139 MacDougal Street, Third Floor • New York, New York 10012 • (212) 992-8932 • www.policyintegrity.org

February19,2013

ActingAdministratorBobPerciasepeUnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency1200PennsylvaniaAvenue,N.W.,Room3000Washington,D.C.20460perciasepe.bob@epa.gov

VIAE‐MAILANDCERTIFIEDMAIL

PetitionforRulemakingsandCallforInformationunderSection115,TitleVI,Section111,andTitleIIoftheCleanAirAct

toRegulateGreenhouseGasEmissionsDearActingAdministratorPerciasepe,

PursuanttotheAdministrativeProcedureAct,5U.S.C.§553(e),theCleanAirAct,42U.S.C.§7401etseq.,andotherrelevantregulationsandpractices,theInstituteforPolicyIntegrity(PolicyIntegrity)1herebyfilesthisPetitionwiththeEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)toinitiaterulemakingproceedingsandacallforinformationundertheCleanAirAct.Specifically,PolicyIntegrityrequeststhatEPAtakerequiredactionsunderSection115,TitleVI,Section111,andTitleIIoftheCleanAirActtocontrolgreenhousegasemissions.2

Section115createsamandatorydutyforEPAtorespondtoU.S.emissionsthatendangerpublichealthandwelfareinforeigncountries.AlltheprerequisitesforactionunderSection115havebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases:EPAhasalreadyacknowledged—basedinpartonreportsfromaninternationalbody—thatgreenhousegasesfromtheUnitedStatesendangerforeigncountries;andothercountries,suchasCanada,havegiventheUnitedStatesreciprocalrights.PolicyIntegritypetitionsEPAto:

1. MakeaformalfindingthatalltheprerequisitesforactiontocontrolinternationalairpollutionunderSection115havebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases;

2. RequirestatestorevisetheirCleanAirActimplementationplanstocontroltheirdangerousgreenhousegaspollutionbymakingreasonableprogresstowardabatement;and

3. AdvisestatesontheiroptionsforimplementationunderSection115,includingflexibleregulatorytoolslikemarketincentives.

Section115providesamandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveapproachtoregulatinggreenhousegasemissions.ItisthereforethepreferredmechanismundertheCleanAirActforrespondingtothedangersofclimatechange.Alternatively,TitleVIoftheCleanAirAct—specificallySection

1PolicyIntegrityisanon‐partisanthinktankatNewYorkUniversitySchoolofLaw.PolicyIntegrityisdedicatedtoimprovingthequalityofgovernmentdecisionmakingthroughadvocacyandscholarshipintheareasofadministrativeandenvironmentallaw,economics,andpublicpolicy.PolicyIntegrityisacollaborativeeffortoffacultyatNewYorkUniversitySchoolofLaw;afull‐timestaffofattorneysandpolicyexperts;lawstudents;andaBoardofAdvisorscomprisedofleadersinpublicpolicy,law,andgovernment.2Greenhousegasesincludecarbondioxide,methane,nitrousoxide,andfluorinatedgases.

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615—alsocreatesapotentiallymandatoryobligationforcomprehensivecontrolofgreenhousegases.UnderSection615,EPAmustcontrolpollutionthataffectsthestratosphereandsoimpactspublichealthandwelfare.Scientificevidencealreadysupportstheconclusionthatgreenhousegasesareaffectingthestratosphereinwaysthatendangerthepublic,particularlybycontributingtoozonedepletion.EPAmay,however,requireadditionalinformationbeforemakingsuchaformalfinding.PolicyIntegritypetitionsEPAto:

4. InitiateapubliccallforinformationunderTitleVIregardingtheeffectofgreenhousegasesonthestratosphereandozoneinthestratosphere;

5. Ifthescientificevidenceexist,issueanendangermentfindingunderSection615;and

6. Uponissuinganendangermentfinding,controlgreenhousegasemissionsthroughflexibleregulatorytoolslikemarkets.

TheremainingauthoritiesundertheCleanAirActdonotprovideassimplearoutetocomprehensivegreenhousegascontrolsasSections115and615offer.Nevertheless,evensector‐by‐sectorregulationunderotherprovisionscanbepiecedtogethertobuildacomprehensiveresponsetoclimatechange.

Therefore,asathird‐bestoption,EPAshouldcontinuethepathithasalreadybegunfollowing,issuinggreenhousegasstandardsunderSection111andTitleII.Section111requiresEPAtoregulatecategoriesofstationarysourcesthatsignificantlycontributetodangerouspollution.EPAhasalreadybeguntheprocessofregulatingpowerplantsfortheirgreenhousegasemissionsunderthisprovision,andtheagencyhasbeenpetitionedorsuedtoregulateadditionalsourcecategories.Besidespromptlyfinalizingsuchregulations,forbothnewandexistingsources,PolicyIntegrityalsopetitionsEPAto:

7. Listadditionalsourcecategoriesthatcontributesignificantlytogreenhousegaspollution,includingagriculturalsources,andtodevelopperformancestandardsforsuchcategorieswithinayearoftheirlisting;

8. Revisetheperformancestandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategoriestocoversignificantgreenhousegasemissions,suchasforlandfills,naturalgasandpetroleumsystems,andvariousmanufacturingindustries;

9. Instructstatestodevelopperformancestandardsforexistingsources,andtodosoincoordinationwithEPA’snewsourceperformancestandards,toavoidgrandfathering;

10. Forbothnewandexistingsources,defineamarketasthe“bestsystem”ofcontrol;and

11. Automaticallyphaseinstrongerperformancestandardsovertime.

EPAcanuseSection111tocreateanefficientandlargelycomprehensivemarketforcontrollingemissionsfromstationarysources.Buttocontrolmobilesources,EPAwillhavetouseitsauthorityunderTitleIIoftheCleanAirAct.EPAhasalreadybegunregulatingsomesourcesunderTitleII,andhasbeenpetitionedorsuedtoregulateadditionalsourcecategories:inparticular,PolicyIntegrityhaspetitionedEPAtoenactcomprehensivecontrolsbyregulatingvehiclefuels.IfEPAdoesnotenactvehiclefuelcontrols,PolicyIntegrityfurtherpetitionsEPAto:

12. Promulgateemissionsstandardsforallsignificantmobilesourcesnotyetregulatedorpetitionedtoberegulated,includingmotorcyclesandthetrailersofheavy‐dutytrucks.

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ContentsI.EPAMustRequireStatestoRegulateGreenhouseGasesunderSection115..............................4 

EPAhasreceivedreportsandstudiesfromadulyconstitutedinternationalagency—theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange..................................................................................................................4 

ThosereportsgaveEPAreasontobelievethatgreenhousegasesemittedintheUnitedStatescauseorcontributetopollutionthatendangersforeignhealthorwelfare...................................................................5 

EPAhasevidencecorrelatingtheendangermenttosourceswithinparticularstates.................................6 

ForeigncountrieshavegiventheUnitedStatesessentiallyreciprocalrights..................................................7 

EPAmustrequirestatestorevisetheirimplementationplanstoeliminatedangerousgreenhousegaspollution,andshouldadvisestatesonthemostworkableregulatoryoptions....................................11 

Section115providesamandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveapproachtoregulatinggreenhousegasemissions................................................................................................................................................................................15 

II.EPAShouldEvaluatetheImpactofGreenhouseGasesontheStratosphereandRespondwithAppropriateRegulationunderTitleVI.............................................................................................16 

Greenhousegaseslikelyaffectthestratosphereandendangerpublichealthorwelfare........................16 

EPAshouldestablishmarket‐basedregulationforgreenhousegasesunderTitleVI...............................17 

TitleVIprovidesanalternatesourceofmandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveregulation............17 

III.EPAMustRegulateSignificantStationarySourcesunderSection111.....................................18 

EPAmustlistadditionalsourcecategoriesthatsignificantlyemitgreenhousegases..............................19 

EPAmustissuegreenhousegasstandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategories.........................................20 

ExistingsourcesmustberegulatedunderSection111(d),andregulationshouldavoidgrandfathering............................................................................................................................................................................23 

EPAshoulddefineamarketasthe“bestsystem”........................................................................................................24 

EPAshouldautomaticallyphaseinstrongerstandardsovertime.....................................................................28 

EPAmustsetperformancestandardsforunregulated,significantstationarysources............................29 

IV.EPAMustRegulateAllSignificantMobileSourcesunderTitleII..............................................30 

Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................31 

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I.EPAMustRequireStatestoRegulateGreenhouseGasesunderSection115.

Section115oftheCleanAirActaddressesinternationalairpollutionandrequiresEPAtorespondtoU.S.emissionsthatendangerpublichealthandwelfareinforeigncountries.Theprovisioncreatesamandatorydutytoactifcertainprerequisitesaremet:

First,EPAmusthavereceived“reports,surveysorstudies”froma“dulyconstitutedinternationalagency.”3

Second,thereportsreceivedmustgiveEPA“reasontobelievethatanyairpollutantorpollutantsemittedintheUnitedStatescauseorcontributetoairpollution”that“mayreasonablybeanticipatedtoendangerpublichealthorwelfareinaforeigncountry.”4

Third,EPAmustdeterminethataforeigncountry“hasgiventheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerightswithrespecttothepreventionorcontrolofairpollutionoccurringinthatcountry.”5

Ifallthoseconditionsaresatisfied,EPAmustrequireanystatescontainingsourcesoftheinternationalairpollutiontorevisetheirapplicableimplementationplansto“preventoreliminate”thedangertoforeignhealthorwelfare.6

Alltheprerequisitesforactionhavebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases:EPAhasalreadyacknowledged—basedinpartonreportsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange—thatgreenhousegasesfromtheUnitedStatesendangerforeigncountries;andothercountries,suchasCanada,havegiventheUnitedStatesessentiallyreciprocalrights.EPAthereforemustdirectstatestocontroltheirgreenhousegasemissionsunderSection115.

EPAhasreceivedreportsandstudiesfromadulyconstitutedinternationalagency—theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.

Thoughthestatutedoesnotdefine“dulyconstitutedinternationalagency,”courtshavefoundthemeaningtobeself‐evident.7TheonlytwocasesthattreatSection115involveacidrainpollutiondriftingintoCanadafromMidwesternstates—anenvironmentalissuethathadbeenstudiedbytheInternationalJointCommission.D.C.CircuitcourtsfoundtheInternationalJointCommissionto“concededly”beadulyconstitutedinternationalagency,8highlightingthattheCommissionwasestablishedbytreatyandchargedwiththeresponsibilityofresolvingtrans‐boundarywaterdisputes.9Perhapsalsorelevant,theCommission’smembershipissplitbetweentheUnitedStatesandCanada,andexpertsfrombothcountriessubmitevidencetothebody.10

TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangesharesallthoserelevantcharacteristicsand,therefore,isalsoadulyconstitutedinternationalagency.ThePanelwasestablishedbytwoUnitedNationsorganizationsandendorsedbyaUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyResolution,whichchargedthePanelwithconductingacomprehensivereviewofthestateofknowledgeofclimatechange,thesocialimpactofclimatechange,andpossibleresponsestrategies.11ThePanelis 342U.S.C.§7415(a).Alternatively,theSecretaryofStatecanpresentsuchinformation.4Id.5Id.§7415(c).6Id.§7415(b).7SeeNewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.1472,1482(D.D.C.1985),reversedonothergrounds,Thomasv.NewYork,802F.2d1443(D.C.Cir.1986).8Thomasv.NewYork,802F.2dat1445;HerMajestytheQueenv.EPA,912F.2d1525,1529(D.C.Cir.1990).9NewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1482.10Int’lJointComm’n,WhoWeAre,http://www.ijc.org/en/background/ijc_cmi_nature.htm(lastvisitedApr.14,2012).11U.N.G.A.Res.43/53(1988);seealsoMassachusettsv.EPA,549U.S.497,508(2007)(callingtheIntergovernmentalPanel“amultinationalscientificbodyorganizedundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNations”).

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composedofmembersfromseveralcountries,includingtheUnitedStates.12ScientistsfromaroundtheworldcontributetothePanel’sreports,whicharereviewedandapprovedbymembercountries.13CongresshaseveninstructedU.S.federalagenciestobasetheirclimatechangeplansonthereportsoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.14

EPAhasreceivedstudiesregardinggreenhousegasemissionsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Mostnotably,whenEPAissuedafindingin2009thatgreenhousegasesendangerU.S.healthandwelfare,theagencyreliedinpartonthePanel’sreports.15Inthatfinding,EPAreasonedthatitdidnotneedtoindependentlyreviewthePanel’sreportsbecauseEPAtook“anactivepartin[their]review,writing,andapproval.”16EPAwentontostatethattheIntergovernmentalPanel’sassessments“havebeenreviewedandformallyacceptedby,commissionedby,orinsomecasesauthoredby,U.S.governmentagenciesandindividualgovernmentscientists.ThesereportsalreadyreflectsignificantinputfromEPA’sscientistsandthescientistsofmanyothergovernmentagencies.”17

Insummary:EPAhasreceivedreportsongreenhousegasemissionsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange—adulyconstitutedinternationalagency.

ThosereportsgaveEPAreasontobelievethatgreenhousegasesemittedintheUnitedStatescauseorcontributetopollutionthatendangersforeignhealthorwelfare.

Thoughthestatutedoesnotdefine“reasontobelieve,”theD.C.Circuitfoundthatthephrase—combinedwiththeword“whenever”—does“implyadegreeofdiscretionunderlyingtheendangermentfinding.”18Yetthatdiscretionisnotlimitless:inparticular,EPAcannotexerciseitsdegreeofdiscretioninanarbitraryorcapriciousmanner,19andoncetheendangermentfindingismade,“theremedialactionthatfollowsisbothspecificandmandatory—theAdministratorshallnotifytheGovernorofthespecificStateemittingthepollutionandrequireittoreviseitsSIP.”20Whenareportprovidesan“amplebasis”ofinformationsupportinganendangermentfinding,andwhenEPAinfactreliesonareportinmakinganassessmentaboutdangertohealthandwelfare,the“reasontobelieve”prongissatisfied.21

In2007,theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeissueditsFourthAssessmentReport.TheReportconcludedthatgreenhousegasemissionsfromhumanactivitiesareacauseofclimatechange.Ithighlightedthegloballyrisingatmosphericconcentrationsofgaseslikecarbondioxideandmethane,22andfoundthattheUnitedStateswasthesecond‐largestsourceworldwideofbothcarbondioxideandmethaneemissions(afterChina).23TheReportfurtherdeterminedthatclimatechangewillharmpublichealthandwelfare,byimpactingmalnutrition,extremeweatherevents,cardio‐respiratorydiseases,infectiousdiseases,foodproduction,coastalerosion,waterscarcity, 12IPCC,Organization,http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml(lastvisitedJan.31,2013).13Id.14E.g.,10U.S.C.§118(g)(instructingtheDepartmentofDefensetoexaminenationaldefensestrategyinlightoftheeffectsofclimatechange,andtobaseitsplansonprojectionsfromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange).15EndangermentandCauseorContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesunderSection202(a)oftheCleanAirAct,74Fed.Reg.66,496,66,510(Dec.15,2009)(citingtothePanel’sFourthAssessmentReportof2007).16Id.at66,511.17Id.18HerMajestytheQueen,912F.2dat1533(emphasisadded).19See5U.S.C.§706.20HerMajestytheQueen,912F.2dat1533.21NewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1482.22IPCC,CLIMATECHANGE2007:SYNTHESISREPORT36(2007).23IPCC,CLIMATECHANGE2007:WORKINGGROUPIII:MITIGATIONOFCLIMATECHANGEat4.2.2(2007).

