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Ethan Bannister Failure in Darfur Dr. Stanton

Failure in Darfur

Ethan Bannister (Student Name)

Global Politics (Course)

11/15/2010 (Date)

Dr. Stanton (Teacher’s name)


Sudan is the largest state in Africa and corresponding to its mass Sudan has been the

setting of “the world’s worst humanitarian disaster.” Charges of ethnic cleansing and genocide

have been leveled against the Sudanese government in relation to the “War in Darfur.” These

charges will be investigated later. Since the outbreak of hostilities between factions of harassed

Darfuris and the Sudanese government in 2000, millions have been affected and the outcome

increasingly becomes more convoluted. Several ceasefires have been agreed to, and

consequently several ceasefires have been broken and reneged. As international and public

outcry grows a peaceful settlement has been desperately sought. One prominent proposal for a

peaceful solution has been conducting a popular vote to establish Darfur as a separate

independent state. Before discussing a final appraisal on this plan, however, it is necessary to

evaluate the initiation of this conflict in order to better understand the best means possible of

concluding this terrible chapter. Indeed, as M. W. Daly makes abundantly clear in his book

“Darfur’s Sorrow,” the situation in Darfur can only be understood in the context of history. After

a historical background has been established and a synopsis of the crisis in Darfur has been laid

out then we will discuss the possibility of an independent Darfur. Although hopeful of an

eventual peace in Sudan, one should hold strong reservations about the success of a popularly

decided Darfur and in place pursue the following theoretical proposal: a sovereign international

state with the authority to intervene in humanitarian crises throughout the world.

Part of an evaluation of the outbreak of this war must include a study of the geography

and the natural and economic resources of the region. Darfur is a territory in western Sudan and

is currently divided into three “states” known as Northern, Western, and Eastern Darfur. As a

whole Darfur is the size of France (Daly, 2007, 5). Present day Darfur is a plateau approximately

650 to 1,000 meters about sea level and while not a desert, Darfur is generally a dry land with


little arable land. Darfur is a landlocked province and, “Is equidistant from both the Atlantic

Ocean and the Red Sea,” and separated from the Mediterranean by the vastness of the Sahara

desert (Prunier, 2008, 2). In the center of Darfur rising out of the plain is the volcanic massif of

Jebel Marra. This mountainous range is significant to the region. In times of conflict it has served

as a place of cover and guerrilla warfare. Ecologically this area receives greater rainfall each year

than barren Northern Darfur. The slopes of Jebel Marra get approximately 500 mm. of rainfall

annually compared to the 300 mm. of rain in the northern dry belt. In the desert in upper

Northern Darfur there is less than 75 mm. of rain a year. In southwest Darfur there is a semi-

humid belt that receives up to 800 or 900 mm. of rain (2008, 3). Economically, in the desert

north the lifestyle is nomadic and dominated by migratory herding of livestock. Near Jebel Marra

and in the more irrigated southwest there is a more settled establishment of agriculture and

farming. The crops that are cultivated on Darfur’s landed farms range from citrus trees, to

tobacco, cotton, tomatoes, onions, maize, and dukhn- bulrush millet, the staple grain (2007, 7).

Due to the remoteness of Darfur, however, agricultural products have never enjoyed a

considerable export market. The only long-distance trading involving Darfur occurred primarily

in the 18th and 19th centuries. Animal products (skins and hides), ivory, rhinoceros horn, gum,

ostrich feathers, and slaves- the principal export- were traded in Egypt from Darfur along the

famous desert path Darb al-Arba’in, the “Forty-Days Road” (2007, 7).

