vivarium, vol. 18, nos. 1-2, 1980
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Vivarium
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1980
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VIVARIUM
AN
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AND
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1980
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VIVARIUM
AN
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vivarium
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nd the
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CONTENTS
OF VOLUME XVIII
(1980)
L. M. de
rij
On Ancient
and
Mediaeval
Semantics
Leiden
and
Metaphysics
3)
1
c. h. KNEEPKENS
M
ore
Evidence
on
the
Manuscript
Tra
-
Nijmegen
dition
of
Aimeric s Ars
lectora: Paris
,
B.N .lat.
y
i
and
Rolduc
Abbey
...
63
paul
a. STREVELER
Gregory f
Rimini
and theBlack Monk
WestChester on Sense and Reference 67
Daniel
o.
Dahlstrom
Signification
nd
Logic:
Scotus
on
Uni
-
Santa
Clara
versais
from
a
Logical
Point
of
View 81
paul
M.
j.
E. tummers
Geometry
nd
Theology
n
the Xlllth
Nijmegen
century.
An
example of
their
nterrela-
tion
as
found
n
the
Ms
Admont
42.
The
influence f
William
of
Auxerre? . . .
112
Leonard a. Kennedy
Cesare
Cremonini and
the
Immortality
Saskatoon
of
the
Human
Soul
143
review
Vincent
Ferrer,
Tractatus de
Supposi
-
tionibus
ed.
John
A.
Trentman
(E.
P.
Bos)
79
books
received
159
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Vivarium
VIII,
i
(1980)
On
Ancient
and
Mediaeval
Semantics
and
Metaphysics (3)*
L.
M.
DE
RIJ
4
The
Categories
as
Classes
of
Names
4.1
Status
quaestionis
The
relation
previous
between
sections
three
contain
maior
issues
several
in
hints
Plato's
to
doctrine,
the
close
viz.
inter-
the
elation
between
three maior
issues
in
Plato's
doctrine,
viz. the
question about the true nature of the Forms and those about
participation
and
predication.1
ndeed,
for
the
founder
of
the
theory
of the
Forms,
predication
was
bound to
become a
problem.
Forms
are immutable and
indivisible;
yet
other
Ideas
have to
participate
in
them;
they
are
unique,
by
themselves
and
subsistent;
yet,
when
saying
'
John
is man
(or
white),
*
Peter is
man
(or
white),
should
there be
one
perfect,
eternal,
immutable
etc. Form of MAN
(or
WHITE)
in the one
and
another in
the
other?
Or,
as
I
have
put
it
above
[1977: 85]:
if
John,
Peter,
and
William
are
wise,
does
this
mere fact mean that there must be
something
which
they
are all
related
to in
exactly
he same
manner
namely
WISDOM
itself?
And
if
'John
is
wise
,
'
Peter
is wise' and
'
William is
wise are all
true
statements,
what
exactly
is the
meaning
of
the
predicate
name
'
wise ?
The former
question
is
concerned
with
participation,
the
latter
with
predication.
Well,
that
the
crux
of the latter
problem
is
not the
separate
existence of the
Forms
(chrismos) learly appears
from
he
fact that also
the
author
of
the
Categories
who had
entirely
abandoned
all
kind
of
chrismos
could apparently not get rid of a
similar
problem:
if the
categories
really
are
classes
of
'things
there
are'
(1
a
20)
(i.e.
'real1
ubstances,
real'
natures,
and 'real'
properties),
rather
than
concepts
(i.e. logical
attributes),
what kind
of
'thing'
is
meant
by
a
term
qua
'category'
?
So
for
Aristotlethe
semantic
problem
still
remained. His
distinction
between
en
hypokeimeni
nd kath
hypokeimenou
ould
only
hide the
original
problem.
It is
often said
that
these
phrases
refer o
different
omains,
the
metaphysical
and
*
Parts
1)
and
(2)
are found n
this
Journal
5
(1977),
81-110
nd
16
(1978),
81-107.1 See also R. E. Allen,
Participation
nd
predication
n Plato's Middle Dia-
logues
n:
Gregory
lastos
ed.)
Plato
:
Metaphysics
nd
Epistemology.
Col-
lection f
Critical
ssays,
New
York
1974,
i7-i83),
167.
I
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the
logical
one,
respectively.
We
have
already
found ome
good
reasons
to
qualify
this
opposition
(see [1978],
84;
88).
It
seems
to be useful
now to collect all kind of information romAristotle'sown writings,
not
only
the
Categories,
bout
the
proper meaning
of the
categories.
This
will be the
aim
of our
sections
4.2-4.7.
One
preliminary
emark, however,
about
Kapp's approach
to the
question.
He much insisted
([1952]:
36-42;
see
also
25-27,
discussed
above,
[1978], 82-84) upon
what he consideredan
utmost unfortunate
development
n the
history
of
ogic concerning
he Aristotelian
ateg-
ories.
They
were
not
usually interpreted,
s
they
should,
he
says,
as
a due
attempt
to
differentiate,
orcertain dialectical and
philosophical
purposes, the sometimesmisleading uniformityfgrammaticalpred-
ication,
but in a
nearly
opposite
sense,
namely,
as an
arbitrary
nd
superficial
urvey
of
classes
or
general
heads to
which Aristotlewanted
to reduce all
the
objects
of our
thought.
And,
still on
Kapp's
view,
it
is
Aristotle himself
who was
responsible
for
the
abandonment
of
his
original point
of
view,
since
in
various
writings
of
his
a more
or
less
complete
enumerationof the
categories
s used as a
conveniently
compendious
inventory
of the
main
aspects
of
reality
Kapp, p.
39;
italics
mine).
Even as
early
as
in the
Categories
he llusion was created
that the ten classes of the
categories
were intended, from the be-
ginning,
o
cover the
whole field of the
possible
signification
f
single
words' and
might
be used
as such. And this is
something,Kapp
adds
(p.
41),
that in
Antiquity
nobody
could in the
long
run know
apart
from he field of
things
n
general'.
Therefore
Kapp,
on
purpose,
eft
out of
consideration
those
passages
in
undoubtedly
Aristotelian
writings
where use is
made of
the doctrineof the
categories
n
a
sense
wider than
what
he takes for
their
original
one.
To his
mind,
Aristotle
himselfwas the firstvictim of this
illusion.
Much could
be
objected
to
Kapp's
view
(see
also
[1978], 84).
I
think,
the
most
fundamental
point against
Kapp
should be
that, if,
really,
in
Antiquity
nobody
could,
in the
long
run,
know
apart
the
classification
of
predicates
from
that of
'things',
what,
for heaven's
sake,
can
guarantee
us that
not
from
he
very
beginning
f the
doctrine,
any
sharp
distinction
between
'things
said' and
'things
said'
was
missing
at
all
?
Nothing
ndeed,
I
am sure.
What
Kapp
did,
is
nothing
but to
find
n the
Categories
sharp ( )
distinction,which,
on closer
inspection, urnsout to be misleadingly ague notonly n thepresenta-
tion of
the doctrine
as
found
in the
Categories
ut also
in
Aristotle's
own
mind,
to
the effect
hat he
himselfwas the firstvictim of the
2
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supposed
illusion.
