wagner - descartes's arguments for mind-body distinctness

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International Phenomenological Society

Descartes's Arguments for Mind-Body DistinctnessAuthor(s): Steven J. WagnerSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jun., 1983), pp. 499-517Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107644 .

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Philosophynd Phenomenologicalesearch

Vol.

XLIII,

No.

4, June

983

Descartes'sArguments or

Mind-Body

istinctness

STEVEN

J.

WAGNER

Universityf Illinois,

Urbana-Champaign

I was

of threeminds,

Like a tree

In

which there re three

lackbirds.

Wallace

Stevens

Descartes's definitions f mindas any thingwhich thinks nd bodyas

any extended

hing eft ntirely pen the question of

mind-body den-

tity' (AT VII, i6i;

HR

II, 53).'

His

negative

answer

was

probably

rooted n

a

sense of the limits f

mechanistic xplanation

W,

-77-85),

but we

may guess

thathe foundno

rigorous rgument

long

such

ines,

for

his

attempted roofs

of dualism

proceededquite

differently.

ere is

one

of

the two

given

n

his most

carefully rguedwork,

the

Medita-

tions:

. . .

because I

know

that all that

clearly

nd

distinctly

nderstand an

be made

by

God

as

I

understand

t,

t is

enough

that can

clearly

nd

distinctly

nderstand ne

thing

apart

from nother

forme

to be sure that one is

diversefrom he

other,

because

God at

least canplace them

part;

and it does not matter

y

what

power

this s

done,

for

hem

o

be

judged

diverse.And

thus,

from his

very

act hat know

exist,

nd meanwhile otice

nothing

learly

o

pertain

o

my

nature

r

essence, xcept

this

lone,

that

am

a

thinking

In some passages mind is called a ("real") property f body (AT III, 667-68, PL,

138-39;

AT VII,

441-4z;

HR II, 254-55). This in some ways very nsightful ove is

simply nconsistent ith the official osition.That Descartes made it underconsidera-

ble pressuremay be seen fromhis uncharacteristicallyutrageousaccount of where

our idea of

gravity omes from

t HR

II,

z55.

References re to be decoded as follows.HR

=

Haldane and Ross, The Philosophical

Works of Descartes,

z

vols. (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity ress,

977);

AT =

Adam ndTannery,

euvres de Descartes,

1 vols. Paris: erf,

897-1913);

PL

=

A.

Kenny, escartes: PhilosophicalLetters Oxford: Clarendon, 970); CB

=

J.

Cotting-

ham, Descartes's Conversationwith Burman (Oxford: Clarendon,1976);

W

=

M.

Wilson, Descartes (London, Henley and Boston: Routledge

nd

Kegan Paul,

1978);

S

=

S.

Schiffer,

Descartes on His

Essence," Philosophical

Review

85,

I

(January976).

I will cite AT

only

n the first

eference

o

a

passage.

DESCARTES AND MIND-BODY DISTINCTNESS 499


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3/20

thing, rightly onclude that my whole essence consists

n

this one thing, hat am a

thinking hing . . because on the one hand

I have a clear and distinct dea of myself,

insofar s

I

am only

a

thinking hing, ot extended,

nd on the otherhanda distinctdea

of body nsofar

s

it is only

an

extended

hing,

ot

thinking,

t

is certain

hat

am

really

distinct rommy body and can exist without

t (AT VII, 78; HR I, i90).

I shallcall thisthe separability rgumentSep). The other ne I call the

divisibilityrgument Div):

.

.

.

there s a great difference etween

mind and body, n that body is by its nature

always divisible,mind however clearly ndivisible.For when

I

consider my mind, or

myselfnsofar s

I

am just

a

thinking hing,

can

distinguish

o

parts

n

myself,

ut

clearly

understandmyself s something

ne and entire. . . On the otherhand there s no cor-

poreal

or

extendedthing

which

I

cannot readilydivide n thought

nd

which do not

therefore nderstand s being divisible.This would be enough to teach me that mind s

entirely ifferentrom

body,

f did not know thiswell enough already AT VII, 85-86;

HR I,

i96).

One problem bout these- rguments

s their elation.While Sep has

been

intensivelytudied,

Div has

been

ignored,'

which

certainly ug-

gests ome difference

n the

nterest

r force f thetwo proofs.Yet I will

argue

that

they re essentially

like. This is not quite to say that they

have one

basic structure,

ecause

my econd

main

point

will

be that he

two

traditionally pposed

accounts

of

God's

role

n

Sep

are both

right.

Deep tensions edDescartesto offer nd confuse wo incompatible er-

sions

of

Sep. (I

believe hatthe same

ambiguity

rises

n

Div,

although

will

concentrate n the

single

form

Div

takes

at HR

I, i96.)

So

my

task

is

at

once

to

unify escartes's arguments

nd to

establish is fundamen-

tal

ambivalence.

Section

introduces

oth forms

f

Sep.

then

develops

the

one

found

in the Meditations

with particular

ttention o its distinctive

remise

about God's veracity (G')).

An

analysiswhich

makes

G') equally

crit-

ical to Div follows n Section I. Section II explainsDescartes's ambig-

uous presentation

f

Sep. (G')

itself s rooted

n

his basic confusion, et

I conclude

by observing

hat the use

of

this premiserepresents pro-

found advance.

It is

Descartes's

announcement

that

classical

approaches

to

the

mind-body roblem

fail.

3

For example,

Div

is

not discussed n

W,

nor n the standardbooksbyBeck The

Meta-

physics f Descartes [Oxford:Clarendon,

965]),

Kenny Descartes NewYork: Ran-

dom House, i968]),

and Williams

Descartes,

[New York: Penguin, 978]),

nor

in

Hooker's anthology

f current

artesian

scholarshipDescartes

[Baltimore

nd Lon-

don: JohnsHopkins,

1978]). It is mentioned

n S only as an

"ancillary

rgument."

The works ust

citedprovide

good

sampling f critical pproaches

o Sep and con-

tain further eferences.

lear representatives

f the

two mainviews of

Sep to be

con-

sidered below are

S and Hooker,

"Descartes's

Denial of Mind-Body

dentity"

n

Hooker, op. cit.;

some of the other

literature

s more confused.

am, however,

indebted

o all of

the literature;

will

not refer o it as often

s it deserves;

nd will

economize

by assuming

points take

to have been

settled here, ven

f they re

still

controversial.

500 STEVEN J. WAGNER




4/20

I. The Separability

rgument

Descartes nfersmind-body

istinctness

y applyingGod's

"validation"

of clearand distinct

henceforth

& d) ideas,

establishedn the Fourth

Meditation,

o the c

& d conception

of mindattained

n the Second

Meditation.The main question about Sep can be put in termsof a

trade-off: oes Descartes

rely on

a modestconception

f mind plus

a

strong ppeal

to God,

or

does

an immodest onception

f mindenable

him

to get

by with esstheology?

Our choice

heredepends

on resolving

an ambiguityn Cartesian

laims

to conceive

mindapartfrom ody,

to

conceive

himself nlyas

a

thinking

hing, nd

the ike.