Scant seasonal rains have made life in Darfur difficult. “Climate has been the decisive

factor in its history” (Daly, 2007, 5). When droughts occur, such as those in the late 20th century,

they have proved to be ominous and costly. Droughts threaten the delicate balance between

nomadic and agricultural tribes. During the dry season nomads would bring their herds down

south to graze in the greener lands and then migrate back north during the wet season. However


recent droughts and desertification have forced the northern tribes to migrate earlier, longer, and

further into the agricultural south. Many maintain that this scenario precipitated and caused the

current hostilities in Darfur between the nomadic and farming tribes. In fact, United Nations

(U.N.) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated, “It [war in Darfur] began as an ecological crisis,

arising at least in part from climate change” (Foerstel, Crisis in Africa, 2008, 31). Another report

on precipitation and the water crisis argued that climate change “Has the potential to create

sustained natural and humanitarian disasters on a scale far beyond those we see today,” and

already Darfur has been the victim of environmental causes (Behr, 2008, 37). Despite these valid

points one must remember there is a distinction between droughts and famines. Nature creates

droughts, but government action perpetuates famines. Indeed the influential Black Book released

in 2000 outlines how the inequality and poor conditions of Darfur had been carefully maintained

to keep power in the hands of Khartoum, the seat of Sudan’s government. The Black Book will

be discussed again later. The Sudanese government is seen to have further hindered the

alleviation of the appalling starvation the famine has inflicted on the people of Darfur. Once the

conflict in Darfur was revealed and foreign aid started to trickle in, Khartoum has continually

obstructed the flow of aid to refugee camps and militia groups threaten aid workers (2007, 291).

Even more troubling is that recently factions of rebel groups have tragically begun to engage in

banditry themselves, ambushing and attacking relief efforts. Although drought may have been a

factor leading to the outset of the war in Darfur the famine, which has claimed the lives of tens of

thousands, must be understood to be the creation of human hands.

“The present crisis has been presented in the media as consisting of a form of ethnic

cleansing verging on the genocidal, as carried out at Khartoum’s behest by ‘Arab’ tribes against

‘African’ ones” (Prunier, 2008, 4). This is a gross misrepresentation of the actors in this scene


and is fit only for the shallowest of understanding and explanation. In reality the situation is

much more complex. The nation of Sudan is derived from the medieval Arabic name bilad al-

Sudan, the “land of the blacks.” Darfur combines the Arabic dar, home or abode, with Fur, the

principle ethnic group (Daly, 2007, 5). While this may be indicative of a conflict between

African- or Non-Arabs- and Arabs this assumption neglects the fact that around ninety percent of

all Darfuris are Muslim (Foerstel, 2008, 15). Although Darfur may have been traditionally

African, or even animist and Christian like southern Sudan, over time the region has been

“Islamized.” This “Arabicization” as it has also been called was the result of gradual Islamic

missionary work from the Middle East and because Darfur overlaps the hajj routes, which are the

roads West Africans traveled for centuries in their pilgrimage to Mecca (2007, 2). To the

outsider Darfur may look black, yet most of them are still Muslim. The mark of distinction is not

skin color, rather, tribal ethnicity and ancestry is the dividing line. Over time various tribes and

clans have intermarried and cultural practices and beliefs have transfused adding to the ethnic

confusion. By and large, however, the nomadic tribes have surfaced as being the most ardent

Islamists and three tribes in central Darfur: the Fur, Zaghawa, and the Masalit, are deemed to be

“Non-Arabic,” zurqa (blacks), and abid (slaves) (2007, 265). Thus at the heart of the conflict is

not racial African against Arab, but Islamic supremacy and fanaticism. Sudanese President Omar

Hasan al-Bashir leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), supported by Colonel Muammar

Qaddafi the leader of Libya are consumed with the superiority of Islam and a desire for global

sharia law. The drought and hostility in Darfur provided President Bashir with the opportunity to

strike at the “Non-Arabic” tribes of Darfur, whom he accused of aiding the Christian regime in

neighboring Chad. Although Bashir has denied it, every report and eyewitness statements have

alleged that the Sudanese government was and continues to be complicit in providing military


aid and strategic support to the collective nomadic tribes called the janjaweed, translated “devils

on horseback” (2007, 263)(Foerstel, 2008, 1-2). Properly understood the war in Darfur is not a

conflict between African and Arabs. Succinctly put initially the violence was between

government supported nomadic tribes against agricultural farming tribes.

