verifying the agreed framework · nuclear fuel cycle the entire life cycle of nuclear fuel,...

UCRL-ID-142036CGSR-2001-001

Verifying the Agreed FrameworkApril 2001

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UCRL-ID-142036CGSR-2001-001

Verifying the Agreed FrameworkApril 2001

Michael May, General Editor Chaim BraunGeorge Bunn

Zachary DavisJames Hassberger

Ronald LehmanWayne RuhterWilliam Sailor

Robert SchockNancy Suski

GLOSSARY

neutrons. The most common of thesematerials are uranium-235 (235U) andplutonium-239 (239Pu). Uranium-233(233U) is also fissile.

Fuel-fabrication facility/plantfacility where nuclear materials (e.g.,enriched or natural uranium) are fabri-cated into fuel elements to be insertedinto a reactor

Fuel-grade plutoniumplutonium containing less than 80 per-cent plutonium-239 (239Pu) and 7 to 18percent plutonium-240 (240Pu)

Gas-graphite reactora nuclear reactor cooled by a gas andmoderated by graphite

Highly enriched uranium (HEU)uranium in which the percentage ofuranium-235 (235U) is raised(“enriched”) from a natural level of0.71 percent to greater than 20 percent.All HEU can be used to make nuclearexplosives, although a very largequantity is required for HEU enrichedto only 20 percent.

IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency

INFCIRCInformation Circular, a series of IAEAdocuments regarding safeguards, etc.

IRT reactorSoviet-designed research reactorfueled with enriched uranium andmoderated with water

KEDOKorean Peninsula EnergyDevelopment Organization

KSNPKorea Standard Nuclear Plant

Kumho sitelocation where the KEDO-suppliedreactors are being built in North Korea

Light-water reactor (LWR)a reactor that uses ordinary water as amoderator and coolant and low-enriched uranium as fuel

Low-enriched uranium (LEU)uranium containing more than 0.71percent and less than 20 percent urani-um-235 (235U). Most modern light-water power reactors use 3–5 percentLEU. LEU is insufficiently enriched in235U to be used for nuclear explosives.

Magnoxuranium nuclear fuel with magnesium-alloy cladding. Because this claddingcorrodes easily, this type of fuel is diffi-cult to store safely for a long period oftime or dispose of in a geologic reposi-tory. Typically, irradiated magnox fuelis reprocessed shortly after it isremoved from the reactor core.

MW(e)Megawatt-electric, used in reference toa nuclear power plant, equals one mil-lion watts of electricity

MW(th)Megawatt-thermal, one million wattsof heat

Natural uraniumuranium containing 0.71 percent urani-um-235 (235U)

NPTNon-Proliferation Treaty

Nuclear fuel cyclethe entire life cycle of nuclear fuel,including the front end (initial mining,milling, conversion, enrichment andfuel fabrication), reactor irradiation(and resulting power generation), andthe back end (including spent-fuelstorage, reprocessing and recycling,and disposal)

ROKRepublic of Korea, commonly calledSouth Korea

Safeguards Agreement An agreementof a country having nuclear activitieswith the IAEA providing for safe-guards (nuclear material accountingand control plus periodic inspections)to assure that nuclear material is notdiverted to nuclear explosives

AFAgreed Framework, signed in 1994between the US and the DPRK, tonegotiate nuclear issues on the Koreanpeninsula

Agreement for Cooperationwhat US law requires the US govern-ment to negotiate with countries(including the DPRK) before USnuclear materials or US nuclear com-ponents can be provided for reactorsfor those countries, including the ROKreactors which KEDO plans to send toDPRK pursuant to the AF

BOLBeginning of Life, generally used withBOL fuel, the first cycle in a reactor

Burnupa measure of the thermal energy pro-duced per mass of fuel (usually meas-ured in megawatts-thermal-days pertonne [MWth-d/t])

Control rodsrods of neutron-absorbing materialinserted into the core of a reactor tocontrol its operations. Pushing in therods decreases the rate of reaction,while removing the rods increases therate of reaction.

Corethe central part of a nuclear reactorcontaining the fuel rods, moderator,and control rods, where the nuclei ofthe fuel fission and release energy

DPRKDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea,commonly called North Korea

Enrichmentthe process of increasing the concentra-tion of one isotope of a given element(in the case of uranium, increasing theconcentration of uranium-235). Also, theresulting concentration of that isotope.

EOLEnd of Life, generally used with EOLfuel, the third cycle in a reactor

Fissile materialmaterial composed of atoms that fissionwhen irradiated by slow (“thermal”)

CONTENTS

Introduction: Verification and the Challenges to Constructive Engagement with North Korea . 1Technical Questions, Strategic Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Nuclear Cooperation: Two Sides of a Coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Means Versus Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Program Management, IAEA Interaction, and Challenges to Preventive Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Dynamics of Technology–Policy Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4By What Standard Shall We Judge, and When? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Verifying the Agreed Framework: Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Safeguarding the Nuclear-Power Reactors Provided by KEDO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Verification of the DPRK’s Declaration and of the Disposal and Dismantlement of Identified or Suspect Nuclear Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Verification of DPRK’s Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Verification of the Disposal and Dismantlement of Identified Yongbyon Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Verification Regarding Other Suspect Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Possible Adverse Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Further Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Non-Cooperation with the IAEA’s Verification of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Need for an Amended DPRK Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Disagreements Over Material To Be Transferred from the DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Disagreements Over the Site of Ultimate Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Disagreements Over the Extent of Safeguards for KEDO Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Interference with Safeguards for KEDO Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Abrogation of AF or NPT after the KEDO Reactors Are Installed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Executive Summary Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Organization of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Authors and Sponsors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Chapter 1 A Brief History of the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons-Related Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151.1 Early History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151.2 Attempts To Restrain the DPRK From Making Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161.3 Agreed Framework of October 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Notes to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Chapter 2 Currently Applicable Safeguards and Related Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232.1 The Existing IAEA–DPRK Safeguards Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232.2 New Information That the IAEA May Ask of All States Under INFCIRC 153 Safeguards . . . . 242.3 Additions to INFCIRC 153 Safeguards for States Willing

To Agree to a New INCFIRC 540 Safeguards Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242.3.1 Safeguards on Existing ROK LWRs—Models for the DPRK LWRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2.4 Major Challenges Ahead to the Implementation of the Agreed Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.4.1 Completion of a “Significant Portion” of the First Reactor in the ROK and Reactor Buildings

in the DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.4.2 Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.4.3 Nuclear Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.4.4 US–DPRK “Agreement for Cooperation” and IAEA Inspection of Undeclared Facilities . . 262.4.5 Improving North Korea’s Electricity Distribution System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Notes to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Chapter 3 The KEDO Reactors and Associated Facilities and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293.2 The KEDO Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293.3 Nuclear-Power Development Along the Shores of the East Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303.4 Site Work to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313.5 Nuclear-Fuel Shipments Into and Out of the Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333.6 Electricity Transmission Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353.7 The ROK’s Energy Development Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Notes to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

iii

Chapter 4 Safeguards on the KEDO Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414.2 Project Organization To Supply the KEDO Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414.3 Description of the KEDO Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424.4 Refueling Operation in the KEDO Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4.4.1 The Special Problem of the Beginning-of-Life and End-of-Life Fuel Discharges . . . . . . . 494.5 IAEA Safeguarding of Nuclear Fuel in the KEDO Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

4.5.1 The Safeguards Goals for Quantity and Timeliness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504.5.2 The Safeguards Accounting Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514.5.3 Material Balance Area in KEDO-type Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514.5.4 The Containment and Surveillance Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524.5.5 Safeguards Inspections During Routine Plant Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534.5.6 The Physical Inventory Verification Type of Safeguards Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

4.6 Assessment of Additional Measurements and Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554.6.1 Measures for Strengthened Safeguards Under INFCIRC 153: Environmental Sampling . . . . 554.6.2 Measures for Strengthened Safeguards Under INFCIRC 153: Remote Monitoring . . . . . . . . 554.6.3 Measures for Strengthened Safeguards Under INFCIRC 153: Other Recommended Steps . 564.6.4 Satellite Remote Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

4.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Notes to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Chapter 5 Diversion and Misuse Scenarios for Light-Water Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595.1 Scope and Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595.2 Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

5.2.1 Scenario: Covert Diversion of Spent Fuel Produced During Normal Reactor Operations . 605.2.2 Scenario: Covert Materials Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615.2.3 Scenario: Short-Cycling the Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625.2.4 Scenario: Overt Reconfiguration of the Reactor for Materials Production . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

5.3 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645.4 Preventive Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Notes to Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Chapter 6 Known and Suspected Nuclear-Related Facilities in the DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676.1 Inspection, Dismantlement, and Disposal Requirements for Existing Nuclear Facilities . . . . . 67

6.1.1 “Full-Compliance” Inspections by the IAEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676.1.2 Disposal of Spent Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676.1.3 Dismantlement of Gas-Graphite Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

6.2 The Facilities at Yongbyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676.2.1 The IRT-2000 Research Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686.2.2 Isotope Production Laboratory Near the IRT-2000 Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686.2.3 Probable Undeclared Waste Site South of the IRT-2000 Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686.2.4 Declared Waste Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686.2.5 Graphite-Moderated Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686.2.6 Fuel Reprocessing Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696.2.7 Undeclared Waste Storage Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706.2.8 Other Unfinished Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

6.3 Verification of the Initial DPRK Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706.4 Verification of Fuel Disposal and Facility Dismantlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6.4.1 Spent-Fuel Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 746.4.2 Dismantlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6.5 How Much Verification Is Enough? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Notes to Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Chapter 7 Timeline for Verification and Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Completion of a Significant Portion of the Project Site at Kumho, DPRK, and of the First KEDO Reactor in the ROK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79IAEA Declaration that the DPRK Is in Compliance with Its Safeguards Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . 79Start of Delivery of Key Nuclear Components of the First KEDO Reactor to the Kumho Site Simultaneously with Start of Transfer of DPRK’s Spent Fuel from Yongbyon to Its Ultimate Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

iv

Simultaneous Completion of Yongbyon Spent-Fuel Transfer and of the First KEDO Reactor . . . . 80Dismantlement of DPRK’s Graphite-Moderated Reactors and Related Facilities Begins . . . . . . . 81Deliveries of the Nuclear Components for the Second KEDO Reactor in Parallel with Proportional Steps by the DPRK To Dismantle All Its Graphite Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Completion of Second KEDO Reactor at Kumho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Shipping Spent KEDO Reactor Fuel When Appropriate Out of the DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Chapter 8 Potential Adverse Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838.1 Benchmark Scenario: The DPRK Fully Cooperates

with the IAEA Regarding Existing Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838.2 Scenario 1: The DPRK Maintains Its Present Level of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848.3 Scenario 2: The DPRK Attempts Covertly To Divert or Hide Nuclear Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 858.4 Scenario 3: The DPRK Abrogates the Agreed Framework or Other Key Agreement . . . . . . . 858.5 Scenario 4: The US or the ROK Is Unable or Unwilling To Meet Its

Commitments under the Agreed Framework Even Though the DPRK Does . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878.6 Predicting the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87Notes to Chapter 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Verifying the Agreed Framework: Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Safeguarding the KEDO Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Past DPRK Nuclear Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Possible Adverse Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

FIGURES

Introduction Figure. Parallel interaction paths related to the Agreed Framework (AF) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Figure 1-1. General map of the Korean peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Figure 3-1. General map of the DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Figure 3-2. Locations of nuclear reactors around the East Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Figure 3-3. The vicinity of the Light-Water Reactor (LWR) project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Figure 3-4. Artist’s conception of the future site for the KEDO reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Figure 3-5. Scope of the grading efforts in the construction area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Figure 4-1. Organization chart for the supply of a Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) reactor . . 41Figure 4-2. Side view of a Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Figure 4-3. A top view of the Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Figure 4-4. Schematic of the primary system layout in the containment building . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Figure 4-5. Internal layout of the Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) reactor vessel . . . . . . . 45Figure 4-6. Schematic of a fuel assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Figure 4-7. Fuel transfer process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Figure 4-8. The relationships between plutonium production, quality, and burnup . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Figure 4-9. Light-Water Reactor (LWR) layout showing the containment and surveillance process . . 52Figure 4-10. Advanced camera–seal system implemented in the Republic of Korea (ROK) reactors. . 53Figure 4-11.Additional monitoring measures that could augment

existing safeguards activities at the KEDO reactors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Figure 5-1. Plutonium discharged from LWR operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Figure 6-1. Satellite image of the Yongbyon site in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Figure 6-2. The buried and the new waste site near the uncompleted 50-MW(e) graphite reactor . . . 69Figure 6-3. Satellite image showing the plutonium separation building

and associated buildings and the suspect waste building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70Figure 6-5. The measurements at the radiochemical lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Figure 6-4. Nuclear program at 5-MW(e) graphite reactor and radiochemical lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Figure 6-6. The suspected route used to produce plutonium with the IRT-2000 research reactor . 73

v

TABLES

Executive Summary Table. Envisaged time sequence of events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Table 3-1. Status of nuclear power plants in South Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Table 4-1. Characteristics of the Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Table 4-2. Commercial remote-sensing platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Table 5-1. Accumulation of Light-Water Reactor (LWR) plutonium in spent fuel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Table 6-1. Visits and inspections by the IAEA of North Korean facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Table 7-1. Summary of steps bearing on verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

SIDEBARS

Spent Fuel and Plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Significant Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Plutonium and Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

vi

The Agreed Framework (AF)between the United States ofAmerica and the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea(DPRK), signed in Geneva onOctober 21, 1994, has become thecenterpiece of recent US efforts toreduce the threat of conflict withNorth Korea. In particular, it seeksto bring the DPRK into compliancewith its obligations under thenuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) not to acquire nuclearweapons. The AF document setsgoals, outlines programs, initiates aUS-led nuclear-power consortium,and notes linkages. The AF refersto a wider range of diplomatic andinternational security initiatives,such as the NPT and the agreementon denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula, and is meant to rein-force others, including those relat-ed to the reconciliation of the twoKoreas.

The effect of each step taken ornot taken under the AF will have asignificant impact broadly onNorth–South Korean relations, eco-nomic and humanitarian interac-tion, East Asian security, USnational security and foreign poli-cy, Western alliances, and nonpro-liferation in the region and aroundthe globe. The larger message ofthe agreement is clear—as NorthKorea complies with internationalnorms, relations with the outsideworld increasingly will be normal-ized, informally and formally. Aidand trade are to grow with thereduction of military threats andthe expansion of political dialogand contacts. As its engine, the AFsets in motion a remarkable jointnuclear-energy project that is a cen-tral focus here.

Technical Questions,Strategic Implications

In this report, we examine sever-al issues related to that cooperativenuclear project, especially monitor-ing and verification of nuclear-material production in the DPRK.The safeguarding of the light-waterreactors (LWRs) to be supplied tothe DPRK is given particularlycareful scrutiny. In focusing onnuclear cooperation with NorthKorea, we are vividly aware thatsuccess or failure in meeting thetechnical challenges posed by thatproject can have a wider impact.Compressed schedules, culturaldifferences, and a limited history ofcooperation with Pyongyang areamong the internal factors thatcould result in a failure to meetprogram deadlines or objectives.External factors that could derailthe process are perhaps even morenumerous and involve major con-flicting interests. Thus, in supportof our technical analysis of verifica-tion issues, we have highlighted anumber of scenarios involvingdelay or disputes that could comeinto play because of developmentsboth within and outside the reactorproject. Such scenarios must influ-ence how we think about verifica-tion. Each, however, also has over-arching strategic implications.

We recognize the primacy ofthese broader strategic considera-tions even if our interest here is theheart of the AF—its procurementfor the DPRK of two LWRs and thelinked, verified cessation and dis-mantlement of the DPRK’s nuclearweapons program. The new reac-tors are being provided by anorganization created for that pur-pose, the Korean Peninsula Energy

Development Organization(KEDO). Procurement and con-struction by KEDO of these reac-tors compels the major parties—the US, Japan, the Republic ofKorea (ROK), and the DPRK—tofind ways to cooperate. Althougheach delay or setback has resultedin more public questioning of theLWR procurement, as each step istaken, commitment to the programhas grown stronger among thoseeconomic and political entitieswithin the party states who seetheir stakes in the effort increase.

Provision of the LWR reactors,however, is contingent uponPyongyang resolving with theInternational Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) existing concernsthat the DPRK is developingnuclear weapons. The triggersleading to the confrontation inearly 1993 were apparent discrep-ancies in Pyongyang’s initialnuclear declaration to the IAEA.At a minimum, these suspect dis-crepancies must be resolved forreactor construction to proceed tothe installation of certain criticalnuclear components, as agreed inthe framework.

Even if a mutually acceptableagreement on a declaration isreached with the IAEA, furtherprogress toward normalization ofrelations between the DPRK andmost of the rest of the world is, inreality, inevitably linked to greaterconfidence that North Korea hasabandoned the rest of its nuclear-weapons program. The two LWRsare a major part of that confidence-building, but only part. Merecompletion of the reactors cannotultimately be the standard bywhich success is judged. Still, the

1

INTRODUCTION: VERIFICATION AND THE CHALLENGESTO CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA

RONALD F. LEHMAN, II

nuclear-reactor project serves as amajor pacemaker and bellwether ofthe status of the AF and its non-proliferation objectives.

Nuclear Cooperation: TwoSides of a Coin

Inherently, the AF seeks to man-age relations between adversariestrying to find their way to saferground in a changing world. TheUS has been motivated in creatingthe AF as much by the risks of fail-ing to act as by the prospects forsuccess. The AF has become ourmost ambitious laboratory fordefining and assessing “construc-tive engagement.” As the recentrestatement of the compromise byformer Secretary of DefenseWilliam Perry and the relatednegotiations on North Korean bal-listic missiles suggest, the AF issubject to “re-invention.” Indeed,the AF itself is a reconfiguration ofthe earlier agreements it referenceson North–South reconciliation anddenuclearization of the Koreanpeninsula. This variability inimplementing mechanisms isinevitable in any framework builton a process in which a regime,such as North Korea, frequentlytests whether it can gain morefrom delay, brinkmanship, andeven threats of war than from thereduction of tensions and expan-sion of cooperation.

The AF also brings togetherallies balancing their collective andseparate interests. For the UnitedStates, Japan, and the ROK, the AFtests their ability to work togethersuccessfully under post-Cold Warconditions to reshape the Cold Warlegacy of a divided Korea. Itremains a test they could still fail,and the price of failure could wellbe fissures between friends as wellas dangerous new confrontationswith Pyongyang. Our allies weighconstantly whether we are tooforceful or too restrained, a debateechoed in the domestic debate inmany capitals, including our own.

Despite some uncertain steps, how-ever, the US and its allies thus farhave traveled in the same generaldirection, retaining their cohesionin the face of both euphoria anddisappointment.

The AF is mainly aboutPyongyang’s normalization withthe West. Russia and China mayshare some of the West’s concernabout proliferation on the KoreanPeninsula, but they are likely moreambivalent about the overall thrustof the AF. Nevertheless, successfulimplementation of the AF maybenefit from engagement withChina and, to a lessor extent,Russia and the nations of WesternEurope, as well as others. In somesituations, carrots such as tradeand recognition are involved. Inother instances, sticks such asUnited Nations Security Councildebate and action have beeninvolved. These interactions alsoreflect the uncertainties of a worldin transition. What is a commoncause on one day becomes a sourceof tension on another. Not all of theissues involved are grave, butsome of the political concerns andsecurity calculations of the keynations involved are serious, evenvital. Clearly, the outcome of theKorean engagement matters great-ly to Chinese and Russian strategicassessments of security inNortheast Asia, just as it does tothe US and its allies in Asia.Success in achieving reductions intensions on the Korean Peninsulacould aid significantly in the evolu-tion of relations with Russia andChina. Unfortunately, North Koreaalso has the potential to be a tragicspoiler in what had been substan-tial reductions in the adversarialpsychology of the great militaryand economic powers.

Success or failure in stopping theNorth Korean nuclear-weaponsprogram—one of the most difficultremaining challenges to an almostuniversal commitment to nuclearnonproliferation—can have a

powerful impact on other nations.This includes those seekingweapons, such as Iraq and Iran,and those such as Japan, SouthKorea, and Taiwan who have thusfar been willing to forgo nuclearweapons they could easily manu-facture. The precedents set withNorth Korea under the AF alsoaffect the standards applied byother nations in their nuclear tradeand technology transfer.

Through the AF, we seek to usenuclear and energy cooperationwith North Korea to strengthen theglobal nonproliferation regime, yetnot every important actor has cho-sen to interpret it that way. Mos-cow has already cited the AF as arationale for Russian nuclear-reac-tor deals with Iran, and New Delhisuggests it is evidence of a double-standard nuclear suppliers haveapplied against India. Indeed,Indian hawks have asserted thatthe respect given to North Koreabecause of its nuclear-weaponsprogram further validates India’sown weapons program. Whetherreal or contrived, such assertionsremind us that our diplomacy inNortheast Asia is watched closelyelsewhere.

The game of carrot and stickwith North Korea is meant to rein-force international norms. It is builtupon the notion that abandoningnuclear-weapons programs bringstangible benefits, but this engage-ment could also suggest to thosealready receptive that nuclearblackmail might pay. Success inbringing about compliance withthe NPT in the near-term, however,will still leave us with the classiclong-term question that can beapplied to many parties to theNPT: namely, will easier access totechnology under the NPT nowfacilitate future nuclear-weaponsefforts? Thus, the value of the AFmust be judged ultimately by thenet contributions it makes to inter-national security in the region andaround the world. The full

2

INTRODUCTION

measure of its merit is to be foundin that broader policy context.

Means Versus Ends

That the AF is bigger than justthe freezing of the DPRK’s nuclear-weapons program and the creationof KEDO, with the provision oftwo new safeguarded reactors toNorth Korea, deserves special men-tion up front. The bigger picturewill also deserve further examina-tion after our analysis of theprospects for verification ofnuclear-materials production andNPT compliance has been present-ed. Admittedly, this study hashomed in on the prospects for veri-fication of the dismantlement ofthe DPRK’s nuclear-weapons pro-gram, especially the dismantlementof the reactors and reprocessingfacilities at Yongbyon and theimplementation of verifiable safe-guards on the KEDO nuclear-reactor program. The core of ourstudy is thus purposefully narrow,but understanding the implicationsof each step or misstep from abroader perspective is even moreimportant. Completion of theKEDO reactors would be a hollowachievement if nonproliferationgoals were not achieved.Elimination of the Yongbyon facili-ties would be inadequate if theDPRK finds another path to theprocurement of fissile material orweapons. On the other hand, fail-ure to complete the reactors mightnot be a waste if our internationalsecurity objectives are otherwiseaccomplished.

A number of paths may reachour goal. For example, the provisionof non-nuclear electric powerplants may be cheaper, faster, andmore conducive to long-term non-proliferation objectives. Additionalnon-nuclear power plants undoubt-edly will be necessary if normaliza-tion brings with it extensive eco-nomic growth. On the other hand,the provision of electricity by anymeans that does not address the

near-term danger posed by theexisting North Korean nuclear-weapons program would greatlyundermine the immediate nonpro-liferation objectives embodied inthe AF, especially compliance withthe NPT. Here we build upon thecurrent approach. In undertakingthis study of the DPRK’s nuclearprogram, however, we are acutelyaware that verification of the AF isa means and not an end.

In this study of the interaction oftechnology with policy—in thiscase, DPRK’s compliance with theNPT—we reference the history ofUS interactions with North Koreaon the nuclear question. We do notintend here to re-open the debateover the wisdom of the AF or theprocess by which it was achieved.We begin our substantive analysiswith the AF as it now stands. Ourobjective is enhancing the prospectsthat it could achieve its goals. Weexamine technical and program-matic hurdles to be overcome in theimplementation of the currentIAEA and KEDO programs, and weexplore means to ensure that verifi-cation milestones and standardscan be met. We also seek to illumi-nate the wider implications of suc-cess or failure at various stages.This inevitably raises questionsabout alternative tactics and evenexit strategies. If the implementa-tion of the AF is delayed orderailed, will we still be able toachieve our goals? And by whatmeans? In some cases, our analysismay suggest the need for advanceconsideration of options beyondthe scope of this discussion.

Program Management,IAEA Interaction, andChallenges to PreventiveDiplomacy

Implementing even the KEDOportion of the AF is already behindschedule. Difficult program man-agement, business, safety, and legaldecisions pertaining to the LWR

and Nuclear CooperationAgreement are ahead. For example,under US law, a nuclear coopera-tion agreement must be reached,but North Korean noncompliancewith the NPT presents legal andpolitical obstacles. The “when” and“what” of the US nuclear coopera-tion agreement is thus complicatedby the hovering question of“how?” Key business and budgetstrategies must await agreement onliability, specific arrangements forfresh-fuel supply and spent-fueldisposition, clarification as to par-ticipation in day-to-day reactoroperations, availability of an inte-grated infrastructure such as a dis-tribution grid in the DPRK, com-pletion of more comprehensivetraining, etc. Thus, important ques-tions of “who” and “how much”also remain. These implementationuncertainties all affect the confi-dence in verification and on thecalculations of the risks and bene-fits of the AF, especially to thedegree that timing is viewed as acritical factor.

Verification of initial declarationsand implementation of safeguardsby the IAEA over the necessaryDPRK nuclear infrastructure createa number of “make or break” mile-stones. Delay in reaching thesemoments of truth has not madethem any easier. Indeed, the pas-sage of time may make some issuesmore difficult to resolve.Recognition that acceptable confir-mation of initial or even amendeddeclarations may be problematicalhas already reopened debate overminimum acceptable requirements.Even the question of whether thesafeguards developed post-Iraqshould be applied remains openand under discussion in somecircles.

This question of the adequacy ofsafeguards is but a subset of thelarger question of whether mereverification that material has notbeen diverted from indigenousreactors and facilities is sufficient.

3

INTRODUCTION

Certainly, the real nuclear threatenvironment is larger. Although itis true that the IAEA’s request forspecial inspections, which resultedin a confrontation in 1993, wasrelated to efforts to resolve discrep-ancies in the DPRK’s declaration,the rejection called into questionthe ability to verify that no broadernuclear-weapons program isunderway by other means. In con-trast, South Africa was receptive tospecial inspections that in turnresolved discrepancies about itsdismantled nuclear-weapons pro-gram. The United States govern-ment and others continue tobelieve that North Korea has hadunderway an extensive effort toacquire nuclear weapons and hasachieved much progress in thateffort on its own. Pyongyang’semphasis on self-reliance has com-plicated efforts to understand andrestrain the North Korean nuclearprogram.

We have long focused on theimpressive efforts by whichPyongyang has acquired an indige-nous capability to produce nuclearweapons, especially in light of itspolitical and economic isolation. Inthis age of globalization of technol-ogy, a deeper perspective may benecessary. The “loose nukes” and“loose nuclear material controls”associated with the breakup of theSoviet Union, and the emergenceof gray and black markets amongnations of concern, such as thosedescribed by the RumsfeldCommission, suggest that indige-nous sources of nuclear capabilityare only a part of the problem. Inshort, even as KEDO program slip-page puts off dismantlement of theYongbyon facilities, nuclearweapons-relevant activities outsideas well as inside these installationsalso could undermine the AF orstall its implementation.

Implementation and verificationof the KEDO reactor program andwith it, the AF, face other large,crosscutting issues as well.

Uncertainty about the DPRK’scapability and intentions was great-ly increased in the face of theprovocative testing of long-rangemissiles, including one launch overJapan of a missile Pyongyang sub-sequently declared to be a spacelaunch vehicle. Whatever it saysabout intentions, DPRK’s willing-ness to sell ballistic missiles toother troubled regions of the world,such as the Middle East and SouthAsia, has underscored the dangersassociated with Pyongyang’s possi-ble two-way trade in Weapons-of-Mass Destruction (WMD) technolo-gy with other potential prolifera-tors. Money is highly fungible, andpayments received from missilesales make it easier to support mili-tary and WMD programs, especial-ly given the otherwise miserableeconomic performance of theDPRK. And what goods other thancash does North Korea get in returnfor its missile and other sales? HasNorth Korea received inputs to itsnuclear-weapons program fromoutside its borders? To deal withmissile launches and military trade,the US has been negotiating onterms to obtain a freeze on theDPRK’s missile program.Engagement has begun on thisissue, but the prospect of being con-fronted with one WMD or militarychallenge after another is worrisomegiven the many types of weaponsand means of delivery that might bedeployed or marketed.

Trade in WMD reminds us thatPyongyang has continuouslysought new access to resources andnew bargaining leverage. Whetherraising the specter of war, threaten-ing to withdraw from the NPT orother agreements, or highlightingthe economic misery of its ownpeople, the DPRK has becomeadept at identifying means tostrengthen its negotiating posi-tions. It has been a “tit-for tat”process and more. Movementtoward a more comprehensiveapproach as embodied in the Perryand Armitage Reports seeks to deal

with this problem. Such approach-es broaden the arena of engage-ment by expanding the linkage ofprogress on verification and securi-ty with progress on political nor-malization and economic benefits.Such linkage is explicit in the AFjust as it was explicit in the earlierefforts it refers to such as the 1991North–South Joint Declaration onthe Denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula and other aspects of theNorth–South dialog.

Such a comprehensive strategymay reduce the tendency for bothsides to become preoccupied withtactical leverage at the expense ofstrategic advancement. Moreimportantly, it recognizes the fun-damental substantive relationshipbetween enhancing real security,including verification, and broaderhuman interactions and openness.Emphasis on a more comprehen-sive strategy, however, may alsosubject progress on the KEDO reac-tor project and Yongbyon disman-tlement to a less buffered linkageto the ups and downs of engage-ment and confrontation. Thus,issues such as family reunificationand high-level meetings such asthe recent summit by the heads ofstate of the two Koreas may add tothe dynamics of the AF projectmanagement and verification.

Dynamics ofTechnology–PolicyInteraction

The AF lies squarely at the begin-ning of a process that has beenpunctuated on both sides by—

1. Delayed implementation,

2. Disagreement over compliance,

3. Near dissolution of fundamentalagreements, and

4. Brinkmanship, including saberrattling.

4

INTRODUCTION

Prudence dictates analyses ofthese and possible future crises.This seems inherent in a processinvolving efforts at cooperation byparties deeply divided over politi-cal, economic, and security objec-tives and with fundamentally dif-ferent views on openness.

Verification issues take on greatersignificance in such an environment.Indeed, verification issues have beenassociated more or less with most ofthese past confrontations withNorth Korea over the nuclear ques-tion. As we have examined verifica-tion of nuclear-material productionand related activities, we have triedto keep this in mind. To understandhow verification might becomeinvolved in a crisis again, one mustlook beyond the simple history ofimplementation of IAEA obligationsand examine several paths that par-allel interaction between the IAEAand the DPRK (Introduction Figure,page 6). Lack of time and a moretechnical interest preclude our deal-ing with all of these interactionsother than to mention their signifi-cance. Notable among these parallelpaths are—

1. The total nuclear programs ofthe DPRK (military and civilian).

2. Related bilateral and regionalefforts to engage Pyongyang onthe nuclear question.

3. Other North Korean and region-al military activities.

4. Broader NPT-related activity.

5. Wider defense and arms controldevelopments.

6. The larger process of politicalchange in the Koreas.

7. Related political events aroundthe world.

These interrelated dynamicswork for and against confidence. Insome cases, developments in the

different arenas for cooperation,competition, and conflict simplyreflect progress or regression onthe nonproliferation front. In othercases, they reinforce progress oramplify setbacks. Thus, positivefeedback may result in a de factohierarchy of security-buildingarrangements, but negative feed-back may amplify setbacks andencourage the widening of fissures.In some cases, strategic or tacticalconsiderations involving eitherinternational or domestic politicsmay result in progress in one arenabeing deliberately associated withstalemate or loss in another.

Much has been written on themotivations and negotiating tacticsof the DPRK, the ROK, the US andothers involved with the NorthKorean nuclear debate. Althoughthe dynamics of interaction fre-quently repeat themselves, muchdisagreement exists among expertsover interpretation. Is North Koreaafraid that resolving uncertaintywill reveal a secret program itclaims does not exist? Or, alterna-tively, is Pyongyang afraid toreveal that the program is thus farunsuccessful, thus depriving it ofbargaining power? Both could betrue at different times or even atthe same time.

By What Standard Shall WeJudge, and When?

Our primary interest in thisreport is the verification of nuclear-material production and the reduc-tion of risk associated with diver-sion or breakout. Fundamental toany such effort is the ability tomonitor activities, a main concernof this study. Technology such asinstrumentation, sensors, sam-pling, tagging, diagnostics, andcommunications contribute signifi-cantly here. Yet, verification hasalways been a larger process thanmonitoring. Verification assess-ments involve—

• The ability to make judgmentsabout the meaning of obligations.

• The centrality of provisions.

• The probabilities of cheating.

• The risks associated with non-compliance.

• The timeliness of warningobtained.

• The efficacy of redress or enforcement.

• Other related costs and gains.

Not all of these elements aredealt with at length in this work.Nevertheless, risks and benefitsmust be weighed against theirimpact on the ends for which anyagreement is a means and againstthe consequences and options ifthose ends are not met. Verificationmay never be perfect, but effectiveverification can contribute signifi-cantly to confidence. Inadequateverification can lead to overconfi-dence and miscalculation.

In the language of the AF, the def-initions of clear success or obviousfailure are relatively easy to under-stand. Whatever the debate over theamount of potential weapons-gradematerial that can be accumulatedunder various scenarios, if theDPRK truly abandons its nuclear-weapons program, the central goalwill have been achieved. Effectiveverification of the AF can help usknow if this has happened, but thatknowledge is not guaranteed. If theDPRK develops and manufacturesor otherwise obtains or retainsnuclear weapons—whether that isone weapon or many—the AF willhave failed to meet its explicit objec-tive. Verification measures may giveus earlier indications of this unde-sired outcome, but again perfectwarning is not in the cards. If theDPRK uses the AF for continuedleverage, verification measures mayhelp us manage this dynamic more

5

INTRODUCTION

effectively, but we must still recog-nize that these negotiations takeplace against a complex geopolitical,legal, and economic backdrop.

The AF offers important nonpro-liferation opportunities and verifi-cation tools, yet, the AF aspires tocontribute more. If the militarythreat on the Korean Peninsula isgreatly diminished and relationsamong the nations involved arenormalized on a sound basis, theachievements of the AF will be evenmore solid. Cooperation on verifica-tion may facilitate normalization.Indeed, it may facilitate politicalchange in North Korea. If tensions

return to Cold War levels, confi-dence in actual achievements of theAF will be reduced. Compliancedisputes under the AF can be both acause and an effect of such tensions.

Clear success and obvious failuremay be easiest to understand, but inthe history of negotiations withNorth Korea, success and failure arenormally not so clear. As the abovediscussion of the dynamics ofengagement on the Korean penin-sula suggests, every success bringswith it a price. Every advance stim-ulates the grounds for new stepsbackward. The value of every spe-cific objective gets re-evaluated. If

war is avoided, what has been lost?If war is only delayed and ultimate-ly made even more destructive,what has been gained? Will delaymean more or less chance thatnuclear weapons will be deployedor even used by North Korea? Willdelay now mean more or lessreform, and over what timeframeand circumstances? Will delay affectinternational cohesiveness in sup-port of the IAEA or in the UnitedNations Security Council of US non-proliferation and other foreign-poli-cy objectives? These larger questionsmust be kept in mind as we exam-ine potential failure modes andconsider means to prevent failure.

6

INTRODUCTION

DPRKNuclearProgram& KEDOProjects

IAEAActivityin DPRK

RegionalNuclearRestraint

MilitaryActivityrelevantto Korea

NPT, NP,& IAEAaroundglobe

RelatedDefense/ArmsControl

RelatedWorldPoliticalEvents

PoliticalChangein Korea

1985 1987 1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

5-MW(e)reactorbegins

operation

Possible Pureprocessing

plantlocated

5-MW(e)reactor

defuelingw/o IAEA?

50-MW(e) and200 MW(e) reactorsunderconstruction

Crisisover fuel rods

w/material for ~6 bombs

KEDO organization,Site preparation,

& financingDelayed LWR

construction beginsLWR nuclearcomponents?

1st LWRoperational?

IAEA verify declaration?

Kumchang-nitunnel

inspection

IAEASafeguards

Agreement notin place for 20

MW(th)

IAEA Agreement,discrepancies, inspectionconfirms reprocessing,suspect site inspectiondemanded

US–USSRtalks on NP

& DPRK

DPRKsigns NPT

Chernobyl

MTCRestablished

UNSCOM

INFTreaty

Roh Tae Woo

Gorbachev &peristroika

Lady Libertydemonstrations

In Beijing

GermanyReunited

Soviet Unioncollapses

Moscowcoup

Berlin Wallfalls

Ceausescuexecuted

Gulf War

Asian currencycrisis

DPRK boycottsSeoul Olympics

3 N-S Ministerials

START I START II CTBT

GW Bush meets Kim Dae Jung, orders reviewClinton meets DPRK general

Armitage & Perry reports Putin visitsPyongyang

North-Southdefense ministers

meeting

US–DPRKmissile talks

US debate onballistic missile

defenses

Carter inPyongyang

2 Koreas in UN

US provides food aid& lifts some sanctions US allies begin normalization

Kim Jung-Il

Kim Young SamKim Jung Il

visits ShanghaiKim Dae Jung

Evidence of DPRKnuclear weaponsprogram reported

CFE & CSBMsin Europe

Presidential NuclearInitiatives

ROK permitsDPRK TV broadcasts

Floods & Famine in DPRK

US, ROK, & Japanestablish TCOG

Kim Il-sung dies

NPT extension, 187 Parties

Sunshine Policy

RumsfeldCommission

Indo-Pak.nucleartests

Pakistanlaunches

DPRK missile

US nuclear testmoratorium

Team Spiritcancelled

US military buildup& evacuation planning

DPRKsubmarineinfiltration

ROK sinksDPRK ship

DPRKmissile testover Japan

Japan fires onDPRK ship

Four Party Talks

DCI fears I or 2 weapons frommaterial diverted in ‘89

US withdrawstactical nukes

DPRK threatensNPT withdrawal

JNCC meets

N-S Inspectionregime talks falter

AGREEDFRAMEWORK

North-SouthDenuclearization

Agreement

North-SouthSummitAgreement on N–S

Reconciliation

CTR

Nunn–LugarCWC

SA, Uk, Kaz,& Belarus

rollback

UN summit onNonproliferation

Sec State in DPRKNobel to Kim Dae Jung

Introduction Figure. Parallel interaction paths related to the Agreed Framework (AF) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Under the 1994 AgreedFramework (AF) between theUnited States and the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea(DPRK), the US and its allies willprovide two large nuclear-powerreactors and some other benefits tothe DPRK in exchange for anagreement by the DPRK, inter alia,

• To declare how much nuclear-weapon material it has produced,

• To identify, freeze, and eventual-ly dismantle specified facilitiesfor producing this material,

• To remain a party to the nuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)and allow the implementation ofits safeguards agreement.

The AF and associated agree-ments are now being carried outaccording to a complex and cur-rently delayed schedule. Benefitshave been provided to the DPRK,the site for the two nuclear-powerreactors has been largely prepared,and construction has begun onsome components. For its part, theDPRK has declared some nuclear-weapon material and has identifiedand frozen some facilities for pro-ducing this material.

As evidenced by the current dis-cussion of the AF, includingPresident Bush’s statement at theWhite House on March 7, 2001, ver-ification is an essential part of anyagreement with North Korea,including the AF. In what follows,we provide an assessment ofwhether such verification can be

accomplished and what is neededto accomplish it. Given the US goalof nuclear non-proliferation on theKorean peninsula, central questionsinclude the following: How verifi-able are the provisions of the AFand ancillary agreements such asthe Supply Agreement? How wellcan it be verified that the DPRK hasno access to nuclear weapon-usablematerial? What is the potentialimpact of delays, disagreements,and lack of cooperation on verifica-tion? This report is devoted toanswering those questions.

Our general answer is that veri-fication can be accomplished to asatisfactory degree of accuracy onmost counts, but that special effortwill be needed from theInternational Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), as well as supportfrom the US and the Republic ofKorea (ROK). Furthermore, cooper-ation and openness from the DPRKare essential for accurate and com-plete verification of the AF.

Our more specific answers arepresented under three headings:one dealing with the nuclear-powerreactors to be provided by theKorean Energy DevelopmentOrganization (KEDO), one dealingwith known or suspected nuclear-materials production facilities in theDPRK, and one dealing with possi-ble adverse developments affectingverification and safeguards. Theseanswers provide the basis for someanalysis of what the US and itsallies will and will not know undervarious, possible future circum-stances, and how to minimize the

risks of diversion of nuclear materi-al for nuclear weapons.

Safeguarding the Nuclear-Power Reactors Providedby KEDO

KEDO is a consortium spon-sored by the US but mostly fundedby the ROK. The two large nuclear-power reactors to be provided byKEDO under the AF are of a rela-tively well-understood type builtand operated by the ROK calledthe Korea Standard Nuclear Plant(KSNP). In what follows, we referto them as KEDO Reactors 1 and 2.

The fresh nuclear fuel for thesereactors contains no nuclearweapon-usable material. On theother hand, like all current nuclear-power reactors, these reactors pro-duce reactor-grade plutoniumalong with energy for electricity.This plutonium, albeit not ideal,can be used to make nuclearweapons. Significant amounts ofthis plutonium are left in the highlyradioactive spent fuel when thatfuel is taken out of the reactors. Themain objective of the IAEA safe-guards is to detect the diversion orclandestine production of nuclearmaterial in a timely fashion.