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economicdevelopment,oceanacidification,andecosystemresilience.24Theseimpactstohealthandwelfareweredocumentedforeachregionoftheglobe:Africa,Asia,AustraliaandNewZealand,Europe,LatinAmerica,NorthAmerica,PolarRegions,andSmallIslandnations.25

TheFourthAssessmentReportclearlyprovidesEPAwithanamplebasisofinformationsupportinganendangermentfinding.EPAhasdeterminedthattheReportiscomprehensive,isgroundedinthepeer‐reviewedliterature,andunderwent“arigorousandexactingstandardofpeerreviewbytheexpertcommunity,aswellasrigorouslevelsofU.S.governmentreviewandacceptance.”26

Moreover,EPAhasalreadybasedadeterminationofthedangersofgreenhousegasesontheFourthAssessmentReport.WhenEPAissuedafindingin2009thatgreenhousegasesendangerU.S.healthandwelfare,theagencyreliedinpartonthePanel’sreports.27BothEPA’s2009findingandtheFourthAssessmentReportalreadysupporttherelatedconclusionthatU.S.emissionsendangerforeignhealthandwelfare.UnitedStatesemissionsclearly“causeorcontribute”toglobalgreenhousegasconcentrations.Notably,Section115setsnothresholdamountforthecontributionrequirement.Regardless,theU.S.contributionissizable:thesecond‐largestemitteroverall,producingabout18percentoftheworld’sgreenhousegases.28Thoseglobalgreenhousegasconcentrationsarealsoclearly“anticipatedtoendangerpublichealthorwelfareinaforeigncountry.”DrawingfromtheFourthAssessmentReport’sdetailsontheglobalimpactsofclimatechange,EPA’sown2009findingnotedthe“unavoidableglobalnatureoftheclimatechangeproblem”anddescribedhowimpactsonforeignhealthandwelfare“mayexacerbateproblemsthatraisehumanitarian,trade,andnationalsecurityissuesfortheU.S.”29Indeed,theentirePartVofEPA’sTechnicalSupportDocumentfortheendangermentfindingwasentitled“ObservedandProjectedHumanHealthandWelfareEffectsfromClimateChangeinOtherWorldRegions.”30

Inshort,EPAhasalreadyreliedonreportsfromadulyconstitutedinternationalagencytodeterminethattheUnitedStatescontributessignificantlytogreenhousegaspollution,andthatgreenhousegaspollutionendangersforeignhealthandwelfare.Ineffect,EPAhasalreadymadethenecessaryendangermentfindingtotriggerSection115,throughits2009finding,whichunderwenttherequirednotice‐and‐commentprocess.31ButevenifEPAbelievesaseparate,Section115‐specificendangermentfindingisnecessary,tobeissuedfornotice‐and‐commenttogetherwithareciprocityfindingandSIP‐call,EPAcertainlyhas“reasontobelieve”thatU.S.emissionsendangerforeignhealthandwelfare,andtheagencymustactunderSection115.

EPAhasevidencecorrelatingtheendangermenttosourceswithinparticularstates.

InHerMajestytheQueenv.EPA,theD.C.CircuitfoundEPA’sinterpretationthatSection115requireda“unitaryproceeding”wasreasonable,butnotclearlyorunambiguouslyrequiredbythestatutorytext.32Underthe“unitaryproceeding”interpretation,EPA“musthavesufficientevidencecorrelatingtheendangermenttosourcesofpollutionwithinaparticularStatebefore[theagency]

24IPCC,SYNTHESISREPORT,supranote22,at48,52.25Id.at50,52.2674Fed.Reg.at66,511.27Id.(citingtothePanel’sFourthAssessmentReportof2007).28Id.at66,539(citingIPCCestimationandreportingprocedures).29Id.at66,535.30EPA,TechnicalSupportDocumentforEndangermentandCauseofContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesunderSection202(a)oftheCleanAirAct(2009).31Cf.Thomasv.NewYork,802F.2dat1446‐47.32912F.2dat1533.

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canexercise[its]discretiontomakeendangermentfindings.”33Tostart,EPAisfreetochangeitsstatutoryinterpretation.34ButevenifEPAchoosesnottochangeitsinterpretation,thesufficientevidencecriterionhasbeenmetforgreenhousegases.

EPAalreadypossessesconsiderableevidenceofmajorgreenhousegassourcesandemissionslevelsperstate.35Since1990,inaccordancewiththeU.N.FrameworkConventiononClimateChange,EPAhasdevelopedanationalgreenhousegasemissionsinventoryeachyear.36Moreover,since2010,EPAhascollectedgreenhousegasemissionsdatafrommajorindividualsourcesnationwide,includingpowerplants,refineries,chemicalmanufacturing,landfills,themetalandmineralssectors,thepulpandpaperindustry,governmentandcommercialsources,anddozensofotherindustrialsectors—6,700facilitiesintotal,brokendownbystate.37Inshort,allfiftystates(plustheDistrictofColumbia,PuertoRico,andU.S.territories)emitgreenhousegases,andEPAmustgivenoticetoeachstateoftheneedtoreviseitsapplicableCleanAirActimplementationplanstopreventoreliminatetheendangermenttoforeignhealthandwelfare.

ForeigncountrieshavegiventheUnitedStates“essentiallythesamerights.”

ThereciprocitylanguageofSection115limitsitsscopetocountriesthathave“giventheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerightswithrespecttothepreventionorcontrolofairpollutionoccurringinthatcountryasisgiventhatcountrybythissection.”38Precedentsuggeststhatreciprocityis“basedonananalysisoffactsandlawastheyexistataparticulartime.”39Thefindingisthereforenottechnicallylegalisticanddoesnotdemandanassurancethatreciprocitywillexistinperpetuity.Instead,allthatisrequiredisEPA’sinitialdeterminationthattheUnitedStatesreceives“essentiallythesamerights,”plusperiodicreexaminationbyEPAtoensurereciprocitycontinuestoexist.40

TheonlyexplicitrightgrantedtoforeigncountriesunderSection115istherighttoappearatanypublichearingassociatedwiththerelevantrevisionstostateimplementationplans.41Additionally,foreigncountriesimplicitlystandtobenefitfromtheUnitedStates’commitmenttopreventoreliminateitsshareofharmfulinternationalairpollution.42

Therightsundertheforeigncountry’slawmustbe“essentially”thesame,notnecessarilyidentical.43Inpreviouscases,EPAreasoneditwassufficientthatanothercountry’slawsprovided

33Id.34SeeNat’lCable&Telecomm.Assoc.v.BrandXInternetServices,545U.S.967(2005).35See,e.g.,EPA,2010GreenhouseGasEmissionsfromLargeFacilities,http://ghgdata.epa.gov(lastvisitedJan.31,2013);EPA,GHGRP2010:ReportedData,http://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgdata/reported(lastvisitedJan.31,2013);EPA,CO2EmissionsfromFossilFuelCombustion(2010)(listingcarbondioxideemissionsbysectorandbystate).36EPA,U.S.GreenhouseGasInventoryReport,http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html(lastvisitedJan.31,2013);seealsoU.N.FrameworkConventiononClimateChange,NationalReports,http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php(lastvisitedJan.31,2013).37EPA,GreenhouseGasData,http://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgdata(lastvisitedJan.31,2013);seealsoEPA,GreenhouseGasReportingProgramFactSheet(2012);EPA,NumberofFacilitiesReportingGHGEmissionsbyState—2012,http:/www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/documents/pdf/2010/ghgdata_figures.pdf.3842U.S.C.§7415(c).39NewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1483.40Id.(“achangeofeitherfactsorlawmightrequirereexaminationofthedetermination”).4142U.S.C.§7415(b).42Seeid.43SeeNewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1492(reproducingAdmin.Costle’sfindingthatthedifferencebetweentheUnitedStates’detailedrequirementsforstateimplementationplanrevisionsandCanada’s“moregeneralrequirement...forprovincialconsultationandreasonableefforts,”“doesnotsignificantlyrestricttheabilityoftheGovernmentofCanadatoprovideessentiallythesamerightstotheUnitedStates”).

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thegovernmentwiththeauthoritytogivetheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerightsasSection115.44Therefore,reciprocitycanexistsimplybecauseacountryhasindicatedthroughaffirmativeconductitsintentorabilitytocooperatewiththeUnitedStatesinabatinginternationalairpollution.45Itfollowsthatacountry’slawsoractionscansatisfythisstandard:eitherthetextofacountry’slawindicatesthatitcouldcontrolairpollutionharmingtheUnitedStates,oracountry’sactionsdemonstratethatitslawisinterpretedtoallowforthecontrolofsuchharmfulairpollution.

BecausethereisscantcaselawonSection115,thepreciseparametersofthereciprocitystandardaredifficulttodefine.However,underthemostplausiblereadingsofSection115(c),reciprocityalreadyexistsforgreenhousegasesthroughthelawsandactionsofseveralforeigncountries.BecauseSection115refersto“aforeigncountry,”EPAneedonlyfindasinglecountrythatsatisfiesthereciprocityrequirementforitsdutiesunderSection115tobetriggered.

Canada’sEnvironmentalProtectionActsatisfiesSection115(c)’sreciprocityrequirement.

In1981,EPAfoundthatCanada’sCleanAirAct,Section21.1,createdreciprocalrightstoSection115.Indeed,theCanadianlegislationwasenactedspecificallytomeettherequirementsofSection115.46KeyfeaturesofCanada’sSection21.1thatcreatedreciprocitywithSection115include:47

1. Authorizingafederalofficialtomakeafindingofforeignendangermentcausedbydomesticemissionsandtoprescribespecificemissionslimitstoreduceorpreventsuchdanger;

2. Allowinglocalgovernmenttotakeabatementactionsandauthorizingthefederalgovernmenttolimitemissionsifthelocalityfailstoprovideanadequateremedy;and

3. Providingopportunitiesforpublichearingsonproposedactionsandallowingparticipationinthehearingbytheaffectedforeigngovernment.

The1981reciprocityfindingmadebyEPAwasupheldbythedistrictcourtinNewYorkv.Thomas,48andthevalidityofthesefindingswasneveraddressedonappeal.

Canada’sCleanAirActwassubsequentlyreplacedbytheCanadianEnvironmentalProtectionAct(CEPA).49TherelevantprovisionsfromSection21.1weresubstantiallyrecreatedinDivision6ofPart7ofthatnewlegislation,whichalsofulfillsreciprocity:50

1. CEPASection166(1)authorizestheFederalMinisterofEnvironmenttotakepreventativeactionif“asubstancereleasedfromasourceinCanadaintotheaircreates,ormayreasonablybeanticipatedtocontribute,toairpollutioninacountryotherthanCanada.”

2. CEPASection166(2)instructstheMinistertoconsultwithlocalgovernmentsresponsibleforsourcesofinternationalairpollution,todeveloparesponseplan;ifthelocalgovernment

44Seeid.at1483(citingEPA’sreciprocityfinding).45ThedistrictcourtinThomasstressedthispointaswell.InreproducingEPA’sreciprocitydetermination,thecourtaddeditsownemphasisasfollows:“Inmyview,theamendmentstotheCanadianCleanAirActdogiveadequateauthoritytotheGovernmentofCanadatoprovideessentiallythesamerightstotheUnitedStatesasSection115providestoCanada.”).Id.at1491.46DeanAdamWillis,Thomasv.NewYork:SisiphyeanTragedyontheEnvironmentalStage,10LoyolaInt'l&Comp.L.Rev.469,474(1988);Am.Soc.ofInt’lLaw,Canada:AmendmentoftheCleanAirActtoProvideU.S.withLegislativeProtectionSimilartothatOfferedtoCanadaunderU.S.CleanAirAct,20Int’lLegalMaterials762(1981)(reprintedfromCanadianCommonDebates,Dec.16,1980).47SeeNewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1488(reproducingAdmin.Costle’slettertoSec’yMuskieandSen.Mitchell).48Id.at1483–84.49EnvironmentCanada,TheHistoryofCEPA,http://www.ec.gc.ca/lcpe‐cepa/default.asp?lang=En&n=4FA2C2C7‐1(lastvisitedAug.5,2012);CanadianEnvironmentalProtectionAct,(S.C.1999,c.33).50Notably,CEPASection166(4)alsocontainsitsownreciprocityrequirement.

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cannot“prevent,controlorcorrecttheairpollution,”theMinister“shall”thentakeabatementactionunderSection166(3).

3. CEPASection168requiresnotificationtoaffectedforeigncountriesofsuchproposedregulations,andprovidesopportunityforforeigncountriestosubmitwrittencomments.UnderSection166(5),theMinistermusttakesuchcommentsintoaccount.

TheseprovisionsoftheCanadianEnvironmentalProtectionActareapplicabletogreenhousegases.Carbondioxide,methane,nitrousoxide,hydrofluorocarbons,perfluorocarbons,andsulfurhexafluoridearealllistedinCEPASchedule1astoxicsubstances,thusmakingthemsubjecttothedevelopmentofpollutionpreventionplans.51

ThelegalauthorityprovidedbyCEPAforCanadatoaddressitsinternationalemissionsofgreenhousegasesisalonesufficienttosatisfySection115’sreciprocityrequirement.But,infact,Canadahasalsotakenactiontoreduceitsemissions.In2012,itfinalizedgreenhousegasstandardsforcoal‐firedelectricityplants,notingthatCanada’sapproachtoclimatechange“isbroadlyalignedwiththatoftheU.S.,”andcalculatingtheregulatorybenefitsbasedon“theavoidedglobaldamagesassociatedwithGHGemissionreductionsbroughtforthbyCanadianaction.”52Importantly,themandatoryactionsthatEPAandthestatesmusttakeunderSection115arenotlimitedbythescopeofpollutioncontrolsalreadyachievedinothercountries.Oncereciprocityisestablished—asithasbeenbyCanada’slegalauthoritytoaddressinternationalgreenhousegasemissions,andbyCanada’scommitmenttocontinual,constructiveactiononclimatechange53—U.S.statesmustactgenerallyto“preventoreliminate”theirdangerousemissionslevels,andnotjusttotheextentthatothercountrieshavealreadyreducedtheirpollution.

Thus,theCanadianEnvironmentalProtectionActprovidestheUnitedStateswithessentiallythesamerightsasthosegivenbySection115,andsoreciprocityissatisfied.

Thelawsofothercountries,likeSouthAfrica,alsosatisfythereciprocityrequirement.

BesidesCanada’sEnvironmentalProtectionAct,SouthAfrica’sAirQualityActalsomeetsthereciprocityrequirement.Thelaw’spreambleemphasizesthat“atmosphericemissionsofozone‐depletingsubstances,greenhousegasesandothersubstanceshavedeleteriouseffectsontheenvironment,bothlocallyandglobally.”54TheactauthorizestheMinisterofEnvironmentalAffairstoinvestigate“anysituationwhichcreates,ormayreasonablybeanticipatedtocontributetoairpollutionacrosstheRepublic’sboundaries.”55Iftheinvestigationshowsthatdomesticemissionsmayhavea“significantdetrimentalimpactonairquality,theenvironmentorhealth”inaforeigncountry,theMinistermayprescribemeasuresto“prevent,controlorcorrect”thedomesticemissions.56Finally,theactallowsthegovernmenttoprovidenoticetoforeigncountriesbeforepublicationofanysuchregulations.57BasedonthesameanalysisperformedforCanada,SouthAfrica’sAirQualityActmeetsthetestforcreatingalegalauthoritytoactongreenhousegasemissions,whichgrantstheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerightsasunderSection115.

Othercountriesmayalsohavesimilarlawsthatwouldmeetthetestforreciprocity.

