OSPREY · VANGUARDS

US 1st MARINE DIVISION 1941-45

Philip Katcher

VANGUARD SERIES

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

US 1st. MARINE DIVISION

1941-45

Text by PHILIP KATCHER

Colour plates by MIKE CHAPPELL

OSPREY PUBLISHING LONDON

Published in 1979 by Osprey Publishing Ltd ~l cmber company of the Ccorg{' Philip Group 12 14 Long Acre, London \\'C2 E 9LP J; Copyright 1979 Osprey Publishing Ltd

This book i!i copyrigh ted under the Berne Convention. All rigills reserved. Apan from dny fair dealing for the purpose of private stud}, research, cr iLic ism or review, as permiued uncleI' the Copyright Act, 1956, no part of this publication ma~ be reproduced , sLOrcci in a retrieval sys tem , or lransmiltcd in an~ form or b) an)' means, e lectronic, electrica l, chemical, mechanical, optical , pholOcopying, recordi ng or otherwise, without the prior permission o f the copyrig ht owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.

ISBN 0 85045 3 119

Filmsct by BAS Prime rs Limit ed, Over \\'allop, Hampshire Printed in Hong Kong

Cor't'T illustration ~rikc Chappell's cover painting shows mcn of the 1St

Marine Division advancing thro ugh the elephant g rass o f Cape Gloucester in December 1943, supported by a cast-hu ll ~14'\1 Sherman tank or the 1St US~IC Tank Battalion. It is taken from a photograph. ilnd shows the \'cry plain appearance of tanks of the divisional banal ion all markings, including national stars, are om itted exccpt 1'01' smail white vehicle numbers on the front and rear quarters of the turret. The printed camouflage combat suit was not much used in the 1St Division. according to pholOgraphic ev idence ; we have included it here for imcrcst, but in fact the normal OD fatigues seem to

have been the norm at Cape Gloucester.

Before t he Battle

On , February '94' the First Brigade of the US Marine Corps, which had been formed to test the latest ideas on amphibious warfare, became the First Marine Division. Already known in the corps as ' the raggedy-ass Marines' because of their lough assignments, the new First Division COI1-

tinued its rugged training schedule. ' \Ye never really came out of the boondocks (rom then on,' a Division veteran later recalled , 'from the fall of '940 when the brigade went to Guanta liamo (Cuba) until after it had , as the First Division , secured Guadalcanal. '

Spring '94' found the Division invoked in th e

l\rarincs man a ,~omlll <lilli-aircraft cmplact l1lc llI (note range­finde r on right .. overlooking Ihe beaches of Guadalcanal. This. and all other photographs, COllrtCS) of uS ~Iarin c

Corps)

largest American exercise of its kind, a mass landing olfNew River, North Carolina. When the exercise ended, most participants returned to

comfortable bases but not the First. They went into 'tenl city' at the brand-new Camp Lejul1c, North Carolina. There Lhey continued their training in jungle terrain surprisingly similar to that of the ye t-unknown island of Guadalcanal. Pearl Harbor, 7 December '94', found the Division with a strength of only 518 officers and 6,8'7 enlisted men , butthe J apanesc sneak attack brought in a wave of volunteers.

In latc t. [arch '94' the Division received orders

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for overseas dUL Y. The 7th Marines- a Marine Corps regiments is ca ll ed a 'Marine' - left Norfolk . Virginia on t a April , reaching Apia, Weslern Samoa on 8 May. They slayed for fi ve monlhs on defensive duty. The reSl of the Division weIll lO Wel ling lon, New Zealand.

The tSl Marines and supporting unils had to go by rail to San Francisco, Californ ia, to be shipped out, wh ile th e 5 th M arines and Division art illery (Divan I' ) left Norfolk on to M ay 1942 on the Wakifield, an old passenger liner. ' A few of us sha red th e terrible lruth that life j ackels and life boats ex.isled for less than half our numbers,' Division Commanding General A. A. Vandegrift wrote la ter. 'Fonunately enem y and weather co­o perated La prov ide an uneventful if tiresome trip, broken on ly on the lasll a p. Due to illlense heat we were sa iling wi lh hatc hes opell despite a heavy sea. Suddenly the old girl slruck a monstrous swell th at serll LOlls of waler below deck. For a mom ent I fca red pani c, but some unknown hero broke the tension by yelling, "\rVomen and children first!" 1

In 1942 a US Marine Divis ion included the following basic comba t units:

Thrtt inJanl1)! regiments, each of lhree battalions, each o f approx. 1,000 men Ollt' artillery regimen/, of four battalions, fielding

1 2 X I 551l1m 12 x Tosmm

36 x 751llnl g uns OneerlgilletT Tegime7l1 ofapprox. 2,500 men 01le lallk ballalioll inili a ll y equipped wilh ~13 Stuan wnks ant US Nauy Const Difmce balla/ion Support unitJ lOla lling some 2,600 men.

The exaCl composilion of lhe ISl Marine Division al \·arious sLages of ils service in the Second \Vorld ''\'ar will be found lisled al lhe end of the main narrative l(,Xl.

The Division's new camp was on North Island , some lhirty-five mil es from Welling ton. Staff officers moved into the Ho tel Cecil in downtown Wellington . The Division had never been posted so close to a city th e size of Wellington before, and th e men took advantage of the city's delights and

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the friend ly inhab itallls. One day General Van­degrifl met 'an elderly, stern- looki ng gelllieman wilh a clipped white moustache .' The old ma '1 wanled to know ifhe was the genera l com mand ing the Division. He was, th e genera l said. The old ma n then sa id , ' \ Vell , si r, I am very g lad to mee t you. I want yo u LO know, sir , tha t I have lived at th e Hotel Cecil for twent y-six yea rs.' General Vand egrift , knowing how the residents were evicted to make room for hi s officers, braced himself ror a blast. 'I wanl yo u to know, sir,' the o ld genlleman went on, 'how pleased 1 am to move rro m my apartment so that you and yo ur o ffi cers have a place to do your job.' Afterwards the general wond ered how many peo ple in other countri es would have been so pleasant a bout th eir enforced moves.

Anoth er meeting the general had was less pleasing. Vice-Admiral Ghormley, South Pacific Area commander, mel General Vandegri ft on 26 June 1942 in Auckland . H e told the general that the Division was to 'O ccupy and d efcnd Tulagi and adjacelll posilions (Guadalcanal a nd Florida Isla nds and the Sama Cruz Islands) in ord er to deny these areas lO th e enemy and to provide United States bases in preparation for further offensive ac tion. ' When was this to take place, the general asked . 'D-Day will be I August,' replied th e adm ira l.

The Div ision's second echelon was not due until II Jul y. " ot a ll the Di"ision's equ ipmem was 'combat-loaded,' so thal it could be brought ashore hrst wilh items needed for combat. The Division had less th an a mon th to unload a ll its eq uipment and reload il comba t style. Even though the aClUal date of' D-Day" was la ter pushcd back to 7 August, it still took around-the-clock work lO un load and reload ships. On 31 Jul y the Di vision pushed olffor Guadalcanal with 956 officers and 18,146 en lisled men. It was only arter they were aboard and under way that the men learned th eir destina tion, and flllal plans were made.

'This is goi ng to be a difficull matter, ' one lie utenant-colonel commanding lroops going in on the first wave said at their final briefing, 'with rivers to cross, lhe grass four to five fee t ta ll, and the drainage ditches . .. . But it ca n be done, and it must be done, and we've got lO lead th e way.'

Guadalcanal The important thing about Guada lcanal was not SO much the taking and holding of an airfield, important though that may have been. J t was that for the first time Americans attacked and beat J apanese. The spell of defeats at Wake I sland and the Philippines, Pearl H arbor and Indonesia was broken. Guadaleanal proved that the J apanese could be and eventuall y wo uld be beaten.

Guadaleanal itself was an accidental battle. Xobody wou ld have chosen to fight there. J ack London , who described the lush, densely jungled island as a malaria-ridden 'place of death,' wro te, 'H I were a king the worst punishment I cou ld inflict on my enemies would be to banish them [0

the Solomons.' The islands were J apa n's southern­most outposts. Previous conquerors had been smart enough to avoid living on Guadaleanal. By the time of the invasion the only civi lian in­habitants were in several Cathol ic missions , a few coconut plantations and a Burns-Philp trading station. The island's main population com prised giant lizards, scorpions, crocod il es, poisonous spid ers, leeches and ferocious white ants.

These elements made up the bulk of the . defending force thaI met the l\la rines when th ey

lancled. [nslead of putti ng up the fierce defcnce

:\ sand-bagged 7smm pack howitzer position on the COas l or Guadalcanal.

expected , the few J apanese in th e landing areas ned on spolting the Marines. At g.08am on 7 August, the boats carrying the 1st and 3rd Ba tta lions of th e 5th Marines (hereafle r written as 1/5th Marines and3/5th M arin es), bore away for shore. Two minutes la ter the battalions hit the beach , landing abreast with the 1/5th M arines on th e right. At Ilam the 1st Marin es (reinforced ) landed behind th e twO battalions and a ll units began moving towards a hill described as 'the grassy knoll ' by a Bri tish planter before the lIl VaS IOIl.

T L was the terrain rather · than the J apanese which slowed down the Marine advance. General Vandegrift, accom panied by a corporal a rmed wit h a l2-gauge shotgu n, landed shonly after the assau lt troops and looked over their advance. 'On the beach west of the main peri­meter I found the 1St Battal ion, 5th Marines, moving as ifil were abollt LO encounter the entire J mperial a rm y. I gave the battalion commander hell .. the day's objecti ve was the TenarLl [aclllally, the IIu) river, about two miles west, wh ich I wanted defended by nightfall.

'A t Cates' C P I learned that his right battalion was bogged down in an imm ense rain forest west of

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the Tlu [actually, the Tenaru] river. Our inror­mants in New Zealand had railed to report thi s obstacle, a foeLid morass so thi ck with overgrowd1 you couldn ' t sec Mt Austen or an ything else rrom its depths. In working their way throu gh it the troops, in poor cond ition rrom the weeks aboard ship, seemed about done in by the heat and high humidity. '

American planners, working with vcry o ld maps and verbal inrormation rrom planters and visitors, had incorrectly labell ed the Ilu River the Tenarll and vice \'c rsa. This not on ly confused them th en , but has confused his lOrians ever since, with some accountS using period designations and others (such as this one! ) the correct names.

While landings on Guadaleanal itself were unopposed save by nature, simu ltaneous landings within the island chain we re meeting with stiff opposition.

The 1St ~Jarinc Raider Baltalion was se nt to the island orTu lagi, the capital orthe British olomon Islands Protectorate, on th e Florida side of the chain. The battalion , under LOugh LiClilcnanl­Colonel Merrill E. ·Red Mike' Edson, landed its 18' and 'D' Companies at 8am on th e western end or the roughl y rectangular island. The spot was chosen in the hope th at it would be undefended.

Marines wade across (he l.unga river al (he stan of a dusk patrol.

6

Such was the case, and a sig nal went alit at 8, I 5, 'Landing successrul , no opposition.' Quickl y U1C

2/5th 1\farines, under Li eute nant -Colonel Harold E. Rosec rans, landed behind th e Raiders and turned north-west whi le the Ra iders headed south-east. The north-west was quickly co\·ered without meeting any Japanese, and the 2/5th I\l arines then returned to sllppon Edso n'g troops,

The rvfarines met their first resistance in the small town around the Burns- Philp docks on the nonh end orthe island. There the :YIarines halted arter taking mocr three-quarters or the island. a long a ridge running between a wharr on the north and the Residency buildings towards the south. The men dug themselves shallow two- and th ree-man roxholes ror the night.

It was the night th e J apanese wcre waiting ror. According to one or their training manuals} '\Vcsterners being very haug ht y, effeminate and cowardly intensely dislike figlHing in the rain or mis t or in the dark. They ca nnOl concei vC' night to be a proper time for battle though it is excellent for dancing. LI1 these weaknesses lie our great opponul1lt)'.

The Raider companies werc in linc, reading from the north, ' S'} 'D ', 'A' and ·C'. The Japanese. under cover or darkness and mOrlar fire,

hit bCl\veen Companies . .\' and 'D\ clilting through and then turnin<; on \ \ '. The company held on, turning back four di[[erenl a u acks. One of those who slOpped the Japanese was Pri \'ate First Class J ohn Ahrens. Xext morning he was found, still cl utchi ng his Browning AUlOmatic RiO e, his green fatigues splashed black with his own blood which oozed out or fivc wounds in his chest, two rrolll bullets and three rrom bayonets. 1\ dead J apanese officer lay across his legs and a sergeant next to him. Some lhirlccn more dead Japanese lillered the ground in front of his roxhole. Cap tain Lewis \\'. Walt, Co. 'A' com­mander, gathered the slowly breathing Ahrens in his anns. 'Captain.' the dying man whispcred. 'they tried to comc ov('r me last night, bUl l don't think they made il.' The capta in picked him up to take him to the Residency lO die. 'They didn·t. J ohnny,' he said softl), 'they didn'l. '

The allacks had cost the J apanese dearly and they could make only token opposition as the next morning the 2/5th ;<- l arines pushed passed the Raiders, taking the last pa rl or the island h) 3pm. The pallern for Pacifi c hallies had he en scl.

