ussbs report 20, aichi aircraft company

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 20, Aichi Aircraft Company

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

AiCHi Aircraft Company(Aichi Kokuki K K)

CORPORATION REPORT NO. V(Airframes and Engines)

Aircraft DivisionFebruary 1947


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g^ X-^^"Tliis report was written primarily for the use of the United States Strategic

Bombing Sm'vey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensivenature. Any conchisions or opinions expressed in this report must be consideredas Hmited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpreta-tion m the light of further studies conducted by the survey.


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FOREWORDUnited States Strategic Bombing Survey

t)y the Secretary of War on 31944, piirusant to a directive from the

Roosevelt. Its mission was to con-impartial and expert study of the effects

aerial attack on Germany, to be used inwith air attacks on Japan and to estab-

asis for evaluating the importance andof air power as an uistrument of

strategy, for planning the future devclop-the United States armed forces, and forfuture economic policies with respect

tional defense. A summary report andsupporting reports containing the find-the Survey m Germany have been

August 1945, President Truman requestedSurvey conduct a similar study of theall types of air attack in the war against

submitting reports in duplicate to theofWar and to the Secretary of the Navy,

of the Survey during its Japanese

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander,

Vice Chairmen.Harry L. Bo\nnan,J. Kenneth Galbraith,Rensis Likert,Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,Fred Searls, Jr.,Monroe E. Spaght,Dr. Lewis R. Tliompson,Theodore P. Wi-ight, Directors.Walter Wilds, Secretary.

Survey's complement provided for 300350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The

military segment of the organization was drawnfrom the Army to the extent of 60 percent, andfrom the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Boththe Army and the Navy gave the Survey all pos-sible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, trans-port, and information. The Survey operated fromheadquarters established in Tokyo early in Sep-tember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya,Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with niobOeteams operating in other parts of Japan, theislands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of wartimeJapanese military planning and execution, engage-ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign,and to secure reasonably accurate statistics onJapan's economy and war-production, plant byplant, and uidustry by industry. In addition,studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra-tegic plans and the background of her entry mtothe war, the internal discussions and negotiationsleading to her acceptance of unconditional sur-render, the course of health and morale among thecivilian population, the effectiveness of the Japa-nese civilian defense organization, and the effectsof the atomic bombs. Separate reports will beissued covering each phase of the study.The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa-

nese military. Government, and industrial officials.It also recovered and translated many documentswhich not only have been usefid to the Survey, butalso will furnish data valuable for other studies.Arrangements have been made to turn over theSurvey's files to the Central Intelligence Group,through which they will be available for furtherexamination and distribution.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

and it:< Importance in the Aircraft Industry _ .^ . . 1_. . 11

Statistics 11of Prc-attack Intelligence _. .- 14

Locations of Plants 18of Parts for Judy , 19

Aircraft Production l. Facing 20Aircraft Production _- ^__. 21Plant, Aichi Aircraft Company (Plant Report No. V-1) '__ 22

Plant, Aichi Aircraft Company (Plant Report Xo. V-2) 38


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CORPORATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRYINTRODUCTION

Aircraft Co. (Aichi Kokuki K K) inof Nao;oya produced both airplanes andor the Japanese Navy. In February 1944,month of its air])hine production, this

7 percent of the total production ofindustry for that month. During ]\Iaypeak month of Aiclii engine production,

of the total production \vas 3

airplanes produced by the com-the dive bombers Val (type 99Models 11 and 22) and the later

Models 11, 12, 33, and 43); tor-Kate (type 97 carrier attack,

and Grace (Ryusei, Alodel 11); andPaul (Zniun, Model 11) and

jNIodel 11. Aichi also was experiment-the twin-engine night fighter Denko,at the close of the war.

products of the engine section ofwere Atsuta in-line licjuid-cooled

the 20 (1,185 horsepower) and 30 (1,380series.Clock & Electric Co. (Aichi Tokei

K), forerunner of Aichi Aircraft Co.,the aircraft industry in 1920 when it be-production of airframes at the FunakataNagoya. Production of engines was

at this same location in 1927. Inproduction was transferred to the

Atsuta plant across the streetFunakata plant in south central Nagoya.

for the Eitoku plant, in southwesternwas acquired in February 1940; the firstwere completed in May 1941, and in theproduction of the type 2 training flyingwas begun at the Eitoku plant. Asplant was expanded more and more of

otal airframe production was attributableuntil by late 1943 it was the principal

plant of the company.

A separate aircraft firm, Aichi Aircraft Co., wasfounded in ]\ larch 1943 and took over the aircraftand aero-engine production from Aichi Clock &Electric Co.

