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Will They Fight?

US Intelligence Assessments and theReliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw PactArmed Forces, 1946-89

James D. Marchio

US Intelligence Community judgments on Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forcesinfluenced in important ways how the United States waged "cold war" aswell as how it prepared for a potential "hot" conflict. The analytic lessons ofthe period are relevant today

Gen. NathanTwining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), was clear in telling Con-gress in Januaiy 1959: 'As we are all aware, the mere recital of numbers will not tell the entirestory. The Soviet bloc and allied divisions are not equally effective, nor of the same size and compo-sition. The political reliability, as well as dependability, of the satellite divisions is questionable. "!The next four decades would show Gen. Twining could not have been more truthful or accurate.

Following is my reconstruction of the story of the US Intelligence Community's (IC) efforts toaddress one of the central analytical questions of the Cold War-whether and how well Non-SovietWarsaw Pact (VSWP) military forces would fight for their Soviet masters in the event of a conflict.In describing how the IC wrestled with this difficult issue, I have attempted to answer severalrelated questions:

* First, how important, in fact, was the NSWP topic to intelligence managers, and what analyticaleffort did they assign to dealing with it?

" Second, what challenges did analysts confront when examining this issue, and how were theysimilar to or different from those facing IC analysts working other analytic problems during theCold War?

* Third, what conclusions did the IC reach on the reliability of East European forces and how con-fident were they in theirjudgments? Did their assessments change over time and, if so, how?

Fourth, did IC analyses of this issue matter in any significant way? That is, did they affect USpolicies and programs or were they academic exercises?

* Finally, are the lessons from this chapter in the Cold War of any Value to today's intelligence ana-lysts?

All statements of fact, opinion, ol analysis expressed in this article are those of theauthor. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US gov-ernment endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 4 (Extracts-December 2007) 29

Intelligence Estimates of the Warsaw Pact

US officials saw Soviet concerns over East European andNSWP reliability as a deterrent to war and a moderating influ- USAREUR study that focusedence on Soviet behavior exclusively on NSWP northern

tier countries.9 Service-levelinterest was evident in a seriesof RAND studies sponsored by

The Analytical Effort--How theater forces, Soviet military the US Air Force on politicalMuch and Why policy, and the Kremlin's con- and military aspects of the

cepts and capabilities for going Warsaw Pact. Air Force intelli-A review of the scholarly liter- to war in Europe. 5 gence also reportedly sup-

ature on NSWP reliability sug- ported an "Achilles" program,gests little work was Reliability issues also dedicated to researching Sovietaccomplished on this topic- appeared in assessments of vulnerabilities. 0

within or outside the IC-until arms control and force reduc-the late 1970s. Then and con- tion proposals for Europe and The IC interest In and efforttinuing for nearly a decade, the in multiple analyses exploring devoted to East European reli-question drew considerable the nature and implications of ability issues reflected in partscholarly attention. 2 Since the political and societal unrest in the importance senior USCold War's end, however, histo- Eastern Europe. 6 Indeed, a national security leaders andrians have written extensively whole series of "vulnerability" military commanders attrib-on the Cuban Missile Crisis, and "resistance potential" stud- uted to the topic. In publicthe "Bomber Gap," and techno- les produced over the years dis- remarks and in national secu-logical advances in collection cussed factors integral to the rity memorandums, US offi-capabilities, but no significant reliability issue as part of prob- cials saw Soviet concerns overhistorical assessment of NSWP lems affecting the stability of East European and NSWP reli-forces, employing unclassified East European regimes.7. ability as a deterrent to waror declassified national secu- and a moderating influence onrity products, has emerged.3 Such now declassified studies Soviet behavior.

