- - - -------------,

. OSPREY· VANGUARD 43

THE M2 BRADLEY INFANTRY FIGHT

Steven J. Zaloga

Colour plates by Terry Hadler, Andy Carroll and Michael Trim

HICLE

VANGUA RD SE RI ES

EDI T OR : MA R T I N W I NDR OW

THE M2 BRADLEY INFANTRY

. FIGHTING VEHICLE T ext by STEVEN J. ZALOGA

Colour jJlates by TERRY HADLER,

AN DY CARROLL and MICHAEL TRIM

OS PR EY P U BLI SHI l G LON DO;'\!

Published in Ig86 by O sprey Publishing Ltd Member compan y of the George Philip Group

59 Grosvenor St ree t, London, \ V 1 X gD A © Copyright 1 g86 O sprey Publishing Ltd R eprinted 1 g86, 1 g87 , 1 g88 , 1 g8g

This book is co pyrighted under the Bern e COIl\'ention. All rig hts reserved. Apa rt from a ny fair dea ling for the purpose of priva te stud y, resea rch, cri ti cism or review, as permi [ted und er the Copyrigh t Act, 1956, no pa rt of this publ ica tion may be reproduced , stored in a retrieva l system, or tra nsmitted in a ny form or by a ny mea ns, electronic, electrica l, chemica l, mecha nica l, optica l, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the pri or permi ssion of the copyrig ht owner. Enquiri es sho uld be addressed to the Publishers.

British Librm) ' Cataloglling in Pllblication Da/a

Zaloga , S te\'en J. The M2 Bradley.-(Va ngua rd seri es; 43 ) I. M2 Bradley infantry fig hting ve hi cle , I. T itle I!. Seri es

623.74' 752 UG446·5

Filmset in G rea t Britain Printed in H ong K ong

Author's note T he author would like to ex tend his special tha nks to Bob Lessels of the Public Affa irs Office of the US Arm y Aberdeen Proving G round for hi s generous help in providing ma teri a l for this book. In addition the a uthor would like to tha nk Arnold i'vIeisner of Defense Images, Pierre Touzin and wIichaei Green for the use of their photos here. Tha nks a lso go to staff of the Progra m Manager's Office, Bradley Fig hting Vehicle a t APG ; to the US Arm y Ba llistics R esea rch La bora tory; to Scott Gourley of FMC Corpora ti on, a nd to Lt. Co l. J a mes Loop (US Arm y R et'd .) for their kind assista nce during the prepara tion of this book. The views expressed in thi s book a re the a u thor's, and do not necessa ril y refl ect the views of the a bove-mentioned sources.

Armou red Infantry S Army experience with a rmoured infantry

transporters such as the 1V13 half-track during V\ orld War Two helped to clarify the technical requi rements for future infantry a rmoured vehicles. I evertheless, in the years that followed there was still some debate as to how mechanised infantry tac tics should evolve. The general concensus was tha t the ha lf-t rack configuration was unacceptable. It offered neither the low cost of wheeled transporters, nor the superior cross-country perfor­mance of fully-tracked transporters. The other main drawback of the M3 ha lf-track was tha t it was open-topped , exposing the infantry squad to overhead artillery airbursts , small-arms fire and grenades. T his led to the requirement for a full y­tracked, completely-enclosed replacement, which fin ally materia ljsed in 1952 as the 1V175 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) . The M75 arrived too late to see any ex tensive service in the Korean \IVaI' , and the concept of a full y-tracked , full y-enclosed infantry vehicle remained untes ted in combat. Nevertheless, the US Army stuck with the basic

The ill-fated XM701 MICV-65 was the first attempt to develop an infantry combat vehicle for the US Army. It was armed with a 20 IllIl1 MI39 a uto cannon, and was provided with firing ports on the hull sides and rear for the infantry squad carried inside. (US Army)

configura tion in its two subsequent infantry vehicles, the rv159 and the famous Mil 3 APC I.

The Mil 3 APC a ppeared in 1959 as S Arm y tactical doctrine was und ergoing important re­eva luations. The US Arm y was beginning to examine whether JATO could realistically expec t to withsta nd a ' ,Varsaw Pac t attack without recourse to tactical nuclear weapons. American doctrin e was placing increasing emphasis on the nuclear option as a counterweight to the greater conventional strength of the ' '''arsaw Pact armjes. Thjs had immedia te implications for mechanised tactics .

The Mi l 3, like its predecessors the t-,1175 and N159 APCs, was envisioned as an armoured ' ba ttle fi eld taxi ' . It would carry its squ ad to the ba ttlefi eld , where the infantrymen wou ld dismount from the vehicle to carry out their combat mission on foot. While this had a certain logic on a con ventional ba tt le fi eld , the conception was und er-

ISCC Vallg ua rd 3.1. The .\/ 113 SerifS : 38 . . \Irc/ulIIisrd " ifnlll'...)': and -1 2. Armollulj 1Ii(' ' ";(, (11(/11/ 'I "{IfS.

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mined by the potentia l presence of nuclear weapons and the related radioac tive conta min a ti on of the ba ttlefi eld . American tacticians began to wonder whether a dismounted infantry squad could ac tua lly function under these conditions.

A technica l solution to the tac tical problem could be provided by having the squad fight from a mounted position in the APC. The APC could be shielded from radia tion or chemical contamination , and the squ ad could fight dismounted if conditions permi tted. This a lso re-opened the issue of whether dismounted mechanised infantry tac ti cs mad e any sense even on a purely conventiona l ba ttlefi eld . Official US Army tac tica l doctrine in \1\ orld War Two had held that mechanised infan try (a rmoured infantry, in American parlance) would a lways fight dismounted. But some US armoured infantry commanders in World War Two found that mounted ac tions made more sense under certain circumstances. U nless an obj ec tive was heavily protec ted by anti-armour weapons, a mounted attack offered the advantage of bringing the infantry closer to the obj ec tive under protec tive

The XM701 MICV-65 during trials at Aberdeen Proving Ground. By 1966 the Army was running out of funds for the programme, and was not very enthusiastic about the XM701 design. (US Army APG)

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cover; a nd , in 'ome circumstances, the squ ad could fight from the vehicle. Such mechanised a ttacks could add considerable shock va lue to the assault. Of course, they a lso offered the risk of disaster. The infa ntry squ ads, bunched up inside each ha lf- track, could readil y be wiped out by a single "veil -placed grenade, or a lucky hit by a rtillery or morta r fire.

Infantry Combat Vehicle

Genesis This tac tical ferment was being matched in other a rmi es of the time, most notab ly in the Soviet nion and the Fed era l R epublic of German y. Develop­ment of a new-generation Bundeswehr infantry comba t vehicle began in 1959, about the sa me time as a simila r programme in the Soviet Army. The German vehicle emerged ten years later as the tVlarder; the Soviet vehicle appeared sooner, in 1967, as the BMP. T he a lacrity with which the Soviet Army adopted this new concept was especially startling given its traditional backward­ness in mechanised infan try tactics, and its mediocre record in infantry vehicle development. The R ed Army of vVorld ' Va r Two was the only major arm y to completely ignore a rmoured infantry vehicle d evelopment, and its immediate post-war d esigns-e.g. the BTR- 152 and BTR-50- were third-rate. The impetus for change had come from serious political upheavals in the Soviet Arm y during Khrushchev's reign.

ikita Khrushchev, fa ced with a bloated and expensive army and an economy still reeling from the devas tation of the war, beca me convinced that a solution to these problems could be found in nuclear weapons. Khrushchev believed that nuclear weap­ons mad e conventional a rmies obsolete; so he began to make serious cuts in the size of the previously sacrosanct Soviet Army, as well as in the heavy industries budgets which fund ed new tanks a nd other Army equipment. This forced the Soviet Army leadership- as well as the Communist Party bureaucracy, which had grown accustomed to its comfortable positions in the favoured heavy industries- out of its Stalinist lethargy. The Army's strategists began to argue that rather than making conventi ona l a rmies obsolete, the continued de-

As a result of experiences in Vietnam, in 1968 the Infantry School at Ft Benning experimentally ada pted an MII3 with firing ports to test the infantry combat vehicle notion. This led to the similar XM734, and to further Army efforts at infantry combat vehicles. (US Army)

vclopment of nuclear weapons by the US and USSR made total war between the superpowers unthin kable. T herefore, it was possible to envisage a limited conventiona l war in Central Europe, in \ hich the superpowers would refrain from employ­ing their strategic nuclear weapons aga inst one another. Tactical nuclear weapons were another matter. NATO was obviously pu tting growing dependence upon tactical nuclear wea pons for any possible confronta tion on the German plains. Hence, the Soviet Army would have to prepa re itself for a confron ta tion tha t could involve tac tical nuclea r exchanges.

Soviet tacticians and vehicle designers drew the same conclusions as their American and German counterparts . T he key sticking point was tha t dismou nted infantry could no t survive on a nuclear battlefield . T he tac tica l solution was mounted in fantry ac tions in new vehicles designed for operations on a nuclear ba ttlefi eld. T he technical solution was the BM P . The Soviet Army and the Communist Party's industria l burea ucracy fend ed off the poE tica l threa t to their well-being by deposing K hrushchev. But shor tly a fter Khrush­chev departed the political scene, the vehicle which his actions had helped into gesta tion fin ally appeared in the Soviet Army. T he B lIP caused a furore in the Soviet Army and in the Party industria l hierarchy. It clearly sa tisfi ed the techni­ca l and tactical requirements on which it was based: the trouble was, it was hideously expensive. A BlVIP cost more than a T-62 or T -55 tank. T his was

unhea rd of in any a rm y. Army priol'ltJ es have a lways been to modernise the ta nk fl eet first, a nd let the mechanised infa n try have the scra ps which a re left. Although the advent of the T -64 tan k at abou t the same time reorien ted the fin ancia l ba lance in the more tradi tiona l direction, the BM P ca used many offic ia ls to ' question whether its tac tical ad vantages rea lly justified such ex travagance.

T he Soviet experience was repeated in other armies contempla ting the sa me shift away from the relatively cheap ' ba ttlefi eld taxi ' of the 1vI I 13 genera tion to the infa ntry fighting ve hicle of the BMPjt--ifarder genera tion. A typical APC cos t a bout one-seventh to one-tenth the price of a con tempora ry MBT, but an I FV of the new generat ion often cost ha lf as much as a tank .

The XM701 MICV-6S T he US Army emba rked on the sa me course as the Germa n and Soviet armi es. In "March 1964 the Arm y began accep ting offers from S industria l

As a n expedient s olution to the need to protect the crew of MII3s firing thei r weapons outs ide the vehicle, the MII3 ACA V was developed with additiona l a rmour s hields around roof w eapons. This ACA V i s undergoing t r ials with a unit of the 11th Armored Cavalry at Ft Meade shortly before their depa rture for Vietnam in 1966. (US Army)

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The XM734 was one of the fir s t officia l US Army efforts to increas e the firepower of the M1I3, while permitting the troops to remain under cover within. It was not felt to be entirely successful, and attempts at more elaborate s olutions continued. (US Army APG)

firms fo r the developmen t of the new M I CV-6S (Mecha nized Infa n try Comba t Vehicle- I 965). The Army fin a ll y selected the bid from Pacific Car a nd Foundry. T he new design, designated the XNl 70 I ,

was based around ma ny components from the M 109 a nd I'll I 10 fa milies of se lf-propelled guns, a nd tes ting "vas completed in 1966. The Arm y cancelled the progra mme, arguing tha t the vehicle was too heavy (26- 27 tons) , too slow, a nd that it could not be a irlifted in a C- 14 1 aircra ft. T his was rea lly onl y part of the problem . In fac t, the Arm y was obliged to cut back on man y of its a mbi tious new developmen t progra mmes due to the rising cost of the war in Vietna m.

The Vietnam Interlude The Vietna m W a r killed the MICV-65 XM 70 1 programme, but a lso strengthened Army interes t in mounted infantry combat. In 1963 US Army advisors began teaching Sou th V ietna mese troops

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tradi tiona l ' ba ttle fi eld taxi' tac ti cs using their new IVl I 13 APCs. The initia l comba t efforts of the South Vietn a mese M I 13 units were fi ascos. The AR VN troops pi led out their vehicles, a nd were chopped up by VC sma ll a rms fire. T hese tactics were dropped in favour of mounted a ttacks. T he VC, a nd later the NVA, were not pa rticularly well equipped with a nti-armour weapons, and moun ted ac tions were oft en successful. The ma in problem with the use of the M I 13 in this fashion was tha t it had not been designed vvith such tac ti cs in mind. Only a small portion of the squ ad could poke their heads out of the roof ha tch to use their weapons. In so doing, they exposed themselves to sma ll a rms fire. An expedient solu tion was the Ivl I 13 ACA V (a r­moured cavalry ve hicle), which had armour shields add ed around the roof positions to coun ter small a rms fire. T here were also some experiments in the USA to modify the M [ [3 by cutting side firing ports in the hull a rmour to permit the squ ad members inside to fire their \-veapons. Nota ble a mong these experiments was the XM734, some of which saw limi ted use in V ietna m. T he main problem was tha t the M [ [3 was not rea ll y very well

A The vulnerability of the MII3 to RPG-7 rockets and s imilar weapons has led to various applique armour adaptions . This particular configuration, consisting of layered s teel armour spaced about a foot from the normal ex terior a rmour, was d eveloped in Is rael a nd u s ed during the fighting in Lebanon in .!}IJ2. (Rafael)

There are numerous armament packages available to correct the fi r epowe r s hortcomings of the MII3. The TAT-252 two­man turret developed by Emerson Electric u s es the same gun a s in the M 2 Bradley. However, turret s ys tems inevita bly r educe the s ize of the squad the vehicle ca n ca rry. (Emerson Elec tric ) ..