51SeeCEPA§56(1)(notingtheapplicabilityofSection166(1)toSchedule1pollutants).52ReductionofCarbonDioxideEmissionsfromCoal‐FiredGenerationofElectricityRegulation,SOR/2012‐167(Can.).Canadahasalsoproposedregulationsformotorvehiclesto“alignwiththemandatorynationalstandardsoftheUnitedStates.”EnvironmentCanada,RegulatoryGreenhouseGasEmissionsfromLight‐DutyVehicles(Nov.27,2012).53SeeReducingGreenhouseGases,http://climatechange.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=4FE85A4C‐1(visitedJan.9,2013).54NationalEnvironmentalManagement:AirQualityAct39of2004(S.Afr.).55Id.§50(1)(“TransboundaryAirPollution.”)56Id.§50(2).57Id.§50(5).

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Existinginternationalagreementsandactionsdemonstrateessentiallysimilarcommitmentsforforeigncountriestocontrolgreenhousegaspollution.

The“essentiallythesamerights”standardlikelydoesnotrequirethemirroringofSection115’slanguagefoundinthelawsofcountrieslikeCanada.IfagovernmenthasobligationssimilartothosecreatedbySection115,iteffectivelygrantstheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerights.Existinginternationalagreementsindicatethatmanycountrieshavesuchobligations.

TheleadingexampleofsuchaninternationalagreementistheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC),towhichtheUnitedStates,alongwith190othercountries,isaparty.58DifferingcommitmentsexistundertheUNFCCC,dependingonwhetheracountryisdevelopedordeveloping,butallpartiesareobligatedtoformulatenationalprogramstomitigateclimatechangebyaddressingsourcesofgreenhousegases.59

EachUNFCCCcountry,andinparticularthosethatarealreadyreducinggreenhousegasemissions,hassatisfiedthereciprocityrequirementofSection115.ByparticipatingintheUNFCCC,acountryiscooperatingwiththeUnitedStatesinagreeingtoreduceairpollutionthatendangersglobalhealthandwelfare.TheUnitedStateshastherighttoattendtheUNFCCC’smeetingsandotherwisestayinformedaboutwhatcountriesaredoingtoreducetheirgreenhousegasemissions.60SomeoftheobligationscreatedbyinternationalagreementsliketheUNFCCCmaynotbestrictlyenforceable.However,anenforceabilitymechanismisnotlikelyarequirementforreciprocityunderSection115.Section115doesmandatecertainactionsbyEPAandstates,butitdoesnotexplicitlygrantforeigncountriestherighttosueinUnitedStatescourtstoenforcetheprovision.61

Manycountriesarealreadytakingstepstoreducetheirgreenhousegasemissions,incompliancewiththeirobligationsundertheUNFCCCandthesubsequentKyotoProtocol.BecauseanyreductioninglobalgreenhousegasemissionsbenefitstheUnitedStates,andbecauseseveralcountrieshaveexpressedinterestincooperatingwiththeUnitedStatesincontrollinggreenhousegaspollution,thereciprocityrequirementissatisfied.

Inparticular,theEuropeanUnionoperatesacap‐and‐tradesystemacrossthirty‐onecountriestocontrolgreenhousegasemissionsandmeetitsUNFCCCobligations.62ThosecountriesparticipatingintheEuropeanUnion’semissionstradingschemesubmitreportsonimplementationtotheUNFCCCConferenceofParties.63TheEuropeanCommissionhasalsoindicateditswillingnesstofurtherreduceemissionsifothermajoremittersmakeproportionalcommitments.64TheEuropeanUnion’stradingsystemthereforealsosatisfiesthereciprocityrequirementofSection115(c).

58SeeUNFCCC,Parties&Observers,http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php(lastvisitedApr.18,2012).59UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,art.4(1)(b),May9,1992(“AllParties,takingintoaccounttheircommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilities...shall....”)(emphasisadded).60Seeid.art.4(1)(j)(requiringpartiestocommunicateinformationrelatedtoimplementation);id.art.12.61CanadadidsueEPAfordenialofitsrulemakingpetitionthatsoughtimplementationofSection115,butthejurisdictionalprovisioninvokedwasnotSection115itself,butratherSection307(b)(1).HerMajestytheQueenv.EPA,912F.2dat1529‐31.However,thetestforreciprocityunderSection115(c)requiresonly“essentiallythesamerights...asisgiven...bythissection,”referringjusttotherightsgrantedwithinthetextofSection115itself,andnotthebroaderCleanAirAct.Inthealternative,itispossiblethattheUnitedStatesalreadyenjoysenforcementrightsthroughcustomaryinternationallaw,whichprohibitscountriesfrominjuringoneanotherthroughtrans‐boundarypollutionandprovidesremediesforsuchharms.SeegenerallyRESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW§§601–02(1987).62Eur.Comm’n,EmissionsTradingSystem,http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm(lastvisitedJan.31,2012);seealsoDirective2009/29/EC,oftheEuropeanParliament&theCouncil,of23April2009,toImproveandExtendtheGreenhouseGasEmissionAllowanceTradingScheme,2009O.J.(L140/63)(referencingtheUNFCCCobjective).63SeeUNFCCC,Compilation&SynthesisofFifthNationalCommunications,SBI/2011/INF.1/Add.1,23May2011,at47.64Eur.Comm’n,WorkingwithInternationalPartners,http://www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international(lastvisitedJan.31,2013)(“TheEUisofferingtostepupits2020reductiontargetsto30%ifothermajoreconomiescommit.”).

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CountriesoutsideEuropearetakingactionaswell.NewZealand,forexample,enactedaClimateChangeResponseActin2002,aimedatmeetingitsobligationsundertheUNFCCC.65Theactrequirescooperationwithothercountriesandrecommendsintegratedinternationalapproachestoreducinggreenhousegasemissions.66Assuch,itprovidesthepublichealthandwelfarebenefitsandtheparticipationrightsthatSection115(c)requires.Theseexamplesarenotexhaustive:manyothercountriesmayalsocurrentlyhavestatutesorregulationsthatwouldsatisfythereciprocityrequirement,andfutureactivitiesmaycreatereciprocityinadditionalcountriesaswell.

EPAmustissueareciprocityfinding.

Becauseothercountries—atleastthoselikeCanadaandSouthAfricawithlegislativelanguagemirroringthetextofSection115,ifnotallcountriesthathaveclimateobligationsunderinternationallawandarealreadytakingactiontoreduceemissions—havegrantedtheUnitedStatesessentiallythesamerightsasthosefoundinSection115,EPAmustmakeadeterminationthatthereciprocityrequirementhasbeenmetforgreenhousegasemissions.

Sincethecriteriaforbothanendangermentfindingandareciprocityfindinghavebeenmet,andsinceEPAhassufficientevidencecorrelatingtheendangermenttosourcesofpollutionwithinparticularstates,themandatoryprovisionsofSection115aretriggered.EPAmustnotifyallthestatesoftheneedtorevisetheirCleanAirActimplementationplanstopreventoreliminatethedangerouslevelsofgreenhousegasemissions.

EPAmustrequirestatestorevisetheirimplementationplanstoeliminatedangerousgreenhousegaspollution,andshouldadvisestatesonthemostworkableregulatoryoptions.

OncetheendangermentandreciprocityfindingsaremadeunderSection115,“theremedialactionthatfollowsisbothspecificandmandatory—theAdministratorshallnotifytheGovernorofthespecificStateemittingthepollutionandrequireittoreviseitsSIP.”67Forgreenhousegases,thoseprerequisiteshavebeensatisfied,andEPAhassufficientevidenceofthemajoremissionsofgreenhousegasesinallfiftystates(aswellastheDistrictofColumbia,PuertoRico,andU.S.territories).Therefore,EPAmustinstructthestatestorevisetheirCleanAirActimplementationplansinorderto“preventoreliminatetheendangerment.”68

EPAshouldprovideguidancetothestatesonwhatrevisionstotheirimplementationplanswillbenecessarytoadequatelypreventoreliminatethedangertoforeignhealthandwelfare.Inparticular,eventhoughSection115triggersarevisionofStateImplementationPlans,itdoesnottriggersettingNationalAmbientAirQualityStandardsforgreenhousegases.Therequirementto“preventoreliminatetheendangerment”alsowillnotrequirestatestoachievezeroemissionsofgreenhousegases.EPAshouldemphasizethatmarket‐basedtoolsareavailabletostatestocontrolgreenhousegasesundertheirrevisedimplementationplans.Toclarifythesepoints,EPAshouldissueeitherofficialguidanceoraproposedFederalImplementationPlanforstatestofollow.

RegulationofgreenhousegasesunderSection115doesnotrequiretheuseofNAAQS.

Section115saysthatEPA’snoticetothestatesoftheirdangerousinternationalemissionsconstitutesafindingunderSection110(a)(2)(H)(ii),whichrequiresrevisionofthestates’

65ClimateChangeResponseAct2002,PublicAct2002No.40(N.Z.);seealsoNewZealandMinistryforEnviro.,ReducingGreenhouseGasEmissions,http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/policies‐initiatives/index.html(lastvisitedJan.31,2013)(discussingemissionstargetsandtradingschemeundertheClimateChangeResponseAct).66Id.Schedule2,art.2§b(“CooperatewithothersuchPartiestoenhancetheindividualandcombinedeffectivenessoftheirpoliciesandmeasures”);id.art.10§c.67HerMajestytheQueen,912F.2dat1533.6842U.S.C.§7415(b)(referencingtheSIPrevisionprocessunder§7410(a)(2)(H)(ii)).

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implementationplans.69Section110dealswiththedevelopmentofstateimplementationplans,whicharemostcommonlydesignedtoachievetheNationalAmbientAirQualityStandards(NAAQS)setbyEPAforcertaindesignated“criteriapollutants.”Nevertheless,states’useofSection110tocarryouttheirobligationsunderSection115doesnotrequireclassifyinggreenhousegasesascriteriapollutantsorestablishingNAAQSforthem.

EPA’smostrecentinterpretationoftheSection115/110interplaywouldsuggesttheopposite,thatrevisionofimplementationplanswilltriggerNAAQS.70And,indeed,Section110doesfaciallyappearexclusivetotheNAAQSprogramduetoitstitle,“StateImplementationPlansforNationalPrimaryandSecondaryAmbientAirQualityStandards.”71However,bothstatutorytextandlegislativehistoryrevealthatSection110isnotexclusivetoNAAQS.EPAshouldreturntoitspriorposition,whichrecognizedthetruebreadthofSections110and115.72

ThestatutorytextofSections115showsthatNAAQSneednotbeusedtocontrolinternationalairpollution.Section115requiresregulationof“anyairpollutant,”73whichsuggestsabroaderambitthanthecategoryofcriteriapollutantssubjecttotheNAAQSprogram.Additionally,Section115(d)specifiesthatinternationalemissionscontrolsdevelopedbefore1977“shallremainineffectwithrespecttoanypollutantforwhichnonationalambientairqualitystandardhasbeenestablished.”74Inotherwords,thescopeofSection115isbroaderthanjustpollutantssubjecttoNAAQS.

Similarly,thestatutorytextofSection110indicatesthatimplementationplanscovermorethanjustcriteriapollutants.Section110(a)(2)(H)(ii)specifiesthatstateimplementationplansmustberevisedwheneverEPA“finds...thattheplanissubstantiallyinadequatetoattainthe[NAAQS]whichitimplementsortootherwisecomplywithanyadditionalrequirementsestablishedunderthischapter.”75Theuseoftheword“or”impliesthatimplementationplansmaybeusedtoachievestatutoryobligationswhollydistinctfromtheNAAQS.76Furthermore,whenSection110(a)(2)(D)specifiesthatimplementationplansmustcontrolinternationalpollutionunderSection115,77thesamesubsectionalsoreferencesinterstatepollution.78There,statesareinstructedtocontrolemissionsof“anyairpollutant”thatinterfereswithanotherstate’sachievementofNAAQS.Again,“anyairpollutant”isbroaderthanthecategoryofcriteriapollutantsdirectlysubjecttoNAAQS.Evenifanon‐criteriapollutantinterfereswithanotherstate’sachievementofNAAQS,thatnon‐criteriapollutantstillmustbecontrolledbythestateimplementationplan,underthetermsofSection110(a)(2)(D).Likewise,stateimplementationplansmustenforceobligationsunderSection115,evenfornon‐criteriapollutants.79

69Id.70SeeAdvanceNoticeofProposedRulemakingforRegulatingGreenhouseGasEmissionsundertheCleanAirAct,73Fed.Reg.44,354,44,482–83(July30,2008).7142U.S.C.§7410.72EPApreviouslyexplainedthatSection115“isbroadlydraftedtoencompassallformsofairpollution‐relatedendangermenttopublichealthorwelfareandisnotlimitedtointerferencewithU.S.airqualitystandardsorsignificantdeteriorationprograms.”LetterfromDouglasM.Costle,Admin.EPA,toEdmundS.Muskie,Sec’yofState(Jan.13,1981),reprintedinNewYorkv.Thomas,613F.Supp.at1472,1488.ThisunderstandingofSection115isrepeatedinscholarshipfromthattime.See,e.g.,BennettA.Caplan,TheApplicabilityofCleanAirActSection115toCanada'sTransboundaryAcidPrecipitationProblem,11B.C.ENVTL.AFF.L.REV.539,570(1983).7342U.S.C.§7415(a).74Id.§7415(d)(emphasisadded).75Id.§7410(a)(2)(H)(ii)(emphasisadded).76HannahChang,CapandTradeUndertheCleanAirAct?:Rethinking§115,40ENVTL.L.REP.NEWS&ANALYSIS10,894,10,896(2010).7742U.S.C.§7410(a)(2)(D)(ii).78Id.§7410(a)(2)(D)(i).79Chang,supranote76.

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Arecentarticle’sdetailedanalysisofthelegislativehistoryofSection115furtherdemonstratesthattheprovisiondoesnotnecessarilytriggerNAAQS.80The1970amendmentstotheCleanAirActdistinguishedbetweendomesticpollution,whichbecamesubjecttostateimplementationplans,andinternationalpollution,whichwasthenregulatedbyanabatementconferenceapproachthatgatheredrelevantpartiestonegotiatepollutioncontrols.Bythe1977amendments,however,theconferenceapproachwasdeemedafailure,andCongresswantedtotakeadvantageofthemoresuccessfulimplementationplanprocess.Consequently,Congressoptedtoaddressinternationalpollutionthroughuseofstateimplementationplans,butnowheredidCongressexpressanintenttoeliminatethedistinctionbetweenemissionswithonlydomesticimpacts,whichweresubjecttoNAAQSfollowinganendangermentfindingunderSection108,andinternationalpollution,whichwasnotsubjecttoNAAQSandwasregulatedfollowingaseparateendangermentfindingunderSection115.81

Section115onlyrequiresreasonableprogresstowardgreenhousegasabatement,andnottheeliminationofallemissions.

Thestatuteinstructsstatesto“preventoreliminatetheendangerment”toforeigncountriesthattheiremissionshavecontributedto.82However,duetoexistingatmosphericconcentrationsoflong‐livedgreenhousegases,andthecontinuingemissionsbyothercountries,evenifallU.S.statesreducedtheiremissionstozero,theystillcouldnottruly“eliminate”alltheclimatechangedangersfacedbyforeigncountries.Evenshortofsuchextremeactions,greenhousegasreductionsbeyondacertainpointwillstarttobecomeprohibitivelyexpensive.AnoverlynarrowreadingofSection115,therefore,couldseemtocreateastandardimpossibleorimpracticalforstatestoachieve.However,statutorycontextandlegislativehistory83counselinfavorofamoreflexibleinterpretationofSection115,onethatonlyrequiresreasonableprogresstowardabatement.

