Disaggregating the political opposition in Afghanistan

By Ghulam Sakhi, DIIS Visiting Analyst

April 2014

Over the last decade, a number of political groups and coalitions have projected themselves as political opposition in Afghanistan. These organizations have failed to evolve into stable and coherent political institutions. Instead, they have split along ethno- factional lines, serving the narrow and parochial interests of either a few strongmen or ethno-political networks. This has affected the nature of Afghan democratic politics, blurring the lines between the government and the political opposition as well as undercutting the development of effective political institutions essential for the function of a democratic polity.

Afghanistan does have the experience of the stable and effective party politics. The only exception has been the communist rule of 1980s where the two ruling parties, Khalq and Parcham, cooperated and confronted each other intermittently. In many occasions, the inter-party competition turned bloody, taking the life of thousands of the party members. The mujahidn rule was characterised by the presence of multiple political factions, many of which were involved in a bellicose inter-factional and inter-ethnic conflict.

In post-Taliban political milieu, first, the establishment of a political system conducive to the development of stable political institutions was resisted. Instead a centralized political system which concentrated power disproportionately in the hand of the president was constituted. This was done through the co-optation of key non-Pashtun power brokers while the Pashtun political elites both Jihadis and technocrats favoured a system centred on a strongman at the top.

Second, an electoral framework inimical to the formation of stronger party politics was proposed. Throughout 2004 early 2005, the United Nations Assistance Mission, the European diplomatic community and a significant number of Afghan political actors struggled for changing the proposed system, single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral framework, into proportional representative, the latter being viewed comparatively more conducive to the formation of stable party and parliamentary politics (Renold, A., 2006). Invoking the disaster record of party politics both those of the Afghan communists and the Jihadis, President along with his Pashtun cabinet members especially the Pashtun technocrats such Mohammad Hanif Atmar and Anwar ul-Haq Ahady, had vehemently resisted the endorsement of a proportional representation electoral system. They had argued that electoral system favourable to party politics would weaken the Pashtun representation as they lacked organized political parties. Lacking political structures, the resistance by the technocrats against laying the institutional and legislative framework for politics stemmed more from their competition over power and resources with the non-Pashtun political leaders or warlords, than their fear of Pashtun’s marginalization.

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Furthermore, the political leaders have projected themselves as opposition time and again have not demonstrated their commitment to Democratic Party politics either. They have been more concerned with securing funding and positions for themselves than building political institutions. The political institutions, political factions or parties, they have represented, have been more ethno-factional/personal networks than political parties. What further compounded the situation for the growth of political parties and by extension the growth of political opposition, was the interventionist approach Karzai had adopted. Karzai has viewed coherent factions and parties outside the government as threats to his power. As such, he has done everything either to disintegrate coherent groups and parties or impede the formation of stable and effective coalitions and groupings outside the framework of his government. To achieve a party free, fluid and manipulative politics, Karzai has used the tactics of cooptation and coercion depending on circumstances. Therefore these factors, the technocratic aversion to party politics, fear of marginalization of the Pashtuns, Karzai’s manipulative approach to political development and the instrumental and commercial view of the political leaders outside the government, have cumulative affected the development of stable political opposition.

Political opposition has never gone beyond parochial ethno-factional network bent to attract resources from the government either for a group or an individual. These opposition networks, which have constantly fallen and risen as opportunities have declined and appeared, have been largely Tajik centric. Few Tajik elements, when thrown of the government have created a group to the pressure the government for concessions. The following the opposition network over the past one decade:

1. National Understanding Front of Afghanistan

This NUFA, constituted by 12 political parties, was established as the first political opposition group in post-Taliban Afghanistan in April 2005. Mohammad Younus Qanooni, head of New Afghanistan Party and Mohammmad Mohaqqeq, head of Islamic Unity Party for the People of Afghanistan, were two key members of this group. Both Qanooni and Mohammaq upset with President Karzai after their removal from government in 2004, had contested the presidential election. Earning significant number of votes in the election, they both enjoyed the necessary political legitimacy to lead a political opposition group. NUFA’s key message was electoral reform and the decentralization of the political system. Although both Qanooni and Mohaqqeq, were part of the government and the constitutional jirgal when Afghanistan’s strongman political system was approved. Qanooni had apparently called for a parliamentary system not that it was good for the country but to secure a seat higher up in the system for himself. Other key of members of the government who turned opposition after their dismissal from the government such as Abdullah Abdullah and Fahim who swung between opposition and government, did not struggle for a decentralized system either. As Faizullah Zaki remarked in early 2012, “Fahim supports decentralization when he is out of power but centralization when he is in power”. The opposition failed to force electoral reform on the government but it contributed to the competitiveness of the first post-Taliban parliamentary election in which Mohaqqeq and Qanooni got the first and second most votes across the country.