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FMC Corp. developed a heavily modernis ed M113, the XM76S, in the late 1960s . Although the US Army was not inte res ted, this vehicle was made available for export, and has b een s old to the Dutch, Belgian and Philippine a rmies. In Dutch s ervice it is called the YPR-76S. (FMC Corp.)

configured for this role without serious red esign . If Vietna m experience supported Army interest

in mounted infan try tac tics, it a lso d rew atten tion to problems in APC design . All armoured troop transporters built during the 1960s were lightly armoured. T his was due to two fac tors. On the one hand, ' bat tlefield taxi ' tac tics meant that such ve hicles were not expected to encounter heavy a nti ­a rmour threa ts such as enemy tanks, anti-tank weapons or heavy a nti-ta nk mines. They were only supposed to protec t their passengers from overhead a r tillery airbursts, shrapnel, sma ll a rms and other anti-personnel weapons. But when used in mounted opera tions, they did encounter heavier weapons against which their armour was no t proof. An RPG-2 or RPG-7, designed to cut through the heavies t tank armour, could easily penetra te an fvI I 13. A more serious threat were la rge mines. An RPG's d amage was usua lly limited to squ ad members in the na rrow pa th of the spa ll cone; this usually meant tha t casua lties were limited , unless a maj or interna l fi re or explosion was caused. In contrast, a large mine, designed to des troy a heavily armoured tank, could kill mos t of the squad inside an M I 13. Not surprisingly, many squads took to riding on the outside of their M I I 3s, fearing the all­too-common mine more than sma ll a rms fi re.

Conditions in Vietnam were not identical to those in Central Europe. M ines ."ere by far the greates t threat to a rmoured vehicles in Vietna m, while in a Cen tra l European environment direc t­fi re anti-a rmour weapons would pl ay a much

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greater part. T he ~/I I 13 saw service again in the 1973 war in the M iddle East with Israe li fo rces. It was genera ll y liked , earning the popular name 'Zelda ', bu t Israe li mechanised infa n trymen a lso showed a propensi ty to rid e on the ou tsid e of the vehicle in man y situations.

The Tribulations of the 'ArIllOUred Grunt' T he seemingly irrational desire to avoid the protec tion offered insid e the M I 13 poin ts to a m~or

fl aw in the ' ba ttlefield taxi' concept. It ignores the psychological elements of mechanised in fa ntry comba t. APCs a re no t pa rti cularl y comforta ble to rid e in , even in peacetime: a squ ad of ten men is crammed in to a space that is hardly the size of a sma ll ba throom. I t is too low fo r them to stand except a t a crouch, and if the APC is full y manned the troops a re packed so close together tha t they can ha rdly move their a rms. Besides the infantrymen themselves, the insides a re lit tered with their gear a nd weapons. In cross-country trave l an APC offers a very j a rring rid e, aggrava ted by the fact tha t the occupants cannot see the terrain they are travers­ing, and so ca nnot anticipa te j olts from terrain obstructions and di tches. APCs become un bearably hot in tempera tures mu ch above 75° F . \Vhen the ha tches are a ll closed , there is only the pa llid illumjna tion of a sma ll dome light, and the ven til a tion of a single fa n.

T he combination of cramped conditions, heat diesel fumes, g loomy lighting, th e confin ed stench or a squ ad of infantrymen in prolonged field conditions, a nd the nausea of a bouncing rid e create a peculia r sort of cla ustrop hobia. T his mental tension only serves to worsen the infantryman's normal combat fears. Confined in a nauseating steel box, the soldier cannot see wha t fate awa its him ou tside-bu t he can hear the horrifyi ng noise or battle over the din of a racing engine and the piercing creaks of the APC's tracks and suspension. A soldier who has seen comba t knows what happens to the crew of an APC that runs over an anti-tank mine: the APC's a rmour confines the mu tilating blast of the mine inside its shell. Other threats are no less pleasant. Although an RPG might not wipe out a whole squ ad , an RPG hit throws a na rrow spray of superheated gas and hypervelocity metal shard into the velucle. An infantryman sits with his back to the outsid e wa ll of the APC, where any momenl

the fier y tongue of a n RPG hj t could en ter. E ven worse fat es can be imagined should a ta nk fire on a n \PC with its main gun. A mod ern tank gun a nd

some modern anti - ta nk guid ed missiles can ream out an APC with horrific eITec ts.

at surprising ly, man y infa ntrymen in combat would rather rid e on the outsid e of an APC than inside, even if the inside oITers them protec tion against small a rms, machine guns, artillery blas ts and many other threats. With a head outside the onfin es of the APC, the claustrophobia is reli eved:

anxieties subside; horribly exaggerated fears shrink with a view of the battle fi eld. Very few battle fi elds arc as horri ble in reality as the imaginings of a frightened and anxious mind.

Most APCs have been designed against the obj ective threa ts of a nti-personnel weapons; they have ignored the subj ec ti ve threa ts to the mora le of mechanised infantry posed by their armoured

enclosure. T here was growing recognition of this fac t by

armoured ve hicle designers in the la te 1960s. A technical solution to the problem was to oITer the enclosed crew a vie"" outsid e the vehicle. This could relieve their anxieti es, and partially compensate for some of the other problems of riding in a n armoured vehicle. Moreover, such a feature coincid ed with

the tac tical requirements for a new generation of infantry comba t vehicl es which mand a ted firin g ports to permit the infantry to fire their weapons from within th e protec ted confin es of the vehicle.

The MICV again? In 1968 the Arm y form ed a special task force head ed by ?vIaj. Gen. G eorge Casey to re-examine whether an MI CV was rea ll y needed. The Casey task force empha tically urged tha t the Arm y continue the development of a n NIlCV. The task force pointed out not only that such a verucle was necessary in order to permit infantry squads to operate in a conta mina ted environment or on a con vention a l battle fi eld , but also that importa nt changes were occurring in Soviet infantry for­mations which mandated such a vehicle. The B1VIP had begun to appear; but tlus was onl y on e small aspect of a dramatic Soviet Arm y programme to mod ernise its infantry. Besides the small numbers of expensive BNIPs being introduced , the Soviets were

Although closely res embling the XM765, the new XM723 MICV was larger, more heavily arnloured and mO"e nlobile. The XM723 was fitted with a one-nlan turret armed with a 20 mm MI39 autocannon. Plans were under way to mount a 25 mm gun, but these were cancelled when it was decided to go for a two-lTIan turret. (US Army APG)

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US infantry vehicles are normally higher tha n comparable Soviet vehicles, as i s very evident in this view showing the XM723 next to a Soviet BMP-I. The h eight difference is due to US preference for a vehicle large enough to accommodate infantrymen up to six feet tall; b y comparison, the Soviet vehicle's troop compartment is incredibly cramped. The XM723 MICV h a d the same layout as the Soviet BMP, with the squad leader b ehind the driver. This is olated him from much of the squad, and did not provide him with a good view of the battlefield. (US Arll1.y APG)

a lso prod ucing much g rea ter numbers of the nevv BTR-60PB. T he BTR-60PB was a rmed with a 14.5 mm cannon capa ble of penet rating the a rmou r of the M 11 3. T he introduction of the BIVIP a nd BTR-60PB ma rked the beginning of a programme by the

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Soviet Arm y to do away with conventi ona l infan try in favourof a full y mecha nised a rm y. T he US Army was being faced with the prospect tha t soon all Sovie t di visions would be heavily equipped with both ta nks a nd armoured troop tra nsporters capab le of des troying the M 1 13.1 he M 1 13 was not \Ne ll enoug h armed to threa ten a ny of these vehicles. As a result, a new rvII CV proj ec t ma nager's office. was opened in 1968.

The troop compartment in the XM723 could accommodate a nme-ll1.an rifle squad bes ides the two vehicle creWInen. (FMC Corp.)

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FMC Corporation had been one of three bidders on the MICV-65 programme, but had lost the competition. FMC was still bui lding the IV1 I 13 at the lime, but rea lised that the future of the APC business was moving in the direction of new generation inf~ ntry fighting vehicles. ~sing its o~,vn funds, it redesIgned the N1 I 13 as a n n V , and tned to inleres t the Arm y in it. In 1969 a nd 1970 the MICV Offi ce exa mined this possibility, as we ll as can 'idering whether the US Army might adopt the German N1ard er to sa tisfy its TvII CV req uiremen t. The FMC vehicle, the XM765 Al fV, was rejected by the Army, which was in the midst of preparing designs for a new generation tank that would emerge laler in the 1970S as the M I Abra ms l , A prima ry feat ure of this tank was to be high cross­coun try speed. T his was desired not onl y for improved mobility, but as a form of passive protec tion, T es ts had shown that a rm oured vehicles moving cross-country were much ha rder ta rgets for enemy tank guns or anti-tank missiles, Since the new infantry fi ghting vehicle wou ld se rve in

conj unction with the M I, hig h speed wou ld a lso be req uired of it. \lso, wi th the ad ven t of the Soviet BTR-60PB, the requirement for the armour protec tion of the new ve hjcle illcreased. The Marder was a lso rejec ted , on the basis of cos t and a rmo ur protec ti on.

As a result , in November 1972 , the Arm y award ed FMC Corp , a contrac t to develop a vehicle simila r to the AIFV, but faster a nd better armoured . This ve hicle was the XM723 IVIICV (Mecha nized Infa ntry Combat Ve hicle) . The ?vII CV closely resembled the Al fV, but was based on heavier co mponents derived from the LVTP- 7 ~/1a rin e Corps amtrac ra ther than the li g hter N1 I 13, The techn ica l requ irements for the vehicle were not pa rti cul arl y exotic. T he ~tIICV was to be armed wit h a 20 mm g un in a small one-ma n turret, with firing ports for its nine- ma n squ ad. It was to be

The XM800-T ARSV proved to b e a technically successful scout tank des ign, but was killed due to Army recognition that Congress was unlikely to fund it. Its cancellation led to the combining of th e ARSV and MICV requirements, forcing another redesign of the vehicle. The XM800-T turret closely resembles the turre t eventually adopted fOl' the IFV/CFV, (US Army APG)

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pro tec ted by a novel la min a ted steel/a luminium a rmour developed by FMC, which was rela tively ligh t in weight but offered improved protection agai nst sma ll proj ec tiles of up to ' 4.5 mm ca li bre. It was capa ble of speeds up to 45 mph.

Although the technical requirements for the new M I CV were not overl y complica ted , i ts fa te soon beca me enta ngled with o ther programmes that would eventua lly drag ou t its gesta ti on. T he V R F ' NS-S was a new Arm y gun progra mme engaged in developing a n ex tern a lly powered autocannon. T hese di ffer from conventi ona ll y gas­opera ted machine g Ulls or a u toca nllolls in that their firing cycles a re independ ent of bleed -off gas from the proj ec til e propell a n t. T heir main ad va ntage is tha t they a re n ot easil y j a mmed , since a misfi red round is a utoma tica ll y expell ed ra ther th a n requiring ma nu a l remova l, as is the case with more

The r edesigned XM723 MICV em erged in 1978 a s the X M2 IFV. This i s one of the eight prototypes undergoing winter tria l s . The p r ototypes can be r eadily dis tinguished from the s tandar d production models by the diffe rent configuration of the firing port housings on either hull s ide. (Hugh es H elicopte r)

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conven tiona l gas-opera ted weapons. T his weapon was envisioned for Llse on light armoured vehicles like the M l CV, on hel icopters a nd in a new air defence gun . Problems in the development of this weapon forced the Arm y to consid er using the older lv1 ' 39 20 mm cannon in lieu of the V R FWS-S. H owever, these guns differed consid era bly, forcing time-consuming cha nges in turret configura tion.