Before proceeding onto a brief summary of the human rights violations in Darfur another

event must be investigated first. This event is of course the Sudanese Civil War between

Northern (Khartoum) and Southern Sudan. This conflict lasted several decades, starting

approximately in the 1980s, rising to a crescendo with the ascension of President Bashir and the

NIF in 1989, and culminating in the unstable peace accord signed in 2005 (Foerstel, 2008, 30). In

1983 then president of Sudan, Nimayri, declared war on southern Sudan. The causes of the civil

war were President Nimayri’s attempts to “redivision” South and institute sharia law in the South

(Daly, 2007, 226).

Southern Sudan is largely composed of Christians and animists. An army mutiny in the

region at the time developed into the core of what became the Sudan People’s Liberation

Movement (SPLM). Fighting continued on up to the overthrow of Nimayri by the current

President Bashir and the NIF in 1989. At this time the SPLM made several advances while the

northern army was in the throes of the coup and purges. Once the Ethiopian Mengistu regime, an

assistant of the SPLM, was overthrown in 1991, Bashir regained ground; however, a stalemate

was eventually transpired in the mid-1990s. In 1996, two minor southern rebel groups signed a

peace charter, but the “mainstream” SPLM continued to fight. A decade later the situation had

changed little as the stalemate dragged on. Neither side had the strength to defeat the other, nor

would either side capitulate (Daly, 2007, 253-8).


Finally on January 9, 2005, in Naivasha, Kenya the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA) was signed between North and South Sudan (Foerstel, 2008, 19). The peace accord

outlined several points. The most important of these was that Sudan would have autonomy for

six years and at the end of this period would vote on a referendum for secession. This

momentous vote of self-determination is scheduled for January 9, 2011. In addition to South

Sudan, three other territories will also be voting separately to stay in union with the North or to

join the South: Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile. A matter of serious contention on the

eve of the secession vote has been the ownership of oil fields, particularly in the Abyei region.

According to a Washington Post article published July 23, 2009, a Hague-based court issued a

critical ruling, which offered a compromise on the oil-fields in Abyei. The ruling adjusted the

east-west borders of Abyei leaving a major working oil field called Heglig in Northern Sudan

and smaller working oil field in Abyei, which is expected to vote to join South Sudan on January

2011 (McCrummen, 2009, 1). This compromise has put many spectators’ fears to bed, but a New

York Times article published in 2010 hinted that the issue may not be fully resolved and the

South’s peaceful independence may be in doubt. “Most analysts do not expect a major conflict to

break out over the referendum. But with the majority of Sudan’s oil in the south, many find it

equally hard to believe that the north will simply let it go” (Addario, 2010, 1). Surely the New

York Times is right. History and reason urge caution as January 9, 2011, steadily approaches.

This excursion into the civil war between North and South Sudan may strike some as

unnecessary and unrelated, however, this issue and the tentative peace agreement has reemerged

as taking precedence over the atrocities in Darfur. Under the Bush administration, attention and

foreign aid was divided from South Sudan and Darfur was brought into greater focus. On

October 19, 2009, the new Obama administration announced its formal policy of focusing on the


faltering North-South peace agreement. Alex de Waal, a Sudan analyst with the Social Science

Research Council, explained, “It was a mistake to lose that focus [on the peace agreement]. And

we must get our priorities right. Darfur is part of Sudan, and if the rest of Sudan falls apart,

you're never going to solve Darfur” (Sheridan, 2009, 1). Denise Bell, a Darfur specialist with

Amnesty International, argued, “A lot of attention has been diverted to Darfur causing

backsliding and insufficient funding for implementing the peace agreement. Darfur threatens to

overshadow the CPA. If the CPA falls, the country falls. The international community needs to

be aware of that” (Foerstel, 2008, 8). The war in Darfur must be evaluated through the lenses of

history. The Sudanese Civil War is paramount to that historical perspective. Without peace in

South Sudan there will never be peace in Darfur.