Karzai’s manipulation combined with the thirst of Qanooni and Mohaqqeq for the speaker and deputy speakership of the parliament triggered the collapse of this opposition. Karzai secretly

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reached out to Qanooni to strike a deal for the speakership of parliament. Sayyar at the behest of Karzai contacted Mohaqqeq for a political deal over the leadership of the parliament. This created split between Mohaqqeq and Qanooni, which led to the disintegration of NUFA. After creating pitting Qanooni against Mohaqqeq, Karzai supported Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf as his favourable candidate for the speakership of the parliament.

Karzai’s attempt to dominate both the executive and the legislative branch triggered a political re-alignment among the Tajiks. All the Tajik palyers including Qanooni and Amad Wali Massoud, who had created political parties other than Jamiat, reunited with Jamiat with Rabbani as the overarching political leader of the Tajiks. Rabbani extended his support for Qanooni’s candidacy as speaker of parliament. In return, Qanooni would lead the parliament in alliance with Rabbani who was supposed then function as the leader of a national opposition.

2. National United Front of Afghanistan

The second political opposition group, the National United Front of Afghanistan, was established in March 2007. The front is traced to the reunification of the three distinct Tajik political groups – New Afghanistan Party, National Movement and Jamiat - on the eve of the election for the speaker of the parliament in December 20051. This reunification had two salient features. First, it marked a return to pre-2001 Tajik model of politics where Rabbani was the overarching Tajik leader as a political orbit for a broader political coalition. Second, it characterized an agreement on a model of power sharing arrangements among key Tajik players with Qanooni leading the parliament, Rabbani the political opposition and the Ahmadzia Massoud among other elements, represented the Tajiks in the executive. These three groups had to complement each other but the superiority of Rabbani as a political symbolism had to be respected as the overall political opposition leader.

Inter-Tajik politics of extracting greater resources and favours from the government held back the development of National United Front into a genuine political opposition. Instead of promoting legislation and policies that could benefit the political opposition, Qanooni raced with Rabbani in striking deals with the executive at the expense of both the legislature and the political opposition. Having his son-in-law, Ahmadzia Massoud, as first vice president, Rabbani tended more to increase his share of power than to institutionalize the opposition. The political opportunism Qanooni and Rabbani promoted, had a chilling effect on the National Front. Mustafa Kazimi, a shrewd politician with solid ties to Iran had earned a steering role in NF as its spokesperson. His death in a suicide attack in 2007 hamstrung the opposition. To fragment the opposition and ensure his victory in the first round election, Karzai picked up Qasim Fahim, a key opposition figure, as his running mate for 2009 presidential election. With Mustafa killed, Fahim and Dostum defected to Karzai and Rabbani unwilling, the National Front had in practice ceased to exist before the 2009

1 Mohammad Ikram Andishmand, “Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan, nauw sazi wa tashakkul jadi, na baz sazi”, undated, Payam-e Mojahid accessed at : http://oldarchive.payamemojahed.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1329&Itemid=18

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presidential election2. The modality of the political opposition leadership once again demonstrated that the Tajik political leaders as usual preferred short-termism over institutional politics.

3. National Front of Afghanistan

The National Front of Afghanistan was established as an opposition coalition in November 2011. Major Afghan ethnic power brokers with strong political clout such as Abdul Rashid Dostum, head of the Junbish-e Milli, Mohammad Mohaqqeq, head of Wahdat-e Isalmi Mardum, two Uzbek and Hazara mainstream political parties and Ahmadzia Massoud, a key member of Jamiat-e Islami, the Tajik mainstream party, formed the backbone of this opposition. Amrullah Saleh, head of the Green Trend, a grassroots movement and former , former Afghan intelligence director and Haji Aman Khairi, chief of the Nangarhar Tribal Unity Council were the lesser players in this alliance.

The National Front advocated radical reform, promoting the change of presidentialism into parliamentarism in a confrontational way, which triggered reactions amongst the Pashtuns including the government and the Taliban alike. The Front was accused for committing national treason, partitioning Afghanistan.

In the run to nomination for 5 April 2014 election, the front split along three different tickets with Abdul Rashid Dostum joining Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, as his first running mate, Mohaqqeq as Abdullah’s running mate and Ahmadzia Massoud as Zalmay Rasul’s first running. Right now the constituent members of the Front compete against each other with different political agendas with Zalmay Rasul and Ashraf Ghani favouring the existing political system but Abdullah have declared to remain committed to changing the system.