Had
we
not better
dismiss
Kapp's
strict
opposition
of
things
sai
and
'things'
entirely
4.2
On
some
modern
nterpretations
f
kata
symplokri
Aristotle
himself
professes
to
deal
in his
Categories
with
'things
that are said
without
combination'
(1
a
16-17).
What
does
the author
mean
here
by
'
combination
{symplok,
itterally
'inter-
eaving'
?
As
for
the
word
symplok
one
commonly
refers
to
Plato,
Sophist
262
A-B,
where
he maintains that a
sentence
is
not
just
a
series of
names
or of verbs but
results
from
he combination
of
a
name
(noun)
witha verb
a
line of
thought
which
s
admittedly
aken
up by
Aristotle
in hisDe interpretatione16 a 9-18; 17 a 17-20). Our author's examples
(at
i a
19)
'mari
'ox',
'runs' 'wins'
are
clearly
set
against
those
clarifying
he
'things
said
that
involve
combination'
('man
runs'
'man
wins'),
to
the
effect hat the
former
eem
to stand
for
possible
ingredients
parts)
of
a
sentence.
This
interpretation
eems to
find
some additional
support
in
that
Aristotle treats
such
phrases
as 'in
the
Lyceum'
and
'in the
market-place
as
lacking
combination
(2
a
1).
By
'
combination
he
apparently
means the
composition and division)
accomplished
n a
sentence,
one
would
presume.
There is, however,some difficultynvolved in what Aristotlesays
in
Ch.
4
of
Categories
every expression
without combination
ignifies,
he
says,
an item
in
some
one
category.
Professor
Ackrill has
rightly
argued
that
this
implies
that
an
expression
like
'
white
man'
which
introduces
two items
from two
different
ategories
is an
expression
'involving
combination'.
Therefore ne
may
conclude
that
the
phrase
kata
symplokn
oes not refer
o
sentence-making
xclusively.
When
discussing
the
problem
in
the
notes added to his
translation
of
the
Categories
Ackrill
suggests (73-74)
two
possible
solutions:
(a)
the
necessary
and sufficient ondition for an
expression's
being
'without
combination' is
that it
should
signify ust
one item
in
some
category.
On
this
surmise,
Ackrill
adds,
the
author's
statement
at
the
beginning
of Ch.
4
is
analytic,
and
the
examples
in Ch. 2
are
mis-
leadingly
selective,
since,
on this
criterion,
single
word could be
an
expression
involving
combination,
whereas
a
group
of words could
be an
expression
without
combination.
Well,
it will
be
clear
that,
on
this
assumption,
Aristotle's
examples
are misleading,and that 'without ombinationwould stand forboth
2
The first
nterpreter
o do so
was
F. A.
Trendelenburg,
eschichte
erKate-
gorienlehre,
erlin
1846;
repr.
Olms
1963,
11.
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'not
surpassing
one
category'
and
'not
making
up together
sentence'
'involving
combination'would
be
the
case
if,
and
only
if,
either
or
both conditions would not be fulfilled. To combine', accordingly,
would stand for either
bringing
ogether
ome
elements,
ay
x
and
y,
as
subject
and
predicate
in a sentence or
combining
x and
y,
which
belong
to different
ategories.
I will come
back to the sense
of com-
bining'
implied
here later
on
(below, p.
7-11).
Ackrill's second
suggestion (b)
seems rather
unsatisfying.
t runs
as follows: the distinction
n Ch.
2
is,
as it
looks,
a
purely linguistic
one between
single
words and
groups
of words
(or
perhaps sentences),
whereas in Ch.
5
the author
neglects
the
possibility
of
single
words
withcompoundmeaningand is indifferento thelinguistic omplexity
of
expressions
like 'in the
Lyceum'.
The
inconsistency
on Aristotle's
part
is
aggravated,
then,
by
the fact that he does
pay
attention to
them in De
interpretation,
Chs.
5,
8 and
11,
as is
pointed
out
by
Ackrill himself
74).
But it
is
precisely
the
supposedly 'purely linguistic'
character of
Aristotle's ssertions
n
Ch.
2 that could make one reluctant o Ackrill's
second
suggestion.
Moreover,
t seems to be of no
help
either,
ince it
explains
our
confusion
as a
result
of Aristotle's carelessness but
does
not remove its cause properly. Finally, Ackrill's suggestionimplies
that
Aristotle's
distinction
between different
arts
of
language
rests
on rather
superficial
features,
whereas
the
opposite
view is
de-
fended
elsewhere
(Ackrill
refers
to
Topics
I
4,
101 b
26-28,
Poetics
1457
a
25I).3
Moravcsik
4
makes the usual
start in
pointing
to Plato
employing
the term
symplok'
n
Sophist,
262 A-B
in order to refer
not
to
mere
conjunction
or
juxtaposition,
but
ratherto the
interweaving
f words
and
phrases
into sentences.
This would
suggest,
he
adds,
that the
uncombined elements are
parts
of
language
from which sentences
can
be
formed.
In his
opinion
this is confirmed
by Categ.,
2 a
4ft.,
where "Aristotle
says
that the combination of
these items
produces
a
true or
false
sentence"
(127).
For that
matter,
this seems to
be an
over-statement:
what Aristotle
is
saying
here is
that
none
of the
'things
said
without
any
combination'
(1
b
25)
is said
just by
itself
in
any
affirmation,
ut
that
by
the combination
of
these
with one
s
See
also
J.
M.
E.
Moravcsik,
Aristotle's
heory f Categories,34-135
n:
J.M. E. Moravcsiked.),Aristotle, Collectionf Critical ssays,New York
1967,125-145.
*
Op.
cit.,
27
ff.
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another
an
affirmation s
produced;
none of
them,
taken
by
itself,
is eithertrue
or
false
(2
a
4-10).
So
the
only thing
Aristotle s
asserting
is that a combination of those elements is needed to make up an
affirmation;
his is
no
statement
about their
nature
proper
as
long
as
they
are
by
themselves.So
it
is
only
implied
that
they
are
potential
elements
of sentences.
t
can
still be asked whether
they
are taken as
nothing
ut
potential
parts
of a
sentence.
I am afraid
that
Moravcsik
goes
even
further
n the
wrong
direction
by having
an
eye
solely
for the
categories
taken s
possible
sentence
elements. As
a
matter of fact he
suggests
some
(plausible,
I
have
to
concede)
qualification
of the 'sentence'
under discussion.
But his
exclusive concern for 'things uncombine taken as just potential
ingredients
f a sentence
recludes
him
from
onsidering
hem n their
own
right.
Moravcsik's
further
iscussion
(i27ff.)
is
entirely
focused
on
'sentence'.
To
give
an
example.
As for
phrases designating
com-
plex
that crosses
two
categories,
uch as
'
whiteman'
'
incontinent an
(that
are to be
ruled
out),
Moravcsik
thinks
(130)
that
we
have
to
introduce
ome
qualification
which,
however,
s not backed
by
direct
textual
evidence,
he
admits,
yet
supported by
what he
(sc )
takes
to
be
the
sense
of
aneu
sympioks.
his
qualification,
now,
serves
to
rule out "as not completelyuncombined" all those phraseswhich the
mere addition
of connectors
i.e.
auxiliary
expressions)
can transform
into a
sentence.
