v. lewis - report of the twg on governance - managing mature regionalism [july 2006]

8/9/2019 V. Lewis - Report of the TWG on Governance - Managing Mature Regionalism [July 2006]

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REPORTOF THE

TECHNICAL W ORK ING GROUPON GOVERNANCEAPPOINTED BY

CARICOM HEADS OF

GOVERNMENT

MANAGING MATUREREGIONALISM

REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE

CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY


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UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES

GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ST AUGUSTINE CAMPUSREPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND

TOBAGO

23 October 2006

H.E. Mr. Edwin CarringtonSecretary-GeneralCaribbean Community SecretariatGeorgetownCooperative Republic of Guyana

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to submit to you the Report of the Technical Working Group on theGovernance of the Caribbean Community, established by the CARICOM Heads of State andGovernment at their Twenty-Sixth Meeting in July 2005.

On behalf of the members of the Working Group and the Advisers to the Group, I would like toexpress our appreciation to Heads of State and Government for their decision to grant us theopportunity to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the nature and orientation of theCommunity; and to thank them for the time which they took to discuss with us their views on theevolution of a regime for governance of the Community.

I would also wish to thank various officials of the Governments of the Community for their adviceon this issue, and also for facilitating our visits to the Member States.

We have consulted a number of persons and institutions as we have conducted ourdeliberations, and we also wish to thank them for their assistance.

I wish to put on record our appreciation of yourself and the numerous officials of the Secretariat

who have taken the time to discuss your views with us; and to express our particular thanks toMr. Neville Bissember of the Legal Advisers Office and to Ms. Marilyne Trotz who acted asSecretary to the Working Group, and indeed did yeoman service.

Finally, I would like to express appreciation to the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) and the Government of Korea which co-financed this exercise.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraphs

I. INTRODU CTION 1-11

II. TERMS OF REFERENCE AND COMPOSITION OF 12-13TECHNICAL W ORKING GROUP (TWG)

III. METHODOLOGY 14

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 15

V. ELABORA TION AND JUSTIFICATIONOF RECOMMENDATIONS 16-69

A. The Role of Governance 16-27

B. Rationalisation of Decision-making 28-32

C. Issues in Terms of Reference 33

D. Constraints in Operation of the Commission 34-37

E. Legislative Interventions 38-43

F. Commission relationship with Community entities 44-48

G. Automaticity in Financing 49-59

H. Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians

(ACCP) 60-63

I. The Pace of Integration 64-65

VI. CONCLUSION 66-69

ANNEXES

I. Terms of Reference of Technical Working Group


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The development of a system of mature regionalism in whichcritical policy decisions of the Community taken by Heads ofGovernmen t, or by other Organs of the Comm unity, will have theforce of law throughout the Region.... The Rose HallDeclaration on Regional Governance and IntegratedDevelopm ent (July 2003)

We must urge, specifically, that CARICOM is already too bureaucratised to add whole new layers of inter-regionalinstrumentalities. What is required is a simplified system usingexisting instrumentalities for the Commissions consultation atMinisterial and other levels and a clearly defined hierarchy of

regional decision-making such as special Committees,Ministerial levels and Heads of Governments. Report of thePrime Ministerial Expert Group on Governance: RegionalIntegration Carrying the Pro cess Forw ard (2005).


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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Member States of the Caribbean Community face a number of major challenges

at this stage of their historical evolution. Pressing domestic issues include the

need to continue to improve standards of living together with Region-wide

demands arising from such problems as crime, security and disaster

management. These challenges must be addressed in the context of the

inexorable march of globalisation and its consequences. The significant

geopolitical and geo-strategic shifts which have occurred in the international

system have forced countries of the Region to promote closer economic

integration. This is reflected in current efforts to establish the Caribbean Single

Market and Economy (CSME). In essence, therefore, economic integration is

seen as an imperative strategy for optimising the development potential of the

Region. It will also ensure the proper management of the regional environment,

and the strengthening of the Regions capacity to participate effectively in the

international system.

2. A critical element in the effort to advance the integration process is the need todevise suitable structures of regional governance to manage an integrated

economic space. This must be based on a pragmatic approach to regional

decision-making, since the promotion of the goals of economic integration

presupposes an increasing degree of political consensus aimed at facilitating the

achievement of agreed objectives.

3. In recognition of this need, CARICOM Heads of Government decided in 2003 to

appoint a Prime Ministerial Expert Group on Governance (PMEGG) to make

recommendations on the structure of regional governance consistent with the


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4. The Report of the PMEGG entitled -- Regional Integration: Carrying the Process

Forward -- was submitted to the Sixteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the

Conference of Heads of Government held in Suriname from 16-17 February 2005.

5. The PMEGG was assisted in its work by three Technical Sub-Groups. It

recommended, inter-alia, the establishment of a CARICOM Commission,

comprising three members and a President, to exercise full-time executive

responsibility for the implementation of decisions relating to the CSME and any

other areas of the integration process as the Conference of Heads of Government

may from time to time determine and to initiate proposals for Community

action in such areas.

6. It further recommended that, in the exercise of its responsibilities, the

Commission would be accountable to the Conference of Heads of Government

and would also be responsive to the authority of the other organs of the

Community within their respective areas of competence.