KSNPs have a well-developedand effective safeguards packageagreed to between ROK and theIAEA.* A similar safeguardspackage (INFCIRC 403) has beenagreed to between the IAEA andthe DPRK. These safeguards havebeen developed in accordance with

7

VERIFYING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK:EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

* The IAEA is charged by the NPT with verifying that the nuclear facilities of non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties are used for peaceful purposes and not tomake nuclear weapons. The actual measurements and accounting practices used for such verification are called “safeguards.”

a model agreement known as INF-CIRC 153. They comprise measure-ments, inspections, accounting pro-cedures and other measures, exam-ined in detail in the report.*

The safeguards applicable to theKSNP reactors are adequate todetect in a timely fashion (definedby IAEA as three months) attemptsat covert diversion of “significantquantities” of nuclear material, inthis case plutonium (defined by theIAEA on the advice of nuclear-weapons member states as eightkilograms). Effective safeguardsrequire that monitoring and data-transmission equipment be proper-ly installed and maintained andkept secure. In the case of remotemonitoring, the transmission ofdata must also be secure and unin-terrupted. Equally important areproperly trained inspectors and thetimely review of all safeguards-rele-vant information. Cooperation andopenness on the part of the DPRKon these matters are essential.

Safeguards are not fixed for alltime but are improved as time goeson. Advanced technologies withinINFCIRC 153 include environmen-tal sampling of air, water, soil, andvegetation near inspection sites,and secure remote monitoring inreal time of key entry points, locks,seals, power output, and otherfacets of reactor operations. Allrequire reliable means of transmis-sion, as well as an automatedreview and analysis of acquireddata. Several enhancement meas-ures, now in demonstration stage,could be applied to the data-trans-mission program. These technolo-gies are currently being tested inthe ROK and in other NPT partieswith INFCIRC 153 safeguards. Theimplementation in the DPRK ofsuch improved safeguards systemswould add significantly to theireffectiveness.

Using these technologies, ifinspectors are promptly availableand allowed to investigate anyquestionable event, the safeguardspackage should be able to detectattempts at covert diversion ofplutonium in quantities smallerthan eight kilograms (down per-haps to the amount contained in asingle fuel pin, a few tens ofgrams) in a shorter time than threemonths (depending on inspectoravailability).

We considered overt and covertdiversion and misuse scenarios. Wecould not find credible covertdiversion and misuse scenariosunder the conditions stated abovefor the KEDO reactors. On theother hand, overt action to breakout of the safeguards agreement isalways possible, as discussedunder the “Possible AdverseDevelopments” heading later on inthe Executive Summary.

In reaching the above conclu-sion, we emphasize two conditionsthat must be met:

1. The IAEA will continue torequire technical and financialassistance from the US and othermember states to implement aneffective safeguards regime atthe KEDO reactors.

2. The DPRK must fully commit tothe terms and conditions of itssafeguards agreement. This willrequire providing the IAEAinspectors full and promptaccess to nuclear facilities for thepurposes of performing inspec-tions and equipment installationand maintenance, as well as pro-viding all requested informationin a timely fashion.

After being taken out of thereactor, the highly radioactive,plutonium-containing spent fuelusually spends several years in

spent-fuel pools under video sur-veillance by the IAEA, until itsradioactivity has decayed suffi-ciently to allow its being placedinto dry storage casks or removedto a storage facility away from thereactor. Provisions for that part ofthe process, which are some yearsin the future, have not been speci-fied or agreed to in detail. Underthe AF, the DPRK must allow theremoval of this spent fuel at therequest of KEDO. In the case ofthe DPRK, it may be desirable toremove spent fuel from the coun-try as soon as is practicable. Thisis particularly true for fuelremoved early in the reactor life-time. The highest quality plutoni-um exists in the very first reactorcycle and it will be the first to loseradioactivity. We note that final orlong-term storage of spent fuelaway from the reactors is a prob-lem that has not been resolvedanywhere and which is morepolitical than technical.

Verification of the DPRK’sDeclaration and of theDisposal and Dismantle-ment of Identified orSuspect Nuclear Facilities

Verifying the DPRK’s declara-tion and its disposal and disman-tlement of identified or suspectnuclear facilities is a complex task.Neither the scope of activities to beverified nor the history of theDPRK’s nuclear program is fullyknown at this time. The task maybe broken down and analyzed asfollows.

Verification of DPRK’sDeclaration

The DPRK has declared the exis-tence of the following facilities assubject to inspections, six atYongbyon and one at Taechon:

8

EXECTUIVE SUMMARY

* Note that IAEA safeguards are not required positively to establish the physical diversion of material. To establish a violation of an INFCIRC 153-type safe-guards agreement, it is enough for the IAEA Board of Governors to conclude that “the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion ofnuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

• Two reactors that were in opera-tion, one of which is subject tothe freeze.

• One reactor that remainsincomplete.

• A fuel-fabrication facility.

• A radioisotope laboratory.

• A waste site.

• A reactor under construction atTaechon that also remainsincomplete.

Plutonium-containing fuel hasbeen withdrawn from one of theYongbyon reactor cores and isstored in cans in a nearby pool.

The DPRK further declared thatit had separated a small quantity(less than 100 grams) of plutonium.

The DPRK’s initial declaration tothe IAEA identifying facilities andquantities of nuclear material sub-ject to safeguards appears to beincomplete. At least one unde-clared waste site has been identi-fied, probably containing addition-al plutonium-containing wastes,and there is evidence for more fuelremoval and more plutonium-sep-aration activity than the DPRK hasdeclared. While estimates of pluto-nium production vary, there isstrong evidence that the DPRKseparated more than its originaldeclaration of less than 100 grams.An amended declaration will verylikely be required for the IAEA tocomplete its verification activities.With such an amended declaration,the US and other interested partieswould have more complete andreliable knowledge of the DPRK’snuclear materials and facilities, andmore complete and ongoing safe-guards over such material andfacilities would be possible.

The DPRK must provide unhin-dered access for the purpose ofmeasurements and inspections atall identified and suspect DPRKnuclear facilities wherever located.

According to the IAEA, the pathforward to determine the correct-ness and completeness of the initialdeclaration has been developed,including planning for contingen-cies. It includes plans for the caseswhere large amounts of radioactivewastes are discovered in previous-ly hidden waste sites. There is noplan to attempt to verify the accu-racy and completeness of the initialdeclaration unless access to thesuspect waste sites is granted, ifthe Agency stays with the recom-mendations of former Director-General Hans Blix. The details ofthe IAEA’s plan are not publicinformation. With DPRK coopera-tion, the process is estimated totake 2–4 years.

A review of the methods avail-able to the IAEA indicates thatwhere the full panoply of IAEAmeasurements and inspections arebrought to bear, there will be rea-sonable confidence (i.e., as goodconfidence as there is with respectto other states that have endedtheir nuclear weapons activitiesand joined the NPT as non-nuclearweapons states) that past nuclearactivities have been generally iden-tified. The exact quantity of pluto-nium separated can only beapproximately determined.Depending on the reactor operat-ing history available, there may notbe high confidence in the exactnumber of kilograms separated.We note three points:

1. The IAEA is likely to need addi-tional resources to prepare forand carry out its verificationactivities in the DPRK. The USand other states supportingnuclear nonproliferation

objectives could work with theIAEA to develop plans andresources adequate to this task,anticipating and preparing forthe specific verification problemsto be encountered.

2. Information provided by thirdparties not limited to the US hasbeen and will continue to be anessential support to the IAEA.

3. The US and other states support-ing nuclear nonproliferationobjectives, including especiallythe ROK and Japan, must sup-port the IAEA in maintaining thehighest standards of verification.

Verification of the Disposal andDismantlement of IdentifiedYongbyon Facilities

Plans for disposing of existingDPRK spent fuel have not beenfinalized. So long as the spent fueland separated material are continu-ously monitored by the IAEA, theydo not pose a serious verificationproblem.

While it is understood the fuelwill leave the DPRK, the destinationfor the fuel has not been determined.Only the Sellafield plant in theUnited Kingdom currently has facili-ties specifically for handling theMagnox type of fuel used in theYongbyon reactors.* According theAF timetable, arrangements must bemade by the time the first KEDOreactor is completed. Disagreementover the destination for this spentfuel could result in significant delaysin completing the KEDO reactors.Perhaps of most concern is the accessthe DPRK would have to theweapons-usable material in thespent fuel should it decide to abro-gate the AF.

After the first KEDO reactor hasbeen completed and the DPRK’sspent fuel has been removed from

9

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

* Magnox fuel readily corrodes and is unsuitable for long-term storage or geologic disposal.

Yongbyon, the DPRK will berequired to dismantle its frozennuclear facilities. The IAEA hascompiled considerable informationregarding decommissioning thatshould help the DPRK in the dis-mantling effort. The major disman-tlement challenge will be dealingwith the radioactivity in the reactorand other facilities. While the basicindustrial processes for decommis-sioning and dismantling nuclearfacilities are reasonably wellunderstood, this is an expensiveand complex undertaking. The costto dismantle these facilities, basedon past experience, is likely to beat least a few hundred million dol-lars. Some of the crucial pipes andthe special equipment will have tobe removed or destroyed early inthe process to make the dismantle-ment verifiably irreversible.

Verification Regarding OtherSuspect Facilities

There have been and may even-tually again be facilities other thanthose at Yongbyon that come undersuspicion of being used for nuclear-material production, storage, orother nuclear activities. These couldpose different verification problemsthan the Yongbyon facilities. Someadditional methods beyond INF-CIRC 153, notably broader environ-mental sampling away fromdeclared sites and easier inspectionsat undeclared facilities would beuseful—and could be necessary—todetect these facilities. Satellite moni-toring and other third-party infor-mation are needed as well. Withthese tools, the uncertainty associat-ed with the detection of undeclaredactivities would be diminished.

At the same time, “false posi-tives,” such as the supposed butnow known to be non-existent reac-tor at Kimchang Ni, can pose prob-lems for both IAEA and US credi-bility and for effective cooperation.Being overly suspicious poses prob-lems for effective verification just asnot being suspicious enough.

Possible AdverseDevelopments

Adverse developments are use-fully considered in the frameworkof the time sequence of eventsenvisaged by the AF. This timesequence, together with its implica-tions for verification and safe-guards, is summarized in theExecutive Summary Table (nextpage). The time sequence present-ed is not complete. A number ofother important steps are linked tothe time sequence. The steps sum-marized in the Table are thosewhich require verification or safe-guards or which bear on the timingof verification and safeguards. Thesteps in the left-hand column areshown in time order. As actualdates have slipped and are likely tocontinue to slip, no dates areshown. Only the sequence ofevents is used.

We note, in connection with thesequence of events in the table, thecrucial link between Steps 2 and 3,i.e., the IAEA declaring the DPRKto be in compliance, the delivery ofnuclear components to KEDOReactor 1, and the necessaryAgreement for Cooperation withthe US. No Congressional review ofan Agreement for Cooperation andno provision of nuclear componentsto the DPRK is possible until theIAEA is satisfied that the DPRK’sreports on all its nuclear materialsand facilities are accurate and complete.

Further Delays

Delays have occurred and arelikely to continue to occur for avariety of legal, financial, and politi-cal reasons. A number of these rea-sons are noted in the report. Delaysbefore any KEDO reactor is com-pleted puts off the eventual IAEAdeclaration of DPRK’s complianceand the attendant knowledge ofwhat material and facilities theDPRK actually has. The ability ofthe IAEA to verify the initial DPRK

declaration could decay to an extentthat depends on the techniques tobe used—and that we cannot fullyassess. A lessening of the IAEA’sability to reconstruct the reactor’soperating history could be impor-tant in estimating the amount ofplutonium separated. On the otherhand, verification that the DPRKdoes not have a program atYongbyon is not affected by delaysso long as the Yongbyon site contin-ues to be verifiably frozen. Inessence, delays at this stage meanthat the situation remains frozenwith no additional source of nuclearmaterial provided to the DPRK.

Delays after either or bothKEDO reactors are completed anddelays in the DPRK’s allowing spe-cial inspections or additional safe-guards measures could have moreserious consequences, and are dis-cussed below.

Non-Cooperation with theIAEA’s Verification ofCompliance

Limited or lack of cooperationon the part of the DPRK has muchthe same effect as delays at thisstage of the AF. Non-cooperationat Yongbyon and other possiblesites of past activities has takenthe form of not allowing access byIAEA inspectors to undeclaredsuspect facilities, limiting IAEAmeasurements where inspectorsare allowed, and preventing off-site environmental sampling.Continuation of this behavior,either in the form of outrightdenial or undue delay, wouldhave the effect, under the AF, ofpreventing delivery of keynuclear components for the KEDOReactor 1 to the DPRK. Citing thetime necessary to complete theverification exercise, the IAEA’sDirector-General has repeatedlyrequested the DPRK to get startedas soon as possible. They havegiven no indication that they areready to proceed.

10

EXECTUIVE SUMMARY

Need for an Amended DPRKDeclaration

When the IAEA is allowed tocarry out inspections and measure-ments at Yongbyon and at suchother sites as may be needed, theIAEA is likely to conclude thatmore plutonium-containing fueland/or more separated plutoniumexists in the DPRK than the DPRKoriginally reported. In that case, itwould become an issue for negotia-tion between the US and the DPRKwhether an amended DPRK decla-ration would be presented andallowed under the AF. From a veri-fication point of view, the situationwould be better than it is now: theUS and other interested partieswould have more complete andreliable knowledge of the DPRK’snuclear material and facilities, and

more complete ongoing safeguardsover such material and facilitieswould be possible. As noted earlier,however, there is an irreducibleuncertainty in verification of theamount of plutonium separated.

Disagreements Over Material ToBe Transferred from the DPRK

A verification issue would ariseif the DPRK took a narrow view ofwhat it was obligated to allow totransfer out of the country underthe AF, for instance, restricting thetransfer to spent fuel from specifiedYongbyon facilities rather thanfrom all relevant facilities. If thesefacilities had been identified andinspected, and nuclear material tobe safeguarded found there, itseems unlikely that the DPRKwould not allow its transfer, but

nevertheless that could occur underpretext of safety or environmentalconsiderations. In that case, or inany case of a disagreement over thetransfer of nuclear material, theIAEA would have to monitor thematerial in the DPRK on a continu-ing basis. If the DPRK were to abro-gate the AF in the future, it wouldregain access to this material.

Such a disagreement could bringthe AF to an end. Because, howev-er, a transfer takes place simultane-ously with the installation of keynuclear components in KEDOReactor 1, it is desirable that anexplicit agreement be reachedregarding what materials are to betransferred, including material thatmay be found in suspect but notidentified facilities.

11

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

StepPartial completion of KEDO Reactor 1 inthe ROK and partial preparation of Kumhosite in the DPRK

IAEA declaration that the DPRK is in com-pliance with its agreements

Delivery of KEDO Reactor 1’s key nuclearcomponents starts. Transfer of Yongbyonspent fuel (and other material?) to “ulti-mate disposition” starts.

Simultaneous completion of previoussteps

Dismantlement of Yongbyon facilities inparallel with delivery of KEDO Reactor 2’skey nuclear components

Simultaneous completion of previoussteps

Verification Issue None but the IAEA wants to start the nextstep early (2-4 years needed)

Verification of accuracy and completenessof the DPRK’s initial declaration on allnuclear materials in the DPRK, atYongbyon, and possibly elsewhere

Safeguards for KEDO Reactor 1 areinstalled. Transfer of Yongbyon spent fuel(and other material?) to “ultimate disposi-tion” verified.

Safeguards on KEDO Reactor 1 opera-tional. Disposition site monitored.

Safeguards for KEDO Reactor 2 areinstalled. Dismantlement verified.

Safeguards on KEDO Reactor 2operational

Possible Problems Financial and legal delays cause someloss of data at Yongbyon

1. DPRK does not open suspect sites tothe IAEA.

2. The IAEA’s activities are interfered with.3. Initial declaration is wrong—can it be

amended?

1. Disagreements over the extent ofsafeguards.

2. Disagreements over site of disposition.3. Disagreements over what is to be

transferred.

Same as previous, plus interference withKEDO Reactor 1 safeguards

1. Disagreements over extent ofsafeguards.

2. DPRK abrogation.3. US or ROK non-compliance with AF.

1. Interference with safeguards.2. DPRK abrogation.

Disposition of KEDO spent fuel.Monitoring disposition site(s).Disagreement over site of disposition.

Executive Summary Table. Envisaged time sequence of events.

Disagreements Over the Site ofUltimate Disposition

So long as the sites of ultimatedisposition for the DPRK’s nuclearmaterial are outside the DPRK andotherwise acceptable to the US, noverification issue is likely to arisefrom disagreements over this issue,except that such disagreementscould prolong the time that thematerial remains in the DPRK andthat the IAEA has to monitor it.Again, such delays would meanthat, if the DPRK were to abrogatethe AF during that period, it wouldregain access to this material. It ishighly desirable that full agree-ment be reached regarding the siteof ultimate disposition before theKEDO reactors come on line.

Disagreements Over the Extent ofSafeguards for KEDO Reactors

As reviewed above, there areuseful advanced technologies thatthe IAEA can use over and abovethe measures in place at most reac-tors, but still within the INFCIRC153 package of safeguards. Thoughthat package of safeguards hasproven its worth, the new meas-ures, together with the enhance-ment measures for the data trans-mission, would add significantly toassurance of compliance with theNPT. The specific package to beimplemented at the KEDO reactorshas to be negotiated, and disagree-ments could occur over applicationof these safeguards. Depending onthe outcome of the negotiations,the effectiveness of safeguardscould be less than optimal.

Successful negotiations forinstalling these measures in theDPRK will depend on similarmeasures being implemented intothe ROK. In general, the role of theROK is crucial in the safeguardsarea as well as in all other aspectsof the KEDO program. Given thatthe new measures are increasinglybeing tested and adopted in manycountries, however, and given that

some of them can give early warn-ing of illicit activity, significantdisagreement over cooperation onthis issue should be taken quiteseriously.

Interference with Safeguards forKEDO Reactors

Once safeguards have beenagreed to and are operational,interference with their operationin any form (e.g., denial or delayof needed access, late or incom-plete records, interference withtransmission of data, unreliablepower supply, or interference withupdating of equipment) couldseriously affect the assurance thatnuclear material, in particularspent fuel, is not being diverted.The seriousness would depend onthe details of the particular situa-tion, but it would be particularlydamaging to verification if itoccurred after the initial refueling,when the initial load of spent fuelcontains plutonium that is particu-larly attractive for weapons use.The fuel initially discharged con-tains enough plutonium to make10–20 nuclear-explosive devices,for instance, of the type tested in1945 at Trinity. Spent fuel mustnormally spend several years incooling ponds under safeguardsbefore it can be moved. Once it isremoved from the pool building, itmust remain the subject of contin-uing safeguards in the DPRK untilit is removed from the DPRK, atwhich time safeguards appropri-ate to the new location areimposed. This location is likely tobe the ROK and removing spentfuel from the DPRK is thus likelyto depend on having storage facil-ities in the ROK.

The IAEA safeguards are nor-mally aimed at detecting the diver-sion of eight kilograms of weapon-usable material within a period ofthree months. It would be desir-able to have the ability to detectthe diversion of smaller amountswithin a shorter period. As noted

earlier, remote monitoring coupledwith prompt readout of data at theIAEA and the availability ofinspectors in the region couldreduce the warning time to thatperiod. Lack of cooperation withsuch measures should be consid-ered significant.

Abrogation of AF or NPT afterthe KEDO Reactors AreInstalled

No safeguards can preventovert acts such as the abrogationof agreements and the expulsionof inspectors. In the case of abro-gation, the US would know howmuch potential nuclear-weaponmaterial is in the DPRK initially.It would, as now, externally moni-tor such large-scale activities asreactor operations and the con-struction of facilities, and itwould to some extent identifymajor activities. It would be pos-sible to estimate how much pluto-nium is made in reactor opera-tions subsequent to abrogation.Handling the radioactive spent-fuel rods and separating the plu-tonium are major operations,requiring facilities recognizableby national technical means. Thefacilities, however, might be hid-den underground.

Once the facilities are built andthe procedures practiced (withoutactually having light-water reactor(LWR) spent-fuel assemblies avail-able for realistic tests), the timeneeded to separate several bombs’worth of material might be onlydays or weeks if all went accord-ing to plan. In view of others’experience, however, the timeneeded is likely to be muchlonger. The IAEA’s StandingAdvisory Group on SafeguardsImplementation has estimated thatthe time required to convert pluto-nium in spent fuel into a weaponis one to three months, comparedto seven to ten days for metallicplutonium.

12

EXECTUIVE SUMMARY

It is possible to remove plutoni-um-containing spent fuel from thereactor site sooner than normalpractice. Such early removal may bedesirable in the case of the so-called“Beginning of Life” fuel, which ismore desirable for weapons use andwhich will be the first to cool (i.e.,lose radioactivity) sufficiently to behandled. An agreement to do thiswould best be reached ahead oftime. Covert removal of such fuel,or later fuel, by the DPRK would bedifficult as the casks needed toremove the fuel are large enough tohave satellite signatures, and as thefuel would have to be replaced inthe pool covertly. Removing spentfuel from the DPRK as soon as ispractical minimizes the advantageof overt fuel diversion after a possi-ble abrogation.

Executive SummaryConclusions

While more complete conclusionsand recommendations are present-ed at the end of the report, brieflythe bottom lines are as follows:

1. With adequate preparation andsupport of the IAEA, and withfull cooperation of the DPRKwith all measures called for inthe AF and in the safeguardspackages (standard and addi-tional) applicable to the KEDO-type reactors, the AF can be ade-quately verified.

2. For this to take place, the DPRKmust reach a decision to makeits operations in the nucleararea, past and present, actualand suspected, fully open. Suchopenness will be readily evidentat the working inspectors’ level.

3. The IAEA is likely to need addi-tional resources to prepare forand carry out its verificationactivities in the DPRK. The USand other states supporting

nuclear non-proliferationobjectives, including especiallythe ROK and Japan, must sup-port the IAEA in maintaining thehighest standards of verification.

The parties to the AF are facedwith both opportunities and chal-lenges. The opportunities for theDPRK include not only the provi-sion of electricity at concessionaryrates,* but also the opportunity tobecome fully cooperative and openin an important area of internation-al concern. Obviously, these oppor-tunities are also challenges, bothfor the DPRK and for the US, ROK,and other KEDO members. Thechallenges include the challenge ofverification that has been taken upin this report.

We conclude, based on the con-siderations of this report, that thechallenges of verifying the AgreedFramework can be met, under theconditions outlined in this reportand summarized here. With theseconditions met, verification isrobust under most scenarios.

Organization of Report

Chapter 1 provides a brief histo-ry of the DPRK’s nuclear programand its interactions with the IAEAand other countries. A summaryand analysis of the AF and relatedagreements that are now or will bein force is given.

Chapter 2 summarizes the safe-guards and how they are appliedunder existing agreements.Possible additional agreements thatthe IAEA has reached with othercountries are also discussed.

Chapter 3 describes the KEDOreactor site, nuclear reactor activi-ties in East Asia, and related issuessuch as fuel shipment and electrici-ty provision.

Chapter 4 provides a detaileddescription of the KEDO reactorsand the safeguards expected tobe applied under the presentagreements.

Chapter 5 describes diversionand misuse scenarios for light-waterreactors, such as the KEDO reactors,and their possible consequences.

Chapter 6 provides a descriptionof known and suspect nuclear-related facilities in the DPRK,specifically at Yongbyon andTaechon, and of the methods thatcan be used to assess how muchplutonium has been produced andseparated.

Chapter 7 summarizes thesequence of activities envisaged bythe AF and notes what there willbe to verify and what measures ofverification will take place as theagreement is carried out.

Chapter 8 examines the processof implementation under assump-tions of varying degrees of DPRKcooperation or obstruction.

The Conclusions and Recom-mendations section provides a briefsummary of the principal conclu-sions and recommendations madein the report. The recommenda-tions are not separated from theconclusions.

Authors and Sponsors

The work presented in thisreport was undertaken at the sug-gestion of former Secretary ofDefense and now StanfordProfessor William J. Perry. Thesponsoring organizations were theCenter for International Securityand Cooperation of the Institute forInternational Studies at StanfordUniversity, directed by ProfessorScott Sagan and Professor ChrisChyba, and the Center for Global

13

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

* Such provision depends on a number of other developments, such as improvements in the DPRK electrical grid.

Security Research at LawrenceLivermore National Laboratory,directed by Dr. Ronald Lehman.The project was carried out underthe leadership of Professor MichaelMay of Stanford University.

The Stanford authors wereProfessor Michael May (generaleditor, Executive Summary,Chapters 7 and 8), ProfessorGeorge Bunn (Chapters 1 and 2),Dr. Chaim Braun (Chapters 3 and4), and Dr. William Sailor(Chapters 6 and 8).

The Lawrence Livermore con-tributors were Drs. Zachary Davis(Chapter 8), James Hassberger(Chapters 4 and 5), RonaldLehman (Overview), WayneRuhter (Chapter 5), Robert Schock,and Nancy Suski (Chapter 8).

Every author contributed to theConclusions and Recommendations,and also reviewed the other authors’chapters. Everyone also contributedto the Executive Summary.

In the process of preparing thisreport, the authors convened twoworkshops, one at StanfordUniversity in September 2000, andone at the Lawrence LivermoreNational Laboratory inJanuary–February 2001. During thecourse of these workshops, theauthors received invaluable sug-gestions, information, and criti-cisms from a number of peoplewho had had experience with theAF, the IAEA, the DPRK, nuclear-reactor safeguards, and other rele-vant topics. The authors greatlyprofited from these and are grate-ful to all those who took the timeto read and critique early versionsof this report and to contribute tothe workshops. Special thanks areowed Richard Hooper, whocontributed significantly to several

parts of the report. Errors andomissions, of course, are solely theresponsibility of the authors.

In this report, the authors donot take a position on the desir-ability of the Agreed Framework,the future of the DPRK, or thedesirable US policy in these mat-ters. It is likely that views onthese matters differ among theindividual authors. The report issolely an assessment of safe-guards and verification.

The report does not represent theviews of Stanford University or anyof its institutes or centers, nor thoseof the Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory, the Department ofEnergy, the US Government, or theUniversity of California.

The authors are grateful to theCarnegie Corporation of New Yorkfor their support of this work atStanford.

14

EXECTUIVE SUMMARY

This chapter is not a completehistory but only highlights thoseaspects of the history and of theagreements entered into by theDemocratic People’s Republic ofKorea (DPRK) that bear on thesafeguards and verification ofnuclear facilities and activities. Wenote and summarize agreementsrelevant to safeguarding theKorean Energy DevelopmentOrganization (KEDO) reactors andverifying the frozen or dismantledstatus of nuclear weapons-relatedfacilities.

1.1 Early History

The Soviet Union began trainingNorth Koreans on nuclear mattersin the early 1950s. In 1965, theSoviets provided a small,2-MW(th), light-water-moderated,research reactor that burned highlyenriched uranium: the IRT-2000research reactor subsequentlyupgraded to 4 MW. Then, toreduce its reliance on outside assis-tance, the DPRK began mining orproducing uranium and graphite,began experimenting with plutoni-um separation, and built agraphite-moderated reactor thatburned natural (unenriched) urani-um. It was similar in design to thereactors used by Great Britain tomake the plutonium best suited forweapons. It was a 5-MW(e),20-MW(th)* reactor used to irradi-ate fuel rods from which the DPRKlater extracted plutonium. Thisreactor can probably produceenough plutonium for approxi-mately one bomb per year.1

This reactor is located, alongwith most of the other knownnuclear facilities, at Yongbyon incentral North Korea (Fig. 1-1). Alsoat Yongbyon are—

• a radiochemical laboratory forplutonium separation.

• a 50-MW(e), partially built gas-graphite reactor. Its constructionhas halted, and it has never beenoperated.

• a small highly enriched uranium(HEU) research reactor that hasbeen decommissioned.

15

CHAPTER 1A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DPRK’S

NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED EFFORTS

C H I N A

R U S S I A

S O U T H K O R E A

J A P A N

N O R T HK O R E A

K o r e aS t r a i t

S E A O F J A P A N

Y E L L O WS E A

K o r e aB a y

C h o s o nM a n

C h e j u h a e h y o p

Liaoyuan

ShenyangFushun Hunjiang

UnggiNajin

Kwangju

Chonju

Taejon

Chongju

Chinju

Kumch’on

Pusan

Puhang

AndongSangju

Masan

Chingju

Samchok

KangyangChunchon

Yanggu

Kosong

Chorwon

Seoul

Kaeson

Sariwon

P’yongyang Wonsan

Cheju

Sasuna

Kunsan

Haeju

Huichon

YongbyonTaechon

KapsanKilchu

Puryong

Changjin

Songjin

Hungnam

Anju

Kuandian

Chasong

KanggyeChosan

Sinuiju

Hyesan

Hamhung

Kita-KyushuUbe

Shimonoseki

Inch’on

Yondok

Mokp’o

Namp’o

Yonghung

Chongjin

Onsong

Pukch’ongSinpo

Dandong

Vladivostok

Tonghua

Yanji

Taegu

0 50 100 Miles

0 50 100 150 Kilometers

Figure 1-1. Generalmap of the Koreanpeninsula.

* While the DPRK usually designates its reactors by their electrical rating, that rating is the product of the reactor’s thermal power and the efficiency of therest of the plant at converting that power into electricity. From the point of view of assessing a plutonium-making capability, the thermal rating—usuallythree to four times the electric rating—is more relevant. Typically, every megawatt of thermal power will generate about half a gram of plutonium per day(actual numbers vary with the type of fuel, reactor design, etc).

• buildings, tunnels, and otherfacilities that have not beendeclared by the DPRK but thatmay have been used to storeundeclared spent fuel for a plu-tonium recovery program.

The entire set of facilities atYongbyon is analyzed in detail inChapter 6.

The DPRK also has a partiallybuilt, 200-MW(e) gas-graphitereactor located at Taechon, and asub-critical nuclear facility at auniversity in Pyongyang.2Construction on the 200-MW(e)reactor has also been halted.

In 1985, the Soviet Union per-suaded the DPRK to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) bypromising two light-water reactors(LWRs) that were better for pro-ducing electric power thangraphite reactors but not as goodfor producing weapons-gradeplutonium. Later, the DPRK said itwas unable to meet its commit-ment to pay for even the site-survey conducted by the SovietUnion at a new location in the areanow proposed for the new LWRs(see Fig. 1-1). At the end of 1991,after the Soviet Union dissolvedinto its former republics, Russiawithdrew the Soviet promise toprovide LWRs to the DPRK.

1.2 Attempts To Restrainthe DPRK From MakingNuclear Weapons

Though a party to the NPT from1985, the DPRK did not accept thecomprehensive InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA)safeguards agreement covering allits nuclear activities required bythe NPT for seven years. In 1991,the first Bush administrationdeveloped a program to restrainthe DPRK from making nuclearweapons. The program relied onSouth Korean and Soviet efforts aswell as those of the US. In 1991

came the Bush–Gorbachevannouncements of withdrawals ofAmerican and Soviet tacticalweapons from other countries.3 InDecember 1991, President Roh TaeWoo announced publicly, and inthe presence of President Bush,that there were no US tacticalnuclear weapons in the ROK.4South Korea announced a plan fora nuclear-weapon-free Koreanpeninsula and engaged the Northin negotiations that produced ageneral declaration to this end atthe beginning of 1992. This JointDeclaration on North–SouthDenuclearization not only calledfor a nuclear-weapon-free peninsu-la but also prohibited both theNorth and the South from possess-ing facilities for enriching uraniumor for separating plutonium fromspent reactor fuel. Moreover, it pro-vided for reciprocal inspections—of the DPRK by the Republic ofKorea (ROK) and vice versa.4

Despite lengthy negotiations, thetwo countries could not agree onthe sites in each country thatwould be inspected by the other.Later in 1992, however, the DPRKaccepted the NPT-required safe-guards agreement for inspection ofall its nuclear installations by theIAEA (INFCIRC 153 safeguards).In accordance with this agreement,the DPRK provided the IAEA witha report that was supposed todeclare all its nuclear material andfacilities for IAEA inspection.When the IAEA’s Director-GeneralHans Blix visited these facilities in1992, he reported among otherthings that the DPRK had a contin-uing interest in securing LWRs. Atthat time, however, South Korearejected the idea of helping theDPRK acquire them.5

Before the end of 1992, informa-tion from IAEA inspectors basedon environmental samples theyhad taken at the Yongbyon facili-ties and from US satellite photo-graphs of the area suggested thatthe DPRK had probably separatedmore plutonium from its small

graphite reactor’s irradiated fuelthan the DPRK had reported to theIAEA.6 When the IAEA requestedthat special inspections take placeat two undeclared sites in theYongbyon area, which satellitephotographs suggested might beplaces where the DPRK had hid-den the products of unreportedplutonium separation, the DPRKresisted strenuously.

After the IAEA’s Board ofGovernors insisted on these specialinspections, the DPRK announcedit was withdrawing from the NPTand gave the required 90-daynotice. In the IAEA discussionsthat followed, China opposedgoing to the U.N. Security Councilfor an order imposing economicsanctions on the DPRK if it with-drew from the NPT. As a result, theIAEA’s Board of Governors simplyreported to the Security Councilwhat had happened. The Boardalso used its authority to terminateall IAEA technical assistance to theDPRK. Subsequently, the DPRKended its membership in the IAEA.This, of course, did not affect theDPRK’s obligation to comply withthe NPT or the safeguards agree-ment made pursuant to the NPT.The Security Council then calledupon the DPRK to permit theIAEA inspections but did not ordersanctions if the DPRK refused,probably because of the likelihoodof a Chinese veto.7

China urged negotiations withthe DPRK. In consultation withSouth Korea and Japan, the USrenewed such negotiations. On thelast day of the 90-day notice periodfor withdrawal from the NPT—June 11, 1993—the DPRKannounced that it would remain aparty to that treaty, at least for thetime being. In a joint statementwith the US, the DPRK said it had“decided unilaterally to suspend aslong as necessary the effectuationof its withdrawal from” the NPT.Both governments “expressed sup-port for the North–South JointDeclaration of the Denuclearization

16

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DPRK’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED EFFORTS

of the Korean Peninsula in theinterest of nuclear non-prolifera-tion goals.”8 Both sides agreed togeneral principles about the appli-cation of IAEA safeguards and theneed for a “fundamental solutionof the nuclear issue on the Koreanpeninsula.” But, there was noagreement by the US to provideLWRs to the DPRK and no agree-ment by the DPRK to freeze theoperation of its small graphite reac-tor or the construction of its twobigger graphite reactors.9

Further DPRK–US negotiationsproduced an agreement in July of1993 on the following joint statement:

“Both sides recognizethe desirability of theDPRK’s intention toreplace its graphite-moderated reactors andassociated nuclear facili-ties with light-water-moderated reactors(LWRs). As part of thefinal resolution of thenuclear issue, and on thepremise that a solutionrelated to the provision ofLWRs is achievable, theUSA is prepared to sup-port the introduction ofLWRs and to explorewith the DPRK ways inwhich the LWRs could beobtained.”10

Both sides also agreed to the“full application” of IAEA safe-guards to the DPRK’s nuclear facil-ities. The DPRK promised to beginconsultations with the IAEA onsafeguards as soon as possible.Both re-affirmed the importance ofimplementing the North–SouthJoint Declaration on Denucleariz-ation, and the DPRK said it wasprepared to begin North–Southtalks on nuclear and other issues.Finally, the US and the DPRKagreed to meet soon to resolveremaining questions includingthose “relating to the introductionof LWRs.”11

Meeting again in August 1993,the DPRK rejected a US proposal tofreeze its nuclear program inexchange for conventional powerstations but agreed “to replace itsgraphite-moderated reactors andrelated facilities with light-waterreactor (LWR) power plants,” andthe US agreed “to make arrange-ments for the provision of LWRs ofapproximately 2,000 MW(e)” to theDPRK. The US also agreed to makeinterim energy arrangements solong as the graphite-moderatedreactors were not operated. DPRKagreed to “freeze construction” ofthe two such reactors still underconstruction, to “forego reprocess-ing” of spent fuel and to “seal” theradiochemical laboratory where itsaid reprocessing had taken place.It also promised to remain a partyto the NPT and to allow IAEAinspections. In addition, it declaredits continuing willingness to imple-ment the North–South JointDeclaration on Denuclearization.12

But, the DPRK continued to dis-agree with the IAEA over the scopeof IAEA inspections, with the ROKand US over whether the annualTeam Spirit ROK–US military exer-cise would be conducted in SouthKorea that year, and with the ROKover inspections pursuant to theNorth–South Joint Declaration onDenuclearization. The DPRK shutdown its small graphite reactor,which by then may have containedenough unseparated plutonium forat least one bomb. It soon beganunloading the fuel rods from thereactor without waiting for IAEAinspectors to test samples of mate-rial from them as they were takenout. Such tests could have deter-mined which fuel rods had been inthe reactor for a long time andwhich had not, and therebyimprove the estimate of how muchplutonium had been made withinthe fuel rods. This DPRK moveprompted fear that the DPRKintended to acquire the plutoniumfor weapons.

Efforts to agree on a U.N.Security Council sanctions resolu-tion failed to gain China’s assent.At the same time, US satellite pho-tographs showed the North Koreanmilitary forces moving to a warfooting. The Pentagon estimatedthat a war would result in 300,000to 500,000 military casualties in thefirst 90 days. No estimates weregiven for civilian deaths. Both theROK and Japan opposed going towar with the DPRK.13

Then, in a June 1994 visit toDPRK, sanctioned by PresidentClinton, former President JimmyCarter met with the DPRK’s leaderKim Il Sung and reported to thepress afterwards that the crisis wasover. He said that the DPRK hadagreed not to reprocess the spentfuel from the small graphite reactorthat had been shut down, to acceptIAEA inspection of its reactors andother facilities declared by it to theIAEA, and to freeze its existingnuclear program. In return, theDPRK expected assistance in secur-ing LWRs and an end to US effortsto impose sanctions if IAEA inspec-tors were denied access to otherlocations. Thereupon, the ROKannounced that it was prepared toprovide technology and majorfinancing to the DPRK for twoLWRs.14 It may be noted that this isessentially the same agreement asthe one from the previous year, butthe DPRK had now prevented theIAEA from making possibly keymeasurements on its spent fuel,and had delayed the US fromimposing sanctions if the DPRKprevented the IAEA from inspect-ing suspect facilities.

1.3 Agreed Frameworkof October 1994

When US and DPRK negotiatorsmet again, they produced theAgreed Framework (AF) of October1994 that gave more detail to thebasic agreement announced in theAugust 1993 joint statement and inPresident Carter’s press conference.

17


The relevant terms of the AF andthe subsequent Supply Agreementthat implements much of it are asfollows:

1. The DPRK and the US would“cooperate to replace theDPRK’s graphite-moderatedreactors and related facilitieswith light-water reactor (LWR)power plants.” Operation of thesmall graphite reactor is to be“frozen” and subject to continu-ing inspection by the IAEA.Construction of two largerunfinished graphite reactors isalso to be frozen. Later, all threeare to be dismantled. Spent fuelfrom the small reactor has beenremoved by the DPRK as indi-cated. Canning of all accessiblespent fuel rods was completedin April 2000, and the rodsremain stored in a cooling pondnear the reactor. Pursuant tofuture US–DPRK negotiations,the fuel will be disposed of “ina safe manner that does notinvolve reprocessing in theDPRK.”15 There is no require-ment that the DPRK’s smallYongbyon research reactor or itssub-critical research facility inPyongyang be dismantled.

2. The US would make arrange-ments for provision of the LWRsto the DPRK through “an inter-national consortium” which theUS would form and for which itwould be the principal point ofcontact. This consortium, whichbecame known as the KoreanEnergy Development Organiz-ation (or KEDO), would enterinto a “Supply Contract” for theLWRs with the DPRK.16 At theend of 1995, the DPRK andKEDO signed the SupplyContract for the LWRs. In addi-tion to the US, KEDO executiveboard members include SouthKorea, Japan, and the EuropeanUnion. More than a dozen othermembers are in KEDO, includ-ing Australia, New Zealand,Canada, Poland, and Argentina.

3. In the AF, the DPRK promisedthat it would “freeze” not onlythe three graphite reactors butalso the related facilities, whichit had declared to the IAEA. Inthe meantime, the US and KEDOagreed to make arrangementsfor periodic delivery of oil to theDPRK to offset the energy fore-gone due to the freeze on thegraphite reactors.17

4. DPRK agreed to remain a partyto the NPT. It also agreed to“allow implementation of itssafeguards agreement under theTreaty [NPT].” However, the USpromised the DPRK that theIAEA would not be permitted atfirst to verify the accuracy of theDPRK’s initial report on all itsnuclear material. This verifica-tion could be carried out by, e.g.,inspecting the two undeclaredand disputed sites where prod-ucts of earlier separations arebelieved by the IAEA and US tobe hidden. Inspection for thispurpose would come later:

“When a significantportion of the LWR proj-ect is completed, butbefore delivery of keynuclear components, theDPRK will come into fullcompliance with its safe-guards agreement withthe IAEA (INFCIRC 403),including taking all stepsthat may be deemed nec-essary by the IAEA, fol-lowing consultationswith the Agency withregard to verifying theaccuracy and complete-ness of the DPRK’s initialreport on all nuclearmaterial in the DPRK.”