For
though
white
man is
not
a
sentence it can be
expanded
into the
sentence
'
some
man
is
white
by
the mere addition
of
a
connector.
t is for
that
reason,
Moravcsik
assumes,
that
phrases
such
as
'
white
man' are
(to
be)
ruled
out.
Summing
up
what,
on
his
interpretation,
s
Aristotle's
basic
view,
Moracvsik
says
(133)
that
Aristotle's
principle' says
that
by
what
we
would
call
semantic
and
syntactic analysis (Aristotle,
like
Plato,
did not
distinguishbetween
them,
as Moravcsik
rightly
remarks),
we can discover cer-
tain
basic
units
among
the
elements
of
sentences
f
subject
-predicate
form
These
turn out to
designate
those
simple
elements of
reality
that
fall under
just
one
category.
Thus
the
designative
link
between
these
simple parts
of
language
and the
simple
parts
of
reality
which
fall
under
only
one
category
s,
according
to
Aristotle
on
M.'s
inter-
pretation),
the
key-link
between
the
structure
of
language
and that
of
reality.
It is true, Moravcsik (p. 133) is well aware of the difficultiesm-
plied by
his account. The
main
problem
is
the
unexplained
doctrine
of
the
genuine
unity
of a
categorial
expression
(of
course M.
has
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11/165
"predicate
expression").
Another
problem
is that the
supposed
ex-"
elusion
of
phrases
as 'white
man' which
rests on the
possibility
of
expanding them into sentences with the help of connectors s not
supported
by any
evidence
(see
above,
p. 5).
However,
Moravcsik
thinks
that
the two solutions
suggested by
Ackrill
(notes,
73-74;
see
above
pp.
3-4)
are inferior
to his
own
account
of the
doctrine. He
rightlypoints
to the
deceptive
character of
Aristotle's statement
at
the
opening
of Ch.
4)
that
"the elements hat
re
in
no
way
combined"
-^M.'s ranslation
132);
it is worth
noting
that Aristotlehas:
"what
is said
without
any
combination",
1
b
25
designate
items
falling
under
only
one
of the ten
categories,
f the statement s to be
taken
as analytic, as is implied by Ackrill's first olution. For this would
mean that
there is
no
way
of
sorting
out the uncombined
elements
except by
observing
whether their
designata
fall under
only
one
category.
If
so,
however,
the
opening
lines of Ch.
4
(on
Moravcsik's
view)
could
just
as well
have run: "some elements
st'c ) ignify
ither
substance or
quantity
or
quality
etc.,
and we take these
as
being
without
combination".
I
think,
so far
Moravcsik's
criticism eems
to
the
point,
with which
may
be
compared
Ackrill's
own critical
re-
marks on account
of
his first
uggestion.
However,
when he
goes
on
and
says
that,
moreover
(according
to the
interpretation
mplied
by
Ackrill's
suggestion)
what Aristotle
says
about the combined
and
uncombined
'things'
(of
course Moravcsik has
"parts
of
language",
134)
rests
entirely
on
metaphysical
grounds
and thus
may
not
be
connected
with
what he
says
elsewhere bout
the structure f
anguage,
Moravcsik seems
to miss
the
point
in a twofold
way.
First,
what he
labels
'resting
on
metaphysical
grounds'
is
nothing
but
the semantic
aspect
at
issue.
When
a
single
word
signifying smainn)
something
that crosses two categories (e.g. 'leukon'
=
'white thing') is used,
what
matters is
its
complex
mode of
signification,
ather than
any
(supposed)
complex
metaphysical
structure
f
the
'thing' signified.
t
should
be
noted
in this connection
that whenever
a
word
signifies
'thing'
falling
under
only
one
category,
the
metaphysical
structure
f
the
thing
signified
s not
concerned either.
Secondly,
the
supposed
inconsistency
between
Aristotle's
statements
in the
Categories
nd
what
he
says
elsewhere seems
to be a result
of an
optical
error
on
Moravcsik's
part
(see
below,
our
section
4.6).
-
As
for
M.'s
rejection
ofAckrill's second suggestion, ee below, p. 17.
It is
worthnow
returning
o Moravcsik's
basic
view that the
categ-
ories
(being
the
'things
uncombined')
are
nothing
but the
genuine
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units
among
the elements of
sentences
of the
subject-predicate
form.
It
entirely
rests
on
the
assumption
that
the
phrase
'
aneu
symploks'
does still take the 'thingsthereare' as related to a potential sentence
they
are
apt
to
make
up,
to
the effect hat
they
must
be
predicates
rather than
things
aid
Well,
this
assumption
will
prove
to
be
rather
weak.
I am
to show
this later
on
(our
sections
4.5
4.7).
But first
discussion
of
some related
questions
as to the use
(4.3)
and the
origin
(4.4)
of
the list of
categories.
4.3
Aristotle*
use
of
the
categories
Apelt
has
tabled
{op.
cit.,
140-141)
63
passages
in Aristotle's
works
wheretwo or more categories are mentioned.They can be classified
into three
groups,
according
to their
being
used as either a classifica-
tion
of
reality
or
a classification of
sentence
terms,
or a
classification
of
the different
meanings
of
what
may
be
termed
copulative being'.
4.31
The
categories
s
a
classification
f
reality
I
shall
give
some
examples
which
may
clarify
his use of the
categ-
ories.
Topics
I
9
presents
a
well-known
passage
in
this connection.
At
103
b
7 19
the
propositions
(p
rotaseis
logot)
are
distinguished
accordingto the predicables. In the next lines (103 b 20 104 a 1) the
division
s based on the
categories.
The
former
ivision of the
protaseis
concerns
the
(logical)
relations
between
their
predicates
and
subjects,
the
latter divides
them
according
to
their
contents,
.e.
the
things
they
are about.
The final
part
of the
passage (103
b
35ff.)
requires
some
comment.
The
problem
is
how
to
explain
that
ti
esti
at
b
35ff.
designates
the
category
of
substance
in
opposition
to the
non-sub-
stance
categories
while
the
same
phrase
was
used at
b
27-35
to
desig-
nate all
categories indiscriminately.
Well,
it
clearly appears
from
Aristotle'swords that at b
27-35
he is
dividing
subjects
by
means
of the
phrase
4i esti and at
b
35ff.
predicates
Thus
it
can be
easily
explained
why
Aristotle
concludes our
passage
in
remarking
b
3gff.)
"such, then,
and so
many
are
the
subjects
on which
arguments
take
place
[peri
hn
hoi
logoi)
and
the
materials
with
which
they
start
(ex
hn)"
i.e. the
predicates.
At
103
b
27-35
it
is the ekkeimena
=
subjects
on which
arguments
take
place)
that
are
divided
by
Hi
esti';
5
For this
ection,
ee
also
my
Utrecht
issertation,
he
Place
of
he
ategoriesofBeing n Aristotle*Philosophy, ssen1952 henceforthuoted s De Rijk:
1952),76-88.
have had
to
correct r
to
adjust
my
former
iews
on
several
points.