7. In addition, it was proposed that the Commission, in collaboration with MemberStates, would seek to promote a system of Community Law which, on the basis of

provisions in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and legislative enactments by

the parliaments of Member States, would be legally binding on Member States

as well as on the organs of the Community.

8. The PMEGG also proposed that in order to fund the increased number of

institutions envisaged under the CSME, it would be necessary to identify a

reliable stream of resources that could be allocated for this purpose. Based on a

review of various options including the imposition of a value-added tax and a tax


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and should therefore be sufficient to fund the Secretariat and the other

institutions established under the CSME.

9. Finally, the PMEGG recommended that:

(i) the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP) should

be strengthened by the adoption of revised Standing Orders designed to

ensure that it functioned as an authentic regional body; and also that it

should continue to function as a deliberative and consultative, rather than

a legislative body;

(ii) there should be an explicit recognition that:

(a) its members would comprise both government and opposition

parliamentarians; and

(b) that the category of observers would be expanded to cater for the

participation of civil society representatives in an effort to increasethe democratic character of the Assembly.

These recommendations were in response to criticisms that CARICOM

institutions were not sufficiently attentive to the need for increased popular

participation.

10. Given the comprehensive and somewhat complex nature of some of the

recommendations contained in the PMEGG Report and the limited time available

during the Sixteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting held in Suriname to consider it


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11. Based on their consideration of the issue at the Seventeenth Inter-Sessionl

Meeting held in Port-of-Spain from 9-10 February 2006, Heads of Government

appointed the present Technical Working Group (TWG) and assigned it the task

of examining the PMEGG Report with a view to suggesting the most feasible

options for implementing its recommendations.

II. TERMS OF REFERENCE AND COMPOSITION OF THETECHNICAL W ORKING GROUP

12. The Terms of Reference and composition of the TWG are shown inAnnexes I

and II of this Report.

13. It is clear from the Terms of Reference that the Heads of Government felt that

there was a need to resolve a number of potentially contradictory provisions

embodied in some of the recommendations contained in the PMEGG Report.

This was particularly so in terms of the overall conception of the Community

and the way in which the functions of the Commission could be reconciled with

the executive authority of National Cabinets.

III. METHODOLOGY ADOPTED BY THE TECHNICAL W ORKINGGROUP IN THE EXECUTION OF ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE

14. In carrying out its work, the TWG met with thirteen Heads of Government and

two Leaders of Opposition appointed to participate with designated Heads of

Government in the Group established to carry forward the dialogue on

integration issues. A list of Heads of Government and Leaders of Opposition

with whom the TWG met, is contained in Annexe III of the Report. These


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experience that are applicable to Caribbean circumstances. In addition, the TWG

held extensive discussions with the Secretary-General and senior staff of the

CARICOM Secretariat in order to gain a better understanding of the role of the

Secretariat in the regional integration effort. Finally, the Group met on four

occasions -- in Barbados, Guyana (twice), and Trinidad and Tobago -- to

exchange ideas among its members and advisers in order to arrive at a consensus

on issues which the Group was asked to address.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

15. The recommendations of the TWG are as follows:

15.1 The TWG accepts, in broad outlines, the recommendations contained in

the Report of the PMEGG.

15.2 CARICOM should continue to operate as a Community of sovereign

States on the basis of the new legal and institutional arrangements

proposed in the TWG Report. The application of this principle ismanifested in the concept of shared sovereignty or the collective

exercise of sover eigntyin agreed areas by Member States. The agreed

areas of shared sovereignty will be determined on the basis of two

principles:

(1) proportionality which stipulates that the content of, and the

institutional arrangements devised for, Community action shall not

exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Revised

Treaty; and


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States demonstrate a commitment to pursue such action. (See para.

25).

15.3 The TWG recognises the provisions of the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas as the

legal basis for the functioning of the Community and therefore as the source of

Community Law. The TWG therefore recommends the passing of a single

CARICOM Act by the parliaments of Member States which will permit the

reception of Community Law in the jurisdictions of Member States. The TWG

also recommends:

15.3.1 The creation of a Caribbean Community Commission subject to the

authority of the Conference of Heads of Government. See para.34)

15.3.2 Expansion of the processes of regional decision-making through

continuous collaboration between the cabinets of Member States,

the ministerial organs of the Community and the Commission. This

collaboration will provide the basis for an effective system of

regional decision-making. (See paras. 24 & 26)

15.3.3 Progressive development of Community Law, already enshrined in

the Revised Treaty, as a basis for the operation of the

Community.This is directed at empowering the ministerial organs

of the Community, in collaboration with the Commission, to effectlegally binding decisions on the organs of the Community and on

Member States by virtue of the single CARICOM Act. (See paras.