First,thetextofSection115doesnotexclusivelyreferto“elimination.”Section115(c)saysthat,toestablishreciprocity,foreigncountriesmustgrantsimilarrights“withrespecttothepreventionorcontrolofairpollution.”84Byessentiallyequatingthe“preventoreliminate”requirementwiththebroaderformulation“controlofairpollution,”Section115givesEPAdiscretiontodeterminetheextentofemissionsreductionsrequired.Similarly,evenSection115(b)doesnotmandatetheeliminationofallemissionsthataffectforeigncountries.Instead,itinstructsstatestoeliminatethedangertowhichU.S.emissionshavecontributed.85EPAdoeshavesomediscretioninmakingitsendangermentfinding,bothonwhatconstitutesadangertoforeignhealthandwelfare,andonwhatcontributionU.S.emissionshavemadetosuchdanger.86Moregenerally,courtshavelongrecognizedEPA’sdiscretionundertheCleanAirActtodetermine“howmuchoftheregulatedharmistoomuch,”87andhaveacknowledgedthatprotectingthepublicdoesnotrequire“aworldthatisfreeofallrisk—animpossibleandundesirableobjective.”88Rather,EPAcanconsidercontextwhen 80Id.at10,897–901.81Id.8242U.S.C.§7415(b).83SeeWhitmanv.Am.TruckingAssoc.,531U.S.457,471(2001)(“interpretedinitsstatutoryandhistoricalcontext”).84 42 U.S.C. § 7415(d) (emphasis added). 85Section115envisionsbothpreemptiveandreactiveresponsestointernationalairpollution:“preventoreliminate”the“anticipated”danger.Inthiscase,however,“preventing”thedangerislikelyimpossible,sinceclimatechangehasalreadybeguntoimpactglobalhealthandwelfare.Therefore,theapplicablestatutorylanguageis“eliminatetheendangerment.”86SeeHerMajestytheQueen,912F.2dat1533(“implyadegreeofdiscretionunderlyingtheendangermentfinding.”).87Whitman,531U.S.at475(“Buteveninsweepingregulatoryschemeswehaveneverdemanded...thatstatutesprovidea‘determinatecriterion’forsaying‘howmuch[oftheregulatedharm]istoomuch.’InTouby,forexample,wedidnotrequirethestatutetodecreehow‘imminent’wastooimminent,orhow‘necessary’wasnecessaryenough,oreven—mostrelevanthere—how‘hazardous’wastoohazardous.”)(citationsomitted).88Id.at494(Breyer,J.,concurring).

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“decidingwhatrisksareacceptableintheworldinwhichwelive.”89Inshort,EPAcandeterminewhatlevelofgreenhousegasreductionsisnecessaryforstatestocomplywithSection115.90

Second,Section115notablylacksanyrigiddeadlineforachievingfullcompliance.IncontrastwiththestricttimelinesandpenaltiesforstatesthatfailtoachieveormaintainNAAQSusingtheirimplementationplans,91Section115setsnocomplianceschedulethatstatesmustadheretowhenrevisingtheirimplementationplanstomitigateinternationalairpollution.Section110reinforcesthat,bygrantingstatestheabilitytoset“schedulesandtimetablesforcompliance,asmaybenecessaryorappropriatetomeettheapplicablerequirementsofthischapter.”92Furthermore,Section110impliesthatrevisedplansneedonlybe“substantiallyadequate”tocomplywithSection115,93aloosestandardthatshouldgrantsomediscretiontobothEPAandthestates.Indeed,statesmayhaveevenmoreauthoritythanEPAdoestoconsiderfactorslikecostsindesigningtheirimplementationplans.94

Finally,Section115’slegislativehistorysuggeststhatstatesmayonlyberequiredtoachievereasonableprogresstowardabatement.Congressaddedthe“preventoreliminate”languagewhenitrevisedSection115inthe1977CleanAirActAmendments.95However,thelanguagedidnotappearintheoriginalbillproposedbytheSenate(theHousebillhadnocomparablerevisionstoSection115).96Instead,thephrasewasaddedinConference.TheConferenceReportgiveslittleexplanation,otherthantheslightqualificationthatplansmustberevised“onlytotheextentnecessarytopreventoreliminatetheendangerment.”97Therefore,theSenate’sdescriptionofitsoriginalbillisthebestsourceforinterpretingCongressionalintent.TheSenateReportsuggeststhatapplyingtheimplementationplanprocesstoSection115wasthedrivingmotivationfortherevisions,andnotchangingthestandardforstringencyofcontrols.TheSenateReportevenstates,“Section115asrevised...willrequiretheStateinwhichthesourceofthoseemissionsislocatedtoreviseitsimplementationplantocontrolthoseemissions”98—control,noteliminate.Beforethe1977revision,thestringencyofcontrolsforinternationalpollutionwasdeterminedbyabatementconferencesandpublichearings.Underthatmodel,thestandardwas“effectiveprogresstowardabatement,”99tobeachievedbyadopting“reasonableandsuitable[measures].”100

Basedonthestatutorytext,context,andlegislativehistory,Section115shouldbeinterpretedtorequirethemoreachievablestandardofreasonableprogresstowardabatement.EPAcanuseits

89Id.at495(quotingNRDCv.EPA,824F.2d1146,1165(D.C.Cir.1987)).90Cf.id.at496(“Norneedregulationleadtodeindustrialization.Preindustrialsocietywasnotaveryhealthysociety;henceastandarddemandingthereturnoftheStoneAgewouldnotprove‘requisitetoprotectthepublichealth.’”).91E.g.42U.S.C.§§7502,7509.92Id.§7410(a)(2)(A).93Id.§7410(a)(2)(H)(ii)(“provideforrevisions...whenevertheAdministratorfinds...thattheplanissubstantiallyinadequate...tootherwisecomplywithanyadditionalrequirementsestablishedunderthischapter”)(emphasisadded).94Whitman,531U.S.at470(“ItistotheStatesthattheActassignsinitialandprimaryresponsibilityfordecidingwhatemissionsreductionswillberequiredfromwhichsources....Itwouldbeimpossibletoperformthattaskintelligentlywithoutconsideringwhichabatementtechnologiesaremostefficient,andmosteconomicallyfeasible—whichiswhywehavesaidthat‘themostimportantforumforconsiderationofclaimsofeconomicandtechnologicalinfeasibilityisbeforethestateagencyformulatingtheimplementationplan.’”).95CompareCleanAirActof1977§115withCleanAirActof1970§115.96S.Rep.95‐127,pt.2at56(1977).TheSenateversiondidnotsay“preventoreliminate,”butonlythat“[t]henoticeoftheAdministratorshalloperateasfindingunderclause(ii)ofsubparagraph(H)ofsubsection(a)(2)ofsection110ofthisAct.”TheHousebillhadnocomparablerevisionstoSection115,seeH.R.Conf.Rep.95‐564,at1517(1977).97H.R.Conf.Rep.95‐564,at1517(emphasisadded).98S.Rep.95‐127at65.99CleanAirActof1970§115(e).100Id.§115(f)(2).

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discretiontodeterminewhatlevelofgreenhousegasreductionsisrequiredtoeliminatetheglobaldangersthatU.S.emissionscontributeto.Settingthestandardatthepointwherethemarginalabatementcosts,basedonreasonabletechnologyprojections,equaltheglobalsocialcostofcarbonwouldbethemostappropriateapproachtotherequirement.Additionally,EPAcanapprovestateimplementationplansthatproposeareasonablylongtimelineforfullcompliance,toavoidanyissuesoftechnologicaloreconomicfeasibility.

Section115permitsflexibleregulatoryoptions,includingmarket‐basedtools.

UnlikeothersectionsoftheCleanAirAct,greenhousegasregulationsunderSection115wouldnotbelimitedtoapiecemealapproach,applyingtoonlyonesectoratatime.Instead,stateswouldbefreetocraftthemostcost‐effectiveimplementationplan,takingadvantageofthelowest‐costabatementopportunitiesnomatterwhetherthesourcewerestationaryormobile,neworexisting.101

Inparticular,statescouldimplementmarket‐basedsystemsforemissionscontrol.ThisauthorityisstrengthenedbySection115’sdirectionstousethestateimplementationplanprocessunderSection110,whichexplicitlyallowsstatestoadopt“economicincentivessuchasfees,marketablepermits,andauctionsofemissionsrights.”102Anationwidecap‐and‐auctionscheme,withdividendsrebatedbacktolower‐incomeconsumers,wouldcreatethemostefficientandfairestprogramforreducinggreenhousegasemissions.103EPAcoulduseitsauthorityunderSection115toseteitheranationalcaporstate‐basedbudgetsatthelevelrequiredtoeliminatetheglobaldangersthatU.S.emissionscontributeto;again,comparingthesocialcostofcarbonagainstmarginalabatementcostswouldbetheoptimalwaytosetthisbudget.ThoughEPAcannotmandatetheformofstates’implementationplans,itcanencouragestatestocoordinatetheirplanstocreateanationwideauctionsystem.104Bymaximizingthegeographicandsectoralscopeofthemarket,suchanationalcap‐and‐auctionsystemwouldmaximizeregulatoryefficiency.

Section115providesamandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveapproachtoregulatinggreenhousegasemissions.

AlltheprerequisitestotriggerSection115havebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases:EPAhasreceivedreportsfromadulyconstitutedinternationalagencythatgivetheagencysufficientreasontobelievethatU.S.emissionsareendangeringforeignhealthandwelfare;andothercountrieshavegrantedtheUnitedStatesreciprocalrights.Consequently,EPAisrequiredtoinstructstatestorevisetheirimplementationplanstoachievereasonableprogresstowardabatementofgreenhousegases.Stateshavetheauthoritytoconstructanintegrated,nationwidecap‐and‐auctioncontrolsystem,coveringallsectorsoftheeconomyinthemostcost‐effectivemanner.

Section115isthereforethepreferredmechanismundertheCleanAirActtoregulategreenhousegases,andSection115‐basedregulationwouldmakemostgreenhousegasregulationsunderotherprovisionsoftheCleanAirActlargelyredundant.

101Thoughtherearesomerestrictionsonstates’abilitytodirectlyregulateemissionsfromnewmotorvehiclesandnon‐roadvehicles,42U.S.C.§7543,aswellasfromaircraft,id.§7573,statescanincorporatevehiclefuelcontrolsintheirimplementationplans,id.§7545(c)(4)(A),sinceEPAhasneitherissuedgreenhousegascontrolsforvehiclefuelsnormadeafindingthatnogreenhousegascontrolsarenecessaryforvehiclefuelsunderparagraph(c)(1).EPAhasindirectlyregulatedthegreenhousegascontentoffuelsthroughitsrenewablefuelprogram,butthatregulationisunderparagraph(o)of§7545,notunder(c)(1).102Id.§7410(a)(2)(A).103InimaiChettiar&JasonSchwartz,TheRoadAhead:EPA’sOptionsandObligationsforRegulatingGreenhouseGases,ch.4(PolicyIntegrityReport3,2009).104Id.atch.5.

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II.EPAShouldEvaluatetheImpactofGreenhouseGasesontheStratosphereandRespondwithAppropriateRegulationunderTitleVI.

AcallforinformationunderTitleVIwouldadvanceEPA’scurrentunderstandingoftheinteractionbetweengreenhousegasemissionsandthestratosphere.IfEPAfindsthatgreenhousegasesaffectthestratosphereorozoneinthestratosphereinawaythatendangerspublichealthorwelfare,itmustdevelopregulations,preferablyacap‐and‐auctionsystem,throughTitleVI.SuchcontrolswouldberedundantandunnecessaryifEPAhasalreadyenactedcomprehensiveregulationsthroughSection115,butTitleVIisalsoavailable—andpotentiallymandatory—asanalternative.

Greenhousegaseslikelyaffectthestratosphereandendangerpublichealthorwelfare.

If,inEPA’sjudgment,“anysubstance,practice,process,oractivitymayreasonablybeanticipatedtoaffectthestratosphere”or“ozoneinthestratosphere”inawaythatendangerspublichealthorwelfare,thenEPAisrequiredbySection615oftheCleanAirActtoregulatesuchsubstance,practice,process,oractivity.105WhileEPAhasrarelyissuedregulationsunderthisparticularstatutoryauthority,itcouldbeutilizedtoregulategreenhousegases.

Thefirststatutoryinquiryiswhethergreenhousegasemissionsaffectthestratosphere.“Affect”isabroadterm:EPAneedonlyfindthatgreenhousegasesinteract,insomeway,withthestratosphereorozoneinthestratosphere.Existingscientificliteraturesupportsthisconclusion.Forexample,a2010reportproducedbytheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramstated,“stratosphericozonecanbeaffectedbytheincreasesintheconcentrationofGHGs.”106Feedbackloopsmayalsoexistbetweenclimatechangeandozonedepletion.107

Nitrousoxide—agreenhousegas—isofparticularimportanceforozoneinthestratosphere.Sinceatleast2009,scientistsfromtheNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministrationhaveacknowledgedtheneedtoaddressnitrousoxideemissionsbecauseoftheirozone‐depletingpotential.108WhiletheMontrealProtocolhasadvancedtheprotectionoftheozonelayer,anthropogenicemissionsofnitrousoxide,suchasfromagriculture,continuetocontributetothedestructionofozone.109Inadditiontonitrousoxide,scientificreportsindicatethatmethaneaffectsthestratosphereandozonedepletion.110Theimpactofcarbondioxideontheozonelayerislessclear‐cut,butevidencesuggestscarbondioxidedoeshavesomeimpactonthestratosphere.111

Thesecondstatutoryinquiryiswhethertheeffectsofgreenhousegasesonthestratosphereendangerpublichealthorwelfare.Existingscientificliteraturesuggeststhatsomegreenhousegasemissionsmaymeetthatstandard,butthatadditionalinformationisneededontheimpactsof

10542U.S.C.§7671n(“...theAdministratorshallpromptlypromulgateregulations...“).106U.N.ENV’TPROGRAMME,ENVIRONMENTALEFFECTSOFOZONEDEPLETIONANDITSINTERACTIONSWITHCLIMATECHANGE1(2010).107SeeM.Sigmondetal.,DriversofPastandFutureSouthernOceanChange:StratosphericOzoneVersusGreenhouseGasImpacts,38GEOPHYSICALRES.LETTERSL12601(2011)(arguingthatdepletingofstratosphericozoneimpactsoceancirculationandtemperatures,whichalsoaffectstheglobalcarboncycle);M.Lal&T.Holt,OzoneDepletionDuetoIncreasingAnthropogenicTraceGasEmissions,1CLIMATERES.2,85(1991).108NOAA,StudyShowsNitrousOxideNowTopOzoneDepletingEmission,Aug.27,2009;seealsoA.R.Ravishankaraetal.,NitrousOxide(N2O):TheDominantOzone‐DepletingSubstanceEmittedinthe21stCentury,326SCI.MAG.123(2009).109MartynChipperfield,AtmosphericScience:NitrousOxideDelaysOzoneRecovery,2NATUREGEOSCIENCE742(2009);CatherineHénault&CecileRevellin,InoculantsofLeguminousCropsforMitigatingSoilEmissionsoftheGreenhouseGasNitrousOxide,346PLANT&SOIL1‐2,289(2011);seealsoUNITEDNATIONSENV’TPROGRAMME,QUESTIONSANDANSWERSABOUTTHEENVIRONMENTALEFFECTSOFTHEOZONELAYERDEPLETIONANDCLIMATECHANGE:2010UPDATE17(2010).110WORLDMETEOROLOGICALORG.,SCIENTIFICASSESSMENTOFOZONEDEPLETION:2010,at1.76(2010)(“Increasingconcentrationsofmethaneanditseffectsonhydrogenoxidescanenhancethedestructionofozoneintheupperstratosphere.”);seealsoUNITEDNATIONSENV’TPROGRAMME,supranote109,at43(describingmethaneasanozone‐depletinggas).111WMO,supranote110,at5.22(concludingcarbondioxidemaybothincreaseanddepletestratosphericozone).