document that attention wasArchival material made acces- also paid to reliability issues at In October 1953, Gen. Walter

sible over the past two decades, the theater and service level, Bedell Smith, a former directorhowever, reveals NSWP reli- where the topic was of endur- of central intelligence (DCI)ability was the subject of atten- ing interest to senior command then serving as undersecretarytion at many levels of the IC. At and service leaders. The US of state, publicly asserted thatthe national level, two national European Command's ground the Soviet Union would notintelligence estimates (NIEs) component-US Army Europe start an offensive war againstwere devoted solely to the issue. (USAREUR)-and the North Western Europe unless its linesThe first was published in 1966 Atlantic Treaty Organization of communication (LOC)("Reliability of the USSR's East (NATO) produced assessments through the satellite countries-European Allies," SNIE.11-15- on the subject; annual and were more secure than they66), and the other ("Military quarterly USAREUR intelli- were then. He noted that theReliability of the Soviet Union's gence assessments examined greatest deterrent to SovietWarsaw Pact Allies," NIE reliability factors in their main aggression was the "unsettle-12/11-83) in 1983. But several bodies as well as in annexes ment" in the neighboringdozen other NIEs contained devoted to "reliability" and satellites."analysis relevant to the topic. "resistance potential."sThese estimates examined Reliability concerns also wereissues such as the capabilities The most comprehensive of perceived to be a force multi-of Soviet general purpose and these works was a 1972 plier for the West should con-

30 Studies in intelligence Vol. 51, No. 4 (Extracts-December 2007)


Reliability issues were studied more closely in the 1950s .. .[but]flict erupt. IC analyses-from Washington's Flexible Response defense policy of the 1960sthe 1950s through the 1980s- and 1970s ensured reliability issues remained of interest.addressed ways in which reli-ability concerns and unrest inEastern Europe might prevent 1950s, when the United States the chances of obtaining indi-the participation of NSWP perceived a real possibility that cations for warning areforces in offensive operations war with the Soviet Union enhanced by the growing

and tie down Soviet forces might erupt. Fostering uncer- independence of the East

responsible for maintaining tainty over the loyalty of Mos- European states in both pollt-

lines of communications and cow's Warsaw Pact allies and ical and military matters.Soviet LO~sand bytheirde nsfointernal order behind the Iron the security of Soviet LOCs more discussion and mutual

Curtain. A national estimate in through Eastern Europe and agreement on Warsaw Pact1968 noted: laying the groundwork for planning and the role of

active resistance behind enemy Soviet forces in EasternThe current status of the . lines were seen as prudent mili- Europe.... We think theCzechoslovak forces is a key tary measures. chances are good that throughfactor in Warsaw Pact capa- such channels we would getbilities for both immediate some knowledge of Sovietand reinforced military action During the 1960s and 1970s intentions.?1against NA TO. Atpresent, the Washington's Flexible ResponseSoviets almost certainly defense policy-with its greater Lastly, changes in Soviet mili-would not count on these reliance on conventional military policy and its war-fightingforces in any serious contin- tary means and the need to strategy-changes that greatlygency. Further, should armed counter the Warsaw Pact's increased the role and impor-conflict with NA TO occur in larger ground forces-ensured tance of NSWP forces-drovethe present circumstances, the reliability issues remained of ongoing interest. NikitaSoviets would probably feel itnecessary to use some of their interest. Unrest and rising Khrushchev's push to reduce

own forces for occupation nationalism in Eastern Europe Soviet general purpose forces

duty in Czechoslovakia. The spurred study as well. The 1956 and rely more on Moscow'sunreliability of the Czechs is Hungarian Revolution, the growing strategic nuclear deter-probably highly disruptive to 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czecho- rent initially generated theWarsaw Pact military slovakia, and the Solidarity cri- requirement for greater Eastplanning.2 sis in Poland as well as European military capability, a

Romania's foreign policy "devia- requirement that was rein-Other studies looked at poten- tions" all served to highlight forced by a growing awarenesstial aid to resistance move- that, despite prophylactic mea- that a war with NATO mightments and dissident elements sures by Moscow and the East have to be fought with forcesin Eastern Europe to ensure European regimes, the reliabil- already in Eastern Europe.16their militaries remained pas- ity of NSWP forces was insive or actively resisted Soviet doubt.efforts to suppress popular Challenges to Analysisunrest.'3

Growing East European Determining whether EastThe IC's level of effort on this nationalism also was perceived European military forces would

topic varied over time, driven as potentially offering greater fight and, if they did, how wellby factors and developments on insight into Soviet attack plans. they would perform was nei-both sides of the Iron Curtain. A 1966 NIE, "Warning of Soviet ther simple nor merely "beanFor sure, reliability issues were Intention to Attack," concluded counting." The IC was con-studied more closely in the that fronted with a host of analytic