20-21, 35, 38-40)


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15.4.1 Constitute persons of high political experience who would have the

capacity to give a deliberate policy direction and orientation to the

Commission. (See para. 34)

15.4.2 Comprise four persons, one of whom should be the President. (See

paras. 44-45)

15.4.3 Maintain formal relationships with national cabinets, relevant

Ministries, Community organs, the Heads of Government

(including the Conference, the Prime Ministerial Bureau, the Quasi-

Cabinet), and the Assembly of Caribbean Community

Parliamentarians (ACCP). (See paras. 35-37, 40-42, 44-47, 59, 61)

15.4.4 Distribute portfolios of the three Commissioners in accordance

with the broad subject areas of the integration movement, namely:

(1) Foreign and Community Relations; (2) Regional and

International Trade and Economic Integration (including Finance

and Planning); (3) Human and Social Development (includingFunctional Cooperation). The President shall have overall

responsibility for coordinating and managing the work of the

Commission. (See paras. 44-45)

15.4.5 Encompass the administrative structure of the CARICOM

Secretariat after its appropriate amendment. (See para. 46)

15.4.6 Be administratively supported, for the execution of its functions, by

the Secretariat re-organised in such a way that: (1) the present


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functions carried out by the Secretary-General will be absorbed into

those of the President of the Commission. (See paras. 46-48)

15.5 The TWG further recommends that expansion in regional decision-making

referred to in 15.3 above should have as one of its main objectives the

decentralisation of regional decision-making aimed at producing greater

effectiveness in the operation of the integration system. Implicit in this

recommendation is that the Conference of Heads of Government should insist

that the sectoral ministerial councils use their full authority under the Revised

Treaty to effect regional decisions instead of relaying a large number of issues

upwards to the Heads of Government as is done at present. (See paras. 28-32).

15.6 The President and the other Commissioners should constitute a strategic linkbetween the ministerial councils and the Heads of Government so as to assist the

appropriate formultation and legitimisation of decisions made at ministerial

levels and facilitate their implementation. In the context of the formalisation of

such an arrangement, the Community Council should be abolished, and its

specific responsibility under the Treaty to examine and approve the CommunityBudget be tranferred to COFAP with Ministers responsible for Community

Affairs being in attendance at the option of Member States (See paras. 35-36).

15.7 The TWG recommends that the Commission, in the exercise of its functions,

should have authority to intervene within individual national systems and at the

level of regional entities on behalf of the collective political directorate (Heads of

Government and Ministerial Councils) in the elaboration and execution of agreed

decisions. (See para. 37).


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15.9 In this context, the TWG recommends that the progressive development of

Community Law referred to in 15.3 above should permit a distinction among

decisions made at various levels, between (1) regulations; (2) directives; (3)

decisions; and (4) recommendations and opinions in order to offer Member

States some measure of flexibility in the reception of Community Law especially

with respect to directives. (See paras. 21, 39-40).

15.10 The TWG endorses the principle that in view of the disparities in levels ofdevelopment among Member States of the Caribbean Community, there is an

explicit recognition that integration must be premised on a bargain involving

recognition of all the requirements for ensuring development by individual

Member States as well as the equitable distribution of the benefits of integration.

This principle also recognises that the nature of the bargain would change over

time. (See para. 27).

15.11 With respect to automaticity of financing of the institutions of

integration, the TWG endorses the use of GNP as the primary measure of the

capacity of Member States to pay. It identifies import duties, from among the

options flagged in the Technical Sub-Group Report, as the preferred source, at

each national level, for the automatic transfer of resources to the Community.

The TWG recommends that this overall objective be pursued in two phases.

Phase 1 would be activated in CARICOM Financial Year (FY) 2008 and would

involve direct transfers of resources from national Customs authorities to the

Community pursuant to a Budget approved by the Conference. These transfers

would be to finance the budget of the integrated Commission and Secretariat,

which should include a small Unit to service the needs of the Assembly of

Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP) and the budget of the Caribbean


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15.12 With reference to the role of the Assembly of Caribbean CommunityParliamentarians (ACCP) in the integration process, the TWG recommends

that the proposals outlined in the PMEGG Report should form the basis for

further strenghtening of the ACCP. These proposals relate to the reaffirmation

that the Assembly should: (1) continue to function as a consultative and

deliberative, instead of a legislative body; (2) revise and adopt its standing orders

to include, as national delegations to the Assembly, both government and

opposition parliamentarians; (3) expand the category of observers in the

Assembly to include civil society representatives; (4) entertain expert witnesses

to give advice on any subject which it may be considering, and provide for their

attendance in the budget of the Assembly. (See para. 60).

15.13 With respect to the specific agenda to be given the Assembly, the TWG

recommends that the Assembly should be mandated to discuss policies,

programmes and matters falling within the scope of the Treaty and be

empowered to make recommendations thereon. The Assembly should also be

mandated to make recommendations on any matter referred to it by the

Conference of Heads of Government, the Ministerial Councils or any other organ

or any institution or associate institution of the Community. The President of the

Commission and the other Commissioners may be invited, or seek leave, to

appear before the Assembly in the context of the deliberative and scrutiny

functions of the Assembly in its sphere of competence relating to CARICOMaffairs. (See para. 61).

15.14 Finally, the TWG emphasises that the deepening of Caribbean integration

together with the management of the maturing of Caribbean regionalism


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political union), often referred to as a variable geometry of integration, among

different groups of Member States provided that this does not contradict the

objectives of the integration movement embodied in the Revised Treaty of

Chaguaramas. (See paras. 65-69).

