vic byron constitutional law 2.pdf

8/10/2019 Vic Byron CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2.pdf

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ATTY. VIC BYRON T. FERNANDEZ

Constitutional Law II

Ichong vs Hernandez

FACTS:

The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent

persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.

It contains a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital

of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade

Imposes that aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue

their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary

retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of

term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on

nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,

commerce and industry.

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of

additional stores or branches of retail business

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal

protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences betweenan alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.


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TIU vs Videogram Regulatory Board

Facts:Political LawDelegation of PowerAdministrative Bodies

Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act

Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise thevideogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the NationalInternal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each

processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five

pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to

sales tax.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative

power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to solicit the direct assistance of

other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, theheads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board is

not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to

its execution, enforcement, and implementation. The true distinction is between the delegation

of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, andconferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of

the law.


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Osmena vs Orbos

Facts: October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating aSpecial Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund

(OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude

oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and fromincreases in the world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was

reclassified into a "trust liability account,". President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated E.

O. 137 expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under

recovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products.

The petitioner argues inter alia that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956,as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trustfund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generatedtherefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated,and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner further points out that

since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State,such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the specialpurpose/objective for which it was created."

ISSUE: WoNthe monies collected are to be classified as trust fund or special fundunder article VI sec 29(3)

HELD: it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, theyare exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF isa special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregatedfrom the general fund


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Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the

petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause isalso violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the ownersonly of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the

lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process.

Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers aredeprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the

sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently

treated.

Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Policepower and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 wasauthorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Thereforeit is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.


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PRC vs. De Guzman

Facts:The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City,Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by

the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) thenreleased their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.

The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College

examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure

Examination.

On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians

of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the National Bureau

of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February

1993 Physician Licensure Examination.

ISSUE: WoNthe refusal of administering the physicians oath in pursuance to RA 2382 in the

exercise of Police Power is valid

HELD: It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a

profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic

requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may beso regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,

education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.

It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by

the government.


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Chavez vs Romulo

Facts:In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the

members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the

rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the

issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR)

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,

requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the

implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the

present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, asExecutive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives

Division.

WoN: The assailed guideline are a valid exercise of Police power

HELD: Police Power

In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:

(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,require the exercise of the police power; and

(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose

and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional

guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.


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MMDA vs Garin

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, whowas issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license confiscated for parking

illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995.

The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license uponnoncompliance with prescribed conditions.

the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers

granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition

of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature;the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued

that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of

government in administrative agencies.

ISSUE: WoN the MMDA may exercise Police power

HELD:the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the statefor the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve

the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger,

their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first

appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, buta privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public

safety and welfare.


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Carlos Super Drug Corporation vs DSWD

Facts:Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in

the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257,

otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of

RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens.

Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes

deprivation of private property.

Issue:Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,

similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.

Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the leastlimitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the power

vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner

of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or

without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and

welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,

property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,

though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.


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FRANCISCO VS FERNANDO

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition

and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F.

Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA

(respondents) from further implementing its wet flag scheme (Flag Scheme).

Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDAs governing

body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because

it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against

cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes

pedestrians to various potential hazards.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MMDA may exercise the Flag scheme or anti-jaywalking scheme.

HELD:

On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and

municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted

anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian

regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents implementation of schemes,

or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After

all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and

regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance

in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents

implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.


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MMDA vs Viron Transportation

Facts: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for

the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System,

WHEREAS,the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the busterminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares

ISSUE: WoN The E.O 179 is unconstitutional for being an unreasonable exercise of policepower

HELD:

MMDAs move didnt satisfypolice power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the

public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and

(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and

not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, thepolice power legislation must

be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must existbetween the purposes and the means.


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Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation

composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to

operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to

vehicular traffic.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular

No. 77-42 which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553,

seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration andoperation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier

models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy

and fit for operation.

ISSUES:

If respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No.101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate

the petitioners constitutional rights to.

(1) Equal protection of the law;

(2) Substantive due process; and

(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

HELDAs enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overridingconsideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and

dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to

promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It

can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulateproperty rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed

by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby

certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.