.\nother large island in the chain was Florida, Ilhich fell to Co. 'B', 2nd ~! arines without opposition. Tiny Gavulll, a speck some 300 yards

SEAL ARK <! a

? ,f

f

~C. .ALE IN "'1ILES

CHANNEL 4:'

wide and 500 yards long, was a lOugh nutlO crack. ho\\·c\'Cr. l 'he Parachute Battalion landed there rrom boats, uncler coveri ng fire [i'om destroyers, at about noon on 7 i\uguSl. The naval nrc broke up J apanese seaplane ramps, so several boats de­toured to land by a nearby concrete dock. As th ey hit the beaches, coveri ng fire ceased and the wcll­dug-in J apanese opened up. The ballalion com­mander was hit a lmost as soon as he landed. One OLit or every len m('n who made it to th e dock was wound ed and the whole right fl ank was pinned clown on the narrow beach. It was not until 2pm that a squad took th e highest point on thc island , Hill t48. Ewn so, the troops cou ld not move olf the island to take the ncarby and equally small Tanambogo sin ce so many J apa nese remained on Gavulli hidden in caves and pillboxes.

\"'hile ~·/[ arines wenl abolll the island lOssing explosive charges inlO these ca\'es, at 6.45pm Co. 'B', 2nd ~Iarines tried to cross the narrow strait to

Tanambogo. Flares ex posed thcm to enemy ore when sti ll in the wa ter, and they had to fall back. The night brought constant attacks from in­dividual J a panese who crawled Ou t of their caves lo toss grenades into Marines' fox holes. The nex t day Lieutenant-Co lonel Robert C. Hunt's 3/0nci ~Iarines successfull y landed on Tanambogo with two tanks. The J apanese slOpped one of th e tanks by jamming a bar into its treads, and then co\'ered it with 1\lo loLOv cock tails. One 1\larin c threw.open the lurret ha tch and jUlllped oul. Rolling 0[[ th e turret, he lanclcd in a sha llow hole only to be rushed by J apa nese. 1 nfalltrymen began picking 0[[ the J apanese aile by one, and even tu all y the tanker go t back to safet}'.

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The three islands around Guadalcanal ­Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo- had been garrisoned by some 1,500 J apa nese. Of these, twcnty~five were ca ptured ali ve and some seventy were thought to have escaped LO o ther isla nds. The rest were dead a grim indication of what th e Marines could expect in th e future.

On Guadalcanal propel' the enemy had not yet been seell in any la rge numbers. f1 eeing J a pa nese abandoned , on th eir airfield, two gene rators, machine shops, an air-compressor faClory for torpedoes and even an icc plant, which th e Marines qui ckl y decora ted with a sign : 'Tojo l ee Plant, Under New Management. ' By th e 9th the airfield, named 'H enderson Fi eld ' a ller Ylajor LofLOn R. H enderson, a !'vl arin e lI )'er killed at Midway, was firmly held by M arin es. A defensive perim eter some 9,600 ya rds long was SC l up , with th e Divarty's 7smm and 10511101 howitze rs in its centre. On 20 August two squadrons, one of fighters and the other of dive bombers, landed at Henderson Ficld LO make it their base.

Things were no t a ll Lhat good , howeve r. The US Navy was ob liged by pl a ne losses and petrol shortages LO withdraw lh e supponing sh ips. Except for th e twO air squadrons, the Di visio n was on llS own.

At first, the Japanese 17th Army, under Lieul enant-General Haru ki chi :Vl ya kutake, did not realize the potential threat of He nd erson Field. Considering the ~larines there to be simpl y

A patrol heads up the lIu . in search of two troublesome Japanese nmm field guns.

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Ll. -Ccn. Thomas A. Holcomb, Col. ~lcrritt A. Edson ofLhe Raider Bn., and 1S t Division commander ~J aj.-Gcn . Alexan­der .\ . Vandcgrin confer dU ling Gen. Holcomb's inspection of Guadalcanal.

a nuisa nce, they sent a force of some 6,000 men und er Genera l Ki yo take K awaguchi to retake the isla nd . Genera l Kawaguchi , who LOld a reporter that th e a llack would be ·extremely serious business', had his men paid and well fed to put them in good hea rt for the light. Then, juSt before midni ght on 18 August the advan ce party of Co lonel Ki yo no Ichiki a nd 9 15 men of the 28th In fa lllry Regiment landed on Guadalcanal. Leav­ing some 125 men LO hold the beachhead, Co lonel Ichiki 's force pushed LOwa rds the dug-in Marines.

At abo ut I .Isam o n 2 J Aug ust, Coloncll chiki 's fo rce was facing 2/ 1St Marines dug in a long th e lIu river. A green fl are was (he sig na l for a banzai attack. A M arine gua rd fired a single sho tLOwards the fl a re, and th en the J apanese ca me splashing across the green sc um of that stag nant creek. Pri va te R obe rt Lecki e was one of the defenders:

I£vcryone was firing, every weapon was sound­ing voice; but this was no o rc hestra tio n, no terribly beautiful symphony of dea th , as decadent rear·echelon observers write. Here was caco­phony; here was dissonance; here was wildness~ here was [hat absence of rhythm , the loss of limit, for everyone fires what, when and where he c hooses; here was booming, sounding, shri eking, wailing, hiss ing, crashing, sha king, gibbering noise. Here was helL '

One i\llarinc machine g unne r nicknamed 'The Indi an' was ca ug lll by a burst from a J apanese machine g un and died , his finger pressed LO the trigger, his weapon co ughing out bull ets as his dead body leaned in LO it. In death he fired twO

hundred morc rounds inLO the oncomll1g Japanese.

Private AI Schmidt, wounded in the leg, the rest of his crew dead a bout him, kept loading a nd firing his machine gun across th e unmoving Stream. Finall y one J a pa nese tossed a hand grenade into his foxhole, th e fl ying ~'agments

blinding him a nd tea ring into his a rms a nd should er. ' J can smell the rOllen buggers' , he yelled, and kept on firing. When fellow Marines finally gOtLO him, he'd been firing steadil y for over five hours. Private Schmidt was award ed the Medal of Honor.

About 2.30am th e reserve pl atoo n o f Co. 'G' went into acti on. An artillery ba rrage was call ed in on th e persistent J a pa nese a t a bout 3am. M 3

tuan tanks from Co. 'll', I st T ank Baualion, fired cannister from th eir 37mm guns into the J apanese in fantry, then drove forwa rd , crushing J apanese hiding in th e shrubbery . Ordered to return, the tank command er declined with th e words, 'Leave us alone- we' re LOa busy killing J aps!' At a bout 8.30a m th e ' lISt Marines cam e up, and by th en th e J a pa nese knew it was all over . Pinned aga instlhe sea, some 250 survi vors tri ed LO escape along the beach a t a bout 2pm, onl y to be

hit by waiting fi ghters from Henderson Field . The Malines took only fifteen prisoners, thirteen of whom were wounded . Virtu ally a ll the rest \·\lere d ead. T otal l\1arine losses we re thirty-fou r kill ed and seventy-five wounded.

'The a llac k o f th e l chiki de tachment', T okyo was inform ed, 'was no t entirel y successfuL'

On 2 1 August the 2/5th II-l a rines were brought from Tulagi to fo rm a mobil e reserve for th e G uad a lca na l garrison.

The Japanese reali zed tha t their error lay in underes tim a ting US strength on Guad alcanal, a nd so sent Genera l Ka waguchi 's 35 th Brigade of some 2,400 men to T aivu Po int, whil e Colonel Akinso ukc Oka's 1, 100 men land ed a t Kokum­bona, ten miles west of th e a irfield . The plan ca lled for ajoint a llack.

Offi cers in th e 35 th Brigade, white crosses pa inted on th eir backs for qu ick identifica tion, led a n a llack agai nst the main position d ue south of" th e fi eld along a high point th erea fter kn own as ' Blood)' Ridge'. At a bout 9.30pm they ran in to

Men of the 7th !\1arincs lake a break during the advance on the Mataniko. )JO I C detai ls of dress and equipment, and the grenade pouch rig worn by Ihe man in lhe middlcground.

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A heavy r 5SInln ho\\ il'lcr in position on Cu;tclaJcanal.

Co. 'C' , ~[arin e Raid ers, driving a whole platoon back aga inst th e Lungga. Company 'C' rell back, joined by Co. ' B', but the ro ugh Lerra in kept Lh e J apanese fro m taking ad \'an tagc of their \·ietory.

The neX L d ay th e 2/5Lh Marines were seill to suppon Co lo nel Edso n 's Ra iders, despite hi s protests that Lhe R a iders a lone co uld hold th c ridge . 1\ [OS t o r th e 2nd Ballalio n ncver gOt to Lhe ridge, held up by ro ug h Lerrain and J a panese air attac ks. New defensive lines were dug aro und the southern slo pe orLhe high knob in Lh e celllre orLhc ridge .

As daylighL faded away, Lhe noise from Lhe Japanese lines in creased . A smoke po t was roll ed into ~1arine lines with the yel l 'Gas a ttac k' , probably rrom a n Eng lish-spea king Japanese. Finall y th e Japanese, screaming and firing th eir weapons from their hips, cam e o n. 'The attack was a lm ost cOnStalll,' wrOLe 2/5 th commander :--Iajor Willi a m M cKennon , ' like a rain LhaL subsides ror a moment and then pours the hard er. In m os t 0('

these assaulLs LheJaps never reached o ur lines .. . vVh en one wave was mowed down and I m ea n mowed down- another rollowed it inLo deaLh. Some or th e J a p rushes carri ed Lh ern inLO our posiLions a nd Lh ere was ug ly ha nd-La -hand fi ght­ing. But nOt one of our men, LO my know ledge, m et deaLh LhaL night by a Jap bayo net.'

The whole line slowly rell bac k und er J apanese pressure, re-rorming a lo ng whaL had been th e

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battalio n reserve line, while I05mm howitzen o pe ned up in su pporl. By dawn it was all over AnotherJapancse attack 'was not entirely success· rul. '

Colonel Edson and one or h is com pa ny com· mand el'S were awarded :\1eda ls or Honor ror their night 's work. General K awaguchi reponed 633 men dead a nd 505 wounded. The survi,·ors. bea te n and starvi ng, made lheir way to Co lonel Oka 's pos ition. For th e moment LhcJapanese had bee n SLOpped.

AL this poinL General \ 'andegrift relt SLrOIlR enough lO begin oUensi,'e o pera Lions. On 23 SepLember th e 1/ 7Lh t- larines were sent LO cross the t- fa taniko a nd scout the hill ) count ry beyond Lhat river. Qu ickl y Lh ey ran illlo some J a panese, and 2/ 5 th M ari nes were sent as reinforcements. B} the 26t h the two ballal io nss Lill had nOt crossed the Mataniko, and th e Ra iders were sent up to attempt the c rossing. IL look three separate atte mpts to ga in a fomhole! o n th e western side of th e river, with th e Marin es taking more casualties than in a ny other pan o r the campa ign, but by 9 OCLOber th ey were across and their lin es had been ad· va nced three mi les.

The Japanese were still not ready to g ive up Guadalcanal. Lie uten ant-G e neral iVlasao ~laru· yam a, 2nd Division, to ld his men: "rhis is the decisive battle between Japa n and Lhe niLed Slales, a battlc in which the rise or fa ll o f the J a pa nese Empire will be decided.'

On 11 O CLOber the J a pa nese reinrorced their LroOpS with anillery, and on ' 3 O elOber they la id do \·vn a huge nava l bombardment on H end erson Field . The bombardment, whi ch began at about 1.30am, included 14-inch shells rrom th e ba llle­ships J-/a1'lJnga and Kongo and eight- and five­in ch shells rrom supponing vessels. The shelljng lasLed ulllil abo uL 3am , leaving hundreds or men more ba llered a nd shocked by the pure intensity of it than by its actual ballist ic e lTects.

By '9 O CLOber, Lil e 2nd (Sendai ) Di visio n, LWO ballalions or Lh e 38Lh Di visio n, three balleries of heavy artillery, a battery of mou nt a in artillery, a mortar battalion, three rapid-fire gun ba ttalions and a force of six teen wnks were ashore, totalling some '20,000 m en. Combining th ese with lhe rema ins of the first two forces, thcJapancsc finally o UlI1umbe red the Am e ri cans. The Firsl f'..1 arine

Division itself had received reinforcements in the shape of the 164th Infantry R egim el1l, an Army ".tional Guard ou tfit.

The Japanese plan this time was elaborate. Their 4th a nd 124th R egimenlS, with hea\")' artillery and tanks, were to hit positions on th e lower :\1ataniko, thcn push towards Henderson Field. The 16th and 29th Regiments would go by them and, following an artillery barrage, attack the southern perimeter. The lower ~Iataniko attack was onc of several schedu led to hit at the same Lime. Another would fall on the upper M atan iko, while a third wou ld hit Bloody Ridge. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their heavily loaded troops fa il ed to get into position for their assigned allacks by '0-Day' on 22 October. Their commanders did not know this, however, because of poor com­munications.

At 6pm on 22 OCLOber, J apanese artillery opened up on th e lower M a taniko positions held by the 1171h l\[arines and a ballalion of th e I 64th. Following the barrage the J apanese infantry charged, led by nine IS-LOn tanks. Marin e anti ­tank fire stopped a ll but one tank , which rolled over the American foxholes until a l\farine jammed a hand grenade in its tracks. Wi th that the tank rocked back a nd forth once, and a tank destroyer caught it in its sights. A luc ky shot, wh ich must have hit its ammunition supply, blew the tank twenty yards back into th e sea. The attack was Slopped.

After that allemp t had been beaten off, General Vandcgrift reasoned that the main attack would fall on the upper M ataniko. The 2/7th l\l arines were sent to reinforce the 3/7th Marin es already there. This left Lie utenan t-Colonel Lewis 'Chesty' Puller's 117th Marines as the on ly force holding Bloody Ridge. At about 3am on 24. OCLOber the next Japan ese allack was laun hed , hitling Lh e Il7th on the ridge. By 3.30 the 164th'S reserve battalion was sent in as reinforcemenLS. Even though they wellt into strange positions, under nrc and at night, the Army troops acqui llcd themselves well. It was the Marines who had LO take the main weight of the defence, however. Sergeal1l John Basilone, who ea rned th e M edal of Ho nor that night, said later, 'They kept com ing and we kept firing. We all thought our end had come.' The attack was a typical banzai charge, notable for a lack of tactical subtlety. When th e rushes finally

SLOpped, at around 7am, the l\larines and soldi ers counted 941 bodies under thei r gu ns.

The allack on the upper Mataniko finally came on 25 October, hitling Companies 'F', (Go and 'E\ 7th ~larines. The weigh t of these charges virwally wiped out Co. 'F' and pushed back Co. 'E'. Linking those two companies was a machine-gun platoon led by Sergeant l\litchell Paige, whose fight here earned him a M edal of Honor and a ballleficJd commission as second lielltenant. Paige not only did not pull back. but actually led his men forward, crad ling his .50 ca libre water-cooled machine gun in his arms a nd firing as he went. Wh en the fight was over some I 10 dead Japanese lay in front of his position.

The overall .Japanese plan, cursed by over­optimism and faulty illlelligenec, had failed.

What the J apanese cou ldn 't do, Guadaleanal's terrible environment cou ld. The Dh·ision reponed ' ,94' malaria cases in October alone. Even those men who were physically well enough, if a bilthin, wcre mentally deadly wcary . They had been pUlling up with rougher cond itions than most l\larines plan to endure for any length of time.

One thing which cou ld be done for morale would be a return LO the cOen ivc. On I November Ceneral Vandegrift launched an attack across th e M atani ko. The 115th Marines were sta lled for a Lime on the right, but 215th ~.Jarines moved ahead smanl y all the le ft. The reserve battalion, 315th ~/l arincs, wenl into line with I/Sth i\.1arines on 2

Len Admiral William F. ·Hulr Halsey, commanding oHicer in (he: SOtuh Pacific, with Cen. Valldegrift (centre) during an inspeClion I,our of the CuadaJcanaJ positions. NOH: sun helmets with USMC insignia worn by Vandegrift and his aide on lhe righl.

II

Interesting photo of new M4 Sherman tanks making practice landings from an LeT outside the reef of Rua Sura Island, near Guadalcanal. The original print shows that each bears on the hull side a triangle reversed , a cartoon elephant, and a nickname beginning with 'Doo . .. '; 'Doodlebug' (right) and 'Dood-it' (left ) are visible, and the former also seems to have a pin-up on a dark panel forward of the name.

November, while 2/5th Marines mopped up Japanese remaining in the 1/5th Marines' zone. Some 450 Japanese were killed, although most did escape, while Marine losses were about forty.

Oh 4 November other troops who had arrived as reinforcements pushed through the Division's lines westward. However, as they were moving forward, word reached General Vandegrift that Japanese troops had landed at Tetere, east of American positions . He therefore halted the advance, leaving some troops on the new perimeter and bringing the others back as a precaution.

Meanwhile, work on a second airfield began at Aola on the island's eastern side. It turned out the land there was too marshy for a strip, so the site was abandoned and the 2nd Raider Battalion, which landed on Guadalcanal in October, began a long, 150-mile hike back from there through Japanese lines along the Gavaga. The march finally ended when they reached American lines on 4 December. They killed 488 Japanese while on the way, losing only seventeen dead and eighteen wounded them­selves.

In mid-November the Army's Americal Division had landed, and the Marines had to admit that the First Division was officially 'no longer capable of

12

offensive operations.' The Division's final action report notes: 'The cumulative effect oflong periods of fatigue and strain, endless labour by day and vigilance by night were aggravated to an alarming degree by the growing malarial rate.'

By 7 December 1942, the anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the last of the troops who had dealt the Japanese Empire its first stinging blow were evacuated, and General Van­degrift turned over his command to the Americal's comman~. The general watched the last of the 5th Marines embark, ' . . . some so weak they could scarcely climb the cargo nets draped over the sides of the fat transports. Two days later I walked to our small cemetery called Flanders Field to take my own farewell of the almost 700 officers and men of my command who died in this operation. I looked in silence on the rude crosses that bespoke valiant deeds by great men.'

The Division, by taking and holding Guadal­canal, had caused the Japanese to lose great numbers of men and equipment and had driven a wedge into their Pacific perimeter. A leading Japanese Navy planner said later, 'After Guadal­canal I knew we could not win the war. I did not think we would lose, but I knew we could not win.'

Cape Gloucester The veterans of Guadalcanal landed in Australia, where they became part of that continent's defence forces. A Division officer watched them land . 'The men were ragged, still dirty, thin, anaemic, shallow, listless. Just about one out of every ten of them fell down, tumbling limply down the steep ladder on their backs, landing pitifully on the dock.'

The Division was camped near Melbourne where, with tender, loving care from both drill sergeants and local ladies, the men slowly recovered their physical and mental health.

In July I943 a reconditioned First Division received their first directive for an operation against Cape Gloucester, New Britain. The oper­ation had the purpose of taking a Japanese airfield there which threatened the flank of an Allied advance towards the Philippines. By 23 October the last of the Division's troops had left Melbourne for Milne Bay, New Guinea, where the men practised landing manoeuvres, using the new LSTs, LCIs, and LCTs. *

*Landing Craft

Many different models were built during the war. Some of the basic characteristics of major repre­sentative types are as follows:

Type LCM Displacement 22- S2 tons Dimensions So x 14ft Draught 3-!-/4tft Load I x 30-ton tank or 60 troops. Type LCV IP Displacement 8- I I-!- tons Dimensions 36 x 10Ft Draught 2-!-/3-!-ft Load I x 3-ton truck or 36 troops. Type LCI (L) Displacement 234- 384 tons Dimensions IS8-!- x 23Ft Draught 4il6tft Load 188 troops. Type LCT S Displacement 143- 3 I I tons Dimensions I I7-!- x 32ift Draught 3/4tft Load 3 x so-ton or 4 x 40-tol1 or S x 30-ton tanks, or 9 x 3-ton trucks. Type LCT7 Displacement S I 3- 900 tons dimensions 2031 x 341 ft Draught 31/7 ft Load 3 x 40-ton or S x 30-ton tanks plus S4 troops. Type LCT2 Displacement 106S- 2 I 60 tons Dimensions 327i x soft Draught 3/9!ftLoad 18 x 3o-tol1 tanks or .I x LCTS or 27 x 3-ton trucks plus 8 jeeps plus 177 troops.

All had top speeds in the range 9- 14 knots. Armament was light anti -aircraft only, the smaller types mounting a few machine guns and the larger types, 20mm cannon in addition .

P ACIF IC OCEAN

N

t

!>lAlE IN f>1\ LES

At 3am on Christmas morning, I 943, the Division got under way for its second amphibious assault of the war. At 6am on 26 December the escorting cruisers and destroyers opened fire on the en­trenched Japanese on Cape Gloucester. At 7-46am men of the 317th Marines were the first to hit the beaches, followed two minutes later by the I/7th Marines. The 'beach' turned out to be a fringe of greenery overhanging the ocean, with a vast swamp just beyond.

The plan called for the 7th and I st Marines to land and move quickly to seize the airfield, while the 2/Ist made a diversionary landing at Tauali. The 5th Marines were in reserve. The landing worked perfectly; the 21 I st Marines were un­opposed, and the other units met only light opposition. It wasn't until they got into the swampy jungle headed towards the airfield that they ran into a stiff Japanese defence. With the aid of some Sherman tanks, however, the Marines pushed the defenders aside, and all units were in their assigned phase lines by the end of 'D-Day'. Casualties among the Marines were only twenty-one killed and twenty-three wounded, with at least one of these crippled by a falling tree instead of enemy fire .

The weather became the big problem. It began raining by early afternoon on 'D-Day' and con­tinued through the night, and then for five more days. The Division's after-action report stated: 'Water backed up in the swamps in the rear of the shore line, making them impassible for wheeled and

Part of the second wave of Marines landing at Cape Gloucester from their shallow-draught LCI , characteristically loaded with spare ammunition.

tracked vehicles. The many streams which emptied into the sea in the beachhead area became raging torrents. Some even changed course. Troops were soaked to the skin and their clothes never dried out during the entire operation.'

The second day's advance was slow. The few tanks that did manage to get up proved a decisive factor in breaking enemy defences. One tank platoon commander recalled turning a corner and running into aJapanese 7smm gun position. 'I saw oneJap walk calmly over and pull the lanyard. The shell- it was HE- hardly scratched the tank. They were so astonished they just stood there while we mowed 'em down and smashed the piece.'

AJapanese company attacked the 217th Marines at about 2.Ispm on 27 December, but was easily driven off with the loss of 466 Japanese against a Marine cost of twenty-five killed and seventy-five wounded.

The Sth Marines were sent against the airfield from the south on 29 December while the 1st Marines moved on it from the east. Because of the appalling jungle, the I /Sth and 2/Sth Marines were not in position until 3pm, and the attack began then. By 6pm the I st Marines were on the airfield; the 2/Sth Marines reached it by 7.30pm. On the evening of the 29th the Japanese launched a banzai charge on a narrow front held by the 2/ ISt Marines at Tauali. A single gunnery sergeant with a light machine gun broke up the attack, and the Japanese

then spent the rest of the night trying to break through the battalion's lines in small groups. All were unsuccessful. At noon on 3 I December the United States flag was raised over a completely secure Cape Gloucester airfield.

Once the airfield was taken, attention was drawn to three hills which dominate Borgen Bay: Hill IS0, Hill 660 and Aogiri Ridge. Troops holding these hills dominate all of western New Britain. The 7th Marines, reinforced by the 3/Sth Marines, were sent towards this high ground. On S January the battalions (from left, I/7th, 2/7th, 317th and 3/5th Marines) set out in line through the swamps towards the hills which rose out of the green carpet. Combat correspondent Asa Bordages, with the 3/ Sth Marines, reported how that battalion came to a slightly wider, less green spot of swamp.

'The Marines didn't know the creek was a moat before an enemy strong point. They couldn't see that the heavy growth across the creek was salted with pillboxes- machine-gun emplacements armoured with dirt and logs, some of them dug several stories deep, all carefully spotted so they could sweep the slope and both banks of the stream with interlacing fire.'

The Marines tried to get across the creek under covering fire. Private First Class Calvin B. King's platoon actually crossed the stream four times that day, only to fall back each time under smashing fire. Only on the last occasion did they actually see a single enemy soldier. 'They were just coming at us through the trees. We were firing,' he said later, 'but they kept coming at us. There were too many of them to stop. We had to pull out. Machine guns were shooting at us from everywhere. And all them Japs coming. We'd pull back a little way and stop and fire, and then we'd fall back a little more.' Not one crossing was successful.

All night long the Japanese directed their dive­bombers on to the pinned-down Marines with their tracer fire. On the morning of 3 January the Japanese brought mortars into use. The Marines tried once again to cross that bloody stream, and again they failed. Snipers cut down survivors as they tried to get back across the stream. One party was forced under a bank, neck-deep in water, while one of their platoon lay across a log in plain view of both them and the Japanese. He'd been hit at least twenty times by machine-gun fire; he was still

alive, calling, ever weaker, 'Here I am, Wills, over here, I'm here! ' It WQuid have been certain death to have gone after him, and the men stayed where they were while his blood, and the blood of others, flowed around their faces . Later they said that it was harder to stay there, doing nothing and listening to him, than anything else in the cam­paIgn.

Finally the Sherman tanks came up. The creek banks, too steep for them to traverse, stopped them. An unarmoured bulldozer, the driver sitting naked to enemy fire, then appeared. Corporal John E. Capito drove the 'cat' pushing three loads from the bank into the stream before being shot in the face. Staff Sergeant Keary Lane and Private First Class Randall Johnson crawled to the machine and, using an axe handle to work the levers, got it working again. Then Sergeant Lane got into the driver's seat and began smoothing out the banks again. He, too, was soon hit, but continued working until nightfall. By then the banks were level enough

Marines warily follow Sherman tanks which blast Japanese bunkers out of their path on the advance from the beach to Cape Gloucester airfield.

Marines in action at Cape Gloucester; note Thompson gun and pouches, grenades hooked to equipment, and fixed bayonets. In the larger photo, immediately below the second bogie of the Sherman, a dog can be seen ; this beast became quite famous, as he led the advance all day, barking without pause!

16

for three Shermans to work their way across the L creek and destroy two enemy bunkers. By 4 0

January both 3/5th and 317th Marines were across u 'Suicide Creek.' Then the whole force halted to t reorgamze.

Meanwhile, back at Target Hill, which had been captured the first day, at 5·40am on 3 January the Japanese launched a two-hour-Iong banzai charge which was beaten off easily. Marine deaths were three; Japanese losses were over 200.

On 6 January, in driving rain, the forward movement was resumed.~ Co. 'A', 1/7th Marines, quickly ran into a stiff fire fight. Another bulldozer, whose driver seemed to have a charmed life, levelled stream banks and several Shermans crossed and drove out the enemy, capturing three 37mm guns and five machine guns. At the same time the 1 17th Marines took Hill 150, finding few defenders, and the 3/5th Marines went on to Aogiri Ridge, running into a position of some thirty-seven interlocking bunkers which the J apanese planned to hold at all costs. The Marines were stopped flat.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis Walt, 3/5th Marines commander, was just about everywhere at once, urging and encouraging his men. Once he joined the crew of a 37mm cannon, helping manhandle it into position and watching as it fired cannister rounds into the dense rain forest of trees, vines, shrubbery and pillboxes. Still the Japanese posi­tion held.

At about I.30am on I o January the Japanese, as they were so helpfully wont to do, leapt out of.their . well-built bunkers and, screaming, charged the Marines with swords and bayonets. This was just what Colonel Walt figured they might do, and his men were ready. A sheet of fire met the Japanese, who charged into that certain death five times. The colonel had one anxious moment when between the fourth and fifth charges his most important machine gun ran out of ammunition. It was a race between the ammunition party and the Japanese to reach the gun first. The Marines won. With that the back of the Aogiri defence was broken.

An attack on the I 17th Marines the same night was easily turned back. By noon on I I January the main Japanese supply and bivouac areas around Borgen Bay had been captured. Aogiri Ridge was later nicknamed 'Walt's Ridge' by the Marines.

On 12 January scouts reconnoitred the last bastion, Hill 660, which was defended by the Japanese 2/141st Infantry Regiment. The 2/7th Marines then dug in on the right flank of the Borgen Bay task force. The fatigued and bloodied 3/5th Marines were held back to rest while the 317th Marines were sent directly up Hill 660 at 6.50am on 13 January. A force made up ofa hal£.. track, two light tanks, ajeep, several 37mm guns, a bulldozer and some specialized troops were senno support the battalion. According to the official report: 'Preceded by a heavy artillery preparation, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines advanced rapidly in column of companies to the northern slope of Hill 660 and at 0930 started up its slopes.'

It really wasn't that easy. One private in the attack recalled: 'You could hardly walk. If you'd try to watch where you were stepping, the vines would cut your face. AJap sniper hit my buddy in the hip. I waited till he fired again, found him in a tree, and let him have it. I shot five times, and he dangled. He was tied in the tree. A BAR man sprayed the J ap and he came bouncing down

through the limbs of the trees.' The Marines were stopped and, under covering artillery fire, with­drew.

The next day troops were sent around to the south side, where they found few enemy troops. Even though it was late in the day they pushed on up. A combat correspondent with them wrote, 'Our boys were tired, wet to the skin, and going on nerve alone. Not even Colonel Buse could explain it, but spontaneously those bedraggled and be­devilled Marines rose and charged that vertical face of rock and clay. They had been broken into small units by casualties and terrain and enemy fire, but these small units just kept going. That night we camped on the crest of Hill 660.'

The 3rd Battalion spent the morning of 15 January mopping up the slopes . The last fighting here broke out at about 5.3oam on 16 January, when two Japanese companies staged a typical banzai charge, suffering a typical defeat.

When the fighting was over around Borgen Bay, the Division was sent some sixty miles east along the New Britain coast. The 5th Marines led the way, being held up for five days until 25 January by Japanese rearguards at the Natamo River before getting across. By 21 February the Marines had taken Karai-ai, some thirty miles east of Borgen Bay. By 8pm on 25 February the 5th Marines' command post was installed at Iboki, the end of the Division's long march.

On 5 March the 5th Marines were loaded into a motley naval convoy which then headed towards Talasea, a small island on the eastern side of the Willaumex Peninsula, some fifty-seven miles from Iboki. The only air support the Marines enjoyed was from a Piper Cub, whose pilot dropped eight hand grenades on beachhead positions, while 'naval' gun fire was supplied by tanks firing from LCMs! The I st and 2nd Battalions landed success­fully by 8.35am on 6 March, under a hail of

Japanese mortar fire; this barrage landed in the midst of an artillery battery which was just being unloaded, but did not stop the infantry. The two battalions dug in just beyond the beach and awaited the 3/5th Marines, who did not get ashore until just before dark on 7 March. The next day the Marines pushed on towards the main Japanese positions on Mount Schleuchter. Under fire from mortars, artillery and small arms, the Marines

succeeded in clearing the area by about rpm on 9 March.

With New Britain secure the Navy wanted the Division back under its control, while the Army wanted it to stay in New Britain. The Navy finally won, and by 4 May the Division's last personnel boarded a ship bound for a rest camp in Pavuvu, the largest island of the Russells. The tired men were in no mood for the tiny, miserable, muddy, hot, poorly -equipped coconut-growing island; when they arrived, Pavuvu did not even boast any lights.

Lieutenant David M. Brown wrote home that on Pavuvu ' . . . you have nothing much to think about except the details of daily routine. The prospect of a bottle of beer is a matter of interest and speculation to us here. One lad wrote in his letter of the things he bought at a recently opened PX [post exchange]~ink and a comb and handkerchiefs and shoelaces, chewing gum and a towel you could

Newly arrived 'cast hull' M4A1 Shermans move off Cape Gloucester beach and into the jungle; December 1943.

r8

get at the meanest ten-cent store. "They an beautiful!" he says. And they are~as fascinatin! and novel as Robinson Crusoe's carpenter chest.'

One good thing about the spell on Pavuvu was that many of the veterans who had been with the Division from the beginning were rotated home-260 officers and 4,600 enlisted men. They were sent off by ship, the Division's band playing as they embarked. After a variety of popular songs, the band started up the Marine Corps hymn, 'From the Halls of Montezuma.' Many veterans wept.

Peleliu Replacements, many of whom were the first draftees in Marine Corps history, had to be trained. The Division returned to the practice manoeuvre field. All the signs of another campaign were in the air.

The target was the Palau Islands, some 470 miles east of Mindanao in the Philippines: another flank to be secured as part of General MacArthur's overall plan for the drive back to those islands. Two islands were the targets. Angaur would be taken by the Army's untried 81st Division, while the First Marine Division would take Peleliu. This ocean speck, some six miles long and two miles wide, was expected to fall in what divisional commander Major-General William H. Rupertus said would be ' ... a quickie. Rough but fast. We'll be through in three days.'

Japanese documents captured on Saipan in­dicated that Peleliu's garrison totalled some 10,000 men. A coral reef lay some 500 yards off the beaches, so large landing craft could not get close enough to shore for the men to land directly off them. Everyone who made a combat landing on Peleliu would have to ride in on an amphibian

Artillerymen in camouflage-printed one-piece combat fatigues and round Marine fatigue hats fire their 7.'imm pack howitzer atJapanese positions near Cape Gloucester airfield .

tractor, the 'Amtrac'. Since Amtracs could not be launched as far from shore as the 18,000 yards that ocean-going transports needed to keep them safely out of enemy artillery range, the men would have to disembark first from the transports into LSTs. Then, after a short ride, they would get out of the LSTs and into Amtracs for the final leg of the assault. An LST could carry no more than a company at a time, so the assault would have to be rather piece-meal. The goal was to get 4,500 Marines on Peleliu's beach in the first nineteen minutes of landing. It would take considerably longer for all the 28,484 men in the reinforced First Division to land.

Peleliu's 10, 700-man Japanese garrison came largely from the Army's elite 14th Division, with Imperial Navy support. The commander was Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, an excellent tactician. He had built a fantastic array of bunkers and

19

interconnected pillboxes, some as many as six slOries deep, made wi ,h "eel doors and gu nports which commanded th e whole island. His philo­sophy was 10 avoid th e ban:cai charges which marked the defence of so many j apanese positions, usually disastrously. I nstead he would let ,he Americans la nd a nd come 10 his positions in the mountains. As onen happened , j apa nese engineer­ing skills were so much in evid ence that naval gunfire from five batt leships, eight cruisers and twenty -one destroyers fai led to do any noticeable damage to the fonifications.

The plan was fo r the three regiments to land in line on the beaches next to the airfield. The 1St Marines would head directly across the airf,e1d , the 7th Mari nes would turn south IOwards ,he waiting J apanese, and the 5th :Vlarines wou ld d rive nonh againstJ a pancse dug in on a rid ge line. I f,hi s pl an were to \· .... ork th e Mari nes wou ld have to meet only to ken opposit ion. ' If the initial momcntum of the assau lt did nOt overrun the rugged grou nd inland from the beach, the landing force would have been placed in a ve ry d iffi cult situation ', lh e senior Divis ion Starr officers latcr wrOlC. 'The art illery wou ld have possessed no suitable position areas frolll which LO suppo n the atlack; lhe tanks would have had limi ted scope for employme nt ; and logistical suppOrt over beaches command ed a t

short range by enemy weapons would have been extremely difficult.

'This course o('action with 100 per cent successful execution wou ld have been excellent ; with less than 100 per cent execulion was dangerous. Experience indicates thal the rapid execution of this course of action would have been problematical. ' (This masterpi ece of LOrlured j argon may be translated thus: 'If the plan succeeds completely, we'll be OK ; ifit is less than 100 per cent successfu l, we're in bad trouble; and fran kl y, our chances are poor 10

ni I. ' ) 'D-Day' was '5 September, 944. It was a dark ,

grey day. 'For an hour we ploughed IOward the beach, th e sun above us coming down through the overcasllike a si lver burning ball·, wrote arlist Tom Lea, who rnadc th e landing there. 'Pclcliu was vei led with th e smoke o f our shelling. New hits against that veil made brown and grey pi llars like graceful ghost-trees by Claude Lorrain .

'Suddenl y I was completely alone. Each man

20

drew in tO himself when he ran down that ramp. in lO that fl ame. Those Marines flattened in tht sa nd on th at beach were da rk and huddl ed like wei

rats in death as I threw my body down among them. There was a rattle and roar und er my helmet while I undid the chin strap and smelled the flaming oil and popping ammunition from the burning LVTs around us. M en of the first wave had penetra ted about twemy-five ya rds inland as I looked up the sand y slope.'

\\'i thin a hal f hour General Rupertus learned ,hat the island's capture might not be quick, but i, would certain ly be rough. One observation pl ane reponed some twenty Amlracs burning off one

beach and eighteen off another. One of the Amtracs which was hi t was th e 1st ~Iarines' com mand vehicle. Communicatio ns were lost be tween Div­ision and regiment , making th e left Rank the weak point of the assau lt.

By the afternoon it was obvious that the a uack was stall ed. The divisional reserve, th e 2/7th ~1 a rines, were ordered in . vVithout enough Am­tracs, it was a ~ Iow job landing .the battalion on beaches still under fire. The sun had burned away the overcas , and turned th e island 's beaches into one huge sizzling frying pan. About 4pm, in an,i cipation of th e expected japanese coun ter­attack, th e men were o rdered to dig in wherever they were. Most had not gOt nea rl y as far as originally pl anned. Inc\'itably , a cou nter-attack did hit the invaders; it was described by a wounded corporal in th e 2/ lst Marines:

"At 1715 someone sho uted , " Here they come!1! \ \le kne\v it meant the J aps and nO( the water wagon. I pushed down deeper in my fox hole; rifle ready, I looked ou , over 'he a irfield. From behind a bombed-down hangar I saw a cloud of dust with the ugly snout of a Nippon tank at the head of it, then came another, then anotl)er from behind a bunker, another from here and one from there. Sure enough th ey a re coming. j ap tanks pouring out of their hiding places, dodging and swirling crazily about. All of us open fire with machine gu ns, autom atic rifles, small arms, bazookas, or whatever we have. The j a ps don' t give up, they keep coming and coming rast, very close now. Things happened so fa" from here on in with these tanks that I wa nt to tell you about only what happened within ten yards of me.

Above : Landing craft away- heading for the shell-torn beaches of PeleJiu . Below: Holding the line against coullter-attacks a t Cape

Gloucester, these !\ Jarincs are armed with (top to bottom) the MI .30 ca l. carbine, the Browning M I9 17 water-cooled .30 cal . Olachincgun, and an M 1928 Thompson sub-machine gun.

21

'D-Day' aL Pc1 c1iu - Marines take cover behind a DUKW on the fire-swepl beach, while one of many 'Amtracs' losl that day burns in the background.

'A tank rushed for the machine gun on my right , "Stoney" stands up in the fox hol e (he's a lad with guts) and lets go a burst of automatic fire. The tank was not ten foot away when it burst into flame, leaving a lrailing fire as il Sli ll roll ed (arward. The lower halfofa twisted and burntJap body fell nOl a pace from mc. The Marine machin e gunn ers jumped to safety just in tim e as th e tank came crushing over th eir nest, smashing the weapon to

bits; still il rolled on, ran over the roxhol e or "Chick" ... "Chick" came crawling Oll t as the tanks moved on, with only singed eyebrows. The Sham bows' tank gave a final lunge as it blew up about ten yards behind our lines. Don ... rushed lip LO give th e tank a sq uirt with his flam e-thrower, bu t only to meet a quick dea th as th e turret gun spoke, catching him directly in the chest. OneJap raised his head above the tUITel to have a look a t the situation. He found ou t the situat ion all riglll, and fell back into the lank only to be pushed OU l again by other Japs inside and to fall down a longside of his machine. I n the boltom of these lanks is an escape hatch ; oneJ ap rushing out of this hatch met instant death. Still another J ap inside raised a

22

bloody and dirty whi te rag, and got his hand shot off. Then hand grenades were LOssed inLO the tank.'

The light tanks were stopped bysmall arms and a few Shermans which had survived the landing. The attack had hit the wrong troops. Had the tanks hi t the hard-pressed 2Jlst Marines they might have destroyed the land ing.

All night lhe J a panese kept lip their fire, yelling through megaphones, 'Amclicans, Amelicans, pigs, dogs, Amelican pigs and dogs, you die, you die, you die!'

'Come on in and see what we did to you r tanks!' a Marin e yell ed back. ' We' re using them to pack fish in .'

Al ni ght the 1st Marines totalled up their casualties and round some five hund red men had been hit , abou t a sixth or the whole regiment. R einforcemellls were pulled in from beach and service parucs.

The next morning the attack gOt under way again. The 7th Marines were to take the high ground , whi le the 5th crossed the airfield and the 1st took the ground a lready nicknamed 'Bloody Nose Ridge'. The 7th Marines had the toughest fi ght ahead of them, but by the end of the day th ey had pushed th e J apanese back enough to a llow artillelY to land and join the fIght. The 1st Marines also faced tough resistance. The left Aank was pinned, but the right continued LO move rorward despite heavy losses. Over the two days the 1st Marines lost 33 pCI' cent of their men. The 5th Marines had things a bit easier crossing the ai rfield.

Thal night found th e J apanese agai n bothering the dug-in Marines. Captain George Hun t's Company 'K ' was one of those hit:

'The battlc broke with a tremendo us, angry roar as though a fi endish blast had shattered th e doors of hell and exposed to human ears the horrible turmoil which bawled and wrilhed within . At the one hoarse cry, HThere they arc! They're comi n' in on us!" lhe entire line opened lip simultaneollsly, bursting in to an uncontroll ed din that stirred the most furious, savage instin cts of a man. I fo und myselr bellowing unti l I though t my lungs would crack- "Give 'em hell ! Kill everyone of the bastards !"

The J aps were answeri ng wi lh grenades and mOrlars and riR es. Again 1 heard the \.vhirring or shrapnel and the whine of bullets, many or which

were smacking inLO the rocks, ri cocheting and burning crazy trails in the air. The Ja ps were assaulting us Wilh slampcding rury, wave a rlcr wave, cha rging blindly into our lines and the hail of bullets and shra pnel which we poured into th elll . Above the uproar I heard th eir devilish screams, ·'Ban<.ai, banzai !" ,

Simi lar attacks on othcr sectors were bea ten o ff, wh ile some of th e Marine positi ons were subjected to mortar and sniper fire on ly.

On th e 17th th e 7th Marines moved ahead stead il y. That morning the 1St Marines, their ballered battalions lined up from west to east in the sequ ence 3rd , 1St and 2nd , pushed forward against 'Bloody Nose Ridge'. The 2nd was stopped on Hill 200 but, supported by artillery, p ressed on rega rd­less of great losses . The 1St moved ahead amazingly easily ror an hour until it ran in to a concre le blockhouse the size of a small block of Aa ts. Some twelve pil lboxes supported the position. Fire from the 14-inch guns of the USS Mississippi was call ed down , but lhe sturd y building still stood. Under cover o r the naval fire, however, the Marin es by­passed th e positi on.

_ - •• ~ __ -"'lIIIIIII_ ... . --,"

•

The shallow lagoon enclosed by the reef 500 yards out frOin Pcleliu beach was a handicap; here, Marines manhandle drums of fuel and wa ter across lhe lagoon, while land ing ships stand in outside the reef.

Concentra ted J apanese nre forced both the 1St and 2nd Ba tlalions to keep up th e impetus of their a llack raLher Lhan SLOp and reorganize. Using Sherman tanks, bazookas and Ram e-throwers, th e 1St Battalion pressed on, ending up on th e forward slopes of lhe first line of hills by evening. The 3rd Ballalion, meeting less resistance than the other two, had advanced nearl y 700 ya rds by nightfall. Losses were shocking. Pri vate Russell Davis, with the 1St Marines, recalled rcaching th e cliff:

' We had los t heavil y, ever since the beach, but I had not realized ho \"., bad th e losses were until our compani es moved Out on the c1.iff. Clawing and crawling up the c1i£f went platoons th at were no more than squads, and companies that were no Illore than la rge platoons. I counted one platoon. It mustered eigh tee n men on that push. But th ey went up. '

Tha t night the Japanese a llacked again , hitling the line between the 1St and 2nd Ba ttalions. There simpl y weren't enough men to sto p Lh em. Quickly, Division sent the 2/7t h Marines' Co. 'F' to plug th e gap, followed th e next morning by that battalion 's Co. ' E·. The line held, but just ba rely.

On the fourth day, 18 September, some I ' 5 pioneers, the last o f th e reserve, were senl to lhe batlcred 1S t M arin es . Su rv i\'ors of the I / I Sl

~Iarines were pulled out of line. The regiment 's line was now made up of th e 31 1St, 2/7th and 21 1St Marines. The line moved on, onl y to mee t the heaviest artill ery and mon ar concentration o f th e emire ca mpa ign. At a bou t noon, the 2/7 th Marin es r.n all y had to pull back out of range. Company ' B', rj l st ~1arincs, was rushed LO reinforce the hard-hit 21 1St ]\i[a rines. Very li ttle ground had been gained , b Ul 1St i\1arines' losses tOtalled 1,500 f"ll cn .

The 5th Ma rines were selll to occupy nearby islands, whil e the bu lk of the 7t h continued to mop up J apanese dug in to th e south .

On the 19th , Colonel Puller's 1St Marin es again rose from their fox holes and ha lf-stumbl ed. half­staggered towards the waitingJ apanese. On th e left the 3/ 1St Marines adva nced a lmost four hundred ya rds before coming under fire. I n th e centre, the 2/7th Marin es slowl y worked their way a long to contact the 31 1St ~1a rines . The right side of , Blood y

lose Ri dge' was hit by th e 2/ 1St Marines, who gained some fi ve hundred ya rds. Company ' A' , ' 11St ~ I arin es, a tota l of fi fty -six men left out of an a uthorized establishmelll of 235, passed through the 2/7 Lh Marines against tough opposition. Wh en Co. "A' returned only sjx men were on th eir feel.

Com pany 'C', ' I ,st Marines, was scm to join th e 2/ , st Ma rines and fought to th e top o f H ill 100. There they found themselves cut 00' and sur­rou nded. The company's handful of men th en fough t oIr consta nt J apanese attacks. With th eir amm unition just about gone, they kill ed J a panese with rocks, ammun itio n boxes and bare fists. They even tossed some 00' the hill 's steep sides. The company comm and er, Ca ptru n Everett P. Pope, received th e Medal of Honor for the stand .

T he six th day, 20 Septem ber, dawned . The ' I , st and 2/ 1S t Ma rin es and the Division R eco n­naissa nce Com pa ny were merged on the right, rein fo rced by some dozen machine g uns manned by clerks, cooks and mechani cs. \ Vi th the dawn came the ex pec ted J a panese art ill ery fire which sto pped th e 1St IVl arines' advan ce . In the late afternoon the ' /7th and 3/7 th Marines replaced th e few survivors still sta nd ing from the ' I ' st and 2 / 1 st -Marines.

The 3/ 1 st M arin es advanced a shan distance o n

2 I September, while (he o [h er units were stili sta ll ed on the hill s. Casua lti es fo r the 1St IVla rine! tota ll ed 1,749 men by nightfa ll on th a t day . On thl 22 nd, the I/ l st Nlarines survivors wcre sent to the 3/ Ist but, even so, th e 1St 1Viarin es virtuall y ceased to exist as a use fu l o rgani zation .

By th e end o f a week it was obvio us th at the Peleliu campaign was going to need reassessment: The 8 Tst Infa ntry Divisio n from nearby Ang uar was brought in as reinforcements. On 23 Septem· bel', a t about 2pm, the 8lS t's 32 1St Infantry R egiment reli eved th e 3/ 1St Marin es. The Marines weregjven a three d ay 'rest' on Lh e beach, and th en those who were no t badl y "vounded were sent up LO

o ther units as replacements- no t a popular move, but losses everywh ere were heavy and replacements nil.

The 7th i',,1 arines were ord ered to take the 1St Marin es' old objective. They began to look for an easier way into th e J apanese posiLion than the onc Colonel Pu ller had tri ed . The 217th Marin es went along th e east coast, while the ' 17th I'vIarines went a long the west coast road . The ' /71.h and 3/7th Nl adncs then attacked frolll the north while the 2/7th Marin es came in from the wes t.

On 4 O ctober the 3/7th Marines weill a f,er a prominent hill , 'Ba ldy Ridge', taking three sma ll er hills fi rst. From one of those hi lls, Co. 'L ' was sent to take a fo urth hill right under the ridge. They scaled th e a lmost venical sides, reaching the tOp without serious loss. On ce there they found a cave w hich they sprayed with small arms fire. Th is noise a ttracted J apanese noti ce, and they opened fire on the Americans. The platoon leader di ed , wrote a combat correspond ent w ith the men, w hen 'bu lle ts to re him from his g rip on the cl iffside wh ere he ,,,ras trying LO withd raw his men to sa fer positions, and he fel l to his death on the ravine 0001' many feet below.' The men still on the hill were tra pped . Under smoke grenade cover they tried to escape, many more d ying in the process . Out of the forty­eight men who had cl imbed the hill , eleven survived .

On 6 October the 7th M arines were withdrawn. Their casualties were now of the sa me order as those suIrered by the 1St I\ll arines. It was the LUi'll of the 5th ;\1a rines to be thrown aga inst those terrible ridges .

The regiment, under Colonel Ha rold D. Ha rris,

A Guadalcanal, 1942

B Peleliu, 15 SepteInber 1944

C Okinawa, April 1945

......

c -<- - .....

D Okinawa, May 1945

1 2 3 4

11 12

was placed in a surprISIng position. The colonel chose li nes somewhat back from the origi nal ones, with his fl anks resti ng on the beach. It looked to the J apanese like the stan or a retreat, and that night they began a series or small attacks with arti llery fire. The 5th held. On 25 September, eleven days arter land ing, the regiment attacked the hill commanding th e northern part of Pclcliu. The Japanese held firm so the regiment swi rled around them like a stream around rocks.

As they bypassed the J apanese, still pushing north , the 5 th came under fu"c from positions on Lhe island of'Ngesebus, on ly a rew hundred yards away rrom Peleliu. TheJapanese had turned a phosphate ractory there into a blockhouse. Colonel Harris call ed in naval and artillery fire and sent a battalion to take that island and Kongau ru and Murphy Islands, whi ch it achi eved by 28 Septem­ber. SomcJapancsc remained o n the nonh-weslcrn tip of Ngcscbus, but their threat was minimal, and the 321St In rantry Regiment secured and gar­risoned the island.

With the islels captured, th e 5th Marines returned to what the Di vision's final report' call ed ' ... a slow, slugging, yard -by-yard struggle to blast the enemy rrom his las t remaining stronghold in the high grou nd .' They cominued to dig ou t the Japanese, using combinations of tanks and in­fantry, flame-throwers and machine gunners, and hand grenades and submachin e g uns. On 12' October the 'assa ult phase' orthe Peleliu campaign was declared Q\·er. At3pm on 13 October, the 32 1 st 1nran lIY Regiment was ordered to replace the Division's remaining regimen t, the 5th Marines, in the line. The 81st Inran lIY Di vision fought on. It was not until 25 November that Tokyo received word from Pelcliu , 'All is over on Pe lcliu. '

The last Japanese to give up there were a group or twenty-six sold iers and sai lors, led by a lieu­tenant, who did nOt surrender until 21 April 1947. The garrison had rought magnificently. It took some 1,589 rounds or ammunition of all SOrts to kill each derender.

For the taking or Peleliu the First Marine Division was awarded the Presidential Uni t Citation.

Okinawa

After Pclcliu , the Divi si on~s survivors returned to Pavuvu, happy for once to see the place. Major­General Pedro Augusto del Valle, the previous 'Divarty' commander, was named to command the Divis ion. After resting, training new recruiLS and generall y binding its wounds, th e Division headed olf on 15 March 1945 ror its las t land ing.

The target was Okinawa Shima, the largest or the R yu kyulslands, only 325 miles south orJ apan. The island had long been held by the J apanese. The garrison, commanded by Lieutenant-General Mitsuri Ushijima, included the 62nd Division deployed south and east or Okinawa 's capital, Naha. To th e north was th e 24th Division. Between the d ivisions were sca ttered the 1st and 2'3rd Medium Artillery R egiments, the 7th H eavy Artillery R egiment and th e I lo th Heavy Artillery Batlaiioll , as well as three machine-gun companies, four anti-a ircraft battalions and various monar, rocket and anti-tank troops. Nort h or the 24th Divis ion was the Bimbo Tai (, Have Nothing'), an organ ization or the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade.

The derence plan called ror al lowing the Ameri­cans to land , and then holding them north ofNaha and the ancient capital orShu ri Castle. The terrain there was characterized by heavily wooded hills, deep ravines and many caves . The plan was designed to neu tra lize American firepower, es­pecially that or tanks. General Ushijima told his officers that 'The enemy's power lies in his tanks. It has become obvious that our general battle against the American forces is a battle against their r-.,r-I [sic 1 and :v!-4 tan ks.' The only Japanese armour on Okinawa was the under-strength 24th Tank Regiment, with (ou rt een medium and thineen light tanks.

The Americans planned to bring some 180,000 troops to the island ; rour divisions wou ld land abreast. The First 'N[arine Division was to land in the very centre between the ai rfields at Yontan and Kadena. They expected heavy losses. There was a sea wall behind the beach which the men would have to climb, and a slope slowly rose up behind that- perrect conditions ror derenee.

'D-Day', call ed 'L ' or 'Love' Day in this

" en

I

~ ~ a€ .... ~ ..... -' -6- ,...;-.-

The 1St i\.larincs move oH'Peleliu beach- the firing Line isjust beyond the smoke rising in Lhc centre background. Olhers dig in on the crowded strip of crushed coral at the edge orthe waler. In the original print Oflhis remarkable battle photo, more than seventy Mannes can be counted.

~.

,.'

opera tion, was I April ' 945. A seven-day-Iong preliminary bombardment dropped 27,226 rounds or naval gunfire on J apanese positions. At 4.06am on I April , the signal ' Land th e landing rorce' weill out, and at 7am troops, covered by ten ba ttleships, nine cruisers l twenty -three destroyers and 177 gunboa ts, disembarked into their ba rges. They headed the 4,000 yards to the beach. A board the ships, olhers waited tensely.

'\Vh at's happening in th ere son ?', asked a doctor, of the o nl y wound ed man to arrive a t his floating hospital a co upl e or hours a rter the landing began.

'Don't ask me, Doc,' said the Nlarine, who had lost a finger-lip in an accid enl. 'All I know is everybody's going in sta nding up.'

There was no Japanese oppositio n. By 9.45 th e 7th Ma rin es were through the vi ll age

or obe, the ir first priority objective, and the 5th Marines were 1110re than a thousand yards inland. Two ballalions or the I st Marines and the 4/' Ilh ~1 arine Artillery, lhe Div isio n's reserve, were ordered in, and the divisional com mand post was set up a t So be a t 4.30 that arternoon. The amazed Marines were ordered to dig in ror the night. It truly had been a ' love day'.

The next morning the Division moved out at 7. l sa m , in cool wea th er and over bea utiful countryside. Aga in th ey met no J apanese oppo­sition. A puzzled General del Va lle tOld reponers, ' I don' t know where the Japs are, and I ca n' t olfer you any good reason why they let us come ashore so easily. We're pushing across the island as rast as we can move the men and eq uipm enl.' On the third ciay,jusl before nOOl1 , the Division Reco nnaissa nce Company, riding jeeps, reached Okinawa's far shore. They were then ordered to scout the Ka tchin Peni nsu la, which th ey did, whil e the whole Division reached th e island 's rurther side by that evening. By 4 April th e whole a rea assigned ror the Division to capture, an area which it had been thought would take firteen days to secu re, was in American hands.

The Division scltJ ed intO a rou tine of patrols while the Anny's 7th, 96th and 27 th Inrantry Divisions were pushing sou th agai nst th e real Japanese line or derence. The Army's drive was slow, too slow, and casualties were heavy. On 24 April the Division was oidered to get ready to join

them, and on 27 th April it was sent to relieve the 27 th In rantry Division.

On go April th e Division , whi ch had moved through the 27 th Di vision's positions th e day berore, went into the attack. The 3/ 1st Mari nes, attemp ting to take Miyagusuku, were hit by concentrated small arms, monar and artillery fire, and rell back to their start positions. A J a panese attack hit Co. ' K' , 1St IV[arines. Mud had put a ll but two riAes in the company out of action, but the Marines beat ul eJapanese back with bayonets and clubbed riA es.

The nex t day the 1St Tank Ballalion sent three gun and rour fl ame tanks to support the 3/ 1st M.arines in the second allempt o n Miyagusuku. Some 300 gallons or napalm were laid on the village, and Co. 'L' then passed through it easily, rollowed by the rest or the baltalion in early afternoon.

At 2am on 4 May, the II Ist Marines (a long with some armoured Amtracs from the 3rd Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion) were in position a long th e beach south or Machina lo a irfi eld when they saw, in the dim moonlight, approaching barges. Flares were fired: it was a Japanese landing party. The Marines opened up with everything th ey had and the 217 ul Marines were a lerted as a possibl e reserve in case or a breakthrough. By 4am the bu lk or the J apanese 26 th Shipping Engineers were dead o r wounded. Among their bodies one Marin e round a carri er pigeon in its cage. The bird was released with a note attached to its leg: 'We arc re LUrning your pigeon. Sorry ,·\le canno t reLUrn your demo li tion engineers.' The few survivors were routed out by a war dog platoon.

The Division raced the mainJ apanese line held by the 62nd Di vision ; this ran a long low cora l ridges with Ji chaku on the right, Hill Nan and Hill 60 in the centre, and Wilson's Ridge and Awacha Pocket on the lert. Behind that lay another ridge and the town or Dakeshi. Further on th ere was a draw in rront or Shuri , behind whi ch were another town and ridge, both named Wana.

On 5 May the 1/5th Marines, supported by firteen gu n and two fl ame tanks, started working its way slowly through this maze or ridges and pillboxes. The typical firefight range was so short that grenades were the main weapons used. The J apanese 23rd Independent In rantry and 14th

27

Independent Machine Gun Ba ttalion held th eir positions on the Awacha Pocket, while heavy ra ins on 7 May slowed Ameri can tanks to a craw!' Meanwh ile th e 1st !'vlarin es faced equa ll y slow, blood y fighting for Hills Nan and 60. On 9 May the 2/ 1st Marines, supported by nam e-throwing tanks, worked their way up those hills while th e Il lst Marines pressed eastwa rd .

AJ apanese 4 7mm anti -lank g un on Awacha was finall y sil enced on 10 Mayas the 2/5u1 Marines went up the north slopes of Wilson 's Ridge and the 1/5 th Ma rines up th e wes t side. On II May Wilson 's Ridge a nd Awacha were in Ameri ca n hands. Some twel ve gun and three fl ame tanks joined in this final push, supporting the 1/5th Marines.

The baltered 5th Nfarincs were then allowed a short rest and were replaced in the line by the 7th Marines, JUSt in time for the 3/ 7th to turn back , with support from fo ur (Divan y' batta lions, a J a panese a ttack. As the J a panese fell back, l /7 th Marines passed through the 3rd Battalion's lin es on th eir own a ttack. They were stopped a lmost immedi ately, and the ca ll went out fo r tanks to

come up . These tanks were nOt onl y used for offensive operatio ns, but also as ambul ances. A tank would drive as tride a wound ed man and pull

A l\'l arinc squad in combat on 'Suicide Ridge'; in the cC lllrc, one throws a ''' Ioloto\' cocktail' which he has just IiI rrom the burning brand held by the man beh ind him. The i\ lari nc on the right has lhe dischargtr for the 1\ 19:\ I grenade fitted (0 his Garand. and a .45 ca l. pisto l hoist('l'cci at his hip.

hilll up to sa fety through th e bell y escape ha tch. \ Vo und ed Ill en were also carried on tank backs, the turrets serving as shields frol11 enemy fire.

The a ttack went on. The 2/7th was at tlle foot of Dakeshi ridge by II May . The next Illorning the town of Dakeshi was a ttacked by 1/7th Marines. A pla LOo n leader, riding o n a fl ame-thro wer tank, led the way, followed by anoth er name-thrower tank a nd a gun tank . R eaching a position overlooking J a panese emplacements, they halted and worked over the ground with 75mlll guns, .30 calibre machine guns and fl ame-throwers. Then tll e tanks fell back and infantry came up to take the ground. By the night of 12 May tlle 7th Marin es had secured Dakeshi 's crest.

The nex t ridge linc was Wana, held by the J a panese 62 nd Di vision's 64th Brigad e along with surviyors of the 15th , 23rd and 273 rd Independ ent Infantry Ba ttalions, 14th Independent Machine Gun Batta lion and 81 st Fi eld An ti-Aircraft Bat­ta lion. Company ' E', 7th :VIarines, first sent a platoon towards \Nana Draw, where they were pinned down. At abo ul 6pm, under smoke cover, th e platoon pull ed out, whil e th e whole ba tta lion pulled back to Dakeshi that ni ght.

The 1/ 1 st Marines relieved the tired 2/7 th Ma rines during the night of 14- 15 May . Once in positio n, th ey turn ed bac k three separa te auacks, aided by naval gunfire, a rtill ery and air suppOrt. The fIghting had so wea kened the regiment that the ' ! ISt was formed in to 3 sing le company ,\,hich was relieved by ul e 3/ 1S( l\'Iarines on 17 May. This baualion aU3cked constantl y fo r the nex l three days, but could onl y gain a Sill all footh old on Wana Ridge.

The ridge's weak poin t a ppeared to be on its right, and ul e only way to break th rough would be by com bined in fa ntry-armour tactics; but heavy rains had mired down th e armo ur, and lh e banie became a stalema te.

On 16 Maya force of twelve M-4Shcrman tanks and four M-7 Pri est tank destroyers joined th e 5th Marines in a ttacking Hill 55, whi ch guarded ule way in to Wana Draw. Colonel A. J. J eb' Stu art, who cOl11m anded the 1st T ank BaLla lio l1 , later described th e grinding, non-Slap advance:

'T anks and fl ame tanks ranged ou t to positions up to eight hundred yards beyond our front lines systema ti cally des troyed positions on forward and

reverse slopes within that distance by point-blank 7smm g unfire into cave interiors, and by Aame allack. In addition, tanks destroyed in a similar fashion enemy direct fire positions on fonvard slopes for an add itional 1,500 yards to the front beyond the farthest point of tank advance.

' In ord er to give the enemy no opportun ity to

reorganize and reinforce, two rclays of tanks were necessary 1O permit reamling while maintaining a cominuous attack. This "processing" then per­mined the infantry to advance lines some five hundred yards wilh relatively light losses, using the neutraliza tion sup port of preceding tanks and artillery. Especially important was the fact that the ground so gained by "processing" was tenable, and held. The procedure was then repeated in a zone extended farther to the fron t.'

During the fierce figilling on Pclcliu a wounded Marine, already labt·lled rOl-thc medics, is given a drink by a rully laden buddy.

By 20 May, Hill 55 had fallen. The I st Marines conLinucd th eir push on Walla, but the terrain and the mud prevented the repetition of tank-infantry 'processing'. Finally, on 23 May, the 1St Pioneer Battalion wen l fOr\\'ard LO fire raw napalm over the creSlLO burn the J apanese oul. Even then, enemy mortar and arti llery fire fell among the I st Mari nes. Still, vita l positions were falling to the Americans. A J apanese stalT offi cer later sa id that lhey realized that their forces wou ld be cut 01T and destroyed where they were unless they fell back to another derensive linc. 'Consequen Li y,' he said, 'il was decided to retreat in accord with the Army policy of protracting the struggle as long as possible.'

On 26 May, J apanese troops were spotted retreating by alen air patrols, and two days later a patrol of the 1/5th Marines discovered Shuri had

only a few defenders left. Quickly Lhe whole ballalion pushed forward, and Lieutenant-Colonel Richard P. Ross Jm, 3/ lst Marines, raised an American Aag over Shuri Castle on 31 May.

The Di visio n received a Preside ntial Unit Citation for Lhe 'bi tter siege' ofShuri . The First had paid for the citation in blood. Some 180 officers and 4,065 enlisted Mari nes from replacement bat­tal ions had to be sent into its ranks by the end of May.

The Division pushed on in June over rutted, muddy roads after the retrea ting J apanese. Some road surfaces were nothjng more Lhan 'mud soup', three feet deep. Vehicl es were abandoned. lIen a t the front found it difficult to get enough to eat, since suppli es cou ld not be brought up. Some supplies were dropped by air. Major-General]. L. Bradley, commanding th e Arm y's 96th InfaIllry Division, gave the Marines rations frolll Army supplies. The general noticed that the Marines ' . . . were not equipped or organized for a protracted cam paign. I was glad to assist in suppl y, air drops, and care of their wounded. They were fine comrades and co­operated to the fullest ex tent. '

One private of the 3/ I st Marines said of IfJ une, a day he spent in miserabl e, driving rain , deep in mud and under enem y fire , 'This day was probably the most miserable speIll on Okinawa by men of this battalion.'

The 1St l\1arines, on the Division 's left, ran in to J apanese on Yuza Hill on 10 June . Charging through sloppy rice paddies, then across a stream and a railroad track, Co. ·C' lost 75 of its 175 men in this action alone-but by noon they were on Yuza.

On I I June Lhe 1St Marines took Hill 69. The Japanese counter-attacked , using novel tactics. A large band of Okinawans tried to enter Maline lines. II turned o ut that every fifth 'civilian' was a J apanese soldier. Suddenly they broke away from the real civilians and charged Lhe Marines. Despite the confusion , the Marines killed everyone of the Japanese.

The 7th Marines, on the right, passed through the villages ofDakiton, Hanja, and Zawa, reaching the coastal city ofItom an on 7 June, an advance of 10,000 yards in a week. With 11Oman's ca plLire, th e Div ision had a pan, which solved its suppl y problems. Then the 7th M arin es ran in to J apanese dug in on the ridge line JUSt beyond !toman, called

Kunishi. The attack on Kun ishi was unusual in thal il was

one of the very few ni glll allacks the Americans ever made during the Paci fi c War. At 3.30am on 12 June the I /7 th and 2/7th Marines attacked a totally su rprised J apanese garrison , and quick ly took possession of the crest. IThe silualion,' General del Vall e said later, 'was one ofLhose tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare. We were Oil Lhe ridge. The J apanese were ill it, both on Lhe forward and reverse slopes.'

Reinforcemeills could not get across the open canefield to aid the troops on the ridgehead , who were counler-attacked in the morning. A pIa LOon was senl in on tanks, six men LO a lank; the tanks later brought back the wounded. Other tanks brought up ammunition , waler and plasma to Lhe defenders. These tanks saw lilli e actual fighting themselves. By I 3J une th e Marines were in comrol of the lidge, a lthough some J apanese were still clinging to caves on both sides and would have to be rooled out. h was a cavC-LO-cave fighl, with tanks bringing oUlthe wounded. Some twenty-one tanks were destroyed or damaged in the fight around Kunishi. Artillery was also of great use in the fights, breaking up counter-attacks before Lhey began. One batta lion commander la ter said , ' Irthe tank­infanlry tea m was th e offensive weapon, our arti llery was ou r best defence. Not since Guadal­canal had the average infantryman realized how important il was to him .'

The 2/Sth Marines were sent in to ta ke [he eastern pan of Kunishi. On Lhe night of 7- 8 June the 7th M arines on Kunishi were relieved by the 8th M arines, who had been a tLached to the Division . T aking th e ridge had cost I, I 50 casual­ties, but th e back of organized J apanese resistance \Vas broken.

Opposite : PeJeJiu, October 19+4 another example of the extraordinary work of US com bat photographers. With the smoke of com bat rising in the teft background, inl'w lry and Shermans of the 18 l Division move into 'The Horseshoe'. The small pond barely vis ible on the vall ey floor beyond the large sinkhole in the foreground was the only source of water for ncarby Japanese dug into the hillsides; many were killed as they tried to creep down to fill their canteens aftcr dark.

Okinawa, late r..,llarch [945 ~ I m'incs make ,111 aS lo lllsh ingiy cas)' landing 011 the J ap-hcld island. Note lhat some wear ratigue caps beneath their helmets.

On 21 June Genera l shij ima and his chief of slaO' eommilled seJlpuku.· The Okinawa ca mpaign, which cosl lhe Di vision 1,1 15 killed, 6,745 wound­ed and 4 ' missing, was over.

On 27 May 1945, Lil e Division began buildi ng ils camp on u1e MOLObu Peninsula, Okinawa. On 6 Augusllhe Uniled Sla les dropped a n atomic bom b on Hiroshim a. On 8 August the Soviel Uni on declared war on J apan. On 9 Augusl the second a LOmi e bomb was dropped on Nagasa ki . On 10 Augusl the J apanese o lTered LO surrender. On 14 Augusl u1e J a pa nese accepled the Allies' lerms of surrend er.

'A 10l of us gOl drunk ,' recall ed one Di vision member o f the day J apan surrendered , 'and ran a round like chickens wilh our heads cul off; bUl I fel l, and I lhink olhers fcl l, il was like doing what we were ex pected lO do. Besid es, it wasn't a very good place to celebrate. [t scemed irreverenl. It was only days before th at your buddies had been dying. There were slill 10ls of wounded men around in hospi tals.'

• S~p/J.ku = ritual suicide, usually blll inaccurately tt'mu .. "<i horo kiri in the West.

On 26 September the Di vision embarked, nOl for home, but fo r ano th er overseas to ur. On 30 September the lroops land ed in Tanku, China, and th e nex t day were in Tientsin , where a parade of honour was heJd fonhem. Elemenls or the Division were sent o n LO Pe iping, while o lhers s tayed in T ientsin . The Di vision's job was to 'carry out the provisions of the surrend er a nd to mairnain law and order in the T ienlsin , T a ngsha n and Chin wanglao area.' This lour, which bro ught them in lO almost consi..ant brushes and 'incidcrHs' with g uerrillas) bandi ts a nd members of th e Chi nese Comm un isl Arm y, lasted umil they fi nally re turned lO lhe United Sta les in October 1946. It had been a long war for the ~ raggedy -ass IVIarin cs'.

The Division Organization Guadalcallal: 1St M a rines, 5lh Marines, 7th M a rines, 2nd r-ifarines (lhree ba tta lions each), I I th M arines (Any. ) (four battalions), 1St T ank Bn., ISl Service

Bn., 1St Special Weapons Bn., 1St Pioneer Bn., 1St Engineer Bn., 1St Parachute Bn., 1St Amph. Trac. Bn., 1St Medical Bn., 1St Raider Bn., 3rd Defense Bn., Div. HQ Bn. Attached subsequently: I64th Inf. Rgt., US Army. Cape GLoucester: 1St Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines (three battalions each), Div. HQ Bn., 1St Tank Bn., 1St Service Bn., 1St Motor Transport Bn., 1St Special Weapons Bn. , 1St Amph. Trac. Bn., 1St Medical Bn., 17th Marines (Eng. ) made up of the I'St Bn. (Eng.), 2nd Bn. (Pion.) and 19th Naval Cons. Bn., 12th Defense Bn., and 11th Marines (Arty.) (four battalions) . Peleliu: 1St Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines (three battalions each), Div. HQBn. , 1St Tank Bn., 1St Service Bn., 1St Motor Transport Bn., 1St Pioneer Bn., 1St Engineer Bn., 1St Medical Bn., 11th Marines (Arty. ) with four battalions, 3rd Amph. Trac. (A) Bn. (Prov. ), 1St Amph. Trac. Bn ., 6th Amph. Trac. Bn. (Prov.), 8th Amph. Trac. Bn., 3rd Bn. III Phibcorps Arty. (155mm), 8th Bn. III Phibcorps Arty. ( I 55mm), 12th Anti-aircraft Bn., 33rd Naval Cons. Bn., 73rd Naval Cons. Bn., and 16th Field Depot. Okinawa: 1st Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines (three battalions each), Div. HQBn., 1st Tank Bn., 1st Service Bn., 1st Motor Transport Bn., 1st Pioneer Bn., 1st Engineer Bn., 1st Medical Bn., lIth Marines (Arty.) (four battalions), 3rd Amph. Trac. (A) Bn., 1st Amph. Trac. Bn., 8th Amph. Trac. Bn., and 145th Naval Cons. Bn.

The Plates A Guadalcanal, 1942 A patrol crosses the Ilu River; and one of its members settles down to the familiar chore of hunting leeches out of his pants ·and boots with a cigarette end. The Marines wear the two-piece fatigue suit of herringbone twill- the pattern accentuated in the foreground figure-in the shade known, like so many others, as Olive Drab. It appears from colour photographs to have been of

every shade from dark green to pale grey-green, depending on age, wear and tear, etc. The only insignia is the black stencil Corps badge silhouette and 'USMC' on the pocket. Some NCOs painted chevrons on their sleeves, but for the most part combat fatigues were bare of rank markings. The usual long web gaiters were often abandoned, as they retained water inside the trouser-legs and boots after the frequent wading of streams and swamps. The fatigues were hot, and not as convenient for tropical combat as those issued by the Japanese. I t was not for several years that orders were issued allowing divisional personnel to chop the trousers off above the knee.

The basic weapon on Guadalcanal was the bolt­action M I 903 Springfield 30/06 illustrated here; its stopping power was superior to that of Japanese Arisakas, but it was not until the arrival of Army units with the MI Garand that the superiority became very marked. The usual basic webbing equipment is worn here, the rifle belt supplemented by cotton and tape bandoliers. Often two water­bottles and two first-aid pouches were worn. The man on the left, taken from a photograph, appears to have a jury-rigged set of grenade pouches slung on his chest, apparently improvised from BAR magazine pouches. The combat-weary appearance

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33

A 'composite hull ' late-model M4 Sherman converted as a 'flame tank' lays a blazing carpet over Japanese-held ruins on the advance to Naha, capital of Okinawa, during May 1945. The practised collaboration of gun tanks, flame tanks and infantry was the key to the American advance.

of these soldiers is considerably played down from the reality shown by the eye-witness drawings of such artists as Donald L. Dickson.

B Peleliu, 15 SepteInber 1944 Peleliu was defended with vigour on 'D-Day'; here, under the cover of rocketing Corsairs, men of the Division prepare to fight their way off the beach and into the jungle. An 'Amtrac', its sinister nickname taken from a photograph of this action­'The Bloody Trail'-provides cover and supporting fire at the top of the beach; it is an LVT(A) I, with the turret of an M3 Stuart tank. Behind it a red fluorescent cloth panel identifies friend from foe to

34

the fighter-bombers. In the distance an L VCP lands men of the second wave. The Marines are dressed in the same twill fatigues as on Guadal­canal; they now have camouflage-printed helmet covers, and camouflage ponchos rolled on their packs. George McMillan recalled how, on Peleliu, 'to protect themselves against sunstroke, the men pulled out the cloth camouflage covers on their helmets and let it hang over the backs of their necks, so that they looked like Arabs.' Later, because of the heat, men discarded the helmets altogether, even in combat, and wore the 'old, soft, floppy fatigue caps of the Army', recalls Pvt. Russell Davis.

The man in the left foreground wears the waist belt of BAR pouches, and carries that weapon. The 'butcher' knife is typical. He wears his trousers loose over his gaiters. On the right are men armed with the -45 pistol, and the Thompson sub-machine gun of the same calibre: note the webbing magazine pouches for the latter. This heavy, slow, short­range man-stopper, a far better weapon than the unsatisfactory Reising sub-machine gun initially issued to the Marines, tended to draw 'friendly' fire in night fighting due to the similarity of its report to that of some Japanese weapons. All these assault troops still wear their knapsacks with entrenching shovels and ponchos.

C Okinawa, April 1945 Behind the front lines, a jeep carrying Japanese prisoners passes the emplacement of one of the I I th

Marine Artillery's I 55mm guns. It was on Okin­awa that prisoners in significant numbers began to be taken for the first time- they were still enough of a novelty to attract the attention of the artillery sergeant in our scene. The correspondent Ernie Pyle was with the Division when two Japanese privates were discovered lying under some bushes, their hands over their ears, pretending to be asleep . Instead of fighting, the Japanese were '... so terrified that the marines had to go into the bushes, lift them by the shoulders, and throw them out into the open.' The Japanese uniforms show signs of considerable wear and tear by this stage. In practice, prisoners were often stripped to their loin­clothes by their captors, to be certain they had no concealed weapons or grenades. Parts of Japanese uniforms tended to end up adorning Marines. Pyle noticed how 1st Division men ' . .. wore Japanese

Identifiable by its markings as tank 5 of Co. 'B', 713th Tank Bn., attached to the 7th Infantry Division of US loth Army, this 'flame tank' - again, a 'composite hull' M4-supports Marine infantry on Okinawa. This is logical, since the 7th landed immediately south of the 1st Marine Division and advanced across the island on the Marines' right flank .

35

insignia or pieces of uniform. Later an order came out that any Marine caught wearing Jap clothing would be put on burial detail. '

The gun crew, taken from several photographs, wear a motley collection of clothing including the T -shirt in a strong green shade, camouflage­printed trousers, 'khaki' shirts - which colour photos show to have been a light yellowish shade­and OD clothing of all shades. The NCO wears the Marines' forest-green overseas cap. Pvt. Russell Davis recalls that ' ... the round hat was a favourite in the First Division. It could be bent into any shape, and serve against the rain or the sun.' The guard in the jeep carries the M I .30 cal. carbine, popular and handy in tropical fighting, but lacking stopping-power. In the background are tents assembled from camouflaged shelter-quarters.

Men of Co. 'N, 2/5th Marines in action on a ridge two miles north of Naha, which held up the advance for forty-eight hours.

36

Note the yellow shade used for stencilling Marine serials on the sides of the jeep.

D Okinawa, May 1945 Marine infantry advance III the Naha sector, supported by a flame-tank of the Army's 7 13th Tank Battalion, attached to the 7th Infantry Division. This is a late-model 'composite hull' M4 Sherman; note the markings on the rear hull ­'IOA- 713TK' and 'BS', and the painted-out star; the track extensions or 'duckbills'; and the ap­plique side armour. Mixed units of gun and flame­tanks, working in close co-operation with the infantry, were the key to success on Okinawa.