V. ELABORA TION AND JUSTIFICATION OF THERECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Role of Governance in the Integration Process:Philosophical Perspectives and Conceptual Issues

16. There is growing recognition that an effective system of regional governance is a

key requirement for the optimal functioning of the agreed regional integration

space. The quickening pace of integration evident in the move towards the

establishment of the CSME now requires the introduction of an innovative

system of regional decision-making, if the objectives of Caribbean integration are

to be achieved.

17. At the same time, approaches to governance have undergone significant change.

Governance is no longer seen as an exclusively State-centred process but is

perceived instead as encompassing the activities of a wide range of non-State

actors, including the private sector, trade unions and other civil society groups.

While this broader appreciation of governance serves as the guiding principle

underpinning the analysis contained in the Report, special attention isnevertheless paid to regional governance structures and their functions, given the

Terms of Reference of the TWG.


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19. This is now widely perceived to be a handicap, which has become increasingly

untenable since action at the national level has not been pursued with the

urgency required to ensure the timely implementation of decisions taken at the

regional level. This is attributable to a number of factors, including a lack of

political will, often resulting from inadequate consultation at the national level

prior to the adoption of decisions at the regional level; the absence of supporting

national legislation; the non-availability of the necessary technical capacity to

implement regional decisions; or insufficient recognition of the importance of the

provision of appropriate legal mechanisms to ensure enforcement.

20. The increasing urgency of dealing with numerous critical issues that have arisen

in the context of the CSME and in response to challenges presented bydevelopments in the global environment have served to underline the need to put

in place suitable arrangements and procedures, including an appropriate legal

framework, to give prompt effect to decisions taken at the regional level. Based

on these considerations, the TWG accords high priority to collective decision-

making at the regional level and to the adoption of arrangements to facilitate the

reception of such decisions into the domestic law of Member States through their

enactment of a single CARICOM Act in their respective parliaments with

provisions to ensure enforcement of such decisions.

21. It is obvious to the TWG that the Caribbean Community has not yet achieved the

level of integration experienced by the European Union. Nevertheless, we believe

that some of the principles and practices involved in the operation of the latter

are quite relevant to Caribbean current and future integration requirements and

could therefore be adapted in an effort to improve the effectiveness of


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22. In addressing governance in the Caribbean, it is evident that there is some

tension between nationalism and regionalism. Both represent legitimate

aspirations of the people of the Region. The reality is that it is natural for

individual Member States to seek to defend their sovereignty, bearing in mind

that, in many cases, national independence has been achieved relatively recently.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Community comprises

mainly island States, scattered over a fairly large expanse of sea which not only

generates geographical separateness, but also encourages a certain degree of

particularism. This factor is exacerbated by the fact that many Member States

contain a multi-ethnic population or are constituted by a plurality of island

communities. However, given the need to accelerate the pace of development of

Member States and to respond to the complex challenges presented by the

profound geo-political and geo-strategic shifts that have occurred in the globalsystem in which they function, it is increasingly accepted by governments and

private actors that new methods of management of integrated economic spaces

are necessary.

23. Indeed, in the face of this reality, there is increasing attention to the restructuring

of economic integration arrangements in various parts of the developing world.

Examples include: the Andean Group, MERCOSUR, and the Central American

Common Market in Latin America; ECOWAS, COMESA, SADC and the East

African Community in Africa; and ASEAN and SAARC in Asia. Our CARICOM is

simply part of this wider evolution of the need for effective governance of

integration processes.

24. A peculiar challenge to the Caribbean is to find integration formulas that

reconcile nationalism and regionalism It is becoming clear that as the


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making at the regional level will apply only to the specific areas agreed on

collectively by Member States. A critical consideration is that Member States,

through inter-governmental processes, are always present at the table in each

arena of collective decision-making.

25. In this context, the TWG believes that it would be useful to apply the principle of

proportionality, utilised by the European Union. This stipulates that the

content of and the institutional arrangments devised for Community action shall

not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Revised Treaty, and

that this should be supported by a second principle of subsidiarity. This

principle asserts that regional action would not be pursued in cases where action

by individual Member States is sufficient to achieve the specified goals of the

Community and these States demonstrate a commitment to pursue such action.

26. The TWG therefore concludes that effective governance in the Caribbean

integration context can best be understood by an approach which combines

elements of inter-governmentalism, (which recognises the continuing

importance of individual Member States in determining the path of the

integration process), and elements of neo-functionalism, (which is premised on

the principle of shared sovereignty or the collective exercise of such sovereignty

in specified areas). On this basis, it would be possible to reconcile the twin

imperatives of nationalism and regionalism, based on a division of responsibility

between the two levels of decision-making.

27. Moreover, in view of the disparities in levels of development among Member

States, there is an explicit recognition that integration must be premised on a

bargain among Member States involving recognition of all the requirements for


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B. Rationalisation of Regional Decision-making

28. Another challenge of regional governance in the Caribbean is the need to increase

the efficiency of decision-making in the Commmunity. It has become

increasingly clear that, despite the establishment of various ministerial councils,

namely, Council for Foreign and Community Relation (COFCOR), Council for

Trade and Economic Development (COTED), Council for Human and Social

Development (COHSOD), and Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP),

decision-making within the Community remains largely centralised, with issues

being referred upwards for decisions. The result has been that the agendas of

Meetings of the Conference of Heads of Government have become overburdened

and extremely unwieldy. This has prevented the Heads of Government fromfocusing on the major strategic challenges facing the Community. These include

the implications of globalisation and the significant geo-strategic shifts which

have occurred in the international system, including the growing economic

importance of China and India, and the geopolitics of energy.