Descartes's

conceptionof

mind certainlyncludes he

c & d percep-

tionthatminds hink.

On themodestconstrual,

which

shall call theA

reading, hat s all there s to it. Descartes'sconception s simply ilent

about whether

minds

re extended;while t

onlyattributes

hought,

ot

extension,

o

minds,

he possibility

f an extended

mind s in no

way

ruledout.

But according o a second

reading

B), Descartes's

onception

of

mind

n the SecondMeditation

lready ncludes

c

& d perception

that minds are not

extendedor that thought

s the only

property

f

minds. Of course these

two interpretations

eave Descarteswith very

different

mounts of work to do

in the following

Meditations.Once

bodies are defined s extended hings,hedistinctionetweenmind nd

body

is

immediate

f

minds are

not

extended.

f that

s what Descartes

perceives

n the Second Meditation,

ll that could remain

would be

for

God

to

assure

him of the truth

f his c & d perceptions.

f, however,

Descartes

starts

with

the

moremodest

conception

of

mind,

he must

infer ualism

from he

fact hat his

onception mits xtension.

o this

end he

would,

t

seems,

first eed God's guarantee

hat f

under

ertain

conditions)

do not

see

that

minds

are extended,

ach

mind

s

at

least

possiblynota body.Modal principleswould then ead from ossibleto

actual

(or

even

necessary)

non-extension.

n this

version

of

the argu-

ment,

God

does

not

justvalidate

a

perception

f

distinctness.

Without

him,

ven

a

perception

f

the objectivepossibility

f

unextended

minds

cannot be

achieved,

and

Descartes

would

have

no

way

to

progress

beyond

confession f

ignorance

bout the extension

f minds.

Not

surprisingly,

onsiderable

videncebears

on

the choice

between

these uitedivergent

nterpretations.

et

us

review s

briefly

s

possible

thearguments oreach side.

The A

reading

eems

trueto the

Meditations.

According

o the

Pref-

ace:

[Ihaverguedhat]

s far s was

ware,

knew

othinglearly

o

pertain

o

my

ssence,

except

hat was

thinkinghing

..

But

nwhat

ollows

shall

how

ow,

romhe

fact hat know

othing

lse

which

ertains

o

my ssence,

tfollows

hat

othing

lse

really

oes

ertain

o t

AT

VII, ;

HR

,

138).

DESCARTES

AND MIND-BODY

DISTINCTNESS

50I




5/20

And indeed, ll

Descartes says n the SecondMeditation s thatnothing

but

thought

an

thus

far

be knownto belongto him

AT VII,

z7;

HR

I,

I

5 ); theFourth

Meditation mphasizes gain

that he question f dual-

ism s stillopen

(AT VII, 59;

HR

I, I76; cf.,

e.g., AT VII,

I76;

HR II,

64). Descartes's

meaning n the SixthMeditation

HR I,

i90)

is unclear

by itself,

ut in

the

light

of

what has

gone

before,

we should read

it

roughly s

follows. I give a closer analysisbelow.) Conceiving mind

apart frombody" should mean forming

conceptionof mind which

does not

attribute xtensionto minds. What God then guarantees s

that

minds can

exist without xtension ". . . God at least can place

them

apart

.

. ."); and the actual distinctness f mind and

body is

inferred rom his

possibility. he role of God,

then, s to permitDes-

cartes's ransition

rom limited onception f mind o a modal propo-

sition bout mind and body, fromwhich dualism s supposed to follow

withoutdivineassistance.This is the essence of

the

A

reading.

I

should add thatbesidesfittinghe

Meditations, he

A

reading s also

in

linewith now

justly scendantview of the

problem f the Circle W

I3I-35; CB

xxvi-xxxii).On that view, God is

needed to validate only

propositionswe

remember & d perceiving ut do not so perceive

now. Thus divineveracity s generallynot a

premise

n

Descartes's

proofs.An ordinary roofresults n the c & d

perception f its conclu-

sion,and c & d perception ompletelystablishes proposition. ut on

the

B

reading,

ualism s

c

&

d

perceived

n the Second

Meditation, et

stillneeds confirmation

rom n

high.

Given this

evidence,

ne is

tempted

o tracethe

B

reading

o

wishful

thinking y

latter-day

ualists.

If

mind-body

istinctness

r

proposi-

tions

entailing

t are

c

&

d

perceived

n the Second

Meditation,

Des-

cartes's

goal

of

proving

he

distinction etween

mind nd

bodyhas been

(or

can

be)

reached hen

nd

there.Among

other

hings,

he

psychology

and theologyof the next two Meditationsare entirely nnecessary.

Since

these are

some

of

the most

dubious

and dated

aspects

of

Carte-

sianism,

someone

sympathetic

o

Descartes's

conclusions

might

well

hope

that

he

perceived

mind-body istinctness,

r

at

least

something

close

to

it, early

on,

for

the

proof eading

to that

perceptionmight

till

be usable

or

easily

revised.

There

s,however, enuine upport

for he

B

reading.Noteworthy

n

this

respect

re

some

passages

from he Fourth

Replies but

see

also

AT

VII,

I3;

HR I,

I40-4I;

AT VII,

i69-70,

444-45; HR II,

59, z56-57;

AT

III,

477-78;

PL

Iz5;

AT

V,

i63;

CB,

z8).

Descartes asserts here hat

mind-body istinctness

was

already perceived

n the

Second

Medita-

tion,

and

that

only "hyperbolical"

doubts

about this conclusionwere

removed n

the

subsequent

discussion

AT VII, zz6;

HR

II, ioi-z).

A

few

pages earlier,

e

claims

to have seen

near

the

start hat

t

s

possible

for

minds

to

exist unextended

AT VII,

zi9;

HR

II, 96-97;

cf. HR

II,

59),

and this

comes

to the same

thing.According

o the

A

reading,

he

502

STEVEN

J.

WAGNER




6/20

basic work

s done

once this

possibilitys established

"[I am]

sure that

one is

diverse from the

other,

because God at least . .

."), and

although

Descarteswill still

need someauxiliary

modal

principles such

as

(NE) below) in order

correctly o

provedistinctness,hese

are pre-

sumably s available in

the Second

Meditation s

they re later

on.

In furtherefenseof the B reading, ts rival'sagreement

with Des-

cartes's

general

epistemology nd

theology s

reduced by a problem

about

the divine

guarantee.Since this

is a crucial

point, I wish to

explain

t with care.

It is of

the essence of

theMeditations

hat God

is no rubberstamp.

The

beliefshe

validates are

supportedby the best

possible

evidence:

generally yproof, lthoughour

belief

n

the externalworld s

"only"

supposedto be

irrefutable

nd

highly

vident. n all

other ases,our ob

is to avoid error ywithholding ssent.Now ourconfidencenproposi-

tions we c

&

d

perceive s

warranted

ustbecause c

&

d

perception s

the result f

a

proof.

