utilities contracting and the eu procurement rules: national contract awards behaviour under the eu...

U T T E R W O R T H I N E M A N N

S0957-1787(96)00003-3

Utilities Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3/4, pp. 19%206, 1995 Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0957-1787/96 $15.00 + 0.00

Utilities contracting and the EU procurement rules

National contract awards behaviour under the E U directives

Andrew Cox and Paul Furlong

Between 1988 and 1992 new rules were enacted to open the EU utilities procurement market to increased competition. The aim was to end national preference for local suppliers and to encourage increased cross-border trade both from within the EU and, when appropriate, from countries outside. This article draws on data that analyse the impact o f the new rules on utilities procurement in 1993. The data show that so far the new rules have not significantly altered the preference o f EU member states for procurement from locally based suppliers.

Keywords: Utilities procurement; Public contracting; EU Single Market

The development of rules to end national preference in utility purchasing can be understood only in the context of the Single Market initiative as a whole, l The intellectual rationale behind new rules for procurement in the E U can be found in the Atkins Report , The Costs of Non-Europe in Public Sector Procurement2 and in the EC Report , The Large Market of 1993 and the Opening-Up of Public Procurement.3 These reports argued that, although the E U spent the equivalent of 15% of GDP (ECU 592 billion at 1989 prices) on civil (non-defence) public purchasing, when compared with similar types of spending in the private sector the prices achieved in the public sector were seen to be much higher and subject to far less cross-border trade. As

Andrew Cox and Paul Furlong are with the Centre for Strategic Procurement Management, University of Birmingham, Birmingham Business School, Birmingham Research Park, Vincent Drive, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2SQ, UK.

a result the EC argued that E U purchasing was nationalistic, protected and inefficient. This was argued to be harmful to the EU's ability to compete in world markets.

The major reason for this lack of competitiveness were threefold. First, protectionist public contracting was causing the public sector to spend more than was necessary and therefore contributed to higher taxation and borrowing. This in turn forced interest rates higher than they might otherwise have been. Second, national protection reinforced support for national champion firms and created featherbedded companies unable to compete in world markets. Finally, national preference resulted in too many small and medium-size firms in Europe, unable to compete equally with US and Japanese companies. The lack of economies of scale was seen thereby to undermine competitiveness and to force prices higher than they might otherwise have been.

For all these reasons, plus the inevitable and related concern about national protection and corruption through single sourced, negotiated public contracts, it was felt that liberalizing and opening public purchasing might well assist in making European industry more competitive. The basic thinking behind the new rules was neo-liberal.4 If existing national purchasing structures were opened to greater competition then, it was argued, protected national champions might be eradicated and replaced either by more efficient national or European firms or, failing that, by more efficient international competitors. Whichever occurred, the consequence ought to be lower prices, lower public expenditure and lower taxation.

The mechanism by which these gains were to be achieved was through regulatory rules on the demand side of the market, which would create

199


behaviour changes by firms operating on the supply side of European public contracting markets. 5 The rules would codify and prescribe the way in which national purchasing bodies would let public and utility contracts to ensure the harmonization of available information, awards criteria, financial threshold levels and awards procedures. The whole process was also to be made much more transpar- ent in that potential contractors would have rights about the timescales, the technical specifications and the details of contracts awards after the event.

Most radical of all, there was to be a new enforcement regime for these rules. Similar rules had been in force in the E U since the 1970s for public works and public supply contracts but they had never been successfully implemented because every- one ignored the rules nationally. Even attempts by the EC in the 1970s to make an example of Italy and Ireland for their abuses of the single sourced, negotiated contract procedures through the European Courts failed to have much impact on national preference and protection. 6 Now, under what are called the Remedies Directives, each national government is required to set up national tribunals or court procedures to ensure that potential suppliers who are aggrieved by any awards procedure can obtain redress at a national level before having to resort to the cumbersome and time-consuming process of the European Court of Justice. 7