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at b
35ff.,
on
the
other
hand,
the
division
starts
from
the
different
types
of
predicate
terms
and
is
concerned,
accordingly,
with their
relationto the subject terms.
Topics
9,
103
b 20
104
i :
Next,
hen,
we
have to
distinguish
etween
the classes
of
categories
n
which he four
rders n
question
i.e.
the
our
predicables]
re found.
They
are
ten in
number:
ubstance,
Quantity,
Quality,
Relation,
lace,
Time,Position,
tate,
Activity,
assivity.
or
the accident nd
genus
nd
property
nd
definition
f
anything
ill
al-
ways
be in
one of
these
ategories:
or
ll
the
propositions
ound
hrough
these
viz.
predicables]
ignify
ither
substance
ti
esti)
or a
quality
r
quantity
r some
one
of
the
other
ategories.
t
is
clear, oo,
on the
face
of t
that the
man
who
ntends
o
say
of
something
hat
t is
signifies
sometimessubstance
ousian
,
sometimes
quantity,
ometimes
quality,
sometimesomeofthe other ategories.or when man s set before im
[as
a
subject
or
dialectical
iscussion]
nd he
says
thatwhat
s set
there
(to ekkeimenon)
s 'a
man' or 'an
animal',
he
states
what t
is
and
sig-
nifies substance
ousian);
but whena
white olour s set
before
im
and he
says
hat
what
s
setthere
s white'
or
colour',
e
stateswhat
t s
and
signifies
quality
Likewise, lso,
in
the other
ases.6
For
7
each of such
categories
nvolved,
f
either
t
be
said of itself
i.e.
if
the
eidos
s
said
of the
individual
hing
et
before
he
respondent],8
r
the
genus
of
the
eidos,
ignifies
hat
t is
(ti
esti);
whenever,
n
the other
hand,
one
category
s
asserted
f
another,9
t
is not
what t is
that s
sig-
nified,
ut
a
quantity
r
a
quality
r
one of the
other
ategories.
uch,
then,
nd so
many
re
subjects
n
which
rguments
ake
place
and
the
materials ithwhich hey tart i.e. their redicates].
Thus Aristotle
tries
to
show
(103
b
25
104
a
1)
that
when
dividing
the
dialectical
propositions
according
to the
'things'
they
are
about,
one
always
arrives
at one
of
the
categories,
no matter
whether
one
starts
from he
subjects
or the
predicates.
epi
tn lln
at b
35
seems
o
refer
oosely
o the other
ypes
f
ekkeimena
together
ith he
propositions
f
which
hey
re the
subject
erms, nd,
ac-
cordingly,
o
the
other
ategories
hich
upply
he
predicate
erms
or hem.
Thereforehe translation
n
the
other
ases'
(Oxford
ranslation)
s
quite
to
thepoint.The phrasehekastonntoioutnb 35-36) eemsto be somewhat
more
pecific
n
referring
o the
categories
nvolved.
7
The
conjunction
gar ('for')
refers
o
all what s
said
in
the
preceding
ines
(103
b
21-33).
Therefore
e
have
to
put
a full
top
after
pi
tn
lln t b
55.
De
Riik:
1952,p. 77
should
be corrected
o this ffect.
8
See
above,
he
end
of note
6.
9
The
phrase
ean
te
auto
peri
hautou*
"
f
tself
. . about
tself)
at b
36
must
be
opposed
ob
:
hotn
de
peri
heterou'
"whenever
on
heother
and,
t .
. .
about
another",
where another
(heteron)
s
to
be
equated
to
'belonging
o
another
enus'
heterogens)
t
Categ.
,
1
b
16
(if
this s
the
correct
eading
there)
of
things elonging
o
another
enus
nd,
accordingly,
ot ubordinate
one o theother". p.Metaph. 28,1024b 9ff. Seealsobelow, . 35.However,at b
J5
wheret is followed
y
the
phrase
or fthegenus s said oftheeidos',
the
formula
uto
peri
hautou
mustrefer
o the
ndividual
hing
nd
its
eidos,
respectively.
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Another
example
of
this use of the
list
of
the
categories
s
found
n
Physics
E
i,
225
b
5
ff.,
where
Aristotle
is
engaged
in
finding
the
various kinds of 'movement' (kinesis by means of the list. As is
known,
when
analysing
the
concept
of kinsis
movement
nd
change)
he
concludes
that
instances of
t
can
be found n
threeof the
categories
(viz.
Quality,
Quantity
and
Where).
In De
generai
et
corrupt
(I.3,
317
b
19,
318
a
15,
and
319
a
12)
our
list serves
for
examining
the
concept
of
'
genesis (coming
into exist-
ence).
In De
anima I
1,
402
a
24
ff. nd
I
5,
410
a
14
ff.)
t s
employed
in
Aristotle's
nquiry
nto the true
nature of the
soul.
It
is
especially
in
the
Metaphysics
that
the ontic character
of the
categoriesappears as signifyingthings*to the effect, ndeed,that the
table
here
seems
to
be
about the
main
types
of
'things'
signified.
pick
out
some
examples.10
In
Metaph.
E
4,
1027
b
33
1028 a
4
Aristotle
distinguishes
es-
sential
being'
('on
kath
hauto*)
from
'accidental
being'
(on
kata
symbebkos)
nd from
being
as truth
(on
hs
althes)
on account of
the
formersontic character.11
This
is in
full accordance with
what
we
find
in
Metaph.
7,
1017
a
22-30,
where
Aristotle
says
that
the
kinds of
'essential
being'
12
are
precisely
those
that
are
signifiedby the schemata of '
katgoria
'
(for
the
ambiguity
of the latter term,
see
below,
our
section
4.5),
since the
meanings
of
'being*
re
just
as
many
as
these schemata
indicate.
Since,
then,
(he goes on)
some
of
the
'things'
said
(ton
kategoroumenon)
ignify
substance
(ti
esti)t
others
quality,
others
quantity,
,
'being*
has
a
meaning
answer-
ing
to each of
these
(categories).
There
is a
well-known
distinction
between
the
mode
of
being
of
things
existing
by
themselves and
that
of
things
which
do not exist
by
themselves but
only
inhere in
those of the formerkind; see also
below,
pp.
22
ff.
Well,
the
opening
chapter
of
Metaph
Z
shows
that
10
For a
more
omplete
iscussionf
these
passages,
ee
De
Rijk:
1952,
5-43;
56-66
nd
82-88,
nd
below
p. 22-31.
11
For
the
correct
meaning
f
accidental
eing',
ee
Ross
ad loc.
nd De
Rijk:
x952>
1-35;
o*
essential
eing',
De
Rijk: 1952,
35-43
against
Ross)
and for
'being
s
truth',
bid.,
-35
against
Ross).
t
should
e
noted, owever,
hat
n
either f
hese
ooks
here s an
unfortunate
ack of
ttention
o the emantical
aspects
f
the
texts
nvolved,
n
that a
term's
redication
s more
n
the
focus
of
the
nterpreters'
nterest
han
ts
naming omething.