The ARSV entangletnent Far more troublesome was the interference of the AR SV. T he XIVI800 AR SV progra mme origina ted in O ctober ' 97 ' , w hen Lockheed a nd F IVIC were given co mpetiti ve development contrac ts for the design of a new Armoured R econn aissance Scout Ve hicle. T his was in tended to repl ace the troubled p'II" 4 a nd M55 ' cava lry scout vehicles. T he govern men t tes ts of both vehicles took place beginning in November ' 973 . The tests of F!VIC's XMBoo-T tracked AR SV "vere pa rticula rl y success­ful. H owever, the progra mme was brought under fi re by S Arm y T raining a nd D oc trine Com mand (TRADOC) and other elements of the Arm y. T he

The production lIlodel of the M2 Bradley IFV elIlerged in 1980- 8r. Its appearance cOlIlpared to the XM723 was considerably a ltered by the larger turret. (US ArlIlY APG)

progra mme was not challenged on the grounds of the techn ica l requirements of the design, nor on the basis of the need for a new scout vehicle. R a ther, the Army was coming to rea lise tha t in the wake of \ ietn a m, the Congress was not very enthusiastic about funding a host of new Arm y prog rammes. In the early 1970S the Army had a co ll ec tion of new program mes which had been postpon ed or cance lled due to the cos ts of the V ietnam involvement. There were requirements for a new helicopter to replace the U H- 1 Huey; a new a ttack helicopter to replace the AH- 1 Cobra a nd cancel led AH-56 C heyenne; a new main ba ttle ta nk to replace the M60 a nd cancelled MBT -70; a new armoured infantry vehicle to replace the M il 3 a nd the cancelled X~·/I701 MICV-65; a new mobile air defence gun to replace the interim M 163 V ulcan ; and a new mobile air defence missile vehjcle to repl ace the interim M48 C hapa rra l sys tem. All this added up to rea lly big bucks. The situa tion was not helped by the anti-military mood in Congress over the recent V ietnam involve ment, a nd this mood

was furthcr worsened by the wid espread percepti on in Congress that ma ny of the Army's weapons designs in the 1 960s had been a bit too gold -plated a nd compli ca ted .

The ca ncella ti on of the XM800 ARSV pro­gramme in November 1974 was indicat ive of an Arm y recognition of the political a nd fi sca l rea lities offuture Arm y budge ts in Congress. Early in 1975, steps began to be ta ken to merge the AR SV req uiremen t in to the IvII CV progra mme. T RADOC began examining whether the IvII CV as currently configured cou ld sa tisfy the ARSV requirement. The genera l conclusion was that a scout vehicle would need some a nti- tank capability, a nd that a two-man turret would be more desirable than a one- ma n turret as on the XNI723 , since it ,lIould a llow the second crewma n to act as a n observer. As the AR SV requirement was being exa mined , US Arm y in telligence was beginning to pick up signs of major policy deba tes in the Soviet Arm y over the B~IIP. These beca me ma nifes t on the pages of the Soviet Army journa l Voel/1/9 Vestnik. These d eba tes were believed to have been prompted by a poor showing of the BMP in the 1973 wa r between Syri a a nd Israel. US a na lys ts

13

assu med tha t the poor showing had promp ted the Soviet Army to ques tion the concept of a n infa n try fig h ting ve hicle like the BM P. In fact , the deba te grew from con tinuing controversy within the Soviet Army over the high cost of the BM P, as well as from concern tha t the Bl\IIP was not as "veil suited to a non-nuclear battlefield as to a nuclear one. T he Soviets had paid li ttle a tten tion to the Syri a n experiences with the BM P, due to a disparaging view of the Syria ns' martial ta lents. (Only about 50 BMPs had been used in 1973, a nd a bou t ha lf the losses were due to the vehicles being a ba ndoned by their crews. )

Nevertheless, American perceptions of the Soviet con troversy prompted the Secreta ry of the Arm y to cha llenge the basic ~HCV concept. T his resulted in the es ta blish men t of yet another specia l task force, this time headed by Brig. Gen. La rkin . T he La rkin Task Force exa mined three issues: Was the XM723 the right vehicle, or were foreign a lte rnatives more

The s ize of the Bradley i s hea vily d ep endent on w hat mus t fit ins ide . This photo d ran>a tica lly illus t r ates w h y it i s 5 0 large. This s hows a full vehicle cr ew , plus a ll the exp endable munitions a nd sep a rate tools that a r e carried ins ide. (US Arn>y APG)

sui tab le? Was the basic notion of a n M I CV sound? H ow could the M ICV a nd AR SV requirements best be ha rmonised into a single vehicle?

T he Arm y again exa min ed foreign a ltern a tives to see if they would be more cos t-effec tive . T he l\IIa rder was ver y popula r with US Army officers fa mili a r with it from tours of du ty in Germ any. H owever, as in the case of the first task force, it was turned down due to its high cost , its heavy weight a nd lack of a mphibi ous capa bilities, its rela tively light a rmour, a nd its arma ment sys tem . T he ~HCV req uiremen t ca lled for protec tion against a t least 14-5 mm cannons like that on the BTR-60PB, and the preferred arm a ment solu tion was a heavier gun with fu ll sta bilisa tion to permit firing while on the move. T he F rench A~/IX- 10 was a lso exa mined and rej ected , a nd the task force exa min ed some BM P-Is captured by the Israelis from the Syri ans.

Heavy infantry vehicles? The task force concurred with the general sentiments of the BfvIP advoca tes in Voe1l1l0' Vestnik. Although the BM P (or M ICV ) was not adequately a rmoured to protect it aga inst a ll a nti- tank

.. An M2 Bradley undergoing production lot testing at APG. Even after a US vehicle is accepted for Army use, production vehicles are r igorously tested to make certain that engineering corrections w ork as planned. This particular Bradley i s fitted with the MILES laser engagement training system on the turret. (US Army APG)

A riBe squad of the 197th Infantry Brigade disembark from a Bradley. The Bradley is armed with an M242 25 mm automatic cannon. This particula.· weapon, built by Hughes Helicopte.·, i s also u sed on the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), on aircraft a nd on s hip 1D0untings. (Hughes Helicopte r)

T

weapons like tank guns or anti-tank missiles, its tactica l emp loyment .vould minimise exposure to such weapons. The task force rea li sed that this was not an idea l solution: inevitably, NIl CVs would encounter such weapons on the battlefield . But rea listica ll y, there were no a ltern atives. As the result of pressure in the Army from advoca tes of an NIlCV as heavily a rmoured as a tank, a sepa rate stud y was conducted of the 'Tank Infantry Vehicle' notion . The conclusion was that even if refurbi shed M48 hulls were used , such a ve hicle would cos t twice as much as the NIlCV. Furthermore, since there were not enough M48 hulls to sa tisfy the MICV requirement, production of new hulls would add cos ts beyond this for further vehicles.

This conclusion was ha rdly uniqu e to the US Army. No a rm y to da te has adopted an armoured infantry transporter as heavily armoured as a tank except on an expedient basis. In World War Two the British Arm y used 'R a m K anga roos ' based on obsolete Ram tank hulls; and the Israe li s have made limited use of sma ll numbers of Centuri on hulls. The problem is quite simply that such vehicles are too expensive . The cos t of the added armour is not the main problem: but added a rmour means extra weight , thereby requiring a more powerful (and expensive) engine, transmission, su 'pension a nd other components. H eavier vehicles place grea ter wear on tracks and other components. A heavy

The Bradley is amphibious once the swimming skirt is raised. This i s normally stowed in a folded pos ition in a recess along the hull s ides and front. (US Army APG)

infantry vehicle not on ly cos ts twice as much as an M ICV, but its li fe time support cos ts a re con­siderably higher . US so urces estima te that the lifetime costs of an armoured vehicle the weight ofa tank a re four times the basic purchase price over a 20-yea r period due to the higher level of wear on the powertra in and suspension. Light a rmoured veh­icles do not have such a high lifetime cos t rela tive to their purchase price due to the lesser st ra in they p lace on running gear and engines. Nlos t a rmies bu y more a rmou red infantry transporters than tanks , and none has been able so fa r to enjoy the luxury of a heavy infantry vehicle. Besid es the cos t problems, there are tactical drawbacks as well. A heavy in fantry vehicle ca nn ot be mad e am phibious, requiring an a rm y to expa nd its stockpil e of tactical bridging for ri ve r crossing operations. For the US Army weight is a se ri ous drawback, since in an emergency vehicles have to be shipped or airbfted grea t dista nces.

There is no happy middle ground in this controversy. On the modern bat tlefield , weapons tend to be lumped into two categories. Anti­personnel weapons a re the most numerous, and they can be countered by light armour as on the M I CV. A t the other end of the spec trum a re the anti-armour weapons. Even relative ly sma ll weap­ons like the RPG- 7 have phenomenal armour penetration ca pabi li ties. T he RPG- 7 can penetrate ' 3 inches of steel, and more modern types can litera lly penetrate ,6 inches of battleship armour. Of course, the amoun t of damage caused insid e the

Oll l'ed vehicle is somewhat more limited . Tank arnl 'L1ns using depleted urani um kinetic energy ~cnc trators can nO.t onl y pene.tra.te such armour, but can cause massive da mage II1s1de a n a rmoured vchicle as wel l. Due to the na ture of ground \llcapons, a rmour con figura tions are ei ther on the li crht side, to defend against a nti-personnel vveap­o~s , or extremely heavy, to defend against a nti-ta nk wcapons. T here is no sense in adopting a n armour

level in between. I n ovem ber 1976 the Larkin T ask Force made

its recommendations. They supported the ~/II CV

concept, as well as the case for merging the M I CV and the ARSV requirements. H owever, they supported the cava lry advocates, who urged the adop tion of a two-ma n turret , a rmed with an additiona l TO\V la uncher for added a nti-a rmour capabili ty. T hey made it clear to the Secreta ry of the Army that there was no rea listic alte rna ti ve to the concep t, either in the form of a heavy infantry vehicle or a reversion to the NIl 13.

Yet another bend in the road T he Secreta ry of the Arm y forma lly a pproved the recommend ations of the Larkin T ask Force la ter in the month, a nd ord ered the award of a contrac t to fMC Corp . to develop the X M723 M I CV into the new vehicle. It was designa ted the X~/I2 Infa n try Fighting Vehicle (I FV) to supplant the MI CV, a nd the XM3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV ) to satisfy the AR SV requirement. Originally, the Army had pla nned to begin acquiring the XM723

M I CV with the in terim 20 mm M I39 gun in 1978, but with the re-orienta tion of the progra mme, these pla ns were d elayed. Congress reac ted to the consta n t turmoil in the programme by a 1977 law obliging the Arm y to begin production of the new infa n try vehicle no la ter tha n 198 I.

Not unexpectedl y, the XM2 /XM3 Fighting Vehicle System (FVS) proceeded rela ti vely smoothly. Prob lems with the tra nsmission on the XNI723 led to a competitive development pro­gramme, with General Elec tric receiving the nod in June 1977. T he decision to adopt a two- ma n turret ca used some controversy in the infantry. The two­ma n turret inevita bly cut into the size of the squ ad tha t could be carried , lowering the tota l crew size from lito nine, a nd the sq uad size from nine to seven . In spi te of the con troversy, tlus has been a blessing in disguise. The XM 723 used a crew layout pa tterned on the B~/IP , with the squad leader occupying a forward position behind the driver a nd isola ted from his squad. In tlus loca tion, the squad lead er does not have the pa nora mic view ava ilable in a turret position. T est crews from Army test installa tions with whom the a uthor spoke were very uneasy a bout tlus configura tion. The squad lead er placed in the turret becomes less isola ted fro m his squad , a nd has excellent views in a ll direc tions. The added twin T O\'V a n ti-ta nk missile la uncher subsequently won the enthusiastic endorsement of

A Bradley during swimllling trials in the Chesapeake River. Propulsion in the water is provided by the tracks. (US Army APG)

the infa ntry units who began receiving the 1\11 2 in 1982. The number of a rmoured vehicles in Soviet divisions continues to rise, a nd the TO\'" la uncher gives the infantry squads the feeling that they a re not helpless if confronted by heavy armour- as is unfortunately the case with the r.,111 13.

The Bradley Finally Arrives The initia l eight proto types were deli vered for tes ting in 1978. The tes ts proceeded without any maj or difficulties a nd , indeed , the XM2 even exceed ed some of its requirements. The Arm y Sy: tems R eview Council gave its nod of a pproval in D ecember 1979 in the wake of the tes ts, a nd this was followed in January 1980 by production approva l from the Secretary of D efense. The IFV jCFV "vas the first Arm y tracked comba t vehicle in 20 years to meet a ll its requirements and to be a pproved for production by both the Arm y a nd the Secreta ry of Defense the first time around . Following type classifica tion , they beca me the M2 IFV and M3 CFV . Although there vvere origina ll y plans to na me the NI2 after Gen. Oma r Bradley, a nd the M3 a fter G en. J acob D evers, the two famous \tVorld \IVar Two cOlllmanders, it was eventua ll y decided to na me them both after Gen. Bradley due to the basic simil a rit y of the vehicles. The US Army is over ly fond of acronyms, a nd so the IFV a nd CFV received a collec tive acronym, the BFV (Brad ley Fighting Vehicle), which shows up regula rly in offi cial Arm y d escriptions of the ve hicle.