29. There is fairly widespread consensus that effective systems of regional

governance require a radical decentralisation of decision-making designed to

shift less important issues to lower levels of regional decision-making. Heads of

Government should therefore insist that the various ministerial councils

(COFCOR, COTED, COHSOD and COFAP) take definitive decisions in respect of

issues falling within their respective areas of responsibility, which in fact they are

empowered to do under relevant articles of the Revised Treaty. Councils should

in turn seek to delegate, with the blessing of the Heads of Government, decision-

making on some issues to Government officials and to the Commission Indeed


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Commission to exercise such functions thus relieving Heads of Government,

Ministers and government officials of this responsibility, and the over-burdening

of the deliberations of the Conference.

30. In this regard, a special word needs to be said about the functioning of the

Community Council in the overall scheme of CARICOM governance. Under the

Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the Community Council is designated as the

second highest organ of the Community after the Conference of Heads of

Government, and has the responsibility for proposing the agenda for Meetings of

the Conference of Heads of Government. Although it was clearly the intention

that the Council should function in this manner, it has instead, in practice, simply

become an instrument through which issues emerging from various ministerial

councils are routinely referred for decision to the Heads of Government.

31. The situation is partly due to the fact that with the establishment of the various

ministerial councils with sectoral mandates covering areas such as -- community

relations, foreign policy, trade and economic development, and finance and

planning -- the Community Council, which comprises mainly Ministers of

Foreign Affairs, does not possess the range of competences required to address

issues referred to it by sectoral councils. Moreover, the original mandate of the

Community Council has been undermined to some extent by the appointment of

the Quasi-Cabinet, comprising Heads of Government who have been assigned

responsibility for specific issues such as crime and security, health, the

environment, external economic relations, the CSME, law and governance and

agriculture. As a result, Heads of Government are able to intervene directly to

effect speedy decisions in their respective portfolios outside the context of the

Community Council The role of the Council is likely to be further diminished by


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It would seem therefore that a number of developments over the years have

conspired to reduce the necessity for the Community Council as it exists.

32. The TWG therefore recommends the abolition of the Community Council.

Instead, the various sectoral ministerial councils should be directed by the Heads

of Government to exercise, to the maximum, their decision-making

responsibilities as envisaged in the Revised Treaty, and to refer to the Heads only

those issues which, because of their importance and acute political sensitivity,

should be considered by the Heads of Government. Under this dispensation, the

preparation of agendas for Meetings of the Conference of Heads of Government

would instead be entrusted to the Bureau, assisted by the chairpersons of the

sectoral ministerial councils and be based on proposals submitted by the

Commission, following consultations with the governments of Member States.Such a realignment and readjustment of responsibilities would result in a

considerable improvement in the efficiency of decision-making and also lead to a

significant rationalisation of the governance structure of the Community. It is

obvious, in this formulation, that the Commission would play a pivotal role in

facilitating decison-making at both regional and national levels. Finally, it can be

seen that in this context, we believe the establishment of the Bureau and the

Quasi-Cabinet to have been peculiar CARICOM innovations; and that their

further institutional integration with the Commissions activities can only

enhance the making and implementation of decisions.

C. Specific Issues Identified in the Term s of Reference of the TWG

33. As indicated earlier, the TWG was requested to examine a number of specific

issues (see Annexe I) dealing with potential constraints on the operations of the


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(iv) participation, with the representatives of Member States in negotiations

with, and representations to, extra-regional authorities in the international

commmunity

In considering the character of the proposed Commission, the majority of the 13

Heads of Government consulted by the TWG were of the view that the

Commission should be constituted of persons of high political experience who

would have the capacity to give policy direction and orientation to the central

executive mechanism of the Community.

35. The rationale for the establishment of a Commission derives from the general

recognition of an implementation deficit in the activities of CARICOM. This isdue to two main factors: (1) the almost exclusive dependence of the Community

on the individual Member States to implement measures agreed upon at the

regional level; and (2) the absence of institutions, involving the organs of both

Member States and the Community, with specific responsibilities to implement

regional decisions. Both of these shortcomings can be overcome through the

adoption of regional institutions and modalities. These will operate on the basis

of Community Law, with specific constitutional responsibities assigned to the

organs of Member States as well as those of the Community, including the

proposed Commission, for the formulation of regional policy, legislation, and the

implementation of Community decisions.

36. The TWG reviewed the mechanism for overcoming the possible constraints

imposed on the operationalisation of the Commission by the widespread

acceptance of the principle that CARICOM functions as a Community of


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(i) the collective delegation of executive authority of national cabinets to the

Commission on specific agreed subjects (implicit in the concept of the

collective exercise of sovereignty); and by

(ii) conceiving of the Commission as a mechanism functioning under

authority of the Heads of Government in keeping with the principle of

centralisation of decision-making within the Community on a rationalised

basis.