Foreign experience appears to have had littleinfluence on plant design or operations of thiscompany. German teclmieians did consult withplant officials during the war with regard to ])ro-duction problems but their efforts primarily con-sisted of studying aircraft designs to elimmate"bugs" which would prevent mass production ofthe particular model and of studying the avail-ability and use of machuie tools. The Atsutaengine, being similar to the Daimler-Benz, wasproduced under a German license.The Eitoku and Funakata plants, the princii)al

plants engaged in final airframe assembly, andthe Atsuta plant were all ui Nagoya city (ap-pendix A). Grace was assembled at Funakatawhile Judy, Paul, and Seiran were assembled atEitoku.

After the first air attacks on the Eitoku plantexperimental assembly of the twin-engine nightfighter Denko was continued at the Ogaki plantat Ogaki in Gifu prefecture. At the Atsuta engineassembly plant the prmcipal product was . theAtsuta in-line liquid-cooled engine.

This corporation received much assistance fromthe Japanese government. Most of the land onwhich the Eitoku plant was built was loaned tothe corporation by the government in early 1940.The majority of the buildings of the Eitoku plantalso were constructed at government expenseand many of the machine tools were furnished bythe government. Durmg 1945 the company wasassisted in its dispersal program by the Navy.The tunnels for the underground machine shopsnear Seto, ten miles east of Nagoya, were dug by theNa\'y to accommodate the dispersal from theEitoku plant. The Navy assisted in dispersal ofengine production from the Atsuta plant by allot-ing space to this corporation in the Tsu Naval


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Arsenal and by liclj)ini;- with the tunnel develop-ment southwest of Tsu.

In January 1945 the company was ap|)ointed a"War Industrial Enterprise", which meant that theoperation of the i)lant was more directly con-trolled by the government. Government super-visors and inspectors were present in the Aichiplants. In conducting its research and experi-mentation the corporation worked in close coopera-tion with the First Naval Air Technical Arsenalat Yokostdva and made use of some of the testingfacilities at that place for its experiments.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONThe key personnel of the corporation were per-

sons with strictly Japanese backgroimds and noforeign experience or travel. The corporate or-ganization was highly departmentalized with ISseparate departments in the airframe division(Figure 1) and 11 departments in the enginedivision (Figure 2).

Within the corporation the Sanno plant suppliedfuel tanks and radiators to both the Eitoku andFunakata airframe assembly plants. The Enokidoplant fabricated and assembled wings for Pauland Judy for the Eitoku plant. Juichigochi wasthe fiy-a-way field for both the Eitoku and Funa-kata plants, from which completed aircraft wereflown to the aii-field at Ibo for test flight anddelivery to the Navy (Figure 3). Kofu, Aotsuka,Hotel, Tsushima, Seto, Hokuriku, Ogaki, Mino,and Yoro were all dispersal plants and are dis-cussed below.

Within the engine section, the Chikusa plantdid the casting for the Atsuta plant, and theImamura plant assisted in machining and finishingof engine parts. The Yongochi plant consistedonly of test cells which, with the test cells at theAtsuta plant, provided the testing facilities forengines produced at the Atsuta plant. The Tsuplant was a dispersal of engine assembly facilitiesfrom the Atsuta plant.Some plants of subcontractors were taken over

by the corporation in its dispersal program. Partof Tokai Aircraft Co. became the Ogaki plant;part of Tono Aircraft Co. became the Mino plant;and part of Mizuno Aircraft Co. became the Yoroplant. A completed Aichi airplane contained partsfrom many different subcontractors and suppliers(appendix B).Kurt Schmidt, a Heinkel technician in Jai)an

as an adviser to Hitachi Aircraft Co., stated thatof all the airframe assembly ])lants he had visited

(including Mitsubishi, Nakajima, and Kishi), Aichi at Eitoku appeared the best orguj,for mass production. Schmidt referri'd i (jmachine shops and parts fabrication io|Equipment in this part of the plant appearet^of good quality and many American m Ljtools were used. Schmidt was not permit Jisee the final assembly buildings, however jpsibly to maintain his illusions as to the juability to mass produce. None of the ||assembly plants used a production line iifjjassembly. Each airplane was assembled oplace with parts and subassemblies being bin and added as required.

AVing jigs were substantially l)iiilt with &steel pipe varying from 5 to 12 inches in disand anchored in pits in the ground. Th(type jig was used in the semiimdergrouii])ersal plant at Seto (Photo 1). The adequjigs and tools used in the Aichi airframemay have resulted from the efforts of Fran;a Henschel technician in Japan as an adv;mass production to the Aichi Co., althougporation officials stated that Pohl only exaircraft (k'signs to improve them for the pof mass prodtiction.

EMPLOYMENTA peak employment for the aircraft sec2ti,240 persons was reached in Septembei

Employment continued at approximate!figure until March 1945 when a downwaroin employment began as a result of air attathe corporation's plants and a loss of avlabor due to the urban area attacks on theNagoya beginning in March (Figure 4).The number of women employees inc

from al)Out 8 percent of the total workJaniuiry to 15 percent in July 1944 andpercent m January and July of 1945. Anumber of employees were classed as iior nonproductive, the percentage figuretotal varying from 37 to 39 percent durinand 1945. Soldiers, students and consolabor were used by the airframe division.Plant Report No. V-1.)