Funding for the first one hundred Bradleys was provided in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1980 budge t, consisting of 75 M2 IFV a nd 25 M 3 CFV. This was followed by 400 more in FY81 , 600 annually through 1984 and 680 in FY8S. By 1982 enough had been produced to begin equipping mechanised infantry uni ts, with the 4 1 st Infantry, 2nd Armored Division a t Ft Hood being the first unit so equipped. The first unit to begin receiving the Bradley in Europe in 1983 was the 3rd (M echa nized ) Infantry Division .

Trial by pen Although the Brad ley had passed its technica l a nd opera tional tes ts without difficulty, it was subj ec ted

18

to the now-fa miliar Press bashing in 1983 a nd 1984. A wide va riety of cha rges were direc ted a t the program me. r.,IIany of the criticisms were simple­mind ed. For exa mple, some criti cs cha rged that the Brad ley was too high, especia ll y when compared to the Soviet BMP. Some of the same critics a lso complain ed tha t the troop co mpartment was too cra mped . That these criticisms should be mutually exclusive does not see m to have occurred to critics . The height of the vehicle is determined in pa rt by the presence of the turret, a nd in pa rt by design of the vehicle to accommod ate over 90 per cent of the ra nge of ph ysica l builds found a mong U S soldiers. T he Bradley is designed so that troops over 6 ft ta ll can sit inside, while the BMP is designed for sho rter men.

Not surprisingly, the Bradley ca me uncler fire for its cos t. In 1984 dollars, the basic NI2 IFV cos t $ I. 1

A view down the 'crawl space' , looking towards the driver's station. Two squad Dlernbers are s tationed in this area when the M2 is fully crewed. (Author)

million , compared to $0. 18 million for a n 1\11 I 13A2 (six times the cos t) . This same cos t problem has faced a ll a rmies a ttempting to acq uire the new generation of infa ntry vehicles. T.h.e . cr~l x ?f the matter is whether the added eapabJlltJes JustJfy the higher price tag. T he Soviet, Germa n and British Armies have felt that it does, a nd so docs the US Army. (A fu ller discussion of the rel ative merits of the Bradley vs. other infan try vehicles appea rs below.) Some of the critics argued that in li eu of the M 2, an up-gunn ed Iv1 I 13 should have been purchased . T his of course ignored the fact that over 60 per cent of the cos t of a n infan try figh ting vehicle like the M2 is con ta ined in the turret a lone . Any armoured ve hicle wi th a sophisticated, turreted weapon is going to be expensive , no matter how inexpensive the hull.

The AlUIniniUIn Controversy (yet again . .. ) Further fuel was thrown on the Bradley controversy in 1984 as a result of tests cond ucted by the Ballistics Research Laborato ry a t Aberdeen Proving G round

to test for alum iniu m armour 'va porifics ' . It had been a lleged for ma ny yea rs that the eflec ts of a shaped-charge impac t ,;vere g rea tly a mplified by the use of a luminium a rmour. No highly controlled vaporifi cs tests had ever before been cond ucted on a luminium armoured vehicles, owing to the cost of such tests, as well as to the absence of verifi able instances of this ph enomenon occurring in combat. A number of countries have used a luminium­a rm oured vehicles in comba t, notably the US with its M I 13s in Vietnam; but there were no reliable reports of a mplified d a mage du e to the use of a luminium armour. Nevertheless, the Arm y de­cided to conduct such tes ts even though it had a lready comple ted a ll the lega ll y mandated tests-to­des truc tion of Bradleys. On the completion of the tests, an Air Force officer in the Department of

A view looking up from the rear s quad compartment into the Bradley turret. This does not have the typical ' feel' of most armoured vehicles, s ince the turret is free ofa p r otruding gun breech . The gun is completely enclosed to prevent fumes from leaking into the vehicle. (Author)

A platoon of M2 IFV Bradleys of the 41 s t Infantry, 2nd Armored Division at Ft Hood, Texa s . This was the fir s t divis ion fully reorganised under the 'Div 86' plan with MI tanks and M2/M3 Bradleys. (Author)

De[ense cha rged that the tes ts were insufficiently rea listic and had been ' rigged '. T hese cha rges were eventually leaked to the Press, and se t off considerable furth er criticisms o[ the programme.

T he tests had aimed a t determining whether the selec tion o[ a luminium ra ther than steel armour does increase the letha lity o[ hostile shaped-cha rge warheads. Aluminium had been chosen [or the Bradley due to its rela tive strengths compared to stee l. A pla te o[ a luminium armour, equa l in protec tion to a plate o[ steel a rmour, is slightly lighter but much thicker. Because it is thicker it has grea ter structura l rigidi ty, and so obviates the need [o r certain interna l bracing need ed with stee l. An IFV using a luminium a rmour weighs about one ton less than an identical vehicle protected to a comparable level with steel. A number o[ other armies have a lso chosen a luminium [or their light a rmoured vehjcles. (Ac tua lly, the Bradley is not

'20

protected by homogenous a luminium armour, con tra ry to the widespread view. T he mantlet is steel a rmour, a nd the hull and turret sid es are protected by a specia l la mina te o[ spaced alu­minium and a ltern ating steel pla tes.)

T he tes ts were conducted aga inst vehicles worn out in previous tests. T hey were instrumented , and load ed with dummies to simulate the crew. T he instrumen tation aimed at discovering whether a sha ped -cha rge hit ca used letha l gases, blinding Rash, enhanced spa lling, or overpressure (con­cussion) when compared to the use o[such a shaped cha rge against comparable steel armour. A va riety o[ wea pons vvas used , [rom RPG-7 equi va lents all the way up to anti-tank missiles (which have a sha ped-cha rge warhead larger th an any current Soviet anti-armour weapon). T he test result showed that there was no signi fica nt increase in letha lity due to the use o[ aluminium . T here was enhanced overpressure and Rash compared to steel a rmour, bu t not enough to increase the letha li ty of the vvarhead . T he tests demonstrated what had already been suspected from pas t comba t ex'

)cri ence with aluminium-armoured vehicles: crew In the path of the spa ll cone would be fa ta lly lI'ounded , whereas crew outside the spa ll cone ",ould suffer from some overpressure effec t, la rgely dependent on the size of the warhead. The tests a lso sugges ted tha t steel a rmour may actually have slight letha li ty enha ncement effects compared to alumi nium, since the steel spall tends to tra nsmit the ki netic energy of the warhead hi t more cffecti vely than the less dense aluminium .

The cond uc t of the test was distorted by cri tics of the program me. T he Air Force officer 's repor t complained tha t the vehicle was not full y comba t loaded with fuel a nd a mmunition . H e con tend ed tha t this was done to avoid the dra ma tic interna l ~res that would have resulted had the vehicles been so loaded. H owever, it is not clea r why the vehicle should have been so loaded since the ai m of the tes ts was to exa mine the va pori fics issue, not the vulnerabi lity of the Bradley to specific weapons which had a lread y been tes ted . T he repor t a lso complained tha t the tes t had been ' rigged ' when the dummies inside had been wet down a t one point to

preven t their uniforms f) 'om burning. T he sug­ges tion was tha t this was done to hide the burn injuries that wo uld be suffered . T his charge ignored long-proven evidence regard ing the le tha l mech­a nisms of sha ped-cha rge warheads, na mel y the concussion a nd letha l cone of hot gas a nd meta llic spa ll thrown in to the crew com pa rtm en t by the wa rhead . rvIinor clothing burns are irrelevant to the letha l effects of the warhead , a nd smoulder ing clo thing conta minates tests a imed a t measuring letha l gases res ulting from the bl ast itsel f.

Althoug h the complaints about the tes t were la rgely refu ted , the report resurrec ted the issue of the in adequ acy of lig ht a rmoured vehicles when subj ec ted to ""ea pons designed to c ripple much more heavily armoured ta nks. As exa mined earli cr, the decision to Limi t a rmour on infa ntry fi gh ting vehicles has been due to both cos t a nd tac tica l features . Like mu ch of the criti cism in the U S Press,

On a b a king hot day on the T exas prairie, a Bradley c r ewlTIa n prepares an alTIlTIunition loa d for a live fi"ing exe ."cise. The 25 1TII"n a lTIlTIunition is s tow ed in the black plas ti c boxes seen in the foreg round. (Author )

the underlying issues of this com plica ted ques tion were compl etel y ignored in favour of the more sensationa l aspec ts of the charges. T he p,II 2 Bradley was la belled a 'd ea th trap ' a nd a 'crema torium ' in the newspapers and weekl y magazin es, a nd the Arm y brass was castiga ted for its 'ca llous disregard ' for the safety of its troops. T he fac t that the Brad ley is more heavily a rmoured tha n any other a rmoured infa ntry vehicle in production was ig nored. Nor did a ny of its Press criti cs sugges t they wou ld support a programme for a heavy infa ntry vehicle with a ll its attend a nt hig her costs. Wha t is especia ll y disturb­ing about such Press excesses is that , in a vo te­sensi tive democracy, they can detrimen ta lly a lter weapons prog rammes, in spite of th eir lack of substance. Since most of the Press is woefu ll y ill ­cd ucated on defence ma tters, it pla ys Ii tt le constru ctive role in sha ping weapons policy. T he Press m ade no a ttempt to shape the con figura ti on of

Squa d exit froIn the Bradley is through the power-assisted rear raInp. The two bins on either s ide of the ramp contain s towage, aInInunition and M REs (Meals-R ead y-to­Eat). (Author )

22

the Brad ley in the la te 1960s and 1970S when the design was still in progress. But once mill ions of doll a rs ha ve been spen t designing a nd building such equipment, the Press feels no compunction in criti cising the results and calling for the termination of th e progra mme.

The Bradley Described The M2 IFY a nd M3 CFY are a lm ost iden tical ex tern a ll y; they differ mainly interna lly. The main ex tern a l differences a re the a bsence of firin g POrt

peri scopes on the right sid e a nd the pla ting-over of firing ports on the P"I3 . Interna ll y, the main differences a re in the rear troop compartment. T he M2, being a squad carri er , has seating for six to seven men (in addition to the driver, gunner and sq uad /vehicle lead er in th e turret) . In contrast, the M3 CFY carries only two men in the rea r. Some tho ught was given to using the additional space in the i\lI3 to ca rry a scou t mo torcycle. This id ea vvas

The TOW m issile launcher can be reloaded from under the protective cover of the rear cargo hatch, a s seen in this view. (Author)

eventua lly dropped due to the haza rd presen ted by the motorcycle's unprotec ted gasoline tank in such a confined space. Instead , the M 3 is configured to carry add itiona l rounds of T OW a nti-ta nk missiles and other munitions.

Thc p,112 IFV is configured differently from either the German M a rder or the Soviet BM P. Like both these carlier vehicles , it has its engine up front , with the driver to the left . The placement of the engine and transmjssion provide a certain measure of add itional protec tion to the turret a nd rear crew positions in the event of a hit on the hull front. The driver is provided wi th a hydros ta tic steering sys tem which is q uite simple to opera te, using a ' butterfly' steering yoke. Behind the driver a nd engine a re the turret a nd squad positions. Since the turre t is offset to thc right , there is a tunnel between the dri ve r's sta tion a nd the rear crew compa rtment. T wo of the squad sit in the tunnel, a nd opera te the two left sid e ~!f2 3 1 Firing Por t Weapons (FP\!\ ) . (The FPW is a

sub-machine gun vc rsion of the },II 16A I assa ult rifl e, configured to fire onl y on a utoma tic. It is provid ed with specia l a mmunition with trace r to assist in a iming. )

T he decision to adopt a firin g port weapon in li eu of using a n unmodified },II 16A 1 was due to the leng th of the M I 6A 1 a nd the diffic ulty of designing a firing port suffic ien tly secure to permit the use of a CBR (C hemica l/Biologica l/R adi a tion) sys tem . T his has meant tha t each squ ad member has both a FP\V while on boa rd the I FV, a nd his regula r weapons- ei ther an unmodi fied iVI1 6, or a nother sq uad weapon such as the M249 SAW (Sq uad Automa tic Weapon)-when dismounted . (It is the a uthor 's opinion tha t the US Arm y should have ta ken tlus opportunity to d esign a bull pup deriv­a ti ve of the M I 6 for use both as a n FPW a nd as the norma l weapon for the squad when dismoun ted .)

T here has been some ques tion as to the effectiveness of the firing port weapon concep t, not onl y on the Bradley but on the Mard er a nd BM P as wel l. The weapon is aimed using a periscope moun ted a bove the ba ll-j oint firin g port. T he

weapon can only be aimed by adjusting fire after observing the fa ll of the tracer, since the normal sight ca nnot be used . This ha rdly results in sha rpshooting . For this reason, FP'I\I fire is usua lly referred to as 'suppressive' : i.e. , i t is not accura te enough for precision, but may intimida te the enemy and force him to keep his head down. Nevertheless, such a wea pon can pay importa nt di vidends in terms of crew mora le. The squad is no longer a passi ve and vu lnerable passenger in the infan try ve hicle, bu t is expected to observe the terrain for enemy positi ons threa tening the vehicle. Availa­bilit y of a weapon to respond to enemy fire ca n help

relieve the anxieties of the squ ad members, and focus their attention on the lay of the ba ttlefie ld before they disembark for dismounted action. "" hile such a configura tion is not going to win any marksmanship prizes for Bradley squads, it is a considerably more effective configura tion than the old ' ba ttlefi eld ta xi ' la you t.

