“So 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy”:

The British Campaign in the Sudan 1883-1898

University of Mary Washington

Sam Taylor

History 300Y

4/22/13

When Mohammed Ahmed labeled himself the “El Mahdi” or “The Chosen One” and led

an Islamic based revolt in the British and Egyptian territory of the Sudan in 1881, the British

clearly had a large issue to deal with. Ahmed carved over a million square miles of territory for

his following to establish the first African nation ever to win independence from a foreign power

by virtue of its own military force.1 For 15 years the followers of “El Mahdi” held back the

weight of British and Egyptian might. Not until Lord Kitchener, who was determined to destroy

the Mahdi forces once and for all, took command over the Anglo-Egyptian forces were the

Mahdist forces finally finished off. Under Kitchener the British soundly defeated the Mahdi at

Atbara and Omdurman which finally re-established British and Egyptian control of the region.

The reason for such sound British victories at Atbara and Omdurman was the combination of

superior tactics and greater technology. Correspondingly, at the battles of El Obeid and

Khartoum, where the British were defeated, neither of these factors were in British favor and as a

result they were defeated by the Mahdist army. The British Campaign in the Sudan consisted of

more than these four military engagements. These four engagements represent the two greatest

defeats of the British as well as their two greatest victories during this campaign. These four

engagements also represent the start and the end of the British dealings with the Mahdist forces

and, when compared, they are a great example of how the British adapted their understanding

and attitudes when dealing with imperial native enemies. After the first set of defeats the British

and Egyptian forces made distinct changes to their military technology employed and tactics

used. Superior military technology and battlefield tactics proved to be the difference for ultimate

British victory in the Sudan.

The leader of the Mahdist revolt had a unique upbringing, which helped give rise to his

future as a revolutionary leader. Mohammed Ahmed, who eventually became ‘El Mahdi,’ was

1 Byron Farwell. Prisoners of the Mahdi (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967), 3.

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born in the Sudan in 1845 and became the key figure for the Mahdist revolt. For most of his

young life, Ahmed spent time with religious teachers and by age nine had memorized the entire

Koran.2 From an early age, Ahmed had large religious aspirations. He was known to declare that

he was the descendant of El Askari, for whom it was believed a great leader of Islam would one

day descend. Also important to his rise as a prophet, Ahmed grew up at the crossroads of the

region. In this region on the Island of Abba in the Nile, many different cultures existed.

Undoubtedly, Ahmed had a great understanding of the Sudan as a result. Yet, his primary

concern as a young man was religion. He often took part in self-flagellation to show his

devotion. Eventually Ahmed became a wandering dervish, traveling and praying all over the

region. During this period he became quite well-known for his religious devotion and his

sermons.3

Mohammed Ahmed used Islamic teachings as ideological backing for his rise as a leader.

He preached a doctrine based on the rejection of foreigners and their ways, as well as

improvement of the self through Islam. He often told his followers to “hate the Turk” and to

follow his lead on the path to heaven, which he called “the way.” During his early life Egypt

directly ruled the Sudan and the term ‘Turk’ applied to any foreigners with light skin including

Egyptians. The Egyptian ‘Turks’ became very cruel and oppressive rulers. Many of the Egyptian

rulers took unfair advantage of the land’s wealth and women.4 Ahmed said the ‘Turk,’ while

Muslim was a sinner, a lazy glutton; he drank wine and oppressed other Muslims. Ahmed called

for the people of the Sudan to purge everything that resembles the ‘Turk’.5 His doctrine became

quite popular during a period where there existed resentment in the Sudan for Egyptian rulers.

2 Farwell. Prisoners of the Mahdi, 3.3 Ibid., 6-7.4 Ibid., 4.5 Ibid., 8.

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Ahmed eventually claimed he was a prophet, and officially adopted the name of ‘El Mahdi’,

which translates to ‘the chosen one’.6

The Mahdist movement subsequently grew and began to take a militaristic stance. His

following grew at a faster rate than the Egyptian government anticipated or could imagine

possible. Eventually El Mahdi called for a Jihad, or a holy war, against the ‘Turk’ or anyone he

saw that was against his doctrine. The Mahdi preached, “I am the Mahdi, the Successor of the

Prophet of God. Cease to pay taxes to the infidel Turks and let everyone who finds a Turk kill

him, for the Turks are infidels”.7 His large group of followers quickly transformed into an army.

The Egyptian government saw El Mahdi as a false prophet and understood they needed to

stop him and the damage his doctrine was causing. The Egyptian government committed small

forces to shut Ahmed down. His large numbers easily overwhelmed the small Egyptian forces.8

The Mahdi had created an army that was well organized and fanatic. What they lacked in

weapons and training they made up for in bravery and devotion to their leader and his cause, and

most importantly they were ready to take the offensive against any and all foreigners.

The British involvement in the Sudan was motivated by very different factors compared

to those of the Mahdi. The British did not directly control the Sudan but rather the region was

controlled by Britain through the Egyptians. Britain had no real interest in the Sudan, but if they

could help it, did not want the Egyptians to completely abandon the region since it was a key

source of revenue for Egypt.9 Also, one can speculate that having Muslim fundamentalists take

control over a piece of the British imperial project was something that did not agree with the

British Victorian hubris. In 1883, the British decided they would help Egypt crush the Mahdi

6 Farwell, Prisoners of the Mahdi, 10-12.7 P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan: 1881-1898 A Study of Its Origins Development and Overthrow (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 59. 8 Farwell, Prisoners of the Mahdi, 13-17.9 Ibid., 19-26.

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revolt, but not directly. They would only send military advisors to help lead an expedition

against the Mahdi.10

The British and Egyptian force that was assembled was clearly inadequate. William

Hicks, a former British officer in the Indian Army, was selected to lead this expedition. Hicks’

force was comprised of only 7,000 Egyptian infantry and 900 cavalry. The quality and morale of

these troops were very low, yet Hicks decided to go forth with the expedition.11 Winston

Churchill remarked in his book The River War, “It was perhaps the worst army that has ever

marched to war… they had no spirit, no discipline, hardly any training.” The expedition’s goal

was to capture the town of El Obeid. El Obeid was the largest and most important town of the

western Sudan. It was a commercial center and the gateway to Darfur. The Mahdist army at this

point was a very capable fighting force, especially when compared to the Anglo-Egyptian forces.

In 1882 the Mahdi had marched on and captured El Obeid with some 30,000 troops. The

Mahdist forces had adapted their fighting techniques in order to best combat the British and

Egyptians. Before El Obeid most of the Mahdist forces only had spears and swords and the

Mahdi had discouraged the use of western weapons, but seeing the effectiveness of western rifles

when first attacking El Obeid, the Mahdi understood the need for these types of weapons. The

Mahdist forces then started distributing captured arms and ammunition from previous victories to

all of their warriors.12 In comparison, the Anglo-Egyptian forces did not have a large

technological advantage. Both the Mahdi and Anglo-Egyptian forces used single-shot, breech-

loading, black powder rifles with either the Martini-Henry rifle or Remington rifle.13

10 Farwell, Prisoners of the Mahdi, 27.11 Winston S. Churchill, The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan. (Project Gutenberg EBook, Last Updated Jan. 2013), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4943/4943-h/4943-h.htm#link2HCH000512 Farwell, Byron. Prisoners of the Mahdi.20-22.13 Featherstone, Omdurman 1898: Kitchener’s Victory in the Sudan, 13.

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Another issue for the Anglo-Egyptian forces was British hubris or arrogance and their

ability to be unaware of their own inadequacies. During the expedition Hicks and other officers

laughed off the Mahdi and when reading reports that even Khartoum, the Egyptian capital of the

region, was threatened, they “all laughed heartily at this…[thinking that] Khartoum [was] not

being threatened in the least.” While Hicks and his staff may have thought their force was

superior in every way, this was not the case. Hicks’ force was vastly inadequate. For example,

Hicks had under his command a body of Cuirassiers mounted with medieval war surplus. They

wore chain mail or ring mail, and used ancient two-handed long swords and some only with

lances. Yet Hicks was encouraged by victory at small skirmishes and he pressed the campaign

forward, not understanding how inadequate his force was and how potent the Mahdist army

actually was.14

Tactically the Mahdi outmatched the Anglo-Egyptian forces at the Battle of El Obeid.

Hicks continued to march towards El Obeid with no knowledge of the strength or position of his

enemy, yet the Mahdist army continued to closely monitor Hicks’ forces. The Mahdi, with an

estimated 100,000 followers, left El Obeid to meet the expedition. On November 3, 1883,

Mahdist riflemen hid in a wooded area in front of the advancing Egyptian force. With the flanks

secured, the hidden riflemen opened fire and took the expeditionary forces by surprise. When the

Egyptians fell back, the Mahdist warriors attacked from the flanks causing confusion and chaos.

The Egyptians huddled into square formation, but the square broke easily and the army was

slaughter. Hicks himself was killed and of the 10,000 in the expedition, only 100 men survived.

Incredibly only 350 of the Mahdist forces were killed. Clearly, the underestimation of the Mahdi

and the overestimation of his own forces caused the defeat of Hicks and the British and Egyptian

forces. Capturing El Obeid only continued to fuel the Jihad of the Mahdi.

14 Farwell, Prisoners of the Mahdi. 29-33.

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In the months following the failure of the Hicks expedition, the British and Egyptians

made the decision to no longer attempt to combat the Mahdi. They were going to let the Mahdi

basically have the Sudan. The British and Egyptians only needed to evacuate the towns and

withdraw in a safe manner.15 For the capital city of Khartoum, General Charles “Chinese”

Gordon was selected to withdraw the government’s forces. Gordon, who was a former Governor

General of the region, arrived in Khartoum on February 18, 1883.

Similar to the Battle of El Obeid, tactically the Mahdi outmatched the Anglo-Egyptian

forces. Instead of planning for the complete evacuation, Gordon started to plan the

administration of the city.16 Gordon thought that safe evacuation was totally impractical. The city

must be defended by any and all means.17 Certainly Gordon was openly committed to direct

British intervention. Eventually the Mahdist forces realized that Gordon was not going to leave

peacefully and thus they laid siege to Khartoum, blocking all roads. Yet, Gordon felt it was his

duty to stay and resist the Mahdi as much as he could, while hoping the British government

would eventually directly intervene.18

Khartoum is another example of how Anglo-Egyptian over confidence was a detriment.

Gordon, in line with British hubris, thought that the revolt was caused entirely by Egyptian

misrule and the revolt would fizzle out as soon as the Mahdist followers were promised that an

English governor, who was to be independent from Egyptian rule, would govern them.19 Clearly

this was not the case and the Mahdi eventually decided to assault Khartoum directly. An advisor

to the Mahdi stated “If Gordon, a single Englishman, has caused us all this trouble, what will our

15 Winston S. Churchill, The River War. 16 Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan, 95.17 Charles Chenevix Trench. The Road to Khartoum: A Life of General Charles Gordon (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 197-198.18 Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan, 99.19 Charles Chenevix Trench. The Road to Khartoum, 200.

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condition be if an army of his countrymen join Gordon?”20 The Mahdi was taking a level-headed

and cautious approach.

Again, the Anglo-Egyptian forces were inadequate. In the city Gordon had a combined

force of 8,665 with 12 artillery pieces on the ground, 11 artillery pieces stationed on the seven

gunboats. The town was constantly under long-range fire during the lead-up to the Mahdist

assault, which did not do significant damage but was very unnerving. On January 25 Gordon

watched the enemy prepare to battle and ordered all to prepare for an attack. Yet that night

Gordon went to sleep and was not awakened until the battle was well-underway.21

At the attack on Khartoum one can see the great advantage Mahdist forces had tactically.

Mahdist forces used a large diversionary force of 20,000 troops to attack a five mile stretch of

the city’s defenses, while the main force of 40,000 attacked a single weak point in the defenses

and easily broke through. Gordon’s forces were decimated without difficulty and Gordon himself

was killed.22 This marked the true strength of the Mahdist forces. While small remnants of the

government’s forces remained in certain towns, Sudan was truly in their possession. The

humiliation and anger of the British people that came with the news of Gordon’s death would

last for over a decade.23

Cleary, the Anglo-Egyptian forces took what happened to Gordon and Hicks and learned

from their mistakes. Over the next ten years the Anglo-Egyptian army underwent a great

transformation. The British took a greater interest in the Egyptian forces and supplied more

British officers and better training. This, combined with more experience fighting the Mahdist

forces during subsequent border disputes, were invaluable experience to the ‘new’ Egyptian

20 Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan, 103.21 Charles Chenevix Trench. The Road to Khartoum, 273-279.22 Ibid, 290.23 Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan, 223.

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army.24 In 1892, a 42-year-old Herbert Kitchener was promoted to commander-in-chief, or

Sridhar, of the British and Egyptian forces in Cairo. Slowly Kitchener surrounded himself and

his army with young British officers who met his strict prerequisites for service.25 His force

started to take shape.

The British wanted some sort of revenge for Gordon, even after all these years, During

the 1890’s popular support for British intervention in the Sudan grew greatly, and Kitchener,

eager to re-conquer Mahdist territory, welcomed this support. It was eventually decided

Kitchener would lead the Anglo-Egyptian army south, out of Cairo, in order to re-conquer the

region. This force of Kitchener consisted of 15,000 men, five gunboats, and three armed

steamers.26

Kitchener is a great example of a British commander who actually was thoughtful and did

not seem to have the same inadequacies as Hicks and Gordon. Money was a major issue for

Kitchener’s force, and in order to strain the government as little as possible, he cut costs

wherever he could, even cutting medical supplies to the bare bone, showing his ability to be

harsh when necessary. Kitchener proceeded south very cautiously and chose to build his

strength methodically, unlike past British commanders.27

The Mahdist forces had adequate leadership of their own. By this point, the Mahdi had

been dead for some time. His successor, Khalifa, effectively continued the Mahdist cause and

their nationalist goals. Seeing the threat that Kitchener’s force represented, a Mahdist force of an

estimated 18,000, advanced north towards Kitchener near Atbara, along the east coast of the

Nile. After some maneuvering by both Kitchener and the Mahdist commander Mahmoud, the

Mahdist forces were able to choose the grounds and formed an entrenched camp with their back 24 Winston S. Churchill, The River War.25 Trevor, Royle, The Kitchener Enigma (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1985), 94-96.26 Ibid. 101.27 Philip Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of An Imperialist (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1959), 95-100.

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to the river.28 Mahmoud’s superior position could only be taken through a direct assault and

pitched battle.29

Again Kitchener approached the situation in a tactically correct manner. Kitchener spent

days trying to figure out how to approach the Mahdist. Kitchener claimed he was “rather

perplexed by the situation here.” Kitchener showed his virtues of patience and thoughtfulness.

Mahmoud, not being lured out by Kitchener smartly remained stationary. Kitchener finally

decided to attack on the morning of Friday, April 8, 1898. The battle started with an artillery

bombardment by the British and then Kitchener’s force positioned in a long, broad front,

advanced. Many of the British troops were yelling “Remember Gordon.” The Mahdist forces

showed incredible discipline and held fire until the enemy was close enough for real damage to

be done. After over 30 minutes of intense hand-to-hand combat led by the British brigades, the

Mahdist forces retreated. The British and Egyptian forces lost 583 causalities, 120 of which

were British and over 3,000 of the Mahdist force were killed.30

After Atbara, Kitchener stationed his troops for summer quarters and were re-supplied

and the technological advantage for the British can easily be seen. Kitchener’s forces were

bolstered by British reinforcements. Now their force consisted of 8,200 British and 17,600

Egyptian and Sudanese regulars. They had 44 pieces of artillery, and 20 Maxim guns. On the 10

gunboats and five transport steamers he also had 36 artillery pieces and 24 Maxim guns.31 The

Maxim gun was a new military technology, which could load, fire, and eject cartridges all in its

recoil, firing 650 rounds per minute. Also, since the Kitchener force left Cairo they had been

using a new superior rifle. The British used new Lee-Metford rifles which had a five round bullet

magazine, with a .303 caliber bullet which had a higher velocity and was smokeless compared to 28 Magnus, Kitchener, 119. 29 Royle, The Kitchener Enigma. 121.30 Magnus, Kitchener, 120-122.31 Royle, The Kitchener Enigma, 124-125.

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the ammunition of the Martini-Henry rifle used by the Mahdist forces, which was a slower,

heavier, and a single shot breech loader that still used black powder. Another key advantage

technologically for the British was a revolutionary new high-explosive artillery shell that had a

greater ranger than previous rounds and implemented a multi-splintered fragmentation.32 Clearly,

the British understood the importance of having the technological advantage over the Mahdist

forces.

At the next battle of Omdurman, again Kitchener was able to show his tactical advantage.

After the summer camp, it became clear the next major engagement would be decisive. On

September 1, British cavalry spotted the Mahdist army under Khalifa with an estimated 60,000

men advancing near the city of Omdurman. Khalifa’s forces were positioned in regular and

precise line facing northeast, stretched for more than four miles from flank to flank.33 Early on

the morning of September 2, British and Egyptian forces were deployed defensively in close

order in a straight line with first rank kneeling and the second rank standing. Egyptian Cavalry

and the Camel corps combined to form Kitchener’s right flank.

The assault by the Mahdist forces shows both the technological and tactical advantages of

the British clearly. The first assault consisting of 10,000 Mahdist infantry attacked the British

center and left, but was pushed back under constant fire from the infantry rifles and the Maxim

guns. None of the enemy in this first assault made it to within 300 yards of the British and

Egyptian line. On the right flank an estimated 20,000 Mahdist soldiers engaged the Egyptian

mounted troops. While it seemed the Mahdi were initially successful, the concentrated fire from

both land-based artillery and gunboats broke the back of the Mahdist forces and they eventually

withdrew. Khalifa kept 20,000 of his best troops hidden in order to either use as a decisive blow

32 Featherstone, Omdurman 1898, 13.33 Churchill, Winston S. The River War

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to Kitchener’s broken lines or to use as a trap when Kitchener advanced. Kitchener knew Khalifa

was concealed somewhere and advanced in a cautious echelon formation. When the eager

British brigades leading the formation broke the echelon formation in order to be the first into the

city, Khalifa took his opportunity and attacked the gap from the west. This second attack was

again repulsed as the British managed to fill the gap in time and pour in concentrated fire at a

much faster rate.34

Suddenly a third counter-attack came from the north but only after the second attack had

already failed and the well-trained British were able to react in time. This was a miscalculation

by Khalifa and if the second and third attack had been simultaneous, the outcome would have

been disastrous for the British.35 Only 48 men of Kitchener were killed, including 28 British and

434 other wounded. For the Mahdist forces over 11,000 were killed and another 16,000 were

either wounded or taken prisoner. Kitchener was applauded in English cabinet saying, “His

victory had come out with absolute accuracy, the like answer to a scientific calculation”.36 The

battle of Omdurman effectively ended the Mahdist movement and secured foreign control of the

Sudan for years to come.37 The British troops spoke very positively of the Mahdi warriors in later

years. In the famous poem “Fuzzy Wuzzy” (a nickname for a few tribes of the Sudan) Rudyard

Kipling writes “So 'ere's ~to~ you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan; You're a pore

benighted 'eathen but a first-class fightin' man;… big black boundin' beggar -- for you broke a

British square!”.38 This poem rightfully shows how the Mahdist were seen and respected as

warriors even after defeat by the British.

34 Magnus, Kitchener, 126-130.35 Ismat Hasan Zulfo, Karai: The Sudanese Account of the Battle of Omurdurman. Translated by Peter Clark (London: Federick Warne Publishers Ltd, 1980), 226-230.36 Magnus, Kitchener, 131-137.37 Zulfo, Karai, 238-247.38 Rudyard Kipling, The Kipling Society, "Fuzzy-Wuzzy." http://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_fuzzywuzzy1.htm

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Clearly the Mahdist revolt represented more of legitimate threat to Victorian British

military might than one would have thought. The battles of El Obeid, Khartoum, Atbara, and

Omdurman demonstrated that in the Sudan, superior military technology and tactics proved to be

the winning strategy. The British being able to put aside their ego and arrogance to assess the

real strength of their opposition after being defeated, understood and implemented the true effort

that must have be taken in order to defeat a truly motivated native force. Clearly the Mahdist

forces taught the British an invaluable lesson in imperialism.

Works Cited

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Churchill, Winston S. The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan. Project Gutenburg Ebook, Last Updated Jan. 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4943/4943-h/4943-h.htm#link2HCH0005

Farwell, Byron. Prisoners of the Mahdi. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967.

Featherstone, Donald. Omdurman 1898: Kitchener’s Victory in the Sudan. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1993.

Holt, P.M. The Mahdist State In The Sudan: 1881-1898 A Study of Its Origins Development and Overthrow. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Kipling, Rudyard. The Kipling Society, "Fuzzy-Wuzzy." ooooohttp://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_fuzzywuzzy1.htm

Magnus, Philip. Kitchener: Portrait of An Imperialist. New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1959.

Royle, Trevor. The Kitchener Enigma. London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1985.

Trench, Charles Chenevix. The Road to Khartoum The Life of Charles Gordon. New York . W.W. Norton & Co., 1978.

Zulfo, ‘Ismat Hasan. Karai: The Sudanese Account of the Battle of Omurdurman. Translated by Peter Clark. London: Federick Warne Publishers Ltd, 1980.

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