All plants of the airframe section operaonly one shift except for the Eitoku plantused two shifts from June through DecembeijThe number of employees o:i the secondvaried from 5.5 percent of the total in Ji2.1 percent in December.Labor tum-over appears not to have tj


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oNozU dismantled but actualhad not begun (Appendix A).

bad its own air attack ])r(>cautionsconsisting of employees with portablelife-saving, and first-aid equipment,250 covered trenches outside of the

which accommodated fi-om 5 to 7 persons480 trenches accommodating from 10 to

each. Witliin the plant area thereof the smaller trenches and 822 of the

trenches.of a heavy attack the employees were

in the trenches outside of the plant and500 yards from the plant area. In caseattack the employees took shelter insidearea. Phint officials stated there were

among those in the outsidebut that there were no fatalities among

in the plant area.DUE TO ALERTS

estimated that loss of productionfrom wasted man-hours caused by air

warnings would ecjual the followingcompleted aircraft: 5.6, January; 5.1,4.6, March; 1.8, April; 5.7, May; 1.0,July; and 0..3, August 1945.

DUE TO AREA ATTACKSplant had a direct ciixuit to a near-

power station and was never affectedin the supply of electric power.

by virtue of its relatively isolatedwas, however, peculiarly vulnerable to

in the local transportation service.was at the terminus of a single trolley

workers often were unable to get to theattacks on Nagoya City.

officials estimated the production losttransportation facilities and

of worker's' homes during 1945 wasto the following number of planes:

11.3, February; 22.1, March; 21.1,May; 17.3, June"; 11.7, July and 11.1,As total employment began to drop

of 1945 the labor factor became moreViewed in the light of the decreasing

ininiber of woi'kers available it becomes evidentthat tile area fire bond) attacks on the city ofNogoya in M.-irdi iind May bad a \>cvccf)t\\>\ceM'ect on |)r()(iuetion by keeping the remainingworkers from (licir ])laces of employment.

INTERRUPTIONS TO SUPPLIESArea attacks had no perceptible edcel on the

supi)ly of raw materials. In fact, ments received duringApril to September 1944, and 98.1 percent duringOctober 1944 to March 1945.

Receipts of aluminum alloy were 198 percentof requirements from April to July 1945, 93 per-cent during January to March 1945, 210 percentof requirements for October to December 1944,and 108 percent of requirements from April toSeptember 1944. Receipts of copper alloy were124 percent from April to July 1945, as comparedto 60 percent of requirements for January toAfarch 1945, 80 percent for October to December1944, and 85 percent from April to September1944.Subcontractors were heavily damaged by inci-

dental air attacks. The Nagoya urban areaattack m May forced suspension of production atOoe Aircraft Works, where elevators were madefor Judy and Seiran tail subassemblies, at KinjoRock Drill Manufacturing Co. where flap rollerswere made for Judy, and at Nagoya Nut andBolt Works where rudder bars were made for Judyand Seiran. All these subcontractors were locatedin southern Nagoya. In addition the Tokai Air-craft Works at Ogaki was forced to suspendproduction of fuel tanks for Judy after an airattack on 29 July 1945.

Aichi's Eitoku plant had been hampered byfailure of suppliers to deliver goods in the ex])ectedquantities at various periods throughout the war.One of the largest of these suppliers was Mit-subishi Electric Co. whose plant, located innortheast Nagoya, supplied electrical equipmentfor the aircraft produced by Aichi. During 1943the supply of this equipment expanded at aslower rate than the ever mcreasing requirements,but as the requirements became more or lessstabilized in 1944, supply caught up and by May

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exceed iiiij: tlie iiniouiits re(|iiire(l (FJiiiiredeeivase in available supi)ly Ix'caiiie

in Sepleinher 1944 and eontimied tothe end of the war (h'spite decreashig

durmg 1945.indications of faihire in the snpply of

e(|nipnient in September 1944 are iniri>-air attacks on the suppHer which begansup])ly had ah'eady begun to fail. Thereexact assessment of the effects of later

on this supplier because of the continuedwith the other factors which caused

to decrease prior to the first air attacks.motors for Judy were furnished by

Electric Works in Kawasaki and a per-reduction in the supply came after April

area attacks on Tokyo. Similarly,fire extinguishers from the Fuji Aero-

Co. in southwestern Tokyo becamein supply at about the same time. New

of this specialized ecpiipnnMit wei'c veryto find, even with government assistance.