Thus, before delivery of “keynuclear components,” the DPRKmust permit the IAEA to inspectthe two sites where the US andthe IAEA believe has the hiddenproducts of its small graphitereactor’s earlier operation. There

is evidence, discussed in Chapter6, that measurements on theseproducts would show that theDPRK removed from the reactormore irradiated fuel than it report-ed to the IAEA—presumably toseparate out the plutonium.18

5. “Key nuclear components”include items such as nuclearmaterial, reactors, the equipmentattached to reactors other thanthe turbine generators, theequipment that controls the levelof power in reactor cores, andany other components “whichnormally contain or come indirect contact with or control theprimary coolant.” These include,for example, reactor pressurevessels, as well as reactor controlrods, pressure tubes, etc.19

6. The Supply Agreement statesthat “the provision of the LWRproject and the performancesteps…are mutually condition-al.”20 As a result, KEDO’s deliv-ery schedule is “integrated”with the DPRK’s performanceschedule in several ways. Thisintegration is to be accomplishedas follows:

First, the DPRK’s acceptance ofIAEA inspections at the disputedand undeclared sites is not requireduntil “a significant portion of theLWR project is completed butbefore delivery of key nuclear com-ponents.” This language broughtobjections from the IAEA because itpostpones the “full-scope” inspec-tions necessary to determinewhether the DPRK has separatedmore plutonium than it reported—as is suspected. Major constructionof reactor buildings at Kumho (theproposed LWR site) and delivery ofnon-nuclear components includingturbine generators—a “significantportion” of the LWR project—willlikely have taken place first.21 Onthe other hand, the DPRK is notentitled to any key nuclear compo-nents if it does not permit theseIAEA inspections. Some, including


18

the IAEA Deputy Director forSafeguards, believe that the agree-ment will likely break down at thispoint because the DPRK will resistthe inspections necessary to bring itinto compliance with its safeguardsagreement.22 Others expertsbelieve, even if the DPRK cooper-ates with the IAEA to permit theseinspections, the whole process willrequire so much investigative workand materials testing that it willlikely take two years or more, thusdelaying provision of the nuclearcomponents and completion of theprogram.23

Second, when delivery of the“key nuclear components” for thefirst LWR begins, the transfer ofspent fuel from the small graphitereactor must begin. The transfer isto be completed when this firstLWR is completed. Again, if theDPRK delays delivery of spentfuel, KEDO can delay delivery ofLWR components.24

Third, “when the first LWR iscompleted [at Kumho], the DPRKwill begin dismantlement of itsfrozen graphite-moderated reactorsand related facilities, and will com-plete such dismantlement when thesecond LWR is completed.” Thus,KEDO must complete the first LWRbefore any of the graphite reactorsare dismantled but can scheduledeliveries for the second LWRbased upon the DPRK’s perform-ance of its dismantlement obliga-tions. The deliveries of the nuclearcomponents for the second LWRcan be staged in parallel with pro-portional steps by DPRK to dis-mantle all its graphite reactors.

Thus, the Supply Agreement con-templates reciprocal steps of per-formance to assure each side thatthe other is doing its part. An agree-ment that has not been made publicprovides more detail. And theSupply Agreement calls for negotia-tion of still another protocol defin-ing the reciprocal steps further.25

7. The model for the LWRs will be“selected by KEDO” but waspromised to be “the advancedversion of US-origin design andtechnology currently underproduction.”26 In fact, the reactorswill be manufactured in SouthKorea using as models two exist-ing ROK reactors based on a US-origin Combustion Engineeringdesign but including refinementsof that design.

8. The DPRK must eventually repayKEDO for the LWRs “on a long-term, interest-free basis.”27 KEDOwill provide nuclear fuel for theinitial loading of the LWRs. TheDPRK promises to use the reac-tors, technology, and nuclearmaterial involved “exclusively forpeaceful, non-explosive purpos-es.” In addition, it promises not toreprocess or increase the enrich-ment level of any nuclear materialacquired pursuant to the agree-ment, and not to transfer anynuclear material, equipment, ortechnology acquired pursuant tothe agreement outside the territo-ry of the DPRK except for thespent fuel transfer alreadydescribed.28

9. The AF provided that the DPRKand the US would conclude “anagreement for cooperation in thepeaceful uses of nuclear energy”as necessary.29 Later, the SupplyAgreement said “In the eventthat US firms will be providingany key nuclear components,”such an agreement would benegotiated “prior to the deliveryof such components.”30 Theseprovisions entail a complication.

Agreements for cooperation onpeaceful uses of nuclear energywith other nations are authorizedby the US Atomic Energy Act(Section 123). Before they can enterinto force, they must lay over inCongress for 90 days of continuoussession without passage of a jointresolution of opposition. No agree-ment for cooperation has yet been

submitted to Congress. Underrecent legislation, an agreement forcooperation indeed cannot be sub-mitted at this time.

Recent legislation requires thatthe President, when submittingsuch an agreement with the DPRK,certify that IAEA inspections—such as those required by the AF—establish the accuracy and com-pleteness of the report the DPRKmade to the IAEA when inspec-tions began in 1992. For example,the inspections must establish thatthere has been no clandestine pro-duction of plutonium.31 Thus,IAEA “full-scope” inspections thatmay well take two to four yearsmust precede congressional actionon an agreement for cooperation.

The basic nonproliferation compli-ance requirements of the agreementsreferred to above are as follows:

1. In the NPT, the DPRK has agreed“not to manufacture or otherwiseacquire” nuclear weapons. In theNPT, it has also agreed to acceptIAEA safeguards on its nuclearactivities for the purpose of ful-filling this obligation.

2. The DPRK’s safeguards agreement(IAEA INFCIRC 403) says that theIAEA shall “verify” the “findings”of the DPRK’s accounting andcontrol system showing that “therehas been no diversion of nuclearmaterial from peaceful uses tonuclear weapons.” The agreementis based on the IAEA’s 1972 modelagreement for NPT safeguards, theonly model available at the time(IAEA INFCIRC 153). Details ofsafeguards implementation for thereactors now in the DPRK appearin a confidential “subsidiaryarrangement” agreement with theIAEA. Details for LWR safeguardsimplementation will be negotiatedwith the IAEA in another “sub-sidiary arrangement.”

3. The AF goes beyond the basicNPT obligation “not to

19


manufacture or otherwiseacquire nuclear weapons.” Forexample, in it the DPRK hasagreed to “take steps to imple-ment the North–SouthDeclaration on Denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula.” Thiscontains provisions prohibitingeither the DPRK or the ROKfrom enriching uranium or sepa-rating plutonium. The AF alsorequires that the DPRK remain aparty to the NPT. Finally, asalready indicated, the AFrequires that the DPRK “comeinto full compliance with itssafeguards agreement” beforethe delivery of “key nuclearcomponents.” Full complianceincludes taking all steps thatmay be deemed necessary by theIAEA “with regard to verifyingthe accuracy and completenessof the DPRK’s initial report onall nuclear material in theDPRK.” This report is the onethat the 1991-92 IAEA measure-ments and environmental moni-toring suggested may be inaccu-rate because it does not reportall the plutonium the IAEA sus-pects the DPRK separated beforeit submitted the report.

The AF and Supply Agreementare being implemented by KEDOand the DPRK with considerablesuccess so far, though at a slowerrate than the AF contemplated. Thesurvey for the Kumho site has beencompleted and major constructionto make roads and build buildingsfor the LWRs and the personnelwho will operate them has takenplace. KEDO has awarded a “turn-key contract” for the manufactureof the LWRs to KEPCO, a SouthKorean company, which in turn has

or will award contracts to fourother South Korean companies fornuclear components. Delays haveresulted because of difficulties onboth sides, and completion is nowhoped for by 2007 rather than the2003 date targeted in the AF.Further delay is likely given theanticipated problems described.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. David Albright, and KevinO’Neill, eds., Solving the NorthKorean Nuclear Puzzle (Institutefor Science and InternationalSecurity, Washington, D.C.,2000), Chapter 1, pp. 15–29.;M.J. Mazaar, North Korea and theBomb (MacMillan, London,1995), pp. 25, 29, and 36; V.I.Denisov, “Nuclear Institutionsand Organizations in NorthKorea,” in The North KoreanNuclear Program, J.C. Moltz andA.Y. Mansourov, eds.(Routledge, New York, 2000),pp. 21–26; A. Zhebin, “APolitical History ofSoviet–North Korean NuclearCooperation,” in Moltz andMansourov, pp. 27–34.

2. D. Albright, F. Berkhout, andW. Walker, Plutonium andHighly Enriched Uranium 1996:World Inventories, Capabilities,and Policies (Oxford UniversityPress, New York, 1997), pp.282–84; R.W. Jones and M.G.McDonough, Tracking NuclearProliferation (CarnegieEndowment, Washington, D.C.,1998), pp. 158–59.

3. G. Bunn, Arms Control byCommittee (Stanford UniversityPress, Stanford, California,1992), pp. 251–52.

4. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition:Why Countries Constrain TheirNuclear Capabilities, (WoodrowWilson Center, Washington,D.C., 1995), p. 239; ForeignBroadcast Information Service,FBIS-EAS-91-243 (December 18,1991), p. 14.

5. Mazaar, pp. 84, 86.

6. Mazaar, pp. 94-95; Reiss, pp.246–49.

7. Reiss, pp. 250–53.

8. Joint Statement of the DPRKand the USA, New York, June11, 1993.

9. Joint Statement of the DPRKand the USA, New York, June11, 1993.

10. Agreed Statement between theUSA and the DPRK, Geneva,June 11, 1993.

11. Agreed Statement between theUSA and the DPRK, Geneva,June 11, 1993.

12. Agreed Statement between theUSA and the DPRK, Geneva,August 12, 1993.

13. Reiss, pp. 259, 265–71.

14. Mazaar, pp. 162–63; Reiss, pp.271–72, p. 275; Leon Sigal,Disarming Strangers (PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton,1998), pp. 155–62.

15. Agreed Framework, pars. I, 1and I, 3.

16. Agreed Framework, par. I, 1.

17. Agreed Framework, par. I, 2.

20


18. Agreed Framework, par. IV.

19. The Supply Agreement refersfor its definition of “keynuclear components” to the“Trigger List” developed by theNuclear Suppliers’ Group toimplement the export controlsrequired by Art. III, par. 2 ofthe Non-Proliferation Treaty.See M.M. El Baradei, E.I.Nwogugu, and J.M Rames, TheInternational Law of NuclearEnergy (Nijoff, Dordrecht,Netherlands, 1993), pp.1,520–33.

20. Non-Proliferation Treaty, Art.III, par. 1.

21. Supply Agreement, Art. III andAnnex 4.

22. Statement of PierreGoldschmidt to William Sailorat the International NuclearMaterials Manangement(INMM) Annual Meeting inJuly 2000.

23. David Albright,“Inconsistencies in NorthKorea’s Declaration to theIAEA” and “How MuchPlutonium Did North KoreaProduce?” Chaps. IV and VI inAlbright and Kevin O’Neill,eds., Solving the North KoreanNuclear Puzzle (Institute forScience and InternationalSecurity, Washington, D.C.,2000).

24. Supply Agreement, Annex 3.

25. Supply Agreement, Art. III, 3;Reiss, pp. 276–77.

26. Supply Agreement, Art. I.

27. Supply Agreement, Art. II.

28. Supply Agreement, Art. XIII

29. Agreed Framework, Art. I, 1.

30. Supply Agreement, Annex 3,par. 4.

31. North Korean Threat ReductionAct of 1999, Sect. 821-23 of P.L.103-113. See Henry Sokolski,“Implementing the DPRKNuclear Deal: What US LawRequires,” NonproliferationReview (Fall–Winter, 2000), pp.146, 148.

21


22


2.1 The ExistingIAEA–DPRK SafeguardsAgreement

The IAEA–DPRK SafeguardsAgreement is a standard agree-ment based on the IAEA’s 1971“model safeguards agreement,”INFCIRC 153.1 Among otherthings, it provides—

1. The DPRK (Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea, or NorthKorea) must establish andmaintain a system of accountingand control that will enable theInternational Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) to verify theDPRK’s accounting for itsnuclear material at Yongbyon,Kumho, or any other location. Itmust permit the IAEA to make“independent measurementsand observations” to assure the“timely detection of diversionof significant quantities ofnuclear material from peacefulnuclear activities to the manu-facture of nuclear weapons or ofother nuclear-explosive devicesor for purposes unknown, anddeterrence of such diversion bythe risk of early detection.”2

This is the standard for theIAEA’s INFCIRC 153 safeguardsagreements.

2. From the design of a proposedreactor, the IAEA will select “keymeasurement points,” called“strategic points,” to be used tomeasure the nature and quanti-ties of nuclear material, and todetermine its flow and inventory.These strategic points will deter-mine the “material balance areas”where the DPRK (subject tochecks by IAEA inspectors) willmeasure what comes into the

areas, what goes out, and what isthere at the time of measurement.3

For the IAEA staff to designatethese points and areas, decidewhere sensors and camerasshould be placed, and perhapseven suggest minor changes indesign that would help in safe-guarding, the papers showingthe design of the reactor shouldbe submitted to the IAEA well inadvance of the reactor’s installa-tion—although this IAEA sug-gestion is sometimes ignored byreactor builders.

3. The DPRK is required to providethe IAEA with two kinds ofaccounting reports for eachmaterial balance area: “invento-ry change reports” and “materialbalance reports.”4 The inventorychange reports are to be sent tothe IAEA within 30 days afterthe end of the month in whichthe change occurred. The materi-al balance reports are to showthe balance based on a physicalinventory of nuclear material inthe material balance area and aredue within 30 days after theinventory has been taken. Moredetails for the light-water reac-tors (LWRs) should appear inIAEA–DPRK “subsidiaryarrangements” for the LWRs.These arrangements have not yetbeen negotiated.

4. The IAEA has the right to con-duct “routine inspections” toverify the information suppliedby the DPRK’s accounting sys-tem. It can examine the DPRK’saccounting records, make inde-pendent measurements, verifythe functioning and calibrationof measuring instruments and

control equipment, apply sur-veillance and containment meas-ures (e.g., TV monitoring cam-eras focused on the reactors andseals on the reactors that, whenbroken, show the reactor couldhave been opened when theinspectors were not present). Itcan also use other unspecifiedmethods “which have beendemonstrated to be technicallyfeasible.”5

5. The Safeguards Agreement callsfor one routine inspection peryear for small facilities and formaterial balance areas outside allfacilities’ annual throughput ofnuclear material not exceedingfive kilograms. For facilities withan annual throughput exceedingfive kilograms, the “number,intensity, duration, timing, andmode of routine inspections…shall be no more intensive thanis necessary and sufficient tomaintain continuity of knowl-edge of the flow and inventoryof nuclear material….” TheAgreement goes on to specifystandards for determining the“maximum routine inspectioneffort” in such cases.6Presumably an IAEA–DPRKnegotiation will determine thiseffort at a later time.

At the time the IAEA–DPRKSafeguards Agreement went intoeffect (1992), the AgreedFramework (AF) had not beennegotiated and the safeguardscontemplated in the SafeguardsAgreement were for graphite-moderated reactors. The changesrequired will not be made in theSafeguards Agreement itself butin the subsidiary arrangementsfor the LWRs.

23

CHAPTER 2CURRENTLY APPLICABLE SAFEGUARDS AND RELATED AGREEMENTS

6. Under the SafeguardsAgreement, the IAEA also hasthe right to conduct “specialinspections” if, for example, itdecides that the routine inspec-tions and the information andexplanation provided by theDPRK “is not adequate for theAgency to fulfill its responsibili-ties under this Agreement.” Assummarized in Chapter 1, theIAEA secretariat tried to institutea special inspection in 1992 todetermine if the DPRK had sepa-rated more plutonium than ithad reported. The IAEA mayagain seek special inspectionswhen the time comes under theAF for the IAEA to inspect sitesnot declared as nuclear by theDPRK to determine whether theDPRK’s original declaration of itsnuclear materials and facilities isaccurate and complete. The IAEAis more likely to simply insistthat the DPRK comply with theAF provision requiring it to take“all steps that may be deemednecessary by the IAEA…withregard to verifying the accuracyand completeness of the DPRK’sinitial report on all nuclear mate-rial in the DPRK.”

2.2 New Information Thatthe IAEA May Ask of AllStates Under INFCIRC 153Safeguards

As we have seen, “when a sig-nificant portion of the LWR projectis completed but before delivery ofkey nuclear components,” theDPRK must provide informationshowing where all the nuclearmaterial in its original inventoryhas gone.7 Under “Part 1” of theIAEA’s “93+2” decisions tostrengthen safeguards, the DPRKcould also be asked by the IAEA toprovide certain information aboutits past dealings with nuclearmaterial. In describing the 93+2safeguards requirements, the IAEAlegal staff concluded, and theBoard accepted, that Part 1 infor-mation, though not always

requested in the past, was includedin INFCIRC 153, the model safe-guards agreement upon which theDPRK’s agreement is based.8[Neither the DPRK nor theRepublic of Korea (ROK, or SouthKorea) has agreed to accept thenew IAEA model safeguards proto-col resulting from the 93+2 pro-ceedings.] Some of the Part 1 infor-mation that could be asked of theDPRK for IAEA use in safeguard-ing the new reactors is as follows:

• Responses to a detailed ques-tionnaire showing the DPRK’ssystem of accounting and con-trol for nuclear material includ-ing the scope and timing of theDPRK’s own inspections andrelated activities relevant toIAEA safeguards.

• Information on past nuclearactivities relevant to assessingthe DPRK’s declarations of pres-ent nuclear activities, includingthe completeness and correctnessof its initial report on nuclearmaterial. (There is already amajor dispute between theDPRK and the IAEA overaccounting for the nuclear mate-rial in the DPRK’s initial report.The IAEA suspects that some ofthe fuel rods, after radiation inthe small graphite reactor, werereprocessed to extract plutoni-um, after which the plutoniumand the wastes were hiddenfrom IAEA inspectors.)

• Information on decommissionednuclear facilities, and on otherlocations previously containingnuclear material that had hotcells or where activities relatingto conversion and reprocessingof fuel fabrication took place.(This may produce IAEA ques-tions on the DPRK radiochemi-cal lab or on a smaller chemicalseparation facility that the IAEADirector-General Blix suspectedthe DPRK once had.)

• Access to existing historicalaccounting and operating

records predating the entry intoforce of an INFCIRC 153 safe-guards agreement. (Given thelength of time the DPRK operat-ed nuclear facilities before itagreed to its INFCIRC 153 safe-guards agreement, this couldproduce more IAEA questions.)

• Information on other locationscontaining nuclear material. (Thisshould include the disputed,undeclared sites.)

The provisions of the AF andSupply Agreement (summarized inChapter 1) that deal with theseissues are thus reinforced by theIAEA Board’s decision that safe-guards agreements like the oneapplying to the DPRK require theDPRK to supply information ofthis kind. Moreover, in adopting its93+2 decisions, the IAEA madeclear that remote monitoring froma distant, safeguarded reactor toIAEA headquarters in Viennausing communications equipmentattached to cameras and other con-trol and surveillance devicesinstalled at the reactor could berequested by IAEA inspectorsunder an INFCIRC 153 safeguardsagreement. Acceptance by the gov-ernment where the reactor waslocated of a 93+2 strengthened pro-tocol for its safeguards agreementwas not necessary.

2.3 Additions to INFCIRC153 Safeguards for StatesWilling To Agree to a NewINCFIRC 540 SafeguardsProtocol

The IAEA “93+2” decision dealswith subjects beyond the INFCIRC153 safeguards agreements, sub-jects requiring negotiation of anamendment or “protocol” to exist-ing agreements. In its 1996 reporton 93+2 to a conference of its mem-bers, the IAEA described the newinformation that would be requiredas part of what it called the “Part2” amendments to be incorporatedin a new Protocol to the standard

24

CURRENTLY APPLICABLE SAFEGUARDS AND RELATED AGREEMENTS

INFCIRC 153 safeguards agree-ment.9 The model agreement forthis new protocol is in IAEA INF-CIRC 540. The new protocolrequires, for example, informationnot involving nuclear materialincluding:

• nuclear research activities andfuture plans for nuclear develop-ments;

• all activities related to the enrich-ment of uranium, reprocessing ofspent fuel, or treatment ofnuclear waste before the activitiesinvolve nuclear material;

• activities in buildings on sites ofnuclear facilities;

• acquisition of a long list ofequipment and non-nuclearmaterial related to the operationof nuclear facilities;

• information on materials con-taining uranium or thorium toolow in concentration to be“nuclear material” within theIAEA definition.

The INFCIRC 540 protocol’srequirements were also intended topermit access to a greater range oflocations than under INFCIRC 153,for example, of sites not declaredby the facility’s government. Thesehad been available for inspectionin the past only through “specialinspections,” which producedmuch controversy between theIAEA and the DPRK. If the IAEAinterprets the “special inspection”provision as originally intendedand as interpreted in its 1993 caseinvolving the DPRK, inspections atother than the declared reactorsites should be possible with theDPRK’s cooperation withoutamending the DPRK’s safeguardsagreement to add the INFCIRC 540protocol requirements. Indeed, theAF requires that the DPRK take“all steps that may be deemed nec-essary by the IAEA…with regardto verifying the accuracy and com-

pleteness of the DPRK’s initialreport on all nuclear material in theDPRK.”

Even under an INFCIRC 540protocol, however, a governmentofficial can prevent IAEA inspec-tors from going to places theyhave not inspected before. Themain difference may in practice bea difference in the “thresholdshowing” necessary to justifygoing beyond routine inspectionsites. For special inspections ofnon-routine, undeclared sitesunder INFCIRC 153 safeguardswhen a government asks for justi-fication, inspectors must arguethat they simple can’t do their jobswithout the special inspection. Forvisits to non-routine, undeclaredsites under INFCIRC 540 safe-guards, when the host govern-ment asks why, the inspectorsshould only have to show that aquestion or inconsistency has aris-en that necessitates an inspectionto resolve. In either case, the coop-eration of the host government islikely to be the most importantfactor. Clearly, if the DPRK doesnot cooperate by taking “all stepsthat may be deemed necessary bythe IAEA,” the language quoted atthe end of the preceding para-graph, it will violate an importantrequirement of the AF.

INFCIRC 540 protocols also per-mit “environmental monitoring”at other locations than thosedeclared by the operator. TheIAEA has been doing “environ-mental monitoring” at some rou-tine inspection sites in other coun-tries. Presumably, it will do this atthe DPRK’s routine inspectionsites (if it has not already). Thehope of INFCIRC 540 is that thisform of monitoring will becomemuch more common. But, the hostgovernment’s cooperation willstill be necessary to permit theinspectors to go to non-routinelocations to take their samples—from the environment, the air, theleaves, the ground, etc. Again, the

language quoted in the two pre-ceding paragraphs from the AFmay be helpful in producingDPRK cooperation.

One of the promises of provid-ing INFCIRC 540 information isthat it will permit closer coopera-tion between the IAEA, the opera-tors, and the government officialsresponsible for nuclear activities.This will result in many fewerinspections for countries likeCanada or Japan where a tremen-dous share of the total IAEAinspections costs has gone in thepast. In general, adoption of INC-FIRC 540 protocol would have, itwas hoped, produced a majorreduction in the number of inspec-tions in countries that accepted thenew safeguards. IAEA safeguardsexperts question, however,whether that is an objective worthpursuing with the DPRK. Somebelieve that having more inspec-tions in the DPRK pursuant toDPRK’s existing SafeguardsAgreement will be more valuablethan attempting to apply the INC-FIRC 540 protocol to the DPRK.10

2.3.1 Safeguards on ExistingROK LWRs—Models for theDPRK LWRs

The DPRK is to receive two pres-surized LWRs of 1,000-MW(e)capacity each, based on a USCombustion Engineering Companydesign that has been refined bySouth Korean reactor designers.Two reactors of this design areoperating in South Korea. They areboth subject to INFCIRC 153 safe-guards and are good models forthe safeguards anticipated for thetwo DPRK LWRs. Safeguards onlarge LWRs of 1,000-MW(e) poweror more do not vary a great dealfrom one reactor to another.11 Thus,the IAEA safeguards on the KEDOreactors in Kumho will likely bevery similar to the safeguards onthe ROK reactors expected to bethe models for the KEDO reactors.

25


2.4 Major ChallengesAhead to theImplementation of theAgreed Framework

Most of this report is dedicatedto the technical means for verify-ing that the plutonium producedin the new LWRs at Kumho is notdiverted to weapons purposes;that the graphite reactors andother nuclear facilities atYongbyon and Taechon are dis-mantled as required by the AF;and that the spent fuel now atYongbyon is not diverted but isdelivered to KEDO when the AFand Supply Agreement require itto be. Other major challenges,however, lie ahead that can pre-vent or delay implementation ofthe AF.

2.4.1 Completion of a“Significant Portion” of the FirstReactor in the ROK andReactor Buildings in the DPRK

This step has been delayed sofar by about four years for manyreasons. There is potential formore delay from the challengeslisted below, including the liabilityproblem. Completion is not nowexpected before 2004, a year afterthe original target for completionof the entire project. After comple-tion of this “significant portion”but before “delivery of key nuclearcomponents,” the DPRK must“come into full compliance withits safeguards agreement…withregard to verifying the accuracyand completeness” of its 1992report to the IAEA on “all nuclearmaterial in the DPRK.” This majorverification problem is discussedin Chapter 6. It holds the potentialfor causing substantial furtherdelay and expense. KEDO esti-mates provide only a few months’time for IAEA inspection after asignificant portion of the first reac-tor is built in the ROK and theDPRK becomes obligated by the

AF to accept comprehensive IAEAinspections. If the DPRK refusesinspections before this obligationcomes into force, as it has so far,and if, based on IAEA expecta-tions, the IAEA inspections andreview take two or more years,major additional costs to KEDOfor the reactor will be caused bythe delay. The reactor is being builtunder a fixed-cost contract thatassumes only a few months will beneeded for the IAEA’s inspectionand review.

2.4.2 Financing

South Korea carries the majorburden of financing now. The UShas paid for most of the heavy fueloil delivered to the DPRK to fuelits electricity supply, but has notpaid for much else. Japan hasmade major contributions to thealready large costs of construction.Australia and the European Unionhave made smaller ones.Completing construction at Kumhoand building the reactors in NorthKorea will be very costly, and dis-putes continue over how mucheach of the interested partiesshould pay.

2.4.3 Nuclear Liability

This applies, for example, topotential liability if one of theLWRs has a major accident duringoperations, and some peoplereceive high doses of radioactivity.Congress has prohibited the USfrom agreeing to indemnify a USmanufacturer that provides majorcomponents for the DPRK reac-tors. As a result, General Electrichas turned down an offer to pro-vide the turbine generators for theDPRK’s reactors. Two Japanesefirms, who seem somewhat lessconcerned about the liability prob-lem, will now supply them. SouthKorea wants KEDO, the EuropeanUnion, Japan, and the US toassume this liability. Negotiationshave not yet produced an agree-ment to share this liability risk.

But, looking to the future, thiscould become a major problemagain.

2.4.4 US–DPRK “Agreement forCooperation” and IAEAInspection of UndeclaredFacilities

This problem was discussed inChapter 1. Negotiating and imple-menting a US agreement for coop-eration with the DPRK permittingthe export of necessary nuclearcomponents by American manufac-turers seems tightly tied to satisfy-ing the IAEA that the DPRK hasdeclared and reported all its nuclearmaterials and facilities—that theDPRK has not, for example, sepa-rated more plutonium than it hasdeclared. Even if the DPRK cooper-ates fully in the IAEA special orother inspections, the process ofreconstructing what happened to allnuclear materials in the DPRK fromthe time it joined the NPT to thepresent is likely to take two to fouryears. No Congressional review ofan agreement for cooperation andno provision of nuclear componentsto the DPRK appears likely untilthis process is completed and theIAEA is satisfied that the DPRK’sreports on all its nuclear materialsand facilities are accurate and com-plete. By one estimate, the IAEAwould have to complete its inspec-tions and make a decision favorableto DPRK within about 30 months ifthe export licensing of a US nuclearcomponent or components is not todelay completion of the Kumhoproject under the present timeschedule—which has already beendelayed several years beyond theoriginal the original 2003 targetdate.12

If the IAEA takes around 24months for its inspections andappraisal, the inspections shouldbegin by mid-2001. But, under theAF, the time has not yet come forthe IAEA inspections to begin, asChapter 1 shows. Implementation

26


Notes to Chapter 2

1. The DPRK SafeguardsAgreement is IAEA INFCIRC403, May 1992.

2. DPRK Safeguards Agreement,Art. 7.

3. DPRK Safeguards Agreement,Arts. 46, 98 (m) and (s).

4. DPRK Safeguards Agreement,Art. 63 (b).

5. DPRK Safeguards Agreement,Arts. 72, 74.

6. DPRK Safeguards Agreement,Arts. 79, 80.

7. See Chap. 1, par. 3 and DPRKSafeguards Agreement, Arts. 8,49, 63–68.

8. See the report by the IAEADirector-General to the IAEAGeneral Conference,Strengthening the Effectivenessand Improving the Efficiency ofthe Safeguards System,GC(40)/17 (August 23, 1996),Annex II, pp. 5–7.

9. Report of the IAEA Director-General to the GeneralConference, Strengthening theEffectiveness and Improving theEfficiency of the SafeguardsSystem, GC(40)/17 (August 23,1996), Annex II, pp. 7–15.

10. Personal communication inAugust 2000 from JamesLarrimore, former IAEA safe-guards expert. Rich Hooper, theIAEA official most closely asso-ciated with leading the devel-opment of the 93+2 revisions,believes these revisions shouldbe used in the DPRK if theDPRK’s consent to doing so canbe obtained. Personal commu-nication in September 2000.

11. Personal communication fromJames Larrimore, August 2000.

12. Henry Sokolsky,“Implementing the DPRKNuclear Deal: What U.S. LawRequires,” NonproliferationReview (Fall–Winter, 2000), p. 149.

27


of pertinent provisions of the AFmay well be delayed for yearsbeyond the four it has already beendelayed, unless the DPRK agrees toearlier inspections. And, of course,if the IAEA inspections andappraisal do not produce therequired result, implementation ofthe AF pursuant to its presentterms could end. In Chapter 8,after more complete discussionsand assessments of verification andsafeguards procedures, we returnto the question of how variouseventualities could affect verifica-tion and safeguards and vice versa.

2.4.5 Improving North Korea’sElectricity Distribution System

Before it will be safe to turn theLWRs on, major expensiveimprovements in the DPRK’s elec-trical distribution system are neces-sary. North Korea does not appearto have the resources to pay forthese improvements, and neitherKEDO nor any of its participantshas agreed to pay for them. Thisproblem is discussed in Chapter 3,which also describes the are wherethe reactors for the DPRK will goand what has been done so far.

28


29

3.1 Introduction

This chapter includes a discus-sion regarding the location of theKorean Energy DevelopmentOrganization (KEDO) reactors inthe Democratic People’s Republicof Korea (DPRK, or North Korea)as well as the location of othernuclear-power plants along theshores of the East Sea. The discus-sion is limited to the large-sized,power-producing reactors thatKEDO will provide to the DPRKunder the terms of the AgreedFramework (AF). Further items dis-cussed here are site-work progressto date, proposed shipments ofnuclear fuel into and out of thereactor site, transmission of thegenerated electricity out of the site,and related Republic of Korea(ROK, or South Korea) energy-development issues. All of theseissues bear on our main topic ofsafeguards and verification andwhat will be known under variouscircumstances.

The proposed power reactors tobe built at the Kumho site are oftenreferred to interchangeably as theKEDO reactors (for their providerorganization), the Korean StandardNuclear Plant (KSNP) reactors (fortheir model name), or the KumhoPressurized-Water reactors (PWRs)for their general design category.We attempt to use these acronymswhere they fit best, but we remindthe reader that they refer to thesame two PWR-type reactors to bebuilt at Kumho under KEDO’ssponsorship based on the KSNPmodel. We remind the reader alsothat PWRs, as well as Boiling-Water Reactors (BWRs) are types ofreactors within the general catego-ry of Light-Water Reactors (LWRs).

A description of the KSNP reactors(the portions relevant to the safe-guards program), a discussion ofthe proposed safeguards measures,and possible additions to them areprovided in Chapters 4 and 5.Other chapters address issues relat-ed to the smaller graphite-moder-ated reactors installed or underconstruction before the AF atYongbyon and elsewhere.

3.2 The KEDO Site

The KEDO reactors will be builton the shores of the East Sea, some-time referred to as the Sea of Japan.(We will use the term East Sea toavoid the clash of perceptions as tothe proper name for that sea.) TheKEDO reactors will be located 30kilometers (19 miles) north of thevillage of Sinpo about midway

along the DPRK’s East Sea coast-line, a distance of slightly morethan 160 kilometers (100 miles)from the ROK’s border to thesouth, and about 288 kilometers(180 miles) from the Russian bor-der to the northeast. The nearesttown to the site is Kumho, and wehave chosen to refer to the site asthe Kumho site so as to be consis-tent with other publications thatalso refer to the Kumho site.1 Thelocation of the Sinpo village isshown in Fig. 3-1. The Kumho siteis located in a rural area away fromthe main population centersaround the Pyongyang area to thewest and around Congjin close tothe Russian border to the north.The climate at the site is dry andcooler than in Pyongyang or Seoul,though the seaside location moder-ates the winter temperatures.

CHAPTER 3THE KEDO REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES

C H I N A

R U S S I A

N O R T HK O R E A

S O U T H K O R E A

Hangang

Yalu

Imjin

Nam

Chan

gjin

Hun

Toudao

Ullung do

Sinmi

Anmyon-do

Y E L L O WS E A

K o r e aB ay C h o s o n

M a n

E A S T S E A( S E A O F J A P A N )

ShuifengSk

ChangjinRes. Pujon

Res.

SonghuaHu

Maokui shan

CH

AN

GB

A

IS H A

NA

NG

NI

MS

AN

MA

EK

Liaoyuan

ShenyangFushun

Hunjiang

Yanji

UnggiNajin

Chongju Andong

Sangju

Chingju

Samchok

KangyangChunchon

Yanggu

Kosong

Chorwon

Seoul

Kaeson

Sariwon

P’yongyang Wonsan

Haeju

Huichon

YongbyongTaechon

KapsanKilchu

Puryong

Changjin

Songjin

HungnamAnju

Kuandian

Chasong

KanggyeChosan

Sinuiju

Hyesan

Hamhung

Inch’on

Yondok

Namp’o

Yonghung

Chongjin

Onsong

Pukch’ong

SinpoKumho Site

Tonghua

Dandong

Vladivostok

0 50 miles

0 50 kilometers

North KoreaFigure 3-1. Generalmap of the DPRK.

The Kumho site had alreadybeen selected for three Russian1,000-MW(e) VVER-1000 reactorsand had been cleared as aprospective nuclear-power plantsite. Russia (then the SovietUnion) had promised those reac-tors to the DPRK as a part of theinternational nuclear electrifica-tion program of the ComeconOrganization and in the expecta-tion of transmitting a part of theelectric output to the Vladivostokarea. In fact, two similar reactors(though of a more updateddesign) are now being constructedin the People Republic of China(PRC), in Tinwan, JiangsuProvince.2 Early site work for theRussian reactors project in Kumhobegan in 1990 and ceased with thecollapse of the Soviet Union and inface of the DPRK’s apparent inabil-ity to pay the cost of this large proj-ect with its own resources. KEDO

has inherited the original Russianplant site as this was the only loca-tion in the DPRK that had been sur-veyed for the construction of alarge civilian power plant.

There were several advantagesfor originally choosing the Kumhosite as a prospective nuclear site:

• A seaside site that can use sea-water for condenser cooling. Theseaside location and availabilityof barge-docking facilities atSinpo and on site permit theshipment of heavy equipmentitems as well as fresh and spentfuel, rather than relying on thedilapidated road and rail net-works.

• Location in a low-density ruralarea, thus minimizing potentialroutine or accidental radiationexposure.

• A hard-rock site with adequatebedrock area at grade level, thusallowing the entire reactor build-ing to be constructed abovegrade as the Russian designrequired.

• Mid-way location between theDPRK load center at thePyongyang area and the Russianload center at Vladivostok.

On the other hand, the distancefrom the load centers requires theconstruction of high-voltage trans-mission lines to transmit the largeamount of electricity generated onsite to the ultimate consumers.

3.3 Nuclear-PowerDevelopment Along theShores of the East Sea

The KEDO reactors at theKumho site will join the large num-ber of other nuclear facilities locat-ed along the shores of the East Sea.The four littoral states—the ROK,DPRK, Russia, and Japan—haveturned the East Sea into one of themost heavily ‘nuclearized’ areas ofthe world.3 The ROK and Japanhave located several large plantclusters along the shores of the EastSea (Fig. 3-2). The ROK has locatedthree of its four nuclear sites on theeastern part of the peninsula, start-ing with Kori—the first nuclear-power station of 2,940 MW(e) netcapacity—extending to Wolsung,the Korean–Canadian CANDUreactors station of 2,800 MW(e)capacity, and to the Ulchin stationwith 3,900 MW(e) installed capacitythat includes the first of the seriesof the standardized KSNP plants,two of which are planned for theKEDO site. Two KSNP reactors,each one similar in size to theKEDO station, are planned for theKori and the Ulchin sites.Additionally, a new nuclear sitewill be opened up in Bonj I1, justnorth of the Wolsung station. Thatsite could accommodate four KSNP

30

The KEDO Reactors and Associated Facilities and Activities

Tokyo

SymbolOperation

1652

4 + 23

Construction

KoreaIkata

Hamaoka

Tokai

Shika

Seoul

DMZ

TaechonYongbyon

Sinpo

Pyongyong

Shimane

Ulchin

Wolsung

Kori

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa

Tomari

East Sea(Sea of Japan)

Yellow Sea

Pacific Ocean

Fukushima II

Sendai

Genkai

Japan

Taejon

Yeonggwang

Fukushima I

Onagawa

Higashidori

Takahama

MihamaMonju

FugenTsuruga

Ohi

Figure 3-2. Locations of nuclear reactors around the East Sea.

reactors or four advanced CANDUreactors, and has been re-designat-ed in early 2001 as a KSNP site.4,5

Should relations between theDPRK–ROK continue improving—and should the ROK’s nuclear pro-gram suffer from lack of nuclearsites, as discussed later—then it ispossible to assume that additionalROK reactors will be built on DPRKsites, probably starting at theKumho site, to generate power fortransmission to the ROK. This willresult eventually in additionalnuclear stations located on the DPRKsection of the East Sea coastline.

The Russian Navy has majornuclear facilities southeast of theVladivostok area, includingChazhma Bay (nuclear submarinerefueling and defueling), BolshoyKamen (defueling and dismantel-ment of nuclear submarines), andPavlovsk Bay (operational subma-rine base), all on the shores of theEast Sea. A large part of the nuclear-powered surface ships and sub-marines of Russian Navy’s PacificFleet are home-ported at these har-bors. Naval facilities in this areainclude storage of spent fuel andlow-level waste from Pacific Fleetships and submarines. Spent-fueland radioactive-waste storage sitesare near Dunai on the ShkotovoPeninsula, and a floating liquid-radioactive-waste filtration plant(the Landysh) at Bolshoy Kamen.All these facilities need upgradingto Western radiation-exposure andemissions-control standards. TheRussians have long-term plans forthe construction of the PrimorskiKray nuclear-power station north ofVladivostok, and discussions havebeen held since 1995 with bothRussian and Canadian organizationsto that purpose.

The extensive, peaceful nuclear-power program in Japan has result-ed in a large number of nuclear siteslocated on the shores of the East Sea.Among the more important facili-ties, we should mention four. The

national fuel-cycle center inRokkasho Mura, located at thenorthern tip of the main island ofHonshu along the bay connectingthe East Sea and the Pacific Ocean,includes a uranium-enrichmentplant, a French-designed fuel-repro-cessing plant of 800 tonnes per yearcapacity now under construction, alarge-sized spent-fuel storage pool,and the prospective Higashidorinuclear-power plant site. TheKashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear-powerstation, with five 1,100-MW(e)BWR-5 reactors and two 1,350-MW(e) advanced BWRs, is thelargest nuclear station in the worldwith more than 8,000 MW(e) ofinstalled capacity. The Japan AtomicPower Company (JAPCO) has newprototypes station in Tsuruga thatincludes, among others, the 150-MW(e) plutonium-burning FugenAdvanced Thermal Reactor (ATR)and the 250-MW(e) Monju experi-mental Liquid Metal Fast BreederReactor (LMFBR). And lastly, threePWR stations of the Kansai ElectricPower Company are clustered at theMihama, Takahama, and Ohi siteswith a total installed net capacityexceeding 9,200 MW(e).

The profusion of nuclear-powerstations and fuel-cycle facilitieslocated on the shores of the East Sea,to which the KEDO reactors will bethe latest addition, may well requirethe littoral states to reach agree-ments about regulating water efflu-ents and air emissions from thesefacilities. Such agreements may wellhave to include provisions for emis-sions monitoring, effluent controlstandards and cross boundary pol-lutant damages, and third-party lia-bility in cases of nuclear accidents.In fact, it may be to the advantage ofthese states to harmonize andimprove their nuclear-insurance reg-ulations to meet current standards,at least at the levels proposed by theInternational Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA). Implementingsuch measures will be essential forthe well-being of the citizens of allthe four states involved, if nuclear

power is to grow at the announcedlevels and provide the energy ben-efits promised.

3.4 Site Work to Date

KEDO initiated preliminarywork at the Kumho site shortlyafter its inception. Major work atthe site was initiated only after thesigning of the Preliminary WorksContract (PWC) between KEDOand Korea Electric PowerCorporation (KEPCO) in August1997. The PWC has been incorpo-rated into the main Turn KeyContract (TKC) between KEDOand KEPCO, signed in December1999, and it is now included in theoverall KEPCO scope for theKEDO reactors. The full value ofthe PWC site-related work scope isestimated at $93 million, out of atotal KEPCO work scope under theTKC, estimated at $4,080 million.Information on the work progressto date can be obtained from theKEDO Annual Reports.6 As part ofits activities, KEDO has opened anoffice in Kumho to act as a con-sular office for staff from KEDOmember countries without diplo-matic relations with the DPRK, andto interact with the DPRK GeneralBureau (GB) for the LWR Project onproject- and site-related issues.KEDO also cooperates with theDPRK regulatory authority—theState Nuclear Safety RegulatoryCommission (SNSRC) on mattersrelated to the safety evaluation ofthe KSNP reactors and to the train-ing of nuclear-plant operators andmaintenance crews.