The rear squad compartment contains the remaining four members of the squ ad . Two are sea ted to use the two right side firing ports, and two by the rear firing ports. The rear a rea also contain additiona l 25 mm main gun ammunition stowage and additiona l TOW missile rounds. The TO'"

IN SIDE STOWAGE - IFV

SQUAD AREA - LEFT SIDE UPPER WALL AND SPONSON (FORWARD OF MISSilE STOW AGE)

7.U MM AMM O 8 0X(2)

S.S6 MM AMMO BOXl2j

REA R

PORTA BLE FI RE

EXlINGUISHER

M 1U' RIFLE

DRAGON MISSilE (S) OR

TOW MISSIL E (5J

2SMM AP AMM O 6 0X(31

LA W MISSll EIl)

SQUAD AREA - LEFT REAR CORNER (MISSILE STOWAGE AREA)

SOUA D ARE A-lURRET SH IELD AN D RIG HT FORWARD CORNER

TELEPHON E KIT

MOO M ACHIN E GUN

25MM ...... MO BOX (7)

RIGHT WAll PORTABLE fiRE EXTI NGUISHER

SQUAD AREA - UNDER flOOR PLATES

RA tiONS r2

DRI VER'S STATION - LEFT SIDE

1.62MM AMM O BOXI ' ,

DAY PERI SCOPE

DR IVER'S NIGHT VI EWER

so S6 MM AMI,IO BOX

PAM PHLET BAG

, 25 MM H E .... ,1""0 I BOXI"

SOUAD AREA - RI GHT REAR CORNER AND RIGHT SIDE lOWER WAll

C

D

rFV 1st Bn., 41st Inf., 2nd Armd. Div.; Ft. Hood, Tx., 1984 . :1\12 '

3

2: M2IFV, 2nd Bn., 41stInf., 2nd Armd. Div.; Ft. Hood, Tx., 1985

A

ACo. BCo. CCo.

g •• R D Co.

1: M2 IFV, 1s t Bn., 7th Inf., 3rd Illf.Div. (Mech.); 'Reforger-84', FRG

ACo. B Co. CGo.

DCo.

1s t Bn., 15th Inf., 3rd Inf.Div. (Mech.); 'Reforger-84',FRG I I

B

1: M2 IFV, 1st Bn., 7th Inf., 3rd Inf.Div. (Mech.); 'Reforger-85' , FRG

G 2: M2 IFV, USA Cold Regions Test Center; Ft.Greely, Alas., 1984

c

o

2: M3 interior, from rear E

F 2 : M3 interior, right side

2: M3 interior, left side G

1: M2 crewm a n 2 : Mech a nised infa nt r y squa d gunner 3 : Mecha nised infa n t ry squad r ifleman

H

launcher on the turret ca rries two rounds. Once these arc expended , the launcher can be reloaded by one of the squad members in the rear comparLmen t using the rear roof hatch . T he hatch is designed to be partly opened , g iving the TOW loader tota l overhead protec tion during the loading process, and mjnimally exposing him to hosti le fire. Access Lo the troop compartment is through the large rea r drop ramp, or through the door located in the ramp. The upper hull hatch is not in tend ed for access or egress.

The Lu rret is longitudina lly in the centre of the Bradley, offset to the right side. It is armed with an !vI242 25 mm Bushmaster ex ternally-powered 'Chai n G un ', a co-axja l ~/I240 machine gun , smoke dischargers, a nd an elevatable twin TOvV laun ­cher. T he turret is occupied by the squ ad /vehicle leader on the right and the gunner on the left. T he squad leader is provided with all- around vision peri scopes. In addition, he is provided with a specia l hatch Lhat can be locked above his head , permitting ru m Lo look outside the vehicle without using the periscopes, while a t the sa me time offering total overhead armour coverage from shell bursts. The controls for the vehicle's wea pons are dupli cated at both the commander 's and gunner's sta tions, to allow ei ther crew man to operate and fire all the vehicle's weapons. Due to this fea ture, either mem ber of the turret crew can disembark with the remainder of the sq uad to bolster their numbers if need be. The main ad vantage of this configuration over tha t of the BMP- I or Ma rder is that it provid es th r sq uad leader with a good view a ll around the bat tl efie ld. F urthermore, he is not as isolated from his sq uad as is the case in the BMP or Mard er.

The weapons a re aimed using an Integra ted Sight U nit (ISU ), which incorpora tes both a daylight sight system and a thermal imaging night system. The thermal imaging night system can a lso be used during the d ay to view through clouds of dust, smoke or haze. This can have a tactical advantage, since a Bradley can screen itself with smoke while still able to target enemy vehicles beyond the smoke cloud. This advantage comes at a price: the ISU represents about a tenth of the total vehicle cost. The M242 Bushmaster cannon is fu lly stabilised , permitting the vehjcle to fire on the move. Either a high or low ra te of fire can be selec ted , the high ra te of fire having a maxj mum of

Turret interior, left s ide, showing the gunner's station.

200 rounds per minute. orma lly, the gun is fired in bursts of four to six rounds, since a g rea ter number can lead to greaLer rou nd dispersion a t long ranges. T he usua l mix of ammunition in the read y magazine is 75 rounds of a rmour-piercing and 225 rounds of high explosive . A further 600 rounds is stowed in the vehicl e. The penetration perform ance of the current AP am munition is cl assified ; but from examin at ion or range targets it is qu ite evident that it will easily slice through the armour or any Soviet a rmoured infantry vehicle or other light AFV. Iew am munition being developed for the '25 mm gun will ex tend this perform ance, and will probably enable the gun to penetrate the side armour of most main bat tle tanks. To deal with tanks, the Bradley has the twin TOW launcher. This is elevated for firing, and the missile controls a re integra ted into the ISU day/night sight to permi t firing under nearly any condi tions. T he cu rrent M2 IFV ca n fire the TOW and I-TOW

33

34

missiles, and there a re plans to mod ify the vehicle to fire the improved TOW-2 .

The ?vI3 CFV is nearly identica l Lo the M 2, except for the rear compartment. The internal stowage on this version is different, accommodating more amm unition. The turret weapon sys tem is identica l in a ll respec ts .

The Brad ley is a mphibious a fter prepa ra tion. A flotation screen is contained along the hull sides, and is erected prior to entering the water. The Bradley is povvered through the water using its tracks, and can be 'swum ' across ri vers and lakes without strong current or wave ac tion. Constra ints on its swimming a re simil a r to those for most other amphibio ll ' a rmoured vehicles except for 'dedi­cated ' amphibians like the LVT -7 amtracs.

O/IJIo,ilf, "bore In contrast to the interior views of the M 2 IFV shown in colour on Plates E, F a nd G, this photo shows the left hand s ide of the vehicle w ith the an>.rnunition and TOW missiles stowed. (Author)

O/IJIO, il,'. beiOi/' Inside an M2 IFV, with the right hand s ide equipment fully stowed. The seats in the centre are folded up. (Author)

Mechanised Infantry

Organisation and Tactics The Brad ley was developed concurrently with the

S Army's new Division 86 organisation and doctrine. T he new 'Div 86' heavy divisions will be equipped with the M 1 tank and ~/I2 lFV in lieu of the older M60A3 tank and M 1 13 APC. The Div 86 follows the new H-series TOE (table of organisation and equip ment ) as compared to the J-series TOE used wi th ~11 13 battalions. I t is worth comparing the tvvo mechanised infantry batta lions, as they serve to place the capabilities of the Bradley in better foc us.

Under the H-series TOE, a Bradley mechanised infantry battalion has four rifle companies, instead of the three companies in a J -series TOE for an M 1 13 batta li on. There are 13 Bradleys in each rifle company, orga nised into three platoons of four vehicles each and a compan y commander 's vehicle. This gives the ba ttaEon a tota l of 54 M2 lFVs (counting the battalion commander 's and the S3's vehicles). The other change from the M 1 13 batta lion has been the amalgama tion of the combat

support company in to the headqua rters company, and the crea tion of an anti-tank compan y using the ba tta li on 's 12 Mgo 1 lTV tank destroyers. The ba ttalion support pla toon has additiona l fuel- and a mmunition-ha uling capability, with more trucks and trailers. Other armour in the new batta li on includ es six M3 CFVs in the batta li on headquarters company, as well as six M l06 4.2 in . sel f-propelled mortars (based on the M 11 3 chassis). T hese new weapons give the battalion considerably more firepower than previously. T he J -series TOW M 1 13 batta lion has only 22 long-range anti­armour wea pons consisting of TO\tV launchers and ~/Igo l lTV tank des troyers: in contrast, the new H-series TOE M2 batta li on has 72. W hen the wea lth of 25 mm guns a re factored in , the new ba tta lion has 132 long- range anti -armour weapons.

The firepower of each pla toon is equa lly impressive , even though the Bradley squads are

Turret inter ior, right s ide, s howing the squad leader's s tation. Als o evident is the squad leader's eve h elmet, which he swap s fo r a normal infantry armoured helmet on leaving the vehicle. (Author)

35

sma ller than the old M 11 3 squ ad. In each platoon , three rifle squads are form ed from the four Bradleys. Each Bradley retains a ' fighting vehicle team' consisting of the driver, gunner, and either the assistant squ ad lead er or the sq uad leader . Each of the three squads consists of a squad leader (or assistant squad leader) a rmed with an MI6A2, a machine gunner (M60 7.62 mm machine gun), an anti-armour specia li st (Dragon an ti-tank missile), two automatic riflemen (each with an M 249 SAvV), a grenadier (M16A2 with M203 40 mm gren ade launcher) and a radio operator with a PRC-68 radio and M16A2 . Normally, three M7 2A2 LAW anti-armour rockets are a lso carried by the squad . Currently, the platoon has no organic anti-aircraft weapon like the SA-7 which ca n be carried in the Soviet BMP. However, as in the Soviet case, anti­aircraft resources could be sha red out below battalion level if and when required. In any event, the 25 mm gun on the lV12 can be used aga inst

An M2 of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during the 1984 'Reforger' exercises in Germany. This was the first unit equipped with the Bradley in Europe. (Pierre Touzin)

'-

helicopters at need , having first-class long-range performance, a long-range sighting sys tem, and excellen t anti-armour lethality (when d ealing with armoured helicopters like the Mi-24 Hind ).

Under nevver US doctrine, the platoons a re being trained in a sma ll number of well-executed drills aimed a t providing different responses to various types of hostile actions. Company training stresses a variety of mounted and dismounted tactics depending on the circumstance. Dismounted tactics include exit from the Bradleys prior to reaching the obj ec tive, on top of the obj ective, or after having overrun the obj ec ti ve. Dismounted action is planned for occasions when the terrain is not suitab le for mounted ac tion , such as in forests, or due to heavy anti-armou r fire ; to clear an obstacle, to cond uct a foot patrol , to cond uct actions in an urban area, to clear ou t an obj ec tive, or to set up defensive posilions.

Although the Bradley was designed to comple­men t the lVll tank, there is a popular rnisconception that this means that MIs and t-,/12s will fight a longside one another. Actually, M I and M2 lIni ts

wiIl fight a longside each other. Combined arms tactics invo lve the use of task forces which might includ e a n M I tank battalion and an N12 Bradley batta li on. Sma ller task forces could be formed using Abra ms tank battalions a nd Bradley battalions shou ld the circumstances warrant such actions. H owever, there have never been plans to ac tua lly mi x the vehicles in a single unit. A typ ical opera tion would see the NI I unit in the vangua rd , where the tank a rmour can better fend off anti-armour weapons. T he Brad ley unit behind can provide covering fi re from its guns against anti-ta nk positions, a nd can a lso engage enem y armour with its TOW missiles. Should the a nti- tank positions be too secure to be dea lt with or bypassed by the tanks, the Bradley infantry squ ads can be brought forward for dismounted ac tion to clear them . Such tactics aim to make maximum use of the capabi lities of both ve hicles, while minimising the ri sk of exposing the Brad ley's more modest a rmour to the full weight of a nti-a rmour vveapons.

IFV vs. BMP The M2 Bradley is more comparable to the newer Soviet BlVIP-2 than to the BMP- I. T he BMP-2 is an evolutionary ou tgrowth of the BNIP- I , which differs mainly in having a new, larger two-man turret with a 30 mm au tocannon in lieu of the old er 73 mm low­pressure gun. In this respec t the Soviets have been pa ra lleling US IFV development. Man y details of the BNIP-2 a re not ye t known , a nd certain aspec ts of the N12 Bradley remain c1assi fi ed . Nevertheless , a tentative comparison is possible.

