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Hasan Karayam

U.S & Middle East

9-26-2011

Review book

Peter h L. Hahn. Crisis and Crossfire: the United States and the Middle East since 1945,

Potomac: Washington, D.C 2005. 223p.

The book is divided into list of illustrations, series editors note, Aacknowledgments,

Introduction, eight chapters, appendix of Documents, notes, Bibliography, and index. It

encompasses the history of American foreign policy in the Middle East after the World War II.

Hahn argues that the Middle East held no strategic or political value for American policymakers

prior to World War II, so there was little official U.S. involvement in the region. American

leaders were content to let Europeans attempt to dominate the region. However, the onset of

World War II, followed by the Cold War, convinced American policymakers of the regions

geographic, strategic, and economic importance. Oil and Middle Eastern proximity to both

Europe and the Soviet Union were especially important. As Americans became more involved in

the regions affairs in an effort to keep out Soviet influence and to promote stability, their

increasing entanglement ultimately led to the current war in Iraq and to continued active

involvement in the region for decades to come. The structure of the book is historically. This

book explains and analyses the broad contours of U.S policy in the Middle East. The motivation

to write this book is as part of the issues in the History of American Foreign Relations series.

The book would be especially useful for teaching undergrad useful and educated people. The

book is smart key to deeper studies about the American foreign policy in the Middle East after

World War II especially for graduated student.

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Hahn shed light on the four major themes. First, he explores U.S policy toward the

Middle East in the context of the cold war and briefly the past- cold war. He examines the U.S

response In terms of both declared doctrines and erected security systems, to the perceived soviet

challenge to the region. He also assesses U.S supports to preserve strategic interests, such as oil

and military bases, deemed necessary to the containment of the Soviet Union and other

adversaries. Second, Iranian nationalism, he explains how the United States tried to curtail,

modify, and channel nationalist movements to serve U.S. interests, and it assesses the degree of

success in such endeavors. He also studies U.S. relations with specific nationalist leaders and

U.S. efforts to preserve conservative, pro- Western governments in the Middle East. Third, he

examines U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. He explores U.S. policy toward the

origins of the conflict and the U.S. position in the various Arab-Israeli wars. It also examines

efforts by officials in Washington to make peace in the 1950s, 1970s, and 1990s. In the process,

the narrative explains U.S. bilateral relations with Israel and its Arab neighbors. Hahn stresses

the rising level of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Noting the absence of official U.S.

involvement in the region before world war II, this study details the growing responsibility for

regional stability that the United States accepted in the postwar period and stresses the centrality

of the region to U.S. policy in recent decades.

The first chapter is entitled National Security: The Genesis of U.S Involvement in the

Middle East.Hahn talks in this chapter about genesis of U.S relations pre-World War II and

during the war years. He explains the beginnings of U.S-soviet tension over the departure of

Allied forces from Iran in 1946, And over Turkey and Greece. Then He also explains the U.S

Cold War interests in the Middle East, like commercial importance of Arab states and their

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strategy. He also explains How to protect American strategic interests in the Middle East against

the perceived soviet challenge.

The Second chapter is entitled Into the Middle of a Fight: the United States and Arab -

Israeli conflict to 1961 he talks about the Arab- Israeli conflict of the late 1940s and the 1950s.

He explains the origins of the conflict over the Palestine since it was officially under the control

of the moribund Ottoman Empire and the Zionist dreams of restoring a community in the ancient

home land of the Jewish people. He examines the American position against the conflict.

The third chapter is entitled Tumultuous Decades: Nationalism and Counterrevolution,

1950s. 1960s. Hahn talks about another problem of revolutionary unrest in the Middle East in

the shadow of World War II, like revolutionary and nationalist movements that sought to create

independent nation states in territories had colonized in previous ears. He explains

counterrevolution in Iran since the late 1940s that led by Mohammed Mossadegh and his

challenge the Anglo- Iranian oil company (AIOC). He also explains the dealing with the

Revolution in Egypt led by Nasser 1952, and Eisenhower Doctrine over the Suez cannel.

The fourth chapter is entitled Unending Controversy: the Arab- Israeli conflict, 1961-

1982. Hahn again talks the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1961-1982. The conflict moved

through several crises in that period. The first one was the six Day War of June 1967, which

Israel militarily drafted Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and occupied large swaths of their territory. He

also examines the, October War 1973 and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 that worse the

conflict, and the role of U.S. officials to resolute the conflict in different times such as 1961-

1982.

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The fifth chapter is entitled Revolution, War, and Terrorism: the Middle East at Center

Stage, 1970s- 1980s. Hahn talks about several other challenges faced U.S foreign policymakers

in the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s. He explains How Carter and Reagan deal with the

Iranian Revolution and soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He also talks about the Iran- Iraq war of

1980-88.

The sixth chapter is entitled Peace Proceed: the U.S. Approach to the Arab- Israeli

conflict, 1982- 2005. Hahn talks, for the third time, about the concern of U.S. policy with Arab-

Israeli dispute in the late 1900s and early 2000s. He explain U.S. efforts to abate the tensions

between the two sides and to achieve a final and formal peace agreement. He examines the peace

between 1982-1990 and after the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, such as the peace

plans in 1982,1985.,1987. He also talks about the peace process in the golden Era of 1990s.

The seventh chapter is entitled Messy Little Wars: U.S Operations in the Middle East

Since 1990. Hahn talks about the new challenges in the Persian Gulf region. In addition to the

Arab-Israeli Conflict, Hahn examines twin new threats in the aggressiveness of Saddam Hussein

of Iraq and the rising tide of anti-American terrorism. He explains the Persian Gulf War 1990-

1991 and U.S policy toward Iraq between 1991-2002. He also explains terrorist incidents against

America that ended by declaring war on terrorism and Iraq between 2001-2002.

The eighth chapter is conclusion of the book that demonstrates how anti-terrorism

replaced anti-communism as the top priority of American policymakers after end of the Cold

war.

Hahns book is a concise and compelling introduction to U.S. policy in the Middle East.

The inclusion of twenty-two primary documents in the Appendix provides readers with further

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insight into U.S. policy. The books strength lies in its broad focus, for Hahn is one of few

historians to examine U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East in its entirety since World War

II. The most other monographs on the region focus on a shorter time period or only on a few

Middle Eastern countries. Thus, Hahns book provides a clearer picture than most others of U.S.

Middle Eastern policy as it evolved over the past half-century. Hahns focus on elite

policymaking does mean that he covers little new ground, aside from his examination of post

9/11 policy, and he does not provide a novel methodological approach. Rather, he synthesizes

the work of hundreds of other historians into one brief, accessible narrative. Thus, this book

would be an ideal introduction to the topic of U.S. involvement in the Middle East, especially for

undergraduates, but it cannot provide the depth and analytical nuance that a research-based

monograph offers. Hahns book should be the starting point, not the last word, for anyone

interested in how the U.S. became bogged down in the Middle East.