The very motley appearance of the infantry in this mopping-up operation is taken from photos taken on the spot. The mixture of khaki and OD clothing of all shades; the hacked -short shirtsleeves,

and green T-shirts; the use of the characteristic Marine fatigue cap underneath, or instead of the steel helmet ; the stencilled name on the shirt back; the mixture of gaiters, and double-buckle combat boots- all are typical of the period. Weapons include (left) the M1 Garand fitted with the discharger for the M9A1 grenade, and (right) the Mz carbine, with its long banana magazine, which first began to appear in September 1944.

E Insignia I, 2,3 & 4 are the collar insignia of, respectively, officers of the Paymaster's Dept., the Adjutant & Inspector's Dept., and the Quartermaster's Dept.; and the Warrant Officer rank of Chief Marine Gunner. This latter wore a gold bar broken by a light blue stripe across the middle on each shoulder. Line officers wore the gold globe-and-anchor insignia on the collars of their dress uniforms. (Approx. half-size. ) 5 is the globe-and -anchor Corps badge, here in the form worn on the blue dress cap of enlisted men. (Approx. full size. ) 6 is the sleeve ranking of a Sergeant-Major, as worn on dress blues. 7 is the sleeve ranking of a Platoon Sergeant, as worn on forest-green service dress. 8 is the sleeve ranking of a Staff Sergeant, as worn on summer khakis. 9 is the sleeve ranking of a Master Technical Sergeant, as worn on dress blues. (All approx. half­size.) 10 is the I st Division's shoulder patch, approximately full size. It was designed by the Division Operations Officer, Colonel Twining, on the plane bringing the Division's staff back from Guadalcanal; the stars represent the Southern

Marines flush Okinawan civilians and Japanese troops out of cover in June 1945. Okinawa was the first battle in which any numbers of prisoners allowed themselves to be taken alive­though many still took the quick way out of what they saw as intolerable disgrace.

Cross. The Colonel recalled: 'I bought a box of water colours, and turned in

with malaria. I made six sketches, each with a different colour scheme. In a couple of days I went back to the General [Vandegrift] with my finished drawings. He studied them only a minute or so and then approved the one that is now the Division patch.'

The original patches were made by an Aus­tralian subsidiary of an American woven-name maker, and were first made available to the Division in February 1943, three weeks after the design was approved. Patches were worn on walking-out dress and overcoats. II is a half-size representation of the black Marine Corps pocket

37

Left: A Tommy-gunner of the 1St Division aims his piece during a 'firefight' on Wana Ridge, near Shuri, in this classic photo of the Pacific War. Note the .45 pistol in a shoulder rig, for emergencies. Above: Flushing pockets of Japanese out of

stencil worn on OD combat fatigues . 12 is a half­size representation, taken from an actual example, of the printed camouflage pattern of the her­ringbone twill camouflaged combat fatigues used by some personnel of the Division. The same pattern was used for helmet covers and ponchos.

Finally, it should be noted that USMC officers' shoulder ranking was as follows: 2nd Lt., one gold bar; ISt Lt.) one silver bar; Capt.) two silver bars; Maj., gold oak-leaf; Lt.~Col., silver oak-leaf; Col., silver eagle; Brig.-Gen.) Maj.-Gen.) and Lt.-Gen.) one, two and three silver stars.

the coral caves. The top Marine has just thrown a smoke grenade over the rock, and it explodes in a shower of sparks as his buddies cover him with a rifle and a BAR. The man on the right has his name stencilled on his shirt back- 'V .]. Murphy'.

Select Bibliography

George McMillan, The Old Breed, Washington, DC, 1949

Major Charles S. Nichols Jnr, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw Jnr, Okinawa, Victory in the Pacific, Rutland, Vermont, 1956

S. E. Smith, The United States Marine Corps in World War II, New York, 1969

John Toland, The Rising Sun, New York, 1970 A. A. Vandegrift, Once a Marine, New York, 1964

39

L

Notes sur les planches en couleur

L'illustration sur la couverture montre des soldats appartenant it l'infanterie de la lere Division et un char M4AI Sherman du 1st USMC Tank Battalion s'avanc;ant vers Ie Cap Gloucester en decembre 1943.

A GuadalcanaI, 1942 Une patrouille de 'cous de cuir' traverse la riviere Ilu; un d'entre cux se repose et cherche les sangsues qui se soot faufilees dans son pan talon et ses chaussures, les tuant a I'aide d'un bout de cigarette. Les soldats portent un treillis deux pieces en 'Olive Drab'~la cGu leur variait selon l'age et I' usage entre un vert fonci:, un marron jaunatre et un vert gris pale. L'anne typique a cette epoq ue etai tie fusil a verrou M 1903 Springfield 30106. Le soldat a J'arriere-plan a fac;onne des poches porte-grenades a partir d ' une cartouchiere com,ue pour Ie Browning Automatic Rifle.

B Peleliu, Ie 15 septelllbre 1944 Les hommes de la Division portent maintenant par dessus leur casque une housse en toile de camouflage; un certain nombre de soldats la glissent en arriere pour qu'elle serve de couvre-nuque. Les annes sont Ie BAR a gauche et Ie T hompson a droite. Un 'Amtrac' vehicule de debarq uement amphibie L VT(A) I, ayant la tourelle d ' un char M5 ouvre un tir de barrage en haut de la plage; son surnom est 'Ia trainee de sang'. Des chasseurs-bombardiers Corsair decrivent des cercles au -dessus de la tete des troupes qui indiquent leur position aux avions a I'aide de panneaux de tissu rouge.

C Okinawa, avril 1945 Unejeep transponanl deux prisonniersjaponais attire I'attention d 'un sergent du 11th Marine Artillery Regiment dont Ie canon tS5mm soutient l'avance de la Division; les prisonniersjaponais etaien t encore rares a cette epoque . Les canonniers portent un melange banole de vctements en IOlive Drab') et 'kaki ', des vetements de camouflage, des chapeaux de COIVee et de soleil ; Ie sous-officier porte Ie calot vert fonce appartenant a la tenue de campagne de I'USMC.

D Okinawa, lllai 1943 Des soldats de I'infanterie de la Division, portant des elements d 'uniforme tres varies, s'avancent vcrs Naha , sou tenus par un char lance-flammes du 713th Tank Battalion de I'armee, qui etait detache a la 7th Infantry Division; notez les marques ' loA-713TK' et 'B5'. Quelques-uns des soldats portent la casquette de cOIvee de I'USMC sous, ou au lieu de, leur casque; certains portent un 'T-shirt' vert au lieu d 'une veste; d 'autres portent des guetres en wile a sangles et d 'autres encore portent Ia chaussure de combat a deux boucles. Entre autres armes, ils avaient la grenade MgAI qui ctait lancee a l'aide d'un dispositif lance-grenades fixe sur Ie fusil semi-automatique Garand (it gauche) et la carabine M2 a cartouchiere en forme de banane qui a fa it son a pparition en septembre Ig44.

E Insignes Les vestes bleues du grand uniforme porte par les officiers de l'infanterie de marine portaient sur Ie coll 'insigne representant un globe et une ancre, exception faite des officiers du Paymaster's Department ( I), de I' Adjutant & Inspector's Department (2) et du Quartermaster's Department (3). Le sous­officier appele Chief Marine Gunner portait I' 'obus' (4). L'insigne de I' USMC (5) etait porte sur la casquette du grand uniforme bleu. Cet exemplaire est Ie type porte par les soldars engages. (6) et (9) sont les chevrons de rang du Sergeant­Major et du Master Technical Sergeant et sonr du type porte sur Ie grand uniforme. (7) est l'insigne de rang du Platoon Sergeant porte sur la tenue de campagne vert fonce et (8) est celui du Staff Sergeant porte sur I'uniforme ' kaki ' d'ete. ( 10) est I' insigne d'epaule de la lere Division porte sur la tenuede vil le vert fond: et Ie manteau ; cet insigne avait etc con~u par Ie Colonel Twining apres la campagne de Guadalcanal. ( II ) es t I' insigne stenci l'; de I'USMC porte sur la poche des vCtements de combat et (12) est Ie dessin de camouflage imprime sur quelques vetements de combat et sur la housse du casque.

Farbtafeln

Auf der Titelseite abgebilder ist Infanterie der Ersten Division und d er M4AI Sherman Panzer des Ersten USMC Tank Battalion beim Vormarsch auf Kap I Gloucester, Dezember 1943·

A Guadalcanal, 1942 Eine Spiihtruppe von 'Seesoldaten' uberqueren den Fluss 1Iu ; ciner ruhe sich aus, und verscheucht mit einer Zigaret tenkippe Blutegel aus seincn Hosen und Stiefeln. Die Soldaten tragen zwei tcilige Arbcitsa nzuge aus 'Olive Drab' Korperstoff- die Farbe variicrt je nach Alter und Abnutzung zwischen dunkelgrun, gelblichbrauh und fadem grau-grun. Die ubli chc 'Vaffcn zu eliesem Zeitpunkt war das M 1903 Springfield 30106 Gewehr miL Riegelfeder. Der Soldat im Hintergrund hat aus Mehrladetaschen fur das Browning Automatic Rifle, cin e Garnitur Patronentaschen fUr Handgrana tcn impro­visiert.

B Peleliu, 15 September 1944 Die Mannder der Division tragen nun Helme mit schutzgeHirbten Bedeckungen-einige sind drubergezogen, so dass sic wie ein Sonnenschutz lose uber dem Halsrucken hangen. Die Waffen sind das BAR (links) und das Thompson (rechts) . Ein 'Amtrac'-ein LVT(A) I amphibischcs Landungsfahrze ug, mit dem Panzcrturm eines M5 Panzers gibt Dcc­kungsbeschuss am oberstcn Ende des Strandes; sein Spitzname ist 'Die blutige Fahrte' . Corsair Jagdbomber kreisen droben, und die Truppen signalisiercn miL roten Stofftafeln ihre Position zu den Flugzeugen.

C Okinawa, April 1943 Ein Jeep miL zwei japanischen Gefangencn zieht die Aufmerksamkeit eines Feldwebels, der I Ith Marine Artillery R egimen t, an, dessen 155mr!l Geschutz den Vormarsch der Division unterstutzt ; japanische Gefangene waren noch etwas Neues. Die Besatzung des Geschiitzes trug Bekleidung mit einer scheckigen Zusammenstellung von 'Olive Drab' und 'Khaki ', gerarnte Kleidung, Arbeits-und Sonnenhutc; der NCO tragt elie dunkelgriine Seitenmutze des Dienstanzugs der USMC.

D Okinawa, Mai 1945 Infanterie der Division, in zwanglosem Gemisch von Uniformen, rucken aufNaha vor, mit der Unterstutzung eines Flammenwerfer­Panzers vom 713th Tank Battalion der Armee, welches der 7th Infantry Division angeh6rte; zu beach ten waren die Markierungen 'IoA-713TK' und 'BS'. Einige der Infanterie tragen USMC AIbeitsmutzen unter ihren Helmen oder an ihrer Stelle; einige tragen grune 'T-shirts' anstattJacken; einige, Gurtbandgamas­chen, und andere den doppeit-geschnaUten Kampfstiefel. Zu den Waffen gehoren die M9AI Granate, die durch eine Entladungsvorrichtung im Garand Gewehr (links) abgefeuert wurde, und der M2 Karabiner mit seinem 'Bananen' Mehrlader, den es ab September 1944 gab.

E Abzeichen Die blauen Paradeanzuge der Marineoffiziere trugen das USMC Erdkugel-und-Anker Abzeichen am Kragen; ausser den Offizieren des Paymaster's Department ( I ), des Adjutant & Inspector's Department (2), und des Quartermaster's Department (3) . Der Stabsfeldwebelrang des Chief Marine Gunner trug die 'Muschel ' (4) . Das USMC Abzeichen (5) trug man auf der Mutze der Paradeanzuge-hier, wie es von Unteroffizieren und Mannschaft getragen wurde. (6) und (9) sind die Dienstgrad abzeichen des Sergeant-Major und Master Technical Sergeant, wie man es aufder Paradeuniforrn trug. (7) ist das Rangabzeichen des Platoon Sergeant, wie es auf der dunkelgrunen Dienstuniform getragen wurde; und (8) ist das des Staff Sergeant, wie es auf der Sommer 'khaki ' Uniform getragen wurde. (10) ist der Schultertuchstreifen der Ersten Division, wie man es auf clef dunkelgrunen Ausgehunifonn und auf Manteln trug, nach dem Entwurf von Colonel Twining nach dem Guadalcanal Feldzug. ( I I) ist das schablonierte USMC Abzeichen wie man es auf der Kampfanzugstaschc trug, und ( J 2) ist das Tarnungsmuster, wie es auf einigen Kampfanzugen und Helmbedeckungen gedruckt ist.

OSPREY · VANGUARD

A selies of books describing the key units and weapons systems of the Second World War, prepared by leading military experts for the enthusiast and mod eller, and illustrating authentlc details of uniforms, insignia, armour and supporting vehicles, camouflage, markings and weapons.

Avec annotations en fran¢s sur les planches en couleur Mit Aufzeichnungen auf deutsch tiber die F",rht"fphI

ISBN 0 85045 311