4. National Coalition of Afghanistan

Abdullah Abdullah contested the 2009 presidential election, earning 30 percent of the votes. Tapping into his electoral success, Abdullah changed his electoral motto, change and hope into an Abdullah-centric political opposition group in the spring of 2010. To broaden this group, Abdullah renamed it as National Coalition of Afghanistan in December 2011.

Ever since 2009 Abdullah remained as an opposition figure rejecting the offers of President Hamid Karzai to join his government. Rabbani who led the predecessor of the National Coalition, the National United Front, another Tajik-centric opposition group, joined Hamid Karzai as head of the High Peace Council. In return for leaving the opposition, Rabbani was also offered some ministerial and ambassadorial positions for his Jamiat cronies including the posting of his son, Salahuddin Rabbani as an Ambassador to Turkey. Salahuddin succeeded his father as after his death in a Taliban suicide attack in 2011 as head of High Peace Council.

2 Andrea Serenikove, “Jabhayi milli az sahna kharij meshawad (The National Front dissipates from the Afghan political scene)”, accessed from www.farsi.ru, 25 April 2009.

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As head of the political opposition dominated by the Tajiks, Abdullah was able to secure the support of nearly all the Tajik power brokers such as the northern strongman “king of the north” Attah Mohammad Noor, former speaker of parliament, Mohammad Younus Qanooni and Salahuddin Rabbani, head of Jamiat and the High Peace Council. Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Ismail Khan, another two Tajik power brokers remain outside the framework of Abdullah’s ticket. Abdullah has also been able to secure the support of the Hazara populist politician, Mohammad Mohaqqeq, leader of the mainstream Hazara political party, Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardumi Afghanistan and Mohammad Khan, deputy head of the registered wing of Hizb-e Isalmi. With securing the support of nearly all the Tajik powerbrokers including two important political parties from amongst the Hazaras and the Pashtuns, Abdullah appear well-positioned for the upcoming presidential election on 5 April.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

The politics of the opposition building faced many obstacles. The opposition leaders viewed opposition-building as an instrument to secure resources from the state and retain their contacts with their constituents with promoting controversial ethnic, factional and regional rhetoric. They had little faith in building stable political opposition institutions. The opposition groups were a little more than personal, ethnic and factional network. This frustrated and demonize the struggle for opposition building.

In an attempt to construct power bases for themselves and thereby appeal to their ethnic constituencies, the Afghan technocrats have pushed for the worst electoral framework, single non-transferable vote. This electoral system made party politics irrelevant and by extension affected dramatically the opposition-building politics. Ironically, some of the technocrats such as Mohammad Hanif Atmar who opposed electoral system favourable to parties, has indeed later, resorted to party politics after he lost his job in the executive. Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi who had opposed proportional representation early on leads his own ethno-centrist Pashtun party, the Afghan Mellat and in the absence of political structures, Ashraf Ghani, who rejected all the Afghan factions as militias and warlords in the past, now attempts to strike deals with nearly every local power brokers, no matter whether they are traffickers, militia men, ethno-fascists or Islamists, to expand his electoral constituencies.

Karzai wasted significant amount of state resources to harm political parties and political opposition groups. Instead, he attempted to resurrect the tribal jirgas, which in many ways is ethically divisive not only among the non-Pashtuns but also among the Pashtuns. The jirga decisions pit the Pashtuns against non-Pashtuns and inside the Pashtuns, certain tribes against certain other tribes. This has affected the not only the development of political institutions but national solidarity and cohesion.

13 years on since the onset of a comparatively democratic politics, despite many manipulative and destructive attempts against political parties and opposition groups on many grounds- ethnic, factional and personal, there is no alternative in sight for political parties and stable political opposition groups.

To help build political parties and political oppositions, the following points should be considered:

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1. Reform the current anti-party electoral system, non-single transferable vote (SNTV) into proportional representation which is more conducive to the development of the political institutions;

2. The continuation of party operation should be tied to their electoral success - preferably fixed number of seats - of the parties in provincial and parliamentary elections;

3. Parties have changed into personal network of few power brokers. To democratize parties internally, the internal party election should be held with technical support and oversight from the independent election commission and civil society to institutionalize democratic transition inside the parties,

4. The government should finance the finance the parties and establish a strict financial control system to reduce the existing financials ties of the parties with illicit and external funding; and

5. The government should promote the replacement of ethno-jirga politics with party politics.

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