DISPERSALhad planned for dispersal during Februaryhad acquired buildings and sites in dis-

beginning the middle of February.Ministry ordered dispersal on 4

plant in the town of Takada, Gifuwas acquired on 15 February 1945. At

time the Ogaki plant in Ogaki City wasfrom Tokai Aircraft Co. These 2 plants

with the Alino plant in the town ofPrefecture, which was acquired 1 June

the Gifu complex. Completionexperimental twm-engine night fighter

eventual production of between 100wings and tail surfaces per month for the

suicide bomb Oka 43 wereat this location.and equipment began moving to the dis-

in March 1945 but none of theproduction had been achieved prior to1945 when an air attack almost com-

the Ogaki plant. Ogaki did, how-a few wings and fuselage sections for

its short career.plant also began receiving workers

March attack on Eitoku but more man-expended in dispersal and repair activi-in production of Denko and Oka

parts priid- to the end of I he war. Some work onthe Carnpini jet-propelled suicide boirib Oka 22,was (lone at the Mino plant after M;iy 1945.

Production of the Kawniiislii-(lesign


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amount of effort in prosecuting its dispersalprogram, but although some of the dispersedfacilities were in advanced stages of completion, nocompleted aii-craft had been assembled at any ofthe dispersal locations at the end of the war(Appendix E). As a result of the dispersal pro-gram and the aii- attacks, the number of machinetools at the Eitoku plant decreased from 1,976 inFebruary to 55S in August 194.5.

INTELLIGENCE CHECKIntelligence attributed production of too many

aircraft types to this plant upon the assumptionthat the origuial Funakata plant had been entirelyconverted to parts production. Actually, the type99 carrier boml)er. Val, and the newer torpedoand dive bomber Ryusei, Grace, were assembledonly at the Funakata i)lant. Production of Judyand Paid at Eitoku were overestimated by 20percent and 47 percent, respectively.

Photo intelligence and functional analysis ofthe plant were fah'ly accm'ate but indicated theexistence of four assembly imits when in fact therewere only three.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONSThe most widespread damage to the \

buildings resulted from fires caused by the uarea raids of March and May, and subseqprecision attacks spent much of their forethose sections of the plant already damagefire. Although much of the damage sustscould be classed as superficial, it appeareeffective in halting production as complete destion because most of it was not repaired. Oiother hand, final assembly was carried on Kremaining buildings, alljeit at a diminishinguntil the end of the war.

In the case of this plant it appears thathreat of continued air attacks and consecdispersal efforts was much more effective iducing production than damage from thiattacks themselves.

In connection with the question of effeeattacks on suppliers of components, the fiof the supply of electrical eciuipment befonair attack nidicates that some parts of the Japeconomy were already on the downgrade 1:the initiation of the intensive bombing progri

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Appendix C. GOVERNMENT PLANNED AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION AT EITOKU PLANT


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Appendix E. DISPERSAL PROGRAMAlCHI EITOKU PLANT


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ATSUTA PLANT, AICHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY(Plant Report No. V-2)

TABLE OF CONTENTSThe Plant and its Function in the Aircraft IndustryEffects of Bombing and EarthquakeIntelligence CheckVulnerabilityAppendix:

A. Atsuta Plant Lay-OutB. Bomb and Damage Plot ^^

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THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRYINTRODUCTION

Atsuta Engine Plant of Aiclii Aircraft Co.Kol\iiki K K) was located in south central

It contained .31 i)rincipal l)iiildin


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After the two-shift system got underway, approx-imately 35 percent of the total number of em-ployees worked on the night shift. This percent-age continued with minor fluctuations untilabandonment of the second shift in May 1945.

Conscripted labor was used, and at the end ofthe war the nvunber of conscripted laborers was58.7 percent of the total number of employees.Plant officials stated that the efficiency of con-scripted laborers was much below that of regularworkers for the first 18 months. The relative effi-ciency of a conscripted worker with respect tothat of a regular workman was estimated at 20percent during the first month of his employment,70 percent after 6 months, and 100 percent onlyafter the conscriptee had been working for 18months. Absenteeism among the conscripted la-bor averaged more than 20 pei'cent.

MATERIALS AND COMPONENTSThe plant did little manufacturing from raw

materials. It did sonu- fight aUoy casting, prima-rily of crankcases and cylinder heads. Other en-gine parts were received in semifinished conditionfrom parts manufacturers: crankshafts from Su-mitomo Metals Co. in Osaka and Japan SpecialSteel Co. in Tokyo; cylinder barrels from Smni-tomo and Daido Steel Co. in Nagoya; connectingrods from Japan Special Steel Co.; and reductiongears and propellor shafts from Japan Special SteelCo. and Daido Steel Co. Important componentssupplied by others included fuel injection pumpsfrom Hitachi Aii-craft Co. at Chiba and KawamshiAircraft Co. at Naruo; oil filters from Japan Air-craft Equipment Co. in Tokyo; magnetos fromKokusan Electric Co. of Tokyo; and starters fromTokyo Aircraft Meters Co. of Tokyo.As certain types of materials liecame scarcer,

substitutes were used. Aliuninum alloy was usedin place of copper alloy for bushings, and as nickelbecame unavailable silicon-manganese-chrome steelwas used in crankshafts, gears ant! connectingrods in place of nickel-chrome steel.