Site activities to date have concen-trated on three areas (Fig. 3-3),including the construction housingand warehouses area, the reactorssite, and the process-water intakesite, some 16 kilometers away fromthe reactors site.7 KEDO has alsointerconnected all three sites with aroad system considered among thebest in that region of the DPRK. Thehousing area now includes facilitiesfor several hundred construction

31


workers and visitors. It includesmedical, dining, banking, and recre-ational facilities. Construction anddesign offices were also built, aswell as warehouses for the construc-tion equipment and supply items.KEDO has also established inde-pendent supplies of reliable electric-ity, potable water, communicationssystem, and constructed environ-mental monitoring facilities and asanitary-waste treatment facility.

A site view7 of the future KEDOreactors is shown in Fig. 3-4. Interms of work to date, KEPCOunder the PWC has concentratedon site-grading and removing alarge hill from the area where thereactors are to be constructed. Thescope of the grading effort isgraphically depicted in Fig. 3-5where the dimensions of the grad-ed area are shown in relation to thesize of the future KSNPs.7 In total,about 4 million cubic meters ofrock and soil have been removeddown to the bedrock. The exposedbedrock at grade level now formsthe ‘platform’ over which the basemats for the two reactor plants willbe laid. The excavated rock materi-als are used to create the cooling-water intake and discharge struc-tures, and to build the breakwaterfor the docking harbor on site,which will be used to barge-trans-port heavy equipment items to theconstruction site.

With the signing of the majorTKC, the direct responsibility forthe KSNP reactor construction hasdevolved to KEPCO as the KEDOGeneral Contractor. KEDO itselfcontinues to negotiate with theDPRK authorities various othercontracts that will govern the con-struction work and the reactors’commissioning and operationsphases. A Memorandum ofUnderstanding was signed withthe DPRK on September 1999regarding environmental protec-tion and indemnification. AnOperators’ Training Protocol wascompleted on April 2000 and is

signed. Substantial progress wasachieved by July 2000 on a Protocoldealing with Quality Assuranceand LWR Equipment Warranties.KEDO has negotiated with theIAEA to conduct a StandardDesign Safety Review of the pro-posed Kumho reactors by mid-

2001. KEDO is discussing with theDPRK the strengthening of its reg-ulatory agency—the SNSRC. As apart of its extensive safety-relateddiscussions with the DPRK, KEDOhas transferred to the DPRK copiesof the ROK regulatory agencies’Safety Review Guidelines, the ROK

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Figure 3-4. Artist’s conception of the future site for the KEDO reactors. From aKEPCO–KEDO brochure supplied by J. Mulligan, KEDO, June 2000.

Aggregate/water source area(1,654,000 m2)

Power plantconstruction area(3,108,000 m2)

Community area

Yanghwa PortSeohochon

Figure 3-3. The vicinity of the Light-Water Reactor (LWR) project.

Atomic Energy Act andEnforcement Decrees, and a numberof codes and standards adopted inthe ROK’s nuclear energy program.KEDO has also conducted detaileddiscussions and seminars with theDPRK SNSRC and GB regardingthe application and implementationof those documents. A PreliminarySafety Analysis Report (PSAR) forthe KEDO reactors has been submit-ted to the DPRK regulatory agencyas a part of the application for aconstruction permit.

3.5 Nuclear-Fuel ShipmentsInto and Out of the Site

Fresh nuclear fuel to the KEDOreactors and spent nuclear fuel dis-charged from the reactors will beshipped in and out of the Kumhosite by barge to the ROK becauseroad and rail links between theDPRK and the ROK have not yetbeen established. A trial opening ofthe Seoul– Pyongyang rail lineoccurred in October 2000; however,commercial rail service betweenthe two countries is speculative.Furthermore, the status of road andrail overpasses, underpasses, andjunctions that need to be traversed,as well as the general condition ofthe transportation routes may notallow bulky, overweight spent-fuel(and even the lighter fresh fuel)transporters. A heavy spent-fuel-cask rail car may weigh about 100tons. It is not clear that the DPRKrail network could safely carry carsof this weight. Should a transporta-tion accident happen due to theinadequate maintenance of theroad or rail links and various junc-tions along the routes, the accidentconsequences may be severe, andthe fuel insurers may not evenallow such transportation.

From a non-proliferationperspective, once spent fuel ismoved out of the Kumho site, theshorter the time period as it movesthrough DPRK territory, the lesschance for attempted fuel diver-sion, or for delaying the spent-fuel

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Master Site Grading Plan• Power Block Area

– Graded elevation: EL 10.0 m (above MSL)– Graded area: about 220,000 m2

• Temporary Facilities Area– Graded elevation: EL 6.0 m (above MSL)– Graded area: about 780,000 m2

• Total Volume/Area– About 6,000,000 m2/1,000,000 m2

Master Site Grading Plan

Cross Sectional View of the Site

Figure 3-5. Scope of the grading efforts in the construction area (according to a KEDObrochure).

transport and using it as a bargain-ing chip in some future negotia-tions. From all the perspectivesmentioned above, moving the fuelin and out of the Kumho site bybarge is the feasible and desirabletransportation mode.

As discussed in Chapter 4, eachof the two KSNP reactors on site atKumho will be refueled every 15months, as is the practice with allthe other KSNP reactors operatedby KEPCO. In general, it isKEDO’s intention, as much as pos-sible, to build the Kumho reactorslike all other KSNP reactors operat-ed in the ROK. This issue is dis-cussed next.

A typical KSNP reactor requires60 new assemblies of fresh fuelloaded into the core every 15months. In parallel, 60 assembliesof spent fuel are discharged fromthe reactor and stored in the spentfuel storage pool, located in thefuel building adjacent to the reactorcontainment building. Each assem-bly weighs slightly more than halfa ton (1,000 pounds). A fresh fuelload then weighs less than 35 tons.The fresh-fuel assemblies are onlyslightly radioactive and can be han-dled by hand, with most of thealpha activity of the low-enricheduranium (LEU) being contained inthe zirconium oxide-clad material.Thus, the fresh fuel shipment intothe Kumho site does not pose anytransportation difficulties and canbe carried out by two commercialtrucks.

It is likely, though not yet estab-lished, that the DPRK will pur-chase its natural uranium in theworld markets and ship it to oneof the major uranium enrichmentvendors, such as the United StatesEnrichment Corporation (USEC),for enrichment. The LEU producedby USEC will be converted to ura-nium oxide in the US and thenshipped to the ROK’s fuel-fabrica-tion plant, operated by KEPCONuclear Fuel Company (KNFC) in

Taejon (see Fig. 3-2). KNFC fabri-cates all the fuel assemblies for thenuclear plants in Taejon, and itwill likely fabricate the fuel assem-blies for the KEDO reactors just asit fabricates fuel assemblies for allother KSNP reactors. From Taejon,the fabricated fuel assemblies willbe trucked onto a barge docked inthe designated ROK harbor andthe barge will carry the nuclear-fuel shipment to the Kumho bargeharbor, whence the fresh fuel willbe tracked to the reactor fuelbuildings. The DPRK operatorwill take custody of the fresh fuelat the barge-docking facility andmove it to the fuel-storage facilityin the plant.

Unlike the fresh-fuel-shipmentprocess, which is quite straightfor-ward, the issue of spent-fuel ship-ment is more complicated. Spentfuel discharged from the reactor ishighly radioactive. Current industrypractices call for keeping the spent-fuel assemblies in the spent fuelstorage pool in the fuel building onsite until their residual radioactivityhas been sufficiently reducedthrough the natural decay of theshort-lived fission products beforeshipping the assemblies in a heavilyshielded container. Usually, spentfuel is kept in wet storage on sitefor at least ten years. Most spentfuel storage pools can be further re-racked and equipped with neutronabsorber plates to increase theirstorage capacity to more than 20years’ worth of discharge, whileavoiding potential nuclear criticalityaccidents. Under these conditions,and assuming the KEDO reactorsreach commercial operation in 2008,it may not be necessary to shipspent fuel out of the Kumho siteprior to 2020, unless so required bynon-proliferation considerations orby special contract conditions. It ismore likely that with proper stan-dardized re-racking measures, theKEDO reactors’ spent fuel will nothave to be moved out of the storagepools in the reactor’s fuel buildingsprior to 2030.

At this point, KEPCO has not yetdeveloped its long-range, spent-fuel management plan for itsKSNP reactors. KEPCO may welldecide to keep all old spent KSNPfuel discharge in concrete dry-stor-age casks at each site, rather thanremove the spent fuel to a centralstorage facility. At this time, noROK-centralized, away-from-reac-tor, spent-fuel storage facility hasbeen developed and built byKEPCO. Thus, the DPRK authori-ties may well decide, all otherthings being equal, to keep theKEDO reactors’ old discharged fuelin the spent fuel pools in the reac-tor buildings and then in dry stor-age casks on site at Kumho, untilKEPCO’s spent-fuel disposal plansare firmed, assuming the spent fuelwill be disposed of in the ROK.Alternately, if by mutual agree-ment between the DPRK and othercountries involved, the spent fuelis to be removed from the Kumhosite as quickly as feasible, a storagefacility in the ROK or a third coun-try has to be so designated, and,assuming it is a new storage site,that facility has to be designed,licensed, and built. That processmay require 20 years or more dueto potential public opposition tostoring spent fuel from a differentcountry. If the KEDO reactors’ fuelis shipped to an existing storagefacility, e.g., in the UK, France, orthe PRC, high storage fees may beimposed, assuming the spent fuelwill not be reprocessed. Thus, thefate of the KEDO reactors’ spentfuel is yet quite uncertain, thoughadequate time remains before thespent-fuel storage pools on site runout of storage capacity.

Once a decision is made toremove the spent fuel from theKumho site, it is necessary to bringa heavily shielded storage cask tothe site. Such a cask, depending onthe number of spent fuel assem-blies it carries, can weigh up to100 tons and is usually rail-mount-ed. The cask has to be barge-shipped into the site and then

34


moved by rail from the barge har-bor on site to the fuel building ateach reactor. The spent fuel isloaded into the cask in a specialsection of the spent fuel pool insidethe reactor building (discussed inChapter 4). The loaded and sealedcask is then lowered into its railcarriage and moved into the barge,which carries it to its destination inthe ROK or beyond. There, thespent fuel is removed and the caskreadied for another shipment. Thelogistics and the financial arrange-ment for spent-fuel dispositionhave not yet been made.

3.6 Electricity TransmissionIssues

As important as the fuel ship-ment into the site is the issue ofelectricity transmission out of thesite. The US Energy InformationAdministration estimates the totalelectricity-generating capacity ofthe DPRK by January 1998 as10,000 MW(e),8 with a total genera-tion in 1998 of 32.0 billion KWh.Hydroelectric plants provide 50percent of the installed capacityand 70 percent of generationnation-wide, and the rest is provid-ed by a mix of coal- and oil-firedthermal power plants. Peter Hayesof the Nautilus Institute9 provides asimilar estimate for total installedcapacity—9.75 GWe. According toHayes, the DPRK energy crisis of1996 resulted in only 2-3 GWe ofinstalled capacity in operation bythe year 2000 due to the lack ofcommercial fuel, cancellation ofsubsidized oil supply from Russia,and drought seasons. Total genera-tion by 2000 is estimated at only15.0 billion KWh. The KEDO reac-tors will inject a 2,000-MW(e)capacity increment into the DPRK’spower grid, with each reactor gen-erating about 7.0 billion KWh peryear (assuming annual operation at80 percent capacity). Evidently, theKEDO project will become a majorgenerating center in the DPRK, pro-viding about a third of all genera-tion from the Kumho site by 2010,

when both reactors reach commer-cial operation. In fact, the total gen-eration from both reactors by 2010will nearly equal the total com-mercial electricity generation in theDPRK in 2000.9 Hayes’ low esti-mate of the DPRK total generationmay itself be an overestimation. Itwas reported in December 2000that the DPRK has demandeddirect electricity supply from theROK as a pre-condition to a contin-ued North–South dialog.10 Thiswould indicate that available fuelstockpiles at the DPRK’s powerplants are lower than expected.The DPRK may barely be able toprovide on its own even its mostessential power supplies. This situ-ation, while increasing the leverageof the US and the ROK in dealingwith the DPRK, will also create sev-eral problems, the four most impor-tant ones being the disposition ofthe generated electricity, networkstability, reliability of power trans-mission, and the supply of high-quality power in-house.

The electricity generation fromthe KEDO reactors beyond 2010will likely significantly exceed thetotal demand of the DPRK, assum-ing other existing generatingplants are brought again into com-mercial operation once economicrecovery is underway. Eventually,the DPRK will have to earn hardcurrency to pay its obligations tothe KEDO participants, principallythe ROK and Japan, and return atleast a portion of their investmentsin the Kumho reactors, and to pro-vide a cash-flow stream to supportplant operations and maintenance.Both supply-and-demand consid-erations, as well as hard-currencyrequirements, imply that a largeportion of the generated powerwill have to be dedicated forexports out of the DPRK. The onlynearby countries that can take theKEDO reactors output are theROK, the PRC, or Russia, thoughan underwater cable in the EastSea that connects the KEDO reac-tors to Japan is being considered.

Of these three, Russia is in mostimmediate need for power importdue to severe energy shortage inthe Vladivostok and the Primorskregions. Russia may, however, lackthe hard currency required forsuch energy export. Furthermore,the transmission links from theKumho site to the Russian borderare the longest, thus requiringmore investments in rebuildingand upgrading the DPRK trans-mission network. Nearer-terminterconnections may includeROK–DPRK, PRC–DPRK orROK–DPRK–PRC links.

Shipping the KEDO reactors’power to market via theROK–DPRK transmission link hasbeen costed and is the most techni-cally feasible and potentially near-term option. Even now there existlimited diurnal and seasonal elec-tricity interchanges between theROK and the DPRK. Transmittingthe KEDO reactors output to theROK would expand the existing adhoc arrangements several-fold.Given the high-growth rate of elec-tric demand in the ROK—now thatthe country’s economy is emergingfrom the 1998 financial crisis—hav-ing access to the KEDO reactors willdefer a new power-plant project byseveral years, which will be benefi-cial considering the paucity of newplant sites available in the ROK.The DPRK will benefit from theenergy payments received. KEPCOhas by now evaluated the feasibilityand the cost of creating such trans-mission interlinks and will mostlikely be ready to implement such aproject once international financingis available and the politicalapprovals are obtained. The mainproblem with this concept is thepolitical dimension. Connecting theROK and the DPRK transmissionnetworks will require integratedoperation of both networks, mostlikely under the technical control ofthe more advanced ROK side. Thisdependency on uninterruptibletransmission flows could lead to aloss of political freedom of action

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unacceptable to the DPRK leader-ship. Thus, technical and politicalfeasibility considerations seem tooperate in different directions asrelated to the large-scaleROK–DPRK transmission link. InDecember 2000, the DPRK request-ed electricity supplies from the ROK.Should this prove politically andtechnologically feasible, it willresolve part of the problemsinvolved in eventually transmittingelectricity from the KEDO reactorsout of the DPRK.

Another option would be to con-nect the KEDO reactors to thePRC’s Northeast Power Network.Such an arrangement would bringadditional power supply to the fast-expanding PRC energy market andwould defer the need to constructnew, mainly coal-fired plants in thenortheastern provinces by severalyears. Deferring additional coal-fired capacity would reduce region-al air pollution and may qualify thePRC for carbon-emissions reductioncredits under the CleanDevelopment Mechanism of theKyoto Protocol. The major problemwith the DPRK–PRC transmissionlink is the longer transmission linesrequired from the Kumho site to theChinese border—500 kilometers ascompared with the transmissionlines from the site to the ROK—about 200 kilometers.9

A more stable, long-term solutionmight be a three-party transmissioninterlink connecting the ROK net-work to the DPRK network at theKumho site and then further con-necting to the PRC’s NortheastPower Network. Such an arrange-ment could benefit all three parties,but connecting the currently decrepitDPRK transmission network toanother country, let alone integratingit to two different networks, wouldbe difficult. Before discussing region-al transmission schemes, it is neces-sary to consider some of the practi-cal concerns related to integratingthe KEDO reactors into the DPRK’stransmission network. These

concerns relate to the stability of theexisting DPRK transmission grid,the hurdles of interconnection toother grids, and the interaction ofthe grid with the KEDO reactors.

Network stability problemsoccur when a large-capacity gener-ation plant or load center appearsin the transmission network, thuscreating a large electricity source inthe network, which if lost due to atechnical problem, may result inhigh electric currents in the gridthat may exceed its carrying capac-ity. As a general rule, a single gen-eration node should not exceed 7to 10 percent of the total systemgeneration for stability and reliabil-ity. Because the KEDO generatingplant will exceed the limits of thisnetwork stability–reliability rule, itwill be necessary to transmitpower out of the site through sev-eral high-voltage transmissionlines that overlay the current lowervoltage transmission system andinterconnect to it at several differ-ent nodes through step-downtransformers. Furthermore,because the DPRK’s total generat-ing capacity once the KEDO reac-tors are in operation will exceeddemand for years to come, it maybe necessary to back down (or, infact, defer restarting) some of theexisting fossil thermal plants tomake room for the newer, moreefficient, and more cost-effectivenuclear plants.

Nuclear plants are generallydesigned to operate at base loadand are not well optimized to meeta fluctuating load. Thus, theDPRK’s electric system plannersmay choose to utilize their hydro-electric plants at full capacity dur-ing the good hydro months andtheir nuclear plants as base loadunits. However, some of the ther-mal plants cannot shut down due tolocal network stability problems insections of the transmission net-work. The DPRK’s system plannerswill have an intricate job of balanc-ing the transmission network and

assuring its stability after introduc-ing the large-sized KEDO reactorsinto their national grid. While theseissues can be resolved usingadvanced electrical engineeringequipment and software tools, theseare not the problems that the DPRKplanners have encountered to date,and they may face many new chal-lenges, including some possiblereactor-safety issues. In this context,it is noteworthy that in early 2001,several large European engineeringcompanies such as Asea BraunBoveri Group (ABB) of Switzerlandand Siemens AG of Germanyexpressed interest in supplying elec-tric transmission and distributionequipment to the DPRK in order toupgrade the entire country trans-mission grid.11 These initiativeswere launched at the behest of theEuropean Union, which is interest-ed in upgrading its involvement inresolving the Korean Peninsula dis-pute. It is not clear, however, whowill pay for these grid upgrades,and how will the DPRK earn thehard currency to pay for the newelectric transmission equipment.

As noted, the high-voltage(345 kV or 500 kV) transmissionlines out of the Kumho site willform a separate network that willoverlay the existing mainly 220-kVtransmission grid and interconnectwith it near load centers. TheDPRK’s electric planners favor the500-kV lines, while the backbone ofthe much larger ROK transmissiongrid is the 345-kV high-voltagelines. Assuming each line from thesite carries the electrical output ofone KSNP reactor, then at least twohigh-voltage lines have to be con-structed. From reliability andredundancy perspectives, threelines will take care of potential out-ages in either of the two otherhigh-voltage lines or their step-upand step-down transformers. Thethree lines option is more expen-sive than the two lines option, bothin terms of direct investments,right-of-way requirements, andline maintenance expenses, though

36


it avoids the need for using other,less optimal reliability measures.

The DPRK does not have theresources to finance construction ofthese high-voltage lines. Financinghas to be provided by internationallending institutions or from contri-butions by third parties. Extendingthe high-voltage transmission linesto the ROK or PRC grids, as dis-cussed above, could bring in thehard currency required to pay forthe transmission lines, as well topay back the investment costs inthe reactors, which the DPRK isobligated to do.

Another problem affecting theintegration of the KEDO reactorsinto the DPRK grid as well as anyinterconnection with the ROK orthe PRC grids is that the DPRKnetwork operates at an effectivefrequency of 50 Hz, whereas boththe ROK and PRC networks oper-ate at 60 Hz. The Kumho areatransmission network operates at a60-Hz frequency, while otherregions of the DPRK’s grid operateat 50 Hz. The KEDO reactors,being similar to other ROK KSNPreactors, are designed to operate at60 Hz. In addition, both voltageand frequency on the DPRK gridfluctuate around the nominal val-ues at wider amplitudes than areacceptable from stability considera-tions in the more modern andmature ROK and PRC grids. At theinterlink points, it may be requiredto install AC–DC–AC converters toeliminate voltage and frequencyfluctuations in the DPRK grid.Similar measures may be neededwhen providing in-house powerfrom the DPRK grid to the KEDOreactors. While these problems canbe resolved by standard electrictransmission equipment, these willincrease the cost of the entire AFproject. These difficulties could berelevant to the question whether

“reactor completion” means thepoint in time when the reactors cangenerate as per the KEDO SupplyAgreement, or whether the com-pletion date is the time when theplant’s electric output reaches theultimate consumers.

The cost and completion dateissues become particularly pointedwhen the need for the KEDO reac-tors to receive external power fromthe grid is considered. The twoKEDO reactors consume in-houseabout 60 MW(e) per unit, or a totalof 120 MW(e). This load is requiredto operate the four large primarycoolant pumps in each reactor, thefeedwater pumps, and all otherlighting, air conditioning, and vari-ous equipment. The in-house powersupply needs to be high quality andstable so as not to interrupt, slowdown, or shut down any continu-ously operated, electrically drivenequipment. If, due to grid problemsunrelated to the reactors, the net-work voltage or frequency sagsbelow pre-determined safety mar-gins, some electrical apparatus mayneed to be shut down. This couldstart a sequence of events leading toa full-plant shutdown, further exac-erbating the initial grid problem. Inthe extreme, disruption of off-sitepower could, if no other counter-measures are available, lead to vari-ous nuclear accident chains. In themore likely event, a prompt shut-down of a reactor due to inadequateoff-site power supply could lead toa major electric grid operations dis-ruption, and, in the extreme, to alarge-scale network collapse.

It is evident that just as the newplant affects grid operations andstability, so does grid stabilityaffect the operation of the newplant. The DPRK has agreed toprovide 220-kV commissioningpower from the DPRK’s 220-kVnetwork. Maintaining the required

high quality of the external powersupply (minimizing voltage andfrequency fluctuations) is the chal-lenge here. Should external powerwithin the acceptable voltage andfrequency ranges not be provided,KEDO may hypothetically have toinstall its own power supply onsite in the form of a gas turbine,additional emergency diesel gener-ators, or solid-state rectifiers, orAC–DC–AC converters to improvethe shape and quality of the grid-supplied power. It is not clear thatthese options will be acceptable tothe safety regulator. All theseoptions would further increase thecost of the project and might delaycompletion date, with associatedverification consequences. KEDO,however, will not ship nuclear fuelto the Kumho site unless accept-able sources of off-site power areestablished.

3.7 The ROK’s EnergyDevelopment Issues

The KEDO project is of value tothe ROK for obvious non-prolifera-tion and political considerations,discussed elsewhere in this report.Additional energy developmentissues, however, provide the ROKwith further justification for theproject. These issues are brieflyreviewed here because they couldaffect judgments regarding timingand verification issues.

First, the ROK is embarked on asignificant nuclear-power expan-sion program, but there are notenough sites available in the ROKin which to build the proposednumber of nuclear power plants.Table 3-112 includes a list of poten-tial new ROK plants, several ofwhich do not yet have a site desig-nation.* It may make sense, withthe general warming of relationsbetween the ROK and the DPRK,and as a part of a long-term plan

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* The KSNP program now extends over the Yeonggwang 3 and 4 plants—the pre-series, Ulchin 3 and 4 plants—the reference units, Yeonggwang 5 and 6,Ulchin 5 and 6, the New (Shin)-Kori 1 and 2, and the KEDO reactors. Further nuclear-plant construction in the ROK may be based on the newer KoreaNext-Generation Reactor plants for which no sites have yet been designated. While two (or four) more units may ultimately be built in the New Kori site,and the New (Shin)-Wolsung site may contain four new KSNP or KNGR-type reactors, no other nuclear sites have been dedicated in the ROK.

to interconnect the infrastructuresof the two countries, for the ROKto build some of its future nuclearplants in the DPRK, ship some ofthe power south, and use the elec-tricity sales revenues to pay theconstruction costs in the DPRKsites. Should such a programmaterialize, the KEDO projectwould be the first of its kind, withother similar projects (built underbilateral ROK–DPRK agreements)to follow. The creation of the spe-cial ROK–DPRK currency-clearingmechanism, which applies tofinancial settling of bilateral trans-actions between the two countriesonly, may ease inter-Korean jointprojects, so long as all paymentsare ultimately guaranteed by theROK. Such a construction programof ROK reactors in DPRK siteswould further increase the number

of nuclear facilities located on theEast Sea, as discussed previously.

Second, KEPCO is embarked onlarge-scale, nuclear-plant standardi-zation programs, starting with theKSNP program and extending tothe 1,300-MW(e) Korea Next-Generation Reactor, now in thedesign and licensing stages. KEPCOwould like each of its nuclear plantsbuilt in the DPRK to be identical toits existing plants in the ROK, savefor minimal site-specific modifica-tions. A standardization programwould ease the licensing burden onthe regulatory agencies, reduceplant capital cost, simplify opera-tions maintenance and refuelingprocedures, and reduce the annualelectricity production costs. In thiscontext, the General ElectricCompany (GE) decision not to

allow the KEDO project to use GE-designed turbines, as they wereused in all other ROK KSNP reac-tors, could deal a blow to theKEPCO standardization program inits first application beyond the ROKborders. GE is concerned with thelack of adequate regulation govern-ing third-party nuclear liabilityissues in the DPRK, as discussed inChapter 2. Because these issueswere not resolved, KEDO is nownegotiationg with the ROK turbinemanufacturer, Hanjung, and with aconsortium of the Japaneese electri-cal-equipment vendors, Toshibaand Hitachi, to provide the turbinegenerators for the KEDO reactors,thus making them somewhat differ-ent from all other ROK-locatedKSNP reactors that use the GE tur-bine, manufactured by Hanjungunder license in the ROK.

Table 3-1. Status of nuclear power plants in South Korea (l = in operation, w = under construction, m = in planning).

Capacity CommercialPlant Unit Rx.Type (Mwe) Reactor Manufacture TG Operation RemarksKori Unit 1 PWR 587 WH GEC 1978.4 ● TurnkeyKori Unit 2 PWR 650 WH GEC 1983.7 ● TurnkeyKori Unit 3 PWR 950 WH GEC 1985.9 ● Non-TurnkeyKori Unit 4 PWR 950 WH GEC 1986.4 ● Non-TurnkeyYeonggwang Unit 1 PWR 950 WH WH 1986.8 ● Non-TurnkeyYeonggwang Unit 2 PWR 950 WH WH 1987.6 ● Non-TurnkeyYeonggwang Unit 3 PWR 1,000 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE 1995.3 ● Non-TurnkeyYeonggwang Unit 4 PWR 1,000 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE 1996.1 ● Non-TurnkeyYeonggwang Unit 5 PWR 1,000 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE 2001.6 ◗ Non-TurnkeyYeonggwang Unit 6 PWR 1,000 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE 2002.6 ◗ Non-TurnkeyUlchin Unit 1 PWR 950 Framatome Alstome 1988.9 ● Non-TurnkeyUlchin Unit 2 PWR 950 Framatome Alstome 1989.9 ● Non-TurnkeyUlchin Unit 3 PWR 1,000 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE 1998.6 ◗ Non-TurnkeyUlchin Unit 4 PWR 1,000 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE 1999.6 ◗ Non-TurnkeyWolsung Unit 1 PHWR 678.7 AECL NEI/Parsons 1983.4 ● TurnkeyWolsung Unit 2 PHWR 700 AECL/CE KHIC/GE 1997.6 ◗ Non-TurnkeyWolsung Unit 3 PHWR 700 AECL/CE KHIC/GE 1998.6 ◗ Non-TurnkeyWolsung Unit 4 PHWR 700 AECL/CE KHIC/GE 1999.6 ◗ Non-TurnkeyNew Unit 1 PWR 1,000 Unspecified Unspecified 2003.6 ❍

New Unit 2 PWR 1,000 Unspecified Unspecified 2004.6 ❍



New Unit 5 PHWR 700 Unspecified Unspecified 2006.3 ❍

38


Hanjung (Korea HeavyIndustries and Construction) is thedesign and manufacturing contrac-tor for the Nuclear Steam SupplySystem and the Turbine Generator(TG). Because GE prohibitsHanjung from using its technologyfor the KEDO TGs, Hanjung willneed to license new TG technologyfrom another vendor, e.g., theJapanese manufacturers Toshiba orHitachi. Both Toshiba and Hitachidesign and build TGs for GE-designed BWRs built under licensein Japan. While Toshiba andHitachi have close working rela-tions with GE and are licensors ofGE technologies, they have notbuilt PWR-type TGs that operate atdifferent pressure and temperaturesthan BWR turbines. Should the TGtechnology finally chosen for theKEDO reactors be different fromthat used for other KSNP plants,this will cause significant changesin the Balance of Plant (BOP)design. These may include redoingthe entire BOP heat balance, sizingup of equipment items, and chang-ing the dimensions and the designof the TG building. The changesrequired in the BOP may delaycompletion of the entire KEDOProject and cause further delays inmeeting some of the DPRK’s non-proliferation obligations, tied to thereactors’ completion dates.

KEPCO has targeted variousEast Asia nuclear markets, particu-larly the PRC as potential opportu-nities to export the standardizedKSNPs. The KEDO project is per-ceived by KEPCO to be the firstexample of building standardizedKSNPs outside the DPRK, thusserving as a reference plant forfuture third-party sales. Should dif-ferent turbines be used in theKEDO reactors, as compared withthe ROK KSNPs, the value of theKEDO project as a demonstrationor reference plant for furtherpotential exports, as well as serv-ing as a lead project for otherKSNPs to be built in the DPRK,would diminish.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. David Albright and KevinO’Neill, eds., Solving the NorthKorean Nuclear Puzzle (Instituteof Science and InternationalSecurity, Washington D.C.,2000).

2. A. Nechaev and S. Onufrienko,“Full Speed Ahead for China’sFirst VVER-1000s ModernPower Systems,”Atomenergoproject, February2000, pp. 41–43.

3. Byung-Koo Kim, Director,Technology Center for NuclearControl, Korea Atomic EnergyResearch Institute (KAERI),“KEDO LWR Project forInternational Cooperation andNonproliferation,” Presentationat the Monterey Institute forInternational Studies, Monterey,California, July 24, 2000.

4. Nuclear EngineeringInternational, 1997 WorldNuclear Industry Handbook(Wilmington BusinessPublishing, Ruislip, UnitedKingdom, 1997).

5. Central Research Institute ofElectric Power industry(CRIEPI), Nuclear Power Stationsin Japan 1995, Tokyo, Japan,1995.

6. Korean Peninsula EnergyDevelopment Organization,KEDO at Five–Annual Report1999/2000, New York, NY,September 2000.

7. J.B. Mulligan, Director forProject Operations, KEDO, per-sonal communication, NewYork, NY, September 2000.

8. Lowell Feld, US EnergyInformation Administration,North Korea Country AnalysisBrief, Washington, D.C., June21, 2000.

9. Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institutefor Security and SustainableDevelopment, “DPRK EnergyDilemmas and RegionalSecurity,” Presentation to theAsia/Pacific Research Center,Stanford University, Stanford,California, October 10, 2000.

10. Ji-Ho Kim, “Minister Denies‘Backstage Accord’ on PowerSupply to North Korea,” TheKorea Herald, “ Seoul, Korea,December 21, 2000.

11. Jay Solomon, “EuropeEngineers Wait for U.S. Moveto Offer Energy Help to NorthKorea,” The Wall Street Journal,March 21, 2001.

12. Korea Electric PowerCorporation, Korean StandardNuclear Power Plant (KSNP),Seoul, Korea, 1996.

39


40


4.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with adescription of the Korean StandardNuclear Plant (KSNP) reactorsdeployed in the Republic of Korea(ROK) and proposed for the KoreanEnergy Development Organization(KEDO) project at the Kumho site inthe Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea (DPRK). The parts of thereactor plant relevant to the safe-guards program are presented so asto provide the proper context forthe safeguards discussion that fol-lows. Most of this chapter describesin detail the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) safeguardsprogram as applied to a KSNP-typeof nuclear-power plant. In this dis-cussion, we assume that the safe-guards program now applied to theROK’s nuclear plants will equallyapply (at the least) to similar reac-tors in the DPRK. The description ofthe safeguards program stressesboth the accounting process and themeasurement process during nor-mal operation and during refuelingoutages. We conclude the chapterwith a discussion of additionalmeasurements and inspections pos-sible under the IAEA safeguardsagreement now in force with theDPRK, together with a brief assess-ment of other verification measures.

4.2 Project Organization ToSupply the KEDO Reactors

Figure 4-1 is an organization chartfor the supply of a standard KSNPreactor in the ROK.1 This figuredepicts the contractors’ organizationassembled to supply a KSNP reactorin the ROK. Since the signing of theTurn Key Contract between KEDOand Korean Electric Power

Corporation (KEPCO) in December1999, this organization chart appliesequally to the KEDO reactors’ proj-ect with the following modifications:

1. KEPCO, who does not own theKEDO reactors, has assumed therole of the general contractor forthe Kumho Site Nuclear Project,with KEDO being the overallowner for whom KEPCO man-ages the project. This arrange-ment is different from all otherKSNP projects where KEPCO isboth the owner and the generalcontractor.

2. KOPEC-A/E (Korea PowerEngineering Company) hasassumed sole Architect/Engineering (A/E) responsibilityfor the KEDO reactors subcontract-ing to KEPCO and has canceled its

consulting contract with the USfirm of Sargent & Lundy (S&L).S&L was the original non-KoreanA/E of Yeonggwang 3 and 4 (thepre-KSNP plants) and (in areduced capacity) the remainder ofthe KSNP reactors. KOPEC hascarried increasing A/E responsibil-ities in the ROK’s KSNP plants.

3. Hanjung (Korea Heavy Industriesand Construction) remains thedesign and manufacturing con-tractor for the Nuclear SteamSupply System (NSSS) and theTurbine Generator (TG). However,the TG to be used in the KEDOreactors will not be based (underlicense) on the General Electric(GE) turbines like the rest of theKSNP plants because GE did notobtain the measures of relief itsought from nuclear liability.

41

CHAPTER 4SAFEGUARDS ON THE KEDO REACTORS

DesignReview

andApproval

DesignReview

DesignReview

Yellow Cake,Conversion,Enrichment

Procurement SupervisionStart-up

Design Design/Manufacture

Design/Manufacture

Fabrication Manufacture Installationand Erection

KOPEC Hanjung Hanjung KNFC

S/L ABB-CE G/E Fuel DesignKAERI

DesignKAERI

Local/Foreign Local Co.

Architect/Engineering

Nuclear SteamSupply System

TurbineGenerator Fuel Balance of

PlantConstructionManagement

Start-upConstructionEquipment

KEPCO

Overall Project Management

Figure 4-1. Organization chart for the supply of a Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP)reactor. KOPEC stands for Korea Power Engineering Company. KNFC stands for KoreanNuclear Fuel Corporation.

4. The Korean Atomic EnergyResearch Institute’s (KAERI)responsibilities for system designhave been transferred to the sys-tems design department ofKOPEC (KOPEC-SD).

4.3 Description of the KEDOReactors

The KEDO reactors are the KSNPdesign, a modification and scale-down of the System 80 design ofCombustion Engineering Company(formerly ABB/CE, nowWestinghouse Electric Corporation,a unit of British Nuclear Fuel Ltd.).The System 80 design, in turn, isbased on an improved design of the1,300-MW(e) reactors built in thePalo Verde plant in Arizona.KEPCO has built two plants of theSystem 80 design—theYeonggwang 3 and 4 units. Thisdesign was enhanced by KEPCO,adjusted to Korean conditions, andrenamed the Korean Standard

Nuclear Plant. The first two units ofthe KSNP series of standardizedplants were the Ulchin 3 and 4plants, the reference plants of theseries. Four other plants of thisseries are under construction in theROK; two additional ones wereannounced and the two KEDOreactors, planned as identical toother KSNP units, are furtherextensions of this ROK series.

A description of the KSNP plants isavailable in References 1-3 (see theNotes at the end of this chapter) aswell as in many other nuclear-engi-neering publications. The discussionhere is limited to the parts of the plantrelevant to the refueling operationsand to which safeguards arrange-ments apply. A side cut of a KSNPbuilding is shown in Fig. 4-2.1 Thecontainment building is in the center,with the fuel building on the right.The left side of the figure includes theTG building and other Balance ofPlant (BOP) facilities—essential for

the energy-conversion part of theplant but not related to the nuclearfuel or to safeguards arrangements.The nuclear reactor itself is in thelower part of the containment build-ing. During routine operations, thereactor pressure vessel is closed andthe entire vessel is immersed in alarge water pool.

During routine operations, accessto the containment building is limit-ed and tightly controlled. The twomajor entries into the containmentbuilding are through personnelaccess port(s), camera-monitoredand controlled by the site-securityforce, and through the large equip-ment hatch. The equipment hatch isregularly tightly sealed to complete-ly isolate the containment buildingfrom the outside for safety consider-ations. Additionally, the IAEAplaces its own seal on the equip-ment hatch and installs a remotelymonitored camera in the reactorbuilding surveying the equipment

42

SAFEGUARDS ON THE KEDO REACTORS

Turbine building

135'-0"

195'-0"195'-0"

230'-0"

173'-0"

142'-0"

125'-0"

100'-0"

77'-0"

58'-0"58'-0"

34'-0"

58'-0"

Dessicator & storage tank

164'-0"

Condenser34'-0"

58'-0"

100'-6"

125'-0"

144'-0"

165'-0"

202'-2"

101'-6"

77'-0"

122'-0"

92'-6"100'-4"

73'-0"

53'-0"

211'-8"

Primary aux. building Containment building Fuel building

Generator L.P. Turbine H.P. Turbine

CEA change platform

Steam generatorReactor vessel

Refueling machine assembly

Polar crane

Spent-fuel handling machine

Figure 4-2. Side view of a Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) building (adapted from Reference 1).

hatch area. These two measures areintended to ensure that no large-scale equipment, such as spent-fuelstorage casks, can be brought intothe containment building to surrep-titiously remove fuel elements fromthe core.

Fresh fuel elements are broughtinto the nuclear plant and spent fuelelements are taken out of the plantthrough the fuel building. The fuelbuilding contains the receiving areafor the fresh-fuel-element contain-ers, the water pool in which thefresh fuel elements are stored priorto their insertion into the reactorcore during the refueling operation,the transfer canal from the fuelbuilding to the containment build-ing, the spent-fuel storage pool, andthe spent-fuel cask loading area.

By far, the largest part of the fuelbuilding is the spent-fuel storagepool, sized to contain the routinedischarges of at least 10 years ofoperation, plus additional capacityfor a full-core discharge in case allthe nuclear fuel from the reactor’spressure vessel must be removed tomaintain or repair the vessel or itsinternal components. It is possiblethrough re-racking and installing ofneutron-absorbing plates toincrease the storage capacity of thespent-fuel storage pool to about 20years’ worth (maintaining the full-core discharge capability) whileavoiding criticality concerns. Oncethe capacity of the spent-fuel stor-age pool is reached, the spent fuelalready in the pool must beremoved either to storage pools atother reactors, to an away-from-reactor storage facility, or to drystorage in steel or concrete casks atthe reactor site or at a remote cen-tralized facility. Because the operat-ing life of a KSNP is expected to beat least 40 years and could well beextended to 60 years, the disposi-tion of its spent fuel outside of thecontainment building is a matter of

safeguards concern. In case of theKEDO rectors, assuming commer-cial operation by 2010, a detailedplan for disposing of old and dis-charged spent fuel will have to bein place no later than 2030.

A top-down (footprint) view of aKSNP reactor is shown in Figure 4-3.1As seen, the parts of the plant of con-cern to the safeguards program—thecontainment building, the fuel build-ing, and the fuel-transfer canal are arelatively small part of the overallplant buildings’ area. The major partof the plant is taken up by the auxil-iary building around the containmentbuilding, and by the TG building.

A particular point of concern tothe safeguards program is the hori-zontal fuel-transfer canal located inthe lower part of the containmentbuilding and connected to the bot-tom part of the spent-fuel storagepool in the fuel building. The IAEAinstalls a seal on the moveablebridge on top of the fuel-transfercanal. A remotely monitored camerais installed by the IAEA on the fuelbuilding’s wall facing the fuel-trans-fer canal and the IAEA seal on the

bridge. Any surreptitious attempt tomove spent fuel through the transfercanal from the reactor to the fuelbuilding, or to remove fuel from thefresh or spent-fuel storage pools inthe fuel building, will be detected.

Figure 4-4 is a schematic of theprimary system equipment layout inthe containment building.2 Theequipment arrangement of the KSNPreactor is unique among Pressurized-Water Reactor (PWR) designs. Thisdesign is built on two large steamgenerators, each connected through a“hot leg” pipe to the reactor vessel.The discharge from each steam gen-erator is divided and sent throughtwo large primary pumps throughtwo large pipes, “the cold legs” backinto the reactor vessel. Most1,000-MW(e) PWRs are built on athree-loop design, with each of thethree loops containing its own steamgenerator. The System 80 design withonly the two “hybrid” loops is alsodistinguished by having two verylarge steam generators. Because theequipment hatch is sized to passthrough the largest equipment itemin the containment building, theSystem 80 design has a large hatch

43


Turbine building

Accesscontrolbuilding

Primary auxiliarybuilding

Containmentbuilding

Fuelbuilding

Fuel-transfer canal

Heater bay

Secondary auxiliarybuilding

Figure 4-3. A top view of the Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) reactor.

capable of passing through a largesteam generator and is certainlycapable of passing through even thelargest spent-fuel storage cask.