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otheremissions.ThestratosphericozonelayerprotectsEarthfromultravioletradiation,whichcancauseskincancerandotherhealthandenvironmentalproblems.112Therefore,totheextentthatgreenhousegasescontributetoozonedepletion,theyendangerpublichealthandwelfare.Asnotedabove,thescientificliteraturealreadysupportsthatnitrousoxideandmethaneemissionsdepletestratosphericozone.113Carbondioxideemissionsaffectthestratosphere,butitislessclearwhethertheyhaveanozone‐enhancingorozone‐depletingeffect.114EPAshouldfurtherexplorethisgapintheliterature.Additionally,moreinformationshouldbecollectedonhowchangesinthestratospheremayaffectclimate,andthehealthandwelfareimpactsofthatinteraction.

EPAshouldthereforeissueapubliccallforinformation,requestingthatthescientificcommunityandotherinterestedpartiessubmitthemostrecentandrelevantinformationconcerningtheinteractionbetweengreenhousegasesandthestratosphere,especiallyozoneinthestratosphere,andthehealthorwelfareeffectsthereof.Basedontheinformationcollected,EPAshouldidentifyanyremaininglimitationsinthescientificevidenceandconductitsownassessment.

EPAshouldissueanendangermentfindingif,basedonthecollectedinformation,EPAdeterminesthatgreenhousegasesaffectthestratosphereinamannerthatendangershealthorwelfare.IfEPAmakessuchafinding,itwillthenberequiredunderSection615todeveloparegulatoryprogramthataddressesgreenhousegasemissions.115TitleVIalsorequiresinternationalcooperationontheprotectionofthestratosphere.116EPAshouldconsiderpromotinginternationalcooperationonthereductionofgreenhousegasemissionsnotcoveredbytheMontrealProtocol.

EPAshouldestablishmarket‐basedregulationforgreenhousegasesunderTitleVI.

ShouldEPAregulategreenhousegasesthroughTitleVI,amarket‐basedapproachwouldbeoptimal.EPAhastoauthoritytoestablishmarket‐basedregulationunderTitleVI.117Section615statesthatonceEPAissuesanendangermentfinding,it“shallpromulgateregulationsrespectingthecontrol”ofthesubstance,practice,process,oractivityforwhichitmadethefinding.118Theuseoftheword“control”issignificant.ThoughtermisnotdefinedintheCleanAirAct,itisoftenusedthroughoutthestatuteinconnectionwithexplicitgrantsofauthorityforuseofmarket‐basedtools.119ThelegislativehistoryofTitleVIfurtherdemonstratesthatCongressintendedtogiveEPAdiscretionindeterminingthekindofregulatoryprogramitwishestopursue,andinthepastEPAdevelopedatradingschemepursuanttotheprecursortoSection615.120

TitleVIprovidesanalternatesourceofmandatory,efficient,andcomprehensiveregulation.

IfEPAfindsaconnectionbetweengreenhousegasemissions,stratosphericimpacts,andpublichealthorwelfare,thenSection615offersapotentiallycomprehensive,efficient,andmandatorysourceofauthorityforgreenhousegasregulation.

112SeeEPA,Ozone,http://www.epa.gov/ozone;ERIKAWILSON,EPA,CLIMATECHANGE,STRATOSPHERICOZONE,ANDTHECLEANAIRACT(2011)(explainingdepletionofstratosphericozoneleadsto“skincancer,cataractsandecologicaldamage”).113SeealsoM.Prather&J.Hsu,CouplingofNitrousOxideandMethanebyGlobalAtmosphericChemistry,330SCI.952(2010).114WORLDMETEOROLOGICALORG.,supranote110,at5.22.11542U.S.C.§7671n.116Id.§7671p.117SeeChettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at72–73;butseeid.at67‐68onlimitationsofrebatingauctionrevenuetoconsumers.11842U.S.C.§7671n.119SeeChettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at65‐67.120Id.at72‐73.

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III.EPAMustRegulateSignificantStationarySourcesunderSection111.

Section111requiresEPAtopromulgateperformancestandardsforcategoriesofstationarysourcesthatsignificantlycontributetodangerouspollution.Becausethecriteriahavebeenmet,EPAmustregulatesignificantstationarysourcesofgreenhousegasesunderSection111:

First,EPA“shall”createalistofsourcecategoriesthat,initsjudgment,“cause,orcontributedsignificantlyto,airpollutionwhichmayreasonablybeanticipatedtoendangerpublichealthorwelfare.”121

o EPAhasalreadydeterminedthatgreenhousegaspollutionendangershealthandwelfare.Severalcategoriesofstationarysources,includingagriculturalsourcesandcoalmines,havenotyetbeen“listed”underSection111,butcontributesignificantlytogreenhousegaspollution.EPAmustlistsuchsourcecategories.

o ListinganewsourcecategorygivesEPAoneyeartopropose“Federalstandardsofperformancefornewsourceswithinsuchcategory.”122

Second,somestationarysourceshavealreadybeen“listed”andregulatedforother,non‐greenhousegaspollutants,butalsoemitsignificantquantitiesofgreenhousegases.EPA“shall,”atleasteveryeightyears,revisetheperformancestandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategories.123

o Nopollutant‐specificendangermentorcontributionfindingisrequiredbeforeEPAcanrevisetheperformancestandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategoriestocovergreenhousegasemissions.EPAhasalreadybegundevelopingnewsourceperformancestandardsforsomecategories,butmanyimportantsourcesalreadylistedunderSection111arenotyetregulatedforgreenhousegases.

o EPAshouldusecost‐benefitanalysistoprioritizeandissuegreenhousegasstandards,suchasfor:naturalgasandpetroleumsystems,landfills,ironandsteelproducers,cementproducers,nitricacidplants,andwastewatertreatmentfacilities.

Third,onceEPAhasdevelopedperformancestandardsfornewsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionsunderSection111(b),EPAmustalsoinstructstatesunderSection111(d)todevelopperformancestandardsforexistingsourcesinthesamecategories.

EPAisalreadyintheprocessofdevelopingnewsourceperformancestandardsforsomecategories,andhasbeenpetitionedorsuedtodevelopthemforothercategories.124EPAmustpromptlyfinalizetheseregulations,forbothnewsourcesandexistingsources—inparticular,fornewandexistingpowerplants.ButEPAmustalsoregulategreenhousegasesfromallothersignificantsourcesofemissions,andisherebypetitionedtodoso,ifsuchsourcesarenotalreadycoveredbyactiontakenunderSections115or615.EPAshoulddevelopperformancestandardsfornewandexistingsourcessimultaneously,toavoidgrandfathering;shouldallowstatestouseflexible,market‐basedmechanismsintheregulationofexistingsources;andshouldsetschedulestoautomaticallyphaseinstrongerstandardsovertime.

12142U.S.C.§7411(b)(1)(A).122Id.§7411(b)(1)(B).123Id.124E.g.,StandardsofPerformanceforGreenhouseGasEmissionsforNewStationarySources:ElectricUtilityGeneratingUnits,77Fed.Reg.22,392,22,412‐13(proposedApr.13,2012)(tobecodifiedat40C.F.R.pt.60);seealsoLawrenceHurley,7StatesPlantoSueEPAoverMethaneEmissions,Greenwire,Dec.11,2012(discussinglitigationoverperformancestandardsfortheoilandnaturalgasindustry).

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EPAmustlistadditionalsourcecategoriesthatsignificantlyemitgreenhousegases.

Section111(b)requiresthatEPA“shall...publish(andfromtimetotimethereaftershallrevise)alistofcategoriesofstationarysources.[EPA]shallincludeacategoryofsourcesifin[its]judgmentitcauses,orcontributessignificantlyto,airpollutionwhichmayreasonablybeanticipatedtoendangerpublichealthorwelfare.”Oncelisted,EPAmustdevelopperformancestandardsforsuchsources.Importantsourcecategories,suchasagricultureandcoalmines,contributesignificantlytodangerousgreenhousegaspollutionand,therefore,mustberegulated.

Revisingthelistofcategoriesisamandatoryobligation.

EventhoughthestatutesaysEPAonlyneedreviseitslistofregulatedcategories“fromtimetotime,”EPA’sdiscretioninthismatterissharplylimitedbytherepeatedcommandword“shall,”whichappearsthreetimesinSection111(b)(1).InterpretingnearlyidenticallanguageunderSection231oftheCleanAirAct,aD.C.CircuitdistrictcourtrecentlyfoundthatthoughEPAmayhavesomediscretionastotiming,thephrase“shallfromtimetotime”doesprovideastandardforjudicialreviewofunreasonabledelay.125Inotherwords,whenEPAhasreasontobelievethatanunregulatedstationarysourcecontributessignificantlytogreenhousegaspollution,theagencyisallowedsomeleewayinprioritizingitsowndocketofrulemakings,butitmustarticulateareasonableexplanationforitstimingandcannotindefinitelydelay.EPAmustdevelopaprocessformakingreasonableprogresstowardlistingadditional,significantsourcecategoriesofgreenhousegases.

EPAalreadyhasevidenceofendangermentandsignificantcontributionforseveralcategories,includingagriculturalsourcesandcoalmines.

EPAhasalreadydeterminedthatgenerally,andforpurposesofSection111regulation,greenhousegaspollutionendangerspublichealthandwelfare.126Therefore,theonlyprerequisitetolistingadditionalsourcecategoriesisafindingofsignificantcontributiontogreenhousegaspollution.

Thoughtheterm“significantly”isnotdefinedintheCleanAirAct,EPArecentlyindicatedthatthequalifierdoesnotrestrictitsabilitytobroadlyaddressgreenhousegasemissionsunderSection111.EPAreasonedthateven“alimitedamountofcontributionwouldmeet[thesignificantcontribution]standardinlightofthefactthatGHGairpollutioniscausedbyalargenumberoftypesofsourcesandthatnoonesourcecategorydominatestheentireinventory.”127EPAalreadyhassufficientevidenceofthesignificantcontributionsofunregulatedsourcecategories,throughitsnationalgreenhousegasinventory.Ratherthansettinganysortofnumericalthresholdforthesignificantcontributioncriterion,EPAshouldsimplyprioritizelistingthoseunregulatedsourcecategoriesthatmakethelargestcontributionstogreenhousegaspollution.

Forexample,EPAhasdeterminedthatagriculturalsources,suchaslivestock,soilmanagement,andriceproduction,constitute7%ofU.S.greenhousegasemissions.128Coalmines,includingabandonedundergroundmines,constitute1.1%ofallU.S.greenhousegasemissions.129Again,whileEPAshouldnotsetanyrigidnumericalthresholdforsignificance,itisnotablethatinrelatedcontexts,EPAhasfoundcontributionsaslowas0.5%ofnationwideemissionstobe“significant.”130

125Ctr.forBiologicalDiversityv.EPA,794F.Supp.2d151,161–62(D.D.C.2011).12677Fed.Reg.at22,412‐13;seealsoEndangermentandCauseorContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesunderSection202(a)oftheCleanAirAct,74Fed.Reg.66,496(Dec.152009).12777Fed.Reg.at22,413.128EPA,SourcesofGreenhouseGasEmissions,http://http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html(lastvisitedJan.31,2013)(basedonEPA’s2012InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasandSinks:1990‐2010).129CalculatedfromEPA,InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasandSinks:1990‐2010(2012).130See,e.g.,ControlofEmissionsfromNonroadLargeSpark‐IgnitionEngines,andRecreationalEngines(Marineand

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Acoalitionofenvironmentalgroupsalreadypetitioned,in2010,forEPAtolistcoalminesasasourcecategoryunderSection111,duetotheirgreenhousegasemissionsandotherpollution.131Morerecently,inDecember2012,EPAindicateditsopennesstoasettlementagreementinthelitigationrelatedtothatpetition.132ThispetitionsimplyrenewsthecallforEPAtoregulategreenhousegasemissionsfromcoalminesasexpeditiouslyaspossible.

Similarly,in2009,acoalitionofenvironmentalandanimalrightsorganizationspetitionedEPAtolistconcentratedanimalfeedingoperationsunderSection111,duetotheirgreenhousegasandotherharmfulemissions.133Thispetitionbothrenewsthatcallandextendsittocoverallsignificantagriculturalsourcesofgreenhousegasemissions.

TheCleanAirActdoesnotprohibitthelistingofagriculturalsourcesunderSection111.EPApreviouslyreasonedthatagriculturalsourcesarenotexemptfromCleanAirActrequirementsforthepurposesofNewSourceReview.134Thedefinitionof“stationarysource”undertheNewSourceReviewprogramisthesameasthedefinitionofstationarysourceforSection111:“anybuilding,structure,facility,orinstallationwhichemitsormayemit[pollution].”135ItfollowsthatagriculturalsourceslikewisemayfallwithinthescopeofSection111andcanberegulatedasstationarysources.EPAshouldregulateagriculturalsourcesunderSection111duetotheirsignificantcontributiontogreenhousegaspollution.

Othercurrentlyunlistedsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionsmayalsomeetthecriteriaforsignificantcontribution.Onceacategoryislisted,EPAmustproposenewsourceperformancestandardswithinoneyear.136

EPAmustissuegreenhousegasstandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategories.

ManyimportantsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionshavealreadybeenlistedunderSection111andregulatedfortheirnon‐greenhousegaspollution.OnceasourcecategoryhasbeenlistedunderSection111,EPA“shall,atleastevery8years,reviewand,ifappropriate,revisesuch[performance]standards.”137Performancestandardsaredefinedbroadlyas“standard[s]foremissionsofairpollutants,”138butSection111doesnotexplicitlylayoutadecisionmakingframeworktoguideEPA

Land‐Based),67Fed.Reg.68,242,68,245(Nov.8,2002)(“(“Nationwide,[spark‐ignition]enginesandvehiclesareasignificantsourceofmobilesourceairpollution.Asdescribedbelow,ofallmobilesourceemissionsin2000theyaccountedforabout9percentofHCemissions,4percentofCOemissions,3percentofNOXemissions,and2percentofdirectPMemissions.”)(discussingthesignificancetestunderSection213oftheCleanAirAct)(emphasisadded).ButmobilesourceemissionsofPM,forexample,onlyconstituted23%oftotalman‐madesources,id.at68,246,and2%of23%isabout0.5%.131PetitionfromEarthjusticeetal.,toEPA,forRulemakingundertheCleanAirActtoListCoalMinesasaSourceCategoryandtoRegulateMethaneandOtherHarmfulAirEmissionsfromCoalMiningFacilitiesUnderSection111,June16,2010.132ManuelQuinones,Enviro‐EPASettlementPossibleonMineEmissions,Greenwire,Dec.10,2012.133PetitionfromtheHumaneSocietyoftheU.S.etal.,toEPA,toListConcentratedAnimalFeedingOperationsunderCleanAirActSection111(b)(1)(A)andtoPromulgateStandardsofPerformanceunderCleanAirActSections111(b)(1)(B)and111(d),Sept.21,2009.134See,e.g.,RevisionstotheCaliforniaStateImplementationPlan;SanJoaquinValleyUnifiedAirPollutionControlDistrict,69Fed.Reg.27,837(May17,2004)(indicatingthattheSIPinquestioncouldnotbeapprovedifitexemptedagriculturalsourcesfrompermitting);seealsoAss’nofIrritatedResidentsv.FredSchakelDairy,2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS36769,*37(E.D.Cal.2005)(rejectingtheargumentthatthefarminquestionwasexemptsimplyforbeingafarmunderthereasoningthatthereisnoapparentexemptionforagriculturalsourcesundertheCleanAirActandthat“itisEPA’spositionthatCAAdoesnotexemptmajorstationaryagriculturalsources”).135Compare40C.F.R.§51.165(a)(1)(i)(2011),with42U.S.C.§7411(a)(3);seealso42U.S.C.§7602(z).13642U.S.C.§7411(b)(1)(B).137Id.138Id.§7411(a)(1).

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onwhichairpollutantsgetstandardsofperformanceandwhichdonot.Nevertheless,EPA’sdiscretiontomakethisdeterminationislimitedbythestatutorycontext,principlesforrationalrulemaking,andexecutiveorders.Forgreenhousegases,EPAmustusecost‐benefitanalysistoprioritizeandissueadditionalperformancestandardsforalready‐listed,significantcategories.

Statutorycontextandprinciplesforrationaldecisionmakingsupportaddingperformancestandardsforanysignificantsourcesofadangerouspollutant.

Listingsourcecategoriesandissuingperformancestandardsare,underSection111,twodistinctprocesses,andonlytheformerexplicitlyrequiresanendangermentandcontributionfinding.EPAhasadoptedthepositionthatneitherendangermentnorcontributionfindingsareprerequisitestoaddingaperformancestandardforanewpollutantemittedbyanalready‐listedsourcecategory.139Certainly,requiringentirelynew,repetitive,formalendangermentandcontributionfindingseverytimeEPAwantedtoaddgreenhousegasperformancestandardsforacategorycouldprovetobeunnecessarilyburdensome,costingtimeandmoneyandcausingdelayswithoutaddinganynewinformation.Instead,EPA’sexistingendangermentfindingfrom2009shouldbesufficienttoprovethedangerofgreenhousegasesemittedbyanystationarysourcecategory,140andtheagency’sgreenhousegasinventory,whichliststheannualemissionsbysourcecategory,shouldprovideampleevidencethatparticularsourcecategoriescontributesignificantemissions.141

However,justbecauseendangermentandcontributionfindingsarenotformalprerequisitestoaddingperformancestandardsforalready‐listedcategoriesdoesnotmeanEPAhaslimitlessdiscretiontodecidewhichpollutantsareregulatedandwhicharenot.Forexample,ifcementmanufacturerswerenotalreadyalistedsourcecategory,andifEPAfoundthatcementmanufacturerscontributedsignificantlytodangerousgreenhousegaspollution(whichtheydo),thestatutewouldrequiretheagencytolistcementmanufacturersasasourcecategoryanddevelopperformancestandardsforthem.142Itwouldmakelittlesense,then,forEPAnottoberequiredtosetperformancestandardsforgreenhousegasemissionsfromcementmanufacturersjustbecausethatsourcecategorywaslistedbeforeEPAfullyrealizedthedangersofgreenhousegases.

Furthermore,anydiscretionEPAhastodeterminewhichpollutantsgetperformancestandardsandwhichdonotislimitedbyprinciplesforrational,non‐arbitrarydecisionmaking.143EPAhasalreadybegunmovingforwardwithgreenhousegasperformancestandardsduringitsSection111reviewofpowerplants.ItwouldbeinconsistentandarbitraryforEPAtorefusetoregulatesignificantgreenhousegasemissionfromothersourcecategoriesduringfutureSection111reviews.144

Thus,basedonthecontextofSection111andprinciplesforrationaldecisionmaking,EPAshouldberequiredtodevelopperformancestandardsforalready‐listedsourcesthatcontributesignificantemissionsofdangerousgreenhousegaspollution.

13977Fed.Reg.at22,412‐13.14074Fed.Reg.at66,496.141EPA,InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasEmissionsandSinks:1990‐2010,supranote129.142See42U.S.C.§7411(b)(1)(A)(“TheAdministratorshall...publish(andfromtimetotimethereaftershallrevise)alistofcategoriesofstationarysources.Heshallincludeacategoryofsourcesinsuchlistifinhisjudgmentitcauses,orcontributessignificantlyto,airpollutionwhichmayreasonablybeanticipatedtoendangerpublichealthorwelfare.”)(emphasisadded).143SeeMotorVehicleMfrs.Ass’noftheU.S.v.StateFarmMut.Auto.Ins.Co.,463U.S.29,43(1983)(definingthearbitraryandcapriciousstandardinrulemaking).144Inthepast,EPAhasnotbeenopentoregulatinggreenhousegasesunderSection111,andhasassertedthatitcanexerciseitsdiscretionunderthestatutenottoissuesuchregulations.ForadiscussionofsuchpreviousEPApositions,aswellasanexplanationofthelimitationsofEPA’sdiscretionunderSection111,seeLetterfromPolicyIntegritytoEPA,onNewSourcePerformanceStandardsforNitricAcidPlants,June23,2011.

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Executiveorderssupportprioritizingsubsequentperformancestandardsaccordingtoacost‐benefittest,suchasforlandfillsandindustrialprocesses.

WhileEPA’sdiscretionmaybelimited,neithershouldEPAberequiredtoregulateeveryairpollutantemittedbylistedcategories—evenpollutantsthatdonotposeadangertopublichealthorwelfare,thatarenotemittedinsignificantquantities,orthatcouldonlyberegulatedatcostsgrosslydisproportionatetobenefits.Cost‐benefitanalysisisarationalwaytoexercisediscretion,isrequiredbyexecutiveorders,andisnotprohibitedbystatute.EPAshouldassessthecostsandbenefitsofsettingperformancestandardsforadditionalpollutantsemittedbylistedcategories,andshouldselectthosepoliciesthatmaximizenetbenefits.

Asageneralpolicymatter,regulationshouldmaximizesocialwelfare.Cost‐benefitanalysisisthebesttoolthatagenciescanusetoachievethisgoal,torationally,consistently,andtransparentlymakepolicychoices.145Accordingtoexecutiveorders,agenciesmustusecost‐benefitanalysistoguidetheirregulatorydecisionswhennototherwiseprohibited.146Section111oftheCleanAirActdoesnotforeclosetheuseofcost‐benefitanalysis.Onthecontrary,phrasesinthedefinitionof“standardofperformance”—suchas“takeintoaccountthecost”and“best”147—areconsistentwithcost‐benefitanalysis.WhilecourtshavedeterminedthatthislanguagedoesnotmandatethatEPAbaseitsdecisionsoncost‐benefitanalysis,“becauseCongressdidnotassignthisspecificweight...ofthesefactors,theAdministratorisfreetoexercisehisdiscretioninthisarea.”148

Whenrevisingthesestandardsofperformance,EPAshouldbeginbyfocusingoncategorieswhoseemissionsreductionswouldyieldthegreatestnetbenefits.Thisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthelargestemittersshouldberegulatedfirst.Certainsmallercategoriesmaylendthemselvestoparticularlylow‐costreductionsinemissions.Thelargestcategoriesmaynonethelessrepresentthegreatestopportunitiestorealizeimprovementstopublichealthandwelfare.Indeed,EPArecognizesthatthisisusuallythecase.149

EPAshouldofcoursefirstfinalizeitspendingperformancestandardsforpowerplants,forbothnewandexistingsources,whichasacategorymakethelargestcontributiontogreenhousegaspollution.Severalotheralready‐listedcategorieswouldalsopassacost‐benefittestforaddinggreenhousegasperformancestandards.EPAshouldfocussubsequentregulationsonsomeoftheselargersources,includingnaturalgasandpetroleumsystems,landfills,ironandsteelproducers,cementproducers,nitricacidplants,andwastewatertreatmentfacilities.150

Importantly,adoptingacost‐benefitframeworkdoesnotmeanthatperformancestandardsunderSection111cannotbetechnology‐forcing.Indeed,asdiscussedfurtherbelow,thestatute

145RICHARDL.REVESZ&MICHAELA.LIVERMORE,RETAKINGRATIONALITY:HOWCOST‐BENEFITANALYSISCANBETTERPROTECTTHEENVIRONMENTANDOURHEALTH10(2008).146Exec.OrderNo.12,866§1(a),58Fed.Reg.51,735(Sept.30,1993);Exec.OrderNo.13,563§1(b),76Fed.Reg.3,821(Jan.18,2011)(stipulatingthatagenciesmust“proposeoradoptaregulationonlyuponareasoneddeterminationthatitsbenefitsjustifyitscosts”).14742U.S.C.§7411(a)(1).148NewYorkv.Reilly,969F.2d1147,1150(D.C.Cir.1992).ThispositionisconsistentwiththattakenintherelevantExecutiveOrders,aswellasrecentSupremeCourtdecisions.See,e.g.,Entergyv.Riverkeeper,129S.Ct.1498(2009).149EndangermentandCauseorContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesUnderSection202(a)oftheCleanAirAct,74Fed.Reg.at66,538–39(“Thus,whenanalyzingwhetherasourcecategorythatemitswell‐mixedgreenhousegasesintheUnitedStatescontributestotheglobalproblem,itisappropriatefortheAdministratortoconsiderhowthatsourcecategoryfitsintothelargerpictureofU.S.emissions.”);StandardsofPerformanceforGreenhouseGasEmissionsforNewStationarySources:ElectricUtilityGeneratingUnits,77Fed.Reg.at22,395(“TheEPAisfocusingfirstonreducingemissionsfromthelargestemittersthroughmeasureswithreasonablecosts”);id.at22,396(“ThespecialcharacteristicsofGHGsmakeitimportanttotakeinitialstepstocontrolthelargestemissionscategorieswithoutdelay.”).150SeeEPA,InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasEmissionsandSinks:1990–2010,supranote129.

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authorizesEPAtomakereasonableextrapolationsoftechnologicalperformance.EPAneednotbelimitedtocomparingthebenefitsofgreenhousegasreductionsagainstcurrentcompliancecosts.Instead,EPAcanmaketechnologicalprojectionsandsetascheduleforautomaticallyphasinginstrongerstandardsovertime.

ExistingsourcesmustberegulatedunderSection111(d),andregulationshouldavoidgrandfathering.

Forgreenhousegases,thedevelopmentofnewsourceperformancestandardsforsourcecategoriesunderSection111(b)willautomaticallytriggertheneedforstatestodevelopperformancestandardsforexistingsourceswithinthosecategories.Performancestandardsfornewandexistingsourcesshouldbedevelopedinacoordinatedfashion,toavoidgrandfathering.

Section111(b)regulationtriggersSection111(d)regulation.

Section111(d)stipulatesthatEPAshallguidestatesonissuingperformancestandardsforexistingsourcesofpollutantsnotregulatedunderSection108(NationalAmbientAirQualityStandardprogram)or112(HazardousAirPollutantprogram),andthatwouldotherwiseberegulatedunderSection111iftheywereemittedbynewsources.151Section111(d)explainsthatstatesshoulddevelopplansfortheimplementationandenforcementoftheperformancestandards.152

GreenhousegasesarenotcurrentlyregulatedunderSections108or112.Therefore,asEPAcarriesoutitsmandatoryobligationstoregulatecertainnewsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionsunderSection111(b),stateswillneedtosubmitplanstocontrolthesepollutantsatexistingfacilities.153UnderthecurrentregulationsgoverningtheuseofSection111(d),EPAisrequiredtofirstpublishaguidancedocument.154Subsequently,eachstatemustsubmitimplementationplanswithemissionsstandards,whichcantaketheformofeither“anallowancesystemorprescri[ptionof]allowableratesofemissions.”155Asarguedbelow,inordertomaximizenetbenefits,statesshouldutilizetheallowanceprovisionstoimplementaflexible,market‐basedprogramunderSection111(d).

EPAshoulddeterminestandardsfornewandexistingsourcesatthesametime,tolimitgrandfathering.

Creatingmorelenientstandardsforexistingsourcesthanfornewsourcestypicallycreatesincentivestokeepexistingplantsinoperationlongerthaniseconomicallyefficient.EPAshoulddevelopstandardsforexistingandnewsourcesinacoordinatedfashiontominimizesuchinefficiencies.

Thecriticalconcernforgrandfatheringisthe“oldplanteffect,”inwhichexistingfacilitiesstayinoperationlongerthanisoptimalunderanefficientpollution‐pricingscheme.Differentialstandardsfornewandexistingplantsdistorttheeconomicanalysisthatplantownersundertakewhen

151See42U.S.C.§§7411(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii)(“TheAdministratorshallprescriberegulationswhichshallestablishaprocedure...underwhicheachStateshallsubmittotheAdministratoraplanwhich(A)establishesstandardsofperformanceforanyexistingsourceforanyairpollutant(i)forwhichairqualitycriteriahavenotbeenissuedorwhichisnotincludedonalistpublishedundersection7408(a)ofthistitleoremittedfromasourcecategorywhichisregulatedundersection7412ofthistitlebut(ii)towhichastandardofperformanceunderthissectionwouldapplyifsuchexistingsourcewereanewsource.”).152Id.§7411(d)(1)(B).153See,e.g.,ApprovalandPromulgationofStatePlansforDesignatedFacilitiesandPollutants;StateofIowa,69Fed.Reg.51,957(“Section111(d)oftheCAArequiresstatestosubmitplanstocontrolcertainpollutants(designatedpollutants)atexistingfacilities(designatedfacilities)wheneverstandardsofperformancehavebeenestablishedundersection111(b)ofthesametype,andEPAhasestablishedemissionguidelinesforsuchexistingsources.”).15440C.F.R.§60.22.155Id.§60.24(b)(1).

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decidingwhethertobuildanewplantortocontinueoperatingtheexistingone.156Newconstructionbecomesrelativelymoreexpensive(andkeepinganolderplantinoperationbecomesrelativelycheaper)thanitwouldbeifthelevelofregulationwereconsistentacrossallplants.Theseproblematicincentivescreateanoldplanteffect,keepingexistingplantsrunninganddelayingthetimelyclosureofold,inefficientfacilities.157(Forasummaryoftheempiricalevidencefor“oldplanteffects”underhistoricalCleanAirActregulations,seePolicyIntegrity’slettertoEPAandOIRAonthenewsourceperformancestandardsforpowerplants.158)

Inadditiontotheoldplanteffect,theCleanAirAct’sNewSourceReviewprovisionscreatea“significantimprovementeffect.”SinceNewSourceReviewistriggeredbysignificantmodifications,159differentialstandardsformodifiedandnon‐modifiedplantswillcauseexistingplantstomakelargemodificationslessfrequentlythanisoptimal.160Thisaddsasecondbarriertonewconstructionandinvestmentinup‐to‐datepowerplantfacilities.EPAshouldavoidreinforcingtheCleanAirAct’sexistingbarrierstosociallyoptimalinvestmentdecisions.

Itisthediscrepancybetweenthestandardsfornewandexistingsourcesthatcreatesthepotentialfornegativegrandfatheringeffects.Therefore,EPAshoulddevelopitsperformancestandardsfornewandexistingsourcesincoordinationandatthesametime,sotheagencycanexaminesuchdiscrepanciesandtrytominimizethenegativeeffectsofgrandfathering.161Byjointlysettingnewandexistingsourcestandards,EPAcanoptimizetheregulatoryregime:itmayachievegreateremissionsreductionsatthesamecostorachievethesameemissionsreductionsatalowercostthanbyfollowingthepastpracticeofenactingstrictnewsourcestandardswithfullgrandfathering.Thisdecisionmakingprocesswillensurethattheoverallregulatoryregimeoffersoptimalincentivesforthetimelyretirementofolderplants.

EPAshoulddefineamarketasthe“bestsystem.”

InEPA’sproposedperformancestandardsforpowerplants,theagencydefinesnaturalgascombinedcycleunitsasthe“bestsystemofemissionreduction,”162andsetstheperformancestandardat1,000poundsofcarbondioxidepermegawatt‐hour,basedonthedemonstratedperformanceofthattechnology.163However,EPAofferslittlejustificationforwhythattechnologyisthe“bestsystem”orwhythatstandardisthemostefficient.Infuturerulemakings,EPAshouldinterpret“bestsystem”toallowforflexiblecompliancemechanismslikemarkets.

Byenablingfirmstoidentifyandtakeadvantageofthelowest‐costopportunitiesforemissionsreductions,flexiblecompliancemechanismsincreasetheoverallefficiencyofregulation.164Several

156JonathanRemyNash&RichardL.Revesz,GrandfatheringandEnvironmentalRegulation:TheLawandEconomicsofNewSourceReview,101NW.U.L.REV.1677(2007);seealsoGarthHeutel,PlantVintages,Grandfathering,andEnvironmentalPolicy,61J.ENVTL.ECON.&MGMT.36(2010).157Nash&Revesz,supranote156,at1708.158 Letter from Policy Integrity, to OIRA and EPA, on Forthcoming Greenhouse Gas New Source Performance Standards for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, Dec. 1, 2011. 159See40C.F.R.§52.24(f)(6).160SeeNash&Revesz,supranote156,at1713‐14.161SeeRichardL.Revesz&AllisonL.WestfahlKong,RegulatoryChangeandOptimalTransitionRelief,105NW.U.L.REV.1581(2011).162StandardsofPerformanceforGreenhouseGasEmissionsforNewStationarySources:ElectricUtilityGeneratingUnits,77Fed.Reg.at22,414.163Id.at22,394.164Chettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at62–63;RobertN.Stavins,PolicyInstrumentsforClimateChange:HowCanNationalGovernmentsAddressaGlobalProblem?,1997U.CHI.LEGAL.F.293,297–98.

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typesofflexiblecompliancearelegallyavailabletoEPAunderthestatuteandareeconomicallyjustified,uptoandincludingmarket‐basedstructures.

EPAshouldinterpret“standardofperformance”and“bestsystem”topermitflexiblecompliancemechanisms.

AsdefinedinSection111(a)(1),astandardofperformanceisbasedon“thedegreeofemissionlimitationachievablethroughtheapplicationofthebestsystemofemissionreduction...takingintoaccountthecost.”165Thebroadtermsofthisprovision,aswellasarecentSupremeCourtdecisionholding“mostefficient”asonereasonableinterpretationofthe“best”regulatoryapproach,166giveEPAampleauthoritytoincorporateflexiblecomplianceintoitsgreenhousegasperformancestandards.EPAshouldexerciseitsdiscretionanddefineflexiblecompliancemechanisms,liketrading,asavitalpartofthemostefficientandbestsystemforreducinggreenhousegasemissionsunderSection111.

Nothingintheexpansivedefinitionof“standardofperformance”precludestheuseofflexiblecompliancemechanisms,andnonegativeinferenceagainstauthoritytoapplyflexiblemechanismsiswarranted.Inthecurrenttext,thestandardisdefinedintermsofa“system,”ratherthanaparticulartechnologyordesign.167In1990,CongressamendedSection111toremovetheword“technology”fromitsdefinitionofperformancestandards,demonstratingcongressionalintenttoincreasetheflexibilityofthe“standardofperformance”phraseandfreeingSection111(a)(1)fromanystatutoryrequirementthatthestandardsbetechnology‐based.168Similarly,inthecontextofnewandmodifiedsources,Section111(b)(5)expresslystatesthat,exceptasprovidedforinSection111(h)(whichaddressesworkpracticeandotheralternativestandards),“nothinginthissectionshallbeconstruedtorequire...anynewormodifiedsourcetoinstallandoperateanyparticulartechnologicalsystemofcontinuousemissionreductiontocomplywithanynewstandardofperformance.”169Thus,thestatutorytextandlegislativehistorysupportEPA’sauthoritytoapplyflexiblecompliancemechanisms.

Inaddition,thepresenceofageneraldefinitionof“standardofperformance”inSection302(l)oftheCleanAirActdoesnotprecludetheuseofflexiblecompliancemechanismsunderSection111.170WhilethedefinitionsinSection302doapplytotheCleanAirActasawhole,“[s]pecifictermsprevailoverthegeneralinthesameoranotherstatutewhichotherwisemightbecontrolling.”171ThegeneralprovisioncontainedinSection302(l)shouldnottrumpthedefinitionof“standardofperformance”containedinSection111(a)(1).

EvenifEPAbelievesthatthetextofSection302(l)isrelevanttointerpretationofSection111(a)(1),useofflexiblecompliancemechanismsisnotprohibited.WhileSection302(l)definesa“standardofperformance”asrequiring“continuousemissionreduction,”172theabsenceofsimilarlanguageinSection111indicatesthatthisrequirementdoesnotapplytonewsourceperformance

16542U.S.C.§7411(a)(1)(emphasisadded).166SeeEntergyCorp.v.Riverkeeper,Inc.,129S.Ct.1498,1506(2009)(“‘[B]esttechnology’may...describethetechnologythatmostefficientlyproducessomegood.Incommonparlanceonecouldcertainlyusethephrase‘besttechnology’torefertothatwhichproducesagoodatthelowestper‐unitcost.”).16742U.S.C.§7411(a)(1).168SeeJonasMonast,TimProfeta&BrooksRaineyPearson,Pre‐WorkshopPaper:RegulatingGreenhouseGasEmissionsfromExistingSources:Section111(d)andStateEquivalency7–10(2011)(citingEPA’sreferencetotheseamendments).16942U.S.C.§7411(b)(5)(emphasisadded).170Id.at§7602(l).171FourcoGlassCo.v.TransmirraProds.Corp.,353U.S.222,228–29(1957)(citationsandquotationmarksomitted).17242U.S.C.§7602(l).

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standards.173IfEPAstillbelievesthattherequirementisbyinferenceapplicabletoSection111,theagencycanincorporatestrategiestoensure“continuousemissionsreduction”thatarecompatiblewithflexiblecompliancemechanisms.Bysettingastandardmorestringentthancurrentemissionslevelsandrequiringuninterruptedcompliance,EPA’sregulationwouldachieve“continuousemissionreduction.”Further,EPAisrequiredunderSection111(b)torevisethestandards“fromtimetotime”174andcouldprovideforautomaticfuturereductionsintherule(ameritoriousapproachinitsownright,asdescribedbelow).EPAcouldalsoensure“continuousemissionreduction”byincludingprojectionsofplants’remainingusefullivesinanyemissionsbudgetallocationorbyretiringtheemissionsallowancesofretiredplants.175

EPAitselfhasinterpretedthephrase“standardofperformance”toallowtradingintworecentSection111rulemakings.InitsCleanAirMercuryRule,EPAenactedacap‐and‐tradesystemforexistingsourcesunderSection111.176Inthatrulemaking,EPAdeclaredthatatradablepermitprogramfitwithin“acarefulreadingofthesection111(a)definition[of]standardofperformance,”findingsupportinboththestatutorytextandthelegislativehistoryofthe1977CleanAirActAmendments.177Previously,EPAhadalsoauthorizedatradingschemeunderSection111(d)foremissionsofnitrogenoxides.178

RecentcourtdecisionsonEPAtradingprogramshaveleftintactEPA’sauthoritytoincludetradingmechanismswithinSection111regulations.TheD.C.Circuit’sdecisioninNewJerseyv.EPAdidstrikedowntheCleanAirMercuryRule’stradablepermitprogram,butthecourt’svacaturwasspurredbyEPA’sfailuretofollowproceduresspecifictoSection112.179ThecourtneverreachedtheentirelyunrelatedissueofEPA’sauthoritytoestablishtradablepermitprogramsunderSection111.180Similarly,thedecisionsinNorthCarolinav.EPAandEMEHomerCityGenerationv.EPAinvolvedEPA’stradingprogramsunderSection110,buttheD.C.Circuit’sdecisionstooverturnthoseruleswerespurredbylanguagespecifictoSection110(a)(2)(D)andunrelatedtoSection111’sprovisions.181TherequirementsofSection110arenotreflectedinthecapaciouslanguageofSection111;therefore,theNorthCarolinaandEMEHomerCityholdingsdonotapplyhere.

Furthermore,flexiblecompliancemechanismshavebeen“adequatelydemonstrated”asrequiredinSection111(a).MultipleEPAregulationshavesuccessfullyincorporatedemissionstrading.The

173Asdiscussedabove,§111(b)(5)expresslystatesthat,exceptasprovidedforin§111(h)(whichaddressesworkpracticeandotheralternativestandards),“nothinginthissectionshallbeconstruedtorequire...anynewormodifiedsourcetoinstallandoperateanyparticulartechnologicalsystemofcontinuousemissionreductiontocomplywithanynewstandardofperformance.”Id.§7411(b)(5)(emphasisadded).174Id.§7411(b).175Furtherdiscussionoftheroleof§302(l)ininterpretationof§111(a)(1)isavailableinChettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at86–88.176StandardsofPerformanceforNewandExistingStationarySources:ElectricUtilitySteamGeneratingUnits,70Fed.Reg.28,606,28,616–17(May18,2005)[hereinafterCAMR].177Seeid.17840C.F.R.§60.33b.179PriortoissuingCAMR,EPAhadremovedelectricutilitygeneratingunitsfromthelistofsourcesofmercuryregulatedunder§112withoutfollowingthespecificdelistingproceduresenumeratedin§112(c)(9).Thecourtconcludedthatelectricutilitygeneratingunitswerethereforestilllistedassourcesofmercuryunder§112andthusregulationoftheirmercuryemissionsunder§111wasunlawful.517F.3d574,578(D.C.Cir.2008).180Id.at584(“Inviewofourdisposition,thecourtdoesnotreachothercontentionsofpetitionersorintervenors.”).181531F.3d896,907(D.C.Cir.2008)(“BecauseCAIRisdesignedasacompleteremedytosection110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)problems,asEPAclaims,CAIRmustdomorethanachievesomethingmeasurable;itmustactuallyrequireeliminationofemissionsfromsourcesthatcontributesignificantlyandinterferewithmaintenanceindownwindnonattainmentareas.Todoso,itmustmeasureeachstate's‘significantcontribution’todownwindnonattainmentevenifthatmeasurementdoesnotdirectlycorrelatewitheachstate'sindividualizedairqualityimpactondownwindnonattainmentrelativetootherupwindstates.”(citationsomitted));seealsoEMEHomerCityGenerationv.EPA(D.C.Cir.Aug.21,2012).

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AcidRaintradablepermitprogramenactedunderthe1990CleanAirActAmendmentsreducedsulfurdioxideemissionsdramaticallyinitsfirsttwelveyears,evenaselectricitygenerationincreasedduringthesameperiod.182ThenitrogenoxidesSIPCallalsousedatradablepermitschemetoreduceemissionswithinthecoveredtwenty‐onestatesandtheDistrictofColumbia.183

Theargumentfortradingappliestobothnewandexistingsourcesinalmostidenticalform.BothSections111(b)and(d)usetheterm“standardofperformance,”definedinSection111(a),whichcanincludetradingmechanismswithinitsscopeasdescribedabove.Nevertheless,somecommentatorshavearguedthatlegalauthorityfortradingmaybemoresecureunderSection111(d),forexistingsources.184Section111(d)instructsstatestouseanimplementationplan‐likeprocesssimilartowhatisestablishedunderSection110.SinceSection110specificallyreferencesstates’abilitytousemarket‐basedmechanismsintheirimplementationplans,185thestatutoryargumentforflexibilityisarguablystrongerforexistingsources.However,ultimatelytheinclusionofflexiblecompliancemechanismsunderSection111turnsonthedefinitionof“standardofperformance,”whichappliesequallytonewandexistingsources.

EPAhasgreatdiscretiontointerprettermslike“bestsystem”underthestatute,buttheagencyshouldexercisethisdiscretionconsistentlywiththegoalsoftheexecutiveorders—namely,tomakeregulatorydecisionsthatmaximizenetbenefitsandutilizeefficient,flexiblecomplianceoptions.186Assuch,EPAshoulddefinethe“bestsystem”asaflexible,market‐basedapproach,whichwillincentivizefirmstodiscoverthemostefficientwaystoreducepollution.

Multipleflexiblemechanisms,includingcap‐and‐auctionmarkets,areavailabletoEPA.

AsdiscussedmoreextensivelyinprevioussubmissionstoEPAfromPolicyIntegrity,multipleflexiblemechanismsareavailableunderSection111,including“bubbling,”“bankingandborrowing,”intra‐categoryandinter‐statetrading,andre‐definingsourcecategoriesbroadlytofacilitateintra‐sectortrading.187ButEPAhastheevengreaterauthoritytobaseitsperformancestandardsonasystemofinter‐categorytradingwithoffsets,suchasthatachievedbyacap‐and‐auctionprogram.Giventheincreasedefficiencythatcomesfromincreasingthegeographicandsectoralcoverageofamarketbyallowingregulatedentitiestotakeadvantageofthelowest‐costabatementopportunityinanystateandinanyindustry,andgiventheinstructionsofexecutiveorderstomaximizeregulatoryefficiency,EPAshouldpursuemarket‐basedperformancestandards.

EPAhasseveralargumentsthatithaslegalauthoritytoapplyacap‐and‐auctionprogramunderSection111.188Thebroaddefinitionof“standardofperformance”inSection111(a)(1)requiresEPAtodeterminethe“bestsystemofemissionreduction”;thestatutemakesnoexplicitrequirementthatsucha“system”beaplant‐basedemissionscontrolratherthanatradingscheme.Similarly,thestatutemakesnorequirementthattheemissionsreductionsattributedtoafacilitybemadeon‐siteatthefacilityitself.189Forexistingsources,someadditionallegaljustificationscome 182SeeCAMR,70Fed.Reg.28,606,28,617(describingtheAcidRainprogram).183Id.(describingtheNOxSIPCall).184See,e.g.,ResourcesfortheFuture,Ctr.forClimateChangeLaw&Inst.forPolicyIntegrity,PrevailingAcademicViewonComplianceFlexibilityunder§111oftheCAA4‐6(2011).18542U.S.C.§7410(a)(2)(A)(“Eachsuchplanshallincludeenforceableemissionlimitationsandothercontrolmeasures,means,ortechniquesincludingeconomicincentivessuchasfees,marketablepermits,andauctionsofemissionsrights.”).186Exec.OrderNo.12,866at§1(a);Exec.OrderNo.13,563at§1(b).187See,e.g.,CommentsfromPolicyIntegrity,toEPA,ontheProposedRuleonStandardsofPerformanceforGreenhouseGasEmissionsforNewStationarySources,June25,2012.188EPAmaybelimitedinitsabilitytorebateauctionrevenuedirectlybacktoconsumers,butstateswouldlikelyretainsuchauthority.SeeChettiar&Schwartz,supranote103,at67‐68.189Section111(b)specifiesthatEPA“shallpublishproposedregulations,establishingFederalstandardsofperformancefornewsources”;similarly,§111(d)statesthatEPA“shallprescriberegulations...underwhicheachStateshallsubmitto

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intoplay.Section111(d)explicitlyreferstotheproceduresofSection110,whichallowstatesplanstoinclude“economicincentivessuchasfees,marketablepermits,andauctionsofemissionrights.”Similarly,EPAregulationsunderSection111(d)authorizestatestoadoptan“allowancesystem”intheirplans.EPAexercisedthisauthoritywhenitappliedacap‐and‐tradeapproachinitsCleanAirMercuryRule.190Thatprogram’slegalitywasneverresolvedincourt,astherulewasvacatedonothergrounds.191

FormoreonEPA’sauthoritytoconstructacap‐and‐auctionprogramcoveringallregulatedsourcecategoriesunderSection111,ontheefficiencyadvantagesofthatapproachoverarate‐basedapproach,andonbuildinginlegalsafeguardsbymakingthetradingprovisionsseverablefromtheoverallregulations,seePolicyIntegrity’scommentstoEPAonitsproposedgreenhousegasperformancestandardsforpowerplants.192

EPAshouldautomaticallyphaseinstrongerstandardsovertime.

EPAshouldphaseinstrongerstandardsovertimeunderSection111.Thisapproachwouldallowperformancestandardstoreflectandfosteremerginggreenhousegasreductionstrategies,suchasnewefficiencytechnologies,newgenerationoptions,andcarboncaptureandsequestration.Apredeterminedscheduleofemissionsreductionswouldclarifyfutureobligationsandallowregulatedentitiestoplaninvestmentsfarinadvance—aparticularlysalutaryfeatureforthepredetermined,capital‐intensiveinvestmentpatternofmanyregulatedsectors.

UnderSection111,EPAmustseta“standardofperformance”thatreflectsthe“degreeofemissionlimitationachievablethroughtheapplicationofthebestsystemofemissionreductionwhich...hasbeenadequatelydemonstrated.”193Withrespecttonewsources,theD.C.CircuithasruledthatSection111hasatechnology‐forcingmandateand“lookstowardwhatmayfairlybeprojectedfortheregulatedfuture,ratherthanthestateoftheartatpresent.”194Thus,neither“adequatelydemonstrated”nor“achievable”meansthatthestandardislimitedtowhatcanalreadyberoutinelyachieved.WhileEPAcannotbasestandardsonpuretheoryorspeculation,itcanmakereasonableextrapolationsoftechnologicalperformance.AperformancestandardthatprescribedfuturephasesbasedonreasonableexpectationsoffuturetechnologycouldfallwithinEPA’sdiscretiontointerpretwhatis“adequatelydemonstrated.”195

theAdministratoraplanwhich[]establishesstandardsofperformanceforanyexistingsource.”42U.S.C.§§7411(b)(1)(B),(d)(1)(emphasisadded).Thislanguagedoesnotincludeanyrequirementthatemissionsreductionsoccuratthesource.Instead,itrequiresEPAtosetstandardsforeachsource.AslongasEPAappliesits“standardofperformance”toanynewand(throughstateplans)existingsources,itsstandardfulfillstherequirementsof§111,regardlessofwhethersourcescomplybyimplementingtheirownemissionsabatementmeasuresorbypurchasingcreditsorallowancesfromqualifiedsources.190SeeCAMR,70Fed.Reg.28,606,28,616(“Inthefinalrule,EPAinterpretstheterm‘standardofperformance,’asappliedtoexistingsources,toincludeacap‐and‐tradeprogram.Thisinterpretationissupportedbyacarefulreadingofthesection111(a)definitionoftheterm,quotedabove:Arequirementforacap‐and‐tradeprogram(i)constitutesa‘standardforemissionsofairpollutants’(i.e.,aruleforairemissions),(ii)‘whichreflectsthedegreeofemissionlimitationachievable’(i.e.,whichrequiresanamountofemissionsreductionsthatcanbeachieved),(iii)‘throughapplicationof(a)...systemofemissionreduction’(i.e.,inthiscase,acap‐and‐tradeprogramthatcapsallowancesatalevellowerthancurrentemissions).”).191SeeNewJerseyv.EPA,517F.3d574,578(D.C.Cir.2008).192Seesupranote187.19342U.S.C.§7411(a)(1).194PortlandCementAss’nv.Ruckelshaus,486F.2d375,391(D.C.Cir.1973).195SeeLigniteEnergyCouncilv.EPA,198F.3d930,934(D.C.Cir.1999)(quotingPortlandCement,486F.2dat391);SierraClubv.Costle,657F.2d298,346(D.C.Cir.1981)(NSPSshould“notstymieinnovation.SolongasEPAconsidersinnovativetechnologiesintermsoftheirprospectiveeconomic,energy,nonairhealthandenvironmentalimpactstheagencyiswithinthescopeofitsauthorizedanalysis.”);Nat’lAsphaltPavementAss’nv.Train,539F.2d775,785–86(D.C.Cir.1976)

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ThemandateinSection111thatEPAconsidercostsalsoarguesinfavorofEPAdiscretiontoestablishapredetermined,incrementalschedule.196Iftheagencywereforcedtosetasinglestandardtogovernfortheforeseeablefuture,thestandardwouldlikelybemorestringentattheoutsetandthusmorecostly.EPAcanarguethatsettingastandardthatincreasesinstringencyovertimeisanallowableexerciseofitsdiscretiontoconsidercosts.197

Inthepast,EPAhascommittedtophasinginincreasinglystringentemissionslimitsunderSection111.TheCleanAirMercuryRule’scap‐and‐tradeprogramfornewandexistingsources,whichwasestablishedasa“standardofperformance”underSection111,includedtwophasesandmandatedamorestringentemissionslimitinthesecondphase.198Therule’sfirstphasecalculateditscapbasedonlyonemissionsreductionsachievableasco‐benefitsfromtheCleanAirInterstateRule.199EPAassertedthatinformationonmercury‐specifictechnologieswas“onlyadequateforustoconcludethatsuchtechnologiesareadequatelydemonstratedforuse”inthesecondphase.200Asaresult,EPAfactoredadditionalreductionsfromuseofmercury‐specificcontrolsintoitscalculationofthesecondphasecap,butnotintocalculationsforthefirstphase.201

InthefinalCleanAirMercuryRule,EPAstatedthatatwo‐phaseapproachwaspermissiblefornewsourcesunderprecedentthatinterpreted§111(b)as“authoriz[ing]EPAto‘looktowardwhatmayfairlybeprojectedfortheregulatedfuture,ratherthanthestate‐of‐the‐artatpresent.’”202Forexistingsources,EPAmaintainedthatbecauseSection111(d)affordedmoreflexiblecompliancedeadlines,atwo‐phaseapproachwasalsopermissible.203WhiletheD.C.Circuitlatervacatedthatmercuryrule(whichhassincebeenreplaced,andiscurrentlyundernewlitigationintheD.C.Circuit),thecourtruledonunrelatedgroundsanddidnotaddressthelegalitythetwo‐phaseapproachunderSection111.204

PastprecedentandtheimperativethatEPAconsidercostsinthisrulemakingmakeclearthatEPAcanandshouldphaseinstricterstandardsovertime,bothtocomplywiththeletterofthestatuteandtobestservetheunderlyinggoalofachievingoptimallevelsofemissionsreductions.

EPAmustsetperformancestandardsforunregulated,significantstationarysources.

Inadditiontopromptlyfinalizingitsperformancestandardsfornewandexistingpowerplants,andrespondingtoallotherpendingpetitionsunderSection111,EPAmusttakeactionstoregulatesignificantstationarysourcesofgreenhousegases,whetheralready‐listed(suchaslandfills)orunlisted(suchasagriculture).Adoptingmarket‐basedregulationscanharmonizethissector‐by‐sectorapproachandmaximizeefficiency.Buttocomprehensivelyaddressgreenhousegaspollution,EPAmustcomplementsuchstationarysourceregulationwithactiononmobilesources.

(“adequatelydemonstrateddoesnotmeanthatexisting[facilities]mustbecapableofmeetingthe[newsource]standard;tothecontrary,‘section111lookstowardwhatmayfairlybeprojectedfortheregulatedfuture,ratherthanthestateoftheartatpresent.’”)(quotingPortlandCement,486F.2dat391).19642U.S.C.§7411(a)(1)(“takingintoaccountthecostofachievingsuchreduction”).197Forfurtherdiscussion,seePrevailingAcademicView,supranote184,at9–10.198SeeCAMR,70Fed.Reg.28,606,28,607.199Id.at28,618.200Id.at28,617–18.201Id.at28,620–21(“TheEPAhas...establishedaPhaseIIHgemissionscapbasedonthereductionsinHgemissionsfoundedintheCAIRprogramandreductionsthatcanbereasonablyobtainedthroughtheuseofHg‐specificcontrols.”).202Id.at28,620(quotingPortlandCementAss’nv.Ruckelshaus,486F.2d375,391(D.C.Cir.1973)).203Id.(“WebelievethatEPAstandardssetundertheauthorityofCAAsection111(d),wherethecompliancedeadlinesarenotsoimmediate,affordEPAsignificantflexibility,commensuratewiththeamountoflead‐timebeinggiventoaffectedsources.”).204SeeNewJerseyv.EPA,517F.3d574,584(D.C.Cir.2008).

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IV.EPAShouldRegulateAllSignificantMobileSourcesunderTitleII.

IfEPAdoesnotenactcomprehensiveregulationsunderSection115orTitleVI,itwillneedtosupplementitsstationarysourcecontrolswithmobilesourceregulationunderTitleII.EPAhasbeguntoaddressgreenhousegasemissionsfrommobilesourcesthroughTitleII,butexistingregulationsareincomplete:severalsignificantcategoriesofmobilesourcesremainunchecked.Tomostefficientlyaddressmobilesectoremissions,EPAshouldestablishacap‐and‐tradesystemforvehiclefuels.Alternatively,EPAcouldinsteaddevelopefficiencystandardsorotherregulationstocontrolemissionsfromaircraft,marinevessels,non‐roadvehicles,buses,locomotives,motorcycles,andtrucktrailers.

EPAhasreceivedseveralformalpetitionstoregulategreenhousegasesemissionsfrommobilesources.205Bylaw,EPAmust,withinareasonableamountoftime,issueitsfinaldeterminationwithrespecttothesependingpetitions.206Inparticular,in2009,PolicyIntegritypetitionedEPAtoinstituteacap‐and‐tradesystemforgreenhousegasemissionsfromvehiclefuels.207TheactioncalledforisdetailedinPolicyIntegrity’spetition,aswellasitssubsequentlettersentNovember28,2012.Thosedocumentsalsoexplainwhyacap‐and‐tradeforvehiclefuelswouldbethemostefficientwaytoregulatethemobilesourcesector.

IfEPAregulatesvehiclefuels,thensupplementalregulationofgreenhousegasemissionfromairconditioningsystemsmaybesufficienttocoverallsignificantemissionsfrommobilesources.Otherwise,however,EPAwillneedtodevelopefficiencystandardsforunregulatedmobilesourcestoensurecomprehensivecoverageofgreenhousegases.

SeveralpartieshavealreadypetitionedEPAtosetgreenhouseemissionsstandardsforunregulatedmobilesourcessuchasmarinevessels,aircrafts,andnon‐roadvehicles.208Litigationispendingonsomeofthesepetitions.Wherethestatutesetsamandatorydutytoregulatedangerousemissions,asitdoesforaircraft,EPAmustmovetowardemissionsstandardswithoutunreasonabledelay.WherethestatutegrantsEPAmorediscretion,asitdoesfornon‐roadandmarinevehicles,theagencyshouldneverthelessdevelopanycost‐benefitjustifiedregulation.

Afewremainingcategoriesofmobilesourcehavenotbeenthesubjectofpetitions.PolicyIntegrityherebypetitionsEPAforgreenhousegasregulationofthoseremainingsources,inparticularmotorcyclesandthetrailersofheavy‐dutytrucks.Motorcyclescontribute2.1milliontonsofcarbondioxideannuallytototalU.S.emissions.209EPAshouldalsoestablishdesignstandardsfortrailers.AsEPArecognizes,“theaerodynamicandtirerollingresistanceimprovementstotrailersrepresentasignificantopportunitytoreducefuelconsumptionandGHGs.”210

205SeeJAMESE.MCCARTHY,CONG.RESEARCHSERV.,CARS,TRUCKS,ANDCLIMATE:EPAREGULATIONOFGREENHOUSEGASESFROMMOBILE

SOURCES6(2010).20642U.S.C.§7604(a)(2006)(grantingjurisdictiontodistrictcourtsto“compel…agencyactionunreasonablydelayed”).OnMarch20,2012theD.C.DistrictCourtorderedEPAtorespond,withinninetydays,totheCenterforBiologicalDiversity’sthreeoutstandingpetitionsregardingtheregulationofGHGsfrommarinevessels,aircraft,andothernon‐roadenginesandvehicles.Ctr.forBiologicalDiversityv.EPA,2012U.S.Dist.LEXIS37870,*3(2012).207PetitionfromPolicyIntegrity,toEPA,forRulemakingUnderSections211and231oftheCleanAirActtoInstituteaCap‐and‐TradeSystemforGreenhouseGasEmissionsfromVehicleFuels(2009).208See,e.g.,PetitionfromCalifornia,toEPA,forRuleMakingSeekingtheRegulationofGreenhouseGasEmissionsfromOcean‐GoingVessels(2007);PetitionfromCtr.forBiologicalDiversityetal.,forRulemakingUnderthecleanAirActtoReducetheEmissionofAirPollutantsfromMarineShippingVesselsthatContributetoGlobalClimateChange(2007).209SeeMcCarthy,supranote205,at4,7(indicatingthatmobilesourcesrepresent23.6%ofU.S.emissionsandthatmotorcyclesconstitute.1%ofthatamount).Whenregulatingmotorcycles,EPAmust“considertheneedtoachieveequivalencyofemissionsreductionsbetweenmotorcyclesandothermotorvehicles.”42U.S.C.§7521(a)(3)(E).210GreenhouseGasEmissionsStandardsandFuelEfficiencyStandardsforMedium‐andHeavy‐DutyEnginesandVehicles,76Fed.Reg.57,106,57,111(Sept.15,2011).

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Conclusion

Greenhousegasesrepresentasignificantthreattoglobalhealthandwelfare.EPAhasalreadybegundevelopingsomeregulationsundertheCleanAirActtocontrolthisdangerouspollution,anditshouldcontinuetoexercisethoseauthorities:inparticular,EPAshouldpromptlyfinalizeitspendingperformancestandardsfornewandexistingpowerplants.

However,manyremainingsourcesofauthorityintheCleanAirActhavenotyetbeenutilizedtorespondtotheenvironmentalcrisisofclimatechange.SomeoftheseauthoritiesaremandatoryandwouldenableEPAtodevelopefficientandcomprehensiveregulationofgreenhousegases.PolicyIntegritypetitionsEPAtoactonthesestatutoryobligations:

1. MakeaformalfindingthattheprerequisitesforactiontocontrolinternationalairpollutionunderSection115havebeensatisfiedforgreenhousegases;requirestatestorevisetheirCleanAirActimplementationplanstocontroltheirdangerousgreenhousegaspollutionbymakingreasonableprogresstowardabatement;andadvisestatesontheiroptionsforimplementationunderSection115,includingflexibleregulatorytoolslikemarkets.

2. InitiateapubliccallforinformationunderTitleVIregardingtheeffectofgreenhousegasesonthestratosphere;ifthescientificevidenceexists,issueanendangermentfindingunderSection615;anduponissuinganendangermentfinding,controlgreenhousegasemissionsthroughflexibleregulatorytoolslikemarkets.

3. UseSection111tolistadditionalsourcecategoriesthatcontributesignificantlytogreenhousegaspollution,includingagriculturalsources,andtodevelopperformancestandardsforsuchcategorieswithinayearoftheirlisting;revisetheperformancestandardsforalready‐listedsourcecategoriestocoversignificantgreenhousegasemissions,suchasforlandfills,naturalgasandpetroleumsystems,andvariousmanufacturingindustries;instructstatestodevelopperformancestandardsforexistingsources,andtodosoincoordinationwithEPA’snewsourceperformancestandards,toavoidgrandfathering;forbothnewandexistingsources,defineamarketasthe“bestsystem”ofcontrol;andautomaticallyphaseinstrongerperformancestandardsovertime.

4. UseTitleIItopromulgateemissionsstandardsforallmobilesourcesnotyetregulatedorpetitionedtoberegulated,includingmotorcyclesandthetrailersofheavy‐dutytrucks.

Theprovisionsofthispetitionareseverable:ifanypartisinvalidorunenforceable,theinvalidityorlackoflegalobligationshallnotaffectotherterms.Asrequiredbylaw,EPAmustgivethispetitionpromptconsideration.Petitionerrequestsasubstantiveresponsewithin180calendardays.

RespectfullySubmitted,MichaelA.LivermoreJasonASchwartzHelenaS.SiljestromChristopherDodgeAlinaJ.FortsonInstituteforPolicyIntegrityatNYUSchoolofLaw139MacDougalStreet,WilfHall,Suite317NewYork,NY10012(212)988‐6093jason.schwartz@nyu.edu