When

my

c

&

d

concept

of a

certain

hing has

shown me certain

properties,

t is

therefore

ntirely

orrect or

God to

validate

my

concept

n

the sense of

assuring

me that

F

must

have what-

ever

properties

attributed

o

it;

thosewere

ust

the

properties

demon-

strated

F

to have. For

example,

I have

proved

that minds

think,

o

thoughts contained

n

my

c

&

d

concept

of

mind,

and it would

be

properfor God to assure me that minds are thinking hings. Even

though

could

hardly

ail

o recallthe

proof

of

that.)

But

the bsence

of,

say,

extensionfrom

my

c

&

d

concept

of, say,

mind

means

only

that

(however

carefully

nd

clear-headedly

consider

the

matter)

lack

a

proof onnecting his

property

o minds.

Nothing

more.

need have no

proof

hat minds ack

extension. may even have no shredof

an

argu-

ment

hat mindscan exist

without

t.

And

of course God

has

no

busi-

ness

guaranteeing propositionfor which

I

have not the least

argu-

ment. o forDescartesto infer venthepossible nonextensionfminds

from a

conception which

merelydoes not represent hem as

being

extended

would

be

(and,

I

think,

ctually s)

a

fundamental lunder.

Generalized,

t would

let Descartes believe

whatever

he findshimself

unable to

refute.

Although

this

generalization

might

be restrictedn

order to block

patently

bsurd

results

as

will occur

in

our transition

from

G) to (G')

below),

it is

just irreparably

nreasonable.

God can-

not, one

might

ay,

be

expected

to

validate Descartes's

gnorance.

This does not reducetheproblems f theB reading, ut it does sug-

gest

that the

A

reading

would

not be

straightforward

ven

if

the con-

trary

assages

in

the Fourth

Replies

and elsewhere ould be dismissed

or

explained

away

(as theycannot).

Another

puzzle

is that those

pas-

sages

are

offered s

elaborations

r

paraphrases

f

the

argument

n

the

Meditations

supposedly

he best source for he

A

reading

o we face

a

complex nterpretive

ask.

We must

explain why

two versions f

Sep

appealed

to

Descartes

n

spite

of

their

ack of

fitwith his

system,

nd

DESCARTES AND MIND-BODY

DISTINCTNESS

503




7/20

why

he

wouldhavetrouble elling hempart.As a firsttep want o

offer precise evelopmentftheA reading. his s in partbecausewe

need carefultatementf one or theother ersion f Sep n order o

clarifyomekey extual oints,

ut preferhe

A

version n philosoph-

ical grounds. shallmentionhese

t the ndof this ection.

I thinkep (typeA) cantake wosymmetricalorms,o which hese

are approximations:

(I)

(G) Let R be a c & d

conception f a kind fthing . Then

God can make

ny hing

fkind conformo R. That s,God

can make

ny hing

f kind have ll and

only hose roper-

tieswhich s are perceived

s having n R. (Cf.HR I, i90.)

(i.i)

Every ody s extended.

(i.z)

I

have c & d

conception hich ttributeshoughtnd

fails o attribute

xtensiono minds.

(I.3)

Anymind an exist

s

a

thinking,nextendedhingby

(I

.z), (Q).

(C)

No mind

s

a

body.

(z) (G) [Asabove.]

(z.i) Every

mind

hinks.

(z.z)

I

have

c

&

d

conception hich ttributes

xtensionut

fails

o attribute

hought

o

bodies.

(2.3) Anybody

an

exist s

an

extended,nthinkinghing.

(C) [As above.]

Perhapshemost laring

eature

f i) and

z) is

their

nvalidity.

et

me,however,

irst eal

with

ome ess ubstantive

oints.

With

Descartes's

ermissionAT

VII, i6z;

HR

II, 54)

I have

tated

(C)

andvarious

remises

n

terms f

minds,

ot mind"

nd

bodies,

ot

"body."

have also toneddownhis

first-person

diom

by speaking

f

minds nstead

f

"myself"

n

(i.z)

and

(C).

More

mportantly,

have

suppressed

escartes's

oncern ith

he ssence

f mind nd

body.

Of

course eextendsC) to non-actualmindsndbodies,

i.i)

and z.i)

being alleged) ecessary

ruths-

nd

(i.z)

and

(z.z) describingoncep-

tions

f

any

mind r

body,

ctualor

otherwise.

ut for

mypurposes,

the

imple

orm f

(C)

is

more

ppropriate.

t avoids

ome

complica-

tions,

nd

although

much

he

ame

extual

nd

philosophicalroblems

arise either

way,4my approach

highlights

he

modal

assumptions

4

See S and

Hooker's rticlen

Hooker, p. cit.These rerelevant

hroughout

he

next

twoparagraphs.

504

STEVEN

J.

WAGNER




8/20

whichDescartes needs even for C) as I have stated t.

In fact, he main repairsneeded

in

(i) and (z) involvemodality. i)

succeeds

if and

only

if

extended things cannot exist without being

extended,wherethisholds

de

re: if b is extended, t s not possible forb

(in anotherpossible situation) to be unextended. z) depends on the

analogous assumption about thinking hings.We may state the two

needed

principles

s follows:

(NE) Whatever s extended lacks

the

property

f

being possibly

unextended.

(NT)

Whatever

hinks

acks the

property

f

beingpossiblyunthink-

ing.

Withthese premises dded, (C) follows n each case byLeibniz's Law.

What, then,

f

(NE)

and

(NT)?

Quite apartfrom heir rucialrole

in

Sep. there

s no

doubt thatDes-

carteswould

accept these principles.

The

metamorphoses

of

minds

into non-minds

nd

bodies into

non-bodies

they

ule

out

are

entirely

foreign o his scheme.Yet while they re decidedlynon-trivial, yown

view

is that they re nowhereclearly rgued for

or

clearly sserted s

self-evident.

he

best

passages

on

the

essencesof mind and

body (e.g.,

AT III, 478-79; AT V,

I9z-93;

PL

I5,

z3I-3z)

arecloudedoverbyan

apparent nsensitivityo

the differencesetween

NE)

and

(NT)

on

the

one hand

and

their

de dicto

ounterparts

n

the other: i.i) and (z.i)

with

"necessarily"prefixed.

escartes does not

commit he

blunder f

inferringNE)

and

(NT)

from

their

counterparts, ut he neglects o

argue

that

thought

nd extension re essential

de

re)

to minds nd bod-

ies respectively,nless we

call

the necessity

nd

self-evidence

f

the

de

dicto

principles

n

argument.

am inclined

to

suspect

confusion

on

these matters n Descartes, although ts exact naturecannot be deter-

mined

without better

nderstanding

f his views on

modality

han s

now

available. Let us therefore

dd

(NE)

and

(NT)

to

Sep

without ur-

ther

discussion,noting

for

future

eference hat this

addition

s reason-

able

in

spite

of

Descartes's

failure

xplicitly

o

supply heseprinciples.

The

remaining roblems

bout

Sep

concern

he

nterpretation

f

(G).