I n the a rea of firepower, the vehicles are fairly even ly ma tched . The 25 mm Bushmaster and Soviet 30 mm gun probably have simila r perfor­ma nce in terms of range and penetration , as Soviet penetrato r a nd propellant design would see m to be slight ly behind US technology. Little is known of

An M2 of the 41st Infantry being prepared for an ARTEP exercise in sultlltler 1983. The flags on the roof are u sed to signal the control tower on the status of the vehicle during training. (Author)

37

the AT-5 Spandrel missile on the BMP-2, but it is believed to be comparable in range to the TOvV. T he B~/IP-2 probably suffers in comparison to the M2 IFV in terms of "veapons stabilisation, fire control and ammunition stowage. Soviet weapons stabilisa tion to date is markedly inferior to ATO standards, and it is not even clear if the BMP-2'S gun is stabilised beyond one plane. Hthis is the case, it has very limited fire-on-the-move capability, increasing its vulnerability to a va riety of weapons. T he Soviet Army is not known to have deployed a therma l imaging night sight system even on its main battle tanks. The current Soviet capa bility appears to be limited to image intensification sights, which ca n only be used on nights when there is ad equate ambient moonlight. These sys tems have no capability to peer through haze, dust or smoke in daylight as the Bradley's ISU can. The presence of an IR sea rchlight on the BMP-2 suggests that long­range night engagements wou ld take place uSll1g this antiquated and provoca tive method.

An M2 of the 7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during the January 1985 winter 'Reforger' exercise. The vehicle is finished in a ternporary snow carnouflage. Above the gun tube is the usual pyrotechnic device array u sed during wargames to simulate firing. Note 'sharkmouth' marking, just vis ible at the front of the track skirt. (Pierre Touzin)

The BMP- I was a lread y badly cra mped . T he BMP-2, with its la rger turret, will probably suffe r even more in this respect, meaning that it cannot ca rry as many rounds of ma in gun ammunition or anti-a rmour missiles as the Bradley. The habita­bility of the BMP is very poor for any prolonged operations, the vehicle being exceedingly cramped. Although the M 2 is not spacious, it is considerably better tha n the BMP in this respec t. While th is feat ure may seem a luxury, excessively cramped spaces add to crew fatigu e and can d egrade squad performance in prolonged combat ac tions.

The armour of the BMP-2 is probably simjlar to that on the BMP- I , mea ning that it can be penetra ted at nearly any angle by the 25 mm gun on the M2. The armou r on the Bradley can probably protec t it against threa ts g rea ter than 14.5 mm in the frontal quadrant. vVhether it is sufficien t to withstand 30 mm a utocannon fire at normal combat ranges is unknown.

In terms of mobility, the BMP-2 is probably fitted with a supercharged version of the 5D 20 engine used in the BMP- I. The BMP- I is a fl eet vehicle on good terrain , but is notorious for flimsy construction when operated at high speeds on rough terrain. In contrast , the M 2 has excellen t

D

The remarkable robustness of the M2 is denlonstrated on a test track at Aberdeen Proving Ground. This photo draDlati­cally illus trates both the speed of the Bradley as well as its durability. A s itnilar Dlanoeuvre would seriously daDlage the flimsier Soviet BMP. (Author)

high-speed performance in cross-coun try travel , and can read ily withstand high-speed impacts that would crack the suspension mountings on BN1Ps. The iV12 is considerably more robust than the BMP-2, and probably has superi or cross-co un try performance. T he Bl\lIP-2 presum ably suffers the

The new M2A . and M3A. Bradleys w ill be capable of firing the iDIproved TOW-2 Dlissile, s hown here dUl'ing a test firing in '985' The extensible pl'obe at the front of the Dlissile gives b etter penetration of Dlodern laDlinate arDlours. (Hughes Aircraft)

The stableDlate of the M2 is the new M. tank: seen here are an M2 Bradley and an M. AbraDls of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during the SUDlDler '984 'Reforger' exercise. (Defense Images Inc.)

sa me relia bi lity and maintainabi lity shortcomings as most Sovie t a rmoured vehicles. Running life is probably about 500 hours of engine usc, by which time the vehicle must be rebuilt. R ebuilding probably adds another 250 hours of running time. For this reason, BM Ps a re restri cted in their annual running time to about 250 miles in order to prolong their usefu l service life to about 20 years. The N12 is considerab ly more robust in tlus respect, allowing an average of 1,000 miles annu a l training time, with a useful life of 20- 30 yea rs d epending on the amoun t of abuse an individua l vehicle is subj ec ted to. The N12 a lso incorporates current sta te-of-the-a rt simplified test equipment, and modular elec tronics and compon ents design which makes fault de­tection and repair consid erably simpler than on Soviet vehicles.

Comparison of the 1\112 with current-generation NATO velucles such as the Atv1X-Io and MCV-80 is difficult due to lack of available details. In comparison with the old er jVIa rder design , the M2 is bette r armoured , more heavily a rmed , and enjoys a full y stabilised weapon sys tem with full night vision capabilities.

Future Brad leys The Bradley was developed from the outset to permit modular (Block) improvements. The first series of improvements a re currently being tested on the M2E I and M3E I, wlllch will become the N12A I and M3A1 when accep ted. The principal modi fica-

39

tion involves the chemi ca l protec tion sys tem and the TOV\ launcher. T he current fi rst-generation Bradley has no in tegral chemical defence sys tem , and the squ ad must wear their suits for chemical protec tion. The next generation Bradley vvill in corporate a Gas Parti cul ate Filter U nit (GPFU ): lhis provides purified a ir to the entire vehicl e crew (through their MOPP-IV gear) in the M3E I, and to th e turret crew and dri ve r in the 1\12E I . The other squad members in the l\t12E I continue to use their own filt er uni ts. T he US Arm y is rel uctant to incorpora te into the 1\112 a full overpressure systelll such as tha t used in the BMP: the feeling is that in chemica l ba ttl efi eld condi tions, the sys tem would be q uickly compromised by the sq uad mounting and dismo unting frolll the vehicle. T he Soviet sys tem appears to have been developed mainl y for use in nuclea r battle field conditions, where the squ ad would remain aboa rd the vehicle for prolonged periods.

T he o th er main cha nge in volves adaption of the TO'vV launcher to permi t it to fire the TOW-2 missile with its improved wa rhead . T he new version is believed to be capa bl e of defeating any existing Soviet tank head -on .

T here a re a lso many ot her sma ll changes in the

T he prototype M3E1 during tests at Aberdeen Proving Ground. This vehicle differs from the normal M3 mainly in internal details. Note the blanked-ofT firing ports on the left side. (US Army APG)

p ipeli ne. In the l\t12E 1 these mainly concern interna l stowage improvemen ts. There are a number of planned ex terna l changes on the M 3E l. These include removal of the vestigia l closed firing ports and periscope cut-out in favour of con tinuous a rmour; a new rear hatch with periscopes to permit improved rea r squad vision ; and many interna l stowage changes. Production of the resulting M 2A 1 and M3A 1 Bradleys is expected to begin in May 1986.

Development "vork is a lso proceeding on Block II for the M 2A2 /M3A2 in the late 1980s and early 1 990s. This is expected to include nuclear blast hardening, and ha rdening against direc ted energy weapons. V ision improvements are a lso antici­pa ted , including a therma l imaging dri ver s periscope, the A T /V AS-3 DTV to replace the curren t A /VSS-2 image in tensifica tion driver's night periscope. Elec tronic improvements to the vehicle are expec ted to include a vehicle navigation system, and a PLRS/JTIDS com munica tion/ navigation hybrid sys tem. The GPFU system will probably be up-grad ed to incorporate op tional overpressure and micro-climate cooling/heating of the crew compartment. 'vVeapons improvements will probably include a modernised gun sys tem wi th improved a mmunition and possibly a lengthened gun tube. Steps are a lso under way to improve the fire control sys tem to make it more suitable for engaging helicopters, in order to provide the vehicle

-SPECIFICA TIONS

General \\'e ig ht , co mbat loaded \ Vcig ht , less fuel , crew and aVE \\'eight , a ir transponablc Ground pressure: combat IOllclcd Perso unel ca pacity, I FV

crv Fud tank ca pac it y

Perfol"Illance Speed on la nd Speed in wa le I' , wil h track Cruising range T'urn illg radi us Slope Sid e slope Trench crossing Vertica l wa ll climbi ng Gross horscpowcr-lO-\\'cig ht ratio

Engine i\ la kc a nd mod el Displacemellt T ype Fuel Gross horsepower

Turret (Two-Man) : \rlllamcill

Tra\'crsc Elc\'tl liOil

'25 nlln g un a nd 7.62 mill mac hine gun

TO\\' miss ile launcher S lcw rate , maximum c lc \'at io ll a nd

tra\"crsc T r;l{"king ra te, minimulll Stab ilisa tion sys tem Ring gca r, pitc h diamctcr

Squad Weapons Firing pa n \\TapOn; ~1 23 1: 5.56111 111

I rv onk I

~I ac hinc g Ull , )\ 160, 7.G2 111111 Rifles. )\1 16;\ 1, 5.56 IllIl1

Ammunition

25 mill 7,G'1 111 111

7.G2 111 111

5,56 111m

5.56 m m ('\ 116A I) TO\" missiles TO\\' Dragon missiles

IFV rcad y/slO\\'cd 300/600 Boo/ 15'fO

2200 sLOwcd +~wo

2520 SLOwed 2 ill Iaullcher

5 SlOwed , any combin a tion

~ SlOwed

'f9, 13B Ib .p ,60o Ih ·P , 136 Ib 7,7 pSI 9 5 175 ga llo ns

22,285 kg IB,B69 kg tB,656 kg 0 .5+ kg/cm'

GG2 li lrcs

+ 1 mi /h 66 km/h +5 mi!h 7.2 km/h 300 ml +B3 km Pi \·ot to infinitc 60 ° 0 .1.0 00, 100 Ill. 25 m 36 in, 9 1 111 20.62 hp /lOn

C ummins VTA-go3 903 ill . :'! q,U lilrcs <1_ cycle Diesel +00 506 mctric

25 111m ca nnon TO\\· miss ile launc her 7.62 mm , ~1 2~OC machine gUll 3600 cominuolls

+ Goo LO - 100

+ 30° 1O -200

600 /sec 0 .05 mil /scc Elect ric 60 in . ( 152,.l em )

G, ba ll-moullI ed I

g, IFV 5, C FV

CFV read Y/Slowed 3 00/ 1200

Boo/3600 5060 slO\\'ed NA 1~60 slOwcd

2 in la uncher

IO T O\\' stowed

with some measure of anti-helicopter self-d efence capability.

There have been a number of attempts to develop even more elaborate derivatives of the Brad ley. Some aspects of these are known , but others are shrouded in secrecy. The CV AST was developed in the early 1 980s as a potential response to the advent of the BMP-2 and a follow-on to the BMP. This consists of a new turret /armament package d eveloped by FMC and Ares Inc. built

In contrast to the blanked-off firing ports on the M3, the M2 and M2E I are fitted with operational firing ports, seen here with the FPW fitted. (US AnllY APG)

TransI11ission, AutOlTI3tic 1\l akc and model T ype S teering Brake type

Running Gear Suspension type Spring ing med ia N umber or wheels Wheel Size

T rack type

Shock a bsorbers N Ul11ber o r shoes

Track p ilch Trae k width

Night Vision Equipm.ent Sig lH , gunner Sig ht , commander

Sig ht , dri\Tr

Electrical System Gellera to r

Amperes Volt s. de

Ba tt eri'es

C.r::. H,\IPT-500 H ydro lllechalliea l I-hd ros t<ltic l\fultidiscJ oi l cooled

Rettl rn roller T orsion b;u 6 pairs per side 2 .~ in . diam 6 1.0 em 4- in . wide 10.2 em S teel sing le pin \\·ith detacha ble

rubber pads 3 per side 83, leti side;

82 , rig ht side 6 ill. '2 1 in.

15.2 em 53 ,3 em

Thenna l imagery Optical re lay rrom

g Ulllle r 's sig ht M , /VVS-2

220

28 .~ , type 6T i\" , 100 '\lnp-hr ,

I '2 -\'0 11 each

CODlntunications (Commander Vehicle) Radi ... In ' AN/ V RC-.f6, I set

Ai\ /CRC- 160, I se t Rad io, c rv AN/ V R C-1 2, I set

AN/ PR C-n, I set

Arm.our T o p a nd rro lll slo pes Venica l sides and rea r Bot tom

Side slopes

Fire Extinguisher Fixed

Portable

5083 a luminium Spaced laminate armour 5083 il luminium with anti mine

applique ( I rv only) 7039 il lu minium

7 Ib (3.2 kg) Ha lo n in cng inc compa rtment

2 x 5 Ib (2.3 kg ) Halon in persollnel compart mcnt

2.75 Ib ( 1. 2 kg) Ha lon

41

This view of the M3E1 prototype shows some of the external changes being introduced on this version, including the new rear hatch with vision blocks, and the faired-over firing ports . (US Army APG)

a round a 35 mm gun . This programme aimed a t ex tending the eflec tive range and penetra tion power oC the Bradley "I'eapon. It would now appear tha t ammunition and gun improvements wi ll give the Bradley sufficient capability without resort to a major modifica tion of th is sort. J evertheless, the programme continues to be pursued in the event of a future requirement.