Once these rules were put in place between 1988 and 1993 it was argued by the EC that there would be a radical change in the way in which public and private sector companies (affected by the utilities rule) behaved. It was expected that there would be a major increase in cross-border contract awards as formerly nationalistic and protectionist purchasers allowed foreign firms to compete for business. The consequence for European supply markets was expected to be profound. First, there would be a static price effect: formerly protected national firms would lose immediate business to other, more price competitive, European or third-country suppliers who had been excluded from specific national markets. Second, in the medium term, there would be a competit ion effect as formerly successful, but nationally protected, firms were forced to become more efficient in order to compete. Finally, there would be a restructuring effect as some of these firms exited the market in the face of insurmount- able competitive pressures, or a wave of mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances. 8

This is the background to the new rules that were put in place between 1988 and 1993. The rules were based on the legislative approach adopted for public works and public supply contracts from the early

1970s. These rules had been seen to fail because they allowed for too many loopholes and because there was no adequate regime to enforce remedies against abuse. In practice the most radical aspects of the new regime, which was enacted by 1993, were the commitment to extend the rules to those utility sectors - energy, transport, telecommunications and water - that had formerly been excluded from the rules, and to create a more effective remedies structure against non-compliance by national authorities. 9

The test of the efficacy of both the public sector and utility rules is of course to what extent the appli- cation of the legislation impacts upon the liberalization of utility supply markets, through the development of increased cross-border contract awards. This, along with an assumption that increased competition leads inevitably to lower prices for public and utility purchases, would appear to be the central argument in the making of the rules.

The theoretical debate: neo-liberalism versus practical sourcing and supply strategies

It is difficult to know in advance whether this new regime can achieve lower prices and an increase in cross-border trade for utility purchases. There are a number of reasons for this, which have generated a debate about whether the rules can work in practice.

While it is difficult to assess the impact of any individual Directive on the structure of European industry, there is evidence that there has already been significant restructuring in European industry through merger and acquisition behaviour since 1985. Much of this activity took place before the new procurement rules were enacted.10

This means that European industry is not behav- ing in a purely reactive way to EU procurement rules. This will not surprise those who have taken issue with the neo-liberal approach to procurement rules adopted by the EC. This school of thought has been called the realist perspective. Realists reject the argument that rules for procurement could be made to work on either the demand or the supply side of the European market. Indeed, realists argue that if they did work effectively the consequences for European industry would be so grave as to fundamentally challenge the existence of the Community in the long term.ll

The main realist arguments are presented briefly below. On the demand side of the market it has been argued that procurement rules are a blunt instrument, which does not effectively liberalize public monopolies or eradicate national champion firms. This is because public sector managers are

200 UTILITIES POLICY July/October 1995

always driven by social and political considerations to find ways of avoiding market rules if the consequence is electorally damaging. It follows from this that only the discipline of privatization and competitive market liberalization can effectively ensure that market outcomes are imposed on public firms. Public purchasers can also effectively ignore or circumvent the rules by writing technical standards, or can use awards criteria that emasculate the rules by favouring national suppliers. While the new EU rules obviously go some way to tightening these loopholes there are still many areas in which subjec- tivity rather than objectivity can intrude. These demand-side obstacles to successful implementation can be overcome, it can be argued, only if there is an effective enforcement regime. While there are new national enforcement regimes realists argue that it is unlikely that all national structures will be equally binding, and that what is really necessary is a European-wide enforcement structure. This structure has been consistently rejected by national governments on the grounds of subsidiarity.

Realists argue therefore that subsidiarity - the idea that the EC should not intervene if things can be under taken effectively at national state level - is the fundamental flaw in the procurement rules. The Directives allow the member states to pretend that they will comply, while effectively providing them with the mechanism to ignore compliance.

Realists also argue that there are serious obstacles on the supply side. It is argued that the concen- tration of markets is evidence not of a tendency to lower prices and more efficiency, but of a tendency to price fixing. The consequence of this can only be higher not lower prices. It can also be argued that even if national preference was stopped by the new rules there are many problems of logistical inertia in supply chains that would hinder the development of cross-border trade. Thus, realists argue that a shift in ownership patterns is more likely than a change in sourcing strategies. As a result it is argued that, while an increase in international trade in compo- nents and services may occur, a major shift in the national location of suppliers is unlikely.

The overall result of this new regime may be an increase in transaction costs rather than the reduc- tion desired. Purchasers will face heavy bureaucratic costs in implementing the new procedures. For suppliers the increase in competit ion for public and utility contracts might also induce suppliers to raise, rather than lower, their bid prices in an at tempt to offset lost income from failure. This might lead to a significant increase in public procurement costs.