Before assessing the international reaction and the corresponding steps taken to resolve

the crisis in Darfur necessity demands a brief outline of the events in Darfur. In 2000 while the

aforementioned janjaweed had begun to assail the agricultural tribes the infamous Black Book

was published and released. Up until this time, resistance to the janjaweed had been feeble, but

the Black Book revealed the systematic neglect and underdevelopment of Darfur by successive

Khartoum regimes (Daly, 2007, 275). “The Black Book helped unite disparate elements of

Darfur’s resistance” (2007, 276). One rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

was born directly from the books revelations. In 2002 there was the first offensive action as

rebels attacked a government post near Nyala. In retaliation the government stepped up its

commitment to the janjaweed. In 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/SLA) was

founded. The SLA’s first major operation occurred on February of that year when a force of 300

armed rebels in thirty “technicals” (or pickup trucks) attacked a garrison town and killed 200

soldiers (2007, 279-281). Rebel forces enjoyed several early successes. Later that year a joint


SLA and JEM force attacked the garrison and airport of El-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur

(Foerstel, 2008, 19). They destroyed several planes and helicopters, captured vehicles and

weapons, and killed or captured several soldiers. The SLA waged battles in Kutum and Tinay.

Respectively, they killed 500 soldiers and took 300 prisoners at Kutum, and at Tinay they killed

around 250 soldiers (2007, 282). These victories served to hasten the Sudanese government’s

armament of the janjaweed. Khartoum developed a coordinated plan of action between the

regular army and the janjaweed. “In this strategy, the army’s role would be largely to provide air

support: bombing, strafing, and transporting, while also mopping up after the janjaweed were

finished with a place” (2007, 283). By the end of 2003, the rebel fortunes had changed as the

Sudanese government turned Darfur into a butcher’s shop. The janjaweed’s tactics are gruesome

and definitely constitute crimes against humanity. They decidedly targeted civilians. Ground

forces would surround a village and ride in on horseback, camel, or “technicals.” The details of

what happened next to these numerous villages make one question whether God had entirely

turned away from the horror. Men, women, and babies were killed indiscriminately, even as they

tried to flee. Men and boys were lined up and executed. Houses were torched, sometimes with

occupants inside burning alive. Wells were polluted with dead bodies. Livestock were killed or

confiscated. Woman and young girls were raped. A consequence of the brutal rape has been an

“explosion of infanticide” (2008, 5). Many believe rape to be a conscientious tactic in a

genocidal campaign (Moore, 2010, 2). “The ultimate objective was always the same: destruction

of settlements and property, depopulation of the land through the death of men, death or

spoliation of the women, and the flight in terror of survivors” (2007, 284). Estimates on the total

extent of the catastrophe are difficult to calculate. Out of total population of six million in all of

Darfur, more than four million people rely on humanitarian aid for food, water, and medical care


(2008, 3,21). Approximations on the total death count vary from 200,000 to 400,000 victims. In

the mass media the idea of “200,000” is prominent, but U.S. State Department reports in 2004

estimate of 200,000. The latest UN figures are anywhere between 280,000 and 310,000 deaths

(2007, 315). The amount of internally displaced persons (IDP) is even more staggering. The CIA

World Factbook lists that Sudan has five to six million IDPs, however, this figure also accounts

for the Southern civil war (Sudan, 2010, 1). Amnesty International’s reporting of over two and

half million civilians displaced from Darfur is closer to the truth (Darfur Facts, 2010, 1). Sudan

is the five largest source of displaced persons (Felton, 2009, 3). There is little debate that the

conflict in Darfur involves crimes against humanity. The question remains did the violence rise

to a level to constitute genocide?