A t a more exotic level, the 1\112 served as the tes tbed pla tform of a laser assault weapon , known by the code-name 'Roadrunn er ' . This was sup­posed to progress into an ac tua l combat laser sys tem sometimes called CCLA W (Close-Combat Laser Assault vVeapon ). T he programme was aimed a t developing a vehicle-mounted , medium-energy laser weapon capable of crazing the optics and vision ports on opposing tactical vehicles, the destruction of electro-optical sensors, and the 'opaqueing' of helicopter orjet aircraft canopies. In 1984 the Army publicly announced that it was cancelling the programme on budgetary grounds, following some Press discussion of the programme. T he Press reports had criticised the programme on the grounds of suspicion that the actua l intent was to develop a nevI' ba ttlefi eld sys tem that could blind enemy troops. T he Army is known to be pursuing a number of medium-energy lase r weapon pro­grammes, though their relation to the M2 programme is completely unknown.

Far less futurist ic are the XM4 Armored Gun System and the ETAS programme. T he XrvI4 AGS

42

A detailed view of the new rear hatch being developed for the M3A1 Bradley.

is an a ttempt to develop a light tank armed with a 105 mm gun using the 1v12 Bradley chassis. T he programme has been dragging on for years under a confusing cloud of acronyms such as MPGS (Mobile Protec ted Gun System), APAS, AMAS, etc. Although the Army-sponsored programme may fad e into obli vion due to bureaucratic dry-rot, commercia l development of such a sys tem for export is not unlikely. ETAS (Eleva ted Target Acquisition System ) is an a ttempt to develop a

sensor pod , mounted on the end of a telescoping pole assembly. The ra tionale behind this is that by fitting such a sensor to the )\113 CFV scou t vehicle, the M3 could hide behind terra in , protecting itself from counterfire, while the sensor package is elevated high above for a better view of the · surroundings. Such a pod would probably contain a thermal Viewer, a low-probabi lity-of-intercept radar , a laser range find er and a radio freq uency in terferometer.

The Basic Bradley chassis also forms the basis for the M987 Fighting Vehicle System a rmoured transporter. This is currently used as the basis of the MLRS multiple rocket launcher vehicle. A number of other derivatives have a lso been developed, including the XM I 007 AF AR V tank re­ammunition vehicle, and a Firefinder mobile radar vehicle using a Hughes phased-array surveillance rad ar.

Although the Bradley has not ye t been expor ted, severa l coun tries have exa mined it for possible

· .I, a e Britain consid ered licence prod uction, 1) L11 ( , . . I It opted to develop the MCV-80 lI1stead due to )l ssure from Bri tish industry. The M2 was pre. . . . Icmonstrated JI1 Sa udl Ara bi a, bu t purchase of the ~racilcY there is complicated by political resistance in the US Senate, which tends to be pro-Israeli . T he basi fVS chassis will be built in E urope as pa rt of Ihe ATO MLR S prog ra mme.

The M2 Bradley IFV is onl y one more step in the c1evelopmen t of modern infantry tac tics. I ts role in c ntemporary opera tions should a lso be seen in the larger 'context of a irmo bile infa ntry tac ti cs. If a nti­armour weapons continue to prolifera te on the ba ttlefield , a nd if their letha li ty continues to rise, IfVs may become increasing ly un viable. \tV hether they are replaced by heavy infa n try vehicles for ground assa ult tac tics , supplemented by infa ntry hel icopters fo r high-speed mobile opera tions, remains to be seen . "Ve may hope that the 40 yea rs of tranquill ity on the Centra l Front con tinues, a nd tha t the wretchedl y toug h busin ess of mecha nised infantry fig hting ca n slip into obli vion.

The Plates AI : M2 IFV, 1- 41s1 liljalllljl, 2nd Armored Divisioll ;

ForI Hood, T exas, 1984 T he Brad leys of the 2nd Armored Division a re almost uni ve rsa ll y fini shed in the four-colo ur MERDC scheme of f ores t G reen (FS34079) a nd

Field Drab (FS30 11 8) .vith Sa nd (FS30277) and Black blo tches. T he d ivision 's ve hicles usua ll y carry a bl ack tria ngle- as shown here- to distinguish them from the vehicles of the neighbouring lsI Cava lry Di vision, a lso stationed at fort H ood . T his Bradley has the traditiona l style of US bum per codes. T he black bumper codes were se lected for low visibility a nd have worked too well- they a re very d iffi cul t to read when pa inted over d ark ca mouflage colours. As a result, many uni ts now pa in t them over a Sand-coloured patch: here, '2 L, /I - I -4 1' a nd 'c26' . This vehicle has the turre t crew's na mes pa inted on the front turret smoke grenad e boxes: ' LTjJOZ" ' IAK' a nd 'SGT /BI LSBY' .

.112: l\l!2 IF V, 2- 41S1 liljall IljI, 211d Armored Divisioll; ForI Hood, T exas, 1985

In 1984 the 2nd Armored Di vision bega n adopting a new style of ba tta li on a nd compa ny insigni a to m a ke it easier to id entify uni ts d uring fie ld opera tions. T his insignia is supposed to be painted on the rear of the troop hatch of Bradleys, a nd on the comma nder 's hatch : the la tter is less common tha n the former. T he colour of the ou ter geo metri c shape identifies the regimen t; in this case it is light blue for the 4 1st Infa ntry (a nd red for the 1st Cava lry) . The sha pe of the outer geometric design indica tes the ba tta li on : di a mond ( 1st Bn. ) , squ are

The M 270 MLRS artillery rocket sys te m is bas ed on the M9B7 armoured transporter . This i s a derivative of the bas ic Bradley chassis . (Pie rre Touzin)

43

The CV AST was developed by FMC Corp. and Ares Inc. in response to the appearance of the Soviet BMP-2 with its long­range 30 IllITl auto cannon. Although there are no plans to begin building this vers ion, which mounts a 35 mm cannon, it is being developed as a standby in the event of future Soviet developments in this field. (US Army)

A comparison of the interior of the M2 IFV and M3 CFV. (FMC Corp.)

(2nd Bn. ), circle (3rd Bn. ) a nd pentagon (4th Bn. ). The inn er black geometric shape identifies the compa ny: diamond (A Co. ), square (B Co.), circle (C Co. ), pentagon (D Co.) and triangle (E Co. ). (A rela ted se t of ma rkings is shown in Vanguard 4 1, The k II Abrams BailIe Tank .) Bumper cod es here are '2- 6 -2-1-4 1 ' a nd 'A33 .'

Patch details are: (j ) IstPtn ., BCo., 1-4 1 InC ; (4) 2nd Ptn ., C Co. , 2-4 1 InC; (5) 3rd Ptn. , D Ca. , 3-4 1 Inf.; (6) 1St Ptn ., E Co. , 4-4 1 InC ; (7) 2nd Ptn ., C Co., 2- I Cava lry.

BI: kf2 IF V, I- 7th IrljantlY , j rd hljantlY Division; 'Rifolger' Exercise, Federal ReJJlIblic if German), September J984

The Bradleys sta tioned in Europe are a lmost uniforml y left in their original fac tory scheme of overa ll Forest Green. During summer 'R eforger'

Gunner's seat Commander's seat Seat NO.8 Seat No.9

Seat No.7

M21FV Seat No.6

Drive s seat Seat No.4 Seat NO.5 Seat NO.5 Commander's seat

Jump seat

M3CFV

Driver's seat Gunner's seat Seat No.4

44

r ",,,-ci,,,, the va ,iou, NATO uni " m divided into 'Orange' and 'Blue' armies to wage mock battles. During the 1984 exercise the I- 7th and I- 15th Infantry served with the Orange army, hence the orange temporary markings taped on this vehicle. The y d Infantry Division a lso uses a set of rear turret insignia to distinguish its ba tta lions. In the case of I- 7th Infantry, this consists of a white hexagon which identifies the ba ttalion , with inner geometric sha pes to identify the companies: an upwards tri angle (A Co.), a square (B Co. ), a circle (C Co. ) and a downwa rd tri angle (D Co. ). The vertica l bars indicate the pla toon . As mentioned earlier, the unit bumper codes are usua lly painted on a Sand-coloured pa tch, in tills case covering the whole transmission housing: '3-1/ I -7-1' and ' A/34' .

B2: lvf2 IF V, I - 15th Iryantl)l, Jrd Irifantl)l Division; 'Rifolger' Exercise, Federal RejJublic if German)!, SelJtember 1984

This vehicle is marked in a sinlila r fas hion to the vehicle above, but with changes for unit identifi­cation. The I- 15th Infantry uses an octagon as its battalion insignia, and the inner designs follow the same pa ttern as the I- 7th Infantry. The rear bumper codes a re painted over the rear stowage bins, the covers ofwhieh are pain ted overa ll Sand : '3-1 - 151' and 'A-I '2 ' .

CI: IH2 IF V, 7th Ilyantly , Jrd hyantl)l Division; 'RifOiger' Exercise, Federal RejJublic of German)!, Jal1l1 a1)1 1985

The 1985 'R eforger ' exercise was held in the winter instead of the summer, resulting in the use of some improvised snow camouflage on many vehicles. This M'2 is fini shed very similarly to those shown on Plate B, but with the obvious addition of extemporised sno';v camouflage. One minor change in marking detail was the addition of the vehicle crew names on the driver 's hatch and turret, on Sand rectangles. Bumper codes a re '3-1 / 1-7 -1 ' and 'A/ '2 3' . (This plate and Pla te B were researched with the assistance of Arnold Meissner .)

Th e evolutionary tree of the Bradley: (I) MII3 ACAV; (2) Product Itnproved MI13 (XM765); (3) YPR-765 AIFV; (4) XM8()()-T ARSV; (5) XM723 MICV; (6) M2 IFV.

(2)

45

C2: i\12 1FT, US Am1)1 Cold Regions Tesl Cenler; ForI Creel)!, Alaska, 1984

One of the earl y-production Bradleys was shipped to FOrl G reely for arctic weather tri a ls, and fini shed in a four-colour M ERDC pa ttern of Forest G reen , \'\l hile, Sa nd and Black. It ca rries lhe number ' I I '

in white on the bow plate, both hull sides, and the left rear stowage box cover. On the svvim vane is the na me DANGE R OUS D AN in red , with the Army Ma teri al Command and Army Cold R egions T est Center emblems on either side. As a fin a l touch a fantasy cha rac ter, d eri ved from F rank Frazetta 's painting T he Silver fif1arrior, has been add ed on the bow above the swim vane. (T his pla te was researched by Bob Lessels. )

D: i\12 Bradley, 1nler-)VATO T hree-Colour Camouj/age Scheme, 1985

In 1983 the Bundeswehr began pressuring other N A T O a rmjes to adopt a new, stand a rdised three~ colour ca mouflage. T he primary reason was the rea li sa tion tha t the nationa lity of JATO vehicles could readil y be recognised from the varying styles of ca mouflage painted on armoured vehicles of the differen t ATO a rmies. The US Arm y agreed to go a long with this decision, since it was pla nning to adopt a new ca mouflage sys tem anyway. T he older MERD C system, a lthough in many ways more sophisticated and effec ti ve than the German pa tterns, was very complica ted . It was supposed to be a ppli ed by units in the fi eld , and changed to

IN SIDE STOWAGE - CFV

SOUAD AR EA - LEFT REAR CORNER

M 129CHE "' IC Al AGENT AUTO ALARM

REf lll !'.IT

CAIIlE SPOOL AND REEL

"' 15 1. 2'" CHE"' IC 4 l AGENT

O£1E C TOR KIT

"" CHEM ICAL ACE'" AUTO AlM,M UNII

Cl ... ... "'OR[ 1.621.01101 AM MO ", t'4E r2j BO~ 191

SQUAD AREA - LEFT RE AR CO RN ER (con i'

PA DlOC K I21

DRIVER 'S STATION - RIGHT SIDE

"'21S CHEMIC AL ACEPIT

IoUT O ALARM REFILL KIT

LAW "OC ~ E1 m

ABC MIl OECQ t.l l "y , .. " TIOh "PlP ,I, R.I.TUS

8 QR[SIGHT

'" "Nl ENNI.

TELEPH ON[ SEl

SPONSON - LEn CENTER

SQUAD AREA - RIGHT RE AR COR N ER

TOW "" ' $$ll E CIOI

S IGN.l. l ,~ , TR IP FlAR£ C' /

SOUAD AR EA - RIGH T REAR COR NER (cont)

l

ma lch climatic changes. Its complexi ty frustrated many fi eld units, and the idea of a ltering the paint finish seasonally never caught on. Secondly, the MERDC scheme was app lied with a type of paint unsu ita ble for chemical decontamina tion. \"'hen the US adopts the new three-colour scheme, it will be fac tory-appli ed in a new semi-gloss pa int which is easier to decontaminate. I t is not clear if the US Army will adopt colour patterns other than this Fores t Green , Black and Field Drab version , more suitable for prairie, desert or winter conditions.