PRODUCTION STATISTICSThe Atsuta plant was the only producer of in-

line engines for the Japanese Navy and the Atsutain-line enghie was the only engine produced atthis plant during the war. From December 1941through Atigiist 1945 a total of 1,62.3 in-fine en-gines were produced at this plant compared withcapacity of ,3,247 and Government oi'ders for .3,850engines.

From 1930 to 1939 the engine division hadduced 450 Type 91 500-horsepower, and Tyi600-horsepower liquid-cooled engines. Theproduction at the present plant consisted oKotobuki 9-cylinder air-cooled 700-horse]radial engine. During 1939 the plant produtotal of 157 Kotobuki engines and from Jaithrough July 1940 152 Ivotobuki and 3 Aengines were produced.

Figure 2. Production of Engine by TypesYear

1939

19411942

1943

19441945

Name and type

Kotobulci" n, air-cooled radial...doAtsuta" 20, Water-cooled A

J"Kotobuki" IIl"Atsuta" 20do

..do.\tsuta" 30, water-cooled A

)".\tsuta"20["Atsuta" 30

do -

30

2 413 2635 48

33

101 8021 27

"Atsuta" 20 was also called "AKIA.""Atsuta" 30 was also called "AEIP."

Production of Atsuta in-line engines vcapacity only for a short period in late 19^early 1943 and agahi in May 1944 (FigureFigure 5, Aiclii Corp., Report V). Proddifficulties kept output low during the earlyof this engine but the rat(> began to increaselast half of 1942, averaging approximatelymonth durmg 1943. There was a slumpturn of the year as preparations were mprotluce the improved Atsuta 30 engine biduction rose again sharply in the sprmg oJPeak production of 107 engines was reaeMay 1944, at which time the productionplant constituted only 3 percent of theJapanese aircraft engine production for theiProduction slumped markedly in SeptembOctober of 1944 because of mechanical difiBencountered in machining crankshafts andjiartial recovery in November was negated imonths by the December earthquake, difliin obtaining components, and air attacks inand thereafter. The production of 50 engMay 1945, as the year before, still constitpercent of the total engine productionindustry.

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cjipacity of tlw plant increased gradiiallvcommencement of production of in-linein 1941 till Dccend)er 1944, when the

of the earthquake reduced capacity for thatRecovery tVoni earthquake damage waspeak cai)acity of 125 engines per monthin January and February of 194.').

of area attacks, dispersal activities, andattack on this ])lant, cajjacity declinedin Fehiuary to 97 in June. Capacity

to SO engines by the end of the war.REBUILDING AND REPAIR

tsuta plant engaged extensively in analyz-in used engines. Although rei)aii'.-5done in Navy arsenals, 100 usedwere returned to the plant in 1944 andPrincipal difficulties with the Atsutacracked jjistons, oil leakage from the

gear casing, sheared comiecting rods,crankshaft main bearings. In

to these difficulties the Atsuta ,30 enginesdamage to ball bearings and drive bevelthe supercharger. Figures for repairedwere not included in engine production

TO EXPERIMENTAL ENGINEShad 1 large building (No. 26 in Appcndi.x

to work on experimental engines.close of the war this portion of the plant

in trial production of the AElTwhich consisted of an Atsuta W enginee.xliaust turbo-supercharger instead of

supercharger formerly used. Twoengmes were to be mounted in athe experimental reconnaissance plane,being developed at the First Naval AirDepot at Yokosuka. Approximatelycompleted but regular production as

contemplated.EFFECTS OF BOMBING ANDEARTHQUAKEATTACKS AND THE EARTHQUAKE

to the air attacks, the plant experiencedat 1150 hours on 7 December 1944for about 5 minutes. Damagealong the south side of the plairt.

boiler plant, part of the laige machinepart of the finishing shop were destroyed,some smaller storage buildings. The

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tuiuu'ling imder |)arts of the i)lant which providedair attack shelters contributed to Uw destruction.Plant officials estimated thai, as a result of theearth


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Photo 2. Interior view of damaged machine shop.

Photo 3. A second interior view of damaged m.-ii/lilm- sliop.


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tool shop, asscmhly shop and some stoi'iijicwere only slifilitly chunii^cd. 'J'iic elec-

powei' |)liint, test cells, the adjacent labora-an


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Production at this location started in May andJuly 3 engmes were completed. By Augustmachine tools of a planned total of 800 hadmoved to the new location and 1,850 em-

of a plamied 2,500 were present at theplant. Production had been planned

reach 100 per month by August 1945; however,5 engines were completed that month.