Not only did the IC lack definitions, but it apparently did not havean agreed upon methodology for assessing NSWP reliability. many and other means

addressed some of these short-falls, but quantity and quality

challenges ranging from defin- Warsaw Pact forces would remained problems.21 Debrief-ing. the problem to overcoming affect whether and how NSWP ings of escapees, refugees, andthe paucity and dubious reli- forces would fight. travelers provided the majorityability of available sources. of Human IntelligenceThese challenges were com- IC analyses also closely exam- (HUMINT) on NSWP reliabil-

pounded by the lack of subject ined the political and military ity. This HUMINT was usuallymatter expertise in the commu- situation in each NSWP coun- based on second- or third-hand

nity and by intermittent try and its implications for reli- access and often was no more

bureaucratic support. ability. In the 1970s and 1980s, than rumor and hearsay.IC products increasingly. Attach6, foreign liaison service,

Although the issue was impor- focused on Warsaw Pact com- and embassy reporting occa-tant to the IC, where its compo- mand and control (C2) arrange- sionally offered insight, as didnents came down on the key ments, the types of military material generated by the For-questions wasn't always clear. equipment NSWP forces pos- eign Broadcast InformationDespite the term's use in doz- sessed, and the frequency and Service (FBIS), Radio Freeens of in-depth intelligence nature of military training.is Europe, and emigre newspa-assessments into the 1980s, Additional insights were - pers and journals.what was meant by "military gleaned from examinations ofreliability" was not explicitly East European forces' perfor- High-ranking sources-like.defined until the 1983 NIE on mance during crises, from the colonels Oleg Penkovskiy andthe subject. In that estimate, 1953 East German Uprising to Rudyard Kuklinski---with

the concept was used In two the Solidarity crisis in Poland. '9 access to senior Soviet andcontexts. The first was as an Warsaw Pact leaders were

assessment of whether NSWP Beyond methodological issues, clearly the exception, not the

armed forces would carry out lack of reliable sources hin- rule.23 Consequently, it is not

Warsaw Pact directives in the dered IC analysis. Estimates of surprising that the 1983 NIE

period before or during a con= the Cold War period acknowl- on reliability readily conceded:

flict with NATO. The other edge this limiting factor.20 Theaddressed Soviet perceptions of fielding of national technical. For the most part the percepNSWP reliability.'7

. collection systems in the 1960s dons of Soviet leadersand 970sdidlitte fr th ICdescribed in the study are ourand 1 970s did little for-the IC own Judgments oftheirpr'oba-

Not only did the IC lack defi- elements that followed the be views, buttressed bynitions, but it apparently did issue. Instead, their problem observations of theirprecau-not have an agreed upon meth- became more acute with the tionary actions.24

odology for assessing NSWP erection of the Berlin Wall andreliability. The declassified lit- the reduction to a trickle of the Two additional factors noterature reveals multiple com- flow of escapees and travelers common to other Cold Warmon factors considered in most who could offer the kind of intelligence-disciplines hin-IC analyses. It was recognized, insights the IC needed. dered IC analysis of NSWP. Forfor example, that conditional - one, the advanced social sci-variables, including the type The quality of the informa- ence skills best suited to assess-and length of the conflict, the tion they did get left much to be ing the complex issue were notpotential opponents and West- desired. Collection by units like widely found in the militaryern actions, as well as the bat- the US Military Liaison Mis- intelligence establishment or,tlefield success achieved by sion (USMLM) in East Ger- for that matter, initially in

32 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 4 (Extracts-December 2007)