E, F, G: 1\12 alld ivI3 interior views: EI : OveraLL view, 1\12 interior , lookingJorwardJrom rear

ramp E2: Overall view, IvI3 interior, lookingJorwardJrom rear

ramI) FI: 1\12 iFV, right side F2: Ivi3 CF V, right side GI: Ivf2 i FV, lift side G2: M3 CFV, Id i side

The M1047 LAV-25 is the US Marine equivalent of the M2 Bradley IFV. The Army considered adopting tills vehicle for its light divi s ions in lieu of the Bradley, but this idea was s quashed both by a lack of Army enthusiasm for the vehicle and b y Congressional refusal to fund Army acquisition. (GM-Canada)

Note that these photographs show vehicles without full interior stowage, which is illustrated in the accompanying monochrome photographs and stowage diagrams. Note a lso the inevitab le per­spec ti ve distortion caused by the lens necessary for these very short- range views.

H: US M echanised bifantljl Uniforms 1986 This pla te shows the newer pattern of uniforms and eq uipmen t being adopted by the mechanised infan try in the Ig80s. Plate HI is a vehicle crewman, and is seen wea ring the DH 132 CVC (Combat Vehicle Crew) helmet. H e is wearing the stand ard Woodland pattern battledress, a nd is armed with the M23 1 Firing Port W eapon (FPW). The FPW is des igned for use from the Bradley firing

47

ports, and the infantry sq uad on board each have a normal II 16A2 as well as an FP' J\I . Plate H2 is the squad gunner, equ ipped with an M 249 SAW (Sq uad Automatic Weapon), a US version of the Belgian F ] Minimi light machine gun. H e is 'Nearing the normal \I\lood land pattern battledress, a PASGT ves t and the Alice equipment. Plate H3 is a rifleman, a rmed with the M I6A2 assault rifle and

Notes sur les planches en couleur

AI Finition d e pcinturc d a ns les qu a lrcs coulclIrs J\JERDe; Ie tri a ng le na ir cst l'insignc d e Ia c1 i"ision: IlUIllCroS d c code de i'unil c d e r a rmcc a lllc ricainc standa rd pci llls sur les garde-boll es; noms de I'equ ipage pcims sur la lOurc lic. A2 1\OU\'Cil UX ins ig ncs 198.~ d e ('ullite: b ic li cla ir pour Ie { I e rcgimclll , ronnc ca rrec pour Ie 2C rCf,rl mc l1l ; sig uc inlc ritur no ir d cnm a nl la co m pag nie, p il l" fo rme- A = iosa ngc, B = ca rre , C = disque, D = pClllagollc , E = triang le.

BI Fillil ioll de pcint u rc tota lclllCIlL ,·cne appliq uee ell lI sinc; les insigncs Icmpo ra ircs oranges inciiq llclH Armec 'O range' e ll ma nDC LI He ' J?eJorgrr'; l'hex-agone bl a nc pe rlne l d ' identifier Ie ba taiJlo li e t les formes illlerie li res les cOlllp<lgnies- A = tria ng le ;\ poimc ell ha llt ; B = carre , C = disque, 0 = tri a ng le;l pointe e ll bas, Les barres venica les permc([ cnt d ' idcllIificr Ie pclOton , B2 Finitio ll d c pcilllllre simibi re ;l ce llc du \'c hi culc c i-dcss lis m ais a \'ce d es insig nes octagon au x pcrme([ (l nl d' identifier Ie ler Bma iJlol1 , 15c in fa nter ie.

C. Ca m ouflage tempora ire d c neige sur finiti o ll d e peinLure \'crte, C2 POll I' les CprCl1\TCS a rc tiques, pcilllurc d e ca mouflage e ll \ 'e rt , sa ble. no ir Cl blanc, Les illsig ll c.:s so m celles d e 101 US ... Im!>' " /(l Ieri(l/ COlIIlII(llld Cl d e r Am!)' Cold I?t'giol1 l?l'Srafc/t Cmlrr; Ie nom ' D(lngerous D(lII' e l Ie d essill d e Frallk Fm<.(' I1(1 SOnt ajOlllCS pa r r CCJu ipage, Le nllmero ' 1 I ' CSt peint ;l r a\'a lll , d es d eu x coteS et Sll r 101 bo ire d e ra ngcm elll de coq ue a r r icre gauche.

D. , D2 NOll \'e llc filliti o ll 1985 en trois coulctlrs, qui sera ad optee pour lOUS les \'ehi c lIlcs bl indcs d e I'O'rA N pOllr ra isons d e scc llritc, afin que 101 Il a lio na lit c nc pllisse plus e Lre rCCOllnlle d 'a prcs les finiLi olls d e ca m ouflage.

E r i\1 2, illlcric lir. en rcga rd a nt \'c rs J" a \'a nt. E2 i\1 3, interie lll", en rega rd a lll \-e rs r ;1\'a II I.

F. ~1 2 , inL eric lIr, cotc d ro it. F2 i\ 13: imcriclIr, COtc droit.

G. ~12 , imc rie ll r , co tc gauche. G2 i\ 13, illter ie ur , COLC ga uche.

H. Ho mme d'equipage du Hrild lcy port a llt lecasque D H 132, Ia tel1ue d ccom ba l de mod ele 'forc t' c t tenant Ie Firillg PorI Ir ('(IIJOII ~ 1 23 1-fll s il i\ II G modific pou r cmploi ;l pa rt ir d es o rificcs d e tirdu Bradley, H 2 ~ I itra ill e urde r escadron porta III la tCflll e d e comba t ' fore t' , Ie casquc Kcvla r (" Fritz')' l' cquipement A LICE el pOrLalll la mitra illctl e Icgi:rc ~ 1 2 '~9 SA \ V, H3 Fusilier d ' lIn escadron d ' illfal1lcrie rncc<lniscc, port a III la m eJ11 e tCIlUC d e base qu e H 2, Les bo tt es cxpcrimelll a ies brun es pon ces par ta us ccs hOJ11J11es fu re lll supprirnces "pres line brc\'e dist rihut ion cn 19R3 R I.

fitted out in a simila r fashion to the gunner. Note that these figures wear the experimenta l no-polish combat boots. These were issued to select units for a short ti me in 1983- 84, but were withdrawn due to unacceptably short life. A modified verSIOn IS

expected to replace the traditional gloss black leather combat boot in the next fevv years.

Farbtafeln

AI Vie rfa rbiges l\l /::RDC Farbcllschcm a ; schwal7;Cs Dreieck a ls Di\'id ionsah. zeichen : tibliche us Arm)' Einhc it COcl ellUll1 l11e rn a ul'd cn KOl fl (i 'eln a u fgemalt· r\a mcll d er Bcsa lzlI llg a uf d e r K a nzel. A2 Nelle Einheitsm a rkic ru ngen \'on 1 98~ he ll b la u id entifizie rl d as 4 1st R egiment , d as Vierec k stehr fij I' d as 2nd Batai lJoll d as inllcrc sChw'lI-le Abzciche ll fiil_' die KOl11pa nie, j e nach Form- A = Karo, II = Vic:reck, C = Scheibc, D = Flillfcck, E = Dreiec k,

B. Grii llcs Fa rbsche lll a, in dcr Fabrik a ufge trage ll ; \ 'o rlibcl:gehcnd e orangcf.,r. bene i\ l a rkierlingell bczeichnen d ie 'Ora nge' Army bei d er O b u lIg ' I?ejorgrr'; d weisse Sechseck bczeichn et d as Ba ta illo ll u nd d as illilere Abzeichen el i Ko mpa ll ie ll - A = a ufwans zcigendes Dreieck, B = Viercc k, C = Srheibc, 0 :::: ~,b\\';i rt s zcigeno es Drcicck, Die senkrecht ell S trcifc l1 ide lllifizicrc lI d en Zug. B~ Ahnlichcs Schcl11" wie bei d elll o bigen Fa hn~,eug, a bel' mit achteckigc Abzeichcn fij r das 1st BIl" 15th Infa ntry,

C. Vorlibcrge hcno e Sc hnccka mouflage tiber dCIll g r linell Farbschem a. C2 Fil a rkti sche Versuche ist die K a mo un"ge in g riin , sa nd r.'uben, sc h\\'an~ lind wci~ Die Abzeiche ll geh6rell ZlIlll US tim!)' l\/aleria/ COII/m(lnt/ und dem AmI)' Cold Regio T t'sl Cmler; d er Nam e ' D(lngerous Dan' lind die F1'lIIIk Fra::.rll(l Figu r Slammen \'on d er Besa lzung, Di e N UIlllllc r I I ist a uf d er Vo rderseit e a n beiden Scile a ll fge m a lt , hintcn links cler Lad ekaslen ,

D., D2 Neues Fa rbschcm a \'on 1985J d as a us S icherheitsgri.illde ll bei a ile Pa nze rfa h n~c llge ll d el' NATO eingefiihrt ",erdc ll so il , d a mit d ie Natio na lita t sicb nicht la ngcr a nha nci d e r Ka m ouflage fcsIste llclI liiss l.

E. ?\1 '2. Inneres, \ '0 11 hil1le ll gesehcli . E2 ~ 1 3, Inl1eres, \'o n him en gesehen.

F. ~ 1 '2 , Inne res, rechtc Sci Ie. F2 ~ 1 3 , Inne res, fcch le Seite,

G. ~ 1 '2. I lllieres, lillke Sci Ie. G2 ~ 1 3 , Inne rcs. lillke Scitc.

H. Bradley Ucsa tz ll nb"S lllilg li ed mil DI-I I 3~ Helm . Ka lliptallz lIg mit ' \\'ood land ?\ Iuste r und l\ 123 1 Firing PorI 'I'mIJo,,- ein modi fiz ierles ?\11 6 fiir die Bradl Schiessc ha n en , H 2 i\ IG -G ruppellschiitze mil ' \\'oodland ' K a lll pfa nzug, Kc\'1 H elm (" Fritz ), , ILlC/c· AusriiSl u ng und eincm le ichten ~1 249 SA il· ~I G. Hl Gcwe hrschiitze cineI' Pa nzerinfalltc riegruppc mi t de l' g leichen Grulld ausrli stun ",ic in 1-12, Die cx perimel1tclle ll brau llell S tiefel a lle r diesel' ~ la nne r wurden nac cin e I' k\ll7;Cn Pe riode 1983/84 zuriickgezogcn ,

IlC

sh r a to IS

lck

en 11 ....

OSPREY· V ANCUARD

A seri es of books describing key units a nd weapons sys tems of 20th century warfa re, prepa red by leading milita ry ex perts for the enthusiast a nd modellcr, a nd illustra ting a uthentic deta ils of a rmour a nd supporting vehicles, camo uAage, ma rkings, uniforms, insig ni a a nd weapons.

Avec annotations en francais sur les planches en couleur

Mit Aufzeichnungen auf deutsch uher die Farhtafeln

(3) US 1St Infantry Division 1939- 45 (6) The Lee/Grant Tanks in British Service (8) US 1St Marine Division 1941- 45

(13) The Churchill Tank (15) The Sherman Tank in British Service

1942- 45 (16) The Panzerkampfwagen ill (17) The Stuart Light Tank Series (18) The Panzerkampfwagen IV (19) Armour of the Middle East Wars 1948, 8 (20) The Tiger Tanks (21) The PzKpfw V Panther (22) The Centurion Tank in Battle (23) British Tanks in N. Africa 1940- 42 (24) Soviet Heavy Tanks (25) German Armoured Cars and Recce Half-

Tracks 1939- 45 (26) The Sherman Tank in US and Allied Service (27) Armour of the Korean War 1950- 53 (28) The 6th Panzer Division 1937- 45

STEVEN J. ZALOGA was born in 1952 , received his BA in history from U nion Coll ege, a nd his l'vIA fro m Columbia U ni versity. H e has pu blished over twent y books a nd numerous a rticles dea ling with modern military technology, especia ll y armoured ve hj cle c1e-

(29) The M47 & M48 Patton Tanks (30) Polish Armour 1939- 45 (31) US Half-Tracks of World Wa r II (32) The SdKfz 251 Half-Track (33) German Light P a n zers 1932- 42 (34) MI13 Series (35) Armour of the Pacific War (36) Long Range Desert Group (37) Modern SovIet Combat Tanks (38) Mechanised Infantry (39) US Armour Camouflage and Markings

1917- 45 (40) US Light Tanks 1944- 84; M24 Chaffee, M41

Walker Bulldog and M551 Sheridan (41) The MI Abrams Battle Tank (42) Armour of the Vietnam Wars (43) The M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (44) Anti-Tank Helicopters (45) Amtracs: US Amphibious Assault Vehicles (46) The Renault FT Light Tank

vclopment. His main a rea of interes t is milit ary a ffairs in the Soviet nion and Eastern Europe in the Second \IVorld "Val' , a nd he has written as we ll on American a rmoured forces. Steven Za loga li ves in Connec ticut.

I SBN 0-85 045 - 655 - X

111111111 9 780850456554