In addition to the Tsu complex, the Atsuta plant

'was to be kept in operation as long as possiblwith a somewhat expanded parts production atlthe Imamura plant near Okazaki, located south-east of Xagoya. A new parts plant was plaiuiedfor Yokkaichi located southwest of Nagoya bulthis plant was never developed.

Plant officials estimated that production capac-ity of the dispersed units would be oidy 60 perceniof the original plant.

1944REQUIREMENTS AND RECEIPTS Of FUELINJECTION PUMPS

1945U . ST*TMIC *OH.VmWAICHI AIRCRAFT CO.ATSUTA PLANTFI6URE 9

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INTELLICENCE CHECK


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AND DAMAGE PLOT OF ATSUTA PLANTAPPROXIMATE SCALE IN FEET

I MAIN OFFICEGUARDIAN'S room""STOWAGECASTING SHOPStORAJE "MATERIAL LABORATORYinm^^

LSlGAS GOVERNOR HOUSEGA:; GOVERNOR HODS"~

LA MACHINE SHOP?0

DESCRIPTIONOFFICE

PAC KING HOUSESTORAGE

STORAGEHEAT TREAtMENr'SHg?'UNISHING SHOPDRAWING ROOMELECTRIC POWER PI ANTOOL SHOPASSEMBLY SHOPSTEAM HEATING PLANT 'LABORATORY

SOP FOR F)(PER,IENTAL EIIGIIIESTEST CELLSLABORATORY^WOODEN PATTERN SHOPWOODEN PATTERN SHOPSTO RAGESTORAGE

LEGENDI GUTTED BY FIRE, AIR RAID 19 MAR, 1945

" 17 MAY 19*5" 9 JUNE 1946

I DESTROYED BY HE 9 JUNE 1945! DAMAGED BY EARTHQUAKE 7 CEC. 1944BOMB PLOT 9 JUNE 1945

us STRATEGIC BOUBIWC SURVETAICHI AIRCRAFT CO.ATSUTA PLAMT

70958317 (Faoe p. 60)


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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYLIST OF REPORTS

folluwing is a bibliography of reports resulting fromstudies of the P^iiropean and Pacific wars.

of these rejjorts may be imrchased from the Siiper-of Documents at the Government Printing Office,D. C.

European WarOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The United States Strategic BomVjing Survey: Sum-mary Report (European War)The United States Strategic Bombijig Survej": Over-all Report (Euro))ean War)The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the GermanWar Economy

AIRCRAFT DIVISION(By Division and Branch)

Aircraft Division Industry ReportInspection.. Visits to Various Targets (Special Report)

Airframes BranchJunkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau,GermanyErla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick,GermanyA T G Maschinenbau, G m b H, Leipzig (Mockau),GermanyGothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, GermanyFocke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany

i

Over-all ReportPart APart BAppendices I, II, III

Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Mimich, GermanyGerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, GermanyWiener Neustaedter Flugzeugvverke, Wiener Neu-stadt, Austria

Aero Engines BranchBussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke GmbH, Bruns-

wick, GermanyMittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha,GermanyBavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof,GermanyBayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Ger-manyHenschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany

Light Metal BranchLight Metals Industry

of Germany /Part I, AluminumI Part II, Magnesium

21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hil(l


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Abrasives Branch51 The German Abrasive Industry52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on ^Tain, Germany

Anti-Friction Branch53 Tlie German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry

Machine Tools Branch54 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment55 ^Machine Tool Industry in Germany56 Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany57 Collet and Engelhard. Offenbach. Germany58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany

MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION59 The Defeat of the German Air Force60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign61 Air Force Rate of Operations62 Weather Factors in Combat Bomljardment Opera-

tions in the European Theatre63 Bombing Accuracy, I'SAAF Heavy and :SIediumBombers in the ETO64 Description of RAF Bombing64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo-gistics MORALE DIVISION64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale(Vol I & Vol II)

Medical Branch65 The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care

in GermanyMUNITIONS DIVISIONHeavy Industry Branch

66 The Coking Industrv Report on Germany67 Coking Plant Report No. 1 Sections A, B, C, & D68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberliausen; Germany69 Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany70 Neunkirchen Ei.senwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger-manv71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf,Germany72 August Thvssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany73 Friedrieh Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Ger-manv74 Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund,Germanv75 Hoesch -A G, Dortmund, Germany76 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G,Bochum, Germany

Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch77 German Motor Vehicles Industry Report78 Tank Industrv Report79 Daimler Benz A G, L'nterturkheim, Ciermany80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris81 Adam Opel, Russelshcim, Germany82 Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany83 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnburg, Nurnburg,Germanv84 .\uto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany85 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, (iermany86 Mavbach Motor Work.s, Friedrichshafen, Germany87 Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik, A G Plaiien, Germany88 Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany89 Bussing XAG, Brunswick, Germany90 Muehlenbau Industrie A C! (Maig) Brunswick, Ger-manv91 Friedrieh Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg,