Consensus and consistency, not discord or significant change,other elements of the commu- generally characterized the iC's overall assessments of NSWPnity. Although service and com- reliability.mand intelligence organizationscontributed key inputs on top-ics like training, discipline, and reliability and associated vul- of which had combat experi-morale, they lacked the..exper- nerability studies were gener- ence, most lacked modern

tise to integrate such analyses ally found in the special equipment and had, from the

with the larger political and operations and psychological Soviet viewpoint, "serious

societal issues that would play warfare communities, neither of shortcomings in organization,roles in determining whether which carried much bureau- leadership, and political

and how well Moscow's allies cratic clout after the 1956 Hun- reliability."2 7

would fight. garian Revolution.26

The June 1953 East German

This deficiency limited the What Did TheyFind? Uprising and unrest elsewhere

community's capacity to pro- in Eastern Europe reinforced

duce on the topic and forced a the IC's Initial judgment that

heavy reliance at times on no nssnd sigconsistency "the question of political reli-

think tanks and universities for ability of the Satellite armies

analytic skills, at least early in change, generally character- places a significant limitationthe Cold War. Later, as the mil- ized the ICs overall assess- upon their militaryitary services produced and ments of NSWP reliability usefulness."2 Even so, someemployed intelligence special- during the period of this study. analysts believed Soviet and

ists with advanced degrees and While acknowledging that there East European measures imple-foreign area officers (FAOs) Would b ationbetween the mented after 1953 to bolster

with regional and language Warsaw Pacts northern and reliability were at least par-

expertise this reliance southern tiers, the IC over- tially successful.29 Noting theexpetisethisrelincewhelmingly concluded thatdiminished.W cswould thab possibility that satellite forces

NSWP forces would probably might be employed in certaininitially fight in a conflict with ightibe eP le iertain

The other limiting factor was NATO. How certain they were situations "Probable Develop-the lack of a strong bureau- of this judgment varied over ments in the European Satel-

cratic supporter. Reliability time, driven in part by events lites Through Mid-1956," NIE

assessments-unlike estimates behind the Iron Curtain and - , concl .identifying a "bomber gap" or the roles Moscow assigned to We believe that while the Sat-new or more numerous Soviet NSWP forces. believe that wuldtanks-could do little to spur ellite armed forces would

larger procurement budgets. In probably fight well against

fact, assessments questioning 1949-1961 traditional enemies, theirreh

the elibiliy o NSW focesability will remamnthe reliability of NSWP forces .sufficiently questionable dur-could be perceived as under- Interest in whether and how ing the period of this estimatemining the need to match well East European military to place a significant limita-larger Warsaw Pact capabili- forces would fight in an East- tion upon their militaryties. Candid assessments posed West conflict predated the War- usefulness in event ofgeneralproblems, particularly in the saw Pact's creation in May, war. 30

NATO arena, where a viable 1955. As early as 1946 intelli-Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact threat gence assessments noted that The 1956 Hungarian Revolu-was needed to justify even mod- while the East European forces tion and Poland's defiance ofest defense budgets. Conse- in the Soviet sphere of influ- Moscow in the days before thequently the few advocates of ence had sizable armies, many Hungarian revolt raised new



The expanded role of NSWP forces in Pact plans and their im-proved military capabilities and reliability became the focus of IC ble of waging war.36 The ICanalysis during the next eight years. monitored Moscow's progress in

training, integrating, andequipping its bloc allies. To theIntelligence Community's

questions about NSWP reliabil- While we anticipate contin- credit, it recognized that theity and Soviet policies. 3' Noting ued improvement of the Kremlin's success did not come.that the Polish army supported militaryposture of Satellite without a cost. A 1964 estimatethe nationalist opposition and fres he Sod es noted thatmost Hungarian soldiers either this estimate, the Sovietswent overi soolthe reselli r id probably would employ onlywent over to the rebellion or did Bulgarian and Czech forces while the Soviets are evi-not oppose it, NIE 12-57, "Sta- in offensive operations. The dently disposed to give East

bility of the Soviet Satellite.. remaining Warsaw Pact European forces greater

Structure," concluded the year forces would probably be used responsibilities within the

ft he 1 in various internal defensive' Warsaw Pact structure, theafter the revolt: roles.34 gro wing political autonomy of

these countries probably tendsThe Soviet leaders probably to reduce the USSR's confi-now believe that for many 1961-1976 dence in its ability to marshal

purposes the reliability of - them for an offensive againstNATO -these forces cannot be counted The expanded role of NSWP

upon, and that, in circum- forces in Pact plans and their Six months later the IC wentstances where internal improved, military capabilities even further, observing thatuprisings or foreign war and reliability became the focusraised hopes ofattaining of IC analysis during the next as autonom spreads in East-national independence, they eight years. By 1964 the IC rec- em Europe, the range ofmight become an actual dan- eig ta Byr164che Cee-

eognized that Khrushchev's deci- contingencies in which theger sion to cut overall Soviet USSR can rely on effective

defense spending-largely at military support from theThe NIE went on to predict the expense of conventional Warsaw Pact allies will nar-

that "intensive efforts will be forces-had enormous implica- row.... This may require theundertaken to improve security tions for NSWP forces. The Soviets to re-examine their

controls within Satellite forces, same was true for the evolu- concept ofa rapid offensive

especially among higher tion of Soviet views on limited sweep thr h Westenofficers." 33 wars, where Moscow went from that they had depended on the