While

the

general

dea is that

f

my

c &

d

conception

scribes

only

cer-

tain

properties

o

Fs,

then

t s at least

possible

for

ny

F

to

have

only

he

properties scribed, ven God cannotmakeobjects quite so bare.5

5 Descartes'stheory f the eternal ruthsmay

provide sense

n

which

God really an do

(could have done?)

anything, ut this s clearly

not to

the point

n

Sep. By thattoken,

God could

create

a

thingwithout tsown (so-called) essence,

et

alone

mind

without

extension

or whatever. G) describes

an

ability

God retains after

having

fixedthe

actual eternal ruths. f. AT VII,

7I;

HR I, i85.

DESCARTES AND

MIND-BODY

DISTINCTNESS

505




9/20

Three sorts

of exceptions o (G) are side issues

forus: I believe

that

God mustadd

properties uaranteed

by sheer ogic (thinking-or-laugh-

ing), "transcendental"

roperties

e.g., duration), nd negative roper-

ties (such

as

being unextended,

n the case of mind). But even apart

from hese,God

cannot,forexample,

make thought

he only property

of

a

mind.

What

thinksmust hink

n

particular

ways,and although

he

contents f

a mind God

makes

may change frommoment o

moment,

he

must always supply t withdeterminate houghts.

More generally,

when God

gives

omething certain roperty, e

mustgive t what

Des-

cartescalls modes of that property

nless, unlike

thought nd exten-

sion,

it is

alreadyentirely specific."6

Modes of positivepropertiesre

positive roperties,

o we need a special clause to

allow their ddition

o

the

F

made

in

conformity ith

R. We might husoffer he following

definitiono clarify G).

(D)

Given

a

c & d conception

R

representing

certainkind

of

thing

F

just

as

having

properties

f,

.

.,

fn,

God makes a

thing

a

conform to

R if and only

if he makes a have

f15

* * X

n

and

no further

roperties

esides:

(dJ)

transcendentalroperties;

(d,) negative roperties;

(d3)

modes

of

fI,

. .

*

fn;

(d4) logicalconsequences

f properties dded

under d1)-(d3).

It

is

worth

noting

hat

d3)

does

not

let

God add extension o a c &

d

conceived

mind or

thought

o

a c

&

d conceived

body,

because

neither

thought

nor

extension

can be

a mode of

the other.

Any

attribute

f

which

a

property

s

a mode is

already

contained

n a c

&

d

concept

of

the mode (AT VIII, 350, 354-55; HR I, 436, 440), yettheconceptsof

extension

nd

thought

o not

involveeach

other

AT VII,

443;

HR

II,

z55; AT III,4z0-zI;

PL,

io9)7

There

s one more

point

to be

coveredbefore can

present

final er-

sion

of

Sep.

In

discussions

subsequent

to the

Meditations,

Descartes

explains

that

G)

holds

only

when

R

is

complete,

hat

s,

not

obtained

by attending

nly

to

certain

lements

f a richer

onception.

or exam-

ple, may

abstract rom c

&

d

conception

f a

moving,

xtended

ody

by focusing ust on itsbeing n motion,but I maynot then nfer hat

God can

make

something

nextended

move.

In

the

case at

hand,

Des-

6

This does not

hold

for he shapeless,

izelesswhole

of res extensa.See W,

i66-68. For

more n modes,

ee

S,

21-z3, z6,

and Williams,p. cit., p.

14-z6.

7

Principles , 53

permits oo

easy a

proofofdualismfrom

he fact

hat houghts not

a

mode of extension,

r that

extension

s notone of thought.

escartes

must

have seen

that the conjunction

f this Principle

with

his theory f modes

begs the

question n

favor f dualism.

5o6

STEVEN J. WAGNER




10/20

carteswants the

conceptionsn (i.z)

and

(z.z) to be "full,"not

formed

by abstracting rom a

concept of mind

which

includes

extensionor

from a

concept

of body which

includes

thought AT VII,

izo-zi,

zz0-z3;

HR

II, zz-z3,

97-99; AT

III,

474-77

(the

best

xposition);

L

Iz3-z4; AT IV,

izo;

PL

I5z). Now this

restrictioneems

not to be

worth

dwelling n,

since

the

concepts

of

body

and mind

formed

n

the

Meditations

re

obviously

not

supposed

to be

abstractions.

ut

in

view

of some

recent iterature

particularly

W,

I9I-97),

a few

remarks

re in

order.

The

problem s that

Descartes's

notionof

completenesss

infected y

the

basic ambiguityn

his

presentationf Sep.

It is clear

from he pas-

sages

cited that

my

conception

f

mind ust as

thinkings complete f,

for

nyproperty

besides

thought,

can doubt

whetherminds

have p

(S,

40).8

This is "completeness"because nothing eems to be missing

frommyconcept.

need

add-no further

roperties n

orderto form

coherent

onceptof a kind of

thing.Now

the

question s

whether es-

cartes akes

conceivingmind n

this

way to amount o

seeing

hatminds

can exist

with

hought and

modes

thereof) s their

nly

property.

hat

is,

when

see

nothing

missing rommy

concept,do I ipso

facto ee that

what conceiveneeds

no other

properties? he

texts eem to

vacillate,

and

withgood

reason. The

choice here

s just

the choicebetween

he

A

and B readings. roponents f the atterwillfasten n thepassgeswhich

suggest

that

a

complete

concept

of mind

has direct modal

content,

because with such

a

concept

Descartes

could

take

the

key step

to

(I.3)

in

the Second

Meditation.But

all

the evidencefor

he

A

reading

ounts

againstthis

interpretation

f

completeness,

nd

some of the

passages

about

completeness

eem to lend

ndependent

upport

o the

A

reading.

So the

problem

of

understanding

ompleteness

s

just

the

problem

of

understandingep.

and

Descartes's remarks n

thisnotion

do

not alter

the basics ofthe account have alreadydeveloped.Theycall onlyfor

refinement

f

(G),

which s

incorporatedntothe

following

estatements

of

i)

and

z).9

(3)

(G')

Let

R

be

a

complete,

&

d

conception

f a

kind

of

thing

F. Then God

can make

any

thing

f kind

F

conform

o

R

(in

the sense of

definition

D)).

(3.i)

Every ody

s

extended.

(3.z)

I

have

a

complete,

&

d

conception

hich

ttributes

thought

nd

failsto attribute xtension o minds.

8

Cartesianoubts

meant.

lso,

must ot e

negative

rtranscendental.

9

One

might

ookfor

notion f

completeness

ntermediateetweenhe wo have

described,

huslso or

omething

omehowetweenhe and

B

readings.

have een

unableofindcoherenthird ay.

DESCARTES

AND

MIND-BODY DISTINCTNESS

507




11/20

(3.3)

Anymind an exist s a thinking,nextendedhing.

(NE) Whatevers

extendedacksthepropertyf possibly

being nextended.

(C) No minds a body.

(4)

(G') [Asabove.]

(4.i)

Every

mind

hinks.

(4.z)

I

have

a

complete,

& d conception hich ttributes

extension

nd

fails

o attributehoughto bodies.

(4.3)

Anybody'can xist s anextended, nthinkinghing.

(NT) Whatever hinks

acks the propertyf possibly eing

unthinking.

(C) [As above.]

Of

course his s only ne face

fSep rememberheB version). find

it

prettier

or

tsvision

f

two

fundamentaloints

which

hope are

at

leastplausible,lthough cannot upporthem ere.