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Propellants BranchKlcktiochemischewerke, Munich, CicniiaiivSchooiichpck Explosive Plant, Lignoso SprengstoffWcrUo (; ni b II, Hail Sal/.onicn, Germany

Vornial, Alfred Xohcl ct Co,Druniniel and Dunebcrg,Plani.s of Dynaniit A (i

Troisdorf, ClausthalClernianyDeutsche Sprengcheniie G ninianv b H, Kraibiirg, Ger-

ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISIONOver-all Economic Effects Division ReportGross National Product ISpecial papersKriegseilberichte [ which togetherHerman Goering Works I compiise theFood and Agiiculture J above reportIndustrial Sales Uutput and Productivity

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISIONPhysical Damage Division Report (ETO)^"illacoul)Iay Airdrome, Paris, FranceRailroad Repair Yards, Malines, BelgiumRailroad Reiiair Yards, Louvain, BelgiumRailroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, BelgiumRailroad Rejjair Yards, Namur, BelgiumSuhuiarine Pens, Brest, FrancePowder Plant, Angouleme, FrancePowder Plant, Bergerac, FranceCoking Plants, Montigny & Liege, BelgiumFort .St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, FranceGnome et Rhone, Limoges, FranceMichelin Tire J'aetory, Clermont-Ferrand, FranceGnome et Rhone Aero Engine Faetorv, Le Alans,FYanceKugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Ger-manyLouis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, FranceWeapons in LondonArea of Krefeld

Air Raid Shelters in GermanyThermal Electric Power Station, Knap-sack, GermanyTransformer & Switching Station, Brau-weiler, GermanyDepot, Nahbollenbach, Germanyand Road Bridge, Bad Munster, GermanyBridge, Eller, GermanyWeimar, ^\'einiar, Germany& Sohn G m b H, Kassel GermanySurvey at Pirmasens, GermanyHanover, GermanyA N Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, GermanyKrupp A G, Essen, GermanyMaschinenwerke, G m b H, Heiterblick, Ger-manyT G Maschinenbau G m li H, Mockau, GermanyMaschinenwerke G m b H, jNIockau, GermanyMotorenwerke, Durrerhof, GermanyMotorenwerke G m b H, Taucha,Germany

Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Ger-manyStructures, Hamburg, GermanyGummiwerke, Hanover, GermanyMarshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany"

Merseburg-Leuna, GermanyBoveri et Cie, Alannheim, Kafertal, GermanyOpel A G, Russelshehn, GermanyA G, Unterturkheim, GermanySuljmarine Assembly, Farge, GermanyFallersleben, GermanyViaduct at Bielefeld, Germany

18218318418.-)18(i18718818919019119219319419.-)196197198199

Ship 'iards llowaldtswerke, Hamburg, GermanyBliihm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, (iermanyDainiliM-Bcnz A G, Mannheim, (IermanySynthelic Oil I'la;it, Meerbeck-Hamburg," GermanyGewcrkschaft Victor, Caslrop-Rau.xel, GermanyKlockner Humboldl Deutz, Ulni, GermanyRuhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger-manyNeukirchen Eisonwerke A G, Ncukirchen, GermanyRailway Viaduct at Altenbocken, GermanyRailway Viaduct a( Arnsburg, GermanyDeurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, GermanyFire Raids on German CitiesI G Farbejiindustrie, Ludwigshaften, Germany, Vol I& Vol IIRoundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, GermanyI G Farben Industrie, Leverkusen, GermanyChemische-Werke, Huels, GermanyGremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, GermanyLocomotiye Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Trans-liortation201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations inRegensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions203 German Locomotive Industry During the War204 German Military Railroad Traffic

UTILITIES DIVISION205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report206 1 to 10 in Vol I "L'tilities Division'Plant Reports"207 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports"208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G

Pacific WarOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

1 Summary Report (Pacific War)2 Japan's Struggle to End the War3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima andNagasaki

CIVILIAN STUDIESCivilian Defense Division

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects, Tokyo, JajJanField Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects, Nagasaki, JapanField Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects, Kyoto, JapanField Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects, Kobe, JapanField Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects, Osaka, JapanField Report Covermg Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects, Hiroshima, JapanNo. 1Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects in JapanFinal Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects in Japan

Medical Division

1011

12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and MedicalServices in Japan13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and MedicalServices in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Morale Division14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale

53


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ECONOMIC STUDIESAircraft Division

The Japanese Aircraft IndustryMitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Corporation Report No. I(Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK)(Airframes & Engines)Xakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd.