37. In this context, the TWG recommends that the Commission, in the exercise of its

functions, should have authority to intervene within individual national systems

and at the level of regional entities on behalf of the collective political directorate(Heads of Government and Ministerial Councils), in the elaboration and

execution of agreed decisions.

E. Legislative Interventions Required to Vest Comm issioners withthe Necessary Powers to Effect Implementation of Community

Regulations

38. Regarding legislative interventions necessary to achieve this objective, possible

approaches for dealing with this issue are outlined in the Report of the PMEGG.

The Report recommends the adoption of a system of Community Law sanctioned

by the various national governments and based on the drafting by the

Commission of instruments of implementation formally approved by the Heads

of Government or other competent organs of the Community to give effect to, or

facilitate, the making of Community decisions.


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Community. This should be achieved through the instrumentality of

collaboration between the Conference of the Heads of Government and

Ministerial Councils (including the Legal Affairs Committee) on the one hand and

the Commission on the other.

40. In this context, it is proposed that new provisions should be inserted in the

Revised Treaty to facilitate collaboration between the Conference of the Heads of

Government and Minsterial Councils with the assistance of the Legal Affairs

Committee on the one hand and the Commission on the other. This is essential

for the purpose of effecting Community legislation which, through the Single

CARICOM Act enacted by the parliaments of Member States, would have direct

application and direct effect within the jurisdictions of Member States. In these

treaty provisions, it would be necessary, as was done in the EuropeanCommunity, to make the distinction among regional legal decisions characterised

as (1) regulations which shall have general application and be binding in every

respect and directly applicable in each Member State; (2) directives that will bind

Member States to which they are addressed, as to the results to be achieved,

while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means; (3)

decisions which shall be binding in every respect for the addressees named

therein; and (4) recommendations and opinions which shall have no binding

force. These legislative distinctions will further emphasise the priniciple that

CARICOM is a Community of sovereign States.

41. The TWG recommends further, that the Commission should be provided with

sufficient legislative and institutional authority to ensure enforcement of regional

decisions through provisions in the Revised Treaty, the delegated authority of

Heads of Government and by virtue of Community Law


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ministerial organs, and Member States. The other Commissioners would also be

expected to establish appropriate links with ministerial organs and Member

States in their respective areas of competence.

46. Under this model, the existing CARICOM Secretariat would be incorporated into

the Commission. As such, technical staff of the Secretariat would provide

substantive technical support to the Commissioners. Within this framework, the

existing position of Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) in the Secretariat could

each be designated as a Director-General who would be required to provide

necessary technical support to the President and the other Commissioners, while

at the same time managing, on a day-to-day basis, the relevant divisions of the

Commission. It is also proposed that the responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary-

General, which in effect encompass the Administrative Support functions of theproposed Commission should be assigned to a Director-General who, like the

Legal Counsel, would report directly to the President of the Commission.

47. As a result, the relations between the proposed Commission and the various

entities of the Community will remain much the same as that which currently

exists between those entities and the Secretary-General and senior staff of the

Secretariat. Moreover, relations between the Commission (incorporating the

Secretariat) on the one hand and the Heads of Government (Conference, Bureau,

Quasi-Cabinet), the ministerial organs, and Member States, on the other hand,

will be put on a new footing. Under the proposed new arrangements, the

Commissioners would be vested with specific executive responsibilities for the

initiation of action and follow-up on implementation based on their

empowerment to act under delegated authority conferred by the Member States,

as described earlier


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Community property, not the property of the Secretariat or of the proposed

Commission.

52. It should also be recognised that the establishment of arrangements for

automaticity in financing would not mean that Member States would be

committing themselves to any greater flow of national resources to the

Community than that which, subject to the budget approval process, they would

in any case be providing through the present system of annual appropriations

from their respective treasuries. Essentially, automaticity of financing would

mean the removal of uncertainties about the timely availability of funds for

Community operations, through a more expeditious and predictable flow of the

resources that Member States undertake to provide for the Community.

53. A particularly practical consideration noted by the PMEGG Sub-Group is that

automatic transfers would enable avoidance of costs arising from the use of

overdraft facilities which the Secretariat has had to negotiate every year on

account of overdue contributions from Member States. The TWG has ascertained

that the overdraft facility negotiated in 2001 was equivalent to US$1.9 million,

and by 2005 the level was US$3.7 million. Drawings on these facilities incurred

cumulative interest charges of US$297,000 over the period 2001 2005.

54. The PMEGG Sub-Group, after indicating the need to use GNP as an indicator of

capacity to pay, identified several options for securing a reliable stream of

resources for meeting the financing needs of the Community. These included

import duties, value added tax and other consumption taxes, income tax or

income tax levy, and an exit tax. From among these, the PMEGG Sub-Group

proposed that the most practical arrangement would be for Member States to


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Secretariat, and would therefore be sufficient to finance the Secretariat and the

other institutions required to support the integration effort.

55. During Meetings with the various Heads of Government, the TWG received

mixed responses to the proposal. Some Heads supported the proposal as a

means of ensuring a reliable system of funding for regional institutions. Others

were skeptical of the feasibility of the proposal and also felt that, even if it were to

be adopted, the resources allocated should be held in a national fund, instead of being allocated to a regional pool. It was recognised, however, that such an

arrangement would probably result in the same problem currently being

experienced by Governments in ensuring timely payments of contributions to

regional institutions.

56. Taking all the foregoing considerations into account, the TWG is recommending

a two-phased approach to the introduction of automatic financing flows for the

Community.

57. Phase One would be implemented in CARICOM Financial Year (FY) 2008,

leaving time for the necessary legal and administrative arrangements to be put in

place during 2007. In FY 2008, direct transfers of resources to the Community

would be activated. These transfers would be to finance the budgets of the

integrated Commission and Secretariat, which should include a small Unit to

service the functioning of the ACCP, and the budget of the Caribbean Regional

Negotiating Machinery (CRNM). The already existing Budget Contribution

formula, painstakingly revised as recently as 2003 on the basis of GNP and other

criteria, would be applied to determine the contribution of each Member State to

the approved Budget for these entities and the national authorities would


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58. In Phase Two, to be implemented after FY 2008, additional institutions, if any, to

be covered by the transfers would be identified and brought under the regime.

Also, the automaticity of the system would be enhanced, and the resource flows

further calibrated to yield sufficient funds to cover the budgetary requirements of

the approved institutions, and to allow for the building up of moderate reserves.

59. In the implementation of the above proposals, the TWG recommends that the

Commission would identify the institutions that should be funded under theregime and submit (through COFAP) recommendations for approval by Heads of

Government.

H. The Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians(ACCP)

60. It is recommended that proposals outlined in the PMEGG Report should form

the basis for the further strenghtening of the ACCP. The main proposals relate to

the reaffirmation that the Assembly should continue to function as a consultative

and deliberative, instead of a legislative body; its revised standing orders should

be adopted; national delegations to the Assembly should include bothgovernment and opposition parliamentarians; and the category of observers in

the Assembly should be expanded to include civil society representatives. The

Assembly should be able to entertain expert witnesses to give advice on any

subject which it may be considering, and provisions for this should be included in

the Budget allowed to the Assembly.


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61. In terms of the nature and scope of the activities of the Assembly, based on the

provisions of the agreement governing its establishment, the Assembly is

mandated to discuss policies and programmes and make recommendations on

any matters relating to the objectives of the Treaty. It can also make

recommendations on any matter referred to it by the Conference of Heads of

Government, the Ministerial Councils or any institution or associate institution

and adopt appropriate resolutions. The President of the Commission and theother Commissioners may be invited, or seek leave, to appear before the

Assembly in the context of its deliberative and scrutiny functions. And the

Assembly could entertain expert witnesses to appear to facilitate its

understanding on specific issues.

62. In addition to the above, the TWG recommends that the next session of the

Assembly should focus on the CSME and its ramifications for the Region and

should also discuss global developments which impact on the Community with a

view to identifying possible responses to these challenges. It is felt that such a

debate could make a major contribution to the effort to increase public education

and awareness of the critical issues facing the Region.

63. Having said this, the infrequent nature of meetings of the Assembly which, in

keeping with its constituent mandate, should normally meet annually, would

militate against the timely consideration of issues affecting the Region. Since

financial constraints exist in respect of countries hosting Meetings of the

Assembly, it is recommended that the financing of these meetings should be

included in the CARICOM budget.


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I. The Pace of Integration amo ng Membe r States

64. Developments at national, regional and international levels are likely to exert

continuing pressure on Member States of the Caribbean Community to intensify

the process of regional integration. This will in turn require national decision-

making to be increasingly supplemented by collective decision-making at the

regional level, supported by the principle of direct effect. This is essential since

the objectives of regional economic integration are unlikely to be achieved, unlesssupported by a rational system of regional governance. However, the advocacy of

enhanced regional decision-making, based on the collective exercise of

sovereignty, as an indispensable element of regional integration, should not be

construed as a statement in favour of federation or other form of political union,

which implies a permanent cession of sovereignty. Instead, it should be seen as a

pragmatic attempt to identify a creative and flexible form of governance in

keeping with the logic of regional integration.

65. During the course of the discussions carried out by the TWG, the issue of the

viability of a variable geometry of integration, based on the adoption of different

levels of integration by groups of states within the Community was raised. In fact,

it could be argued that the existence of the OECS already represents such a

pattern of integration. Moreover, some Member States have expressed their

intentions to explore closer forms of political integration while, at the same time,

retaining their membership of the Community. Indeed, it can be argued that the

process of economic integration itself can be traced to the actions of three current

Member States of the Community, namely: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and

Guyana, which in 1965 formed CARIFTA, to which other Member States

subsequently acceded There appears therefore to be no obstacle to the pursuit


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VI. CONCLUSION

66. The Caribbean stands at a critical juncture in its evolution which compels it to

adopt a creative, yet pragmatic, system of regional governance. Such a system of

governance must be capable of supporting the wide-ranging process of economic

integration as envisaged in the CSME. At the same time, it must respond to

global challenges impinging on prospects for national and regional development.The decisions taken today in respect of the structure of governance therefore

assume critical importance in determining the capacity of the Region to deal with

the plethora of multi-faceted challenges it will continue to face.

67. In the discussions with Heads of Government, Leaders of Opposition and other

persons, the TWG has been impressed by their persistent emphasis on the

importance of citizen participation in the decision-making process and in the

legitimisation of decisions taken in regard to the nature and pace of the

integration process.