(i) There s simply othingn the onceptf houghttself hich ules

out

extension

r even ells

us

thatwhat hinks

s

possiblynextended.

Similarly,heres

no

direct ay o conclude

hat xtended

hings

o not

or neednotthink.

(ii) To form concept, owever lear,

f

mind

nly s thinkings not

at all

to see

the

possibilityf

an

unextended

ind.One

might

ven

ay

that

he

tep

rom

his

onception

o

knowledge

f

what s

(objectively)

possibles so bigthatwe needGod's help otake t.

I

count hese mongDescartes's est nsightsnd would udge

heir

depth y thepersistence

f failure o appreciatehem. utDescartes's

own

appreciations tenuous.

t

disappears

n

the

B

version,

here t

leastthe

possible

nonextension

f

minds s inferredt

once,ground-

lessly

n

my

iew.How Descartes

ould

poil

his

own

dea s

the

tory

f

Section

II. First,

etus consider

ep's

neglected

win.

II. TheDivisibilityrgument

I

gather

hat

Div is

usually

ead

ike

his:

(5) (5.i)

Every ody s

divisible.

(5.z)

Every

mind

s

indivisible.

(C)

No

mind

s a

body.

(5.I) is

given

n

the

Fifth

Meditation.ut

howdoes

Descarteset

5

z)?

5o8

STEVEN

J.

WAGNER




12/20

He is sometimes

eld o argue romhe ntrospected

implicityfhis

ownsoul.'0Butthat

ne should e able

to introspectimplicitys most

implausible,ndDescartes's iscussions

f ntrospection

o not uggest

otherwise. is usual objects f

ntrospectionre "ideas"

and faculties

(e.g.,

AT

VII,

53-54;

HR

I, I72),

and

simplicity

s

quite

omething

lse.

Besides, n appealto introspectionshard o discern t HR I,

i96

and

harder lsewhere

AT

VII,

3;

HR

I,

I4i;

AT

XI,

35i;

HR

I,

345;

AT

VII,

5zo;

HR

II,

3I3).

Another

ossibility

s a

more

r

essdirect

ntui-

tion f

5.z).

This,

however,

ould addle

Descartes

ith claim o c

&

d

perception

hich

s

unlikely

ven

by

his

standards.

ow could

ndi-

visibilityossibly eem

o

follow ustfromhedefinitionf

mind s a

thinkinghing? ne would

have

to wonder

whyDescartes others

o

arguefordualism t

all. There s also a

more ubtle

extual roblem

here. f (C) follows rom woimmediatetems f c & d perception

((5.I),

(5.z)),

Div would

be

far

more traightforwardhan

ep (particu-

larly

s on

HR

I, 90).

Therewouldbelittle hance hen f

explaining

why ep

even

ppears,

et

lone

why

t

receivesopbilling.

he

obvious

routes o

(5.z)

are

thereforenacceptable.The others

haveheard n

conversation

remore

asily efutedhan hose ust

onsidered). fresh

look at Div in

theSixthMeditation

eems o be

in

order.

Certainly

e

maybegin nyreconstruction

ith

premise

bout he

divisibilityfbody.We shall ee that ependingnexactly owwecast

the

rgument,

he

necessaryivisibility

f

bodiesmay

be

useful ven

or

thenon-modal

orm f

C),

unlike

n

5)

or n the

parallel

ases

of

3.

I)

and

4.i).

Thus:

(6.i)

(Necessarily,)very ody

s divisible.

For our

purposes,

ncidentally,t is

merely onfusingo understand

divisibilitytself

s a modal

property,

n

spite

f

themodal uffix.

es-

cartes oes notdistinguisheingdivisibleromctually aving arts,

and

accepting is dentificationillallow an easier

xposition

f Div.

Descartes's ext

tep

s that

when consider

my

mind .

.

I

can

distinguish

o

parts

n

myself

ut

clearly

nderstand

yself

s some-

thing

ne and entire."

aken

quite

iterally,

hisneednotbe

a

declara-

tion

f

ndivisibility.

escartes

eems

ust

o be

saying

hathis

concept

of

mind

oes

not

reveal

nyparts.

Theymay

be

there

although

es-

carteswill

hortly

ule

hat

ut),

butat least

s

far

s

Descartes

nder-

stands hemind, eseesnodivision.

? See, e.g.,H. Heimsoeth, tom, eele,Monade Wiesbaden:

kademie erWissen-

schaftenndderLitertur,

960)

and J. Bennett, ant's

Dialectic Cambridge: am-

bridge niversityress,974), chapter

.

Bennett,

ncidentally,eserves redit or

being irtuallylone n treatingiv with eal espect,

ven hough find

is

discussion

riddled ith roblems.

DESCARTES AND MIND-BODY DISTINCTNESS 509




13/20

I admitthat

Descartes's

wording lone does notdictate his nterpre-

tation.

But

thiswayhe does not have too

easy

an

intuition f the ndivis-

ibility f

minds, o there s no danger hatDiv will be

simpler hanSep.

What am in fact

proposing,

f

course,

s thatthe

arguments

ormind-

body

distinctness

n

the Sixth

Meditation re at bottom like. In

argu-

ment

3)

a certainproperty,

xtension,

s

attributed o bodies, and we

then

note

that

t does not

belong

to

minds

as far s we can

tell, ny-

way.

(Analogously

for

argument

4).) (6.i)

attributed

ivisibility o

bodies,and

Descartes's next observation s that this

property oes not

visibly

belong

to

minds.

Again

the

concept

of mind

nvolvedmust

be

clear,

distinct,

nd

complete.

Thus,

(6.z) I have a

complete,

& d conceptionwhich ttributeshought

and failsto attribute ivisibilityo minds.

If

thismuch

s right,

iv also

relies

on

(G')

[as usual,]

which

with 6.z) yields

(6.3)

Any

mindcan

existas a

thinking,

ndivisible

hing.

It

is true hat G') and (6.3)

are absent

from

HR

I,

i96.

But t s

also

true hatDescartesmerely aysthatwhat s stated here, 6.i) and (6.z),

would

suffice

or

the construction f an alternative o

Sep.

He can

expect

he reader o remember

G') (or (G))

from few

pages back,

and

he can afford

ot to finish he

argument

ince

he has

alreadygiven

full

proof

of

(C) along analogous lines. ndeed,Descartes's sketchiness

up-

portsmy

nterpretation.

he lack

of a full

presentation

f

Div is

under-

standable

f

the

argument

would

exactlyparallel

one

alreadygiven.

And

I find

he

analogybetweenmy

representations

f

Sep (at

HR

I, i90)

and

Div an attractive esultwhich dds to the ndependentupport or ach.

Our

next

problem

s that

mind-body istinctness

oes not

yet

follow.

We need to know

that

no

body

can

exist

without

being

divisible.One

expedient

s

to borrow

(NE)

from

Sep. although given

our

present

wording

it

is

convenientto

rewritethis

principle.

Relying

on

the

definitional

quivalence

of

bodies and extended

hings:

(NB)

Everybody

acks the

property

f

possibly

not

being body.