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Lozano vs Martinez

Facts: Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularlyknown as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or forvalue, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or creditwith the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, whichcheck is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without anyvalid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offenseis imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not lessthan the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case toexceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

ISSUE: WoN B.P. 22 is a valid exercise of police power for violating the constitutional

guarantee that no person shall be imprisoned for a debt Held: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuinga worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.

An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malumin se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawedand criminally punished as malum prohib i tum. The state can do this in theexercise of its police power.


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Lim vs Pacquing

Facts:

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-

Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invokedPresidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permitsto operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADCassails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protectionand non-impairment provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand, the government contendsthat PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherentpolice power of the State.

Issues:WON P.D. No. 771 is unconstitutional

HELD:

On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of theConstitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simplecontract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which arewithin the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of thepolice power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of policepower for the public welfare.

There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decreerevoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception.

ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the

only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADCwas not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late inthe day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for itcould have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty (20) years ago.


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Miners Association of the Philippines vs Factoran

Facts: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainlycontends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 inexcess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumptionthat the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,

petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III,Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharingagreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No.82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements withintwo (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause theabandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.

Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9,all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and thosepertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less,

shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity ofthese guidelines.

On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990,laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement(MPSA) through Negotiation."7

Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons orentities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement(MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining,quarry and sand and gravel claims.

Issue: WoN administrative order nos. 57 and 82 are unconstitutional for being violativeof the non-impairment of contracts clause

HELD: Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause,mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant toExecutive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through areasonable exercise of the police power of the State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not beprecluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential

Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power,being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest;extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 whichsuperseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary tocarry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.


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Pollution Adjudication Board vs CA et al

FACTS:Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and

dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent

Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the taskof determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or

violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably

forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other

hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into

the river.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that

Solar had been denied due process by the Board.

HELD:It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural dueprocess yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved,

through the exercise of police power.Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed

Solar's petition for certiorari.
http://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/pollution-adjudication-board-v-ca-et-al.htmlhttp://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/pollution-adjudication-board-v-ca-et-al.html


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Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626).

To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of

carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot

was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation ofEO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his

right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate

carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot rulingthat the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb

down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A

ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from

one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynotshould be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they

can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of thepolice power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary

to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the

owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is

immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of thepower to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions

and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid

delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimiteddiscretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.


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City Government of Quezon City vs Judge Ericta

Facts: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE

ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE

CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY

AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basicallyprovides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set

aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon

City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QCjustified the law by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable

relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private

cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,

good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a takingwithout compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are

charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery forthis purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.


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JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs CA

Facts: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of

performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the

introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to

POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposalPOEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an

Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being dep loyed abroad. The

Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as itviolated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their

individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in

favor of EIAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police

power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personalliberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed

Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners todemonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public

welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists,

particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a

total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, ameasure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very

least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational

and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately preparedfor the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this

scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.


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PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694;

22 May 1995]

Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing

newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for

the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall

be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to

enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue

and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by

the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of

newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare

Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it

violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government

against the taking of private property for public use without just

compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General

claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of

supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of

print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a

fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held:The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held

that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to

taking of private personal property without payment of the just

compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of

necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,

considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space.

The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution,but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does

not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at

bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take

private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/philippine-press-institute-vs-comelec.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/philippine-press-institute-vs-comelec.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/philippine-press-institute-vs-comelec.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/philippine-press-institute-vs-comelec.html


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LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC.,

respondent.

G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005

Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-

buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and arehereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of theirpassengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable

starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and

buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance

as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise ofpolice power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional

prohibition against monopolies.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e.

lawful subject and lawful means.

Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police poweronly if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished

from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed

are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not

unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawfulsubject and lawful method


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Cabrera vs Lapid

Facts:petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over atract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. According to petitioner, she had spent

approximately P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the fishpond operations commenced in August

1995. A month later, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her

fishpond as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Thus, petitioner sent the

fishpond administrator to dissuade respondents from destroying her property.

Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond. The property

was demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting.

Issue: WoN the respondents are liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or ofArticle 324

Held: A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's

criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they

effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisanceper se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e)21of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act or of Article 32422of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents. In thewords of the Ombudsman, "those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only

impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good."
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_129098_2006.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_129098_2006.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_129098_2006.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_129098_2006.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_129098_2006.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_129098_2006.html#fnt21


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MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the operation of casino

followed by Ordinance No. 3375-93 providing penalty therefor. Petitioners also attack gamblingas intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of thisCourt expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State

policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang

Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.

HELD:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is

generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution

categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is

left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, thelegislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some

forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has

prohibitedjuetengand montebut permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such

choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review,much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting

theories.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held thatto be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.


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City of manila vs Judge Laguio

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation

engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and

opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the

DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for aWrit of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court

impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon.

Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDCprayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited

establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is

entitled

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OFBUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,

SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING

PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors werecommitted by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,

unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;

(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allowsoperators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and

(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the

Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for anordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government

unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also

conform to the following substantive requirements:(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.


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Didipio Earth-Savers vs Gozun

Police Power Eminent Domain

In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies

when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramossigned into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAAwith Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to

explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage

of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the

RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. Inseeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,

petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40

which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purposein contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private

property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just

compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and itsImplementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property andallow taking of land without payment of just compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or

injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the

owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved

but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as

section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,


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Napocor vs Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation

Facts: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, commenced its 350 KV Leyte-

Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. The project aims to transmit the

excess electrical generating capacity coming from Leyte Geothermal Plant to

Luzon and various load centers in its vision to interconnect the entire country intoa single power grid. Apparently, the project is for a public purpose.

In order to carry out this project, it is imperative for the [petitioners] transmissionlines to cross over certain lands owned by private individuals and entities. One ofthese lands, [where] only a portion will be traversed by the transmission lines, isowned by [respondent] MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION.

Issue: WoN the payment of just compensation is proper

Held: Petitioner contends that the valuation of the expropriated property -- fixed by the trialcourt and affirmed by the CA -- was too high a price for the acquisition of an easement of a mere

aerial right of way, because respondent would continue to own and use the subject land anyway.

Petitioner argues that in a strict sense, there is no taking of property, but merely an imposition

of an encumbrance or a personal easement/servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code. Suchencumbrance will not result in ousting or depriving respondent of the beneficial enjoyment of the

property. And even if there was a taking, petitioner points out that the loss is limited only to a

portion of the aerial domain above the property of respondent. Hence, the latter should be

compensated only for what it would actually los


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Bardillon v. Brgy. Masili

Facts:

- Brgy Masili in Calamba Laguna wanted a lot on which a multi-purpose hall will be constructed,

so it offered to buy Bardillon's 144 sq. m. lot for Php 200,000.

- No agreement was reached.

- Feb. 23, 1998: The first complaint for eminent domain was filed before the Calamba MTC by

Brgy. Masili against Bardillon.

- MTC dismissed for Bardillon and counsel's failure to appear at pre-trial. MTC denied Masili's

Motion for Reconsideration (MR).

- Oct 18, 1999: The second complaint for eminent domain was filed with the Calamba RTC by

Masili.

- Bardillon opposed the complaint thru Motion to Dismiss, alleging res judicata.

- RTC denied motion to dismiss, saying that MTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint.

- July 10, 2000: Municipal Ordinance authorizing Masili to initiate exprop proceedings was

approved and submitted.

- Aug 16, 2000: RTC issued writ of possession.

- Bardillon appealed to the CA. CA affirned RTC.

- No res judicata. MTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint.

Issue # 1:

Whether MTC had jurisdiction over first exprop case:

Held: No. Expropriation suit does not involve sum of money. It is incapable of pecuniary

estimation and should be filed with the RTC (Section 19 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691).

- The primary consideration of exprop proceedings is whether the gov't has complied with

the requisites for the taking or property.

- An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land.


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Napocor vs Gutierrez (1991)

Facts: Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, in

accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for

the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, andmaintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For theconstruction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass thelands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses MisericordiaGutierrez and Ricardo Malit

Issue: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE ORFULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES.

Held: In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power ofeminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limaytransmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period

deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation


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Republic vs Castelvi

Facts:In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into

a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate

the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the

AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced theexpropriation proceedings for the land inquestion.

Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that

just compensation should not bedetermined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for

more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the propertymust be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the

utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of

beneficial enjoyment of the property.