Corporation Report No. II(Xakajima Hikoki KK)(Airframes & Engines)8 Kawanishi Aircraft Company

Corporation Repoit No. Ill(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha)(Airframes)

19 Kawasaki .\ircraft Industries Company, Inc.Corporation Report A'o. IV(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo KabushikiKaisha)(Airframes & Engines)0 Aiclii Aircraft Company

Corporation Report No. V(Aichi Kokuki KK)(Airframes & Engines)

21 Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller DivisionCorporation Report No. I'/(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera

Seizosho)(Propellers)

22 Hitachi Aircraft Comi)anyCorporation Report A'o. VII

(Hitaclii Kokuki KK)(Airframes & Engines)

23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd.Corporation Report No. VIII(Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK)

(Airframes)24 Japan ^Musical Instrument Manufacturing CompanyCorporation Report No. IX(Nippon Gakki Seizo KK)

(Propellers)2o Tachikawa Aircraft Company

Corporation Report No. X(Tachikawa Hikoki KK)(Airframes)

26 Fuji Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XI

(Fuji Hikoki KK)(Airframes)

27 Showa Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XII(Showa Hikoki Kog3''o KK)(Airframes)

28 Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd.Corporation Report No. XIII(Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki

Kaisha)(Engines)

29 Nippon Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XIV(Nippon Hikoki KK)

(Airframes)30 Kyushu Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XV(Kyushu Hikoki KK)

(Airframes)31 Shoda Engineering CompanyCorporation Report No. XVI(Shoda Seisakujo)(Components)32 Mitaka Aircraft IndustriesCorporation Report No. XVII(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)(Components)

33 Nissan Automobile CompanyCorporation Report No. XVIII

(Nissan Jidosha KK)(Engines)

34 Army .\ir .\rsenal & Navy Air DepotsCorporation Report No. XIX

(.Airframes and Engines)35 Japan .\ircraft L'nderground

Report No. XXBasic Materials Division

36 Coal and Metals in Japan's War EconomyCapital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division

37 The Japanese Construction Industry38 Japanese Electrical Equipment39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry

Electric Power Division40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan41 The Electric Power Indu.stry of Japan (Plant !

ports)

Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Ut

zation of ManpowerMilitary Supplies Division

43 Japanese War Production Industries44 Japanese Naval Ordnance45 Japanese .-^rmy Ordnance46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding

Oil and Chemical Division49 Chemicals in Japan's War50 Chemicals in JajJan's WarAppendix51 Oil in Japan's War52 Oil in Japan's WarAppendix

Over-all Economic Effects Division53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's VEconomy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Econoi

Intelligence on JapanAnalysis and ComparisAppendix B: Gross National Product on Jajand Its Components; Appendix C: Statist)Sources).

Transportation Division54 Tlie War Against Japanese TransDortation, 19'

1945Urban Areas Division

55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Econo(Summary Report)56 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tok;Kawasaki-Yokohoma57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya58 Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima

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MILITARY STUDIESMilitary Analysis Division

Air Forces Allied with l,lio United Stales in the WarAgainst JapanJapanese Air I'owerJapanese Air Weapons and TacticsTlie Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground ArnivLogisticsr:mployment of Forces Under the Southwest PacificCommandThe Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom-bardment in the War Against Japan (TwentiethAir Force)Air Operations in China, Burma, IndiaWorldWar IIThe Air Transport Command in the War AgainstJapanThe Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against JapanThe Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the WarAgainst JajJanThe Fifth Air Force in the War Against Jajjan

Naval Analysis DivisionThe Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols Iand II)Campaigns of the Pacific WarThe Reduction of Wake IslandThe Allied Campaign Against RalmulThe American Campaign Against Wotje, MaloelapIMille, and Jaluit (Vols. T^ II and III)The Reduction of TrukThe Offensive Mine Laying Camjjaign Against JapanReport of Ships Bombardment Survey PartyForeword, Introduction, Conclusions, and GeneralSummary-Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party.closure A), Kamaishi AreaReport of Sliips Bombardment Survey Partyclosure B), Hamamatsu AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Surveyclosure C), Hitachi AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Surveyclosure D), Hakodate AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Surveyclosure E), Muroran AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Partyclosure F), Shiniizu AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey

PartyPartyParty

(En-(En-(En-(En-(En-(En-

closures GSaki AreasParty (En-

87

88

89

9091929394

96

979899100101102103104105106107

and H), Shionomi-Saki 'and Nojima- 108

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure I), Comments and Data on Effectivenessof AmnmnitionReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy ofrirmgReports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments onJapanese War Potential

Physical Damage DivisionEffect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (aReport on Eight CitiesjThe Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on^ Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents^Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, JapanEffects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, JapanEffects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa-nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents)Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousanrl, and FiveHundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (aReport on Eight Incidents)A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (SummaryReport)

G 2 DivisionJapanese Military and Naval IntelligenceEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensioe ReportEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part II, AirfieldsEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb PlottingEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area AnalysisEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part V, CamouflageEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part VI, SlappingEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part VII, ElectronicsEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach IntelligenceEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part IX, ArtilleryEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and RailroadsEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis