waiting for democracy: the politics of choice and recognition
TRANSCRIPT
Waiting for Democracy:
The Politics of Choice and Recognition
Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain:
Institutional Choice in Decentralization
Jesse C. RibotEquity, Poverty & Environment GroupInstitutions and Governance Program
World Resources Institute
Shell corporation ad
Malaysian Naturalist
September 2004
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Research Program on Democratic Decentralization Project Main findings
New Research Programs Commodity Chain Analysis as a Policy Tool Institutional Choice and Recognition
Institutional Choice and Recognition
Today’s Talk
Power Transfers
Defining Decentralization
Central GovernmentMinistries:
-Health -Environment -Education….
Democratic Local
Government
AdministrativeLocal Authority
Customary Authority
NGOPVOCBO
DonorsBig NGOs
Individual orCorporation
Democratic
Decentra
lizatio
n
Decon
cent
ratio
n
(Adm
inis
trativ
e
Decen
traliz
atio
n)
Privatization
Hybrids?
3rd SectorGovernment
Non-market Privatization
Decentralization Not Decentralization
Public-Private Spectrum PrivatePublic
Participation
Contracts & Delegations
Theoretical Mechanisms of Decentralization Benefits
Advertised Benefits Enfranchisement, Equity, Efficiency, Development, Better
Management, Better Service Delivery, Benefit retention
Mechanisms Local Authorities are believed to: Better match services to needs and aspirations (public choice theory) Reduce transaction costs (new institutional econ) by proximity
allowing: Mobilizing local knowledge and skills for collective/public good Mobilizing local labor for collective projects Improved coordination among local programs
Balance of negative and positive outcomes in decision making (economic theory of “internalizing externalities”)
ALL IMPLY INCLUSION MECHANISM: REPRESENTATION *With* POWERS
REPRESENTATION
Preferences
Signals
Mandates
Policies Outcomes
Responsiveness Accountability
Sanctions
= Responsiveness &/or Accountability
Elements of Effective Decentralization
Positive Outcomes are Expected from:
Local InstitutionsActors
Entrusted with Powers (executive, legislative, judicial: discretion+capabilities to exercise them)
That are Accountable to the Local Population
[Representation is integrative mechanisms in rural development]
Central GovernmentMinistries:
-Health -Environment -Education….
Democratic Local
Government
AdministrativeLocal Authority
Customary Authority
NGOPVOCBO
DonorsBig NGOs
Individual orCorporation
Democratic
Decentra
lizatio
n
Decon
cent
ratio
n
PrivatizationNon-market Privatization
Participation?
Local Populations
??
Power Transfer
Accountability
Contracts & Delegations
Central GovernmentMinistries:
-Health -Environment -Education….
Democratic Local
Government
AdministrativeLocal Authority
Customary Authority
NGOPVOCBO
DonorsBig NGOs
Individual orCorporation
Democratic
Decentra
lizatio
n
Decon
cent
ratio
n
PrivatizationNon-market Privatization
Participation?
Local Populations
??
Power Transfer
Ability to Sanction
Contracts & Delegations
What Happens in Practice?
Power Choices in Practice
Choice of Institutions in Practice
Institutional Choices in Practice Local democratic institutions rarely empowered. Elected local institutions, when chosen, are often not democratic. Deconcentration to local branches of forest departments most common. Privatization of public resources in the name of Decentralization very common:
Hunting in Senegal and Namibia Forests to individuals and chiefs in Mali and Uganda Land to individuals in South Africa
NGOs and community groups being chosen by donors—even where there are democratic local authorities Competition with & de-legitimating of local democracy-[Bee-keepers in Uganda] Proliferation of Committees, PVOs and NGOs since 90s Institutional “pluralism” undermining democracy [pluralism is good, but it must be
subordinated to representative authorities] Participatory Processes in lieu of working with elected local authorities Customary authority being chosen as if representative.
Many of these choices take legitimacy and powers from local democratic authorities, and are used to mobilize rather than enfranchise.
Choice of Powers in Practice Only a few cases discretionary powers (domain of democracy)
Fiscal resources (eg Cameroon) & some allocation decisions Non-commercial subsistence resources transferred Powers to allocate lucrative resources retained Mandates: the odium of management, dominate transfers
Some funded Most unfunded—NRM not viewed as labor Forced labor for tree planting still included in Ugandan laws
Draconian mgt. Planning required for communities [although NOT usually necessary double standards applied] Local use often not ecological problem, but requires elaborate plans Concessions get to operate with few regulations Access to resource exchanged for labor to implement plans—participatory
corvee in Senegal, Cameroon, Zimbabwe CBNRM programs Donors and NGOs needed to assist planning
Means of transfer problem—rights vs. Privileges Most are insecure Secure means of transfer legitimacy, security, stability over time
These choices constitute Government Tactics
resisting decentralization
Choice of Institutions
Resisting Power Transfers
Getting the Institutions Right?
Decentralization theory is an IF-THEN proposition [out of new institutionalism] If we have the right institutions with the right powers Then we get all these positive outcomes
But we’re not getting to ‘IF’ in most cases
New institutionalism is being stomped out by a larger set of political-economic forces
[Sort of like “Bambi Meets Godzilla”]
New Institutionalism Meets Political Economy
CONCLUSIONS
What are we doing about it?
Better Match Policy to protect procedural objectives of democracy against instrumental
sectoral objectivesPowers: Subsidiarity/Standards
Actors & Accountability: Institutional Choice
New Research Program: If states resist via institutional choices: lets understand those
choices and their effects.
Recommendations Section
Principles of Institutional Choice
Choose democratic local institutions where they exist; Call for them where they do not Scrutinize and re-design local electoral processes to make elected bodies democratic
Choose and focus on fewer institutions. Nest institutions so that any institution with powers over
“public” or collective resources is subordinated to democratic authorities NGOs, Local administrative authorities, Local forest services, customary
authorities should be accountable to local elected authorities Disciplining effect of just hierarchy
Do not transfer public powers to private institutions Use Participation as a tool not a substitute for local
democracy Inclusion of marginal groups…. Use committees as tools within democratic structures not in
place of them
Central GovernmentMinistries:
-Health -Environment -Education….
Democratic Local
Government
AdministrativeLocal Authority
Customary Authority
NGO/ PVOCBO
Committees
Individual orCorporation
IdealAccountability of Institutions
Power Transfer
Accountability
Local Populations
Subsidiarity Principles Focus on creating local discretion Devolve lucrative opportunities Separate technical from political decisions—
devolve political decisions. Shift oversight and approval to a legal control
model—function of forest service to assure compliance with laws, not to approve every decision.
Keep in mind that capacity follows power Use taxation of resource to retain value [must set
at higher level—do not only give locals revenues from fines.]
Shift from Planning to Minimum Standards [next]
Subsidiarity Principles IILimits and Context of Powers
Shift to uniform minimum standards from a planning approach Planning not needed Standards needed Delimit Space of Discretion Eliminate double standards between communities and corporations [That much forest management being required of local communities by
forest services is unnecessary is unthinkable—gather the data to make it thinkable!]
Incentives—local people do not choose to invest in the environment Treat NRM investments as other public works—pay labor Project solutions—reduce co-pay, pair projects, green windows
Framework for Future Analysis Representation
Means of Transfer Empowering Representation Mix of Institutions
Citizenship and Belonging Residency Interest Identity
Public Domain Maintaining public space Enclosure through privatization and desecularization
Public Domain Representation and Belonging
The End