12
Essential
eing
s what
s
signified
y
the
essential
nity
f
the
copula
est'
and thepredicate erm e.g. convalescens'viz. convalescentemsse = con-
valescentia.
For
a
detailed
discussion,
ee
De
Rijk: 1952,
35-43,
and our
Section
.
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this distinction
runs
parallel
with
that
between
the
category
of
substance
and
the non-substance
categories.
The former s
primarily,
the latter are only in a secondary way:
Metaph.
Z
x,
1028
25-30:
Now
these
i.e.
the non-substance
ategories]
are seen
to be more eal
because
here s
something
efinite
hich nder-
lies
them,
.e. individual
ubstance
h
ousia
kai to kath'
hekaston),
hich
is
implied
n such
a
designation Clearly,
hen,
t is
in virtue f
this
ategory
i.e. substance)
hat ach of
the others lso s.1*
Aristotle
s
quite
consistent
n
confining
is
inquiry
nto true
being
(in Metaph.
Z-H)
to the domain
of
the
categories.
What came
up
for
discussion
n
7,
1017
a 22
30,
viz.
the
categories
s
signifying
hat
is called 'essential being', returns n Z 6 after a thoroughmetaphys-
ical discussion.
There
the
categories
turn
out to
signify
he
highest
essences,
which are to
be found
nowhere else but in
every-day
reality.
As for the
several
categories,
Aristotle
more than once
mentions
their
ontic
character,
.g.
Metaph.
2,
1003
b
5
ff.; Zi,
1028 a
25
30
(see
above,
p.
10)
Z
4,
1030
a
21
ff.
and
b
4
ff.
x,
1045
b
27
ff.
n
all these
passages
the author
stressesthat
all
categories
have an
ontic
character;
the
category
of substance
has this character
primarily
(firts),
he non-substance
categories
n a
secondary
way
(
hepomens
,
viz. as a result,orin virtue,of their ntimateconnectionwithprimary
being.
We
may compare
this
with what is said
in
Categ.
5,
2 b
7ff.
about the
ontic character
of
secondary
substances as
borrowedfrom
primary
ubstance,
with the
proviso,
of
course, that,
in the
Categories,
the
non-substance
genera
and
species
are not involved,
(see
below,
p. 24;
39-41).
Before
concluding
this
section
it
should
be remarked
that Aristotle
in
nearly
all
the
passages
discussed
above,
though using
the
categorial
division for a classificationof reality, yet introducesthe categories
themselves as
'things
said'
{ta legoumena,
a
katgoroumena,
nd
the
like).
This
may
be
an
additional
motive
to discuss the two other
ways
in which
the
categories
are used
by
Aristotle,
viz.
as
a
classifica-
tion
of
predicates
4.32)
and of
copulative
being' (4.33).
4.32
The
categories
s
a
classification
f
sentence
redicates
It
is
on this
use of the
categories
that the attention of
all modern
interpreters
eems
to be
focused,
to
the effect
hat most
of
them are
in
a
constant
habit of
associating
'category'
exclusively
with
pre-
ls
For
furtheriscussion
f
this
mportant
assage,
ee
below,
. 23
ff.
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dicate.14
Some
of
them
do,
indeed,
see some minor
problems
(such
as
the
non-predicable
character of
primary
ubstance)
or are cautious
enoughto speak of"a verywide sense of predicate'
"
(thusMoravcsik,
143).
Nevertheless
they
do not
make
any
attempt
to clear
up
the
situation.
I
will
make
an
attempt
at a
reconsideration
n
sections
4-5-
4-7-
My
rejection
of the
common
view,
however,
does
definitely
not
imply
a
denial
of the fact
that
the
categories
frequently
eem
to
be
used
as
(possible)
sentence
elements. In fact the first book
of the
Organon
does
classify
what
is called
(
Categ
1,
1 a
16-17)
'things
that
are
said
without
combination'. Above all I
object
to the common
view nthat it takes thephrase things hat re said without ombination
to
refer
o the
'things'
concerned as
nothing
but
potential parts
of
a
sentence.
On
my
view
they
are rather
things'
taken
by
themselves,
i.e. not related
to
any
possible
sentence
whatsoever. In other words:
the
expression
without
ombination
(aneu
symploks)
hould
be
taken
as
not
only ruling
out
any
actual
combination
into a sentence but
also,
in
fact,
as
setting
side the
very
question
of
any
possible
sentential
use
of the
terms involved.
(See
above,
our
section
4.2
and
below,
sections
4.5
4.7).
In
Categories
ch.
3,
where the
author
discusses the
transivity
of
the
'being-said-of'
relation,
the
classification of
the
categories
really
may
also be
taken as
a
table
for
reading
off
the mutual
relations
of
the
terms
involved
according
to
their
capacity
to
be
subject
and
predicate
of one
another
(see
however,
below,
p.
35).
Another
important
passage
is
found in
the
Posterior
Analytics
There
(chs.
19-22)
15
Aristotle
argues
that
it
is
impossible
that a
demonstration should
consist
of an
infinite
chain
of
premisses.
In
14
So
in
recent
imes
Ross,
Kapp,
Ackrill
nd
earlier
Otto
Apelt
Die
Kate-
gorienlehre
es Aristoteles
in:
Beitrge
ur
Geschichte
er
griechischen
hilo-
sophie,
eipzig
1891),
101-216),
H.
Maier
Die
Syllogistik
es
Aristoteles
II,
277ff.);
C.
M.
Gillespie,
he
Aristotelian
ategories
n:
The Classical
Quarterly,
19
(1925),75-84
also
in
J.
Barnes,
M.
Schofield,
.
Sorabji
eds),
Articles
n
Aristotle,
Metaphysics,
uckworth
979,
1-12),
sp.
p.
75:
"the scheme
f
the
Categories
..
is
primarily
onnected
ith
he
use
of
inguistic
hought
o
make
ssertions
italicsmine)
bout
reality
nd
hence
with
he
proposition
the
judgement
s
expressed
n
language".
All
the
same
Gillespie
ppears
ften
o
have
had
an
eye
for
he
semantic
ide
p. 76:
"the
Categories
lassify
he
many
nameswhich
we
apply
to
the
ndividual; p.
ibid.
pp. 78; 70; 81).15 followheexcellentnalysis iven ySirDavidRoss,Aristotle*Prior nd
Posterior
nalytics
A
Revised
Text
with
Introduction
nd
Commentary,
Oxford
949,
566
ff.
II
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Ch.
19
the main
question
is
split up
into
three
sub-questions:
(1)
can
therebe
an infinite hain of attributes
scending
rom
given
subject
?
(2) can there be such a chain of subjects descending roma given
attribute?;
and
(3)
can there
be an
infinite
eries
of middle
terms
between
a
given subject
and
a
given
attribute
The
following
hapters
(20 22) argue
that the answer
to
all
these
questions
must be
in the
negative.
One of
the three
proofs
put
forward n
Ch.
22 as
to the
third
question
is
of interest
o our
purpose.
It
is a dialectical one
and
extends,
with its
preliminaries,
from 82 b
37
to
83
b
31.
The
argu-
mentation
runs
as follows:
-
82 b
37
83
a i : essential
predicates
of a
subject
must be finite
n
number; if the attributesin a series of predication such as we are
discussing
are
substantial,
they
must be finite n
number,
because
they
are
then the elements
constituting
he definition
f a
substance
(
Oxford
ranslation,
ote ad
83
a).
-
83
a
19-35
on
the
preliminary
ssumption
that
any
predicate
is
invariably predicated
strictly
(
hapls
and not
accidentally
of the
subject (since
demonstrations
depend
on such
predication
for their
force),
it is stated
than when
a
single
attribute
is
predicated
of a
single
subject,
the
predicate
must
affirm
f
the
subject
either some
elementconstituting ts substance (
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The
purport
of
the discussion
in
Ch.
22 is
clearly
summed
up
by
Ross
as
follows
(579):
"Thus
Aristotle
contemplates
several finite
chainsofpredicationreachingupwardsfrom n individualsubject like
Callias.
There is a
main chain of
which the successive
terms re
Callias,
infima
species
to which
Callias
belongs,
differentia
f that
species,
proximate
genus,
differentia f that
genus,
next
highergenus
.
.
.
-
*
category (i.e.
substance).
But
also
each
of
these elements
in
the
essence
of
the
individual
subject
entails one or more
properties
and
is
capable
of
having
one or more
accidental
attributes,
and each
of
these
generates
a
similar train of
differentiae nd
genera, terminating
in the
category
of which the
property
or
accident
in
question
is
a
specification quality, quantity,relation,etc.".
It
may
be
easily
concluded
from he
discussions
n
Anal. Post.
I,
22
that
the
doctrine
f the
categories
an
serve for
ogical purposes,
viz.
in
order to
classify
the terms of
scientific
premisses
according
to their
capability
of
being
subject
or
predicate
of one
another.
4.33
The
categories
s a
classification
f
copulative
being
As
we have seen above
(4.31 p. 9-10)
Aristotle
eems
to
distinguish
in
Metaph.
7,
1017
a
22-30
the
various
senses
of essential
being'
bymeans of the doctrineof the
categories.
As a matter of fact the ratio
distinguendi
s
a
more substantial
one than
is
suggested by
our
phrase
'by
means
of.
Really,
the
various
senses
are
distinguished
n virtue
of the distinction etween what
is conceived
of as the
categorial
modes
of
being.
We
should notice the
use
of
'epei'
('since')
at
a
24:
"since,
then,
some
of the
things
said
(ton
katgoroumenn)ignify
ubstance,
others
quality,
other
quantity
. . .
etc.,
being'
has a
meaning
nswering
to
each
of these"
(a 24-26).
It will
be
remembered hat in
our section
4.31 (p. 7-10)
this
passage
was
adduced
in
support of the view that
the
categories may
be taken
as
providing
a
division of
reality.
It
should be
noticed,
however,
that
this
ontological
function of the
categories
is
explained
here
by
clarifying
heir
relationship
to what
may
be
called
'copulative
being'.
The
categories
turn out to be
of
major importance
to the
correct
view of
this kind of
being
(einai)
11.
In
Soph
El.
,
167
a
i
ff.
Aristotle
sserts
that
some
sophists
did not
distinguish
between
esse
simpliciter einai
hapls)
and
esse
quid
(einai
ti).
Our author
himself
does make
the
proper
distinction at
167
a
2,
as well as in De interpr. 1, 21 a 24 ff. implicitly),Anal. Pr. I 38, 49
18
For
a
further
iscussion
f
copulative
eing',
ee
our
ection which
will
deal with he
anatomy
f
the
proposition
n
Plato and
Aristotle.
13
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a
31
and Anal. Post. 1
10,
76
b 6.
That,
on
Aristotle's
view,
copulative
being
has as
many
senses as there are
categories,
ppears
fromAnal.
Pr. I 36, 48 b 2-4when taken togetherwithI 37, 49 a 6-8: "We must
suppose
the verb to
belong'
(tohyparchein)
o have as
many
meanings
as those
in
which B is A'
and
'it
is true to
say
that is A' are used"
(48
b
2-4)
. . . "The
expressions
this
belongs
o that'
nd 'that s
true
of
thai'
must be taken
in as
many
ways
as
there
Eire ifferent
ategories"
(49
a
6-8).
For
that
matter,
the einai ti
(
esse
quid)
is a
genericheading
over the
categorial
distinctions
f
being.
For from
he lines next fol-
lowing
the latter
passage
(49
a
8-9)
it
appears
that the
predicates
within this
or that
category may
be said of the
subject
either
n a
particular respect or absolutely (hapls), and either as simple or
compound (
haplas
sympeplegmenas).
Finally,
the
categorial
distinction urns out to be
indispensable
for
solving
various difficulties
oncerning
predication.
Antisthenes ad-
mittedly
denied the
possibility
of
any non-identifying redication
(see
Plato,
Sophist,
251
A; Theaet.,
201 E ff. nd
Aristotle,
Metaph.
A
29, 1024
b
32-33).
He admitted
only
of
tautological predications
uch
as
'man is man'
or
'the
good
is
good'
In his
Metaphysics
A 29,
1024
b
29-36)
Aristotle
points
out,
011 he
contrary,
hat also
non-tautological
predication s possible, since "it is possible to describe each thingnot
only by
the account of tself
i.e.
in a
definitory
ay]
but also
by
that
of
something
else"
(b 34-36).
As
a matter of
fact,
n Anal. Post.
I,
22
(discussed
above,
11-13)
is
it
clearly mplied
that accidental
(=
non-
definitory)predication
is
possible
no
less
than essential
predication,
of which the
tautological
ones make
up
a
special
group (which
is
rejected by
Aristotle s
being
useless,
indeed;
see
loc.
cit.).
From
I
22,
83
a
24-32
it
appears
that,
from the
ontological point
of
view,
acci-
dental
predicates
are
just
accidents
( ymbebkota
of their
subjects,
falling
under one
of the nine non-substance
categories.
All this seems
to be based
on his
view that it is
possible,
and
quite
natural, ndeed,
to assert
one of
the
non-substance
categories
of substance
(
ousia
.
It
should be
noted
in this connection
that individual substance
is
char-
acterized
by
its
not
being
asserted
of
any subject,
whereas
every
thing
else
(viz.
all non-substance
categoriesplus secondary
substance
and
differentia)
an
be
said
of t. See
e.g.
Metaph.
A
8,
1017
b
13
Z
3,
1029
a
8;
Physics
I
2,
185
a
32
and
7, 190
a x.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that all the passages discussed
in
this
section
can
be
interpreted
s
dealing
with
copulative being.
So
they
all admit
of
translatingkategorein
Categoria
by
'to
predicate'
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('predicate').
Of
course,
the same
applies
a
fortiori
to the
passages
dealt with
n our section
4.32.