Indignant outcries of “genocide” have tactfully been used to raise international attention

and public awareness to Darfur. Images of burning villages and victims are used mercilessly to

tug on the hearts of the third party. The legalist, however, will tell you that charges of genocide

are at best premature and at worse simply untrue. “The December 1948 International Convention

on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes of Genocide says that what constitutes genocide is

‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical

destruction in whole or in part’” (Prunier, 2008, 155). Among the legalist ranks are former

President Jimmy Carter and Amnesty International, both admit that atrocities are being

committed, but they do not qualify genocide (Foerstel, 2008, 9). Thus far, the United Nations has

avoided labeling the conflict in Darfur as genocide because the implication of this charge would

require countries to take action to “prevent and punish’ genocide (2008, 6). Early in the former

Bush administration officials were hesitant and refused to condemn Darfur as genocide. But

finally in July 2004, “the U.S. Congress passed a resolution labeling Darfur a genocide” (Straus,


2005, 1). Following suit, on September 9, 2004, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee former Secretary of State Colin Powell made the following statement,

When we reviewed the evidence compiled by our tea, and then put it beside other information available to the State Department and widely known throughout the international community, widely reported upon by the media and others, we concluded, I concluded, that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility- and that genocide may still be occurring. [Sic] (Hagan, 2009, xviii).

The debate over whether the mayhem in Darfur amounts to genocide has been heated. On

the one hand, legalists maintain that technically Darfur isn’t genocide and their case certainly has

merit. While on the other side of the aisle, moralists fervently argue that the Sudanese

government is guilty of genocide and certain evidence lends validity and credence to their side.

Despite the outcome of this contest over genocide, the substantiation that ethnic cleansing and

crimes against humanity are being committed is beyond a doubt and this automatically demands

a moral obligation of everyone to rectify the situation.

Unfortunately, the international response has been dismal and left much to be wanting. A

report released on July 31, 2008, by the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

exposed that several countries- specifically India, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Italy, Romania, and

Spain- which typically contribute aircraft to peacekeeping missions have failed to do so in

Darfur. These countries could easily provide up to seventy helicopters for Darfur, but instead

they rust and gather dust or perform at air shows. The report was entitled, “Grounded: the

International Community’s Betrayal of UNAMID” (Foerstel, 2008, 22). Russia and China, both

permanent members of the UN Security Council have repeatedly vetoed sanctions against Libya.

Russia had arms contracts with the NIF regime, which they didn’t want to jeopardize (Daly,

2007, 297). Similarly, China is uniquely positioned to negotiate a peace between in Darfur, but


does not desire to endanger their investments in Sudan. China also has weapons deals with the

Sudanese government and in addition is Sudan’s largest oil customer, buying two-thirds if

Sudan’s petroleum (2008, 7). China, however, has always had a foreign policy of

noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Whereas the United States (U.S.)

provides conditional aid to foreign nations, China offers investment with no strings attached to

certainly immoral regimes, such as Sudan. As the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou

Wenzhong stated, “Business is business. We try to separate politics from business” (Foerstel,

China in Africa, 2008, 7). Imani Countess, a senior director at TransAfrica Forum made this

judgment of Darfur, “It’s a damning indictment against the government of Sudan, because it

refuses to end the violence. But it’s also a pretty damning indictment of the international

community” (Foerstel, Crisis in Africa, 2008, 7). Indeed, for a global community that vowed

“Never again!” the situation in Darfur is truly condemning.

As disgusted as I feel about the international response as a whole, I reserve my greatest

contempt for my own country. The fact that China deceitfully uses “noninterference” as a cover

for their shameful profiteering does not excuse the dismal response by America. Every since the

inception of this great nation we have boasted about being a beacon of liberty and justice. The

United States, however, is no different than the rest of the world in its response to Darfur. At

least China is open and honest with the world and itself about its sleaziness. Whenever the U.S.

stands before the world arena and preaches freedom and law we only deceive ourselves. Just like

every other state, the U.S. only acted in Darfur once the mass media began to report on the war

and public outcry grew to the point that it could not be ignored any longer. The United States

government has also allowed itself to be distracted by other headline stories that flit along: Iraq,

Iran, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and Hurricane Katrina (Daly, 2007, 293). On July 13, 1999,


former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke to the annual NAACP convention in New

York City. In her address, Secretary Albright spoke about the troubled nations of Africa and in

regards to the horror and genocide in Rwanda she said, “I say to you today that we must do all

we can now to see that such a nightmare is never repeated” (Albright, 1999, 1). Tragically this

promise has been broken. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11 the CIA

began to work closely with the Sudanese government to apprehend suspected terrorists. Current

President Obama denounced the events in Darfur as genocide and vowed on his campaign for

office to intervene if elected (Foerstel, 2008, 10). On June 17, 2009, while millions of IDPs

continued to be harassed and were starving and as the violence between militia groups persisted

unabated, President Obama’s special envoy to Sudan stated that the “coordinated” genocide in

Darfur was over and talked about easing some sanctions on Sudan (Lynch, 2009, 1). Some may

argue that the United States has been the largest contributor of foreign aid and the driving force

behind holding Khartoum accountable for Darfur, and this is true. Nevertheless, the “greatest”

nation in the world can certainly be expected to sacrifice the most and lead the charge, and the

failure to bring peace to the Darfur region has been truly distressing and disturbing.

In fairness to the United States government and other foreign states there have been

several efforts made to bring about a peaceful solution. Several cease-fires have been negotiated,

but inevitably they have all been broken by one or all parties. On May 5, 2006, however, the

Sudanese government and one of the rebel movements, the SLM, signed the Darfur Peace

Agreement (DPA) (Foerstel, 2008, 20). This peace accord outlined the disarmament and

demobilization of the janjaweed and the rebel militias, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of

the civilians, and political reform and development. The agreement also specified plans to

establish Darfur as a unitary state with a separate government that is Darfur would vote on


independence much like South Sudan. Predictably, this pact did not succeed. In the first five

months of 2008, two years after the DPA was signed, 180,000 Darfuris were driven from their

homes, attacks against aid workers have doubled, and the UN World Food Program was forced

to cut its food rations by forty percent due to banditry (2008, 3). An orchestrated attack by

helicopters and the janjaweed on Sirba in February 2008, resulted in the death of nearly one

hundred civilians and 40,000 people were driven from their homes, according to Human Rights

Watch (HRW) (2008, 1-2). The situation in Darfur looks even bleaker now than at its peak.

Today the few rebel militia groups have splintered into several factions, and some of the

janjaweed have defected to the rebels. This has resulted in greater confusion, adding greater

uncertainty to an already convoluted mess. Now rebel groups attack one another as well as

Sudanese forces, and janjaweed militia groups fight one another too (Prunier, 2008, 163-4).

Hafiz Mohamed, Sudan program coordinator with Justice Africa, explained, “At least in 2004 we

only had two rebel movements. Now we have more than twelve SLA factions and more than four

JEM factions. Security-wise, Darfur is worse than in 2004” (Foerstel, 2008, 23). There is cause

for hope, however, on February 2010, Darfur’s most powerful rebel group, JEM-“the most

significant holdout in efforts to end the seven year conflict in Darfur,”- signed a truce with the

Sudanese government (Padire, 2010, 1).It remains to be seen whether this cease-fire will have

long lasting effects or will be abandoned like all previous attempts at peace.

The proposal has been posed that Darfur be allowed to vote for independence similar to

South Sudan. Although knowledge of South Sudan is imperative to understanding the condition

of Darfur, there are still significant differences that do not allow for complete parallels to be

drawn. In short, I am not convinced that a popular referendum for an autonomous Darfur will

work. Before offering my reasons for doubt, we will inspect a unitary Darfur in an optimistic


light. After studying the situation in Sudan and the Darfur my opinion is that any plan for

bringing peace through independence is plausible only if South Sudan stabilizes and peace is

solidified between North and South. If there is any turbulence in this region there is no hope for

Darfur. In addition to a resolute peace in South Sudan, an independent Darfur will require the

vigilant attention and aid of the international community. As well as hypothetically ending the

human rights violations, a sovereign Darfur could additionally create a buffer between Chad and

Khartoum, thus alleviating tensions between these two regimes. This image, however, allows

only for the best of circumstances. If history has taught us anything, it has taught us that events

hardly play out so easily, especially in Sudan. My reservations about an independent are stated

simply: what has changed? The factors that led to an outbreak in hostilities still remain. Darfur is

a region with few resources and suffers from drought and water shortages. Darfur would never

stand as a self-sufficient state, but would require continued fostering by nations such as the

United States. There is still an open flow of weapons through Libya and from China. The social

layout of nomadic tribes versus settled agricultural tribes remains. In fact, it is doubtful that

Darfur would actually be able to achieve a majority vote for secession. Many of those who

would vote for independence are dead or are refugees. One must remember also, Darfur is not

South Sudan. Whereas in the South the populace is mostly Christian and animist and desiring of

a secular government, Darfur is mostly Muslim. A secession and establishment of a sovereign

Darfur state is improbable and would doubtfully succeed in acquiring peace.

Another proposal that has been raised is “regime change,” deposing the NIF and

President Bashir. Hafiz Mohamed of Justice Africa argued,

I don’t think we’ll find a political solution for the Darfur crisis if the current government stays in power. Since 1997 we’ve had six agreements, the CPA, the DPA. This regime


will never honor any agreement. If the international community managed to overthrow the regime there is the possibility of a permanent solution (2008, 25).

This suggestion is even more preposterous than a Darfuri state. Alex de Waal has offered

sufficient rebuke, “Global and Arab anger sparked by the Iraq War leaves ‘zero chance’ that the

international community will launch any military action against another Muslim country” (2008,

25). Offensive military in Sudan is beyond comprehension.

In absence of these two options, I offer my perspective on Darfur. Before explaining my

solution, one must understand that this is a purely theoretical proposal as stressed earlier. The

problem in Darfur has been a lack of accountability. “Darfur is a ‘test case for international

response- or the inability of the international community to respond- to this type of situation”

(2008, 7). In an attempt to increase responsibility and accountability the entire global system

must be abandoned and a unitary global government must be established. Only a unified,

concentrated global effort can solve the ongoing conflict. The existing structure of sovereign

states must be replaced with a one world government, a global republic. In order to better portray

my position let us review the history of the United States. After the War for Independence the

American colonies established a decentralized union of autonomous states- the Articles of

Confederation. This setup was immediately seen to be faulty as the government was inadequate

to handle external threats and internally the fledgling nation seemed about to implode. The

American experiment in self-government was feared to be in jeopardy of utter failure. Then in

1787, one of man’s greatest inventions was born: the Constitution of the United States. Under

this new arrangement the country was organized under a centralized federal government. The

current global system of separate states and the ineffective United Nations is comparable to the

Articles of Confederation. What the world needs is to be centralized into a system that is based


off the model of the Constitution. I understand and agree that as a practical and immediate

solution to the war in Darfur, my proposition would fail to remedy the situation. My aim, rather,

is not to address the particular problem in Darfur, but a broad source of the quandary. I offer a

template that would prevent and address future Darfurs. We must increase the world’s

accountability and scope of responsibility in order to abate our frustrations and prevent future

atrocities.

For the past decade Darfur has been ensnared in a bloody horror that has affected the

lived of millions. Many attempts at a peaceful settlement to these atrocities have been made and

so far each has fallen short. Whatever resolution is achieved it must be accomplished with a

complete understanding of the history of Sudan and Darfur. Several solutions have been

proposed to end this particular scenario, yet, I argue that the real form of the problem lays in the

ability to prevent future human rights violations.


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· web viewlittle arable land. darfur is a landlocked province and, “is equidistant from...

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