Now this,plus the de dicto)necessary ivisibilityf bodies assertedn

(6.I) yields

(6.4)

Everybody

acks the

property

f

possibly

being

ndivisible.

Therefore,

(C)

No mind

s

a

body.

5IO

STEVEN

J.

WAGNER




14/20

Although his

version of Div seems acceptable, t leaves Descartes

with no

argument or the indivisibility

f

minds. To

fix

this

we may

replace NB) by

(ND)

Whatever is divisible lacks the

property

of

possibly being

indivisible.

Now

indivisibility ollows with the help of (6.3). (6.i) then yields

mind-body

distinctness. n fact, the

"necessarily"

in

(6.

) can

be

dropped

f

we use

(ND),

with

gain

n

symmetryetween ep and Div.

I

suggestednconnectionwith NE) and (NT) that

Descartes s some-

times onfused

r

sloppyabout modality.

f

so, the line between

acit

assumptions nd

gaps

in his

argumentsmay be hard

to

draw.

Although

it

is

interestingo

ask how

well Descartes

saw

the need

for

ND)

or

(NB) in Div andhow he might ave defended hem, do not muchcare

whether heir ddition s

the discovery

r

the

creation

of

a

Cartesian

argument.

What

reallymatters

o

me

is

that the conclusion

s

reached

from 6.z) and

(G')

and that

ND)

or

(NB) is needed

for

validity. hat

suffices

o avoid the

faults

f

other

nterpretations

nd

to establish he

kinship etween

Div

and

Sep.

The most

seriousobjectionto my nterpretation

oncerns ts fitwith

passages outsidethe SixthMeditation.

n the

Synopsis

Descarteswrites:

. . .we

understand

o mind

xcept

s indivisible.

or

we cannot onceive

f he

half

f

anymind s we can ofthe mallestf

all

bodies

. .

(AT

VII, 3;

HR

I,

I4I;

cf.

HR

I,

345);

This

suggests s a

premise

for

Div not (6.z), but

something

ike:

(INC)

A

divided

mind

s inconceivable.

A

complexset of

questions

now

arises:

(a) Is (INC) strongerhan 6.z)?

(b) Is it

strong nough to

let

Descartes

manage

without

G')

or

without

ND)

or

(NB)?

(c)

If

so,

are there two formsof

Div

or is

(6) just

an incorrect

interpretation?

(d)

If

Div

does

take two

forms,

s

the

one

with

INC) analogous

to theB form fSep as (6) is analogousto theA form?

One

might

hink hat if the

answer

to

(a)

is

"yes," (6)

is

just wrong,

since

the

Synopsis

passage

is

plainly

an

intended

paraphrase

of

the

argument

t HR

I, i96.

But

we

know

from

ep

that

Descartes's

report

of

his own

argument

might

e

questionable.

Otherwise

we could

as

well

reason that

since

(6.z)

is

plausibly

a

literal

reading

of the

text,

while

(INC)

is somewhat

unclear,

he

atter hould be

glossed

by

the former.

DESCARTES

AND MIND-BODY

DISTINCTNESS

5

II




15/20

The equivalenceof (INC) and (6.z), however, annot be assumed. This

makes the task of

interpretationuite hard, and the following emarks

are intended nly as a

preliminaryxploration.

A first, mportant

oint about (INC)

is

that it does not assert the

impossibilityf a dividedmind. Descartes nfers mpossibility ot from

inconceivability ut onlyfrom something ike?) a reductio d absur-

dum:

". . . I

have

never

udged anythingo be impossiblefor God],

unless

t

was

contradictory

or

me

distinctly

o conceive t"

(HR I, I85).

Incidentally,

his

s

not

unnatural.On a reasonable

view,conceivability

varies with our

concepts

or

beliefs, o that what is inconceivablenow

may aterseem

possible or even true. Quick inferences rom nconceiv-

ability

o

impossibility

re

perhaps

to be

avoided,

and

Descartes

could

be right

ot

to rule out divided

minds

on

the strength

f

(INC) alone.

This leaves tunclear ust what (INC) means. n order o make prog-

ress, however, et us

plausibly assume that t

is

stronger han (6.z) in

expressingDescartes's

inability o see that mental divisibility

s

even

possible, et alone that t

obtains. This

would mean

that

he also cannot

see that xtension

spossible,

but

that eemsperfectlyonsistentcf.

HR

II,

3I3).)

So:

(INCP) My (complete,c & d) conception

of mind

does not show

me that a dividedmind s possible.

With

this we

reach the

heart

of

the matter.

t is clear that

(INCP)

is

stronger han 6.z), but if t

is

even roughly he sense

of

(INC),

then s

far as I can

see, Descartes

still

gets

nowhere

without

G'). Nothing

about how

things

objectively

re

follows fromhis

inability

o

see or

conceive

anything; his

s

just

the

gap

that

G') bridges.

f this s

right,

then

t

s

less criticalwhether iv beginswith 6.z) as opposed to (INC)

because (G'), the most

characteristic eature

f

Descartes's reasoning,

is there itherway. But there s one interestingifference.INCP) and

(G')

would

give

Descartes:

(6.3 a) Anymindcan

exist

as a

thinking hing

which s

not

even

pos-

sibly

divisible.

Readers

may verify

hat

(assuming

ven the weaker

form f

(6.i)) (C)

can now

be

reached

with

something onsiderably impler

han

ND)

or

(NB)." The use of

(INCP)

would thereforeminimize he

dangers

of

Descartes's mplicit elianceon modal principles.

We now

have the

following icture.

There

are

two

versions f

Div in

the

Meditations,

like

in

theiruse

of

(G')

and

different

n that

one

pro-

ceeds

from

somewhat

stronger remise.

But this difference

akes a

difference

nly

at

a

point

the

ntroduction f

(ND)

or

something

nal-

If

we

interpret

escartes'smodaltalk

via

standard

ossible

worlds

emantics,

he

symmetryfthe ccessibilityelationuffices.

5I2

STEVEN

J.

WAGNER




16/20

ogous)

which

Descartes typically lidesover anyway.No wonder,

hen,

thathe

fails

o

distinguishhe two

versions. believe hat ertain actors

might lso

facilitate confusionbetween 6.z) and (INCP)

themselves.

But shall not

enter nto thesenow or into various other uestions

eft

open

in

the past few pages.'2

I

am

content

to have

given

a

reading

whichmakes

reasonable sense and

displays he kinship f Div and

Sep.

I

have

some confidence

hat whatever

epairs

r

amendmentsmight

e

required

will

not erase that kinship, o thatthe viewpointnow to

be

developed

will

illuminate oth

arguments, lthough

shall

speak prin-

cipally

of

Sep.

III.

To begin o untangle escartes'sconfusions bout

Sep.

let us review he

basic

problems

for

each versionof

the

argument.

The

B

version,we may recall,beginswith false optimism.

escartes

reads at least

possible nonextension

ffof his c

&

d

conceptofmind,

when he knows full

well

(in

his

better

moments)

hat

his

concept

of

mind s

initiallyust silent bout the

mind-body elation. escartes

hen

compounds

his bad

startwithan

inconsistency.nstead

of

accepting

is

c

&

d

perception

s

proof

that minds can exist

unextended, e

adds

a

divinevalidation fthisproposition.Actually, hispartoftheargument

does

no

positive

harm

having supposedly) & d perceived he

pos-

sible nonextension

f

minds,

Descartes should

simply roceed

without

the

unnecessary

eference

o God.

But

by appealing

to God

for

the

completion

f

a

step already taken,

Descartes

betrays

his

own confu-

sion.

Unlessthe

B

version

llows Descartes an

immediate

&

d

perception

that

minds

are

actually unextended,

t also

shares with the

A

version

whatever roblems he use of (NE) and its lk involves. do not,how-

ever,

wish to dwell on

these.

They

are outside

the focus

of

this

paper;

besides,

t would be an enormous achievement

or

Descartes even to

establish

ossiblenonextension.'

Notable here s Descartes's

talk about the contrarietyf the natures f mind nd

body

in connectionwithDiv

(HR I,

I4I;

CB,

A8),

which neglect ecause t clearly lays

no

part n theSixthMeditation.

Another uestion s whether

have made Sep and Div too

equal

to

explain Descartes's

favoritism owards theformer. his one has a relatively

easyanswer: 6.z) was more controversialhan ts counterpartsn Sep. and Descartes

completed

his

defenseonly in the Passions of

the Soul.

(I discuss this issue

in

"Descartes

on the

Partsof the Soul," forthcoming

n Philosophy nd Phenomenologi-

cal

Research.)

'3

What

about the

possible

nonmentalityf bodies expressedby (2.3)

and

(4.3)? One

might

ake it

to

be

obvious anyway, o

that

4.I), (4.3),

and

(NT) allow

Descartes a

proofofdualismwhich avoids (G'). But aside from

he

fact

hat

n

thiscontext

NT)

would

be

virtually uestion-begging,

4.3)

is not so

easily

had. Descarteswouldrightly

regard4.3) as uncontroversial,ut

f

ll

a

methodical

oubterhas to

go

on are his c &

d concepts fthought

nd

extension, heproof

of

4.3)

would be

just

as remarkable

s

DESCARTES AND MIND-BODY

DISTINCTNESS 5

I

3




17/20

In the A version, G') is at

once the most nterestingremise nd the

obvious weakness. I have already explained the fundamental onflict

between G') and the proper

role of God

in

Descartes's system. t is

also worthnoting he price

Descartes pays

to

insulate G')

from

oun-

terexamples. he problem

ies with d3)

of

(D)

in

Section . This clause,

it seems, restrictspplications of (G') to provingmind-body istinct-

ness, nd while thatmight e considered pplication nough, t s a dis-

appointing imitation

of

what

looked

like

a powerfulprinciple

for

obtaining

modal

results.

To see this, uppose we want to use (G') to show that a can lack a

property which is absent

fromour c & d conceptionof a. If F is

thought

r

extension,

must

be

a

body

or a

mind,

nd

we are proving

nothing ew.

If F is a

mode

of thought, cannotbe a mind:

f

a were a

mind, d3) would tell us that n making conform o our conception,

God could add modes of

thought,

o we could not

be

assured that a

could existwithoutF. So a

mustbe

a

body, but we alreadyknow that

bodies can

lack thoughts.

imilarly,

f F is

a mode

of

extension, must

be a mind, and again the

use

of

(G') only yields

a

familiar esult.

Of

coursethe situation

s

somewhat

more

complicated

f

there re

(created)

substances

besides

minds

and

bodies,

but in

any

case

Descartes

could

not use (G') to

show

that

might

not have red hair or not be

thinking

about Vienna. I suspectthat this leaves his epistemology f modal

propositions

eficient.

If

(G')

is short on

applications

t is also more or

less

immune

to

counterexamples

hich

do not

beg

the

question

of

mind-body

istinct-

ness. It should.be clear nonetheless hat

G')

is

objectionable

for

ssen-

tially

hosereasons

which et

t at

odds with he

general pistemology

f

the Meditations.We have

no business

believing

hat

omething

an lack

whatever

roperties

we

do

not

find

ssential

o it at a

givenmoment,

o

matterhow clear and distinctour understanding f the concepts

involved

might e,

and God

has no

business

validating

uch

beliefs.'4

With

this

we return o the

problems

raisednear the outset. t

is in

a

way

understandable

or

Descartes to offer wo versions

of

Sep.

since

each avoids

(some of)

the

objections facing

the

other.

But

still,

how

could he fail to

tell

his

arguments

part?

And how could he overlook

the twin difficultiesbout the

divine

guarantee

that

properly

nder-

stood it is

insufficiento

make

the

A

versionwork

and

unnecessary

n

one

of

3.3).

So forDescartes here

would

be

little

o

choose between orms

3)

and

(4)

of the A version.

'4

This is the point of a famous example

of Arnauld's AT VII, zoi-z; HR II, 83). Of

Descartes'sthree eplies AT VII,

2z4-z5; HR II,

ioo-ioi),

I think hefirst ests n a

bad misconstrual f the example,

thesecond is eitherwrongor inapplicable, nd the

third

boils down to an appeal

to (d3)

(it is

in

factone of

the best textual

ources for

thatclause). But since the replies ake some unraveling, iththe end result

eingonly

Descartes'svictory n the technicality

d3) and defeat n the matter f principle,

shall

spend no imeon themhere.

5I4

STEVEN J.

WAGNER




18/20

the

B

version? believe that a

singleconfusion xplains thesepuzzles.

The distinctionsrucial to Sep

are between:

(i) a (complete) c & d

conception of minds which does not

attribute xtension o

them,

and

(ii) a c & d perception

hatmindsneed not be extended,

or

(iii) a c & d perception

hatminds re unextended,

and

Descartes's treatment f dualism s largely he productof running

these

together.

We

already

know that i)

is

the starting oint for he

A

version inform

3)),

while theB version an startwith iii) or with ii)

(fromwhich iii) followsby (NE)). The assimilation f (i) to (ii) or (iii)

therefore

ives

hetwo versions

eemingly

dentical irst

teps.

Now this

in turn

nduces he furtheronflation f (G') withthe divineguarantee.

God would be a deceiver fmindswere necessarily xtended n spiteof

(ii);

if

(i)

is

misread s (ii), then

the principle

which

assures Descartes

that

minds can

be

extended

f

he

has

(i)

can be identified ith what

would

guarantee

he

same conclusion

given

the

conception ii). (Simi-

larly or i) and (iii).)This iswhyDescartesmistakesG') for n expres-

sion

of God's veracity, nd

hencewhyeach version

f

Sep appears as

no

more o

him

than an application f

the divineguarantee

o a c

&

d

per-

ception

f

"mind

apart

from

body."

To explain the apparent egitimacy f (G') in the A version s not to

explain why the

B

version also invokes

God's benevolence.Here

I

believewe

find

Descartes at

his most

confused.When he

slips

nto

the

B

version, hinking

e has

not

materially hanged

he

argument, misap-

plication f theguarantee s the nearest hing o hisuse of (G') intheA

version.

Of

course

this

makes

no

sense;

but we

can

now understand he

instability

f

Descartes'sposition.

He

needs to overlook

the difference

between

i)

and

(ii)

to

accept

G')

in

the first

lace,

but

once

the differ-

ence

is

gone (G')

is

unnecessary

the

independence

f mind from

body

can be c

&

d

perceived

withoutGod's

help.

Yet Descartescannot

just abandon (G')

and stick o the

B

version,

withor without

premise

about divine

veracity,

ecause he continues

to

sense that

(i),

which

entailsdependence n (G'), is all he is entitled o. The vacillationwe

have found s built

nto

the heart

of

Descartes's

reasoning.

Confusion

between (i)

and

(ii)

or

(iii)

is

promoted by

Descartes's

notoriously magistic pproach

to mental

representation.

o be

sure,

his "ideas" are

nonphysical,

nd it

s unclear

whether

ny

of

them

re n

any

sensemental

mages,

but

various familiarweaknesses

f his

philos-

ophy

can be

traced to

an

imagistic

model of

thought.Notably,

Des-

cartes

mishandles

he distinction

etween

concepts

and

propositions,

DESCARTES AND MIND-BODY DISTINCTNESS

5

I

5




19/20

which infects he theory f c & d perception nd leads to

problems

about assertion nd proof,and he has difficulties ithnegationwhich

show up, for example,

n

the theory f "privations" AT

VII, 43-46;

HR I, i64-66). In this ight, rouble bout (i)-(iii) s not

surprising.

o

be clear on the differences etween these and on what,

if

anything,

"validation" would amount to in each case, one needs some command

of the

concepts-propositions

istinction nd of the mechanics f

nega-

tion.

One might

lso note

that

magistic

iews

of

thought

ave trouble

handling

modal

content.

This is

relevantnot justto (i)-(iii)but also to

(6.z)

and

(INC).) Without much elaborating

on

thesepoints, et me

indicate ne natural

way

forDescartes to

get himself

nto

trouble.

Descartestakes the dea of x to be x itself s it exists "objectively")

in

the understanding: hen

I

have an idea, what my dea

representss

right here n mymind, ven f t existsnowhere lse. Thusideas are not

just magesor replicasbut things hemselves xisting n a special way.'5

Now the slide from i) to (ii) is particularly asy on such a

view. Sup-

pose

I

have the

c

& d idea described

n

(i). This means that

what s rep-

resented, mind, exists

in

my understanding.' Clearly this

mind

thinks,

ince that

belongs

both

to its essence

and to

my

concept

of it. Is

it also extended?The answer ought

to

be

that

this is

indeterminate,

because

my concept eaves the question

of extension

pen.

But that s

hard forDescartes to allow. The mindthat exists nmyunderstanding

must,

t

seems,eitherbe extended

or

not, and

one

mayeasily suppose

that since I

do

not attribute

xtension o minds, his

mind

must exist

without

xtension. escartescould then oncludethat ny mindhe

may

think

f

can exist without

xtension,

which

yields ii).

I am

acutely

ware of

having ust suppressed arious

problems

within

Descartes's theory f mentalrepresentation. ut I thought t important

to

explain

even

briefly

ow he could confound

i)

and

(ii) (or,by

similar

reasoning, iii)). Even thoughhis conductofhis arguments ivesample

independent videncefor thiserror,Descartes's procedure

nly

makes

good sense

once

we see

it as

a

product

f

his system.

We need

not,

nci-

dentally, upposethat

he

explicitly easoned as described

n

the

preced-

ingparagraph.

t is

enough

thatwhen t

came

to

discriminating

etween

several

more

or

less

subtly

different ental

acts,

Descartes's view

of

thought

ould

encourage

a

confusion

which

must have

been

tempting

anyway.

Is See especiallyMeditations II

and

V,

passim,

which draw on medieval ources.A par-

ticularly

ine

discussionof some aspects

of Descartes's positionhere s in

W,

I07-I9.

Kenny, p. cit.,pp.

146-56

is also

helpful.

i6

The relationbetween deas of particular

minds nd of mind generally s actuallyvery

problematic n Descartes,but I think can

make mypointwithoutgettingnvolved n

these ntricacies.

5i6

STEVEN

J.

WAGNER




20/20

This

completesmy analysis.Although hope to have

conveyed ome

ofDescartes's ngenuity, like to think hat my efforts ill

help lay to

restthe fashion perhaps alreadyyesterday's ashion of trying o

support Cartesian dualism along Cartesian lines. Too

much in

Des-

cartes depends on things hat are too far wrong. ndeed, his deepest

contributionmay be to comfort he enemy: arguments ased on

(G')

are near admissions f defeat.The essenceofDescartes's

strategy

s

to

prove immaterialityr indivisibilityrom he absence of

arguments o

the contrary; speculate hat

he

took thisnegative pproach because

he

found

none better.Descartes's efforts o formulate, efine,

nd defend

Sep

show

ample awareness of the difficultiesis proof

strategy aced,

and he

surely

would

have preferred more straightforward

ne had

any

seemedacceptable. Perhapsthe historical lace of the SixthMeditation

should thenbe reconsidered. escartes, believe, s quietly nnouncing

the failure

f

"positive" demonstrationsor refutations)f dualism nd

simplicity,t least insofar s- heyproceed from he kindsof considera-

tions

about thought nd matter nvokedby earlier hilosophers.

n

this

respectDescartes anticipates ome

of

Kant's

discussions f

the

soul in

the Critique of

Pure

Reason.

Of

course, Kant,

in

adding

a

general

theory

f

why

n

a sense the nature

of

the

soul cannot

be established t

all, says

much

more.

But I

would

claim that his additions

combine

remarkable nderstanding ith some of his most unfortunaterrors.n

any case, Descartes's rejection

f

classical

arguments

bout

the

soul

is

a

decisive

tep which,

should one

care to call

him

the father

f modern

philosophy,would serve s well as anyof

his

other chievementso

jus-

tify

he

title.That

his own

approach

also fails s

secondary.

I thus onclude

with n

unusual view of what

s best n

the

arguments

I

have discussed.

From

my

own

point

of

view

t s not

their

onclusions,

because

I

believe that dualism s

false

and with t the

simplicity

hesis.

Nor is itDescartes's admittedly lever trategy. ather, n falling ack

on

(G')

Descartes came as close

as a dualist

can to

saying

hat

there

re

no

good ways

to

prove dualism. Obviously

that was not

his

intention.

But

t s

still

his

nsight.

f

this

s

a strange egacy

for he

eponym

f

dual-

ism, t also confirms he

depth and fertility

f his

mind.'7

'7

For

their ommentsthank

Wright eely, tephen chiffer,

nd

Margaret

Wilson.

Wilson lso

helped ywriting

he

most

ubtle,udicious,

nd

lluminating

f

he om-

mentarieshave ited.

DESCARTES

AND MIND-BODY DISTINCTNESS

5I7

wagner - descartes's arguments for mind-body distinctness

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