68. Viewing this process as an evolutionary one, the TWG stresses the importance of

continuing interaction with stakeholders of different kinds and the formalisation

of such interaction wherever possible. The purpose of this engagement would be

to ensure that, in the process of globalisation that now accompanies the

transition to a form of open regionalism, the people of the Community would

develop a thorough understanding of the movements of the international

economy as they impact on the Region. This is important for enabling the people

of the Region to advance to a more mature understanding of the imperatives of

increasing regional and international integration and the emerging modes of


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69. Given the length of time already spent on the consideration of regional

governance in the Caribbean, it is recommended that a decision on the subject be

adopted with a due sense of urgency. This is especially so in the context of

achieving the objectives envisaged in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas which

remain central to the survival and prosperity of the Region.

ANNEXE I


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A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR THE

TECHNICAL WORKING

GROUP ON GOVERNANCE

ANNEXE I


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TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) FOR THETECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON GOVERNANCE(i) Review the proposals from the Rose Hall Declaration on Regional

Governance (July 2003), taking into consideration both the philosophicaland practical issues influencing the elements contained in the Declaration;

(ii) Examine the Reports from the Prime Ministerial Exert Group and thecomments on the Reports with a view to suggesting the most feasible

option(s) for implementing the broad recommendations in whole or part,

paying particular attention to the components of the Reports as follows:

(a) With respect to the establishment of the Commission -

1. propose mechanisms for overcoming the possible constraints,imposed on the operationalisation of the Commission by the

widespread acceptance of the principle evident in the Revised

Treaty of Chaguaramas to the principle that CARICOM

functions as a Community of Sovereign States;

2. establish the basis by which the Commissioner system wouldco-exist with the executive responsibility for implementation

that now resides in respective Cabinets and by implication,

how such responsibility could/would be transferred to a

Commission;

3. determine more specifically the legislative interventionsrequired to vest Commissioners with the necessary powers to

effect implementation of community regulations;


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o other institutional arrangements for enhancing

Governance, such as the Bureau and the Quasi

Cabinet;

o the Caribbean Community Secretariat;

o the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community;

5. make a determination on the basis of an analysis of the aboveissues, and advise on what and how the Commission

system can contribute to more effective governance of theCommunity;

6. engage Heads of Government as part of the process offormulating these detailed recommendations, especially those

who may have anxieties about the establishment of a

commission system.

(b) With respect to automaticity in financing the New Governance

arrangements -

1. examine the options suggested by the Sub-Committee onautomatic financing of Community Institutions and

recommend the most feasible option, taking into account the

preferred arrangements recommended for the system of

governance;

(c) With respect to the Assembly of Caribbean Community

Parliamentarians (ACCP)

1. make provision for the earliest implementation of therecommendations of the Prime Ministerial Expert Group

aimed at enhancing the effective functioning of this body and

recommend the nature and scope of the activities of the

Assembly in the immediate and medium term period, bearing

in mind that its main functions are intended to be

deliberative.


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ANNEXE II

COMPOSITION OF

TECHNICAL WORKING

GROUP ON

GOVERNANCE


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COMPOSITION OF TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON GOVERNANCE

MembersProfessor Vaughan LewisProfessorInstitute of International RelationsUWI (St. Augustine) - Chairman

Professor Denis BennMichael Manley Professor of Public Policy

UWI (Mona) Vice-Chairman

Ms. Angela CropperPresidentCropper Foundation and former Director of Functional Cooperation,CARICOM Secretariat

Professor Ralph Carnegie

Executive DirectorCaribbean Law Institute Centre (CLIC)Faculty of LawUWI (Cave Hill Campus)

Mr. James Moss-SolomonPresidentCaribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC)

AdvisersDr. George BelleAdviser to the Prime Minister of Barbados on Government Issues

Dr. Cuthbert JosephAmbassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

& Special Adviser on International Legal MattersMinistry of Foreign AffairsGovernment of Trinidad and Tobago

Mr. Roderick RainfordFormer Secretary-General, CARICOM


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CONSULTATIONS

I CONSULTATIONS WITH CARICOM HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND OTHER

RELEVANT PERSONS

Antigua and Barbuda: Hon. Baldwin SpencerPrime Minister

TheBahamas: Rt. Hon. Perry ChristiePrime Minister

Barbados: Rt. Hon. Owen S. ArthurPrime Minister

Belize: Rt. Hon. Said MusaPrime Minister

Dominica: Hon. Roosevelt Skerrit

Prime Minister

Grenada: Dr. the Rt. Hon. Keith MitchellPrime Minister

Guyana: H.E. Bharrat JagdeoPresident

Jamaica Most Hon. Portia Simpson MillerPrime Minister

St. Kitts and Nevis: Hon. Denzil DouglasPrime Minister

Saint Lucia: Dr. the Hon. Kenny D. AnthonyPrime Minister

St. Vincent Dr. the Hon. Ralph Gonsalvesand the Grenadines: Prime Minister

Suriname: H.E. Drs Runaldo Ronald Venetiaan


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1

ANNEXE IV

CHART

ON

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE


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1

v. lewis - report of the twg on governance - managing mature regionalism [july 2006]

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