Figure 4-5 shows the internal lay-out of the KSNP reactor vessel.2 Thereactor core, in which the fuel ele-ments are contained, is located inthe lower half of the pressure vesselbelow the two outlet nozzles of thetwo hot legs and the four inlet noz-zles of the cold legs. The water inthe primary system (the reactor ves-sel, the tubes side in the two steamgenerators, the four primarypumps, and the pressurizer) entersthe reactor vessel through the inletnozzles, flows down around the cir-cumference of the vessel, enters thereactor core area from the bottompart and flows upwards throughthe core volume inbetween the fuelelements. Water is heated on its pas-sage through the core and then exitsthe reactor vessel through the twohot legs on its way to the steamgenerators. The steam generatorsproduce steam in the secondary sys-tem (the vessel side of the twosteam generators, the TG, condens-er, and the feedwater heating sys-tem) that rotates the TG machineryto generate electricity. Table 4-1summarizes design data for theKSNP reactor.2

The upper part of the reactor-ves-sel internals contains the controlrods’ guide tubes and the portionsof the control rods withdrawn fromthe reactor core to achieve criticalityin the core and maintain a stablenuclear chain reaction. The upperpart of the vessel is also filled withprimary system water, which pro-vides extra water volume in thevessel for emergency cooling pur-poses, increasing the safety marginsof the entire reactor system. Thecontrol rods are connected thoughthe top of the reactor vessel withthe Control-Rod Drive Mechanisms(CRDMs) that govern the verticalmovements of the rods in and outof the reactor’s core.

44


5871978.4

Gross capacity(MWe)Comm op. date

Generallayout

Containment building

Type ID (m)Design pressure(lb/in2 (g))Free volume (m3)

Steel containment32

4341,000

Pre-stressed concrete39.6

6061,000


5476,000


5776,000

LoopsNo. of fuelassembliesReactor ID(cm)Inlet/outlettemperature(°C)

Reactor coolantloops

2

121

132

282.6/320.2

3

157

157

291.9/326.9

2

177

162/396.9

295.8/327.3

2

177

162/396.9

295.8/327.3

10001995.3

10005501985.9

Kori 1 Yeonggwang 3 KSNPKori 3

ID ID ID ID

Development of Korean PWRs

Reactor

Reactorcoolant pump

Steam generator

Pressurizer

Steam generator

Figure 4-4. Schematic of the primary system layout in the containment building.

4.4 Refueling Operation inthe KEDO Reactors

Of particular interest from a pro-liferation perspective is the timerequired to access the reactor coreand its fuel assemblies. This takes atleast two to four days with a rela-tively experienced crew and maytake longer. First, it takes about twodays for the reactor to cool anddepressurize and for the intenseradioactivity to subside to tolerablelevels. Second, the vessel head andCRDM mechanisms must beremoved. This takes an additionalone-half to two days.

The time between refueling (alsocalled the cycle time) depends on anumber of variables, including thedesign burnup (a measure of thetotal energy supplied by a givenmass of fuel), and the design of thefuel and reactor. Most PWRs operat-ing today are transitioning from aone-year cycle to an eighteen-monthcycle and some to a two-year cycle.These cycle times are “nominal”and can vary in practice with powerdemand or to take advantage ofpersonnel availability. CurrentPWRs of the KSNP vintage aredesigned to operate at a design bur-nup of 45 to 50 MWd/kg, and thereis interest in increasing these bur-nup levels still further to about70 MWd/kg. The transition to high-er design burnup levels and longerresidence times in the core (longercycles) means that over time asmaller amount of spent fuel is gen-erated that has to be stored, moni-tored, and disposed of.

One-third of the core is replacedat each refueling. Fuel will normal-ly reside in the reactor’s core forthree full cycles, four and one-halfyears, before being discharged asspent fuel. In practice, both therefueling schedule and the fractionof the core replaced each time canvary between cycles depending onthe operating history of the plant.

Generally, the reactor is refueledby—

1. Shutting the reactor down,allowing it to cool, and remov-ing the pressure vessel top (orhead) and the associated equip-ment.

2. Removing the oldest fuel fromthe reactor. This is the fuel thathas resided in the core for threefull cycles, and therefore hasachieved its nominal design burn-up. This fuel is generally in thecenter of the core. This fuel is sentto the spent-fuel storage pool.

45


3. Shuffling the remaining in-reac-tor fuel to different positionswithin the core. This is done tolevel the reactivity and powerdistribution in the core.

4. Inserting the fresh fuel. The freshfuel is inserted into the outerperiphery of the core. The higherreactivity of the fresh fuel compen-sates for the lower neutron fluxand the higher neutron leakagerate from the core at the periphery.

5. Reinstalling and bolting thepressure vessel head and recon-necting the CRDMs.

Closure head nozzle

Reactor vesselclosure headassembly (Class 1)

Outlet nozzle

Fuel assembly

Core shroud

Core stop

Core support barrel

Reactor vessel(Class 1)

In-core instrumentation

nozzle

Flow skirt

Bottom headnozzle

Surveillancecapsule

Upper guidestructureassembly

Inlet nozzle

CEA extension shaft

Lowersupport

structure

CRDM Figure 4-5. Internallayout of the KoreanStandard NuclearPlant (KSNP) reac-tor vessel.

6. Restarting the reactor.

In the US, the shortest reactorrefueling operation has been accom-plished in just 16 days (the currentUS record), although the average isapproximately 34 days. The actualtime required to refuel a reactorvaries depending on the type ofreactor, the skill and experience ofthe operators, and the maintenance(both scheduled and unexpected)required during the outage.

As seen in Table 4-1, the reactorcore contains 177 assemblies. Eachone-third-core refueling results in 59assemblies withdrawn from the coreas spent fuel and 59 fresh fuelassemblies inserted into the core.Figure 4-6 is a schematic of a fuelassembly.3 Each assembly weighsslightly over 600 kilograms (morethan half a ton) and contains 236long- and small-diameter fuel rodsarranged in a square 16 x 16 latticewith an empty “water hole” in thecenter. Each fuel rod contains anumber of cylindrical fuel pins orpellets stacked in a column and heldin a zircalloy tube.

During refueling, each fuelassembly is inspected before beinginserted or reinserted into the reac-tor. The level of detail to which eachassembly is inspected can vary. Forexample, fuel that has been in thereactor for two cycles may beinspected more thoroughly thanfuel in for only one cycle. If thereare indications of problems (such asdetection of fission-product gasesreleased from a leaking fuel pin), amore rigorous inspection mayensue. Fuel that is damaged or oth-erwise suspect is not reinserted intothe reactor, but sent to the spent-fuel storage pool. Depending on thetype and extent of damage, therejected fuel assembly may beplaced in an intermediate sleeve(and the entire assembly placed inthe spent-fuel storage pool) to mini-mize contamination of the spent-fuel storage pool. Alternately, a

46


Table 4-1. Characteristics of the Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP).

Reactor Type PWRThermal output 2815 MW(th)Coolant flow rate 121.5 x 106 lb/hDesign pressure 2,500 Ib/in2

Operating Pressure 2,500 lb/in2

Design temperature 650°FInside diameter at shell 162 inOverall height 48 ftFuelNumber of fuel assemblies 177Number of UO2 fuel rods per assembly 236 (16 X 16)Fuel weight 188,609 lbCore height (active) 150.0 inCore diameter (equivalent) 123.0 inClad material Zircaloy-4Clad thickness 0.025 inReactor coolant systemNumber of loops 2Hot leg/cold leg 42/30 inReactor inlet temperature 564.5°FReactor outlet temperature 621.2°FTotal coolant volume 11,315 ft3

Control rodsNumber of control assemblies 73Number of rods per assembly 4 or 12Material (full/part strength) B, C/InconelSteam generators Type, number of units Vertical U-tube, 2Steam flow per steam generator 6.354 X 106 lb/hrSteam pressure at full power 1,070 lb/in2

Steam temperature at full power 550.5°FMaximum moisture 0.25%Feedwater temperature 450°FReactor coolant pumpsNumber 4Motor/type AC Induction/ Vertical, centrifugalDesign capacity 82,500 gal/min Design head 340 ftContainmentType Prestressed cylindrical concrete with steel linerInside diameter 144 ftHeight 216 ftFree volume 2.73 x 106 ft2Liner thickness 0.144 inTurbineNumber 4 (high 1, low 3)Type Serial 6 flow arrangementRPM 1,800Generator Number, type 1, 4 poles (1,800 RPM)Voltage 22 kV, 3 phasesFrequency 60 HzNet electrical output 1,000 MW(e)CondenserNumber, type 3, once-through sea water coolingPump type Vertical, Centrifugal

leaking fuel rod can be removedfrom an assembly (underwater) anda new rod inserted so that therepaired assembly can be reinsertedinto the core.

A reactor operator normally has asupply of fresh fuel on hand.Immediately prior to a refueling,there is at least one-third of a core offresh fuel available. This stock isaccumulated over the course ofsome months, as it was not likelydelivered in a single shipment.Because of the possibility of defec-tive fuel, reactor operators normallykeep a small stock of additional(beyond that required for the nextrefueling) fresh-fuel assemblies onhand. Partial refueling may occurbetween normal fueling outages.Although unusual, this can occur if,for example, failed fuel is detectedduring operation (usually by detec-tion of fission-product gases such asiodine).

The spent fuel assemblies dis-charged from the reactor are movedby the charge/discharge machineaway from the pressure vessel andplaced in a horizontal position on atrolley that carries them through atransfer canal (a tunnel) leading fromthe containment building to the fuelbuilding. Figure 4-7 is a schematic ofthe fuel transfer process.2 Once in thefuel building side of the canal, the fuelassembly is brought again to anupright position and is carried under-water to its storage position in thespent-fuel storage pool. The positionand identity of each assembly in thestorage pool are recorded and verifiedby the IAEA safeguards inspectors ontheir periodic inventory-verificationvisits to the plant.

47


Lower end fitting

Inconel spacer grid

Fuel rod

Lower zircalloy spacer grid

Upperend cap

Fuel Rod Assembly

Bottom view

Spring

CEAguide tubeassembly

Upper end fitting

Al2O3spacer

Al2O3spacer

Lowerend cap

Fuelpellets

Fuelcladding

150"(3810 mm)

Activefuel

length

15.719"(399.27 mm)

9 spaces

16.719"(424.66 mm)

4.312"(109.52 mm)

163.550"(4154.17 mm)

178.250"(4527.55 mm)

Figure 4-6. Schematic of a fuel assembly.

48


1. CSB storage stand2. Alignment guide pin3. Pool seal4. Upending machine5. Transfer tube valve 6. Spent-fuel handling machine7. New fuel shipping container8. Transfer system control console9. Hydraulic power package10. Spent-fuel shipping cask loading11. Refueling machine12. CEA change platform13. CEA storage racks 14. Transport container15. Reactor vessel head assembly16. Missile shield 17. CRDM cable trays18. Upper guide structure lift rig19. Upper guide structure20. Fuel transfer tube21. Transfer system winch22. New fuel elevator23. New fuel storage24. Spent-fuel storage pool 1

17

5

15

16

18

19

20

2110

22 23

14

13

12

11

98

7

6

4

4

3

2

24

18

SPENT FUEL AND PLUTONIUM

Light-Water Reactors (LWRs)fueled with Low-Enriched Uranium(LEU) (essentially all of them)inescapably produce plutonium asa byproduct. The quantity and quali-ty of the plutonium are both affect-ed by plant operations, with theprincipal variable being the totalirradiation of the fuel in the reactor.Fuel irradiation is referred to as bur-nup and is a measure of the totalenergy produced by a unit mass offuel. Fresh LEU fuel has no plutoni-um and the total amount of plutoni-um in the fuel increases withincreasing burnup.

Plutonium is produced primarilyby neutron capture in 238U, themost abundant isotope of uraniumin LEU fuel. This produces primarily239Pu, the isotope best suited toweapons applications. However, thequality of the plutonium produced

(measured as the fraction that is239Pu) decreases with increasingburnup. As the reactor continues tooperate (and burnup increases),some of the plutonium itself cap-tures additional neutrons. Some ofit then fissions, contributing a signif-icant amount to the total energygenerated by the reactor, and someis converted to the so-called “higherisotopes” of plutonium. The highereven-isotopes of plutonium, in par-ticular, do not fission efficiently in athermal reactor and thus accumu-late (at the expense of the 239Pu).Other nuclear reactions also con-tribute to the production of trouble-some isotopes (such as 238Pu),with the fraction of these isotopesalso increasing with increasing bur-nup. These other isotopes of pluto-nium may themselves be used in aweapon, but they make design,manufacturing, handling, and relia-

bility of a weapon containing suchisotopes difficult.

For the plutonium in spent fuel tobe used in a weapon, it must firstbe extracted from the spent fuel.Although the basic chemistry forextracting plutonium from spentLWR fuel is well known (the so-called “PUREX” process), theprocess is significantly complicatedby the existence of both nuclearradiation and the heat output of thespent fuel. Both the radiation andheat exacerbate handling, influencesafety, and complicate the chemicalprocessing. Both slowly decay withtime so that these complicationsare somewhat less onerous for“older” spent fuel (spent fuel dis-charged from the reactor severalyears past) than for “younger” spentfuel (recently discharged).

Figure 4-7. Fuel transfer process.

4.4.1 The Special Problem of theBeginning-of-Life and End-of-Life Fuel Discharges

A reactor can be considered tohave three distinct phases in itsoverall life cycle: beginning of life(BOL), equilibrium, and end of life(EOL). Most of the reactor’s lifetimeis in the equilibrium part of the lifecycle where spent fuel is put in thereactor, remains for three cycles,and then is removed as spent fuel.

Early in the reactor’s operatinglife (the BOL), much of the fuel inthe core is very fresh, without thebuildup of fission-product poisons,plutonium, and other elements thataffect the reactivity of the fuel. Forthis reason, some of the BOL fuel issupplied with lower enrichmentthan fuel used later in the equilibri-um part of the lifecycle. In the “ini-tial core,” the lowest enrichmentfuel goes into the center zone of thecore, medium-enrichment fuel goesinto the intermediate zone, andnominal enrichmenƒt fuel is placedin the outer zone. This arrangementmimics the reactivity distribution ofa core later in its life.

At the first refueling, the centralzone of the core is removed and sentto the spent fuel pool, just as normalspent fuel. However, this fuel hasbeen in the reactor for only onecycle, and therefore has only one-third the “nominal” burnup. As Fig.4-8 shows, reduced burnup intro-duces two effects that have impor-tant implications for proliferation:

• The total quantity of plutoniumin that spent fuel is reducedbecause of the reduced burnup,

but

• The quality of the plutonium forweapon use is higher than forfull-burnup spent fuel.

Similarly, at the second refueling,the spent fuel removed has seenonly two cycles, so the quantity andquality of its plutonium lies roughlymid-way between that of one-cycleand three-cycle or full-burnup spentfuel. Roughly, the BOL portion ofthe reactor lifetime can be consid-ered to last for the first three cycles.

A similar situation occurs at theend of the reactor life. At the next-to-the-last refueling, the fresh fuelinserted into the reactor will onlyremain in the reactor for two cycles,and that inserted during the lastrefueling will remain in the reactorfor only a single cycle. The implica-tions of the EOL part of the lifecycleare similar to those at the BOL:some of the EOL spent fuel willhave seen only one or two cycles,and thus has plutonium of higherquality, albeit lesser quantity.

Thus, three “types” of spent fuelare generated as a result of normalplant operations:

1. Of greatest concern is the spentfuel discharged during the BOLand EOL, which has much less

than nominal burnup. The earli-est discharged BOL fuel has seenonly one cycle of operation andwill only have 12 to 15 MWd/kgburnup (assuming a “nominal”45 MWd/kg design burnup). Thefirst cycle discharges spent fuelcontaining approximately 100kilograms of plutonium, of whichover 80 percent is 239Pu. The one-cycle EOL spent fuel will havesimilar characteristics.

2. The second refueling dischargesfuel at approximately30 MWd/kg, yielding some175 kilograms of plutonium con-taining roughly 65 percent 239Pu.The two-cycle EOL spent fuel willalso have similar characteristics.

3. Each equilibrium refueling(45 MWd/kg) discharges fuelcontaining about 288 kilogramsof plutonium with about 57 per-cent 239Pu content.*

Due to their higher 239Pu quality(and thus increased attractiveness forweapon use), both the BOL and EOLdischarged fuel assemblies merit spe-cial attention and verification efforts.

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20

16

12

08

04

0

100

0 20 40

%23

9 Pu%239PuTotal Pu ProductionPu

pro

duce

d (k

g/to

nne

HM)

60 80Net burnup (MWd/kg)

80

60

40

20

0

Figure 4-8. The relationships between plutonium production, quality, and burnup. At verylow burnup, very little plutonium is produced but that produced is primarily 239Pu. At higherburnup, the total amount of plutonium produced becomes substantial, but the fraction of239Pu decreases significantly.

* The values cited in this paragraph, as well as in Fig. 4-8, were developed from a variety of data from different LWR reactor designs, using various initial enrich-ments, design burnups and operating cycles. They are intended for illustration only, and are not representative of any particular reactor or operating scenario.

It is important to note that thislow-burnup fuel issue is not uniqueto the BOL and EOL parts of thereactor life cycle. At all times, thereactor core itself will contain a mixof lower, medium, and higher bur-nup material. What differentiatesthis in-core material is that thelower and medium burnup in-corefuel is not normally dischargedfrom the reactor, and therefore con-sidered somewhat less available.

4.5 IAEA Safeguarding ofNuclear Fuel in the KEDOReactors

The following discussion ofIAEA safeguards aims at describ-ing the actual implementation ofsafeguards agreements related tonuclear-power plants such as theKEDO reactors. The application ofsafeguards measures to commercialLWRs and particularly to 1,000-MW(e)-class PWRs such as theKSNP reactors is described inReferences 4 and 5, both of whichrelate to safeguarding nuclear-power plants in the KoreanPeninsula. We assume that thesafeguard measures applied to theROK’s KSNP reactors will apply asa minimum to the KEDO reactors.In fact, the IAEA might well insiston further enhancements within itsagreements with the DPRK, andsome of these are described inSection 4.6 and Reference 6. Untilthe appropriate FacilityAgreements are signed betweenthe IAEA and the DPRK, we willnot know what these will be. AnIAEA perspective on the generaltype of IAEA safeguard measuresapplied to typical LWRs is present-ed in References 6 and 7. An ROKperspective on developing a leadproject on safeguards enhance-ments that will equally apply inthe ROK and the DPRK, and whichcould in fact apply to all otherLWRs is presented in Reference 5.Some problem areas in implement-ing safeguard measures related to

the Agreed Framework are dis-cussed in Reference 8, and theIAEA safeguards requirementsrelated to the DPRK nuclear pro-gram are discussed in Reference 6.

4.5.1 The Safeguards Goals forQuantity and Timeliness

The standard IAEA approach toLWR plant safeguards for signato-ries to the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) is the IAEA “ModelSafeguards Agreement,” INFCIRC153 of 1971, and its specific appli-cation to the DPRK is documentedin IAEA INFCIRC 403 of May1992. In general, the purpose ofLWR-type safeguards agreementsis to verify that nuclear materialsare not diverted to producenuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices. The verificationprocess is achieved through theinspection measures describednext. The purpose of these inspec-tions is two-fold: first, theQuantity Component is meant toprovide assurance that there hasoccurred no diversion of aSignificant Quantity (SQ) of vari-ous nuclear materials over aMaterials Balance Period (MBP);and second, the TimelinessComponent is meant to providetimely detection against abruptdiversion of a SQ of nuclear

materials within specified time peri-ods between periodic inspections ofthe LWR. The inspection goal foreach LWR is attained if all the quanti-ty and timeliness criteria specified inthe Facility Agreement signedbetween the IAEA and the hostnation of the specific LWR are met.

In terms of the timeliness criteri-on, the IAEA defines the frequencyof inspections as:

• one year for fresh Low-EnrichedUranium (LEU) fuel (FF),

• three months for reactor core fuelcontaining bred plutonium (CF),

• three months for spent LWR fueloutside the reactor core (in thespent-fuel storage pool) and con-taining plutonium (SF).

The choice of the time periodbetween inspections is predicated onthe IAEA’s assumptions regarding thetime required from diversion throughfissile-material refining to the manu-facturing of a completed nuclear-explosive device. Based on the detailsof the specific Facility Agreement, theIAEA must perform interim visits atthe frequencies mentioned above toensure that no diversion of nuclearmaterials has occurred during theperiod since the last inspection.

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Significant Quantities (SQs) of nuclear materials are defined as theapproximate quantities of materials required to manufacture a nuclear-explosive device. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) hasdefined SQ based on direct use of fissile materials as—

• 8 kilograms of plutonium,• 25 kilograms of 235U contained in Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU),• 8 kilograms of 233U.

The IAEA further defined the SQ for uranium requiring additional pro-cessing (indirect use) as—

• 75 kilograms of 235U contained in Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU),• 10 tons of natural uranium,• 20 tons of depleted uranium.

These various forms of uranium require further enrichment to extractadequate amount of fissile 235U for direct use in weapons production.

The IAEA meets its safeguardingobligations through item accountingand independent measurement, andthrough Containment andSurveillance (C&S) measures. Itemaccounting includes record check-ing at various locations, physicalidentification, counting, non-destructive measurements, andexaminations to verify the integrity(over time) of different items. In anuclear plant, the items inspectedand verified are the fuel assemblies,and in few cases of leaking pins—individual fuel rods. Inspections areperformed using non-destructiveprocedures. C&S measures comple-ment accounting and inspection byproviding seals at critical points inthe reactor plant to prevent unau-thorized entry, and by operatingsurveillance systems to detect unde-clared movement of nuclear materi-als or attempts to tamper with thecontainment system or the IAEAseals and safeguard devices. TheC&S system is particularly applica-ble to highly radioactive nuclearmaterials, which cannot be inspect-ed from nearby and thus areremotely monitored. In practice, theC&S system applies mostly to theplutonium-bearing CF in the con-tainment building and the SF in thespent-fuel storage pool in the fuelbuilding. Both the accounting andthe C&S measures, which are theheart of the safeguards regime, aredescribed in the next section.

4.5.2 The SafeguardsAccounting Process

The IAEA safeguards regime isbasically a large-inventory account-ing system, systematically appliedto account for all nuclear materialsat all the declared nuclear facilitiesin each country. Full inventory (sta-tistically complete) is taken atappropriate frequencies based onthe timeliness criterion to ensurethat no diversion which could haveled to the manufacture of nuclear-explosive devices has taken placesince the last inspection and inven-tory. In each country, the accountingprocess starts from the country’s

borders and narrows down to thespecific plant and specific MaterialBalance Areas (MBAs) within eachplant. At the country level, theaccounting process may includeunprocessed or partially processedmaterials such as natural, enriched,or depleted uranium. At the power-plant level, the accounting processdeals with specific numbers ofassemblies at different locations indiffering time periods.

To carry out the accountingprocess, the IAEA relies first onexaminations of records. Theseinclude both country reports andspecific facility records. The IAEAfurther:

• checks domestic and internation-al materials transfers,

• attempts to confirm that nounrecorded production of direct-use materials (measured in SQ)has taken place,

• confirms the absence of borrowednuclear materials,

• correlates all the above with thedata from its last interim inspec-tion,

• and, out of these data, recreatesan updated material balance thataccounts for the whereabouts anddisposition of all nuclear materi-als at the time of the specificinspection.

This material-balancing processoccurs both at the national and atthe facility levels with the recordsfrom each level aggregating (or dis-aggregating, as the case may be) tothe other level.

At the facility level, in particular,the IAEA’s records examinationmay include several activities:

• Examination of the facility’saccounting records such as thegeneral ledger, receipt and ship-ping records, inventory docu-mentation, etc.

• Examination of the facility’soperating records such as theoperations logbook, assemblyhistory cards, core fuel maps,pool fuel maps, etc.

• Reconciliation of the accountingrecords, the operating records,and the results of the last inven-tory inspection.

• Comparison of the facilityrecords with the country reportsand specific notifications, toallow vertical reconciliation.

• Preparation of the summaryresults of the inventory inspec-tion that will become the baselinefor the next inspection.

The above activities are supple-mented by physical inspectionsand verification examinations ofthe FF, CF, and the SF, to make surethat the facility records correspondto the results of the actual inspec-tions on site. At the power plant,this means that the office recordsrelated to the number of assembliesat various locations in the plantcoincide with the results of theplant inspections and assemblycounting on site.

4.5.3 Material Balance Area inKEDO-type Reactors

A KEDO-type, 1,000-MW(e) PWRincludes three MBAs during whichan inventorying process is undertak-en between each periodic inspectionand the next. The MBAs include:

• FF Storage with KeyMeasurement Point A. This bal-ance is applicable to LEU only. Itis based around the FF pool in thefuel building and the reactor corein the containment building (atrefueling outages). This materialbalance considers new FF broughtinto the plant, FF in storage at theFF pool in the fuel building, andFF loaded into the reactor coreduring a refueling outage.

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• CF with Key Measuring Point B.This balance is updated duringscheduled refueling outages,which occur in a KEDO-typereactor every 18 months. Specialinspections are also held if forany reason the reactor was shutdown, the pressure vessel topwas removed, and core fuel wasdischarged. The assembly balanceis held between the numbers ofassemblies in the core as of thelast inspection (CF), the numberof spent-fuel assemblies removedfrom the core (SF), and the num-ber of fresh fuel assembliesadded to the core (FF). Core-fuelinventorying has to consider boththe enriched 235U in the FF andCF (as well as the unfissioned235U in the SF), the bred plutoni-um growth and fissioning in theCF, and the discharged plutoni-um in the SF.

• SF with Key Measurement PointC. The spent-fuel storage pool isthe most sensitive part of thesafeguarding process, consider-ing that at each 18-month inter-val, an additional 59 SF assem-blies are added to the pool, andthat the short-lived fission prod-ucts decay at a fast rate. After 18years of operation, close to 600assemblies will have accumulatedin a KEDO-type reactor’s SFpool, all of which have to beaccounted for, based on the time-liness criterion, every threemonths. As detailed earlier, thefirst core (BOL) assemblies with ahigh 239Pu fraction are particular-ly sensitive, especially after its(relatively lower) activity hasdecayed for 18 years.

The material balance on the SFpool includes:

• the inventory as of the lastinspection,

• additional SF discharged from thecore in the latest refueling outage(assuming one has occurred sincethe last inspection),

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• SF removed from the storagepool for dry-cask storage on siteor to another SF storage pool,

• SF removed from the pool to acentralized away-from-reactorsstorage facility,

• SF removed for direct disposal.

The SF material balance has toconsider both the plutonium contentin the various SF assemblies and theresidual 235U remaining in the SF.

In each periodic inspection,described next, a material balance iscarried out on each MBA, and it isrequired that each of the balancesproperly close and that all three bal-ances correspond to the facilityrecords, taking into account theplant’s operating history. Given thismulti-layered, inventory-takingprocess, it is now necessary to dis-cuss the C&S process, and followingthat, the inspection process.

4.5.4 The Containment andSurveillance Process

The C&S measures implementedby the IAEA are aimed at comple-menting the accounting process by

placing seals at strategic locationsto prevent access to nuclear materi-als and by installing surveillancecameras to check for suspiciousmovements in the containment orfuel buildings. The IAEA standardmethod of installing C&S equip-ment is shown schematically inFig. 4-9.4 The IAEA installs a sealand a surveillance camera in thecontainment building, and anotherseal and a camera in the fuel build-ing. Some variation on this basicscheme involving additional sealsalso exists, as seen in Fig. 4-9. Anadditional temporary surveillancecamera is installed by the IAEA inthe containment building during arefueling outage.

The seal in the containment build-ing is placed on the large equipmenthatch, and the camera is pointed atthe hatch. The purpose of observingthe equipment hatch is to make sureit is not opened surreptitiously toadmit a heavy shielded cask into thecontainment building to removecore fuel or spent-fuel assembliesfrom the building. Both the CF andSF assemblies, being highly radioac-tive, require large-sized holdingcasks that cannot pass through thenarrow personnel access ports and

SV Unit 1(observesonly exithatch)

SVUnit

1

SV Unit 2(if additional hatch exists)

SV = surveillance

TemporarySV Unit 3

TemporarySV Unit 4

TemporaryReactor

Rack

View Angle

Racks for spentfuel assemblies

Transfer Channel Pit

Canal Gate (possible sealing)

Underwater Fuel Transfer Channel

TransferChannel

Pit

Reactor Pit

Decontamination area

ExitHatchExit

Hatch

Hatch

Racks

Reactor Double-Containment Building

Spent Fuel Pond

WalkingBridges

RefuelingBridge

ReactorDome

Steam Generator

FlaskLoading Base

Overhead(Polar) Crane

Seal onCable Tray/ReactorBlocks

Seal onCable Tray/ReactorBlocks

LimitedAccess Seal

Equipment Door

Inaccessible Seal

AccessibleSeal

Inaccessible Seal

AccessibleSeal

Figure 4-9. Light-Water Reactor (LWR) layout showing the containment and surveillance process.

that can only be brought into thecontainment building through theequipment hatch.

The seal in the fuel building isinstalled on the bridge above thetransfer canal from the reactor to thefuel building. The purpose of thisseal is to reveal any unauthorizeduse of the transfer canal, for instance,to remove CF or SF fuel from thecontainment building to the fuelbuilding. The wide-angle-lens cam-era on the wall of the fuel buildingcovers the entire fuel pools area,including the fresh and spent fuelpools, the cask-loading and unload-ing areas, and the fuel-transfer canal.This camera tracks and records allmovements within the fuel buildingand can record any unauthorizedtransfers of fuel in or out of thebuilding or the storage pools.

In some cases, additional sealsare placed on the cable-tray bridgeconnecting the reactor pressure ves-sel top and the side of the contain-ment building. These seals revealaccess to the reactor top, which hasto be opened to divert CF or SFfrom the reactor core. The IAEAdoes not routinely install a thirdseal and camera in the plant, withinthe reactor building and facing thetop of the reactor vessel and CRDMassembly, and the cable-tray bridgeleading to it. During outages, theIAEA does rig a temporary camerain the containment building facingthe open top of the pressure vesseland records the entire sequence ofthe refueling operation for laterreview. Routine installation of athird seal and camera would height-en confidence that the reactor vesselis not being tampered with and isdesirable in this case.

Even more desirable is anadvanced seal–camera systemimplemented on a trial basis inthree ROK reactors, shownschematically in Fig. 4-10.5 Thisscheme is based on twocamera–seal pairs, one installed inthe containment building and the

other in the fuel building. Theunique aspect of this scheme is thatall cameras and seals are connectedvia to a server that records the sen-sors’ data and transmits them viaan Internet uplink or a satelliteuplink to the IAEA in Vienna everythree minutes. The server is locatedin the fuel building and is placedinside a secured box to preventtampering. This remote-controldata-gathering allows a near-real-time inspection of the status of theequipment hatch and the fuel poolsareas by the IAEA safeguardsexperts, thousands of miles fromthe actual nuclear plants in theKorean Peninsula. If this proves towork effectively—and all indica-tions are that it will—the IAEA willconsider this system as an equip-ment enhancement package thatmatured with new technologies,and which should be implementedat all reactors under safeguards.The data-gathering and transmis-sion systems should themselves behardened and monitored so thatthey cannot be spoofed or inter-fered with without warning.

This experimental program notonly provides an immediate viewof the sensitive parts of a nuclearplant located anywhere in the

world, but is also quite economicalin terms of conserving scarce IAEAresources. Installing this system inthe KEDO reactors, in parallel withits installation in all the ROK’snuclear plants, would significantlyenhance the KEDO reactors’ safe-guards, particularly if the system isinstalled on three camera-seal sys-tems. Until there is considerablepositive experience of cooperationwith the DPRK, however, the sys-tem should not be used as a reasonto reduce actual visual inspectionsby trained inspectors.

4.5.5 Safeguards InspectionsDuring Routine Plant Operation

The safeguards accountingprocess and the verification of theintegrity of the containment meas-ures and surveillance devices arecarried out by the IAEA safeguardsinspectors during plant inspections.The purpose of the inspections is toconfirm the operators’ recordedinventory of nuclear materials andto reconcile the records with theIAEA’s independent measurements.Each inspection is conducted byMBAs and is considered valid for aspecified Material Balance Period.Two types of Inventory Verificationinspections are carried out:

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Truckaccess area

7-wire multi-core for RS-232 (195 m)

Camera 1 Server

IAEA

Main power (120 V/60 Hz)

7-wire multi-core data + power cable routed through auxiliary building (COM2) (265 m)

FF storage5-wire multi-core data + powercable (COM1) (30 m) Containment

penetration box

Personnelaccess hatch

Steamgenerator

Camera 2

Camera 3VACOSS seal 2

5-wire VACOSS cable

VACOSS seal 1

External equipment hatch VACOSS

Canal gate

Spent-FuelPool

7-wiremulti-core data + power

cable (80 m)

Steamgenerator

Spent-FuelPool

Figure 4-10. Advanced camera–seal system implemented in the Republic of Korea (ROK)reactors.

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• Physical Inventory Verification(PIV). This inspection coincideswith the physical inventorytaken by the operator, mostimportantly during refuelingoutages. The detailed fuelaccounting possible during suchinspections allows closing of theMaterial Balance Period.

• Interim Inventory Verification(IIV). This inspection is carriedout during the periods inbetweentwo PIVs. Its purpose is to verifythe status of CF and SF materialswithin the plant for meeting thetimeliness component of the safe-guards goals. Alternatively, theIIV is used to re-establish thecontinuity of knowledge of thestatus of the nuclear-materialsinventory following a safeguardsbreakdown episode, e.g., a failureof the surveillance system.

IIV inspections are carried outfour times a calendar year, with themaximum time between two consec-utive inspections being no longerthan three months and three weeks.The period between inspections isgoverned by the timeliness criterionfor inspecting plutonium-bearingfuels (CF and SF), which is threemonths. Because the reactor pressurevessel is closed during an IIV andthe plant is in routine operation, thescope of the inspection is limited toverifying the C&S measures andinspecting the spent fuel. CF inven-tory is verified by checking theintegrity of the seal(s) and the sur-veillance camera in the containmentbuilding. The SF inventory in thefuel building is verified by checkingthe status of the C&S measures inthe fuel building, by item countingof SF assemblies in the spent-fuelstorage pool, and by carrying outnon-destructive examination of SFassemblies using Cherenkov radia-tion-viewing devices. Becauserefueling outages in KEDO-typePWRs occur nominally every 18months, the period between tworefueling outages will be covered

(from a safeguards perspective) byone PIV inspection, one PIV-equiva-lent inspection, and four IIVs.

4.5.6 The Physical InventoryVerification Type of SafeguardsInspection

The most comprehensive type ofa safeguards inspection is the PIVinspection. The PIV is carried outnominally once every calendar yearto correspond to the timeliness cri-terion for LEU in the fresh fuel. Themaximum allowed time betweentwo consecutive PIVs should notexceed 14 months, except if the PIVschedule coincides with a refuelingoutage. PIVs are carried out at year-ly intervals even for reactors operat-ing on an 18 months’ refuelingcycle. The PIV is carried out basedon the nuclear-materials inventoryrecords provided by the reactoroperator. The IAEA inspects theplant records, reconciles them withthe country statement, conducts itsown inventory of the fuel in theplant, and further reconciles its ownmeasurements with the plantrecords. If the IAEA can close theMBAs within the plant, and thetotal plant balance, the MaterialBalance Period can be closed.

Two types of PIV are carried out,depending on the plant’s refuelingoutage schedule: a PIV during a rou-tine plant operation with a closedcore (called a PIV-equivalent inspec-tion) and a PIV during a refuelingoutage. A PIV-equivalent inspectionis similar to an IIV, except that forcompletion of the material balances,the FF inventory is also determined.The fresh fuel on hand is a part of theFF inventory buildup toward thenext refueling outage. The inspectionactivity for the FF assembliesincludes item counting, serial-num-ber identification of individualassemblies and comparison with theplant records, and non-destructiveassay (NDA). The inspection activityfor CF is similar to the one carried out

during an IIV and includes replacingthe seals on the equipment hatch andon the transfer-canal bridge gate, andinspecting the operating status of thesurveillance camera in the contain-ment building. The inspection activityfor the SF is identical to that carriedout during an IIV. It includes verify-ing the status of the C&S measuresinstalled in the fuel building, itemcounting of the SF assemblies in thepool, and NDA inspection of the SFassemblies using Cherenkov radia-tion-viewing devices.

The most complex type of PIVoccurs during a refueling operation,when the IAEA inspectors have tocoordinate their inspection activitieswith the refueling work of the plantoperators and with the physicalinventory undertaken by the opera-tors for completion of the plant’sown records. The IAEA activitieswhen a PIV coincides with a refuel-ing outage can be divided into threedistinct phases. Prior to the outage,the IAEA carries out Pre-PIV activi-ties, which include removing theseals from the equipment hatch, thefuel-transfer canal gate, and the topof the reactor core (if applicable),installation of a third temporary,camera in the containment buildingfacing the pressure vessel, and inven-torying the fresh fuel in the fresh fuelpool prior to insertion into the reac-tor. At the end of the core refuelingand before the closing of the pressurevessel, the IAEA conducts its ownindependent inspection of the fuel inthe core. For the fresh fuel (both inthe core and remaining in the FFpool), this includes item counting ofassemblies, identification of individ-ual-assembly serial numbers, andNDA. For the core fuel, this includesitem counting of assemblies in thecore, serial-number identification ofFF assemblies in the core, and inspec-tion of the permanent surveillancecamera in the containment building.For the spent fuel, this includesassembly item counting and inspec-tion of the surveillance equipment inthe fuel building.

55


After the pressure vessel hasbeen closed, the IAEA conductsPost-PIV activities. These includeplacing new seals on the equipmenthatch, the spent-fuel transfer canalgate, and the vessel head assemblybridge; removing the temporarycamera from the reactor hall; re-inspecting the spent-fuel storagepools including SF assemblies itemcounting; inspecting all irradiatedassemblies or parts of assembliesusing Cherenkov and gamma-raydetectors; and verifying the statusof the C&S equipment in the fuelbuilding. At the end of these inspec-tion activities, the IAEA comparesits own inventory records with theplant operators’ records and recon-ciles the differences.

4.6 Assessment ofAdditional Measurementsand Inspections

The package of safeguardsdescribed in Section 4.5 has beenadequate to prevent any covertdiversion from safeguarded powerreactors to date. The internationalcommunity has not yet encountereda premeditated NPT breakoutattempt by a determined and aresourceful country relying on thenuclear materials accumulated in aLWR plant. As discussed in Chapter2, the currently applicable IAEAsafeguards agreement with theDPRK (that follows INFCIRC 153)allows for additional measurementsand inspections beyond the meas-urements and inspections at thereactors that have just beendescribed. In this section, we dis-cuss these additional measurementsand inspections briefly togetherwith their utility.

4.6.1 Measures for StrengthenedSafeguards Under INFCIRC 153:Environmental Sampling

Under INFCIRC 153, the IAEAcan carry out environmental sam-pling only at places to which it oth-erwise has access to at declared

sites but not at undeclared placeswithout getting permission orrequesting a “special inspection.”The utility and practicality of envi-ronmental sampling in and aroundnuclear facilities have been validat-ed through field trials at the invita-tion of a number of member states.Samples can be collected fromwater, air, soil, and vegetation. Eachhas its own features. Water sam-pling has been shown to be aneffective and relatively low-costtechnique for both short- and long-range detection of nuclear activi-ties, but a clandestine facility canprevent water-borne effluents fromreaching the sampled bodies ofwater. Air-sampling techniques canbe applied to both airborne gases,such as 85Kr, and airborne radionu-clides associated with particulates,such as 129I and 106Ru. Someradioisotopes can only be detectedlocally, some as far away as 100kilometers from the site of emis-sion. In some cases, highly sensitivemodern analytic capabilities areneeded, e.g., for sampling of emit-ted particulates. Signatures in soiland vegetation generally cannot bedetected at ranges greater thanapproximately 10 kilometers andwould be useful in the neighbor-hood of declared, and, in a specialinspection, suspect facilities. Whileenvironmental sampling cannotprovide 100 percent certainty ofdetecting covert or illegal activities,it faces a prospective diverter witha significant chance of detection,particularly if diverted material isnot simply transported and stored,but is involved in some industrialprocess. The latter would have totake place if spent fuel is to bereprocessed to yield its plutonium.

4.6.2 Measures for StrengthenedSafeguards Under INFCIRC 153:Remote Monitoring

As discussed in Section 4.5.4,field trials of remote monitoring ofcamera–seal systems are being suc-cessfully completed, though thismeasure has not been routinely

implemented in safeguard systems.In addition to the camera–seal sys-tem, other sensors can also beremotely monitored:

• Portal monitors, video, andTESA-type locks9 that recordentry and exit information (per-sonnel, date, and time), and mon-itor nominal reactor operations,the movement (or non-move-ment) of nuclear material, anddetect interference with contain-ment or tampering with IAEAsafeguards devices, samples ordata.

• Reactor-emission sensors to pro-vide facility data from operatingreactors.

• Tamper-resistant electrical powermonitors that would continuallymonitor and transmit to remotelocations the current and voltagein an electrical transmission line,electrical substation, or powerline entering and leaving thefacility.

• Neutron spectrum and fluencemonitors to indicate reactor per-formance between inspections.

This additional monitoring has yetto be tested. For several of the sen-sors, new procedures and portableinstrumentation must be developed.

Monitoring systems require reli-able and sure means of data trans-mission to the analyzing organiza-tion. The DPRK (or power reactorvendors) will also probably requiresecure data transmissions. Threeseparate requirements (reliability,surety and security) can be provid-ed by e-commerce communicationtechnologies.10

Reliability of the data providesfor recoverable data in the case ofcommunication errors, potentialpartial signal jamming, possiblecomponent failure, and power sys-tem vagaries. Surety is the portion

of the data system that encapsulatesthe signal and metadata (time-stamps, identification, and statusrecords) to ensure an unambiguousdata source and accuracy ofattached metadata. Security is com-munication and data encapsulationthat ensures the message contentsare not usefully disclosed to a thirdparty. Reliability is provided byredundancy, error correction andbackup components, and systems.Surety is provided by authenticatedtimestamps, digital signatures, andchecksums. Security is provided byencryption, tamper-detection sys-tems and secure communicationschannels.

Another necessary feature of anyunattended monitoring system isautomated review and analysis ofacquired data. The classic method isthe review of video-monitoring dataat video review stations after thefact. Typically, surveillance tapes arecollected from the sealed monitor-ing units by inspectors andreturned to a “home” facility forreview. The tapes contain time-lapseimages of the items being moni-tored. Existing video review sta-tions allow the review of imagery atincreased speeds. Yet, even withtime compression of the monitoringsystem and review speed, each hourof human review time can currentlyonly evaluate a little over a day ofsurveillance data from a single sen-sor. This makes clear the very labor-intensive nature of current videoreview efforts. An automatedassessment tool for the video orother signal data streams that detectand assess changes and conditionsindicating safeguards significantevents is needed. Otherwise it maybe weeks or months before informa-tion is reviewed. In certain cases,this may be too late.

4.6.3 Measures for StrengthenedSafeguards Under INFCIRC 153:Other Recommended Steps

Other recommended safeguardmeasures include:

• A Safeguards Center, a dedicatedroom for safeguards equipmentand activities, is a recommendedsecurity consideration.

• A redundant stable, uninterrupt-ible power supply. Protection isneeded against loss of power forsafeguards equipment.

• Adequate training for the DPRKsituation, including red-teamingthe particular physical and opera-tional circumstances.

• Updating equipment and trainingon a regular basis.

Safeguards—no matter how welldesigned—are only as good as thetraining, maintenance, and supportsystems that implement them.Given the DPRK’s record of limitedcooperation, inspectors will need tobe trained to look beyond the con-ventional monitoring and inspectionpoints for unexpected activities. Allof these recommended steps necessi-tate that the IAEA and its memberstates pay special attention to thefunding additional inspectors andequipment needed for safeguardingthe KEDO reactors.

In conclusion, the additionalmeasures and inspectionsdescribed would clearly lower theprobability of covert diversionfrom a safeguarded reactor. Absentany instance of such covert diver-sion from a safeguarded reactor, itis not possible to make this conclu-sion quantitative. Red-teams couldbring out some covert diversionpossibilities that these additionalmeasures and inspections would

prevent. A systems approach to theoverall package of safeguards mustbe taken to ensure that the particu-lar additional measures are thosethat add the most assurance for themoney invested. The authors ofthis report have not had either thetime or the specific data needed tocarry out such an approach, whichis rather the province of the IAEA.

4.6.4 Satellite Remote Sensing

Satellite-based remote sensing isnot a part of the IAEA safeguardspackage, but if carried out by the USor other member state, is a usefuladdition to safeguards. Satellite-basedremote sensing may prove particular-ly applicable to detecting an “intent-to-abrogate” from requirements ofthe NPT treaty and IAEA agreements.

Reliable and informative remotesensing suffers from a number of dif-ficulties. The weather does notalways cooperate, the observed partymay conceal facilities, equipment,and evidence from overhead view,and current commercial technology(and marketability) limits GSD(Ground Sample Distance) to a mini-mum of one meter, so that only itemsthe size of automobiles or larger canbe clearly distinguished.* Never-theless, remote sensing can be theonly source of timely informationwhen trying to monitor broad areas,restricted facilities, or suspect sites inan uncooperative state. In particular,the following can be done:

What can be monitored? High-resolution imaging systems canmonitor specific items and changesat a nuclear site. Synthetic apertureradar can evaluate conducting items(fences, transmission lines,pipelines, railways, equipment, andsome industrial structures).

Shipping casks. Individual fuelshipping casks are large enough tobe imaged from space, but the casks

56


* High-contrast items smaller than the GSD limit can be imaged, but they cannot be unambiguously identified.

need identifying marks to betracked from satellites. The state of acask’s contents cannot be deter-mined from space, but if infraredimagery can determine the surfacetemperature of a shipping cask, itmight be possible to infer somethingabout spent-fuel contents. Satelliteimagery could also be used to countcasks at a dry storage facility.

Cooling units, associatedpumps, and exchangers. The ther-mal state of elements of an industri-al site can be evaluated by infraredimagery. The thermal output of areactor can be estimated from tem-perature changes in exposed cool-ing water flows and cooling struc-tures. The operational status of sitefacilities can be evaluated by moni-toring the temperature of exposedheat exchangers, steam pipes,HVAC equipment, power transmis-sion components, and gas-exhaustplumes.

Facility construction at declaredfacilities. High-resolution imagery ofsites clearly identifies outdoorchanges associated with construction.Earthmoving, grading, plowing, dis-turbances from heavy vehicles, build-ing construction, and security perime-ters are typically easily distinguished.Change-detection techniques allowanalysts to focus quickly on changesin sites between images acquired ondifferent dates, thus highlighting theeffects of construction changes.Determining the nature of the con-struction and purpose of facilities aremore difficult, but satellite imagerycan direct the planning and conduct-ing of ground-based inspections.

What is the response time scaleof satellite remote sensing sys-tems? The time scale for monitoringby satellite is determined by theorbital dynamics of the resourcesused and the local conditions at the

site to be monitored. In the case ofSAR, weather conditions are notimportant. Commercial satellites inpolar orbits revisit exact positions in15–26 day cycles. More frequentimaging of locations can be per-formed by systems with the capabil-ity to acquire images at angles otherthan perpendicular to the earth’ssurface. This additional capabilityallows images of a site to beacquired as frequently as onceevery 3–4 days.

Remote-sensing resources. Table4-2 lists some commercial, space-based remote-sensing platforms.* Anumber of additional imaging sys-tems are planned for the nextdecade. The yet-to-be-deployed sys-tems will generally not add signifi-cantly new technical capabilities inthe near term. Additional systemswill provide greater revisit frequen-cy, and perhaps an independent

imagery supply of a particularcountry. Hyper-spectral imagery athigh spatial resolution, not yetdeveloped, might identify specificchemical species on surfaces and ingas and liquid plumes. This devel-opment might provide significantnew monitoring capabilities.

Figure 4-11 shows how the vari-ous additional monitoring measuresconsidered in this section couldaugment existing safeguards activi-ties at the KEDO reactors.

57


Table 4-2. Commercial remote-sensing platforms.

System Nominal Revisitresolution frequency

(m) (days)IKONOS 1 14SPOT 10 4IRS 5 5LANDSAT 15 ?

Satellitesurveillance

Electricpower motor

Reactorengineering

KEDOLWR

Portal androoms monitor

Neutron spectrumfluence monitor

Airsamples

Watersamples

Environmentalsampling

IAEAData

Collection

Figure 4-11. Additional monitoring measures that could augment existing safeguards activi-ties at the KEDO reactors.

* LANDSAT is a US government system, but the images are available commercially.

4.7 Conclusions

As the foregoing discussion indi-cates, the IAEA safeguards underthe applicable agreements—if car-ried out with adequate funding,cooperation of the host country, andpreferably with augmentation fromnational technical means—providehigh assurance that no nuclear-materials diversion has taken placesince the last inspection. Indeed, theglobal record to date suggests thatno fuel diversion from a civilianLWR under safeguards has takenplace. Both the quantity and thetimeliness criteria on which theentire accounting and inspectionsystem are based have proven ade-quate so far. Including the addition-al measures permitted under theapplicable agreements and dis-cussed above, safeguards in ouropinion will give high assurancethat covert programs at or near anyinspected locale are not going on.

The international communityhas not yet encountered an overtpremeditated NPT breakout by adetermined and a resourcefulcountry relying on the nuclearmaterials accumulated in a LWRplant. That option cannot be com-pletely be ruled out but only pro-tected against. In such a case, IAEAsafeguards—supplemented byother indications of diversion dis-cussed in Chapter 5—should pro-vide timely warning, which is tosay, warning time shorter than thetime required from diversionthrough fissile-material refining tothe manufacturing of a completednuclear-explosive device.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. Korea Electric PowerCorporation, Korean StandardNuclear Power Plant (KSNP),Seoul, Korea, 1996.

2. Byung Ryung Lee, Keun SunChang, and Jun Seok Yang,Korean Standard Nuclear Plants:Safer, Simpler, and Easier to Build(Korea Atomic Energy ResearchInstitute, Nuclear EngineeringInternational, August 1992), pp.29–35.

3. Korea Heavy Industries &Construction Co. Ltd. (Hanjung),Nuclear Power Plant, Seoul,Korea, October 2000.

4. Yousry Abushady, InternationalAtomic Energy Agency,“Inspection Activities at LightWater Reactors,” Paper present-ed at the 2000 Workshop onIAEA Safeguards, NTC/KAERI,Taejon, Republic of Korea,August 9, 2000.

5. Byung-Koo Kim, Korea AtomicEnergy Research Institute,“KEDO LWR Project forInternational Cooperation andNon-Proliferation,” Paper pre-sented at the Monterey Instituteof International Studies,Monterey, California, July 24,2000.

6. Neil Harms and PerpetuaRodriguez, International AtomicEnergy Agency, Safeguards atLight Water Reactors: CurrentPractices, Future Directions, IAEABulletin 38/4, pp. 1-6, Vienna,Austria, September 29, 2000.

7. O.J. Heinonen, InternationalAtomic Energy Agency,“Additional Protocol andSafeguards Agreements—TheNew Non-ProliferationStandard,” Paper presented atthe 12th Pacific Basin NuclearConference, Seoul, Republic ofKorea, October 30, 2000

8. Daniel A. Pinkston, Center forNonproliferation Studies,Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies,“Implementing the AgreedFramework and PotentialObstacles,” Paper presented atthe 12th Pacific Basin NuclearConference, Seoul, Republic ofKorea, October 30, 2000.

9. TESA Entry Systems, P.O. Box620138, Atlanta, GA 30362-2138.

10.D.R. Manatt, R.B. Melton, C.E.Smith, and S.M. Deland,“International Safeguards DataAuthentication,” LawrenceLivermore National Laboratory,Paper presented at the 37th

Annual International NuclearMaterials Management meeting,Naples, Florida, July 28–August1, 1996 (UCRL-JC-124825).

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5.1 Scope and Intent

This chapter briefly describes afew scenarios by which a Light-Water Reactor (LWR) could con-ceivably be exploited for the purposes of—

1. diverting spent fuel to supportweapons acquisitions, or

2. misusing the reactor to improvethe quality of plutonium foundin spent fuel.

Exploitation of an LWR for pro-liferant purposes requires bypass-ing safeguards, either covertly orovertly (by abrogating treaty obli-gations). Access to the reactor andto the spent fuel produced as aresult of reactor operations is large-ly limited to the operationsinvolved in refueling the reactor.This chapter also looks briefly atmajor signatures and other indica-tors that might serve as earlywarnings of potential proliferantactivities. We also look at some ofthe technical options that couldreduce the consequences of diver-sion or misuse and those that canimprove the reliability and/ordecrease the response time of safe-guards measures.

There are scenarios by which anLWR power plant can “indirectlysupport” the development ofnuclear weapons. For example,LWR construction and operationcan justify the development of anunderlying infrastructure andserve as a cover for a nuclear-weapons program. Some technolo-gies associated with LWR opera-tions, such as core physics comput-er codes, could be used for calcu-lating weapon-materials produc-

tion, either in the LWR or in othertypes of reactors (assuming thecross-section libraries for othertypes of reactors are available).Such indirect scenarios are not dis-cussed here.

5.2 Scenarios

The most important vulnerabili-ties with LWR nuclear-powerplants are associated with plutoni-um: either that generated normallyduring reactor operations andbound up in spent fuel, or thatpotentially generated as the resultof improper use of the reactor.Because plutonium is created in theLWR fuel as it is being used, themajor proliferation concern is thediversion of spent fuel. As alreadynoted, although the plutonium inspent LWR fuel (so-called “reactor-grade” plutonium) is not ideal fornuclear weapons, it is consideredusable, and thus an attractive targetfor theft or diversion of spent fuelresulting from normal reactor oper-ations. Vulnerabilities associatedwith fresh fuel are minimal, asfresh LEU fuel has no value to apotential proliferator unless that

proliferator has the facilities andcapabilities for further enrichinguranium. Other vulnerabilitiesassociated with LWR plants are alsorelatively limited. Misuse of ancil-lary capabilities (such as glovebox-es) or the application of skills,knowledge, and expertise to aweapons-development programoffer little of value to potential pro-liferators and are capabilities rela-tively easy to obtain.

The fact that spent LWR fuel isnot ideal for weapons leads to thesecond concern: the intentionalmisuse of the reactor for producingplutonium with improved isotopiccomposition. Two scenarios areoffered that could be used by pro-liferators to covertly produce suchplutonium. A proliferator couldsubstitute so-called “target” assem-blies (assemblies specially designedto produce plutonium) in place ofnormal fuel assemblies, or couldarrange to have some fuel removedprematurely from the reactor bymaking it appear to be “failedfuel.” A common feature of thesescenarios is that the material to bediverted in either case ends up in

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CHAPTER 5DIVERSION AND MISUSE SCENARIOS FOR LIGHT-WATER REACTORS

PLUTONIUM AND WEAPONS

While all plutonium isotopes can be used in a weapon, not all iso-topes are equally desirable. So-called “weapons-grade” plutonium has90 percent (or more) of the isotope 239Pu and little of the other iso-topes. All the “even” isotopes cause problems because they emit neu-trons, which can lead to premature detonation and impaired reliability.The isotope 240Pu is the most common of these. 238Pu is also prob-lematic because it produces a great amount of heat in addition to neu-trons. Even the “odd” isotope, 241Pu, is somewhat less desirable than239Pu because of its higher neutron and heat production rates.Because all these other isotopes of plutonium are less desirable than239Pu, we can approximate the weapons-usable “quality” of reactorplutonium as indicated by the concentration of 239Pu.

the spent-fuel storage pool. Thus,both of these scenarios share manyfeatures.

The last two scenarios discussedwill be the overt misuse of thereactor to produce “weapons-grade” plutonium, either through“short cycling” the reactor orthrough modifications to the reac-tor core design. While these twoscenarios could be attemptedcovertly, the complexity and signa-tures associated with these scenar-ios are of sufficient magnitude thatdetection is essentially assured andabrogation of the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea’s(DPRK) international commitmentsis required. We also briefly discussthe other options that the DPRKmay have should it choose to abro-gate its obligations.

The reactors for the DPRK use afuel assembly designed to be“reconstituted,” that is, they aredesigned to facilitate the replace-ment of individual fuel pins bythe plant operators. This is doneto maximize fuel utilization in theevent that a few fuel pins becomedefective or damaged duringoperation. This fact leads to thepossibility of a variant of thespent-fuel diversion scenario, thepotential diversion of individualspent-fuel pins.

The main advantage of this vari-ant to a potential proliferator isthat a single spent-fuel pin, or evena few spent-fuel pins, might bemore easily removed from thespent fuel building without detec-tion. The radiation from a few suchpins can be shielded with a smallercask (several centimeters of leadpipe might be sufficient shielding,1and the heat load from a few pinscan be more readily dealt with byfilling the cask with water for shortperiods of time.

There are several difficulties(from the proliferator’s perspec-tive) to this variant. First, relatively

little plutonium is in an individualfuel pin [a single Beginning of Life(BOL) pin contains only about 7 grams of plutonium, a normalburnup fuel pin contains about 21grams of plutonium). Thus, many(several hundred to a thousand)would have to be diverted (proba-bly over a long period of time) toaccumulate a significant stock of plutonium.

Second, the diverted rods wouldhave to be replaced with fuel pinsthat matched those removed, bothin terms of appearance and possi-bly radiation characteristics. If onlyone or a few pins were removedfrom a given fuel assembly, match-ing the radiation characteristicsmay not be required, as the signa-ture from the total fuel assemblywould change only a few percent,probably within the errors inherentin safeguards instrumentation.

Third, the operations wouldhave to be carried out withoutalerting the safeguards inspectors.The fuel-reconstitution station is inthe spent-fuel storage pool visibleto the safeguards cameras. Whilethe cameras can probably identifythat operations are proceeding atthat station, they may not discernthe details of the operation. Thus,while a proliferator will need tojustify fuel-reconstitution opera-tions on a specific fuel assembly,the extent of those operations maynot be observed.

Finally, even though it would beeasier to shield and transport a fewspent fuel pins, it is not trivial to doso without risk of detection. Thefuel pins are long, so a shield caskwould also be quite long, andtherefore likely visible to surveil-lance cameras. The fuel pins couldbe cut or chopped into shorterlengths, but that would require spe-cialized equipment, and even ifaccomplished with minimal equip-ment, it would release considerableradioactive fission gasses and likelytrigger radiation monitors. Packing

the fuel-pin sections into a shorterbut larger diameter cask would alsoexacerbate heat removal.

Because of the difficulties associ-ated with this variant, and espe-cially in light of the small amountof plutonium in each fuel pin, thisappears an unlikely scenario forlarge-scale diversion. However,this scenario may serve as anattractive prelude to abrogation, byproviding material to perform ini-tial testing of a covert reprocessingplant and associated weaponsmaterial infrastructures anddesigns.

5.2.1 Scenario: Covert Diversionof Spent Fuel Produced DuringNormal Reactor Operations

The diversion of spent fuelrequires overcoming three obstacles:safeguards, radiation, and heat.

First, to covertly divert signifi-cant quantities of spent fuel suc-cessfully, the safeguards surveil-lance systems monitoring thespent-fuel storage pool and accessportals have to be compromised.Current IAEA safeguards arespecifically tailored to address thisissue, and R&D continues on waysto improve the reliability of spent-fuel surveillance methods.

Second, even the least radioac-tive spent fuel requires transport ina heavily shielded container, andthe activities associated withremoving spent fuel from storage,and preparing and loading it intothe transport casks require suffi-cient manpower that much of theoperating staff would have to beinvolved in the operation.

Third, “young” spent fuel (spentfuel discharged less than severalyears) produces a great amount ofheat and must be cooled to preventdamage or even melting (especiallyof very young spent fuel.)

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DIVERSION AND MISUSE SCENARIOS FOR LIGHT-WATER REACTORS

The combination of the latter twoobstacles places tough requirementson the design of the shipping cask.Shortcuts in the handling and trans-port of young spent fuel greatlyincrease the risk of fuel damage andposes significant personnel hazards.

Both the radiation and heat pro-duced by spent fuel decays slowlywith time, so older spent fuel canrepresent a greater diversion riskthan fresher spent fuel. Because theoldest spent fuel (the BOL spentfuel) is also the spent fuel with thehighest quality plutonium, this ten-dency is reinforced, and there is adesire (from a nonproliferationview) to preferentially relocated theoldest spent fuel and place it undermore effective international control.

Spent-fuel storage pools do notnormally have enough capacity tostore all the spent fuel dischargedduring the life of a plant. As spentfuel ages, and the heat and radiationgenerated by the spent fuel lessen,the spent fuel can safely be stored indry casks at the reactor site. Thesecasks are very large, bulky, and diffi-cult to transport without specializedequipment. Removing fuel from thecasks is a difficult procedure owingto the high radiation field. The caskshave tamper-proof seals to detectany attempt to open the casks.Safeguards of dry-cask storage areasrely on surveillance monitoring andon periodic inspections of inventoryand cask-seal integrity. The size ofthe casks makes them detectablefrom satellites, providing additionalsurveillance certainty. Thus, diver-sion attempts on dry-cask storageareas incur difficulties similar todiversion attempts from spent-fuelstorage pools, but they could also bedetected from surveillance satellites.

Diversion of spent fuel has anumber of signatures, especially in aonce-through fuel cycle. First, themovement of the spent fuel itself isobserved via the installed safe-guards measures. Cameras and por-tal seals verify the security of access,

and advanced notice of spent-fuelstorage facility activities involvingthe movement of spent fuel is nor-mally required. Related signaturesinclude evidence of intrusion orillicit activities detected directly bythe monitoring equipment and evi-dence of manipulation of the moni-toring equipment (perhapsobserved as failures in the monitor-ing equipment). Raising spent fuelfrom the storage pool increases theradiation level in the facility and isreadily detectable.

Because the diversion of spentfuel requires the transport of thematerial away from the reactor site,a transport cask is needed. Even acask designed to bare minimumrequirements will be large andbulky, and likely observed fromsurveillance satellites, although thecask may be on site for a relativelyshort time (on the order of hours.)

For spent-fuel diversion toremain undetected, the divertedspent fuel must be replaced with adummy that mimics the appear-ance and characteristics of thediverted fuel assemblies.Safeguards practices include peri-odic surveys of spent fuel to verifyboth the appearance and thenuclear characteristics of the mate-rial. A dummy fuel assembly withsuch characteristics presents simi-lar radiation hazards to normalspent fuel. This in turn requiresremote handling during the manu-facture, necessitating potentiallyobserved facilities. Transportrequires a similar (or same) ship-ping cask as normal spent fuel.Movement of the dummy assemblyinto the spent-fuel storage areaentails the same observables asmoving the real spent fuel out.

5.2.2 Scenario: Covert MaterialsProduction

The ability to covertly misuse anLWR to produce better quality plu-tonium than that found in normalspent fuel is limited. It is technically

feasible to introduce a small num-ber of target assemblies speciallydesigned to improve the productionof weapons-quality plutonium. Lu,et al. estimated that as much as 8kilograms of plutonium/year couldbe produced in a Pressurized-WaterReactor (PWR) by populating nor-mally empty control-rod guidetubes with special target pins, andthat this might be accomplishedwithout substantially affecting reac-tor operating characteristics.1 Thephysics and cycle length of the LWRcore make it unlikely that a targetassembly could produce high-quali-ty plutonium if left in the core forthe entire 4.5-year life of a normalfuel assembly. However, if left in thecore for only a single cycle, the plu-tonium produced by special targetassemblies could have as much as90 percent 239Pu.

During refueling, LWR operatorsinspect fuel assemblies before rein-serting them back into the core;they inspect more carefully if fueldamage is indicated. It is feasiblethat a potential proliferator couldarrange to have some fuel or targetassemblies modified to appeardefective as a justification forremoving them at relatively lowburnups.

The possibility of defective fuelpresents additional safeguardsimplications. Any fuel (eitherfailed or not) removed beforeachieving nominal burnup willhave a plutonium isotopic compo-sition similar to BOL fuel, and thusrepresent a more attractive diver-sion target. Thus, there is someincentive for verifying that onlytruly failed fuel is removed prema-turely from the reactor. The fueldesigned for these reactors isexpected to be “reconstituted,”that is, in the event of fuel failures,individual fuel pins can bereplaced and the bundle reinsertedinto the reactor. On the one hand,this increases the number ofaccountable items because individ-ual fuel pins become accountable.

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On the other hand, it reduces theaccumulation of low-burnup spentfuel because only those failed fuelpins remain in the spent-fuel storage pool.

Such a scenario requires severalsteps. First, an expectation of failedfuel needs to be established to pre-pare the inspector to accept theunusual fuel change-out. Thisrequires spoofing the reactor failed-fuel monitoring equipment. Suchan expectation also serves to maskthe true intent of the mis-identifica-tion of the failed fuel. Alternately, afresh fuel element might be covert-ly “pre-damaged” prior to the ini-tial insertion into the reactor so thatit would be a truly “failed” fuel ele-ment at the next refueling. Becausefresh fuel will be imported into theDPRK, pre-damaging it wouldrequire cooperation from the coun-try of origin, presumably theRepublic of Korea (ROK), or thefuel would have to be covertlydamaged at the plant site.

Second, the “failed” fuel wouldhave to be “identified,” likelythrough spoofing of fuel inspectionprocedures or by contaminating (orotherwise camouflaging) the fuelto appear failed.

Third, the evidence of failed fuelwould have to be sufficient to con-vince the on-site refueling inspector.

From there, the “failed” fuelwould be placed in the spent-fuelstorage pool. Generally, failed orsuspect fuel is first placed in a spe-cialized storage cask (or sleeve) toisolate the failed fuel and minimizepotential for contaminating thespent-fuel storage pool. Once inthe storage pool, the fuel is nomore or less vulnerable to diver-sion than any other spent fuel,with the slight possible complica-tion of (perhaps) needing toremove the fuel assemblies fromthe failed-fuel storage cask.

An advantage (to the prolifera-tor) of this scenario is that it pro-vides a mechanism for producingspent fuel of higher plutoniumquality within the normal operat-ing procedures of the reactor.Conversely, the use of reconstitut-ed fuel assemblies significantlyreduces the amount of low-burnupspent fuel that could be accumulat-ed under such a scenario.

Such a scenario has severalobservables. First, utilization of spe-cial target assemblies to optimizeplutonium production requiresobtaining such assemblies andintroducing them into the normalfuel supply. Arranging for fuelassemblies to fail (or to appearfailed) requires similar efforts.Accomplishing such a feat requiresfooling of safeguards, either by fal-sifying records and/or swappingtarget assemblies for real fuelassemblies, as well as avoidingdetection during fuel handling andfuel inspection. Safeguards practicesare specifically designed to detectthe introduction of extraneous fuelassemblies into the fuel supply.

The second observable occurs inthe need to manufacture the targetassemblies, which would requirethe acquisition of a number ofitems and materials subject to vari-ous export and nuclear-supplierrestrictions. The target assemblieshave to be indistinguishable fromthe real fuel assemblies, have theserial numbers of the real fuelassemblies, and the real fuelassemblies being replaced have tobe covertly removed from the site.

The third observable in the sce-nario requires some justification forremoving the special assembliesbefore the end of the normal fuellife, most likely after a single cycle.

Finally, even if such assembliesare successfully irradiated, theyend up in the spent-fuel storagepool and must be covertlyremoved.

5.2.3 Scenario: Short-Cyclingthe Reactor

A reactor can be operated forless than its normal cycle, reducingburnup and improving the qualityof the plutonium in the spent fuel.This “short-cycling” can be eithercovert or overt. Covert short-cycling of the reactor is limited topremature discharge of only a fewfuel assemblies, perhaps as “failedfuel” as discussed previously.Premature discharge of more thanone or two such assemblies is sounusual that detection is essential-ly certain and the scenario must beconsidered overt. There are few“legitimate” reasons for short-cycling a reactor, and these aregenerally for safety-related issuessuch as component failure (includ-ing severely failed fuel), systemleaks, and control problems. Mostsafety- and control-related reactorshutdowns do not necessitateopening the reactor, let alone handling fuel.

Thus, if potential proliferatorswanted to short-cycle a reactor tocovertly produce plutonium ofhigher quality, they need to con-coct a relatively elaborate schemeto make the early shutdownappear justified, especially onethat requires even partial unload-ing of the reactor core. Even ifsuch a covert scenario were fol-lowed, it would be limited to thediversion of very few fuel assem-blies, owing in part to the necessi-ty to have replacement fresh fuelavailable. Normally, a reactoroperator maintains a small stockof fresh fuel in the event that afuel element requires replacement,but fuel is relatively reliable, andthe necessary stock of surplus fuelis small.

In addition, once the short-cyclefuel was removed from the reactor,it would eventually have to bediverted from the spent-fuel stor-age pool, as in Scenario 1.

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Short-cycling a reactor creates anumber of observable signaturesrelated to the loss of power. First isthe loss of power to the grid thatmay be detected if the power gridhas “external” connections (espe-cially if significant power is nor-mally exported, or is monitored.Second is the loss of “dump heat”that can be remotely detected bythe loss of infrared signals.* Bothsignatures should be detectedpromptly, and certainly within thetime needed to cool the reactorprior to removing the head andgaining access to the fuel (whichnormally takes a few days).

Diverted short-cycle spent fuelmust be replaced if the reactor is toremain operating. Thus, replace-ment fresh fuel has to be obtained(probably in advance of the reactorshutdown) and this has to occurmany months sooner than for nor-mal reactor operations. The earlyaccumulation of fresh fuel wouldthus indicate possible reactorshort-cycling.

In the event of overt short-cycling of the reactor with a goal toobtain plutonium with 90 percent239Pu, burnup would be limited tono more than about 7 MWd/kg,limiting the reactor cycle time toapproximately 9 months.Assuming an industry average of40 days per refueling outage andrefueling of the entire core, thereactor could produce as much as150 kilograms of plutonium (con-taining approximately 90 percent239Pu) every 10 months.†

If the goal is to obtain a limitedquantity of 90 percent 239Pu with aminimum of observables, then thereactor could simply be shut downwithin about 9 months of the lastrefueling. At equilibrium, one-thirdof the core (the last fresh fuel

reload) would contain approxi-mately 50 kilograms of plutoniumwith about 90 percent 239Pu. Insuch a case, the primary observablewould be the premature shutdownof the reactor.

We note again that the previoustwo paragraphs apply to overtdiversion, in which case the DPRKabrogates the Agreed Framework(AF) and withdraws effectivelyfrom the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT).

5.2.4 Scenario: OvertReconfiguration of the Reactorfor Materials Production

While LWRs can be short-cycledto improve the isotopic composi-tion of plutonium found in thespent fuel, such an approach iscostly—both in terms of operatingcosts and lost revenues. Weapon-material production through theuse of special target assemblies orthrough the ruse of failed fueloffers very limited capabilities formaterial production. To providesignificant increases in materialquality and quantity requires theintroduction of a large number oftarget assemblies. Target assembliesusing depleted uranium, arrangedas a blanket surrounding the core(a region of reduced neutron flux)would help extend the cycle time ofthe reactor, while helping toimprove the quality of the plutoni-um produced. However, such anapproach significantly reduces thetotal amount of reactivity in thecore (a measure of how much“active” fuel is in the core), signifi-cantly affects the thermal andnuclear performance of the reactor,and dramatically affects the per-formance of the reactor control sys-tems. These effects lead to the needto substantially reconfigure the

reactor core to achieve significantincreases in the quantity and quali-ty of discharged plutonium.

Such modifications are expen-sive and time-consuming andrequire significant reactor-designcapabilities. Moreover, the modi-fied reactor would require fuel sub-stantially different from that nor-mally used, probably requiringmuch higher enrichments than nor-mal LWR fuel. Thus, besides thedesign and manufacturing effortsassociated with the core reconfigu-ration, a source of fuel and enrich-ment capabilities also has to beprovided.

The modifications necessary toachieve these goals could not gounnoticed under any inspectionregime, and an overt abrogation oftreaty responsibilities wouldappear necessary. While designand construction of the modifica-tions might proceed before anyovert display of intent, the lack ofknown enrichment capabilities inthe DPRK means that an externalsource of fuel would be an essen-tial element of such an approach.

In a worst-case scenario, one inwhich all modifications were com-patible with the existing core inter-nal structures and all materials(including both modified fuelassemblies and target assemblies)were available prior to modifyingthe reactor core, the substitutioncould not proceed without noticeby the inspectors. On the otherhand, it may be feasible that themodifications could proceed inapproximately the same time asrequired for a normal refueling(perhaps as little as 15 days, butmore likely 30–60 days). Thismeans that the rest of the worldcould expect at least 15 days torespond to an abrogation before

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* Only about one-third of the power produced in the reactor is turned into electricity, the remaining two-thirds is wasted and dumped to the environment.The dumped-heat infrared signature of an operating reactor is easily detected from satellites.

† These data are obtained from the rough approximations of plutonium production in LWRs described earlier. Plutonium production rates vary broadlywith fuel enrichment, and using lower fuel enrichments would likely reduce cost and optimize plutonium production. Significant additional analysis isrequired to determine more accurate estimates of fuel requirements and of material production and plutonium isotopic contents at these lower burnups.

reactor restart (and some additionaltime—on the order of severalweeks—before significant plutoni-um could be accumulated.)

5.3 Consequences

The primary consequence ofdiverting spent fuel from an LWRis tied to the quality and quantityof the plutonium contained in thespent fuel. Normal reactor opera-tions result in the discharge ofnearly 300 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium every 18 months,with lesser discharges of somewhathigher quality plutonium duringthe beginning of the reactor life.The spent fuel discharged duringthe beginning and end of reactorlife, while still not considered“weapons-grade” would be some-what less difficult to design andfabricate into a weapon than thehigher burnup equilibrium fuel.Because all plutonium produced asa result of LWR operations is con-sidered “weapons-usable,” thesedifferences must be considered dif-ferences in degree, not differencesin kind. An approximation of theprojected accumulations of spentfuel is summarized in Table 5-1and Fig. 5-1.*

In addition to these spent-fueldischarges, there is also partiallyspent fuel in the reactor at alltimes. At any refueling, thereremains in the reactor one-thirdcore of 1-cycle fuel (containingapproximately 100 kilograms oflow-burnup plutonium) and one-third core of 2-cycle fuel (contain-ing approximately 275 kilogramsof medium burnup plutonium). Atthe end of the reactor lifetime, this“in-core” fuel is discharged (shownin Table 5-1 and Fig. 5-1).

This in-core fuel is of most con-cern during the reactor’s BOL peri-od. As previously noted, at the endof the first cycle, the core fuel con-tains approximately 300 kilograms

of low-burnup plutonium, 100 kilo-grams of which is normally dis-charged. Thus, should the DPRKdecide to abrogate its obligations atthe end of the first cycle, therewould be approximately 300 kilo-grams of low-burnup plutoniumavailable.

As already discussed, overtshort-cycling of an LWR could pro-duce as much as 150 kilograms ofessentially “weapons-grade” pluto-nium roughly every 10 months,and there some potential thatsmaller amounts could be accumu-lated through some of the scenar-ios discussed here. Safeguardshave been designed to help detectsuch activities and minimize the

potential for such attempts. Thus,production of substantial quanti-ties of low-burnup plutonium andsubsequent diversion of it likelyrequires an overt abrogation oftreaty obligations.

Exploitation of the plutoniumproduced in an LWR requiresreprocessing to extract the plutoni-um. Although reprocessing ofspent LWR fuel is similar to thereprocessing of spent fuel fromgraphite reactors (of which theDPRK has experience), there aresome notable differences. First,LWR fuel is clad with zircalloy, avery durable alloy that complicatesdissolution of the fuel (as com-pared with magnesium-clad metal

64


* The values for accumulated plutonium shown in Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1 refer to the plutonium content of freshly discharged spent fuel and do notaccount for the decay of plutonium, mostly associated with the decay of the short-lived isotope 241Pu.

Table 5-1. Accumulation of Light-Water Reactor (LWR) plutonium in spent fuel.Discharged Discharged Discharged Cumulated

Time from First Low-Burnup Medium-Burnup High-Burnup Total PuStartup (years) Pu (kg) Pu (kg) Pu (kg) (kg)

1.25 100 0 0 1002.5 — 175 0 2754 — — 275 550

5.5 — — 288 838— — — — —40 100 175 288 7,737

Total Discharges 200 350 7,187 7,737

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40Time from startup (years)

Plut

oniu

m (k

g)

Cum. Low BU PuCum. Med BU PuCum. Hi BU PuCum. Total Pu

Figure 5-1. Plutonium discharged from LWR operations (BU = burnup).

fuel that is easily dissolved.) TheLWR fuel must be mechanicallychopped into small pieces, and thetoughness of the alloy makes this adifficult process. Second, the com-plexity and size of the LWR fuelassembly (hundreds of very longpins as opposed to the single shortslug of a graphite reactor fuel ele-ment) further complicates thisprocess. Third, the combination ofthe zirconium and oxide fuelmakes the chemical dissolutionstep itself slower than dissolutionof the magnesium-clad metal fuelused in the graphite reactors.Finally, spent LWR fuel has higherradiation levels than graphitereactor fuels, due both to its high-er burnup and the fact that thefuel assemblies themselves aremuch larger. In short, even if anactive reprocessing capability forthe graphite reactor fuel is avail-able, a new front-end to the repro-cessing facility must be providedto prepare the spent fuel for repro-cessing. This front-end needs to beco-located with and likely con-tiguous to the rest of the repro-cessing facility, as the dissolvedfuel is too radioactive to be rea-sonably shipped.

5.4 Preventive Measures

As just described, reducing theproliferation risk associated withpotentially weapons-usable pluto-nium generated by reactor opera-tions fall into several broad areas:

1. Reducing access to plutonium-containing materials,

2. Reducing the quantity or qualityof the plutonium in spent fuel,

3. Reducing the desirability of mis-using the LWR for weapon-material production.

For practical purposes, all covertscenarios for misusing an LWR forweapon-material acquisition can bereduced to the issue of spent-fueldiversion. LWR power plants, by

nature, are quite robust againstmisuse or modification for weapon-materials production. As has beendiscussed, such misuse is expen-sive, time-consuming, and involvessufficient, easily detected observ-ables. Because the DPRK reactorsare copies of existing designs, thereare few, if any, substantial modifica-tions to the reactors or the plantsthat could significantly reduce therisk of misuse, a risk that appearsrelatively low to begin with.Remote monitoring of plant-operat-ing characteristics, both directly(through telemetry of plant param-eters) and indirectly (throughremote surveillance), discussed inChapter 4, is an area of technologythat could improve the ability ofthe safeguards community to detectand reduce the attractiveness ofany of the scenarios discussed.

Increasing the burnup capabilityof LWR fuel is the most promisingnear-term approach to enhancingthe intrinsic proliferation resistanceof the LWR fuel cycle, includingthose in the DPRK. In addition toreducing the quality and overallquantity of plutonium resultingfrom LWR operations, it can reduceoverall fuel cycle costs and thus isan attractive option for the reactoroperator, and could be implement-ed within the AF. Research isunderway, both in the US andabroad, to extend the burnup capa-bility of LWR fuel, and this optioncould become available in time.

Other technologies have beenproposed to further enhance theproliferation resistance of LWRplants and associated fuel cycles.Most, if not all, of these options fallfar outside the bounds of currentLWR practice and are likely unac-ceptable within the guidelines ofthe AF. One example is the addi-tion of substances to fresh fuel tomake fresh fuel radioactive as adeterrent to theft and diversion.Such an approach, while feasible,introduces complications that sig-nificantly increase the cost of the

fuel, reduces safety, and compli-cates transport, inspection, andhandling. Moreover, such anapproach deals only with the pro-liferation risk of fresh LEU fuel, arisk already considered very low.As such, it is unlikely that suchmeasures would be willinglyaccepted by any plant operator.

The issue of the higher-qualityspent fuel resulting from BOLoperations can be eliminated byinitially fueling the reactor withpartially irradiated fuel, such thatall BOL spent fuel would beexposed to full design burnup ondischarge. That approach intro-duces a number of technical andoperational challenges and is out-side the bounds of current reactoroperations. Partially irradiated fuelrods are much more prone to dam-age during handling and transportthan fresh fuel and introduce sig-nificant risks for fuel failures on re-irradiation. The operational chal-lenges include, among others (1)identifying a source of the partiallyirradiated fuel, (2) licensing thepartially irradiated fuel followingthe additional handling and trans-portation involved, and (3) ensur-ing personal protection and facilitysafety when introducing partiallyirradiated fuel into the reactoroperations normally designed tohandle fresh fuel. None of thesesteps are even remotely practical oreconomic.

Diversion of individual fuel pinscan be impeded by eliminating theability to reconstitute fuel. This istechnically easy to accomplish;indeed, not all LWR fuel is designedto be reconstituted. However, sever-al issues need to be solved beforeimplementing such an option. Firstis licensing. The current licensedfuel design for these reactors isreconstitutable, and any new designwould have to be licensed. Second,is the issue of reciprocity. Becausethe ROK reactors use reconstitutablefuel, the DPRK is unlikely to acceptdifferent treatment. Third is the

65


cost. A new fuel design would bemore costly (mainly due to licens-ing costs), but would also be slight-ly more costly to operate. Fuel isdesigned to be reconstituted to gainmaximum life out of each fuelassembly. A failed single pin in anon-reconstitutable assembly canlead to premature discharge of theentire assembly.

In summary, the best practicablemethods for preventing the diver-sion scenarios outlined are theones described in Chapter 4,

Section 4.6. These methods, underthe conditions recommended, pro-tect against covert scenarios so thatother methods of attaining aweapon capability, other thancovert diversion from the KEDOreactors, would probably be chosenby any proliferator. Overt diver-sion, the abrogation of agreements,cannot be prevented by safeguards,though they can be warned aboutand damage can be limited. Thisovert scenario is discussed inChapter 8.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. M.S. Lu, R.B. Zhu, and M.Todosow, Unreported PlutoniumProduction in Light-WaterReactors, Brookhaven NationalLaboratory, Upton, New York,ISPO-282, TS-88-1 (February1988).

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6.1 Inspection,Dismantlement, andDisposal Requirements forExisting Nuclear Facilities

6.1.1 “Full-Compliance”Inspections by the IAEA

The Agreed Framework (AF) pro-vides that the Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea (DPRK) mustcome into “full compliance with itssafeguards agreement with theInternational Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA)” when a “signifi-cant portion of the Light-WaterReactor (LWR) project is completed,but before delivery of key nuclearcomponents.” This means comple-tion, to a stage still to be agreed on,of the buildings for the turbine gen-erators for the first LWR at Kumhoand delivery of its turbine generatorbut not the LWR itself or keynuclear components for it. Thus,before IAEA inspection is requiredof facilities other than those“declared” to the IAEA by theDPRK when the DPRK accepted itssafeguards agreement, the KoreanEnergy Development Organization(KEDO) must complete major con-struction of buildings at Kumhoand deliver much of the non-nuclear equipment for electric gen-eration. The specific stage of con-struction and delivery required is tobe agreed in a “delivery protocol.”

Believing that the inspectionsand analysis necessary to show“full compliance” will take two tothree years, the IAEA has beenpushing the DPRK to permit theseinspections to begin even though

the completion of construction ofthe LWR buildings and the deliv-ery of the turbine generator are stilla year or more ahead.

6.1.2 Disposal of Spent Fuel

When the transfer of key nuclearcomponents to Kumho for the firstLWR takes place, the DPRK is obli-gated by the AF to begin transfer ofthe spent fuel stored in the coolingpond near the small graphite reactorat Yongbyon. Transfer will presum-ably continue during the period ofdelivery and installation of keynuclear components for the secondLWR at Kumho because the spentfuel is all to be transferred to “ulti-mate disposition” by the time thatLWR is completed at Kumho. TheAF does not specify where the spentfuel is to go but says that DPRK andthe US will “cooperate… to disposeof the fuel in a safe manner thatdoes not involve reprocessing in theDPRK.” Thus, where the spent fuelwill go and how it will be transport-ed still remains to be decided.

6.1.3 Dismantlement of Gas-Graphite Reactors

When the first LWR is completedat Kumho, the dismantlement of thethree existing gas-graphite reactorsand “related facilities” at Yongbyon,Taechon, and elsewhere must begin.This dismantlement must be com-pleted by the DPRK when the LWRproject (including installation of thesecond LWR) is completed atKumho. More agreement than thison how this dismantlement will bescheduled, including how it will becoordinated with steps towardinstallation of the second LWR at

Kumho, remains to be negotiated.The technical problems do notappear to be major, but how the dis-mantlement will take place andwhere the dismantled parts of facili-ties will go remains to be decided.

6.2 The Facilities atYongbyon*

The main site for the NorthKorean nuclear program was theYongbyon Nuclear Center, about100 kilometers north ofPyongyang, on the Kuryong River(Fig. 6-1). Many of the facilities atthe site have been “frozen” as a

67

CHAPTER 6KNOWN AND SUSPECTED NUCLEAR-RELATED FACILITIES IN THE DPRK

* Much of Sections 6.2 and 6.3 is taken from David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, eds., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, Institute for Science andInternational Security Press, Washington, D.C., 2000.

NN

Figure 6-1. Satellite image of the Yongbyonsite in 2000 (used with permission fromSpace Imaging). The facility extends onboth sides of the river throughout essen-tially the entire photograph.

result of the Agreed Framework(AF) of 1994, but the site as awhole is still active.

The site includes facilities forfuel manufacture, three nuclearreactors, at least one hot-cell facili-ty, at least one spent-fuel repro-cessing facility and several wastesites. There is also a high-explo-sives testing area, which has beeninactive since at least 1992.

The North Koreans reported tothe IAEA that the site was dedicatedto the pursuit of peaceful nuclearenergy and there was no weaponsprogram; however, inspections,measurements, and satellite photo-graphs have shown suspiciousactivities. As of this writing, it hasnot been determined exactly whichof the Yongbyon facilities were forweapons-manufacturing and which(if any) were for energy production.It is possible that entire site was adedicated weapon facility that useda peaceful cover story. Given theactivities observed, it is unlikely thatthe site was dedicated entirely topeaceful purposes.

Uranium mining, milling, andrefining operations were carriedout at other sites in North Korea.The DPRK has sufficient domesticuranium resources to be self-suffi-cient. Estimates of the capacity ofNorth Korea’s uranium miningand milling operations in 1992range from 300 tonnes to 1,800tonnes per year. There are noknown uranium isotopic-enrich-ment facilities in the DPRK. Thereactor program was to operatewith fuels of natural enrichment,with the exception of the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor.

In the rest of this section, wefocus on the main facilities, declaredand suspected, at Yongbyon.

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KNOWN OR SUSPECTED NUCLEAR-RELATED FACILITIES IN THE DPRK

6.2.1 The IRT-2000 ResearchReactor

In 1965, the IRT-2000 reactor wascommissioned in Yongbyon. Thereactor is light-water-cooled andmoderated, uses enriched uraniumfuel, and was designed to operateat a power level of 2 MW(th) [laterthe power level was increased to 4 MW(th) and then 8 MW(th)].Soviet nuclear reactor specialistsdeparted the DPRK after the reac-tor was completed, but continuedto cooperate on agreements to sup-ply the enriched fuel.1 The reactorwas placed under IAEA safeguardsin 1977. This reactor is not frozenand is not scheduled to be disman-tled under the AF.

6.2.2 Isotope ProductionLaboratory Near the IRT-2000Reactor

In the northern part ofYongbyon, there is a set of labora-tory buildings including one desig-nated as the Isotope ProductionLaboratory. In this building, thereare hot cells for handling radioac-tive material. This is where NorthKorea first produced plutonium,generated in uranium targets in theIRT-2000 reactor. They have admit-ted to the production of less thanof gram of the material by thismeans. This laboratory is notfrozen under the AF.

6.2.3 Probable UndeclaredWaste Site South of the IRT-2000 Reactor

Near the (uncompleted) 50-MW(e) graphite reactor is an unde-clared waste site that was probablyin operation from the 1970s untilAugust 1992. From satelliteimagery (Fig. 6-2), it was deter-mined that the undeclared wastesite contains two cylindrical tanks,each about 5.8 meters in diameter,in addition to a rectangulararrangement. This type of waste

site is commonly associated withIRT reactors. Iraq, for example, hasan almost identical facility at theTuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.It has two dry wells for storage ofirradiated fuel elements, plus twocylindrical tanks for storage of liq-uid radioactive waste. The site atthe Yongbyon facility was coveredwith dirt in August 1992, and theroad leading to the site was hiddenby freshly planted trees. Some ofthe trees then died within a fewmonths, and more vegetation wasplanted. The IAEA has not beenallowed access to the waste storedat this site, but it is suspected thatfurther waste from processing IRTreactor targets is stored there.

6.2.4 Declared Waste Site

Nearby, there is a declared wastesite that did not exist until mid-1992.The North Koreans, nevertheless,stated that this site has been activesince 1977, holding solid waste in 28steel-lined storage pits (upgraded to42 pits in 1990). The deliberate con-cealment of the older waste site,together with the false history of thedeclared site, make it appear thatthe IRT-2000 reactor produced sig-nificant amounts of plutonium, andthat the wastes have been concealed.

6.2.5 Graphite-ModeratedReactor

In the early 1980s, construction ofa nominally 5-MW(e), 20-MW(th)graphite-moderated power reactorwas started in Yongbyon. A decisionto seek nuclear weapons couldalready have been made at thistime, and the graphite-reactor tech-nology would be easily adapted toa dual-use role. The reactor designis said to be based on the CalderHall reactors, originally built to pro-duce electricity and support theBritish nuclear-weapons program.

The Yongbyon design uses urani-um-alloy (99.5 percent uranium, 0.5 percent aluminum) fuel rods inmagnesium-alloy (99.5 percent Mg,

69


0.5 percent Zr) tubes. The rods are2.9 centimeters in diameter and 52centimeters long and contain 6.24kilograms of the uranium alloy. Thetube walls are roughly a millimeter

thick but there are longitudinal fins,bringing the outer diameter toabout 5 centimeters. Cooling is byforced convection with carbon diox-ide gas under 6 bars of pressure.

The reactor core consists of a setof large graphite blocks, with 812vertical holes (“channels”) bored inthem for the fuel and coolant. Thechannels are 6.5 centimeters indiameter. There are 10 fuel rods perchannel, stacked vertically. Thediameter of the core is 6.4 metersand the height, not including reflec-tors, is 6 meters. While the core isabout half the physical size of theCalder Hall units, the maximumthermal power is only about one-tenth that of the Calder Hall units.

6.2.6 Fuel Reprocessing Facility

During the late 1980s, a fuel-reprocessing facility was construct-ed. The facility is housed in abuilding 192 meters long and sixstories tall, quite visible in satellitephotographs (Fig. 6-3). In 1994, thefacility had a nominal capacity toreprocess 220–250 tonnes ofMagnox spent fuel per year, usingtwo PUREX processing lines, if thelines are operated 24 hours perday, 300 days per year.*

The spent fuel from the Magnoxreactor would be transported to thesouth end of the reprocessing facili-ty by truck in buckets within shield-ed casks. The buckets and fuel rodswould then be moved to the northside of the building by remotelyoperated vehicle and the processingoccurs in the southerly direction.

Along the eastern side of thebuilding is a complex set of storagetanks within shielded vaults thatcontain liquid processing wastes oflow- and intermediate-radiationlevels. At the southeastern end ofthe building is a vault containingtwo storage tanks for highlyradioactive fission-products. About120 meters east of the reprocessingbuilding is an L-shaped buildingassociated with the storage of high-ly radioactive waste. There are fourtanks just south of this building inan underground vault that contain

50-MW50-MWereactor

New waste siteNew waste site

Buriedwaste sitewaste site

Tunnel

Bridge

50-MWereactor

New waste site

Buriedwaste site

Tunnel

Bridge

* The PUREX process, or Plutonium Uranium Reductive Extraction, is used ubiquitously to reprocess spent fuel. See Benedict, Pigford, and Levi, NuclearChemical Engineering (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1981).

Figure 6-2. The buried and the new waste site near the uncompleted 50-MW(e) graphitereactor. Only the new waste site was declared and the IAEA has not yet been allowed toinspect the buried waste site (used with permission from Space Imaging).

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most of the volume of the declaredreprocessing high-level waste.

6.2.7 Undeclared WasteStorage Building

An undeclared waste storagebuilding (sometimes calledBuilding 500) is located about 300meters east of the main reprocess-ing building. This building, builtprimarily in 1991, is 18 meters high(including the basement), 24 meterswide, and 67 meters long. Thebasement has four large pits for liq-uid-waste storage tanks and sixsmaller compartments for storageof containerized solid wastes. Thebasement is covered with concreteslabs for shielding. Trenches weredug and pipes were installed fromthe main reprocessing building inthe winter of 1991-92. It is suspect-ed that these pipes pumped aque-ous radioactive wastes containingfission products and spent uranium

from undeclared reprocessing cam-paigns in 1989-91. Inspectors whovisited this building during thethird ad hoc inspection ofSeptember 1992 were told incorrect-ly that this building had no base-ment, and that it was a workshopfor military vehicles.

6.2.8 Other Unfinished Reactors

Construction began on two othergraphite reactors, one a nominally50-MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon andanother a 200-MW(e) reactor atTaechon. Neither of these two reac-tors was completed. The reactorgraphite had been installed at the50 MW(e) reactor but not at the 200 MW(e) reactor at the time ofthe freeze.

It has been speculated that the50-MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon wasto have been the main producer ofweapon materials (in conjunction

with the reprocessing facility) andthe Taechon reactor was to be forelectrical production only.

6.3 Verification of the InitialDPRK Declaration

The IAEA inspections weremeant to verify the correctness andcompleteness of the initial declara-tion of nuclear materials that theDPRK provided to the IAEA onMay 4, 1992. The declarationincludes statements as to—

1. The nuclear-material inventoryof seven facilities declared bythe DPRK to the IAEA as subjectto safeguards.

2. Design information of thoseseven facilities.

3. A list of locations of nuclearmaterials outside these facilities.

4. A list of nuclear facilities underconstruction or planned.

5. A list of scientific institutions.

6. A list of nuclear facilities relatedto the nuclear industry.

The first IAEA visit occurred onMay 11–16,1992, and was followedby six ad hoc inspections to deter-mine the correctness and complete-ness of the initial declaration. Theseinspections and some meeting andcorrespondence dates associatedwith those inspections are listed inTable 6-1. Attempts to inspect twoundeclared facilities at theYongbyon site in early 1993 under“special inspection” authority wereblocked. The DPRK thenannounced that it was withdrawingfrom the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). Although its withdrawalwas suspended, the DPRK hasnever allowed IAEA special inspec-tions. The IAEA began conductinginspections at the 5-MW(e), 20-MW(th) gas-graphite reactor andthe other two unfinished graphite

Suspect wasteSuspect wastebuilding

Coolingtower

Spent fuelreception

Stack (shadowextends NW)extends NW)

Plutoniumseparation building

Suspect wastebuilding

Coolingtower

Spent fuelreception

Stack (shadowextends NW)

Plutoniumseparation building

Figure 6-3. Satellite image showing the plutonium separation building and associated build-ings and the suspect waste building, the so-called Building 500 where nuclear waste fromundeclared reprocessing campaigns is suspected to be hidden. The waste could include 50 tons of uranium and 30 kilocuries of 137Cs (used with permission from Space Imaging).

reactors and related nuclear facili-ties declared by the DPRK startingshortly after the AF was signed.

The declaration claimed that thevery first core-load of fuel was still

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in the 5-MW(e) graphite reactorand that only a few defective fuelrods had ever been removed. Tothe contrary, evidence leads to thesuspicion that beginning in 1989large amounts of spent fuel from

the reactor had been reprocessedand several kilograms of plutoni-um removed. The nature of the dis-crepancy is shown schematically inFig. 6-4, which shows a suspectpath employing the 5-MW(e)graphite reactor.

From satellite imagery of thesteam emitted from the reactor’scooling tower, a rough power his-tory of the reactor was determined.The design of the reactor does notrequire the reactor to be shut downto remove some of the fuel.However, it was determined thatsignificant outages had occurredduring operation, which wouldallow large fractions of the coreinventory to be removed, depend-ing on the speed of the refuelingmachines available. It has beenestimated that during a 70-day out-age in 1989, half the core couldhave been removed with a singlerefueling machine, or the entirecore could have been removedwith two refueling machines.Based on these rough estimates, itis likely that up to 50 tons of fuelwas processed in the radiochemicallaboratory, which then may haveproduced as much as 8.5 kilogramsof plutonium. If this were the case,there would be tens of kilocuries ofradioactive fission products, andtens of tons of uranium sludge inthe basement of Building 500.

The North Koreans declared thatthe reactor operated with only onecore load of fuel from 1986 until1994, when the entire core invento-ry was removed and put in thespent-fuel storage pool. Currently,about 8,000 rods are sealed in cansin the fuel pool, representing thisone full core load. Only about a100 rods were otherwise removedfrom the core because they hadfailed during reactor operation. Ofthose rods, they were able to take86 from the spent-fuel storage pooland transfer them to the radio-chemical lab for “hot tests” of thefacility. The other rods, theyclaimed, were too badly damaged

Table 6-1. Visits and inspections by the IAEA of North Korean facilities.Dates Purpose and accomplishmentsMay 11–16, 1992 Initial official visit by Director-General Hans Blix and

delegation.

May 26–June 5, 1992 First ad hoc inspection to verify the initial declaration.

July 8–18, 1992 Sampling of radiochemical lab includes swipes in and around five glove boxes that compose the plutonium-production area of the lab.

September 11–14, 1992 Visits to radiochemical lab and fuel-fabrication complex. Acting on suggestions made by the US, there are visits tothe high-explosive facility and to Building 500, which appears to be a single-story building under military control.

November 2–13, 1992 IAEA provides DPRK with details of the inconsistencies and requests an explanation. Answers are not satisfactory to IAEA, who has been shown US satellite photos of the construction of Building 500 and the trenches leading to it.

December 22, 1992 Hans Blix requests extraction of samples around basement of building in question.

January 5, 1993 DPRK’s Atomic Energy Minister Choi rejects Blix’s request.

January 1993 Agency task force summarizes inconsistencies and makesrecommendations for a set of measurements on reactor fuel.

January 20–22, 1993 El Baradei of IAEA visits Pyongyang to request special inspections of the two undeclared waste sites. Response is that the sites are military and non-nuclear—there will be no inspections.

January 26–February 6, 1993 Sixth ad hoc inspection. Extensive meetings and discussions between IAEA team and DPRK officials discussing isotopic inconsistencies found in swipe samples from radiochemical lab.

February 22–23, 1993 IAEA Board of Governors meets and discusses findings ofinconsistencies. Satellite photos are shown. Board decides to support Blix, and declares that inspection of additional sites is essential to ensure verification of compliance with the agreement.

March 12, 1993 DPRK announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

May 10–14, 1993 Seventh ad hoc inspection team visits Yongbyon and performs maintenance and replacement of safeguards equipment at reactor.

June 11, 1993 DPRK announces suspension of NPT withdrawal, based on negotiations with US Assistant Secretary of State Gallucci.

to be removed from the pool andare still in the sludge in the bottomof the pool. For “cold tests” of theradiochemical lab, they claim tohave used 172 fresh fuel rods. The“radiochemical lab” (reprocessingfacility) was therefore declared tohave only processed 86 irradiatedrods and 172 fresh fuel rods. Itwas claimed that the processingoccurred in a single campaign,consisting of three batches, in1990. The amount of plutoniumdeclared was a uniform metalsample of 62 grams.

As was mentioned in Table 6-1,the IAEA inspectors visiting theradiochemical lab in July of 1992took a variety of samples, includ-ing swipe samples in the plutoni-um area of the lab. Some of theinformation from those measure-ments is shown in Fig. 6-5. In thisfigure, the PUREX process is bro-ken down into its four stages. Thein-process waste in the tanks ineach of the stages was analyzed forthe plutonium isotopic content.The fraction of the plutonium thatwas 240Pu was different in the tankinventory than in the plutoniummetal sample shown the IAEA,which could indicate the wastesthat were in the tanks were not thewastes resulting from the manufac-ture of the plutonium sample. Thisresult in itself is not a “smokinggun,” however, because there mayhave been very different extractionefficiencies in the three batches andthe three batches may have haddifferent irradiation histories.

Swipe samples taken in the plu-tonium area of the facility provid-ed more evidence of undeclaredreprocessing campaigns. Usingsophisticated techniques, the frac-tional content of 240Pu was deter-mined for individual dust parti-cles. This fraction was found tovary from particle to particle, clus-tered in three groups, whereas theplutonium metal sample shownthe inspectors was uniform. This isa very unlikely result, unless there

72


were undeclared processing cam-paigns. Additionally, the ratio of241Am to 241Pu was measured forthese dust particles. 241Pu has a14-year half-life, and decays to241Am. The ratio 241Am/241Pushould therefore indicate theamount of time elapsed since theplutonium was separated, as longas the initial separation was cleanand the sampling and analysiswere performed without the intro-duction of bias. This measurementindicated that reprocessing hadoccurred in three separate cam-paigns, in 1989, 1990, and 1991.

Because of the hidden waste siteapparently associated with the IRTreactor, there is also an issue asso-ciated with that reactor. The

means by which the reactor couldhave been used to produce pluto-nium is described schematically inFig. 6-6. The reactor used enricheduranium oxide fuel, not of suffi-cient enrichment for use inweapons. The fresh fuel was sup-plied by the Soviet Union, andspent fuel was stored in a storagecanal near the reactor. It is sus-pected that targets made of natu-ral uranium were irradiated in theneutron flux in the core of thereactor, and then transferred to the“Isotope Production Laboratory”or other facility near the IRT forplutonium removal. The totalamount of plutonium that couldbe made by this route is probablyless than four kilograms.

86 rods

Tunnels

5-MW(e)reactor

86 rods+ 8,000 rods

172 rods (fresh)Radiochemical lab

Fuelpool

Building 500basement

Figure 6-4. Nuclear program at 5-MW(e) graphite reactor and radiochemical lab. Declaredquantities are shown as numerical values. It is suspected that as much as one additionalcore was processed without declaration and the wastes could be stored in Building 500, an undeclared waste site.

DissolutionFissionproduct

extraction

Waste inventory in mixer-settlers andstorage tanks

(240Pu content averaged about 2.25%)

240Pu contentabout 2.44%

Uraniumextraction

Plutoniumextraction172 rods (fresh)

62 grams

86 rods (hot)

Plutoniumnitrate

Figure 6-5. The measurements at the radiochemical lab, shown broken down into the fourstages of the PUREX process. The declared input and output processing quantities areshown.

It is not clear that the buildingidentified to the IAEA inspectors asthe Isotope Production Laboratoryis the facility that would have beenused for this process. The NorthKoreans may plausibly have had apilot reprocessing plant some-where that enabled them to scaleup to the large scale used in theRadiochemical Lab. They havedenied there was a pilot facilityand none has been found.

The path forward for the IAEAto determine the correctness andcompleteness of the initial declara-tion has been developed, includ-ing planning for contingencies.This plan, which is not publicinformation, will be presented tothe IAEA Board of Governorssometime in the future. It includesplans for the cases where largeamounts of radioactive wastes arediscovered in previously hiddenwaste sites. There is no plan toattempt to verify the accuracy andcompleteness of the initial declara-tion unless access to the two sus-pect waste sites is granted, if theagency stays with the recommen-dations of former IAEA Director-General Hans Blix.

One core load of spent fuelremains in the pool near the 5-MW(e) graphite reactor. To pre-vent corrosion, the fuel has beenplaced in an argon atmospherewithin stainless-steel cans keptunderwater for cooling. The infor-mation as to where each fuel rodwas located within the reactor was

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lost when the DPRK refused topermit IAEA inspectors to be pres-ent and to sample materials fromthe rods from each of a number ofkey locations in the reactor whenthe DPRK removed the rods.Allowing such sampling couldhave allowed a more accuratereconstruction of how much pluto-nium was produced and when.

It will be important to performmeasurements on the fuel alongwith isotopic depletion calculationsto verify the reactor operation his-tory. Spontaneously emitted neu-tron rate measurements can beused to estimate the 240Pu contentof the fuel. From the 240Pu contentper unit mass of fuel, the plutoniumproduction can be estimated. It willbe difficult to infer accurately thereactor’s operational history withthis information alone, so that fur-ther analysis or data may berequired. It would be helpful tohave the reactor operator’s logbooks for the years when the reac-tor operated. Perhaps more infor-mation could be obtained bygamma-ray spectral analysis ofstructural materials within theempty reactor.

If an assay of the suspect wastesites is found to contain significantamounts of fission products or ura-nium sludge, there will be a needfor the DPRK to amend its initialdeclaration. It would then have toreveal the appropriate amount ofseparated plutonium, which maybe as much as 10 kilograms. An

additional facility (for plutoniumstorage) may have to be declaredto the IAEA.

Even if there is openness on thepart of the DPRK, there may stillbe ambiguity due to the impreci-sion of the assay methods or thepermanent loss of operatingrecords. As an example, supposethat an assay of the suspect wastesites determines that a “missing” 8 kilograms of separated plutoni-um should be accounted for.Suppose that by this time NorthKorea has changed their declara-tion, claiming that 6 kilograms ofplutonium was produced and theyshow this amount to the IAEA.Even if the DPRK were to openmany of the facilities at Yongbyonto inspection and grant interviewswith workers, the discrepancybetween 6 and 8 kilograms maynever be fully resolved.

The size of the IAEA-alloweddiscrepancy would be partiallybased on the estimated accuracy ofthe assay (see Section 6.5). Time isa factor, because a more detailedassay will require more time. Arealistic goal may be ~25 percent ofthe amount of plutonium inferredby the waste site inspections,which in this particular examplewould be 2 kilograms. If full coop-eration had been given to theIAEA, they may accept that theverification process is complete,provided that there were no morefacilities or sites they felt that theyneeded to inspect. It is unlikelythat any discrepancy over a fewkilograms would be allowed ifthere were signs that North Koreawas still concealing information. Inaddition, any discrepancy largerthan one weapon’s worth of pluto-nium (~8 kilograms) would proba-bly not be tolerated by the USCongress, regardless of the appar-ent degree of DPRK cooperation.

IRTreactor Natural uranium targets

Enriched uranium fuel

Storagecanal

Hot-cellfacility at IRT

Declaredwaste site

Buriedundeclared

site

Figure 6-6. The suspected route used to produce plutonium with the IRT-2000 researchreactor.

6.4 Verification of FuelDisposal and FacilityDismantlement

6.4.1 Spent-Fuel Disposition

The spent fuel at the 5-MWegraphite reactor is kept in canistersmanufactured by NACCorporation of Atlanta, Georgiaconstructed of stainless steel, filledwith inert gas, and equipped with apressure relief valve. The canisterswere designed so as to fit within ashielded shipping cask, also manu-factured by NAC Corporation. Noagreement has been worked outbetween the DPRK and the US onexactly how the canisters will beshipped. It is known that the USgovernment paid the cost of thecanisters to begin with, which indi-cates the shipping will probablyalso be paid for by the US. If thedestination for the fuel is Russia orChina, it could be transported overland. Otherwise, ship transporta-tion will be required, which willincrease cost.

The fuel is in poor condition andthere may be some significant safe-ty issues when shipping thesematerials. The magnesiumcladding was extensively corrodedbefore the fuel was containerized.In some canisters, apparently, ura-nium hydride has formed from thereaction between uranium metaland water. This reaction releasesoxygen and has caused overpres-sure. The sludge in the bottom ofthe spent-fuel storage pool, whichmay contain as much as a kilogramof plutonium, should also becanned and shipped. Wherever thefuel is shipped, it will have toundergo sorting into a multitudeof waste streams, including bareuranium rods, rods with intactcladding, and fuel sludge. Thesludge and cladding can probablybe converted directly into wasteforms, but the uranium metal mayrequire processing before it is in asuitable waste form for disposal.

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The best place to send the fuelfor technical reasons is theSellafield plant in the UK, whereMagnox fuel is routinelyreprocessed. For example, theTokai-1 nuclear power plant inJapan was a Magnox reactor thatoperated from 1965–1998. Duringthis time, the fuel was sent by shipto Sellafield for reprocessing. TheUK still operates a dozen or moreMagnox reactors; the Magnoxreprocessing facility at theSellafield plant is scheduled tooperate until at least 2011. IfSellafield were chosen, it may haveto store the resulting reprocessingwastes, which is unusual, becausethe wastes are ordinarily returnedto the customer.

Other locations, which could intheory process the fuel, includeTomsk in Russia, Sichuan in China,and the Savannah River Site (SRS)in Aiken, South Carolina. Thesesites have facilities specifically forprocessing uranium metal fuel andare preferable for technical reasonsto sites that process commercialuranium-oxide fuels. The compli-cation of the magnesium claddingcould introduce significant pre-treatment costs. While the Russianand Chinese locations would entaillower transportation costs, it is anopen issue whether safety stan-dards at those plants would beconsidered adequate.

Both the SRS and the IdahoNational Environmental andEngineering Lab (INEEL) nowaccept reactor spent fuel (for stor-age) from other countries as part ofthe National Spent Nuclear FuelProgram.2 Of these two sites, theINEEL site has more diversity in itsoperations and accepts more differ-ent types of fuel than the SRS,which only accepts aluminum-claduranium-metal fuel. In any case,the fuel is ultimately to be buriedas waste in the National Repository(currently thought to be YuccaMountain in Nevada), along withthousands of tons of aluminum-

clad fuel from past US operationsat Savannah River and a large vari-ety of fuels from INEEL. Some ofthe aluminum-clad fuel at SRS willprobably be chemically processedinto other forms before ultimatedisposal. Additionally, over 2,000tons of aluminum-clad spent fuel isbeing put in dry storage at theHanford site and is tentativelybeing packaged for disposal with-out further processing.3

If one of the sites in the US ischosen for the spent fuel, there iscertain to be some opposition fromstate governments. A lesson fromseveral cases of such opposition inthe US, however, is that state gov-ernments may be willing to con-sider limited and well-definedshipments of spent nuclear fuel ofoverriding national security inter-est. There are also some legal bar-riers to sending the fuel to eithersite that would have to be over-come. The current program acceptsfuel irradiated in foreign researchreactors, but it only covers fuelthat is of US origin, and theYongbyon fuel is certainly not ofUS origin. The existingEnvironmental Impact Statement(DOE/EIS-218F) would also haveto be modified for this fuel.

6.4.2 Dismantlement

Some important verificationissues in the dismantlementprocess are called for in the AF.After the first LWR has been com-pleted, the DPRK will be requiredto dismantle its frozen nuclearfacilities. If this part of the AF actu-ally takes place, the DPRK willhave already come into compliancewith its INFCIRC 153 IAEArequirements and will haveallowed all of its spent fuel to beremoved from Yongbyon. While itis the responsibility of the DPRK todismantle its own facilities, it maybe in the interests of US nationalsecurity to assist the DPRK in itseffort. The IAEA can also providesome help (if the DPRK re-joins it).

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There are three stages of decom-missioning as far as the IAEA isconcerned4:

Stage 1 (“safe storage”): Theouter contamination barrier is keptas it was during operation, but themechanical opening systems arepermanently blocked and sealed(valves and plugs, etc.). The con-tainment building is kept in a stateappropriate to the remaining haz-ard and the atmosphere inside thebuilding is subject to appropriatecontrol. Access to the building isallowed, subject to monitoring andsurveillance procedures.

Stage 2 (“cocooning”): Theouter contamination barrier isreduced to a minimum size and allparts easily dismantled areremoved. The sealing of that barri-er is reinforced by physical meansand the biological shield in a reac-tor is extended if necessary so thatit completely surrounds the barri-er. After decontamination toacceptable levels, the containmentbuilding and the nuclear ventila-tion system may be modified orremoved if they are no longerrequired for radiological safety.

Stage 3 (“greenfield”): All mate-rials, equipment, and parts of theplant in which activity remains sig-nificant despite decontaminationare removed. In all remainingparts, contamination has beenreduced to acceptable levels. Theplant and site are released for unre-stricted use. From the point ofview of radiological protection, nofurther surveillance, inspections, ortests are necessary.

The first of two 2 major dis-mantlement challenges atYongbyon is the 5-MW(e) graphitereactor, which operated for sever-al years and should be quiteradioactive. Fortunately, there issome international experience

with similar facilities. A verifiedcocooning of the graphite reactorcould be performed relativelyquickly compared to the green-field approach. The process isdeemed “irreversible” if the reac-tor is taken to a state where itwould be cheaper for the DPRK tobegin an entire new reactor con-struction project rather than re-activate the old reactor. Emphasiswould be placed on removing anddestroying critical reactor compo-nents such as control rod drives.The steam generators could bedestroyed in situ by filling themwith concrete. The empty core ofthe reactor could also be filledwith concrete. The reactorgraphite may be poisoned by theintroduction of a boron-contain-ing spray or resin that would ren-der it permanently useless fornuclear purposes.

The US has recently obtainedextensive experience cocooning itsown graphite reactors, many ofwhich are located at the HanfordReservation in Washington. Theseold reactors, built to produce plu-tonium for weapons, were nearlyidentical to one another and wereeach rated at 425 MW(th). Five arebeing cocooned now, and one iscomplete. As experience has beengained, the cost per reactor hasgone down. The typical cost isabout $25 million each (130 man-years labor each). The key to thelow cost is the use of the existingouter concrete shield that sur-rounds each reactor as a major partof the cocoon.

The Yongbyon reactor is muchsmaller and is also less radioactivethan the Hanford reactors. Its outerconcrete shield wall is similar inthickness to those of the Hanfordreactors. In theory, therefore, itshould not be significantly moredifficult to entomb.

It is to be remembered that theNorth Koreans have no experiencewith nuclear decommissioning. Ittherefore may be advisable to hirea private company to do the proj-ect management and provide tech-nology. Obviously, the NorthKoreans may press that their ownlabor will be used and mayattempt to engage the US in pay-ing for costs not directly related toreactor entombment, such as sitecleanup and waste disposal. Adecision will have to be made as tothe scope of US involvement inthose other activities.

Handling the radioactivegraphite core blocks is time-con-suming and presents a radiologicalrisk to workers because of thedebris and dust. This is part of thereason why greenfield costs esti-mates are so much higher than theactual costs at Hanford.* It is prob-ably undesirable for these reasonsto take the Yongbyon reactor to thefinal state of decommissioning.

The Yongbyon reactor shouldeasily be brought to a safe storagestate within a three-year period.Because of the special securityissues surrounding this reactor,some critical pipes and possibly thereactor vessel itself could be cutwith a saw to provide assurancethat the Stage 1 decommissioningwill not be reversed. The steamgenerators, the refueling machines,and control rod drives should beremoved and destroyed.Cocooning could begin as soon asStage 1 is complete.

The other two graphite reactors,one located at Yongbyon and theother at Taechon, could be taken tomore advanced stages of decom-missioning. Of some concern is thedisposition of the nuclear-gradegraphite from the 50-MW(e) reac-tor, which should be treated insome way so that it cannot be usedto reconstruct the reactor.

* The final greenfield decommissioning costs for the Hanford reactors has been estimated to be in the billions of dollars.

The second dismantlement chal-lenge is the Radiochemical Lab atYongbyon. Experience obtained atthe Eurochemic Reprocessing Plantin Belgium (and at other reprocess-ing plants) should provide someassistance. This facility was con-structed in the early 1960s and wasowned by a 13-nation consortium.It went into active operation inJuly 1966 as a demonstration plantwith a 60-ton annual capacity.Between 1966 and 1974, about 180tons of low-enriched uranium fueland 30 tons of high-enriched urani-um fuel were reprocessed. After itsshutdown in January 1975, theplant was decontaminated duringthe years 1975-79 for keeping it ina safe, standby condition.Decommissioning began in 1991and the plant has been completelydecommissioned as of today,except for the outer structure andthe floor.

In 1987, the first decommission-ing phase was estimated to requirea team of 20 dismantlement opera-tors and 17 technical and safetyassistance to work for 11 years.Total cost was estimated at $172million. In 1992, the cost estimatewas revised upward to $235 mil-lion, reflecting increased waste dis-posal costs. Progress reports pub-lished over the last few years haveconfirmed that the 1992 estimate iscorrect to within about 25 percent.Waste management and disposalcosts are more than a quarter of thetotal cost. A computerized data-management system has been setup to keep detailed records ofcosts, hours worked, and wastesproduced to enable the OECDcountries to make estimates forfuture decommissioning activities.5

The Yongbyon plant had a totalcapacity of the plant in 1994 ofabout 220 tons/year (with twolines). One of those lines has neverbeen tested or contaminated. Theradioactive waste tanks and con-taminated concrete will be the

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most time-consuming componentsto dismantle. It is to be remem-bered that far more fuel in totalwas processed at Eurochemic thanat Yongbyon. The cost and man-power estimates for theEurochemic plant are therefore rea-sonable upper limits for the corre-sponding numbers at Yongbyon.

Again, it may be sensible toengage a Western company forproject management and technolo-gy know-how. For instance, mod-ern remotely operated machinescould cut some of the moreradioactive pipes and remove someof the more contaminated equip-ment. In any case, the assistanceshould focus on the rapid, verifi-able, and irreversible destruction ofcomponents and subsystems ofgreatest concern to US nationalsecurity, such as remote manipula-tors and leaded-glass windows.Help provided to the NorthKoreans for activities that do notdirectly affect verification process,such as general site cleanup, geo-logical waste disposal, and shallowland burial of wastes should beprovided only if it furthers USnational interests. If the DPRK re-joins the IAEA, some assistancecan be provided for additional sitecleanup through that mechanism.

6.5 How Much VerificationIs Enough?

Verification of the completenessof a state’s initial report, particular-ly for states that have, or are sus-pected of having, producedweapons-usable nuclear materialprior to entry into force of theirsafeguards agreement, is complex.The process involves a detailedreview of facility-operating histo-ries, a comparison of facilities andnuclear material types andamounts with other informationavailable to the IAEA and the reso-lution of any resulting inconsisten-cies. The objective is a high level ofassurance that the nuclear material

declared and presented to theIAEA is consistent with what couldhave been produced.

Cooperation between the IAEAand a state is necessary for the suc-cessful implementation of safe-guards in any context. The level ofcooperation essential to the processof verifying the completeness of aninitial declaration goes beyond thatrequired to implement the safe-guards agreement or even anAdditional Protocol (INFCIRC 540)to that agreement. It can be arguedthat the state is obliged to provideany existing facility-operatingrecords to the extent they are perti-nent to assessing the completenessof present declarations. However,the process may require access toindividuals (e.g., knowledgeablefacility personnel) and locations(e.g., locations beyond declarednuclear sites) that the state is notlegally obliged to provide (at least,without resort to a request for aspecial inspection). Further, theverification process does not pro-vide certainty and while a highlevel of openness regarding astate’s past and current nuclearactivities is a necessity, it may notbe sufficient depending on thelevel of ambiguity judged political-ly acceptable at the time. Technicalaspects of the verification exerciseare important determinants, butthe final judgement regarding howmuch verification is enough willlikely be political in nature.

At the point when the process ofverifying the completeness of theDPRK’s initial declaration wasstopped, the DPRK was not incompliance with their SafeguardsAgreement. There were a numberof major inconsistencies betweenthe DPRK’s declarations and theIAEA’s inspection results. If any-thing, the situation has worsenedin that the possibilities of recon-structing and in some sense verify-ing historical activities degradeswith time. There is no metric or

quantitative measure of a state’sintent; however, when the processof verifying the completeness ofthe DPRK’s initial declarationresumes, the DPRK’s intentions tobe open (or not open) shouldbecome visible quickly. The DPRKknows the actions necessary tocome into compliance with theirSafeguards Agreement. It is awarethat its initial declaration needs tobe amended. It is aware that theIAEA has and will continue toreceive and make use of informa-tion from third parties that couldresult in IAEA requests for accessto locations not identified in theirinitial declaration.

Several parties, working in otherareas, have indicated that, withpatience and perseverance, theyhave obtained cooperation fromthe DPRK necessary to makeprogress. This has not been IAEA’sexperience. When inspections firstgot underway in late May 1992, theIAEA enjoyed a high level of coop-eration from the DPRK. This coop-eration disappeared quickly asproblems developed. Today, theDPRK accepts the continuous pres-ence of IAEA inspectors to monitorthe freeze as prescribed in the AFand they accept safeguards ondeclared nuclear material per theSafeguards Agreement. They havesteadfastly refused any actionsrequested by the IAEA that wouldhave the effect of improving theIAEA’s position to deal with theverification of the DPRK’s initialdeclaration once that exercise getsunderway again.

Citing the time necessary tocomplete the verification exercise,the IAEA’s Director-General hasrepeatedly requested the DPRK toget started as soon as possible.They have given no indication thatthey are ready to proceed. Still, theIAEA can do a number of things toprepare now. The first is to develop

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as comprehensive and detailed pic-ture of past activities as possiblethrough collection and evaluationof information from open sourcesand third parties, together withIAEA inspection data and DPRKdeclarations. The Agency shouldalso anticipate and prepare specificverification measures includingmeasurement methods and devel-op agreed standards that at leastbind the ambiguities.

The support provided to theIAEA is a real issue. Most impor-tantly, the IAEA is struggling todayto maintain the routine implemen-tation of safeguards. Resources willbe stretched very thin when theyprepare for and effectively respondto the DPRK verification problem.The IAEA also needs informationprovided by third parties andstates other than the US. The IAEAalso needs political support to dealwith the likely pressure to accept alower verification standard (i.e., ahigher level of ambiguity).

Finally, the evolving NPT verifi-cation framework provides anotheravenue that could be pursued withthe DPRK. Beginning in the early1990s and continuing through thedecade that followed, the IAEA hasbeen involved in an extensive effortto improve the effectiveness andefficiency of its safeguards system.IAEA’s Programme 93+2, the cor-nerstone of this effort, concluded inMay 1997 when the IAEA’s Boardof Governors approved the “ModelProtocol Additional to theAgreement(s) Between State(s) andthe International Atomic EnergyAgency” (referred to as theAdditional Protocol and publishedas INFCIRC 540). The AdditionalProtocol is designed, through great-ly expanded nuclear openness andinspector access, to improve theIAEA’s capability to detect unde-clared nuclear material and activi-ties and thus increase assurances

that state’s nuclear material arecomplete as a continuing feature inverifying compliance with the NPTcommitments. At this time, 55states, including Japan, theRepublic of Korea (ROK) and theUS, have signed AdditionalProtocols to their SafeguardsAgreement with the IAEA.Nineteen, including that for Japan,have entered into force.

There is no legal obligation for astate to accept the AdditionalProtocol, but KEDO principalswould not be asking the DPRK toaccept a more intrusive verificationregime that they, themselves, havenot indicated a willingness toaccept. The presence of anAdditional Protocol is not likely tobe a determining feature in the ver-ification of the DPRK’s initialreport (either the DPRK providesthe required cooperation or theydon’t), but it could simplify things.Under an Additional Protocol,IAEA inspectors would have accessto any location on a nuclear site(e.g., the Yongbyon site), otherlocations involved in the produc-tion or storage of source material,and any other location in the DPRKfor the purpose of collecting envi-ronmental samples. The DPRK hasgood reason to be familiar with thepower of environmental samplingand this might encourage them tobe more forthcoming regarding thewhole of their past and currentnuclear program. Certainly, shouldthe verification of the DPRK initialdeclaration come to a successfulconclusion, an Additional Protocolwould be very helpful in assuringthe DPRK’s continuing compliancewith their NPT commitments.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. G. Kaurov, “A Technical History ofSoviet-North Korean NuclearRelations,” in J.C. Moltz and A.Y.Mansourov, eds. The North KoreanNuclear Program: Security, Strategyand New Perspectives from Russia(Routledge Press, 2000), pp. 17–18.

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2. National Spent Nuclear FuelProgram web site,http://nsnfp.inel.gov.

3. M. Gerber, “Removing the K-Basins Fuel: Downpayment onProtecting the Columbia River,”Radwaste Solutions Magazine,American Nuclear Society,March/April 2001.