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Moday vs CA

Facts: Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan

passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion ofModays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and otherpublic buildings. The mayor approved

the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the

said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by

Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation

nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution

which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case,

is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate,

in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently

possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local

governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government

to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon

which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such

resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the

same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands

for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the

expropriation case is valid.


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Equal Protection of the Laws

PEOPLE VS CAYAT

[68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]

Facts:

Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any

intoxicating liquors of any kind.The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which

the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.

Issue:

Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law.

Held:

No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law

must rest on real or substantial distinctions.

The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members

of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and

culture. The termnon-Christian tribes' refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the

Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The

distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian

tribes


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Tolentino vs Board of Accountancy

Facts: Plaintiff brought this action for the purpose of testing the constitutionality ofCommonwealth Act No. 342 because, according to the complaint, it constitutes class legislationfor "by its term it excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions from adopting,acquiring or using a trade name in connection with such calling or profession." His mainobjection centers on the exclusive character of the law which extends its benefits only to thoseengaged in the profession of accountancy.

Issue:whether or not said Act is constitutional.

Held: Commonwealth Act No. 342 does not offend against the equal protection clause of ourConstitution on the ground of class legislation, for the reason that said Act applies alike to allpersons pursuing the same calling or profession under the same conditions or requirements.

Said Acts gives the right or affords the same privileges to all accountants without distinction ordiscrimination. This benefit is extended to the defendants as well as to the plaintiff.


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Mirasol vs. DPWH

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and

Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways.

Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought thedeclaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of

the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the

Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.

Issue: WoN all motorized vehicles created equal?

Held: We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable

classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized

vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The

first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be

reasonably differentiated from newer models.


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PASEI v. Drilon

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.

(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)

FACTS:

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,

male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1

(1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino

Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and

females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with

similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the

lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker

participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be

provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the

challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the

respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with

the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and

protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional

Held: The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does

not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the

law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It

admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they

are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they

apply equally to all members of the same class.


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Conference of Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA

Facts: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of

licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which

hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-

principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No.

05, series of 1994, on the grounds that:

(3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the

equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.

Issue: WoN it violate the equal protection clause

Held:There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum

circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution. To support its

contention of in equality, the petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and

principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing overseasFilipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the

guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable

classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial

distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing

conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.


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Equal ProtectionSuspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies

Facts: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder

of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant

to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides

that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the

PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the courtshall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject

to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his

suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of

over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal

protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It

gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave

offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The

suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section

providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit

the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of

suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged

criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is

that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses

against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case

is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus

easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of

preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended

policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.


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TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC

[289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]

Facts:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization

of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue inthis case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury

as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring

the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines

affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as theComelec Timewhich shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within

the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all

radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or

television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space innewspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC

free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time inconnection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even

more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the

radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air

time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.

Issue:

Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal

protection of the laws.

Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and

without just compensation.

Held:

Petitioner's argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the

government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast

that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises,

do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are

merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be

burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to

operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public

funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against

newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide

is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not

do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair

exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the

requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.


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INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING

[333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN 2000]

Facts: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent

School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues

in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work

of equal value.

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a

domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other

temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its

standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to

employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or

other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their

employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the sameinto two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,

transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary

rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significanteconomic

disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.

Issue:

Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of

their constitutional right to the equal protection clause.

Held:

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal

pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,

under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international

character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of

foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same

position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by

logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee

to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The

employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treatedunfairly.


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ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY

[22 SCRA 603; L-23794; 17 FEB 1968]

Facts:

On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing

"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a

municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other

foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March

20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12, 087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of

a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal

Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal

protection

clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI,

Constitution).

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under

the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial

and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a

decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant charteredcity broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its

charter.

Issue:

Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause

under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution

Held:

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the

laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons

or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a

classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)

these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but

also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies

only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only

centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the

taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of

Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The

taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar

central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is

set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar

Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.


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PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSO. VS. PRADO

[227 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 105371; 11 NOV 1993]

Facts:

The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing

the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with

certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the

franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines,

Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the

general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid

classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Held:

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discriminationoffends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in

Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue

favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due

process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper

weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things

similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the

clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA

7354 is declaredunconstitutional.


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Tiu vs CA

Facts: Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled

"An Act Accelerating the Conversion of MilitaryReservations Into Other Productive Uses,

Creating the BasesConversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing

Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the Subic SpecialEconomic Zone and granted there to special privileges. President Ramos

issued Executive Order No. 97, clarifying the application of the tax and

duty incentives. The President issued Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the area

within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative. The petitioners challenged

before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right

to equal protection ofthe laws. This Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.

Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the exact metes and

boundsof the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA

7227. Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the

provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise

and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous

extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement

between the Philippines and the United Statesof America, as amended . . .'"

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of

the Constitution

Held: No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances

obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid andreasonable classification. The fundamental right of equal protection of the lawsis not

absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by

substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and

regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the

purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. Classification,

to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the

law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of

the same class. The Supreme Court believed it was reasonable for the President to have

delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military

base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop fromits status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and

commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational

bases for their businesses and industries.


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107 Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan [GR 118533, 4 October 1995]Second Division, Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave.

Facts:On 15 December 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Rogerde Leon, charged Paraaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups

to implement Paraaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution 744, (series of 1992) which Olivarezhimself approved on 6 October 1992. Resolution 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer'sfair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from 11 November 1992 to 15February 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly,BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to issuethe same unless BCCI gives money to the latter. Attached to BCCI's Reply-Affidavit was a copy ofExecutive Order dated 23 November 1992 issued by Olivarez granting a group of Baclaran-basedorganizations/associations of vendors the holding of "Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair Sa Baclaran" from 28November 1992 to 28 February 1993 using certain portions of the National and Local GovernmentRoads/Streets in Baclaran for fund raising. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Ringpis conducted apreliminary investigation and issued on 22 September 1993 a resolution recommending theprosecution of Olivarez for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, as amended. On 16

February 1994, the information was filed against Olivares (Criminal Case 20226). On 17 January 1994,Olivarez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law and onground of newly discovered evidence. The motion was granted on 24 January 1994. On 9 February1993, Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation to withdraw the information as Olivarez does notrefute the allegation and that bad faith is evident with his persistent refusal to issue permit. On 18February 1994, Olivarez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan forhis temporary release. On 21 February 1994, Olivarez filed an Omnibus Motion for a re-examinationand re- assessment of the prosecution's report and documentary evidence with a view to set aside thedetermination of the existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of the case; whichwas denied by the Sandiganbayan on 3 March 1994 in Open Court. In view of Olivarez's refusal toenter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not guilty" entered into his record. On 8 March 1994, theprosecution filed a Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, Olivarez

filed a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With Entry of Appearance),Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused andSupplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused; which were denied bythe Sandiganbayan on 4 April 1994. The Sandiganbayan, however, set aside the proceedingsconducted on 3 March 1994 including Olivarez's arraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty"entered in his record in the interest of justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of thecase due to technicalities. On 20 April 1994, Olivarez filed a motion for reconsideration which wasgranted on 15 May 1994. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman foranother reinvestigation to be terminated within 30 days from notice. The reinvestigation was reassigned toSPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on 3 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case. On 9December 1994, DSP Jose de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation, finding Olivarez liable by givingunwarranted benefit thru manifest partiality to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant

failed to apply for a business permit. The Ombudsman approved the reversal and on 27 December1994 directed the prosecution to proceed under the existing information. On 13 January 1995,Olivarez filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP Jose deG. Ferrer, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. and on 16 January 1995,Olivarez filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of Reinvestigation. The latter motion wasdenied by Sandiganbayan. Olivarez filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:Whether Olivarez exhibited partiality in the denial of / inaction over BCCI's application forlicense.


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Held:Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in favor ofthe unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of an executive order,whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse,Olivarez failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and theunidentified Baclaran- based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least asemblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that

if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of Olivarez. As the mayor of themunicipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourseto take appropriate action on the letter- application of BCCI although the same was not strictly inaccordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. WhetherOlivarez was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond the Court for themoment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficientto create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable,absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, isexpressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for anycharitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v

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