 -



- 98-

Chapter IV.

Communism Versus Freedom

• A Contrast

"The si n and sor:r'0w of despotism is not

that i t does not love men, b ut that i t loves

them too much and trusts them too l i t t le."

- G. K. Chlqs te rt on .

"Contemporary Communism is that type

of totalitarianism whicl1 consists of three

basic factors. which c o n t r ~ l people. The

first is power, the second ownership, the

third ideology. II

- Milovan DjUas.

"The history of ev erynaHon under a

communist xegime demonstrates conclusive

ly that the com.munist version of freedom is

only a new form of total slavery. "

.... J . E. Hoover.

-'- 99 -

th e Communist an d "'·.I..I.I.o... ·- ...... "'lU1UU..LU ",., ideologies,.1 J ' t : : ' . : 1 1 · 1 . J . l . J , ~ of warfare, some people that

is a mere copy f rom t he and that mere copy



power of's v iewed f rom the

it is against hate. Al l an d

actions of the NationalGovernment takes their·origin from love

whilst those of th e Ch inese Reds hate The ".ut,,,..,•. ....,«

the of China is in the Threeha tcontinuation of '"'v ......., .."."'... conflicts. I f

f rom the Communi st wil l not necessarily e na ble d emoc rat to

us make clear at the outset that

wa r i n th e words of Clauswitz, a continuation of

we mean wa r then war is

fr om lo ve and laVAf the ,which

sixth lecture on

tiThe ancients 'o f lOY8 t.o

as yqUT children t an d I Be kind

the people and l ove al l creature s I Love -N as to

al l duties from which we ca n se e how well\

kindness and l ove i nt o e ff ec t" It The essence of

t he l ove of the the oppre ssed

the essence of is loye

Communist

'-""'uuauu.....H and

Such ahe Q,u,., ...--...,'CJU'"l1" ....u....

study is of because from it

we c an s ee the differences between these warfares in nature

and find ways to defeat the enemy. The is a com-

of the si x of polit icalw arfare

the ......,.""",,"1' conflict between the democratic

...... ~ ~ 4 ' ~ 4 . ' v\J' .... .L•.L\.,;,O:W'. no t a ti t fo r

IJv ......" ........C:>.L war must be won, we have to make

warfare as

'bf th e

the

th e Natkm.al

oppressed peoples of the

"""."..... y . ~ ~ is th e love of the corn....·

wh.ieh t he of

and the Fv . ".," .................<

The essence of the

munity and t he " ' \ . .ovuvu.........,c"' ....... ,

love " 'o .. · I T ' a ~ ' t '

love Versus Hate

Contrast in ldeclogical Warfa re

love into effect"entis

The Communist. ideology, on .the other is

hate. The Reds 9 RusSian qr Ch.inese f

the State because they hate i t

advocate the wip ing ou t of class because

as a the workers" And

the obliten'1 tion the class becau.se

the Republic China and the

In order to defeat

enemy ideologically, one ha s to find hi s weakness,..

shatter his belief, and hi s whole Sy before

destruction ca n be achieved. On th e other hand one ha s to

know one s strength, consolidate one l s belief and establish

so that one's thought ca n generate unmatchew.

Here is a contrast be -

100 - - 101

natural environments t hr ough t he application

of the law o f n a t u r e ~ Non-human beings do

sys

the

consider theclass ..

t ern a to th e Communist



i

of ou r brains and sense Qrgansut there

no t ,know how to solve problems they eneo'nntsr

in their struggle fo r survival, whilst human

beings are seeking w ays and means to solve

such problems. As human beings we should

survey the l \niverse and r eso lve ou r own problems from the humanistic viewpoint" I>

The Communist ideology is in the d.ialectical

of Marx and Lenin .. . Having denied t he value of

hurnan nature, it. has tr ied annihilate i t. The

adherents consider the w or ld a s consistitued

ters with their force re igning supreme. What they call

is to var ied in terpretat ions. According to . LeIl.ir;,

matter exists b eyon d t he realm of perception,

subsisting, it attracts sensibility and s.o

pea rs a s "re fh::cted" in th,e p ~ r c i p i e n t $ Interpreted

wa.y, th e term "matter" comprises practically al l

natural vvorld y in the hum8:n, society r including the man

Ac:cording to lvlarx r who proceded Leninf

are, they seem

The President was of the opini'On that man should be the

rnaster of no t vice versa. He went on to sa y

IlHistory rnarks t.he of mankind ; and the uniyerse is

t.he stage of human 11 AU these ca n be 'summed up a

nutshell - - humanism ..

of hi s

Com-

it. be

the

aggres-

also

humanism

a humanistic

;;;)J.;;;:'I.xu.".,Russia

with ·man as center ..

form an essentialpaxt ofnon-human

the law

and matter as '-.. 5""·.u• . . . , ~

have their solid basis on material

in

, liquidation, massacre J

"Human

process

whereas t he l if e of human beings

nature

universe ..

the

resort to

J l ~ H J " ' U L U " " ' U l dialectic in

livelihood as the cause evolution as ~ r . ~ ~ - - ~ v the 'Communist

historical materialism; and in methodology

Q . ~ , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , the Communist

manism is the human

master of the and the element of

done in the intere 5t of man.. In Section I,

"Fundamentals of and

President '-J . J . Q . ~ ; . " . . 'Y ' ..... r n . . . , , " ' ~ i r " ' " " "

sion"

viewed from the

Q . ~ ' c x . . u J . ' ; ; : > " materialism ..

outlook on

munists

ism ..

not t o l ove their

cause they hate hate

-102 - .- 103 -



First , the ideological krmament should be

By ideological armament we mean ~ h building up' of the i d e o l o ~



gical bu lwark on the one handand the sharpenin,g of t he i de01 0"';

gical weapons' to attack the enemy.. The former is to the

enemy I s ideological offensive at bay whilst the lat ter tdbe

employed in penetrating and thus destroying the enemy I d e rense line.. In r egard to the ideo log ical bu lwark on .the pa."tt

of the adt i-Communists , I t is to be built solidly on th e Three

Principles of the People, because these doctrines not,

mee t t he need of mankind bu t also ride th e tide of th e

With ou r faith in the s e p ri nc ip le s VIIhich 9 based upon h u m a n ~ism, are the orthodox cultural heritage of China, the l a ~ ~ O l . U -gical bulwark is strong enough to hold back any attack from

the e nem y. A s to ou r ideological weapons, t he mos t

are th e first and second of Dr .. Su n Yat-sen j s P r i n . , ~ciple of People! s Livelihood in criticism of Marxism

Leninism, and President Chiang I s works'refuting the samein

the past th ir ty odd years, among which "The Fundamentals of

Anti-Communist and Resisting-Russia Struggle ll liThe Basic

Problems in Deal ing wi th th'8 Comrqunist Ideology ,and Mel,n()Q:.'l;'

"Soviet Russia in China" and others are of paramount

tance.. These works may well be called the hydrogen bombs

ou r ideological weaponry"

Next the operations i n i deolog ical

Chinese Reds should be increased" I t is beyond doubt that the

pr e sent ideol,ogical warfare ag' al ns t t he Peiping must

be broadened and intensified. In dealing with t ~ Red

sonaus the Government and the people of the·

of

on the

i t

na:rmon,lOlU5 re -

an IDyincible re-

the Three Prill

kindness

the funct ion

social

of

warfare

determine their fate

with the "".....'_ 4 ••

with mutual aid and

it woUld be easy to

s ~ r v i c e m e n and t he

th e

hi s method of

the course Of social H e m ad e further

social throug-h class

,one can unite the people

and win over

With hate as th e

pr e sent lUE301,0l:rlCl::I

what

was mistaken

in warfare ..

strike the enemy. the

Tn ' "n , ' \ ! of constant s t rugg le th e in te rna l s t ri fe

will lead to their collapse. Therefore the wa r

Q./!; ........... .., .. the Communists is sure to be won", hasten

need to make th e af-

in u .< '••"v, '" ' , .......,..

their

these

resul t ina n d d i s ~ ; e n s i o n

'which could lead. to col. -.Meanwhile w ith th e fulle st 'development of human na

ture and wisdom, olie could' make use of material forces fo r

of mankind. As the Communists believe

as

disease

blunder in ..""'- 0

munists is love h,ate, humanism O'F,"" '......" .....

.. , . _ , ~ ~ , ~ _ aidllgainst s t r u g g ~ , e , and in a word

th e against communism.

-101 -

2. Reconstruction Ve rsus Destruct

various forms ofseust

expose their



th e world

Cont rast in St rategical Wa rfare

In'n.".,."·,..,...•... should

nail down the

cit ies of th e Chinese Reds in contrast with.t.heir

and their dialectical

t he Chinese Reds had c n : a m p l ( m E ~ ( 1

construction", the Founder of Chinese as

it s main thre-e of reconstruction,

, social and economic On the basis

Sun I s outline 9 Pre sident in hi s lecture

tem and :?ractice of the Principle s of th e

two more of reconstruction, the the ethical"

From these one can see t ha t t he main r.h"o,...."',

In to the tenet of strategical

construction Communist destructlon a The program of

national reconstruction of t he Repub li c of China

is based upon the doctrine of Dr. un

Father of stated that the

al l strategy of national revolution was I n th e

similar , President of

Anti-Communist and lissia S tr ug gl e" t ha t l iThe

supreme of ou r

to national reconstruction ll" In h is " Pla ns fo r

from the Communist camp LI1 many r e s p e c t s ~ We are fo r

craoy, a nd i n order to map out ways to defea.t communism w

must make a comparison of factors involved,.

the

have

realiztEould

faith in COmrrmtlllSJrIl

now

what the Chinese

th e

the e lemen ts

to

decehredand

theservicemen

among

the

Chinese Reds had those industrialists and business-

them th e honorific titleD!

most

the totalitarian

ful les t extent the u 'n , .... I;·o...... 1 S blood and

them of their The Chinese

induced l and r eform

led the ha IS been

thermore Article Two of Dr. Sun's "Fundamentals

Fur-

.- 1 -1

On the other hand, th e basic st rategy of the Chinese Recb

in t he ir , subvers ion and rebe l li on is "destruction 1I c"The of

Reconstruction!l reads as follow



-111

what call S Qwnershipll ha s resulted in

owning nothing at aU" c o m m u n i s m ~ when. rendered

into Chinese, Ha doctrine thl:!t property is shared

all" is in th e end ll a doc trine that nothing c an be shared

al l !I . Thub the peo.pie are rendered destitute and be.come s l a Y , e ~laborers . In the social phase, the people IS COfnmune

th e family system. In t.he cul tural field, the Chinese

st s on the mainland are promoting vl'hat they call the lithe

thoroughly Red and ye t h ighly spec i al ized" educat ion, a

bination of Communist poli tical consciousness and

knowledge, which stresses the expediency rather than

tradition, the practical us e ra.ther t han t he old w i s d o m ~an aim to the Chillese history f culture and ethics ..

finallf, the objective of th8Ghinese Reds as embodied in

~ l a r x i s l n - L e n i n i s m , is world revolution, or, th e communization

of t ~ world, whleh is tantamount to thE:' destruction of f r e e ~ ~peace and happiness of the manki.nd. What is more

tactic S 1'esort to ar e "st:ruggle sl! • claim

ownership" ha s resulted in "collective

"" ,V.LVj>; .L, , , . a . J . phase, they tr y to destroy t he f re edom of

through indoctrination, brainwashing and

poliHcal regaid the s ta te a s means of

sing the p eo ple and they a dv oc ate th e ab oli tio n of th e

because their ultimate objective the tptal destruction.

In the economic phase, the deprivation of the

private property is nothing but toe dest.ruction of

and social economy * What t he Communi st s call

over

process of

the

pellQ€mt and pro-

of op -

the Chinese Reds were

started the

food fo r them

their

the

to

and to construct roads

t10n.

canals fo r

-110 -

build

with " , ; " "J I ,LU .U , !£.

reconstruction l i E ~ s in the people I

T h e r e f o r E ~ order to

I s basic mleds food

and means of

government must exert it s utn::ost

what sort of

, is dedicated l t build ing an

sperolls natidn.. I t

the had h09k

to reConstruct ..

dead se t the reconstruction

because a well-·reconstructed China. meant dea th

to communism. For instance, to

s book liThe of

_ ~ ' ~ " " ' 4 , " , th e last war f because it was r s -

China ..

and at different pla9ElS use democracyand to ' - ' ' - 7 . ' . ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' C

to attract t h o s ~ naive and pitiable democratic and l iberal

socialist

, a nd h av e go on with their

reconstruct



is

to take the offensive

• In a smear ' - " " ' t U i - ' ' ' ; ' ' ' ' ' ' X ~ ' '

recalled that

of the Chinese

In

selves

Government on the UGH:: ; ;1 . 1 . ' " ' ' ' .

war

to the G o ' v e r ~ m e n t I s

and had n r . , ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' H n nnn" " .... rYl

s t r e n g t h ~By the time when Chinese

, - , , , , , , ~..u,,,,u..U"''''''''

to open the Governmen t was alrrioat UI.!-pre:-

"""rUYlg'!"""" reason of th e fall of the main land

hands of the CommtLTlists was that the Government

,mained p a s s i v E ~ and on the now

nave Since Communists established the

mentsf

but the objective of t he Reds is totalitarianism e..nd

As a rule th.e Communist hierarchy is more

nical the in , fo r the uncontrolled

of a despot cannot reach every pe rson and hi s n ....."niC::.'t"'1f'''r

despotin

can control the body of hi s, ~ o . . , r " r T '" to violence too t bu t not to

exploIt and control

body and s ou l, u nd er t he name of

matter they may the enslavement

the people under the Communist rule is a well-known

the world e

in

can

thehe Three

structive tactic s"

is attained" as

means when 'others the

end in. itself"

destructive, and

an d

even if the

government

communism is

nevernever

-113

warfare: one is to employ .it against t he Chi ne se Reds

the ,J lse lves, and the other is to deal wlth the thehad

decaJiesthe thE! mainl and more

tlcoalition government"



slave-rninded and inhuman"re

national communism and attain perrrlaIl6'IlJ;.

We cannot ta.ke them fo r average

have to their mater ial is t ic dialectic s in

st riking against their organization t an d th.eir

activities This its what w e Chinese

say: the \1 S8 of the enemy I s spear to

hi s s h h ' 3 1 d ~ Only by so doing can we make th e

Reds contradict, negate r transform and thus

annihilate each other.. so can

we once and fo r al l th e materialisticon which the Communis t

ar e base6; And only

to maanee posed by

the

!lIn 'our against the Chinese Reds

matter i t is in military;

o r s oc ia l field 1 regardless of whatever time

and space, we should neve r en te r ta in any i l -

lusion of coexistence and cooperation with

them. We have to know the Chinese Communists

mainland u n d ~ r the Communist In dealing with the

Chinese Reds, she ha s to adhere to the ti t fo r tat:

In hi s lecture on "The Basic Problems in Dealing with t he

Communist Ideology and Methods " ., President

out:

to

the

the

rult:l

pea-

def<?at

direc .

busineSSmen

are self--evident. UndeI' the

Chinese Heds

ha s seen

turned out to be hundred Commu.llist

al l the on th e mainland

any· sort of freedom to of

sante with th e carry ou t "land reform"

distribution

114 --

As regards th e Communist organization i t is based upon rutn

l ess pressure and under mechanical control.. It is constantly

i n the " ' T . : I " R r . ! ~ D ' lthe



-117 -

Firs t , le t us ma¥e a comparative study of the organiza

tional theories .. I t is apparent that ou r organization based

upon physiological principles, hence i t is organic ; whils t th e

Communist organization is based upon mechanical t h e o ~ i e s ,hence i t i.s inorganic. The former, being organic, is ap t

yield Rn inexhaustible living force t hr ou gh th e process of

continuou3 growth and development.. In hi s message on

ganization: It s Principles and Functions, I President ' J AU .Q . UM

pointed out: IlIf we wish to strengthen ou r own organization. so

that 'we can surpass the enemy, i t is necessary that w the physiological concept by the application of the

of division of labor"cooperat1on, balance and c o o r d i r i a t i ~among the constituent elements of ou r organization.. T h e r E ~should be no opposition, confl ic t, f r ic tion and laxity no r

should there be any f is s ur e , c rack, dislocation and . n ~ ' o ....·",''''''''

tlon. II "Personal;ly", the President went on , til have been con

v inced tha t t he highest form of organization in the universe

none other than the organic entity of living things with that of·

human beings the most pe rfect .. In th e s truggle for exis tence f

hum'an beings must perfect their physiological

order to survive.. Ther8fore the. principle of physiologica.l

in danger of disintegration if one of it s links breaks off e In

order to defeat the enemy in the organizational aspects we

must use ou r strength to attack the enemy ' is weakness before

we can achieve the absolute , overal l victory.. A comparative

study of such a w8.-rfi:rr e is necessary ..

the

Ou r

and

ca n

are

is no

of the

fw:un-

Therein it s

in

camps, the

o

As the Three

and the

China and

Chinawill adhere

and to the

comrade" To defeat t he Ch inese

the interest

In 9.n

disihtegrate and decompose al l of a sudden. II In th is pas sage ,

President Chiang, had exposed the weakness of the Communist

.allor

of

or$.!aJtl12,atJLOn is the most rational criterion r P " " r r Q " ~ ' "ganizations. It From thi s message we ca n see the



As regards the Communist organization, it fol.low s the line

Next, le t us make a comparative study of the lines that ou r

organi?lation and the Communist organization follow respec

tively. Quite obviously, our organization follow s t he l in e of

the entire people whilst the CommuI!ist organization follows

the line of what ha s been called the prol et a ri an c l ass" The

former is shaped in the interests of the entire nation whereas

the latter is limited to those of a part of the nation. Judged

from the modern democratic ideas, i t is certainly erroneous

to follow the line of only one class of the people Besides

the strength ofa class of the people can never surpass that of

the entire people. Therefore we insist that ou r organization

should follow the popular line. Our Party organ is to uni te aU

revolutionary youths alld patriotic countrymen w'ho have fai th,;-

in the Three Principles of the People as its constituent ele-

ments, in a common struggle fo+, the interests oCour

and so also of the !I\asses of the people, as strongly

to class struggle. The constitnentsof ou r Party ar e the en

tire p e o p l e ~ We struggle for. the interests of our nation and of

the mass of the pe"ople. We struggle no t fo r the interests of

a single class, or of a few persons, bu t fOT the interests of

the entire peolpe .. In so doing, we follow the popular line&

organization based upon the "pathological" theories. Its

structure will definitely end up in complete collapse beyond

retrieval.The Communist o the other is based

up mechanical theories. All belong to mechanism are as

rule constrained and l ifeless. The theoretical basis

Communist organizatlon is , in a sense

In the same message on "Organization: It s and

U..u'';;I.J,IJJ:A" It the President also pointed out: nl t par-

emphasized that logical patterns"as embodled in

Three Principles the. People entirely follow the

from those of the Communist or-

ganization which follow the pathological

' I · i 'o . . . . . . . , . . ~ " ....."" the overall orgsl.11izational activities the Com-

munist Party come f rom the premises of ne -

gatio'ns cataclysms. I t Iseems that the Reds t reat a &.&'V .......... ~ man as one who s ~ f e r s from diseases. I f we go a: l i t tle deeper

the of the COIDffiUltllst organfzation 9 we can fir..d that

the constituent elements wID engage ~ h e m s e l v e s in

self-contradiction, self":'coJtlflict and self-negation. In other

words, in the Communist organizatiorithe constituents have

engage themselves.in const;ant confl ic t, contradi tion and ne

gatioa 0V'en if they ar e unwHling to so so; tha t is to say, from

it s inception, conflict, contradition andnegation ar e the order

of the and then. conflicts ar e followed confUcts, con

·tradictions by contra4ictlons, and .negations by and. J

end , the v ic ious ch'cle of ,innumerable conflicts., con-

tradictions and negations c.au,ses the. internal organization to

physiologipal organization.

1 1.8 119 -

zaUonal methods used by the two' camps.. We organize' .onr,;,.

s e l v ~ s by the way of right while the Communists organize them-

p:b:)letariatll. follow the. proletarianclass line

......,...,..,•. "'... they utilize class struggle as a mea,ns

ca l power, wlthoutany sllncere regard fo r the interests of the



Fig" IIig . I

lIIf we wan t t o restore ou r nadonalsu'uld

ing, we must revive OUI:" national spirit Q If ' W want to :r:,evive ou r national spirit II ,'Va must Cul- '

fill. two conditions .. First , we mU3t understand

that we occupy today a most perilous posiUon;

and second, knOWing ou r danger, we must

util ize China I s ancient social groups, as tl'te

In regard to u n i t y ~ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in the sixth

on Nationalism, had given the following concrete

selves by the way of might. We ar e united fo r th e same ptlr.-

pose, while the Communists are affil iated under coercion «-

Our organization is characterized by unity, While t he Com

munist organization is marked by control. Unity forms B.

natural circle (Figure One), tight and inseparable like.

cell in a body show ing no sign of integration 411 An or ganiza:tion

marked by control is formulated in ' layers piled up (Figure

Two) to the top, which is liable to collapse when one of it s

parts falls apart . The strength and weakness easily d h ~ " ' :carnable ..

organi-fs ma,ko a comparativetill

p:t'bletarian, class as profess t o have struggled for ll Take,

the Bolsheviks fo r . x a m p l ~ .. ln the first stage of the so-calledJ

revolution, had ut il ized the proletarian c la ss a s basic

f or ce t o s ei ze power and meanwhile rall ied the peasants as

reserves man attempt to neutralize the capitalist class which

Qomprised. the l iberals and the Tsarists., In t he second stage,

'With the.proletariat s t il l as the basic force' of the revo lu t ion

and peasants and the proletariat of neighboring state s ;as

reserve_, they attempted.to neutl'alize what they had called

the bourgeois democrats from the masses .. ,And then in the

third stage, t he Bol shev ik s c lamored fo r the, proletarian di

ctatorship, :but as a m a t t . ~ r of faqt, the Russianpolitica.l power

had aJ;ready fillen into thl9 hands of th e Communist hierarchy,

and slnce"thenthe proletnrian class itself had, no longer ex ...

Inheriting th e Bol sheviks I practise, the Chinese Reds

seized power by followlnir ,practically the same line. They had

used such la-balsas "the lRed Army of W o r k ~ r s and Peasants",

nW n .... ln::t.y·!Ill in charge of thE. factory", and rule

of various classes" e ll em the same party line of the Bolshe

viks.. They had utilized the class struggle as a means to

usurp the political power,. However, as 'Soon as the workers

and peasants wake up and revolt against Communist dicta-

i t is certain that the Red Par ty a s a would

th e v ~ ~ t mass of the Chinese people ..

-120 - - -121 -

family system.. Theyalso promoted the struggle of tenant far

mers against landlords, labor against the management, appre

ntices against their tutors, students against their teachers,

national

and the clLan and consolidate them to

form a

complished and w ! have th e strength



I t suffices to say t ha t i n the organizational warfare to ,be

waged against the Chinese Communists, so l ~ n g as the National

Government ~ n the people of the Republic of China adher$ to

-123 -

in order to split the society into conf l ic ting factions with the

.Cormer stability: ruined. They also conducted th e st:b!JS'gle by

pitting t ~ functionaries- against the department heads, the

lower organ against the higher, the mobs against the government in order to destroy the independ eht states through inter

nalstr ife and dissension. HaVing destroyed' a ll t ra di ti on al

systems and exi st ing organiza tions, t he Communi st s then

seized control and imposed their will upon the people 6 Such a

control, of course, could never last long, because, as a rule,

the greater the pr e ssure, the stronger wil l be th e re sistence..

I t is a certainty t ha t t he Communist tyrannical regime can

never avoid their eventual doom. Within the Chinese Communist

PaTty, there have been absolute control 'and bloody suppres

sion. As a result of internal strife and purges, so , many

Communist Party members and even senior Communist cadres

had met their death5. In th e revised edition of this book in

1959 t the present writer had remarked that "Khrushchev and

Liu Shao-chi ar e the masters of t he Communist intramural

struggle, but their own fate can well be imagined. II Things

have happened as predicted. I t ca n be safeiS- presumed that no

C't>mmunist t opno tche rs can escape their doom in the constantparty struggles ..

ele-

or the Government ..

rallying ,behind him al l genuine

power s truggle within the

ments and ye t there had f,le1Ver been any blo,odshed due to

reforms

Communist method is the use of violent suppression

and, absolute control.. For, the sake of the Reds in -

imposed their will upon the after

had de strayed it s volitional basis.. They what was

called the Itstruggle campaJtgns" pitting t he s on hi s

own young b r o ~ b e r against hi s elder wife

_K ' a ....J. i:) i> he r husband in 6 r d ! ~ r todestroy the traditionalChine se

hundred millions nnited to fight, no matter how

out present pos it ion ' we should be abl e,

lift i t up.. So, to know and to unite are

two essentials for reviving ou r nationalism"

-122 -

'!'he method of utilizing tlie traditional civic bodies China

conglomeration into a J;]ational entity is in with

the natural law and human nature and fee li ng without t he need

thus formed of kindred

one of voli tion and love, not of arbitrary force I t should be

recalled that Dr .. Sun had used this method to organize

Kuomintang.. he encountered many difficulties

and frustrations during orga'nizational , the Founding

Father of the Party and the! Repub li c h ad persisted in the

above-mentioned method to consolidate the organs. I n t he

course of the National he had initiated several

discern the sincere attitude on the part of the Government

time will In the directiv-e entitled "The Essence and

the physiological ra ther than pathologICal organiza-

adopt the way of rather than t he way of .



\1ethods of Initiative 11 President Chiang Kai-shek quoted Hu

Lin·-yi, a famous general in the Ching Dynasty, as that

only b y s i n c e r i t ~ may we be able to defeat all hypocrisies in

thE) world an d only us e of truth mat we be able to rout

falsehoods. Thereupon he instructed ..-1,.5 countrymen to

preciate realist ical ly th e essence of °chec1ting activeness

passi veneSS" in such fields as mHitary operation,

campaign and personal cul ti va ti on t hr ough the practice of

?Jhonestyll and "simplicity", both of which ar e synonymous with

tltruthfulness". In another article, HA Study of Techniques in

the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion II t the President

said: "I t is a matter of urgency fo.r us t o make amends f or t he

defects in ou r publicity works. Natural lyour information 581 ' -

vice should cater around the Three Pr inc ip les of the

with adequate us e of n ew s release and educational means on

the one hand and fac tua l publ ic it y in the mili ta ry , social and

political aspects on the other in order to boost the morale of

t he a rmed forces and the peopl e against the en emy, an.d in

turn to enhance ou r fighting spirit .." "Here, the principle of

publicity based upon facts indicates the at ti tude of the Chinese

Government in it s psychological warfare against th e Reds.

4 Truth Versus lies

,in Psychological Warfare

follow the popular Hne, and c on so lid at e th e structure the

final over the" enemy will certainly be won ..

There is nothing similar or identical.in the

psychological warfare waged by the Chinese National Govern

mentand it s enemy, t he Chinese Communists.. Whether it is

in the attitude during actua l combat, in the techniques "and

skill employed in the psychological field, or in t he facts used

as for the the Chinese Government is fa r

to the Communist s, . In the first section of t;bap1;er

i n t hi s book, we have amelysed the tactics employed

the Russian and Chinese Communi st s i n their psychological

warfare which include and intim id atio n. To put

these tactics into they have to resort to various un,;""

derhand methods dealitJ,g with their real or

and with the m as s of peopl e under their control ..

"The study below show s the way t o t he Com-

munists wnrfare ..

The Communist attitude in psychological warfare is , on the

contrary, al l fa.lse.. They teU sheer lies an d i ssue rubber

cheques .. They peddle drugs but they are

harbor pointed arrow s but they have a mouthful of sweet talks

They fool the people fo r time, bu t canrrot fool them

such a war, Ollrs .i s faith

to In or information

, we h ~ l ! v e never re sorted s u g ~ ; . . c o a t e dE'ren i l the public may no t readily

Q J . ~ ' C ! . O : : ' ' C ' U tolies·. o r r ubbe r , . "ht :>nt1IA

In the Q."'.. L I < \ . ~ \ " & C

based

--124 - -125 -

essence beauty. Where does i t lie? In ou r thi.nking, tnith

is beauty, virtue is beauty. In th e persuit of truth and

tue, we ar e true representatives of b E t ~ u t y . Therefore t inPre

of

U l l i i i i U , U J . ; : : > ~ Rebel-

still another article of similar nature

Tactics Employed in the Suppression of the

and What. Ou r Senior Officers Should Understand"



Speaking of the facts as basis fo r . waging psychological

The Communists have no art to speak of in psycholvgical

war fa re bec au se thei rcharacter is ugly t theirmind p i t c h d a r ~an d their means treacherous. As stated in the above 1 the

strength of th e Communists in the psychological aspect l ies in

duplicity, hypocrisy and sham. They have to resor t to

camouflage and double talk in th e employment of tactics of

temptation and intimidation. To carry ou t their temptation

tactics, t he Chin e' se Reds use flattery and bribery; and to

carry ou t their intimidation tactics, t hey u se struggles, pur

ges, t o rt u res , massacres and other atrocit ies. As they are'

w ry in face, bad in manners, uncivilized in actions and

vieious in schemes, they ar e ugly in every sense of t he WOrl".

Despite their friendly masks and s w e ~ t l ies, they can neve r

conceal their ugly attributes. As soon as their masks ar e

ripped apart and their li e uncovered, whatever achievement

they might have made in t ~ field of psychological w a r t a r e ' w i ~ lbe written off at one stroke.

warfare.

psychological warfare as an ar t , we have both the inner beauty

as well a s i ts outward mainfestation. The outward manifesta

tion is the artist ic from of inner beauty. In ou r daily life yve

talk about "the art of war", ~ n lithe ar t of l iv i ng " , t he same

principle of artistic beauty can a1so be applied to psychological

ou r

the

in

one

order to

warfare ours

armed

it is evidentthat falsehood can never

of a e s t h e t i i ~ s'

time.

the

and support

criteria. However we the out...

ward appearance of t he means and techniques

warfare. When we a paint or print

there is no doubt that ·a certain standard of

be observed in it s Nevertheless, an artistic re-

should have for i ts b as is the source aestheticvalue. The source consists of the four factors

~ h a t ou r mind and upright; motive is

ou r objective is far-reaching and pro-

and tha t ou r is righteous and • Par-

when we , we should upon th e

stand the test

concrete

e must love ou r is stillwe must pay attention to their needs.

J . U ~ { J . ' : > I , . l . ~ ' i : I can reach, we should

s:hall never follow the Communist

of hypocrisy small favorsJ! This was pre-

Chine se Reds had done to the and

servicemen Now that their measures

said: IlWhether in warfare

-- 1 127 - ,

al l workers have turned ou t to b e s l a v e - l a b o r e r ~ .. With th e

slo.gans of l ithe election of model workers l' and Itgrabbing the

Red f lag"

, the last drop of sweat and blood of t he se wor ke rs

of China has for it s h<ll,"".Ir ....... r ' n " ' ~ a happy

Taiwan as the fo r national

\'Iiar fare, the

and prosperous "" ....."""",t>"



To sum up , ou r present psychological warfare against the

Chinese Communists is truthagainst falsehood, beauty ' . & < = . ~ ~ ' ' ' ' ' ¥ugliness , v i rtue against evil, and abundance against dearth ..

'Time is on ou r side: the longer the Chinese Communists rule

the mainland, the more weaknesses will be exposed in their

psychological field. The primary ob.jeptive in our warfa re is

to strike the Communists I psychical weaknesses and to s h a t . t E r l . ~their fighting spirit so as to arouse the people's anti··-Red and

resisting-tyranny sentiments and encourage the defec tion of

-129

is squeezed They are n better than th e beasts of burden e

The little tract of l a n ~ the farmer wa s alkted to till after the

so-called land re form ha s also been taken'away when th e

Chinese Reds se t up the UAgricultural Production Cooperati'ves

H

and "the People I s Communes", and al l th e peasants have

turned out to be the Communists I serfs. Even iJ they the

daily "working quota" the peasants cannot receive th e meag:re'

food ration.. The ration system h as k \p t the basic biological

n ~ e d s of mainland. people under controlt> The annual ration of

raw clothing materials i s l imited to teu feet .. Besides, they do

not have modern transportation facilities, no r do have

'U'.e freedom of movement. In short, the mainland suffer

so much froiIl the acute s h o r ~ a g e of food, c l o t h i n g ~and means of transportation that they are now like

animals. Unde r such a c i r c u m ~ t a n c e , w h a t facts can serve

basis fo r the Communist propaganda or psychological warfare?

and

the

en -

Sinoe the

weUare

worker!S in

or

under

the

'-1

when used as the

China

. . . . 0 ......... "0 fo r the

of mainland

Reds hvve confiscated allfactories,

m atter in

CnID!O'Q'U::a1 warfare, constitute an unmatched < : l l . L I 'U=< '. L to the

behind the iron curtain.

labor insurance .,."'.".....,.....

Th e se concrete

trast with

On the other we can wel l app rehend how a

the on the mainland are leading.. Under t he na me

S tate and , the

and T. V. sets II

en.couraU'l9ffiI9nt 1 to and assistance

and business have been ,.,....."'"",tI...,

the growth rate of international trade rose to 48 pe r

rate Jin 1973 wa s the same II Due to the

of national economy, people in al l walks of life

are now enjoying p ro sp erity .. T he life of the on this

island bastion of national reconstruction serves a con-

Taiwan have been q[uite comfortably well off" Since the

of such policiesa.s public land redistribution,

reduction of land to the tiller , reclamation of land

mechanization al l the peasants are haVing their

farms and mos t of them have owned modern facilities such

reconstruction has been built up ~ a model

accordance with the Three Principles

advancement of of the entire

of such IDf'aSUres as full

the Communist armed forces. As regards ou r psychological

bulwark, we have to instill in the mind ortha people and ser

vicemen the Communist -ba it ing thoughts by poi nt ing out to

and tactics

materialism

The Communist J..J.AI,O.!.,1..i.l>( . . . .u, . . . .O warfare, like

fa re h as.it s

the Communists are deduced



them that the Chinese Reds must a nd w ill be defeated. More

over, we shall use the method of psychological reconstruction

to consolidate th e p eopl e a nd th e servicemen I s wil l t o

Thus, we can a tt a in the goal of Ilwinning the opponent I s heartbefore overcoming him and w i n n i ~ l g the support of the. op

ponents' people before recapturing the 'land" e Al l these ar e

measures to be t aken in defeating the Chinese Communists on

the psychological battlefield.

is

of r e tr e at a s advance

domestic

said elsewhere: !l The Communi-

upremacy is based on certain

flexible to meGt the varied situa:tions of

f i l ~ l d of' political or wa1.'-

backward before t"VVO

CAI:l.l!llfJ.Lt::, their

international as

, President Chiang Kal-shek, in a lecture given at the Yang

mingshan Institute on April 1950, had pointed out: "In

order to defeat the Communists, we must be able to ou ts t rip

them i n th e intell igence work. Negatively, we should tighten

up ou r own security to guard against any leakage of ou r

military secrets. Positively f we should develop ou r

network on the mainland and then penetrate i nto t he Chinese

Reds I inner circles and other organization:.; to obtain va luable

information from them. Thus, we can k e ~ p t he Red

from having access to o ur c la ss if ie d mat te rs while keeping

thelT pulse under our, thumbs. Il These short remarks U U , U l 1 , ~ Uout'the way to defeat the Communists in intell igence warfare •

5. Science Ve rsusSorcery

-A Contrast in Intelligence Warfare

ap

to

have

more

up to us 9

other

lecture we ca.n se e that the Chinese Communists

but also tactics their kU'"vJ. . ... . l .""; 'C!Jl.... 'O

From

stress not

areas, ha s to devote himself to thestrategy and too".

years

"''' '·...Itl1, .... '''' moment fo r their' e activities.

&.ttaln their ends, these Red w ~ l l ,suffer and any kind of hardships. As we are unaware

their their , we have suffered

Therefore anyone who is mission in th e Communist-

or even effect the stratagem

When necessary, will themselv€\

verbal attacks ""/;;:.CL.ULi:\I- their own Party and

tricks in order to win confidence in

their planted in 0 ul'

than three five ten

• The went on to say: liThe Chinese Com-

-131 -

ach ieved, t ho se ind iv idua ls of high quali ti -es can undergo

specialized training. In a message on tlThe Mission and The

Outlines of Intelligence Worku , President Chiang pointed out,:

munists inherited their system from Soviet R n s ~ ~sians m As early as the Tsarist days, the Russian intelligenc(i

work had been well-foWlded $ Since the overthrow of the



On the contrary, the Chinese Communists hs.vebeen ac

customed to utilizing the hoodlums in the intelligenoe opera

t i o n . s ~ Being masters of recruiting riff-raffs fo r such work f

they would u se any sort of, hoodlums to serve the i r purpose

and any Tuthless methods at their, disposal. For i n s t a n c { ~ ~'\IV ho in 1 himself as me.gician J)D. the

tiThe success of i nt el li gence work d ep en ds upon no t only

trainings but also outstanding talents" Trainings ca n only

provide the principles, but the in tel ligence operatives should

b e abl e to ac t on their own initiative by use of their talent while

following the principles already learned. In t h ! ~ way 11 the in

telligence service can be developed and effective. II "Genera

lly speaking, n the President went on, " th e int el li gence work

is t he mos t difficult and ip.volves great danger, with th e oper ....

ative I sl ife atoStake from time t o t ime" If the individual con

cerned is imbued with revo lu tionary fe rvor the greater the

difficulties f the better will he b e abl e to m a k ~ use, hi s

natura l gif ts , which might be undeveloped in peace tima ll!! At

present, in the United States and Great Britain, emphasis is

laid on the technical knowledge arid scholastic attainments of

th e recruits fo r intelligence service. Many specialists and

scholars .take pride in i oi ning in the combined 'War of nerves

and of cloak and dagger. And so they gla<liy contribute their

knowledge and skill so as to pushahead their national security

work both in width and in depth ..

be

both

engage

to those

and

this

the t ime when

'VUA.J.J.O:; ' '; : ) 'C' Reds

traditionalundergroun.d gangsterism

the recruits fo r the intel-

of the f ac t t ha t the Chinese Communists

more

132 _.

In

the

have to raise

in regard to thE! intelligence recruits, We

in on th e scholastic attainments

in warfa!:'s against

until ou r defeat on the mainland in 1949

:realize that we had fa r IJ'Cl,ULl. ! ' ,U

Reds in the field of intellIgence .. From now

must start anew ou r intelligence workn"

Lenin had continued the practJce and the GPU

police) to the vast mass of th e

under controL. , to trace it s

arid operation I:)f Chinese ha s had

of more t ha n one hundred years ..

infiltrat,ed into ou r in 1924,

inherited aU related to J . l l 1 , ~ . L U ~ ~ t : l J J ' l , ; ' t : f fromSoviet Russians", Since then we had be en fo rc ed

and tactics in their intelligence there

are still ways to defeat OUlr enemy"Such measures to be

taken may be stated as follow s:

....U " ! " j J L ~ ~ work" Particular attention should oe

, scholastic

In regard to the methods engaged i n intelligence

intelligence.A J U , I J I J . A . _ U j l ~ Well Road in wa s a notorious

' V L L i I ( Q I \ : { ~ U in the Chinese He

around him various of hoodlums as hi s dis-



the- - ~ - . / ;'

intellif{lence warfare

/-135 -I

To sum up, the

we ar e using scientific technique against the

c:ery. In the past, the Chinese

activities had

doctrination, masquerade f manipulaUon and

of Communist cadres were like the wicked sorcerers ,

in smart • Theyhypnotizedthe people and then

sweet carrots dangling &-head and

whips behind t h e ~ e victims puzzled,

or frenzied. No wonder many of t hem jumped an d

around l ike mad. Therefore, th e methods the ' - ' ' - /HH'U,A. .U+ , , , .. .,

in their intelligence service Jlre a sort

Yv hich seem te rri fying at fi r st

but a careful scrut iny w il l reveal that there is

therein. Like the tricks of magicians 1

arEt not worth a straw. I n t he world of

intell igence work has entered

v i n c ( ~ of science. Take psychology fo r example,

merly treated as a myster ious subject of s tudy , but

recognized as a branch of science, there-is nothing

about i t any more. Many advanced nations today have IQ I J l J . l . J l CU

scientific' techniques to and u'sed modern scientific

in th e intelligence service.with surprising results"

Entific techniques and apparutus, we c an de fe at the

Communists in the f ield of intelligence.

in

the

and

age or

and in -

that we can

stress on the

i t is

-will use the

In to the in intelligence we

ar e momentum because of pitting ou r democratic against

the Communist force.. Ours the way of

the way of the Communists is one of might.. It is natural that

favor the not the might" In the foreseeable

the g r ~ a t mass people on the farmers,

bvsinessmen and

who have suffered from theCommunists

",""..:au',-.1. and recognized t hei r tr ue face, will

us in the operations.. Our

UULt : '1 .1LULI . will be on the i n c ~ r e a s e while the Communists on the

~ O n c e the Reds lose the mainland

will deV"ote their efforts in us sort of

-1

comf;l out victorious in intelligence warfare

Chinese Communists who ar e advocates of

and to

are hoodlums.. If we

and natural of the

go,

k l ( 1 n ~ l m ) i n I Q and frantic assassination ll the Chinese

Communists expanded their intelligence networks-

the hoodlums in: t h r o u g h o u ~ the n . \ 1 . . . . .' ..... , e s ' p 1 C m a ~ Q ' e works through series

And everywhere the Chinese Reds

for infi l tra tion and sub

control But hoodlums

and seht them. out to terrorize the

as the people ar e no t aware of the Red conspiracy, they ar e

often led by the Communists and becpmethe tools of subversion

and power The loss of the Chinese mainland. to

a.-

on the main-KElDUlbllbC of China. the Comml.lnist

land 1s scholarship gang5terism, UVI,JU.!. itLoi

alienation, and scIence against sorcery. the



There is a wide difference between theway we upon

t he peopl e and the way the Chinese Communists treat thel1'b.f'!,-

We look upon the people as th e main bodyo!' the L . . . . ._" .......'u .

the Communists look upon them as mere tools. We regard

people as the main body of t.henation beca.use His the will of

the people that In one of hi s lectures on Ue'ffiC)C}"R.C:V

Dr . Sun Yat-sen had pointed out: "Since China ha s had a re-

volution and ha s 9..dopted a democratic f01'111 of government 9 the

people should rule i aU 1l13tteT The gove;rnment !lUly

'be called popular goyernment; in ether words ,under a 1"19-

usurpation.

the Communists m ~ be attr, ibuted to various factors,· but one'

of the primary causes is the alienation from the masses.. I t

should be confessed that our P art y and Government had fo r a

cons iderable period al ienated themselves f rom the rank and

rUe of the people. I t goes without saying that the government

and t.he people ar e c103ely related to each other like the water

and the fish. Without the popular support, the government is

l ike a- fi sh out of water. In ou r p l to recover the mainland,

we must first regain the confidence of the people and take hold

of the psychological trend of the masses. These constitute

chief mission in ou r mass movement warfare against the

Chinese Communists. In waging such a war, we ar e nowassured of victory. A comparative study of strength and

weakness betwee.1 the Republic of China a n the Peiping r e gime in th e mass operations is'ma.de as follows:

6. rvi ice Versus tXP loUation

-:A Contrast in Mass Movement

The mass moyement warfare is waged i n two N .. .""' ....,!" ,

t he one hand, we have to cOllsolidate the

trend of ou r own a,nd step up our organization

so as to develop the powerin the decisive wa r against

Communists to r securing the final On the other

hand, we -also have t o win over ,the heart of the under

the Communist to disintegra te the Red mass

~ Q . U . l . 4 : I . : : t " . L U l o i so as to faci li tate our military counter a t tack.

Mancius, speaking of things other than had stated

"Natural climate is of less importance than topographical

and advantage is less importance

III Here i t is clearly indicated that

support is to be reckoned with much more tha.n

climate topographical advantage. It also accounts

<> ... f".u....AJ. . _ c : U l " " ~ of strength of the mass of the in

The Chinese Communhlts ar e adept in deception and coer-

simulation of' goodness and small

favors deceive and lure the And

we can turn into ..,."'-.i-,.." ........

emphasis on and the strelngthening of ou r . I . l l 1 . ~ J . U . " ' : ~ l J L \ ' ; ~ work

-- 136 - 137

centre - - the mass ofe no deviation from

the people ".

I t is qui te cle .ar that here the total strength of the nation isand is

handedrom' these

is the ..." •.n .uL ..........

we make the

dOJ/Vn



the strength of the' people as an enti ty, not that of a part or a

class of the people. As regards the task ofNational R e v o l u t i o n ~i t is also clear that i t is a fight fo r the cause of the entire

people with the will of the people prevailing4

who ar e the ruler In

Era To Be Proclaimed: The Scientific

' JU J . UL ; ' I : ! . had to say:

based upon the

the lecture v n ' ~ . a.JLvU.

Era the

"The era differs from the in

In the promotion of mass movement , our objective is to

serve the great mass of t he peop le fo r their own good. Dr ..

sun Yat-sen said s u c - c i n c t l y ~ liThe end and aim of life is'

serve, not to rob others. II President Chiang a lso said

similar vein that llRevolution is nothing but service'll. From,

On the contrary, the term llpeople lt , as often used the

Communists in their hackneyed 'slogans, means, strictly " " j . . " ~ a . , , , , -

ing, not the great mass of the people, 'but tools used to start

riots and t o seize power. They inc it ed and intimidated the

peasants and workers, but once they usurped .the power,

d id not care fo r the interests o! the peasants and workers ,

and the peasants then turned out to be serfs, the workers the

slave-labor-ers of the Communist hierarchy. In the years of

1?47 and! 948, the Chinese Communists agitated the college

students throughout the country to start anti-Government cam-

paigns, but after the ~ a l l of the mainland, t h o s ~ college boys

had become cannon-fodders and the coeds had become th e re-

g i m e n t e d p r o s t i t u t ~ s to "comfort" the frontline soldiers during

the Korean War. Obviously, from the start, the Chinese ",Com

munists had used the youths 'and students as tools.

that the ar e not cQmpeting the

:strength bu t wUh total

strength of the nat ion. Therefo re

success or failure of a nation

ability to build up and use the of the

great mass of' the people, th e ,meet

the needs and to promote th e united efforts

the great mass of the people. The is

not an era in which knowledge or wealth can

be monopolized by a few; no r is i t a feudal era

in which the ambitions and caprices a few

persons ar e b t fulfilled; no r is i t an ,era in

which a small number- of outstanding

'alone can aC,com}:ilish the great task

nation. It an ~ ~ r a in which the combinedwis

dom or folly, t h ~ ~ combined strength or weak- '

ness' of the mass of the people determines

prosperity 0):' decay, the rise o r faU of a

nat ion. The revolution of 'the present er a is

the caUEie of the people, with the

out participation of the masses. There

---I 38

Lamplight", "Hackneyed Bla st Furna ce II , tlDowngrad.ing ll

t the'Reds a lso for the purpose of exploiting thec.

mainland I t is doubtful t.hat the masses can to le rate

pre-

mass

The landre-

these we c an s ee th at th e primary pt 'pose in

movement is to serve the mass of the

sent mass movements in Taiwan fo r



form measures to reduce farm rentals. the Communist exploitation fo r long

5 perc ent of the

land tof th e main crops and .thenotal annual

As reaards the Chinese Communist approach in leading theo

masses, i t is deceptive t1u:ough and t hr ou gh .. D e c e p t i v e n € ~ s smay fo r a time prove more effept ive than ~ i n c e : r i t y , but i n the

long ru n i t will lose out a nd be rejected by th e people As we

d id not give due emphasis to mass movement warfare, many

people had. been duped and lured i nt o the Communist

the people on th e mainland" h a v ~ had e nough o t

Communist maSs line also has reached the other sndi!> So

as we regard the pE:)ople a-s t he main body of the serve

t4ern falthfully and lead iheI,n i n s i n c e ~ i t y .. o.ur mission in

-14': '-

titutle.

In regard to the manners by whi ch th e masses a.T'S- guidEld.

to takeJ'part in various movements, the NationalGoveinment d

the Republic of China and cOplmunity leaders have ?1ways as

serted the attitude of fra ternal s inceri ty and congeniali ty ..

treating the people of d if fe ren t wa lk s of life as kinsfolk in a

family, there is no n e ~ d for the government or commuIll.ty

leaders to u se sweet wor ds to win the p eople! s heart or hy""

pocrit ical 'gesturesand "small favors to deceive the people

, Hence, ou r approach in guiding th e masses depends

on sincerity" The ancient Chinese saying that HSincerity in

it s utmost ca n mel t t he toughest minds" reflecJ;s the truth that,

th e masses will be with us as long as we' are· sincere in at-

the

the

are

and

sweat ..

.etc

Increase iI}.

movements un -

the purpose

Chinese Communistsf

Cut in

the people.

"farm collectivism",

of the Youths I National Salvation

purpose of serving the young

etc. are staged the.Chinese

"' ...............,...... the p e a s a n t ~ . Movements snch as

assistance to farmers, in

serve the workers . . The various

• .aUUJLUM of the R ed Banners",

On the

ments as

lithe

the Chinese RE:ds in f'3.ctories

v.A.t-'... '-, ..... ~ . ~ F . the workers lMovements such as " j . J ' o . " , . f ' 1 1 ~ \ ; I : : t . " J . U U

"Hundred Cultural 'Revolution" et c .. are

by th e Chinese Redf) fo r the purpose of persecuting,the

intellectuals and studentn" Besides., there are such move-

Production Quotas"

Movements such

It Stockade

in rural areas

in mass movement are just the UUl.Jv. : l . I .&.c

meant fo r the of people I s blood

of a ll s o rt s and in' so:rei:U:U.nl:! "sweetness

c o m r r : l W 1 1 1 t 1 e ~ aim at

women . The activities of the armed forces

are

ment

the t i l lers are a movemEmt serving the farmers., The oromlOt:lOn

of th e workers welfan:l and t.he labor in.surance are move-

movement warfare Q . ~ a . " U . l . i : : I l . the Chinese Reds accomplished to

Chapte.r V.

PracUce Is Eve ry thingTh e serves a be -

tween and the Peiping in the var-



Polit I Warfare in Operation

110 Div in e A rt of Subtlety an d...... D . ....· n r> ' r

Through thee we learn to be invisible,

through thee we learn to inaudible and

hence hold th e enemy's fate in ou r hands II

Suntse

warfare .. The' differences as Do,wt.ed

may well answer the ridicules of those

effort on ou r part copy Com-

munists.. i ndi ca te th e ways defeat the

who interestedin t he s tudy of war-

well be conv:inced We shall come out the victor

present anti-Communist war ..

. "The ideo log ical war is related to poli

t ical, economic and military war, bu t is dif

f e ~ e h t from them in function, scope and

objective. ·For instance, in politics one ca n

compromise or compose differences; in

ideology, on e cannot. In military wa r there

may be a stalemate; i n ideology, none. The

ideological war is of paramount impor tance

in th e next te n years ••••"• . . . "

Dr. Lin Yutang.

liThe times calls to r cou rage r es ol ut ion

arid integrity, no t cleverness p e x p e d ~ E m c yor 'love of soft l iving. No man ,has a right to

a ' t ime-out ' , 'a leave of absence' --"aU

-142 --143-

liberation of the people under the Commumst yoke as it s ultimate

obj ec ti ve . S uch are the opera,Hons of political warfare in the

strategical field at present.

E Hoover.

lines. tlmus t b e on the

meet the of the present in the



2. In the tactical field. Tactically, the target of ou r

political wrrfare is the enemy I s a rmed force s and people within

th e o pe ra tio n zo ne a nd it s vicinity. This is a direct support to, '

tho military operations. In space, there are p r e s c r ~ b e d areas;in time, thereare divisions of phases. Fo r instance, in a certain

specif indarea behi nd the enemy lines, po li ti ca l wa rfa re i s to,

be ,conduc ted to stage armed ~ p r i s i n g s against the

Communists. Or , when th e time fo r us to l aunch the countcr- '

offensive against, the enemy, political warfare will be waged in

&. "cer ta in thea ter with armecl strength as it s cer ter . Such ar e

the operat ions of political warfare in th e tacticrl field •

3 In the field of pacification. Political warfare shou1si be

carried out as , a means of pacif icat ion in are,as recovered

o ur armed forces after the ccmnter offensive. It s immediate

objective i s to lead the people therein into close coordination

with and ge t their support to th e Government. On the one hand,

shall consolidate what we have a l ready $ tt ained in the

a s well as political fie ids, .::tnd on the other, er forts can be made

to facilHatesubsequent military operations, For e xamp le when

we recover a certain area f ol lowing the counter o H : : : , n s . h ' ( ~

in

and must

warfare,

nation; It

and

strategy

and maSE

of

us e in th e

ona in

. They are stated as follows:

• Political warfare is a part of

strategy

th e overall

operations, . . ,V ..... "'-vLL ...

of the si x

the

Based upon thE!

based upon

be coordinated

at th e same time should in keeping with

ations at home and abroad In t he strategical field,

is waged. fo r Instllnce, t o evoke anti-Communist and

moveme nt s aU over Asia..and al l over the

centers

tactical

should be an

national as well as international p i c t u r ~ , th e basic theories

warfare have been down.

should be made on how to

there are at least two

- 1 4 5 ~

pacHica ti on and field administrs-tion should go hand i n hand .

Th e re-estabUshment of a local government and t he mohtlbm,tion

of manpower and re:50urces' to mee t the requirements or U ' - ' _ . l , k ' ~ C . " " "

operation are two aspects in. the poli t ica l

J44-

and to th e people behind the iron curtain to rise and

communjsm and tyrannica l rule to strive fo r

freedom' an d The highest poli tical is ,

formulation of Ii world wide united

should be made to destroy the e'nemy Y s brutal l JU" 'L \ .> ' , ; : )U 'UH

materialism t to disarm him ideologioally arid to shat ter hi s will to

fight, which aims crush the enemy without th e need to resortn chargehe

above t h r e ~ are pv, , !...." ....... ~ ; L . ! . warfare '

• As

Communists have suoh I-'v ......"' ......." ..... bureau . war.



and t.he White

In order to achieve the objectives in ideological w a r f ~ r ewhich comprises the ""U , lL , l< : ; :U" 'C"" '"here is the need of an overall

theren'' ' .....1'.,,....''',.,+, a nd in th e

the State

and the united tront

have

the warfare sect ion s o r ommittees as well as ,the objectives. In suci plan, the form

otherwise known as the II Polit ical Section." contents, miss ion and methods of ideological warfare

mapped o ut i n details an d c le a rl y d ef in ed , s o that QUY"U' JLHUH, , ; ; }

and faith can be built whi le the enemy's destroyed.

the keynote in the whole blueprint of political warfare because i t

th e reservoir of moral an d spiritual strength 1 th e

in the Guidelines

of such

as "'''''''UUJl'''''

Polit ical Warfare on the

China the agency

the President sets th e s ou ls of men afire and lights the to th e

th eTo incu lcate in the minds of the freedom-loving

spiri t a nd t ho ug ht s as contained in Dr. Su n Yat-sen I

of communism.

The present ideological warfare waged a g a l n ~ t t he Ch ines e

Gommu,nists is a. pol it ical p rinc ip le aga inst the materialistic

philosophy. VIctory of t r l { ~ Three Pr inc iple s of th e People

over communism Th e .missions to be accomplished in

warfare are r el at ed a s follows:

IS

in

to

of warfare, ha s it s

Princip

Warfare in Ope

in

Ideolog

warfare , l i k e ~ h e other

and the destruction of the

detailed as follows

sum up

these

own

Principles of th e People. Thou ghts engender beli e f and

necessarily translateS itself into an invincible strength.

2. .To ar m th e rank and f il e of th e people with th e theory and

practice of the T hree P ri nc ip le s of the 'People and make it

effective weapon to strike t h Communist ideology.

3. To point ou t that the Three Principles of th e

front.

are to be carr ied ou t in two directions.

is the need of

ou r own as ou r

urselves in

-147--

10 . To employ the ideological weapons in areas where the

military operations ar e conducted to' effect a clean. sweep of

Communist thoughts •

The maj or obj ec ti ve s of ideological warfare thus explained,

Dr . Stin is the supreme on

the China was founded, t ~ ultimate goal of ou r

national reconstruction, and t he doctrine that citizens

should observe andput into pJractice , as ' " ' I . J .UU,. Q,I .v.....



. tution.

the Par ty , andthe.:>U-""O'LJ'C....

" pe acef ul co ex ist en ce " a n employ-

of to camouflage the Communist <:I ." , . " , ... """"

we c an p ro ce ed ..;with the operations of such a warfare in the

strategic, tactical and pacifying fields.

A. In the strategical field In planning t h . ~ stratagem in

ideological warfare, we r..ave to take into consideration the

extensive and goals in th e war against the Communists,

It sh ould be in coordination with the overall strategy of the

nation. The object of ideological warfare in th e strategical

. field is the armed forces and t he peop le . He re ar e ~ h objectives:

I. To exp la in and hus 'to support the national policy, th e

administrative programs and various goals in wartime.

2. To explain without equivocation fo r what and fo r whom we

are fighting.

:3. To thwart the infiltration and spread of the Communist

To stress the fac t tha t the Three of People

is in full with the demand of the time and the requirementsof and also out that the era

is an era of the Three Principles of t he Peop le

To direct our concentrated at tack agains t the of

ideology and Mao thought by thoroughly

evils of Marxism and .LJ""""............. ,.u

6. To expose to l ight the so-called "coalition is

Communist tactical man€:lUver to establish the of

ideology •

4. To guard agains t the indirect approach of the Communist

in their ..ideological warfare by using fake freedom to

genuine freedom', sham democracy to'destroy true democracy.

5. To seek the true unders tanding and moral support of the

friendly nations in the ideological aspects.

6. To engage in the scholastic study of th e Three

of th e People, to spread it s thoughts in l i te r a ry ar tic les t

popularize and to make it in keeping with the changing situ-

ations.

as venomous

behind the i ron cur tain to renounce commu-

chaos

l a l ~ O J L o ~ r v and shatter th e Communist

into

arouse the

designate 'M:to

sheer liessow the of dissens on among the schools

of such as the "leftist" .the "r ight is t"

th e "revisionist", order to throw the enemy s ideological

point out that .tvlarxism-Lenlnism is an that

runs counter tt f human and the democratic way and

-149 -

nated . areas, to encourage theu to r ise i n a rms aga inst th e

Communist ty.I-anny J and to make sure that the people wi ll extend

no support to the enemy 1 s military operations .

30 To in the minds of the armed forces and the

.... V . .. ~ .......< .A science,

To these , t he agency in charge of l a E ~ O l O g l L C awarfare should make use of the following media:

L. Academic works: Works on philosophy

9 economics, etc. the standpoint of



,

secure the fa ith of the people in t h newly-recoyered areas in

4. To eY:tend wha teve r suppor t i n id eo logy to t he officers

and men , to the· mass of the people and ev,an to those behind the

enemy's line upon the request of the field commanders.

5. To.> deflect the. ideology of th e enemy on the f r o n t ~ H n 6through persUas.\on.

To change t he though ts of the young ~ n t e l l e c t u a l s and

Communist followers, making them the motivating force of anti

Communist movements beh ind the enemy.

C. In the f ield of pacification. ' the ideolggical activities as

the means of pacification aim to consolidate the fruits of offensive

in the new ly-recovered aI"eas and to support the laws promulgated

by the field commanders fo r th e peopl e t o abide by. The of

ideologicalwarfare in the field of pacification is the armed 'forces

and the people in such areas 0 Here'.are the objectives:

L To purge th e venomous· thoughts "left behind by the e ~ e m yin the" newly-recovered a 'r ea s so as to prevent them from

like a phoenix from i ts a shes .

2. To promote the extensive educa tional work so as to make

in th eCcmmunist-controlled areas a clear i dea tha t the govern

ment forces undel' the banner of the Three of the

People ar e the forces of benevolence and righteousness and

therefore invincible.

the Three Pr inciples of t h f ~ People and the national

Literary articles: Poetry prose, d rama and

articles other genres written to depict of

Three of the People and the of the

after implements,tion.

• News PeJriodicals, pictorials dis-

jJUL'I,,;A,"::::<::>« etc. to be used.in the ideological V I J ~ . 1 . , a . l , . J . V U L i : : lRadio 'broadcasts l ~ n d TV programs: Radio

and TV programs to be uSEld as means of ideological s p r e a d ~5 • P o p ~ l a r read ing ma te ri al s: Fo lksongs , ballads, drum

songs , s tory- tel ling, local dramatic performances, articles on

customs, e tc to be used as a help in ~ U U \ . i I " " " ~ , V U

B, In the tactical field. In planning the, tactical operations

ideological warfare, we have to take into consideration the

be to the military operations th e situations in

the wa r areas, ideologicaLrequirements of the armed

forceS and t people behind the enemy line speaking,

ideological isd.irected against the servicemen and t he

'people i n t he rea rbf the enemy or i n t he areas.

Here ~ r the nt'\',o,..,·rl'l:rO"l!

t To shake of the enemy's. to de -

fighting

faith of the people in

-150- -151 -

gy , political and mili tary, through wisdom and deliberation, tlJ

carry out the national pol icy and strengthen national secu:rity;

and on th e other hand se t upon·keeping the e.nemy bewildered and

of the People and in the Government g

in the rehabilitation and restoration of social

Three

order.

• To win over wav'ering people i n t he



perplexed so as to commit fatal b lunder s i n h is polic ies, . Then

in t he f ace of ou r all-out offensive, the enemy will be unable to

defend himself. St ra t eg ica l war fare is c o n d u c ~ d with the dis

truction of th e eIlemy 1 s wil l to fight as it s ultimate objective.'

To at ta in these objectives in s tr at eg ic al w ar fa re , t he re is

the need of the formulation of separate p lans for operation§ in

which the form and contents and t h ways and means ~ s h a l l be

clearly d ef in ed s o as to keep the thoughts and actions of the

enemy under control . Therefore in al l plans fo r military oper

ations, t he empha si s s hould be laid on the major strategy. As

the situations and r e s p o n s j b i l ~ t i e s in mi li tary operat ions vary,

t he obj ec ti ves strategical warfare are also different. When

militaryactions are. taken t th e major stratagy should be directed

to support the military operations.

Our present s tr at eg ic al w ar fa re is c on du ct ed w it h t he

Chinese Communists as ou r main target. Here are the

1. To expose the evils of "dlalettical materialism" which is

th e highest tenet of th e Communist strategical warfare. Based

upon lithe law of unity in contradictions lt the Chi.pese Communists

emphasi;2ie the constancy of contradictions and make -it a theore

tical basis fo r their diversionary and dividing tactics .A s to }lthe

law of transformational" quality andquantitytr,the ChineseComrnu

nists make th e mutability in qua li ty and quant i ty as the basis fo r

their infiltration tactics In regard to 11 th e la w of

strate

a . " " ' j l l ; , ~ ' ~ < A . ' warfare

strate-

As in operatiol1g .there should be '"'OJ."' .... "..

warfare. The supreme objective' in

be on t he one hand Se t upon mapping out an overall

-152-

2. Calculations Behind the Heavy rtains

Wa rfare in Operation

areas so that wil l work with the Government

To seek the of they young intellectuals making

them the mainstay in th e society.

5.To offer assistancEl in the resumption of

cultural andeduc'ational activities

The above are .the principles in'the operations ot ideological

T o pu t into , we have to, refute. th e Communist

with logical or s c l ~ n t i f i c arguments t o g iv ecthe enemy

th e expo,sing th e grim realities the people have fac.edhmder

communism, to th e Communist perversion' to

the materialistic philosophy or Marx and Lenin the

cherished humanist , to root up th e of class

by rea:ssertion of traditional ethics, to the

dictatorship upholding democratic thoughts, ,and

to rebut Communist expropriation by th e and

n " r ' n ~ l n l : l l ' r ' O " l f l l l if e t ha t th e people are enjoying under democracy.

,-J53,-. 'Il

their s t ra teg ica l war fa r e. That is why we have t o m ak e known

to th e free world and overSeas Chinese communities the bitter

that i s , under the Red banner, and the Chinese abroad d o n ot

Know that what the Sommunists call "unification" is a "front" inth e

Govern-

call

doc trina t basis fo r

fo r what

the Chinese Communists use

the free w0rld how the

rebeUion and make



6. To make i t known that what th e Communists call national-

-155 -

ism is a mere pretext to divide the western world and the small

nations; that w ha t t he C om mun is ts call democracy is a mere

pretextto

stir upthe people

to rise against theirlegal govern

ment; and that what th e Communists- call socialism is a mere

pretext to incite the working class to rise against the manage

ment. Thes 'e tactics of d i s s e n ~ i o n and divis ion are steps taken by

t he R ed s in their subversive activities.

7. To make i t known to th e w or ld t ha t the Chinese, by nature

a peace-loving race, hav·e cons istent ly supported al l e fforts to

uphold international justice, have promoted the total diplomacy

maintaining cor di al r el at io ns with the governments and the

peoples 01' friendly nations, and had tr ied t through unofficial

channels, to offer kind advice to th e non-committed countries and

those which fail to distinguish friends from foes, and to rivet

cultural and economic ties with them

lesson we had learned from our experience that t hey w il l n ot

fall into the Red traps again.

5. To make i t clear. that isolation as a t act ic s tems from the

Communist military s t ra tagem, trying to drive a wedge among the

a ll ie d c ou nt ri es i n the free world and tJlUS undermine th e

darity of th e anti-Communist camp. T hi s i s the objective of the

Communist tactic of isolation.

such

is one

in

Chinese Reds

themselves

their eyes is

" U d L L J . ~ J H ' " ar e

ar e

Government. Now

of n thA unity in

I H''' ' ' 'J.L'' ', . '' in their dialectics

as nT'OOlosen by the'Communists between

seek peaceful coexistence when

to aU-out rebellion. The

Communist conspira.cy. When

upo.n the ove ,r seas Chinese to

-154-

to

II h united front" ismake i t known the world that t e

Mfensive tactic in the whole pattern of the

The C hine se Red had' repeatedly

make known to the free world that

tactics Communist strategy

against the

of China had suffered

the Chinese Communis ts , and to

Communists want

4. To

the.

OOooS11ao'll or

, which is a synonym for isola tion,and ,. but a..lJ.;O .... " . . . . . . . .

is the tactic in their s truggle. When nation is

to be neutral; fo r to neutralize is to

is militarily weak, the Communistweaken or to isolate i t When

will never allow i t to be neutral, fo r

coexistence !I , ,because

and " th e

fa:vorable,

themselves in peace talkS is the

• This is the

hands

intervals

unfavorable

m en t o f

Political s t ra tegy' as distinct from but in. conjunction'

,military, i s c ar r ie d out i n t he following two aspects:

A In th e s t r a t e ~ c a l field: Political strategy, as

rule , must be p lanned in accordance" with the na ti ona l goal s andthat

• To le t i t be known that, i n t he eyes of th e vU. J .Ul: :o : : l l ; ; ! p e o p ~ eth e Nations ha s be,come the second nations

after t he s ea ting of t he Peiping reg ime and the free is in

seriol1s that the belief of th e Chinese



policies. I t should -als6 be in keeping with the changing politica.l

situations of t he wor ld Ja t large ~ b . i l ~ dealing with the Chinea-e.

Communist politica;l strategy ·In point of space, the implemellt

a t ion isnat ionwide , o r ever global. In point of time, i t is of

duration. It is the chief of th e state, in consul ta t ion wit1h the

National Security Council as the advisory body, who will

and direct t he major strategy in th e pol it ic al f ie ld . The target

of ou r present political strategy is th e Chinese Reds and

Peiping c.ountries. Here are the main objectives in o'ur po1'itlcal

strategy:

1..To fight against communism to the last with ou r own.

efforts and with determination as th e leading country in. th e

democratic w'orld, and to accept the challenge of th e Communists

by further unifying the freedom-loving peoples al l th e world over

2. To maintain and promote the ties an d 90operation through

all channels with those countr ies which, diplomatically, had eS

tab l is hed rela tions with the Peiping regime, b.ut domestically

adhered to their a . n t i - C o ~ m u n i s t policies, so as to help intensify

their anti-Communist aCJivities i n the po litical andfields.

3. To strengthen th e re la t ionsh ips and keep contacts in

cultural and economic fields with th e peoples of those n""",...l'"",,,,,,,,,

whose' governments have l eaned toward the l ef t but citizens

Chines-e

the national

how the Chinese

parties

af ter

infiltrate.

t o an d

be attained. through

and when time comes f the

will extend the ir support

that th e awakened countries feel there is

to establish a "coalition "''"',,.''''">',"

Chinese Communists to divide

which can

To uni te all anti-Communist,

t he f al se

I I .To make a comprehensive report

Communists had "hOI . ~ e d ! l the

utilized

mainland take-over how t hey had deceived the jJl : : ' ' ' ' ' ; : ; :> '4Ul,; ; ;>

false promise of implementing "land reform" and "land distri

bution II how they had duped th e workers by th e false

Ulactories totae workers :rnd how they hadfooled the business

men by th e false promise "tobenefit both t he labo r and the manage-

a ~ contrast them with the grim realities on the Communist-

mainland so as t o uncove r their and cause

of mainland recovery and-national reconstruction.

them to disintegrate from withiv

The are major objectives in ou r ,s trategical

in a revelutionary

call upon al l to be united

differences and narrow-m:lnded so as not to be

ustice

Chinese

any international

th e need to

-157 -

5. To carry· out . and step up the spiritual mobilization and

psychological reconstruction in Taiwan.

The warfa re per ta in ing to political and military

has importaht bearings on.the nati01?-alpoUcy and national defense.

.. , , , . ~ , . ~ ~ ~ - system and free wa y of

V A U U A U , ~ " , L ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 5 the Sou thea st Asia Afr ic a and

- still have u n s w e r ~ ' . I . 1 1 g i l::uth in

liCe, with issues shelved.

4. keep th e world on the alert t o t he Chinese Communist



3. Unity of Feeliog and Affection"'\

Organizational Warfare in Operation

It is highly comple:x; and complicated. What ha s been discussed

here is but a sma ll f ac ti on . The brier description aims to enhance

the interest in t he s tudy of strategy in i ts r el at io n to

warfare and to thwart the Communist chicaneries in ' time.of

chicaneries

in Communist

and lithe United' front".

IS

the ChinE! se Communist I J v ~ , , ~ . , L ' - ~ " L

is another term fo r lithe li beraHan movement If

remind from time to t ime the so-called non-co{l1mitted

under such catchwords as

dissensions and to expose the timeworn Communist

tricks of setting up the "coal it ion government ".

Itnd neut ra l count ri es of the Chinese Communist

The primary objec tives of organizational warfare may b (

d iv ided into two parts. First , on ou r side, the is

strengthen the relationship and coordination of the activities of

organizations, tangible 'or, intangible, related to political,

economic, social, and military affairs. Negatively, this aims to

guard them against the enemy IS -infiltration <lnd posiUvely; to

strike the enemy in. a concerted effort. This is what Suntse said

liTo emerge the victor with ou r forces intact! '. In o the r words,

i t is to strengthen ourselves by consolidating ou r own o r g a n i z ~aHons. Seeondly, in the fight against th e enemy, there is th e

primary task o£ infiltrating, di'Viding and sabotaging the enemy I 15

political f economic; social and military organizations so as to

dislocate and disintegrate them. This is to destroy the enemy

through the operation of organizational warfare. In conjuctioll

with the ,military, the final goal of organizational warfare,

- j 59 -

of the

to rise

strate-

break up

of

and

mainpoints of

fo r the total warfare -l". .....u • . .., .. the

and make use of

mainland people

and Mao

J 58-

s e r i e ~ i of national calamities

Communist

pay attention

call

To

.... U U A ~ __ JL

rule from within

r ~ g i m e •

B. In the tactical field:

a watchful eye on the Communist inner strife

Lin Piat,) s untimely death.

enemy's

keep a watchful eye on the

conflicts.

\ gy in the tactical field are alS follows:

I. To unmask the Communist vicious

mainland

the

military and the civic, and forces of varyIng services, thus

making officers and me n one body, and the military and th e civic

one family.

7. To step up t he o rge. niza tional work in th e rear of the

!-,V.LJ.l.-J.l.;t:L.\ warfare, is to support th e

our overall and national

other type of

in

In ou r present wartare



enemy.

For the purpose of achieving the above-mentioned objectives

t he ope ra ti on of organizational warfare may be divided into

following categories:

A. In th e strategical field: In planning t he s tr at eg y

organizational warfare, we have to meet the demand of the ex-

t en si ve and l ongr ange obj ec ti ve s i n th e conflict and keep times

with th e implementation of overall strategy. The operational

targets inc1llde the· enemy and it s allies and the whole system of

th e enemy s military and political set-ups, covering the entire

war thea te r" Here are the objectives:

1. To exhort t he governIm nt s of free countries to uphold

justice and dist inguish friends from foes oo:sedupon historical

lessons and for the g oo d of humanity, not to "open door fo r th e

robbers", as the Chinese saying goes.

2 . Togi ve support to and maintain close t ies with the friendly

forces fighting fo r freedom.

3. To form a strong and united anti-Communist body comp

rising patriots at home and abroad.

4. To call upon the people .q.t t he l ow levels of th e Communist

structqre to rise against the Red tyranny on the mainland..

5. To urge the youths under th e control of the Red

ations to rise and fight the Comm.unists.

Government

j : ;a.UJ.z ,a L.LVIJI:::l of

of

and economk aspects

between

overseas Chinese united

the task of mainland and national

r e . Q ~ l m e ! n th e

support the anti-Communist

on th e international level,

and the

unofficial channels.

To

3

an d tne the and the pubUc, and the labor and the

making them an invincible composed of

IJV

1IJUJlQ. .... C', and to consolidate the governmental structure

the carrying out the administrative measures .

........ I"' ....''''U th e

eUlUonships between the rank officers the

international

every

is the best weapon use against the

of affection we also best weapon to

en em y's control co ercio n. With the

center the organizational based upon th e correct line

a'nd should be conducted with the

attain:

-161-



\I

~ "u No Enemy, He Is Our Comrade"

Psychological Warfare in Operation

There are two major objectives involved in th e operations

the· reco·very the enemy-held areas and to meet the

i . r E ~ m ~ ~ n t , S of the field commanders in manpower and

These operations are toward the 8.J;'med forces and the



psychological warfare: one i s the strengthening of ou r own beliefs

and th e other is the shattering of th e enemy I s faith. The former

includes the c onsolidaHon· of tJ;1e,spiritual grace' of ou r orrie er sand men, t he fortification of their wil l t o fight an d the ·fostering

of their persevering spirit during comoo.t. The latter includes

the attack upon the psychological weaknesseS of the enemy, the

reduction f' f combat s treng th, the weakening of h is w ill to

f i g h ~ , and the derangement of hi s mental make- up . However , t he

psychological operat ions should conform with t he overa ll st ra te-

gy and center a round the mil it ary situations.

The psychological warfare we are now waging against th eCommunists is one of s inceri ty agains t fa lsehood, morali ty

against t he immora l, and th e well-being against the misery of the

people. In this respect, we are in a position much superior to

th e enemy, bec au se hypoc ri cy , treachery and misery are

p reci :s ely the weaknesses of the Communists . If we a tt ack thei r

vulnerable spots , their psychological defense will surely collapse .

Here are the objectives in our psychological. warfare.

1. To convince ou r people at home and abroad thatthe Chinese

Communists ' lhave Spoken the best in words out d on e t he worst in

deed$ll, and that there will be no compromise w h a t s o e v ~ r with

them so that with the unshakable faith in the ultimate victory and

strong determination to fi ght U ll th e end., the people under t he

mem-·phose who have sworn to2. To

To attain above objectives, the

should be undertaken the unit concerned:

To condur t t he census checkup.

""'vo,,,,..,.,,,nt their

2. the these areas in the

\ '

work and i n t he restoration of peace and order ~ n to

in the establishment of local :self-government after the U . I J I ; . . U . 1 U . Q o i ~ . 1 . V J . A

CA ....."" ............ elements

assist those who have contributed to th e anti-Red

struggles in establishingcivic organizations related to

o r o f ~ ~ s f n o , n s , et c

in the Comnltmist

3. set the date fo r the. Communist undercover agents to

surrender to th e authorities concerned and sort out the

C.ommunist remnants and saboteurs lurking among th e

The abov e discuss ion covers only a of to

be attained and activities to undertaken in th e organizational

warfare against the enemy

people in these newly-recovered areas • Here are the

out al l Communist organizations 1n- these areas to

1-165-

and the people as the targets of operat ions, covering the 'entire

wa r areas . Here are the objectives in the·psycb.ological oper

ations:

1. To support a nd e xp la in withQut ambiguity the nationaL

in

from

ou r servic,emen and the2.. Toenhand'e th e

the final victory·Over th.e

anU-Comrmmist banner will ward off the enemy tacticsbl

united front and effor ts . to ta lk peace .



out a ~ d . i n s t anyone, instead, those who haveil l be

contriquted to the anti-Communist efforts will be awarded....

3. To call upoh the mainland people ~ . rise up and over throw

th e Pe ip in g re gim e so as to prevent th8 nuclear hol oc au st i n a

Chinese and Russian Communis t War.

p.olicies, object ives and g o ~ l s during wartime.

2. To extend the us e of the catchwords that "If no enemy , he

is our comrade " as a politicfll appeal to the main land people.

With the exception of a few Communist leaders, no punishment'

4. To welcome those who have visited the mainland to Taiwan,

either individually or as a group, in the hope that they will make

a f ai r and just comparison between the life in Taiwan and that on

the mainland.

stabilize the

extreme s k e p t i c ~ s m in th e minds of th ereate"6 ..

to bed'efeaied.

boost th e ! U V . l . a · J l ~ of the servicemen,

his tory that despotic rules Cell and trai tors

J.. To increase valor to forge ahead with th e anti-

Commumst struggle e:x:posing the RedS criminal acts on the

mQ,lnlandandshowing to·the,m why c o m m u ~ s m must and i s s ur e

minds of tbepeople an d to consolidate the defense" . (

of th e dation through psychological reconstruction as a positive.

methodand mentalquarantlne as a preven.tive

5 ' T ~ 8 t i r up anti-Communist upr is in gs c ap it al iz in g on the

disillusil1nmentan d dissatisifacUonof themainalnd people with" " \

. reali t ies OJflUe under the C::ammunist rule ..

countries of the Communists establish

warfare andwork with them effectively •

systematica,Hy collecting materials and pUblishing

5 To help those

conununism

a sound system of

.,....167 -

6. To lay bare before the world the true nature of Chinese

documentedb O ~ k S

to show how th e Chinese Reds rose i n power..

how they had dup"ed the people and how t hey had .oppressed •

controlled the mainland people.

T. To open the eyes of the delegates and representatives of

th e Peiping- regime stationed out.side of the i ron curta in .to thE

free world and to help them to c;iefect to th e Government in Taiwan

of

\ ' ; V 1 . l . U . 1 1 . l \ " ; ~ ou r

armedf war, with

-166-

warfare mus t be in full coordination with the ex -

and Long-range . . , " ' ~ . ' " ' ~ ¥ .

objectives as s ta ted in the above, we

psychological,warfa re in the following fields

A In th e field: Th e strategical

enemy' l ' o r r ~ e r s a n d m ~ r i as to the future o f t he Peiping regime.

due' incessant strifes among the topnotchers

7.. To create 'conditions favorable to our operations

w i n b i n g t ~ heart of th e e:nemy I s servicemen a nd through

contrasting ,the lite ilfTalwan with that on ihe main land .

through rad io such questions: "What do your kinfolks eat? What

do they wear? What is the fate of th ose g e n e r a l ~ , commanders,

commissars, and many other top officers who have contributed

their feats fo r the cause oCcommunism? Fo r whom are you figh

ting now?"

pictorials,

authoritiesorder to attain the above "h·i ........+' ....' ' ' ' 'c.

concerned should employ t h following means:

Radio network.

matters induding handbills, ....a. ........ , ....""

periodicals, air' floating "'Wlo.LUJ,au.u.



To attain the ab ove objectives, the authorities concerned

sho uld employ the following:

1. guns, aircraft , balloons, and task force to launch,

drop f or diss'emlnate .Leaflets an d other propaganda materials.

2. loudspeakers.

3. radio broadcasts •

4 . sma ll -si ze newspaper s and pamphlets fo r smuggling into

the Red-controlled. areas through al l poss ible means .

C. In th e field of pacification: The psychological operations

in this field are conducted to consolidate the fruit§ already

reaped prior to th e recovery of the enemy-held areas, and' to

moraland material supports as required by the field commanders.

The targets of such operations are th e servicemen and the people

i n t he recovered areas. Here ar e the objectives in this field:

To promptly take over and make use of the broadcasting

stations, newspapers, and other mass media .

6. To instill in the minds of the mainland peopl e tha t t he

Governmev.t forces are fighting under the banner of benevolence

and righteousness , trying to help them out of th e Communist·yoke.

7. Tc repeat the Government proclamation: those who have

been aff li at ed with the Reds ar e not quilty and those who con

tribute themselves to the anti-Red efforts will' be rewarded.

officers an d men

necess it ies for

on asking the Chinese

smuggUn, into· th e mainland.

-Systematic work on the international

B.. In the tactical field.: The tactical of

gicalwarfare, when conducted to. suppor t the operations

in areas, are direeted at the enemy s armed force-sand th e

people, in. such areas and vicinit les . Here ar e the of

t a ( ~ U I ~ ! operations:

}.. T o m a k ~ . J r n o w n , t o thepeople in these areas radio

broadcasts th e economic recons1\...a ct ion and in the

is landm$UonofT-man lind the happy an d free life .of the people.

To ask th e Communist cadres ,through radio such soul-

searcbi.Q:1 questions: 1I][f Liu Shao-chih Lin Piao/could not

presen 'elbeir lives, how could you? ,I

To.keepon asking 'Mao Tse-tung the query through radio:

HIf peOJ1ls' Shao,-chih and Lin Piao "!¥erEf unreliable, how

yotttrust Chou En-Lal and Yao"Wen-yuan in

To .keep On asking th e Chinese Redffntricers and men th e

9luestionthroughradio: ,-'J+tf Pang Teh":huai, Lo Ja i ....chinganq Lin

p o ~ s i d e r e d to have done wrong, then pause and

is what: you are doing. now right? II

etc for to

Important propagrctnda sheets and

-1 68 -'- -169-

5. Vigilance.-the Price of libertyIntelligence Warfare in 'Operation

Jjike· other types of political warfSlTe, the objectives of

intelligenoe warfare are divided into two: on e is self-protection jcultural and educ-or

in these areas and make them

rumors and fabrications ..

over

4. To

2. To

work wi th us

To stop the



to do so , we'have to employ the overt and the covert measurel;

before we can safeguard the internal s e c u r i ~ y ; thwart t h ~ ~enemy I s infiltration, and prevent <the Jeakage of classified.

secrets . The othe r is to defeat. th e enemy; and to attain

this, we have to use th e highest wisdom and, most e r t e c ~ v emethods in appraising, the enemy I s s i tuat ions , in evaluat ing i h Conected informat ion , in 'seeing through' the enemy· I ~ i n s i d i ( ) u ~ lplots, and in predicating his. act.\ lsbefore we can ~ k the!

initiative and tinal ly come out th e v, ctor without <any bloodshed

in · ou r struggle against the ' ~ n e m y --...:. th e Commums·ts ..

As is well known, the Chinese Communists gained power

ttyough : h i g h l y - o r ~ n i z e d intelligence operations .. In spite of th e

fact that the ,henchmen t he Chine se Reds ha d employed as under

c ~ v e r agents wer.e largely hoodlums, and t he methods they

resorted to were sorcery, they had succeeded in utilizing a-

no means small number of countrymen as tools in the e ~ t e n s i v e.clandestine espior.mge network . Since the establishment of

P eip in g reg im e a nd the tyrannical rule on the mainl and

whole situations have ,changed and t he old game they played be

lore th e usurpation of power have ,proved to be of no effect any

l onger . There fo re in the aspect of intelUgenbe warfare, the

Government of the Republic of China ha s g a i n ~ d an upper hand

and turned from defensive to offensive. Now, the mi:ssitms

as means:

the Reds

employ the

venomous

. U.lU.l . \ J'j : ; ... , ...... effects of the local on

J .AC. I- .u . . '. . . . . . . . .L .... ' bulletins, booklets, periodicals,

areas tormerly held

4

. loudspeakers.

2.

pn,r.p .-Sl lUl .nF CLLI,.L1..1.1U.C of the people , an d estahlishTo

the scope of intelligence \.:U.L!.'C' . 1.-J 'VU

in psychological

above , the authorities concerned in

and other printed matters"

5 motion anlf dramatic perfo:r:mances.

sum up, the ope:ratlons of psychological warfare are

conducted with the purpc)se of establishing in minds of th e

mass of the f ai th i n the Government through dUlb't::::t:LO

an d and the ultimate goal Is to defeat the enemy

t he n e w l y - r e c o v e r e d a r e a ~ ;radio brbadcasts

a tional activities.

-110- -1 71 "'-

7. To kee p wat ch fo r th e Communist methods of "human

wave" intelligence collectionthrough tourists and foreign agents.

8. To take the counter-intelligence measures by sending

men to get close to the known Red agents and plant ing them in

connivance.

of nationals o t ha t eve ry considers the

ou r warfare at present may be related as follows:

1.. To heighe tn the consciousness and elevate the

alertness th e security movement, tighten-

up the secur ity measures and expanding th e ed.u-



I . To ensure the security of the mil itary bases, th e ,,....J. . . . . .CL ...

e st ablishments t andthe mintary redeployments in order to ward

off the Communist intrigue of infiltration an d espienage.

2. To insure, inpartioufar, the se'curity of national defense,

foreign affairs, scientific developments, and others .

3 To guard against the possible development of th e Commu-

10.. To develop and strengthen t he int el li gence network

behind th e enemy I s frontlines.

Among the missions ' l isted above, some are missions of

counter- inte l ligence, others are those of offensive in the in

telligence warfare. In order to accomplish these missions t the

operation is conducted in th e following fields:'

A. In strategic:al field: Th e strategical operations of

intelligence warfare mus t be conducted in ful l conforml ty with

th e extensive an d long-range objectives of war, with t he lurked

Communist agents in Taiwan, t he officers and men on the f ron t

line and in the rear of th e enemy, and their organizations,

official or unofficial, as targets. The objectives in t hi s f ie ld

are as follows:

the cells.

9. To be engaged in the large-scale and long-range re

search work on Communist affairs.

or

from any

improve

finding

~ a U A J U < O < . I W . V U ' " from

checks and keep tracks of l JUU"'A.OJ . J ,Cu .

which violate th e national

precaution against ilie Communist

, th e Reds often assume to be l iberals,

, and ( ~ v e n anti-Communists, in order

th e Chine sa Communist espionage network as its

fo r their espionage and subversive activities

or

To take

ke ep wat ch fo r the enemy IS

o rgan ized and infiltrations of enemy's

• To uproot the Communist intelligence network

. from cases· uncovering high-level,and sorting -out Red secret serv icemen through

3. To advoca te

means and to ' " 'vu . :>""" , .J . . . . . .

th e .. ' O , ~ J . U . A ... "'I ....-:;;;'" and methods of investigation.

direction

interests

th e hi gh ly selected and well;...trained

personnel and the establishment of close-knit and

effective I in charge of collecting,

and tracking down the with·

secrets the duty of a citizen

out t he Chi ne se Communist undercover

-17 -173-

of intelligence warfare in the tactical field are stated as r O l l o v ~ s :r.. To -tighten up al l security measures regarding the

tary activities.

2. To take steps to pre"(rent the Communist ageEts

filtrating into our fighting and logistical Ul1.its.

who

in the policy-

potential in planting into service the

II Coreignagents

as CommUJrllst united front

maklp.g bpdies of the Government .nd, the Party the agencies of

mass and the department· and sections' otcommunications.

ca n be

nist intelligence

""'"' ...... .., ..LL . . . ""' ", .. the ...,.."'--,........



34 To gather f ir st -hand iriformation 'wjth r e g a i d t h - e

Communist contemplated actions a,nd intrigues.

4. To carefully provide the enemy 'with false i n t e l l i g ( ~ h C e §causing,the enemy to commit serious tactical blunders ..

To accomplish the missions listed the following are

considered n e c e s ~ a r y :I. The mos t sophisticated communication apparatus and

most advanced ti-:;chniques in comrnunication.

2.. The most competant perso nnel and the highest wisdom..

3. The c o m p l e t ~ and weH-arranged intelligence reports ..

C.. I n ~ , h e field of pacification: Intelligence warfare in this

field is to ensure the security QI the newly recvoered areas

to help th e field administrative unit i n t he work of re-establi

smng the loca lgovernments. The objec tives of intelligence war.;.

fare in this field ar e as fallows:

I. To take OYer the Communist llpublic security" units'

sort out their regular secret servicemen and members of these

affiliated organs so as t o keep them under contrQl.

,2 .. To wipe out all Communist secret party.organs and sort

ou t thei:r cadres in an extensive drive that t he Red s a nd their

a r f i l i a t e ~ will betray their identities ..

3. To impose cenSus· checkup in order to prevent the lurking,

"':-175-

countries

use

In t h e ~ tactical f ie ld : T he object'i,'e'of war-

in this field ir;; to give support to themllitary operations in

wa r zenes.. It conducted in coordination with the military

situations, and the situatIons of both sides in these areas, with

enemy t SIntelli:genceagents"and officers and men as targets {

To meet tJ1e requirements of the field comma.nders, the o'bjectives

-174-

5. keep informed of the activities on

b a ~ l e s , the development of manpower

and , and the redeployme,nts.

To accomplish the above missIons, the authorities concerned

s.hould undertake the following:

I .. To streamHne and strHngthen the personnel and t e c h n i c ~ lsections in, the counter-intelligence organizations

have selective appointees and c i r c u m s p e ~ tarrangements

3 To prQvide radio transmitors and other e q u l ~ ) m l ~ n t : s,4.. To keep under control the s t ra tegicai

'5. bridge over al l cormections and contacts for poss ible

communities a,nd in

keep.a watchful eye on the possible developments of

Communist i nt el li ge nc e s yst em in t he overseas Chinese

4. To keep th e Communist cap tives under control

strict disciplinary measures.

5. To t ighten up al l socurity measures.

To sum up, in tel ligence warfare itself is a contest of wit

and related u n i t s ~

new troubles

a U ~ U l d . I . ~ secrecy of the strength, th e re -

, the actions of ou r UU". l . , , "" . l .

4. To maintain

• Tc maintain th e ~ e c r e c y of th e movements of strategical

elements from



between two parties, it is also th e consummation of tactics To

achieve the. premeditated r e s u l t ~ from such an operation, we

have to make u s of the e : x p e ~ i e n c e s an d techniqup-s available,

both ,ancient and modern, at home and abroad.

fortresses

and t he meansmaterials their

To insure the

arsenals and other

ation.

into the enemy-held areas so as to

spy and collect information on th e Communists activities

make an extensive inves tigat ion on the materials,

6. The Voice ,of the Pecple Is the Voice of God

Mass Movement Warfare in .Operation

The people form the basis of political power .. With thenl

there I s polit ical; power; without t hem there is no political

pOwer w h a t s o e " r ~ r . During the t imeof peace a g o v e r n m ~ n t .cannot

last long without th e support of the people. In the time.ot

th e ' a l l e g i a ~ c e ~ non-allegiance of the people d e t e r ~ i n evictory and defeat .

Th e highest p:r:incipie in the operation o! mass m o v e m e ~ t L'S

on th e one hand to carry out t ~ national policy in: accordance

with the theory, of total warfare by securing th e support and

us ing the s t rength of th e maSs of the people in the consolidation

of tJIe warstrl lcture; an d on t he o ther . hand t o defeat the enemy.

by weakeni ng his' fighting strength t h r ~ u g h th e dovelopment and

the use oC mass agitation and ~ a s s action against the--enemy

in tenl or externP.l. T h i ~ may also be called the principle

political· stratagem ..

, to

come

so as to

prisoners

Communist

the

measures

of th e

or have been " , , ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' r , ' ' ' '

behind

serveillance

LI U';I. .J. . ;>.U 1'0/ and

tives, the authorities concerned

ou r service.

Cl.LL.'.L.l..l.l,..l.C:;.:> of untoward

up intelligence networks.

in

i mp ose the

or

Communists

these areas have to take th e

war an d to presS them

attain the above

hold

To utilize those reliable elements who have c::\,\,.-\.;L ' ll1!J ' l..U:Hl'V

ations

feats in the ( ' t J . 1 \ . ~ - ' ' V ' ' ' l 1 t H U U . ' U 0

sor t out the

wea po ns , a nd

confiscate f or o ur u se .

activities-177 -

equalize thewealth after economic prosperity; to' e s . ~ b l i s h a new

s oclety of freedom. security ,harmony and happiness on th e

basis of the Three Principles of t he Peopl e by the increase in

t h ~ p e r capita income of the people, under t he directives of

Premier Chiang Chin-Kuo.

thE

are the

the National Government oft o a tt ain th e "I"\ , ; , , , , , t ....·,...

carry out operations on th e

Chinese Communists, as is

Republic of upon the g u i ~ i n gstrategy, has charted the ways to be <A-lJl.Jl."'O::::U

nT',D!Q'i:Ilrif situations so as



5. To fortify the anti-Communist· determinatinn of th e people

by making them realize thoroughly that the Chinese Reds are

public enemy, and by...exposing the fa ct s tha t al l the people on

th e mainland 'inc luding t h ~ , peasants, th e workers, the businessmen, th e youths and the women, h ~ v e been exploited. persecuted,and oppressed under t he Communist tyranny.

6. To win the inclinations of the people In'the Commumst-

held areas toward the National Government by th e to

satisfy their urgent need as a political appeaL

7. To inspire the agitation of the people in the.......

,..".\1-, ......

areas as a prelude to t he a rmed uprisings'against the Commu

nists l•

8. To pub lic ly advoc at e the liberation of the people

th e Communist rule andto topple t he Pelping regime by o r ~ · -n i ~ m i g and mobil iz ing the anti-tyranny strength of t he mas s of

the mass of the people on th e mainland.

Among th e missions listed in the above , the first five aim

at the c'onsolidation of ou r own anti-Communist structure 1 while

th e lastthree aim atthe defeat of the enemy. For the convenience

of putting into operat Ion , mass'movement warfare 1s conducted

in the following three fields:

A. In the strategical field: Mass movement warfare, as

s

the

program

missions

over this

and affection theTo establish

of

To merg0 the a ~ r i a n movement with the program of

llT.iclutll1nLI development and ih e improvement of t he p ea sa nt s

livelihood; to merge the industrial movement with

of, industrial and trade develcmmen,t a1,ld th e

interests of the .\ndustrial an d t r ade c i rc les; to

movement wi th the program of t he promoti on in

ethics, and democracy and m e n t ~ l as well as bodily health

the ; to merge the IwomE!n' s movement th e program

domestic happiness and t he women' slivelihood •.

To i ns ti tu te s oc ia l r ef orm after reform: to

measures.

faith wHhthemaSs 9f the i n t he common doom

out t'he prt;lg'rams of national reconstruction in th e

livelihood and weH-being promoted.

2s To work'with'the mass of th e people fo r th e recovery of

mainland and th e defeat of communism in the self-

reliance and mutual assistance through cultural an d educational

masters of 'th e ar t of and controlling the

Cor the. purpose of winning the

mass mo;vement battlefields, the

are be acco'ffif>ll:shl"d:

enemy

-: 178- -119 --:-

help us in th e anti-Communist effort in due t ime.

In order to accomplishthe above missions, th e authorities

concerned should undertake the following activities:

I. To put .into effect aU measures i n t he interest of the mass

1 with th e

of th e enemy as

gical deployment in overall military

of the people . t h l ~ froiltand i n t he

a t should be carried out in coordination·with the extensive

and long-range wa r and m e a n w ~ i l e ? with strate-



of t.he people.

2. To strengthen the work to serve the interest of the people.

3. To promote the' education in anti-Communism .

4. accelerate the tempo in f i g h t i n g . a ~ i n s t th e Chinese

Reds on the mainland thrQugh ou r underground organizations

there.

5. T o compl ete the preparatory work in organizing the

masseS against the Communists on th e mainland.

B. In the tactical f ie ld : T he obj ec ti ve of mass movementin

this field is to give direct support to the ni iEtary operations in

th e wax: areas. It is conducted in coordination with th e war d e

velopment s and the s i t u a t i o n ~ of the people on the front, with

t he m as se s of the wa r area and their vicinities as ta rge ts . The

o,bjectives in the tactical field are as follows:

1. To exhort the people on the enemy I s front. to support our.

mil it ar y ope ra ti on s a nd convince them t ha t the Government

fighting f or t he ir liberation from the Commur.Jst oppression.

2. Tomake the masses provide us w it haccurate informatlon

voluntarily.

1. Through strict discipl ine and by political appeal to

, J h e f r o n t l i n e ~ o p l e in steps with ou r forces, notwith the enemy.

• To mobilize the manpower and resources in meeting th e

requirements in ou r military operations.will

life

in ou r mass movement the:rein voluntarily so

2.. To call upon the mass of the people to support the

mobilization program of manpower andresourtes in

the face of the Chinese Communist menace

3 To ensure the national security by upon the people

to support the present program of sorting out th e Communist

agents and traitors

4. To exhort the mass of th e people to

governmental foundation their to the

p r e ~ e n t adminstration.

5 To 'alert in th e enemy-held areas to true

nature of communism an d call upon them to agains t t he R ed

oppressors to th e bitter end with determination

6.. To in the. minds of the in the enemy-

held areas that the. Kuomintang represents the main current of

Chinese political thoughts jl that the National Government is the

legal and government of China; and

l;;;.,,a.u'tan Chiang Kai-shek is th e national savior.

To way fo r the people in the areas

The may be sUf111I1ed

I.. To lead the in th e adaptation t o t he

.......,........."..... an d thriftand ill extending the

t o t he national wartime

180 - -18 t -

.""Ii£&&tMJ&£1

2. To re-educate those people who have "been utilized

Communists an d re-orientate them toward the Government.

in these areas so as to ensu re there wi.ll be no comeback anyhe people · U C H ..."' .... the enemyo

6. To most of the enemy' materials in

fo r mass· movement,S so as to hamper

on Iront.



:3. To stress the refugee relief work, with wages as a

s t i tu tefor relief.

th e hands mainland people fo r use our oper-

ations agitatIng them fo r starting movements to their

4. To res tore th e soda l order by re-establishing the

defense organizations, with th e themselves J;'esponsible

fo r screening and self - fjefense .

5. To exhort the people the recovered areas to give, all-

out support to the political platforms based on th e Three Prin-

c i p1es of th e , w ltb th e esta bUs hment o f the government of

t he people. the and fo r the peoplg as the ult imate" goaL

6, To utHize the positive elements among th e masses as the

in th e anti-Communist organizations.

7. To the strength of th e people to t he ful le s t extGnt

to support th e mili tary operat ions by promptly restoring the lines

o ft rans porta ti o nand prod uction.

To attain th e objectiv'es listed in th e above, th e authorit ies

concex:ned should carry out tb e following activities.

I. To support the field civil administ rat ive uni ts .

2. To make al l materials available f or r el ie f work.

J. ,- 'I e pr.0vide the civi l defense crganizations with arms .

with weapons and

Commu-

on. the mainland to

1

p s y c h o l o g l ~ a l operations on the enemy 's Cront

To coordinate th e intelligence work with the anti-Commu

o,ist people behind the enemy I s Cront .

provide the anti-C ~ l I \ m u n i s tammunition time and keep them fihgt ing on

despite setbacks •

To aH-outsupport. to the

mass movements without let-up.

In the field of pacification Mass movement warfare in

this field is to extend the achievements in the mass

work.

attain. of ITiass movement warfare in the

f ie ld , the following activities should be

- .To take the masses in the target areas as the

To organize the maSses behind the enemy s so as to

thwart the to the Communlsts in their administr-

ations so t ha t t he can-be laid in the re ....e·stablishment

political power in the recovered areaS of such

operations as

To uproot foundation of the Communist mass operations

-182 -

4. Topr iv ide facilities fo r transportation, communication

and production.

The mass movement warfare i n t he pacification zones is the

final check-up of all the achievements of political Yvarfare It

-183 -

to e xe rt o ur , utmost in this respect at th e present

Chapto r VI., Conclusion

"There,is no subst itute for vic tory"

Douglas 11acArthur.

th e

it

the evils ofIn order to

political po'wer on

'" ' ' ' '6 ....,u ....,u 6 'of ,political reconstructIon

I n ( a p , U ~ S of

communism andto se t up

Three

also' marks the



liThe fight against communism" is

th e responsibility of all. Th e Communists

exploit ou r apathy f indifference and

unconcern tl• - - ,J . E. Hoover!

"The world conflict is simply a war

between good and evil . On e cannot but be

sure that f however the ebb and flow of

fortunes of wa r and' currents of power

pol it ics change, man will aspire toward

th e good and spurn eVil'in th e long run.

Therefore it is inevitable that evil will

pass. and good must win. II

- - Lin Yutang .

In the preceding chapters, i t has been made extrem,ely clear

that the Communists f Russian and Chinese 1 have long been em

phasizing th e significance of political warfare and using i t as

means to fu rther thei r agg res sions and rebellions.

th e concept and the art of political warfare are by nO'means

inventions of th e Communists . The political warfare we of

differs from that of the ,Communis ts , both in meaning and in ob -

- 184-- 185-

&E&£&£

by strength ll• lIThe contest by wit", in modern term, is t he same

as the ,conflict of thought or ideology. The earliest examples DC

ideological warfare in China took place in the days of Confucius

and Menclus who flourished in the f if th and fourth century B.C

respectiv:ely. As in the Period of Spring and A utumn, the ortho

has

presentway do we fol low the enemy . WhatIn

native China fo r several thousand years

Yat-sen and President Kai-shek have bed

been

writer wants to make clear h er e i s that



dox phi losophy handed down from Emperors Yao , Shun,

Tang, Wen, and Wu, and th e Duke of Chou, syncretized in Con

fucianism, had gradually diversified with conflicting schools of

thought vying fo r supremacy. On8 of the marked trends wa s a

type,of "hypocrites" who in words and deeds pract ised pretense

and chicanery to gain their own sel fi sh ends. Among them Shao

Cheng-mao was the distinguished representative-. It wa s said

Confucius' detested them t he mos t. As soon as he took th e post

of Minister of Justice i n h is nat ive State ofLu, he promptly pu t

Shao Cheng-mao to death. The stern measure taKen by Confucius

to uproot the weeds has been admired by la t3r generat ions .

in the period of Warring States, schools of heterodox

thoughts took concrete shapes . In t he face of cultural anarchy #

Menciu s, t he main architect of Confucianism, entertained the

bitter resentment against Yang Chu, who preached ego ism, and

Mo-Ti, who expounded the doctrine of all- embracing love. He

took upon himself the responsibity to denounce both

saying: "The whole world is in chaos . Those who do not belong

to the school of Yang Chu must be of the school of Mo Ti", and

fl} am notfond of disputing, but I cornpelledto do i t " . Mencius I

denunciation of both schools of thought can be considered an

open attack on the he te rodox philosophy of his t ime. This is an

be

will

win

also

pre

and

wHh-

highest

enemy s

rnastery

science

ha'Ve

advocated in

ar t

but rather the use

it.'

not

the skillful leader subdues

ha s i t that

he will

times the

stratagem and

few

valor".

is

military

lithe contest by wit" and lithe contest

the enemy I s plans II. In

be cited to show how

a l : : a , u , ~ " L the enemy. Suntse

has said:

warfare have been stressed

the

in

th8 best

a dis tinction

the

ancient China.

he goes on: "With hi s forces

the, and thus

This is the

genera

a war

enemy I S troops without any fight ing; he captures

without them he overthrows their

in the field!l . Suntse IS

stratagem, ra ther than

great

6- . - 18 7 - ~

this toreknowledgecannot be elicited, from spir i ts ; it cannot be

obta ined induct ive ly from experience, no r by any deductive

calculation. Knowledge of the ene my I s dispositions ca n be

obtained from men." In order to detect the enemy I s situations,

one must resort to espionage. The use of spies a n agents t as ·

ideological warfare in ancient China

In th e first of his famous work The Art of War ,

had laid down the by merging hi s

ar y science with hi s philosophy by liThe moral

113.w causes th,e' people to be in complet e accord with their ru ler



indicated in many cases in Chinese history wa s the generCl':

practice in intelligence warfare waged in ancien t China.

In " the Book'of History", one of the five Confucian classics,

there i s a passage which reads: "The people are the foundation

of the s tate ; when the foundat ion is firm, the s ta te i s s ecu re . t1

And again, in "The Great Learning", one of th e Confucian four

books, it is s aid: "Having first t he p eo pl e, a nd then one may

possess land; with land secured g one may have wealth; and then

with materialwealth at hand, one may us e i t fo r good purpose".

Both passages s t r e s ~ t he v iew that th e people as th e foundation

oI a state are more important. than land, especially in wartimes.

Menelus accordingly poin ts out: "One who ca n wi n the empire

must first win over the people". The doctrine of winning the

heart of. th e people is th e keynote of t he mas s movement warfare.

With reference to th e passages quoted above, however brief

they may seem, when supported by historical facts, it is evident.......that s ince ancien t times the Chinese have emphasi24ed t he impo r-

tance of political warfare in aspects.

warfare ancient China.

the Chinese ancient classics ha sne

th e when united, wil l be as

Th e word "wil l" deserves sp,ecial notice. The saying

to the consolidatinn of the bulwark.

Art of War, another passage reads: "The best policy

in the attack upon thH heart ot, the people of the enemy

next comes the' assault upon the enemy I s "11 this

Suntsehas' laid down the appUed in war of nerveS.

China, phases of psychological warfare

He also st resses

of belligerent

"AH:::UJeuJll:, of the

sothat will follow regardless of their lives,

11 In this passage, what Sunise says be nIn

c accord" an d to shELre t he s ame doom indicates

empmaSJ.S .on th e streng

FO.............."" .....v .......... structure with feeling and affection.

of winning the of the

showing them kindnesses soas

th e of

Throughout hi s ..ife, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had the

supreme stratagem i n p ol it ic al warfare, as ca n be seen in th e

starting of th e NationalRevolution, in th e overthrow of th e des

potic Manchu House and i n t he d ef ea t of Yuan Shih-kaL. Without.

V \ ' ; J l ! V J , . V ~ ~ \ , ; ( ' : L J . attask were stressed.

what enables th e wise sov

to strike and conquer and achieve

men is Now

to

defense and

n n ' < T n T , n the of

-- 188- - 189-

of the Republic of China had consistently stressed the necessity

of applying political warfare to the Revolution .. We ca n also say

that the success in th e Wuchang Uprising and the victory,over

Yuan Shhi-Kai were the fruits of political warf ar e i n ' - I LU.U.U.<> ' ' ' ' i

The theory practice of political ~ ' V a r f a r e have been

s Live-h is le clures on.. and

Dr . could not have succeeded in

u n d . e r t ( : u { : m ~ ~ s . He wrote his magnum opus th e Three

he took Marxism to task. This is aJ.}. of how he

had warfare against sinisrer force

these



consummated in President Chiang Kai-shek. He ha d no t only

coined the Chinese term of II political warfare" but also

defined it s contents as consisting of si x types i n h is lecture on

It The Principles of Political Warfare It . It is highly

that the ranking officials and military officers o f ,Chi na h ad

failed in years before 1949 to fLIlly appreciate. the President I s\

enlightening- instructions in the f ie ld of political warfare and had

suffered se t in the struggle against th e Chinese Com

nists on themainla • With these ,bitter lessons in mind, we have

to heighten ou r p o l i t ~ c a l c ~ m s c i o u s n e s s and strengthen t he work

of political warfa.r"e'in order to ~ i the f}nal victory in the an ti -

Communist war •.

of

t-""-!:: ;a. ,un, rather

success in

on

He

to th e success in

fo r the cause

fo r the heart o f t he

to him

he made an extensive tour around the

said:

evolution, the

than on

th e

he

ommunism. From the earliest days of the Hevolution when he

established th e rv1eng Hui till the t ime of the in

the Kuomlntang, the ru ling party China Dr . Sun

ha d the tactics of organizational warfare .. In a " " ~ t : O C ' - · l l

delivered in the December of 1923 before the of the

As a result· of the "smileoffensive" launcbed by the Chinese

Commimusts .. the cross-currents of appeasement are now prev

ailing on the international leveL., Many leaders of the free world

ar e bewildered andean hardly distinguish friends from foes.

S orne cast doubts on "UZ: capability of recovering the main

landand even consider i t unfeasible. Others have a lso expres s-

ed t he ir concern over th e poss1ibiUty of ou r fig1)ting back. As a

matter of fact._ they'fail to understand the nature of th e Commu

nist r eg im e in Peiping', no r do they understand the strength of

th e Repub li c o f Cllln.a in Taiwan. It is trtie that the Chinese

his

of

Father

<, ; ; ;U! tJ ! . !u - . ., ....... on mass

he lua, \J l-J'Ou.

River for the

in a common struggle

J.UI,C:.l .J. ,Cf; : : .Cj .l l '-C:: collection.

declared that , in order to attain the

is necessary to

and associ<:'te ours,elves with those ",,",'JU'' ' ',",

the

members message to

movement. F rom aU these we ca n say t ha t t he

who t reat us as

Dr. Sun had '"'ULC;""......

information about the en f illy

This is an to show the

lower

- 190- - · 1 9 · 1 ~

of tho mainland people. it 'hat which we u se t o pierce t h enemy's

weakspot is tho political weapon. So' long as we are able to con

duct our po li t ical warfare against th e Chinese Communists e f f e c ~ .

t ively and a g ~ e s s i v e l y , we shall defeat them without difficulty 6

Political warfare, :i s advocated by President Chiang.,. poverscan-

are in poss-

ther'e is no denying the fact that

forces, and in addition,

t he upper hand numerically in terri torial 'areas f

nuclear weapons. With mere' figures and stat.istics as

wa r I J J . C ; " U A U . U . ~

ommunists

basis

sucha counteroffensive against the mainland. is also

ession



helpless, but such destruction can only be co'inpensateaon our pa rt

by reassert ing th e human dignity, rebuilding the domestic happi-

ness, restoring thesocia l o rde r and reconstruqting a new,

- 193-

a wide range of knowledge. what has been discussed here can .but

s er ve a s introductory. Further studies on t he s ix types' of

political warfare, both in theory and in practice, will contribute

t o t he great mission in ma,inland recovery and national

reconstruction.

Finally f the present writer wants to raise three major points

in tha subject under discussion, presented h er e f or the r e f e r e n ~ e ·of those who ar e interested in th e study df political warfare:

I.. th e strategy of political warfare, reconstruction. is

preferable to destruction. As mentioned in. the above chapters 9

botqDr. Sun Yat-:sen and President Chiang have emphasized that

th e .supreme strategy of th e Party. is recons truct ion. Of course1

in a wa r d e s t r ~ c t i o n is unavoidable, but one thing which is esse

ntial to th e .strategical planning is this: reconstruction is

preferable .What ha s to bedestroyed only paves th e way fo r recon-

struction. At present the most important thing f or t he country is

political ,cul tural , economic, and national defen.ce reconstruc

tion. Once we take the, mHitary offensive against the mainland,

we have t o resor t . to extensive destruction to render the enemy

in

but

con-

stress-

, and

. More-

milltary

Even if the

at alL

which is at

is finished.

number but not in

err orts in material

and

he ha s his vulnerable

and seventy percent

'" 1-'<;;"""""""''''' of 'war efforts has

war and Taiwan Straits it s . ::>u,...... , ' - '

wa r ha s

- IS

the Ta lwan Straits

of the enemy in : s t r e q ~ h is granted, one has can-

that in of grea t s treng th there are ah ,ays

• Powerful and as t he Greek hero Achi lles in

V ~ J L " ' ' ' ; L ' - support However

is , the main force in ou r crusade l ies not

percent

heels Pierced where alone he is vulnerable

Achilles' heel af th e Chinese Communists is

is admitted that th e enemy is superior

Numerical

IJv ...............c.... warfare. That i s a ls o th e reason

Battle

Weak

sider the

theater

over, the battlefield of a. wa r is not the

th e malnlano4 President Chiang has made i t clear that

~ I l J I U " : l . L < ' : : ; U . counteroffensive !lwill not

on ""v ..... ................ doctrine II that "The uU ;..........L ..."'"

undeniable that once the counteroffensive is we have