Well,
taking
nto account that even the
passages where the categoriesseem to serve as a means of classifying
reality
(our
section
4.31),
are
presented by
Aristotle as
dealing
with
'things'
said rathei
than
things'
see
above,
p. 10),
one
might suppose
that
Kapp
and others are
right
n
taking
the Aristotelian
categories
as classes of
predicates.
So
we have to
deal,
again,
with the
question
are
the
categories
the
'highest
predicates'
? This discussion
will take
place
in
our
section
4.5
after a
discussion
of
the
possible
origin
of the
list
of
categories.
4.4 How did Aristotle rriveat his listofcategories?
Sir David Ross was
right
n
maintaining Aristotle,
ondon,
si949,
p. 22)
that
the
controversy
bout
the
meaning
of the doctrine of the
categories
was
largely owing
to the fact
that nowhere n Aristotlewe
see it in the
making.
Against Trendelenburg's
view that the
distinc-
tions between
the
categories
were
derived from
grammatical
distinc-
tions,
Ross
pointed
out that the
only parts
of
speech
which Aristotle
recognizes
as such are the noun
and the verb
{De
interpr.,
hs.
2-3),
and that the
doctrine
bringstogetherthingsthat grammar separates
(c.q.
'Quantity'
and
'Quality'
include certain nouns
as well as
adjec-
tives)
and
separates
things
that
grammar
does not
distinguish,
viz.
primary
nd
secondary
substance.
Ross himself
hought
t
was
highlyprobable
that
the doctrine
began
as
an
attempt
to
solve
certain
difficulties
oncerning predication
which had
troubled the
Megaric
school and other
earlier thinkers.The
same view was defended
by
Otto
Apelt
as
early
as
1891
and C.
M.
Gillespie
n
1925
ie. On
this
view
Aristotle's
purpose
has
been
to clear
up the question of predication by distinguishing he main types of
meaning
of those words and
phrases
that can
be combined
to make
up
a
sentence.
And in
doing
this he arrived at
his classification of
the
main
types
of
entity
nvolved in the
structure f
reality {op.
cit.
23).
Professor
Ackrill,
too,
has
discussed the
question
of how
Aristotle
did arrive
at
his list of
categories {notes,
8-81).
He discerns one
way
of
classifying hings
n
distinguishing
ifferent
uestions
which
may
be
asked about
something
nd in
noticing
hat
only
a
limited
range
of
answers
can be
appropriately given
to
any particular
question.
He
thinks that such a proceduremay explain some of Aristotle's abels
"
Apelt,
p.
cit.,101-216;
Gillespie, p.
cit.
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for
categories, e.g.
poson, poion, pou, pote,
which, indeed,
all are
indefinite
pronouns, corresponding
as
linguistic
items
with the
respective nterrogatives so izoavwith toctov, oiv with tcoov tc.;
see, however,below,
p. 37).
Some
additional
support
for
this view
can
be found
n
the
actual
examples
Aristotle
uses which
strongly
uggest
that he is
thinking
f answers
to
questions
about a man
20
nd
certainly
will have
thought
of the
questions
as
being
asked
of
a
substance.
An
alternative
way
to
arrive at the
list of
categories
may
be
found,
on
Ackrill's
view,
in
addressing
oneself not to
the various answers
ap-
propriate
to various
questions
about a
substance but to
the various
answers
to one
particular question
which can be
asked
about
any
thingwhatsoever the question 'what s it?'. So we may ask 'what s
Callias',
'what
is
generosity?'.
Ackrill
interprets
uch
questions
as
asking
in what
species,
genus,
or
highergenus
an
individual,
species
or
genus
is.
Repeating
the same
question
with
reference
o the
species,
genus,
or
higher
genus
mentioned
n
answer to
the
previous question,
and
continuing
thus,
in the end one shall arrive at some
extremely
high genera.
As
a matterof
fact,
Aristotledoes
thinkthat
Substance',
'Quantity',
'Quality'
etc.
are
supreme
and
irreducibly
ifferent
enera
under one of
which falls each
thing
there s.
Ackrill is of the
opinion
that these two
ways
of
grouping
things
have led
to the same results:
a
thing aptly
introduced n answer to
the
question
'of
what
quality?'
(in
Greek
{poion),
as in some modern
languages,
e.g.
French
quel,
Dutch
hoedanig,
single-wordnterrogative,
as should
be
noticed)
will
naturally
be
found,
when classified
in
a
generic
tree,
to fall
under the
genus
of
Quality'.
These two
approaches
involve
equivalent
assumptions.
The
assumption
that a
given
question
determines
range
of
answers that does not
overlap
with
any range
determinedby any otherquestion corresponds
o the
assumption
that
no item
when defined
per genus
et
differentiam
ill be found such
that
it wl fall
under
more than
one
highestgenus.
The
assumption
that a
certain list
of
questions
contains
all
the
radically
different
uestions
that
may
be asked
corresponds
to the
assumption
that a
certain
list
of
supreme
genera
contains
all the
supreme
genera.
As a matter
of
fact,
Aristotle's
use
of
the
doctrine n
Topics
I,
9
may
be adduced
in
support
of Ackrill's
view,
(see
above,
p.
7-8).
0
See Gillespie, p.cit.,8iff.Kapp (op.cit.,38, n. 14) remarkedhat of the21
examples
fdifferentategories hich heCategoriesffers,nly5 (horse,
double,
alf,yesterday,
ast
year)
would
be ont of
place
in
a
sentence
with
man
or
child)
s its
subject.
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The
criticism
put
forward
by
Moravcsik
(140-142)
does
not
seem
to
the
point,
(cp.
above,
p.
6-7). Especially
his remark
that it
would be
surprisingf the two approaches describedbyAckrillwereto yieldthe
same
list
of
categories
deserves
our
attention. For that matter
Moravcsik
thinks
t
is
unlikely
that
the
classification of the
aspects
of
one
kind
of
entity, e.g.
Substance,
should coincide with
an ex-
haustive
classification
of
the
essences
of all
entities
that make
up
reality.
To
his
mind such a
correlationwill
not hold
unless one views
everything
s a modification or
relational accident
of
the
type
of
entitypreferred.
Well,
this
way
of
viewing
reality
s,
in
fact,
the one
Aristotle
displays
throughout
his
works,
in
spite
of
Moravcsik's
verdict that it is a trivial one. Substance, really, is the logical and
ontological
focus
of
Aristotle's
nterest s a
philosopher.
In
making
an
objection
as
to
AckrilTs econd
way,
Moravcsik
s
no
more
fortunate.
He
objects
(141)
to
AckrilTs
view
that
one
could
never
decide whether
the
highest genera
had been
reached. To
take
one of
Aristotle's
examples,
why
should one not
arrive
at
change
(kinsis)
as
one of
the
categories
Moravcsik
seems
to
be
quite right
n
observing
this,
for the
'what
is
it'
question
can
certainly
be
answered
n
some
specific
cases
by 'change'.
Yet,
as we
know,
Aristotle
does
definitely
not take kinsis as a categorybut tries to show that is cuts across
three
categories (
Physics
E
1,
see
above,
p.
9).
However,
how can
this
be adduced as
a
decisive
argument
gainst
AckrilTs
view
? It
only
proves
that
kinesis
is not
a
simple entity
(on
Aristotle's
view).