4. International Atomic EnergyAgency, State of the ArtTechnology for Decontaminationand Dismantling of NuclearFacilities, Technical ReportsSeries No. 395, Vienna, 1999.

5. L. Teunckens, P. Lewandowski,and E. Trauwaert, “Taking itApart: The EurochemicReprocessing plant,” NuclearEngineering International, August,1994.

In this chapter, we present asimplified timeline that focuses onverification and safeguards issues.The chapter contains no new mate-rial. Rather, the material relevantto the Agreed Framework (AF)timeline from earlier s is broughttogether and the implications forverification and safeguards of eachstep in the timeline are noted.Based on this timeline, Chapter 7presents an analysis of what cango right and wrong with the AFfrom the viewpoint of verificationand safeguards.

Seven major time-linked stepsin the AF and related agreementsmay be identified, of which all butthe first require verification orsafeguards:

1. Completion of a significant por-tion of the project site at Kumho,DPRK (Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea, or NorthKorea), and of the first KoreanEnergy DevelopmentOrganization (KEDO) reactor inthe Republic of Korea (ROK, orSouth Korea).

2. International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) declaration thatthe DPRK is in compliance withits safeguards agreement.

3. Start of the delivery of keynuclear components of the firstKEDO reactor to the Kumhoproject site simultaneously withthe start of the transfer of DPRKspent fuel from Yongbyon to itsultimate disposition.

4. Completion of Yongbyon spent-fuel transfer and of the firstKEDO reactor simultaneously.

5. Dismantlement of DPRKgraphite-moderated reactors andrelated facilities at Yongbyonbegins.

6. Deliveries of the nuclear compo-nents for the second KEDO reac-tor in parallel with proportionalsteps by the DPRK to dismantleall its graphite reactors.

7. Completion of second KEDOreactor at Kumho.

In addition, another step is notexplicitly linked to the timeline butmust be carried out if verificationthat the DPRK does not havenuclear weapons-usable material isto be complete:

8. Transfer of KEDO spent fuel whenappropriate out of the DPRK.

We review briefly what informa-tion is expected from each step,how long each step will take, andwhat must take place before thestep can be taken.

Completion of a SignificantPortion of the Project Siteat Kumho, DPRK, and ofthe First KEDO Reactor inthe ROK

Before the DPRK is obligated bythe AF to permit the IAEA toinspections beyond the DPRK’sdeclared facilities, a “significantportion of the Light-Water Reactor(LWR) project” at the Kumho sitemust be completed. The steps to becompleted have been spelled out inChapter 1. They include—

• Completion by KEDO of sitepreparation, excavation, and

major building construction atKumho.

• Completion of the nuclear-plantdesign for the LWRs by theROK.

• Delivery of the turbine genera-tors for the first LWR, withother delivery details still to beagreed on.

As noted earlier, it would beadvantageous to South Korea, themajor nuclear-reactor supplier andprovider of money, for the IAEAand the DPRK to begin negotia-tions soon on the special expand-ed inspections and to get themstarted before too much is invest-ed in site preparation, construc-tion, and manufacturing. But,there is no DPRK obligation topermit these IAEA inspectionsprior to those investments, and theDPRK has not volunteered so farto cooperate on this matter. If itdoes not, the inspections of unde-clared facilities cannot begin for2–3 years at least, more if the cur-rent problems holding up deliveryof the turbine generators are notresolved in that time.

IAEA Declaration that theDPRK Is in Compliancewith Its SafeguardsAgreement

After the step above, the DPRKis obligated to come into full com-pliance with its safeguards agree-ment, including taking all meas-ures that may be deemed necessaryby the IAEA “to verify the accuracyand completeness of the DPRK’sinitial declaration [to the IAEA] onall nuclear materials in the DPRK.”These measures, and the informa-tion they will yield, include—

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CHAPTER 7TIMELINE FOR VERIFICATION AND SAFEGUARDS

• Visual inspections of all declaredand undeclared suspect facilitiesat Yongbyon (detailed inChapter 6), including possibleundeclared waste sites, to identi-fy facilities used for plutoniumproduction and separation,waste storage, radiochemistry,and any other potential nuclearweapon-related activity.

• Measurements, including swipeand particle assays, of all equip-ment, surfaces, and other materialat these facilities that could con-tain or have contained any prod-uct associated with the produc-tion and storage of plutonium.

• Analysis of at least some of thespent fuel from the reactor atYongbyon, and of any waste orother relevant material recovered.

• Identification and visits to sites,other than those at Yongbyon,suspected of being used fornuclear materials-related activi-ties. If identified, measurementssimilar to those at Yongbyon haveto be made. Identification of sitesoutside of Yongbyon may requiresome use of national technicalmeans of surveillance as well ascooperation from the DPRK.

These measures should yield anestimate of the amount of nuclear-weapon material made and of theforms it may be stored in, togetherwith an estimate of the capabilityof the DPRK to make more suchmaterial. They could also yieldinformation regarding what otherparts of a nuclear-weapon programthe DPRK has carried out. Theycould lead to a need to modify theoriginal DPRK declaration, whichin turn, could jeopardize the AF.

Verification of accuracy andcompleteness of the DPRK’s decla-ration is needed for the IAEA todeclare that the DPRK is in compli-ance. The time needed to completethis verification is difficult to esti-mate. The Director-General of the

IAEA has told both the IAEAGeneral Conference and the U.N.General Assembly that he believesit will take 3–4 years for the IAEAto complete this task, presumablyassuming DPRK cooperation.

If insufficient cooperation isforthcoming, attempts to completethis step could bring about anindefinite delay. Furthermore, if theDPRK declaration and the IAEAfindings cannot be brought intoagreement, the AF could end. Wediscuss the implications of thosetwo outcomes in Chapter 8.

The AF is silent on whatshould be done if spent fuel,waste, or separated plutonium isfound outside the ponds wherethe declared spent fuel is storedat Yongbyon. Thus, the outcomeof this key step is both crucialand indeterminate. Whatever theoutcome, at this point, no nuclearfuel or key nuclear componentwould have been delivered to theKEDO reactor site.

Start of Delivery of KeyNuclear Components of theFirst KEDO Reactor to theKumho Site Simultaneouslywith Start of Transfer ofDPRK’s Spent Fuel fromYongbyon to Its UltimateDisposition

After the DPRK comes into com-pliance, and simultaneously withthe start of delivery of key nuclearcomponents to the first KEDO reac-tor, the DPRK is obligated to beginthe transfer of spent fuel from thecans in the small graphite reactorpools to “its ultimate disposition,”outside the DPRK if that is whatKEDO wants. The spent fuel is to becompletely transferred by the timethe first KEDO reactor is completed.

If identification of the materialto be transferred is complete andreliable, verification of this step isstraightforward so long as the ulti-

mate disposition site is outside theDPRK and under the IAEA’s juris-diction and control. If the materialwere to remain in the DPRK, con-tinuing verification and accounta-bility would be required.

The time needed to ship spentfuel and any separated plutoniumidentified out of the DPRK is prob-ably measured in months once allpreparations, both operational anddiplomatic, have been made. Thosepreparations, however, could takemuch longer. Shipping appropriateto the transport of spent fuel mustbe made available. Possible sitesfor disposal are discussed inChapter 6, Section 6.4.

Simultaneous Completionof Yongbyon Spent-FuelTransfer and of the FirstKEDO Reactor

Upon completion of the spent-fuel transfer from Yongbyon, thefirst KEDO reactor can be complet-ed. All safeguards for that reactor(discussed in detail in Chapter 4)must be installed and operationalbefore operations can begin. Untiloperations begin, there will be nonuclear weapon-usable material inthe reactor. About two years ofprior training in maintaining thesafeguards and in materialaccountancy are needed before thereactor can begin operation. Thetime needed after the completionof the first two steps noted above,and after the training has takenplace, has been estimated at abouta year, depending on the detailedcircumstances. Delays could beincurred owing to technical andlegal problems associated with thereactor itself and its safeguards, orto problems external to the reactorinstallation, such as the lack of anadequate electrical grid to acceptthe power. These problems havebeen mentioned previously.

The information expected fromthis step will continue to flow asthe reactor operates. As noted in

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TIMELINE FOR VERIFICATION AND SAFEGUARDS

Chapter 4, Section 4.5, the globalrecord to date suggests that no fueldiversion from a commerciallyoperated LWR has taken place. Itseems to us highly unlikely thatsuch a diversion could be carriedout undetected if the safeguardsdescribed are adequately imple-mented. As noted at the end ofSection 4.5, the additional meas-ures and inspections describedcould be useful in further loweringthe probability that covert diver-sion could take place from a safe-guarded reactor. Further, as notedin Section 4.6, satellite monitoring,which is not a part of IAEA safe-guards, could—in case of someintent to abrogate—give informa-tion as to the time of the diversionand the amount and form of thematerial involved.

Dismantlement of DPRK’sGraphite-ModeratedReactors and RelatedFacilities Begins

Deliveries of the NuclearComponents for theSecond KEDO Reactor inParallel with ProportionalSteps by the DPRK ToDismantle All Its GraphiteReactors

The timing of these parallel pro-cedures is complex and may becontentious. Only some of theagreements between KEDO andthe DPRK have been made public.Among possible points of con-tention particularly relevant to ver-ification are—

• The precise meaning of “dis-mantlement” and of “ultimatedisposition” of the dismantledparts. Chapter 6, Section 6.4 out-lines some technical possibilities,but they are suggestions only.

• The nature and extent of “relat-ed facilities” at Yongbyon andpossibly elsewhere.

• The possibilities that nuclearfacilities not covered by the AFbut implicitly covered by the1992 ROK–DPRK JointDenuclearization declaration, towhich the two parties recentlyrecommitted themselves, exist.

• The question of who pays for thedismantling.

Auxiliary agreements and proto-cols covering those points areneeded. Absent knowledge of theseagreements and protocols, esti-mates of time and verificationbeyond the ones made in Chapter6, which are based on analogy withplans for dismantling similar butlarger facilities, cannot be made.According to those estimates, dis-mantlement would take severalyears owing to the radioactivity insome of the buildings, but irre-versible changes could be broughtabout sooner.

Completion of SecondKEDO Reactor at Kumho

The same verification and safe-guards comments can be madehere as were made in connectionwith the completion of the firstKEDO reactor.

Shipping Spent KEDOReactor Fuel WhenAppropriate Out of theDPRK

According to the SupplyAgreement (Art. VIII, par. 3),“KEDO and the DPRK shall coop-erate to ensure the safe storage anddisposition of the spent fuel fromthe LWR plants. If requested byKEDO, the DPRK shall relinquishany ownership rights over theLWR spent fuel and agree to thetransfer of the spent fuel out of itsterritory as soon as technically pos-sible after the fuel is discharged,through appropriate commercialcontracts.”

The spent fuel from the LWRreactors provided by KEDO will behigh-burnup fuel, not nearly assuitable for weapons use as thefuel from the Yongbyon reactorswould have been, but neverthelessa potential proliferation risk. Suchfuel is left in cooling ponds at thereactor site for a period of years.After the radioactivity in the fuelassemblies has decayed sufficientlyto permit handling the assemblieson dry land, the assemblies can beplaced in casks and kept in drystorage for an indefinite period oftime. Such dry storage is in use inthe US for example, but so far ithas not been practiced in Asia. Theassemblies continue to become lessand less radioactive over the yearsand must continue to be monitoredand accounted for until ultimatelydisposed of.

If the plutonium-containingspent fuel from the KEDO reactorsis not to be left indefinitely in theDPRK, facilities for ultimate dis-posal or at least long-term dry stor-age must be found. This problem isnot unique to the DPRK’s KEDOreactors and must be solved for allAsian and other countries that usenuclear power, although the DPRKcase is particularly sensitive.Discussions about disposal andlong-term storage for spent nuclearfuel in Asia have been going on foryears inconclusively. The existenceof spent DPRK fuel may add to theincentives for resolving them.

Table 7-1 summarizes in a sim-plified way the steps outlined inthis chapter. It does not contain allthe linkages and details describedabove but may serve as a usefulreminder of the overall pattern ofactivities bearing on or associatedwith verification.

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Step Verification Issue Possible Problems

Partial completion of KEDO Reactor 1 in the ROK and partial preparation of Kumho site in the DPRK

IAEA declaration that the DPRK is in compliance with its agreements

Delivery of KEDO Reactor 1's key nuclear components starts. Transfer of Yongbyon spent fuel (and other material?) to "ultimate disposition" starts.

Simultaneous completion of previous steps

Dismantlement of Yongbyon facilities in parallel with delivery of KEDO Reactor 2's key nuclear components

Simultaneous completion of previous steps

Disposition of KEDO spent fuel

Financial and legal delays cause some loss of data at Yongbyon

1. DPRK does not open suspect sites to the IAEA.2. The IAEA's activities are interfered with.3. Initial declaration is wrong—can it be amended?

1. Disagreements over the extent of safeguards.2. Disagreements over site of disposition.3. Disagreements over what is to be transferred.

Same as previous, plus interference with KEDO Reactor 1 safeguards

1. Disagreements over extent of safeguards.2. DPRK abrogation.3. US or ROK non-compliance with AF.

1. Interference with safeguards.2. DPRK abrogation.

Disagreement over site of disposition

None but the IAEA wants to start the next step early (2-4 years needed)

Verification of accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial declaration on all nuclear materials in the DPRK, at Yongbyon, and possibly elsewhere

Safeguards for KEDO Reactor 1 are installed. Transfer of Yongbyon spent fuel (and other material?) to "ultimate disposition" verified.

Safeguards on KEDO Reactor 1 operational. Disposition site monitored.

Safeguards for KEDO Reactor 2 installed. Dismantlement verified.

Safeguards on KEDO Reactor 2 operational

Monitoring disposition site(s)

Table 7-1. Summary of steps bearing on verification.

We present a benchmark cooper-ation scenario plus four other sce-narios that among them bracketpossible degrees of cooperation ofthe Democratic People’s Republicof Korea (DPRK) with safeguardingand verification efforts. These sce-narios do not capture variations inother dimensions—such as finan-cial, regulatory, diplomatic—towhich they are nevertheless linked.They serve as a rough frameworkfor evaluating potential failuremodes of the Agreed Framework(AF) and their implications forverification and safeguards.

8.1 Benchmark Scenario:The DPRK FullyCooperates with the IAEARegarding ExistingAgreements

This scenario is given to providea success benchmark for compari-son. Under this scenario, the DPRKwould—

• Allow the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) to carryout inspections at suspectfacilities soon.

• Allow measurements on theYongbyon spent fuel and pro-vide reactor logbooks and otherdocumentation to help recon-struct the operating history.

• Cooperate with the IAEA in issu-ing a modified declaration thatwould reconcile the discrepan-cies between its previous decla-ration and IAEA measurements(see Chapter 6) and allow verifi-cation of that declaration. Whileestimates of past plutoniumproduction vary, there is strong

evidence that the DPRK separat-ed more than its original declara-tion of less than 100 grams. If so,an amended declaration will berequired for the IAEA to certifythe DPRK’s plutonium holdings.

• Permit IAEA inspections, meas-urements, and environmentalmonitoring at all sites wherenuclear activities subject to safe-guards may have occurred.

• Begin early training of its per-sonnel in nuclear-materialaccountability.

• Participate positively in negotia-tions aimed at taking spent fuelout of the DPRK (the DPRK maynot be the main problem in thesenegotiations, but its early coop-eration would facilitate them).

Fully satisfactory implementa-tion of the DPRK’s safeguardsagreement with the IAEA willrequire that the DPRK cooperatewith the application of advancedsafeguards technologies as theyevolve. As discussed in Chapter 2,even without the implementationof the “Additional Protocol” (INF-CIRC 540), the IAEA has the rightto utilize remote and unattendedmonitoring systems, request ad hocand special inspections, and reviewthe data collected by the DPRK’snational system of materials con-trol and accounting. The DPRKwill be required to make accuratemeasurements of several keyparameters, such as the quantitiesof nuclear material received, pro-duced, shipped, lost or otherwiseremoved from inventory, and thequantities of material in inventory.Procedures must be implementedfor identifying, reviewing, and

evaluating differences inshipper/receiver measurements;taking physical inventory; evaluat-ing accumulations of unmeasuredinventory and unmeasured losses;and providing reports to theAgency in accordance with its safe-guards agreement. These safe-guards measures will be applied toall nuclear material subject to safe-guards, including the IRT researchreactor, the light-water reactor(LWR) power plants, and theirrelated facilities.

Evidence to date indicates thatthe DPRK has not implementedsuch rigor in its nuclear-materialsaccounting activities in the past,nor has it operated nuclear facilitieson the scale of the Korean EnergyDevelopment Organization (KEDO)reactors. Perhaps implicit in the AFand the formulation of KEDO is theprovision of necessary training andtechnical support to the DPRK toassure that the DPRK is prepared toaccept this responsibility. As wehave learned from other coopera-tive threat-reduction programs,increased openness with respect tothe peaceful use of nuclear materialis key to building a sustainablenonproliferation regime.

Even with full cooperation fromthe DPRK, verification of past activ-ities is likely to take years. EarlyDPRK cooperation with such meas-ures as described above, especiallypertaining to verification activitiesat Yongbyon, would relieve pres-sure on the time schedule andallow for earlier operation of theKEDO reactors. Reconstruction ofpast activities at inspected sites(declared and suspect) could be asaccurate, and knowledge thatnuclear-weapons activities have

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CHAPTER 8POTENTIAL ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS

ceased at these facilities could be asassured as was the case for SouthAfrica.1 The safeguarding of theKEDO reactors would be positivelyaffected: there would be greaterassurance that inspections, meas-urements, materials accounting,and data transmission would becarried out as specified in the safe-guards agreement.

This scenario would represent adeparture from past experience. Itwould speed progress on the meas-urable requirements of the AF,mainly contained in Articles I andIV having to do with nuclear activi-ties and energy supplies. It couldease working toward normalizationof economic and political relations,and toward peace and security, ascalled for in Articles II and III. Suchincreased DPRK cooperation couldlessen any incipient strain amongKEDO members stemming fromthe members’ different relative pri-ority among these goals.

8.2 Scenario 1: The DPRKMaintains Its Present Levelof Cooperation

Under this scenario, furtherdelays can be expected. In thisevent, one must consider the rami-fications of continued delay onsecurity planning in the ROK, US,and throughout the region, a con-sideration that goes beyond whatthis report has undertaken to do.As time passes, there is continuedopportunity for improved relationsbetween the North and South, sig-nificant investment in KEDO bymember states, as well as possiblyan opportunity for the DPRK totamper with materials and recordsneeded for complete verification.Continued delays could lead to aninability to certify the DPRK decla-rations and possibly result in abreakdown of the cooperationbetween the ROK, US, and Japan.In particular, verification couldalmost surely not be accomplished

on the presently anticipated timescale in two areas:

• Reconciling the data taken andto be taken by the IAEA regard-ing activities at Yongbyon withthe DPRK declaration of theseactivities. The consequence of afailure to certify the DPRK’s dec-laration will be a function ofwhen and how this failureoccurs. Given the history ofinteractions with the DPRK,issues of uncertainty in theIAEA measurements may arise.There is no predetermined stan-dard by which “acceptable”uncertainty is measured. In fact,this is often a function of specificmeasurement technologiesemployed and the openness ofthe inspected party to the IAEA.As with so many things in thenonproliferation regime, it is asubject of negotiation.

• Assuring that no furthernuclear-weapons-related work isgoing on in the DPRK, and thatno separated undeclared pluto-nium is stored anywhere. TheAF does not freeze nuclear facili-ties or activities other than thosefrozen at Yongbyon. Althoughthe question of plutonium pro-duction at these facilities is inthe forefront of most verificationefforts, providing a determina-tion of the “completeness” of theDPRK declaration is paramountto the continued movement ofthe DPRK towards membershipin good standing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),which is required by the AF.

As discussed in Chapter 2,though it has rarely occurred,access to “undeclared” sites or tolocations suspected of containing“undeclared” nuclear material ispossible under the model IAEAsafeguards agreement (INFCIRC153). Several provisions under theDPRK’s safeguards agreement(INFCIRC 403) could assist the

IAEA in making a determination of“completeness” with respect todeclared nuclear facilities andmaterials. These include:

• Provision and verification ofdesign information,

• Notification of new facilities ormodifications to existing facili-ties, and

• Access for routine, ad hoc, andspecial inspections.

• In particular, “special” inspec-tions may be requested in caseswhere the information providedto the IAEA is not adequate forthe Agency to fulfill its responsi-bilities. Special inspections maybe requested at “undeclared”facilities.

It was the request for a “special”inspection of two undeclared wastesites at Yongbyon that precipitatedthe DPRK to withdraw from theNPT. It seems likely that the IAEAwill require access to these unde-clared sites to verify the DPRK’sdeclarations. A full understandingof the operation of the IRT researchreactor (discussed in Chapter 6)and the disposition of nuclearmaterials associated with its opera-tion are among steps necessary toprovide confidence that the DPRKhas no undeclared nuclear pro-grams. In addition, there may beother special inspections requiredto fully determine that the DPRKhas no undeclared nuclear facili-ties, nuclear-material inventory, oractivities. This would require betterDPRK cooperation than has takenplace, and probably cannot bedone perfectly. The best that couldbe done would be to identify andmake measurements of the typedescribed in Chapters 4 and 6 onany facility where plutonium isthought to have been made andseparated. Some of these measure-ments could become difficult orimpossible as time goes on.

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POTENTIAL ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS

8.3 Scenario 2: The DPRKAttempts Covertly To Divertor Hide Nuclear Material

While declared facilities atYongbyon are verifiably frozen,overt diversion or hiding of materi-al from the suspect but undeclaredfacilities at Yongbyon and else-where in the DPRK is feasible solong as the extensive IAEA inspec-tions and measurements discussedabove have not taken place, asnoted in Chapter 6. Early inspec-tion of suspect undeclared facilitiesand measurements of what isfound there could help identifyhidden material and prevent futurediversions. Without such inspec-tions and measurements, it cannotbe known whether or not nuclearmaterial additional to the declara-tion remains hidden. The tech-niques discussed in Chapter 4,Section 6, particularly environmen-tal monitoring at sites other thanthe declared sites, would go someways toward reducing the likeli-hood of successful covert diversionor hiding.

Continued assistance from theUS and other member states will berequired for the IAEA to provideassurance that the DPRK is notengaging in clandestine nuclearactivities. Early warning of poten-tial illicit activities through the useof satellite imagery and other tech-nical means is critical. In addition,it is important to have a well-exe-cuted and coordinated approachwith respect to investigating per-ceived clandestine activities.

Attempts by the DPRK to divertor hide nuclear material would beincompatible with the AF. Delaysin carrying out the inspections andmeasurements discussed above atYongbyon and elsewhere couldlead to increased suspicions thatmaterial was diverted from inspec-tions and hidden. In particular, ifthe DPRK were to delay effectiveIAEA inspections while continuingon the path of warming relations

between the North and South, veri-fication problems could evoke dif-ferent responses from the KEDOmembers with respect to continua-tion of the AF. If the DPRK were torefuse to allow access to facilitiesand information needed by theIAEA to verify declarations, it isdifficult to imagine that the USwould continue with its part of theAF. It is less certain what positionKEDO member states might take,especially in light of domestic,bilateral, and regional politicalpressures.

These comments pertain tomaterial and facilities at Yongbyonand possibly elsewhere in theDPRK but not to the KEDO reac-tors. Covert diversion or hiding ofnuclear material generated in thecourse of operating the KEDOreactors would be far more diffi-cult, as discussed in Chapters 4and 5. So long as the IAEA and itsmember states are successful inobtaining full enforcement of safe-guards, we believe that the proba-bility of covert diversion from theKEDO reactors is very low. Themain covert diversion or hidingproblem, at least in the first manyyears of the AF, is connected withthe earlier DPRK activities atYongbyon and possibly elsewhere.

8.4 Scenario 3: The DPRKAbrogates the AgreedFramework or Other KeyAgreement

If the DPRK were to abrogate itsagreements, and for instance, expelthe IAEA inspectors, it would havecontrol over any nuclear materialleft at Yongbyon and other possiblesites (and over spent fuel left at theKEDO reactor site if abrogationoccurs after the KEDO reactor(s)have begun operation). This is, ofcourse, an argument for removingsuch material from the DPRK assoon as is practicable. Fuel can besafely, and more or less routinely,removed after 2–3 years. The fuel

discharged from the KEDO reac-tors will most probably be US-obli-gated, which will require that theUS approve any movement orretransfer of the fuel.

We note parenthetically that theDPRK previously (in 1994) gave a90-day notice of intent to with-draw from the NPT, which it then“suspended.” This may leave thelength of notice that may be givenof any future intent to withdrawambiguous.

In the case of abrogation, theoutside world would know howmuch potential nuclear-weaponmaterial there is in the DPRK atleast as well as it knows now, bet-ter if inspections and removaloperations at Yongbyon have beencarried out. It would, as now, beable to externally monitor suchlarge-scale activities as continuedreactor operations, construction offacilities, and, to some extent, iden-tification of major activities, as dis-cussed in Chapter 4, Section 6. Itwould not be possible to knowaccurately how much plutonium ismade in reactor operations subse-quent to abrogation, should thoseoccur, nor how much is separated,or how it is being used.

It is to be remembered that nonuclear components will be deliv-ered to the KEDO site until a bilat-eral nuclear cooperation agreementis signed, which will first requirethat the DPRK is in full compliancewith its IAEA safeguards obliga-tions. For this to occur, there mustfirst be a dramatic change in theopenness of the regime, as statedabove. The LWR reactors wouldbegin operation only after theDPRK has verifiably given up itsYongbyon program and its store ofspent fuel.

Once these factors are consid-ered, there is still the chance thatrelations with the North couldchange again a second time. Thesituation could deteriorate in the

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future, after the Yongbyon spentfuel has been removed and theonly plutonium available to theDPRK would be that in the spentfuel at the KEDO site.

If safeguards at the KEDO reac-tors were abrogated, for instancefollowing a DPRK declaration of astate of emergency, foreigners suchas IAEA inspectors or Republic ofKorea (ROK) personnel would beforced to leave the country. Remotemonitoring equipment would bedisconnected or removed. Aftersuch a set of events, the risk ofdiversion of fuel becomes a veryserious concern.

Because of the highly radioac-tive nature of the fuel and highheat-generation rate for the firstfew years after discharge from thereactor core, the older fuel in thepool would be the most likelydiversion target. The 59 assembliesdischarged initially from the firstcore load, as was mentioned inChapter 4, weigh about 0.6 toneach and contain 3 kilograms ofplutonium. The burnup will beabout 12–15 MWd/ton, and theseassemblies would possess the bestweapon-quality plutonium of anyof the fuel that has cooled for a sig-nificant amount of time. In theory,the DPRK could take those 59assemblies and make between 10and 20 atomic bombs of the typedetonated at the Trinity test. Thattest, it is to be remembered, usedabout 6 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium in an “implosion”configuration and generated over10 kilotons of explosive energy.While possible in principle, theeffort to turn this plutonium into aset of explosive devices would faceformidable obstacles.2

Because the plutonium is notseparated from the fission productsof the spent fuel, chemical separa-tion must be carried out with veryradioactive material. Each assem-bly, even if it had cooled for

15 years, would be extremelyradioactive, exposing an unprotect-ed individual to a lethal dose ofmore than 1,000 rads every hour ata distance of one meter. Each fuelassembly would probably require aton or more of shielding in order toremove it from the spent-fuel stor-age pool. A shielded, remotelyoperated reprocessing facilitywould have to be built somewhereand tested without being detected.The testing would be hard to con-ceal, if it used “hot” materials,because of the release of radioac-tive material such as 85Kr into theenvironment, which could bedetected by remote sensors operat-ed by US intelligence. Anotherproblem for the DPRK would bethat the zirconium cladding on thefuel is extremely difficult to dis-solve in a simple PUREX facilitysuch as the one that they built atYongbyon. The cladding must bechopped away with a heavy,remotely operated machine beforefuel dissolution.

On the other hand, its experi-ence at constructing and operatingthe Yongbyon facilities would helpthe DPRK in building this hypo-thetical reprocessing laboratory.Rather than build a very largefacility such as the one atYongbyon, the DPRK could rely ona simpler and lower-cost facilitydesigned to separate enough pluto-nium for a few weapons, with littleattention paid to health or safety.The greatest problem would be therequirement to carry the mainreprocessing steps with remotelyoperated equipment. If the facilityis built ahead of time and the pro-cedures practiced (without actuallyhaving LWR spent-fuel assembliesavailable for realistic tests), in prin-ciple the time needed to separatethe requisite amount of materialmight be only days or weeks if allwent according to plan. In practice,however, the time needed is likelyto be much longer. The IAEA’sStanding Advisory Group on

Safeguards Implementation hasestimated that the time required toconvert plutonium in spent fuelinto a weapon would be one tothree months, compared to sevento ten days for metallicplutonium.3

If the DPRK were to overtlyabrogate specifically to obtain asmuch high-quality plutonium aspossible, then one might predictthe more likely times that such anevent would occur. The highestquality plutonium exists early inthe very first reactor cycle. If theDPRK were to overtly abrogatespecifically to obtain as much high-quality plutonium as possible, thenone might predict the more likelytimes that such an event wouldoccur. The highest quality plutoni-um exists early in the very firstreactor cycle. During initial start-up, the entire core is at very lowburnup. If the DPRK were to shutthe reactor down early (before thefirst normal refueling), it would bepossible to recover spent fuel withvery good plutonium isotopics. Asan example, if the reactor wereshut down after 4 to 6 months, thespent fuel would have only5,000–7,500 MWd/MT, and couldcontain about 100 kilograms ofessentially weapons-grade plutoni-um (~90% 239Pu). At any othertime in the reactor’s lifetime, thequantity of this high-quality pluto-nium decreases because of addi-tional burnup (although the totalplutonium inventory increases).Thus, if obtaining comparativelyhigh-quality plutonium forweapons were a goal, one mightexpect abrogation to occur at aboutthe time the first one-third corefuel is actually removed from thereactor. We emphasize, however,that even high-burnup, reactor-grade plutonium can be used forweapons. To gain an absolute max-imum inventory of high-qualityplutonium, this would occur dur-ing the first refueling of the secondreactor. In that case, the total


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inventory of high-quality plutoni-um would be approximately 400kilograms (100 kilograms ofBeginning-of-Life fuel in the firstreactor’s spent-fuel pool, plus 300kilograms in the second reactor’score). The time required to gainaccess to this material (i.e., the timeneeded to prepare the reactor forrefueling and start unloading thecore) provides some (albeit limited)response time to such an event.

In either case, the challenges ofrapidly removing and transportingthe fuel from the reactor site wouldbe significant. Sufficient transportcasks would have to be acquiredand pre-positioned near the reactorsite. Even though the DPRK maybe willing to take significant safetycompromises in shipping the fuel,the fact that it must remove the fuelwith no time for cooling means thatthe casks must be capable of pro-viding both cooling and shielding,a serious engineering task.

Presumably, for such a scenarioto be attractive to the DPRK (giventhe potentially severe responsefrom the US and other states), itmust also be prepared to use thematerial quickly. This means theDPRK would need to have areprocessing facility ready andwaiting. There would also be anincentive to have performed sometesting, possibly “hot” testing ofthe equipment and processes. Todo hot testing would require somespent fuel with which to test thesystems. This spent fuel couldcome from the diversion of a fewindividual fuel pins, as discussedin Chapter 5. If this were the case,then abrogation would be morelikely to occur after startup of thesecond reactor, as the first reactorwould have to operate for sometime to provide the irradiated indi-vidual fuel pins for the hot-testingprogram. Thus, such diversioncould serve as an indicator of anintent to abrogate.

8.5 Scenario 4: The US orthe ROK Is Unable orUnwilling To Meet ItsCommitments under theAgreed Framework EvenThough the DPRK Does

This might be the case, forinstance, if a US administrationdetermines the AF is not in the USinterest, or if Congress prevents thecompletion of a nuclear coopera-tion agreement. New US legislationwill make gaining acceptance (non-objection) from Congress more dif-ficult and will probably put offnegotiation of an Agreement forCooperation. Lack of anAgreement would prevent installa-tion of nuclear components of USorigin. Again, at that point, nonuclear fuel would have beendelivered to the KEDO reactor,and, of course, no plutoniumwould have been made there.

A similar issue may arise regard-ing nuclear liability. As noted inChapter 2, Congress has prohibitedthe US from agreeing to indemnifya US manufacturer that providesnuclear components for the DPRKreactors. General Electric has indi-cated that it will not provide suchcomponents without indemnifica-tion. Negotiations have not yetproduced an agreement to sharethis liability risk.

The scenario could also bebrought about if KEDO ran intofinancial difficulties, perhapsowing to delays. The ROK is theprincipal financial backer ofKEDO; its contribution, in financialand other areas, is crucial to thesuccessful completion and safe-guarding of the KEDO reactors.The ROK could also decide torevisit its level or conditions ofsupport if political conditionschange between the two Koreas.

Such a scenario could occurbefore or after the verification ofaccuracy and completeness of the

DPRK declaration had been com-pleted. If verification has not beencompleted, the DPRK might delaycompletion of that step, bringingthe verification situation closer towhat it was before the AF wassigned, i.e., incomplete knowledgeof prior DPRK activities and anincomplete KEDO reactor. Thus,failure on the part of the US tomeet its commitments to the AF ina timely way could, depending onthe timing, itself jeopardize verifi-cation that the DPRK does not pos-sess nuclear materials or facilitiesto carry out a nuclear program. Atthe same time, if IAEA inspectorsremained at the Yongbyon site,activities there would continue tobe verifiably frozen. The key factoris continued presence and accessby the IAEA inspectors, not thepace of the AF itself, although thetwo are clearly linked.

8.6 Predicting the Future

The scenarios presentedattempt to capture some of thekey questions and decision pointsthat may occur. The DPRK’sefforts at normalization of rela-tions with the US and the ROKover the past ten years or so maymake some of the more dire sce-narios unlikely, but they remainpossibilities. At the least, theDPRK has shown that it is capableof some risky negotiating ploys.

Delays in carrying out the AgreedFramework may present benefits tosome parties as well as dangers,such as were pointed out above. Allparties to the Agreed Frameworkhave, from time to time, takenactions that delayed implementa-tion. Competing domestic, budget-ary, and security interests have reg-ularly taken precedence over theAgreed Framework. Some propo-nents of the Agreed Frameworknever intended to build the prom-ised reactors, but rather sought tofreeze plutonium production whilethe DPRK ground toward anexpected decline.

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Despite the many hardshipsimposed on the North Korean peo-ple, however, few experts predict aDPRK collapse. Indeed, the coun-tries with the most at stake—SouthKorea, China, the United States,and Japan—have gone to somelength to prevent a collapse.Beyond nonproliferation, theAgreed Framework is part of a“soft landing” strategy that seeksto contain the DPRK’s problemsthrough an extended period of rec-onciliation with South Korea.Continued delay could endangerthis strategy. The development ofcontingency plans in cooperationwith the ROK and Japan must bepart of an execution strategy forthe Agreed Framework.

The Agreed Framework faces itsparties with both opportunitiesand challenges. The opportunitiesfor the DPRK include not only the

provision of electricity at conces-sionary rates, but also the opportu-nity to become fully cooperativeand open in an important area ofinternational concern. Obviously,these opportunities are also chal-lenges, both for the DPRK and forthe US, ROK, and other KEDOmembers. The challenges includethe challenge of verification thathas been taken up in this report.

We believe, based on the consid-erations of this report, that the chal-lenges of verifying the AgreedFramework can be met, under theconditions outlined. In essence,these conditions account for theIAEA to be ready and capable ofspecial efforts in this case, effortsthat will probably require enhancedUS and ROK support, and for theDPRK to fully cooperate with theIAEA, and open as to its past activ-ities. In other words, the AgreedFramework is verifiable, but

whether it will be verified is up tothe parties. With these conditionsmet, verification is robust undermost scenarios.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. National Academy of Sciences,Management and Disposition ofExcess Weapons Plutonium,Report of the Committee onInternational Security andArms Control (NationalAcademy Press, Washington,D.C., 1994), p. 151.

2. David Albright and KevinO’Neill, eds., Solving the NorthKoran Nuclear Puzzle, Institutefor Science and InternationalSecurity Press, Washington,D.C., 2000), Chapter 3, p. 9.

3. Albright and O’Neill, Chapter 8,p. 4.

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Safeguarding the KEDO Reactors

• The applicable InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA)safeguards are adequate for thetimely detection of the diversionof nuclear material. Timeliness istaken as the estimated time toconvert diverted nuclear materi-al into weapons-usable form.

• Advanced safeguards technolo-gies, such as real-time remotemonitoring, are being tested onthe type of reactors being pro-vided by Korean PeninsulaEnergy DevelopmentOrganization (KEDO). Uponcompletion of this testing, it willbe desirable to implement thesemeasures in the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) as they will enhance theeffectiveness of safeguards.Implementation by the Republicof Korea (ROK) is probably aprerequisite to implementationby the DPRK.

• All safeguards-relevant monitor-ing and data-transmissionequipment must properly andsecurely installed and adequate-ly maintained, and data trans-mission must be secure anduninterrupted. The IAEA mustalso have adequate resources toensure that inspectors are prop-erly trained, and that safe-guards-relevant information isreviewed in a timely manner.

• Full cooperation and openness bythe DPRK is essential to the suc-cessful implementation of itsIAEA Safeguards Agreement.

• The IAEA is under severe budgetconstraints and the memberstates (in particular, the US, ROK,and Japan) can usefully assist theIAEA by making available thetechnical and financial resourcesnecessary to implement theDPRK’s Safeguards Agreement.

• Removal of Beginning-of-Life fuelfrom the DPRK as soon as practi-cal is desirable due to both thequality of the contained, weapons-usable plutonium in such fuel andthe fact that it will be the first tocool (i.e., lose radioactivity), whichfacilitates ease of handling. Nego-tiating an agreement for suchremoval as early as possiblewould be usefull.

Past DPRK Nuclear Activities

• The DPRK’s initial declaration tothe IAEA identifying facilitiesand quantities of nuclear materi-al subject to safeguards appearsto be incomplete. At least oneundeclared waste site has beenidentified, probably containingadditional plutonium. There isevidence indicating more fuelremoval and more plutonium-separation activity than theDPRK has declared.

• An amended DPRK declaration,confirmed by IAEA inspectionsand measurements, will verylikely be required. With such anamended declaration, the USand other interested partieswould have more complete andreliable knowledge of theDPRK’s nuclear materials andfacilities, and more completeand ongoing safeguards oversuch material and facilitieswould be possible.

• With adequate preparation andunhindered measurements andinspections (including access toappropriate records), the IAEAcan assess past DPRK nuclearactivities to reasonable accuracyand confidence. With DPRKcooperation, the process is esti-mated to take 2–4 years.

• The exact quantity of plutoniumseparated can only be approxi-mately determined. Dependingon the reactor operating historyavailable, there may not be highconfidence in the exact numberof kilograms separated.

• The IAEA is likely to needadded resources to prepare forand deal with the problem ofverifying the DPRK declaration,and beyond this, to verify thatthe DPRK is complying with theNon-Proliferation Treaty asrequired by the AgreedFramework.

• Access to third-party informa-tion provided by member stateswill continue to be an importantpart of IAEA verification andsafeguards activities.

• The US and other states support-ing nuclear non-proliferationobjectives, especially the ROKand Japan, need to support theIAEA in maintaining a “standardof verification” for the DPRK, asexpected for other member states.

• The Agreed Framework requiresdismantlement and disposal ofthe identified nuclear facilities atYongbyon after the first KEDOreactor has been completed. Thecost to dismantle these facilities,based on past experience, is likely

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Verifying the Agreed Framework:Conclusions and Recommendations

to be at least a few hundred mil-lion dollars.

• Spent fuel of the type at theYongbyon site cannot be storedindefinitely. It will have to betransported to a facility that cansafely handle and treat this typeof spent fuel within a few years.Such an operation raises signifi-cant technical and politicalchallenges. Negotiating andidentifying a site to which thismaterial can be removed shouldbe done as early as possible.

• Some of the crucial pipes andthe special equipment at theidentified Yongbyon facilitiesmust be removed or destroyedto make the dismantlement veri-fiably irreversible. It is desirableto do this as soon as possible.

Possible AdverseDevelopments

• Delays at this point of imple-mentation of the AF have littledirect effect on verification abili-ty. Delays later, after one or bothKEDO reactors are completed,for instance in allowing specialinspections (in addition to thosebefore completion and alreadyrequested as part of the SupplyAgreement), could have moreserious consequences.

• Disagreement over the need foran amended DPRK declaration orover the means used by IAEA toverify the declaration could pre-vent the US and other interestedparties from having a full knowl-edge of past DPRK activities.

• Failure to remove the Yongbyonspent fuel would leave weapons-usable material in the DPRK.

• Failure to dismantle and disposeof identified nuclear facilities inthe DPRK would leave themavailable for later use.

• Lack of agreement over or inter-ference with the extent andnature of advanced safeguardstechnologies to be applied to theKEDO reactors could limit theeffectiveness of the IAEA’ssafeguards.

• Abrogation and other overt viola-tion of the Agreed Framework orNon-Proliferation Treaty cannotbe prevented by verificationmeasures. Early removal of spentKEDO fuel would minimize theamount of plutonium-containingmaterial in the DPRK in the eventof overt abrogation. Applicationof additional methods beyondINFCIRC 153, notably broaderenvironmental sampling and eas-ier inspections at undeclaredfacilities, would diminish theuncertainty associated with thedetection of undeclared activitiesand increase the warning time ofpossible overt violations.

90

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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