Finally, it is argued that even if these criticisms are unjust, and the rules do work successfully, the


EU could not endure the political and social consequences they would occasion. Because the EU has relatively relaxed rules on third-country (USA and Japan etc) firms locating within the EU, and is seeking to encourage third-country imports and trade through the liberalization of public and utility contracting, the new rules could result in the closure of thousands of inefficient firms and the loss of thousands of European jobs. The consequences of this, plus the fact that it might well be in formerly socially and economically prosperous regions, would be very difficult to handle politically. As a result the resulting demand for social funds from distressed regions might well wipe out any gains from more efficient contracting.

It is for these reasons that even the EC has insisted upon a reciprocity clause in the Utilities Directives. The clause insists on 50% local content in all third-country contracts bids and allows EU firms a 3% price advantage against third-country competitors. This latter clause fully underscores the intellectual confusion and contradiction at the heart of the EU's approach to public and utility purchasing: it supports neo-liberalism but appears to be fearful of the ultimate consequences of such an approach.

E U utilities procurement in 1993: the evidence so far

The question is whether the optimistic EU neo- liberal or the more pessimistic realist interpretations is correct. Most EC officials claim, anecdotally, that the rules are working to open-up EU utilities markets, and that lower prices for public and utility contracts across Europe are being achieved.

This view does not, however, match the results of our own survey of the behaviour of the member states in awarding utility contracts in 1993. This research reinforces the realist view outlined above. There is little evidence so far of any significant change in cross-border contract awards, and most of the utility practitioners we have interviewed appear to believe that the rules have increased their own transaction costs significantly.

The results of our research into utilities procurement in the EU are presented in Tables 1-6. The data are based on an analysis of the utilities contract award notices published in the 'S' Supplement of the OJEC. Since Greece, Portugal and Spain do not have to implement the utilities rules we are unable to draw any relevant conclusions about their contract awarding behaviour. We must assume therefore that there has been no significant change in their contract awarding behaviour.

UTILITIES POLICY July/October 1995 201


Table 1. The number of utility contracts awarded by the member states in the EU, 1993

Country of Number of Share of EU award contracts % GDP, 1989 (%)

Belgium 50 2.48 3.2 D enmark 68 3.38 2.2 France 359 17.84 19.7 G e rmany 309 15.35 24.5 Greece 0 0.00 1.1 Ireland 41 2.04 0.7 Italy 239 11.88 17.9 Luxembourg 5 0.25 0.1 Nether lands 96 4.8 4.6 Portugal 2 0.1 0.9 Spain 0 0.00 7.8 U K 843 41.88 17.3

Total 2013 100.00 100.0

Source: EC: OJEC, 1993

Table 1 indicates that the UK is either awarding far more utility contracts than other countries or is by far and away the most compliant member of the EU as far as reporting the award of utility contracts is concerned. The UK appears to have awarded approximately 42% of all utility contracts in the EU, compared with 18% for France and 15% for Germany. This is an improbable statistic, hardly credible given the amount of reconstruction and development being undertaken in Eastern Germany. The figures imply that some countries may not be fully reporting their utility contract awards in 1993. This view is supported if one compares the data on contract awards with the member states' share of EU G D P in 1989.

Table 2 indicates that approximately 20% of utility contracts were awarded for works, with over

Table 2. The types of utility contract awards by member states in the EU, 1993

Type of contract

Awarding Works Supply Combined Services countries (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %)

Belgium 28.0 72.0 Denmark 13.2 82.4 1.5 2.9 France 9.5 87.2 0.8 2.5 Ge rmany 64.4 34.3 0.3 1.0 Ireland 2.4 97.6 Italy 10.4 88.3 1.3 Luxembourg 100.0 Nether lands 24.0 75.0 1.0 Portugal 100.0 UK 11.7 84.8 1.1 2.4

Total E U 20.1 77.3 0.7 1.9


Table 3. The types of utility contract awards procedures by member states in the EU, 1993

Award procedure

Awarding Not reported Open tender, Restricted bids b Negotiated c countries (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %)

Belgium 14.0 48.0 8.0 30.0 Denmark 10.3 13.2 35.3 41.2 France 5.8 2.5 9.2 82.5 Ge rmany 0.6 63.8 9.4 26.2 Ireland 9.8 17.1 65.9 7.3 Italy 3.3 9.6 10.0 77.0 Luxembourg 20.0 40.0 40.0 Nether lands 15.6 45.8 38.6 Portugal 100.0 U K 0.8 0.4 28.6 70.2

Total E U 2.8 14.3 21.4 61.5

Source: EC: OJEC, 1993 Notes: aGermany and Belgium tend to use open tenders. blreland and Portugal use this - Luxembourg , Nether lands and Denmark to a lesser extent. cFrance, Italy and U K use this mostly - is this an infr ingement?



Table 4. The value of utility contract awards by member states in the EU, 1993

Ranges of prices

Awarding n.a. ECU <2OOk ECU ECU ECU ECU ECU ECU ECU countries 2ook-lm 5ook-lm lmn-5m 5mn-20m 20m- 50m- >100m

50m loom (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %)

Belgium 74.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 8.0 Denmark 86.8 1.5 4.4 4.4 2.9 France 93.3 0.8 1.7 0.8 2.2 0.8 0.3 Germany 75.4 3.9 2.3 5.8 9.4 1.6 1.3 0.3 Ireland 97.6 2.4 Italy 92.5 2.5 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.7 0.4 Luxembourg 80.0 20.0 Netherlands 94.9 1.0 1.0 2.1 1.0 Portugal 100.0 UK 97.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.4

Total EU 91.5 1.1 1.1 1.7 2.6 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.2


77% being awarded for supplies contracts. The country most involved in major works p rogrammes in 1993 was Germany , with close to 65% of contracts in this category. This high figure was probably due to the reconstruction needs of Eas tern Germany.

Table 3 reveals that negotiat ion contracting was the predominant contracting form used in 1993, throughout the EU. 61.5% of contracts were awarded using negotiated techniques. Restricted tendering accounted for 21.4% of all awards, with open tendering accounting for only 14.3%. France, Italy and the U K were the most regular users of negotiated procedures. Given the EC ' s desire to encourage more open and liberalized contracting this may be seen as a failure. It is clear, however, that negotiated contracts can involve more than one potential supplier and, in some cases, given the limited size of potential supply and the technical sophistication of the products and services required, it may be inevitable that negotiat ion rather than open procedures are commonly adopted.

The E U Directives do not provide consistent data about contract values. The Utilities Directives allow awarding bodies not to publish information about the value of contracts awarded on the grounds of commercial confidence. Table 4 shows that awarding authorities have commonly used this loophole to avoid providing information on contract values. In 91.4% of all contracts repor ted there is no specifi- cation of contract value.

Table 5 has been compiled by aggregating contract types on the basis of SIC codes provided in the O J E C database. What the table shows is that most of the utilities contracts awarded in the E U are in: machinery and metal products (27.5%); building

and civil engineering (20%); and in cabling and electrical machinery (18%).

The major goal of the Directives was, however, to ensure that the marke t for utilities contracts should be opened-up to non-national competi t ion through an increase in cross-border contract awards by the members states. As Tables 6 and 7 reveal, however, the suppliers of utility contracts are still primarily national. In the U K 94.9% of all utility contracts are awarded to local suppliers. France awards 77.4% of all utilities contracts to local suppliers, Ge rmany awards 76.1%, Belgium 74%, D e n m a r k 73.5% and the Netherlands 63.7% respectively.

Only Ireland awards around 50% of its utilities contracts to suppliers from other member states or f rom third countries. Countries that appear at first sight to have open markets (such as Luxembourg and Italy) may actually be just as nationalistic as other member states. This is because Italy and Luxembourg fail to report how many of their utility contracts are being sourced. We may assume that many of these were locally sourced. If we made the same negative assumption across four major member states we would have to conclude that around 97-98% of their contracts are sourced locally.

These figures lead us to conclude that by 1993 the E U Utilities Directives have had little impact on the location of contract awards, or on cross-border contract awards.

A r e t h e u t i l i t i e s r u l e s a f a i l u r e or is it j u s t t o o s o o n t o m a k e a d e c i s i o n ?

It is clear, therefore, that the new rules have not occasioned an increase in non-national supply or a generalized lowering in tender prices. The EC



Table 5. Utility contracts by industrial and commercial sectors and by member states in the EU, 1993

Industrial and commercial sectors

n.a. Food and Fuels, Iron & Building Chemicals Machinery, Office catering energy etc steel materials and pharm, metal equipment

prods etc. (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %)(Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %)

Belgium 8.0 2.0 2.0 10.0 6.0 Denmark 4.4 5.9 1.5 2.9 35.3 2.9 France 0.6 2.8 5.3 3.6 3.1 25.6 5.8 Germany 0.3 6.1 1.0 0.6 1.6 8.4 1.9 Ireland 2.4 9.8 46.3 4.9 Italy 1.7 0.8 3.8 15.5 2.9 4.6 28.0 8.4 Luxembourg 20.0 Netherlands 1.0 2.1 20.8 4.2 19.8 1.0 Portugal UK 2.3 4.6 2.3 2.4 35.8 8.2

Total EU 0.7 0.1 3.3 6.3 2.3 2.4 27.5 6.7

Industrial and commercial sectors

Cabling & Precision electr, instruments mach. etc. (Row %) (Row %)

20.0 14.0 4.4 19.5 0.3 7.4 1.3

31.7 16.7 0.4 40.0 15.6 1.0

100.0 21.0 0.6

4.9 5.1

Domestic Vehicles Clothing Wood Paper Building Banking, Misc. electr. & and & assoc. & civil fin. & manuf. goods transport furniture prods, eng. insur. (Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %)(Row %) (Row %) (Row %) (Row %)

Belgium 18.0 4.0 2.0 28.0 Denmark 1.5 7.4 2.9 13.2 1.5 1.5 France 1.7 13.9 2.2 1.7 1.4 9.5 1.1 0.8 1.1 Germany 0.3 2.6 0.3 1.3 1.0 64.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 Ireland 2.4 2.4 Italy 3.8 0.8 0.8 10.0 1.7 Luxembourg 20.0 20.0 Netherlands 2.1 3.1 24.0 5.2 Portugal UK 0.4 6.0 1.1 0.4 0.8 11.4 0.6 0.9 0.4

Total EU 0.5 6.7 1.1 0.8 1.0 19.9 0.5 1.1 0.4

Health education & welfare (Row %)


Table 6. The number and location of utility contract awards by country in the EU, 1993

Countries awarding utility contracts Total

Country of Belgium Germany Denmark France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal UK supplier (count) (count) (count) (count) (count) (count)(count) (count) (count) (count) (count)

Belgium 37 1 11 49 Denmark 50 1 51 France 2 4 278 3 3 1 2 1 294 Germany 3 235 1 2 3 14 2 260 Ireland 22 8 30 Italy 1 2 110 113 Luxembourg 2 2 4 Netherlands 1 1 61 3 66 Portugal 1 1 Spain 1 1 UK 7 7 2 800 816 z-other 3 4 1 2 2 3 15 Not reported 2 73 1 77 126 2 6 25 312

Total EU 50 309 68 359 41 239 5 96 2 843 2012


a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e is a n e c d o t a l e v i d e n c e o f m a j o r

p r i c e r e d u c t i o n s a n d i n c r e a s e d c r o s s - b o r d e r t r a d e ,

b u t t h e r e is s c a n t e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e p r o v i d e d to

s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e s e c l a ims .

O n t h e f a c e o f it, t h e r e f o r e , t h e p e s s i m i s t i c r ea l i s t

v i e w s e e m s c l o s e r t o t h e m a r k e t t h a n t h e m o r e

o p t i m i s t i c E C p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e d a t a p r e s e n t e d h e r e

a r e n o t h o w e v e r d e f i n i t i v e . T h i s is b e c a u s e t h e r u l e s



Table 7. The percentage and location of utility contract awards by country in the EU, 1993

Awarding countries

Country of Belgium Germany supplier (Col %) (Col %)

Belgium 74.0 0.3 Denmark 73.5 France 4.0 6.0 77.4 7.2 1.3 20.0 Germany 6.0 76.1 1.5 0.6 7.2 Ireland 53.7 Italy 2.0 4.9 46.0 Luxembourg 4.0 40.0 Netherlands 0.3 Portugal 2.4 Spain 2.4 UK 10.1 17.1 z-other 6.0 5.9 0.3 4.9 z-n.a. 4.0 23.6 1.5 21.4 52.7 40.0 Total EU 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Denmark France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal UK (Col %) (Col %) (Col %) (Col %) (Col %) (Col %) (Col %) (Col %)

11.5 0.1

2.1 0.1 14.5 0.2

0.9

63.5 0.4

2.1 94.9 100.0 0.4

6.3 3.0 100.0 100.0 100.0


Table 8. Cross-border supply in the EU, 1993 (% by value)

National Other EC USA Rest of world

Address of supplier 88 3 8 1 Nationality of supplier 50 19 17 14 Origin of product 41 20 21 18

Source: Brussels, European Commission, DG XV: Estimates of the Origins of Public Suppliers, 1993

came into force only after 1993 in the utilities and will not operate fully in Greece, Portugal and Spain until the end of the century. It could be argued, therefore, that major changes will take place in the future as the rules come fully into force. Despite this caveat we doubt that the rules will have the impact on cross-border contract awards that the EC assumes.

The reasons for this are self-evident. The rules were framed in ignorance of the fact that there are logistical reasons why some contracts must be sourced locally. Second, the framers of the rules seem not to understand that suppliers in the market are capable of finding ways of avoiding the rules. Thus, the rules take no account of the ownership of locally based companies, nor do they take any account of the degree of subcontracting and cross-border trade already involved in locally sourced utility contracts. If one begins to look behind the location and address of the company winning utility contracts it is clear that utility contracting involves sourcing and supply relationships that are rather more complex, and more liberalized, than the framers of the Directives may have initially presupposed.

This has been revealed emphatically in recent research undertaken as part of the E U and US

negotiations on the GATT. Research undertaken at the time demonstrates that merely concentrating on the location of a supplier tells us very little about the degree of cross-border trade that may be going on or about who actually owns a particular company winning a contract.

As Table 8 shows, in 142 public and utility contracts, 88% were sourced from suppliers who had local addresses in the country awarding the contracts. When the nationality of the company owning the supplier was raised the figure falls to 50%. When the quest ion of where the products and services in the contract are sourced from the figure falls only 41% from within the national economy. The total supply from outside the national economy is 59%, and from outside the E U the figure is 39%.

This indicates that the E U procurement rules for the utilities may well be directed against an enemy that does not really exist. There is already a high degree of cross-border trade in existing EU utilities contracts, even if there is little evidence of cross- border contract awards. This means that even with the Directives there is unlikely to be much change in the way in which E U utilities award their contracts across borders.


Utilities contracting and the E U procuremen t rules

Given that there is evidence that the new rules may very well be increasing transaction costs within the utility purchasing bodies, as they are forced to comply with the new rules, it may well be that history will declare the Directives a costly waste of scarce E U resources. It is to be hoped that the E U will l ook closely at these issues when it reviews the implementat ion of the rules in the future.

~P Cecchini, The European Challenge, 1992, Wildwood House, London, 1988. 2WS Atkins, The Costs o f Non-Europe in Public Sector Procurement, 1988, EC. 3EC, The Large Market o f 1993 and the Opening-Up of Public Procurement, 1991, EC.

4A Cox, Public Procurement in the EC, Vol 1, The Single Market Rules and the Enforcement Regime After 1992, Earlsgate Press, Boston, 1993. 5p Lee, Public Procurement, Butterworths, 1992; A Cox, op cit, ref 4. 6S Arrowsmith, Public Procurement in the EC; Volume 2, Earlsgate Press, Boston, 1992. 7S Arrowsmith, Public Procurement in the EC; Volume 4, Earlsgate Press, Boston, 1994. 8Cox, op cit, ref 4 (1993). 9EC, Public Procurement in the Excluded Sectors, Supplement 6/88, EEC, 1988. ~0A Cox and G Watson, 'The European Community and the restructuring of European National Champions: an empirical analysis of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures since 1985', in JES Hayward and V Wright, From National to International Champions: Firms and Governments in the West European Economy, Oxford University Press, 1995. "Cox, op cit, ref 4.


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