For
that
matter,
Moravcsik
himself
dmits
(141)
that
Topics
I
9,
103
b
22ff.
states,
amony
other
things,
that
the
categories
make
up
such
an
exhaustive
classification
f
reality
that no
real
essence
will
cut across
categories.
Therefore,
whenever
the
'what
is
it'
question
does not
produce
a
simple
answer
(i.e.
a
one-category nswer),
either one
has
to
keep
asking (e.g.
if one has arrivedat answers such
as
'
white
man')
or to correct one's
way
of
asking
(e.g.
if
one
has arrived at
answers
such
as
'being'
matter'
change
y
ll
spanning
more
than
one
category).
However,
when
it
comes
to
explaining
the
proper
meaning
of the
Aristotelian
categories
Ackrill's view
of how
Aristotle
arrived
at,
and
used,
his
list of
categories
seems
to
fail. For
Ackrill, too,
takes
them
exclusively
as
possible
sentence
predicates.
It
may
be
remarked
n
the
first
place
that when
taking
the
question-procedure
s
a
way
of
grouping things,one is inclined to conceive of the categoriesas (pos-
sible)
parts
of a
sentence
in
which
the
answers are
given.
It
is
true,
when Ackrill
asserts that
Aristotle
reaches the
first
way
of
categorial
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classification
by observing
that
different
ypes
of
answer are
ap-
propriate
to
different
questions,
he can find
(79)
some
support
for
this view in the predicativeformofsome of Aristotle's xamples. For
that
matter,
he
question-answer rocedure
s such s bound to involve
expressions
n a
subject-predicate
form.
In
focusing exclusively
on
the
relationship
of the
categories
to
sentences
(of
which
they
are
the
potential parts
indeed)
Ackrill
appeals
to
share
the
common view.
I
have
already pointed
(above
p.
15,
n.
19)
to
Apelt
and otherswho
saw
the
doctrine
of
the
categories
primarily
s an
attempt
to solve certaindifficulties
oncerning redica-
tion
occurring
with the
Megarians. Among
them
Ernst
Kapp
was most
explicit in maintaining op. cit. 23 . 37-42) that our earliest docu-
ment,
the
Topics,
shows
that the doctrinewas
originally
doctrine
of
sentence-predicates
nd was
only
later
transformed,
s
early
as
in
Aristotle
himself,
nto a scheme for
pigeonholing
whatever carries a
single
word as its
name. I intend to show in
the
next
sections
4.5-4.6)
that
Kapp
has
caused much confusionboth in
opposing
the
syntactic
to the
semantic
function
nd in
separating
them
chronologically.
4.5
Are the
categories
he
highest redicates'?
As has been said before
above,
p. 2-7;
10-13;
I5"I8)
modern nter-
preters
associate
the Aristotelian
categories
with one or other kind of
predication.
t need
not
surprise
us that the Greek word
katgoria'
s
commonly
accepted
as
predicate.
Ross
(
Aristotle
23)
takes
'predicate'
as the
ordinary
meaning
of
katgoria'
and so
does
Kapp
(op.
cit.,
21)
who maintains
that
"the
singular 'katgoria'
means
originally imply
predicate,
but the
plural 'katgoriai'
could
naturally
be
used
in
the
sense of 'different
inds or formsof
predicates'
the
full
Aristotelian
expressionforwhat we call a 'category',he adds, s kind ofcategory'or
'form of
category'
"
;
elsewhere
37)
he
speaks
of Aristotle'sdistinction
of
ten
different
lasses or forms of
predication'.
Ackrill
(Notes, 80),
too,
holds that
the Greek word transliterated
category' ctually
means
'predication'
or
'predicate'
and
he calls the
categories
the ultimate
predicates'.
I should
like, first,
o make a
preliminary
emark on the
original
meaning
of
katgoria' .
De
Rijk: 1952, 89-91).
Before
Aristotle he
word
always
had the sense
of 'accusation'.
However,
the connected
verb 'katgore' nd the primitiveword of the substantivenoun and
the
verb,
that
is,
'katgoros',
ad
originally
the neutral
(non-hostile)
meaning
of
'revealing',
'betraying'
(so
Aeschylus,
Septem,
439;
18
-
8/9/2019 VIVARIUM, VOL. 18, NOS. 1-2, 1980
24/165
Xenophon,
Oeconomica
20,
15;
Hippocrates,
De
arte
13,
19
Jones).
Similarly,
n the earliest
passage
extant the verb
'katgore'
has
a
non-hostilemeaning: Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 71: "ay, for t is of a
loyal
heart
that thine
eye argues
thee"
(
omma sou
katgorei
; .
Herodotus
III,
1x5;
Xenophon,
Cyrop.
I
4,
3;
Plato, Phaedo,
73
and
passim (see
Friedrich
Ast,
Lexicon
Platonicum,
.v.).
It should be
noticed
that
a
scholion ecentissimumn
Sophocles,
Aiax,
907 says
that
both
good
and bad
things
can be the
object
of our verb
(see
Boisson,
Anedota
II,
351),
and the
Etymologicum
Magnum
apparently
holds
'to
speak
about' to be
its
primary
ense.
In
moulding
the term
'katgoria'
for his
philosophic purposes
Aristotle seems to have returned to the original sense of the verb
katgore.
or the
rest,
the
basic
question
still
remains:
what
is,
in
this
connection,
he
proper meaning
of
the verb
'kaigore?'
I will to
come back to
the
question
below
(p. 21).
Of
course,
most
interpreters
were
fully
aware that there
are some
embarrassing ieces
of evidence
against
the
acceptance
of
katgoria'
=
'predicate'.
The first
category,
which
should be considered the
key-
stone of the
doctrine,
as for ts
primary
members ndividual
ubstances
(primary ubstances)
which
are the
proper
nhabitants of the
group
of
things
hat are neither
present
n a
subject
nor are said
of
any
subject
(Categ.
2,
i
b
3-4;
cp.
5,
2 a
34
ff.).
Thus
the
primary
members of the
most
basic
category
are
anything
but
predicates.
Ross
(23)
is
right
n
rejecting
the conclusion
sometimes drawn from
this
that
primary
substances
do not fit
properly
nto
the doctrine of
the
categories.
He
tries to solve
the
problem
in that he
recognizes
that
'Socrates'
is,
on
Aristotelian
principles,
no
proper
predicate;
but if we
ask
what
Socrates
s,
the
ultimate,
.e.
the most
general,
answer s 'a
substance',
just as, if we ask what red is, the ultimateanswer s 'a quality'. Thus,
Ross
concludes,
the
categories
are
a
list of the
widest
predicates
which
can
be
predicated
essentially
of the
various nameable
entities,
i.e.
which
tell
us what kinds of
entity
at
bottom
they
are.
The
question
at issue should
be related to
another
one,
viz.
whether,
generally peaking,
the
categories
nclude
only
universais,
or
particu-
lars as well. Moravcsik
deals with
this
question
in a
remarkable
way
{op.
cit.,
142-143).
He
thinks
that
it is
difficult o
conceive of each
categor