"holding that limited non- Satellite forces for supporting

Theater- and national-level nuclear wars would almost cer- action.3"tainly escalate" to a growingestimates monitored and noted acceptance of the possibility of The IC's most significant

improvement among NSWP limited non-nuclear conflict."3 5 assessment of the monumentalforces in the years that fol- changes going on in Easternlowed. By 1960, the IC's assess- These changes in strategy Europe and the Warsaw Pactment had evolved based on this were reflected in the four-fold was delivered in August 1966 inprogress, albeit with reserva- . increase in Warsaw Pact exer- the first of the two estimatestions remaining over NSWP cises between 1961 and 1965 the Intelligence Communityreliability. USAREUR's annual and multiple other measures would devote solely to the sub-intelligence estimate, for exam- designed to transform the orga- ject, SNIE 11-15-66 ("Reliabil-ple, stated: nization into an alliance capa- ity of the USSR's East



The 1968 "Prague Spring" and the Warsaw Pact invasion ofEuropean Allies"). Prompted by Czechoslovakia demonstrated that the IC had overestimateda request from the Office of the Moscow's success in controlling and channeling East EuropeanSecretary of Defense, the SNIE nationalism.explored the factors affectingthe political/military reliabilityof the East European Warsaw nationalism and an emerging invasion highlighted the fragil-Pact nations as allies of the independent voice in ity of NSWP reliability.USSR, "particularly.in respect Romania.42

to the Soviet assessment of Ironically, only seven yearsthose factors."3 The request The assessment also acknowl- earlier, Czechoslovakia hadspecifically asked the IC to edged that Soviet policy and been assessed in a USAREURassess success varied behind the Iron intelligence estimate as one of

Curtain, and that key differ- Moscow's most capable and reli-East European reliability ences existed between the mili- able allies. 46 Yet the IC's fail-under three assumed circum- tary capabilities and ure to foresee the Praguestances in which the USSR importance it attributed to the Spring did not blind it to themight conceivably plan to Warsaw Pact's northern (East profound political and militaryengage the Westin non Germany, Poland, and Czecho- ramifications the events that

crisis; 2) a deliberate non- slovakia) and southern tiers year would have for the Sovi-

nuclear attack on Western (Hungary, Romania, and ets. A SNIE published in Octo-Europe; and 3) a conflict aris-. Bulgaria).43 Nonetheless, the ber 1968, "Capabilities of theing by accident.40 SNIE's bottom-line was clear: Warsaw Pact Against NATO,"

noted:The writers of the SNIE dis- The Soviets probably believe

cerned that the Pact's military that strict military disci- We believe that they (Sovietpurposes were intertwined with pline, Communist leaders] must now reexaminepolitical objectives, and thus indoctrination, and the care- their decision of the latethey examined what they con- ful selection of East European 1950's to place much heaviersidered the major consider- officers and career NCOs, will reliance on East Europeanations affecting NSWP ensure the reliability of the armies in operations againstreliability-the growth of East European forces in the the Central Region of NA TO.national communism and event of war. We, too, believe The Czechoslovak situation isSoviet strengthening of the that this would be the case, at but the latest in a series ofWarsaw Pact. least initially.44 developments putting in ques-

tion the reliability of EastThe assessment correctly rec- The 1968 "Prague Spring" and European forces-Romanian

ognized that Moscow was the Warsaw Pact invasion of insubordination, the abortive

engaged in a "delicate task of Czechoslovakia demonstrated Bulgarian military coup, and

giving the East Europeans that the IC had overestimated Polish military disgruntle-

more stature wituin the Pact Moscow's success in controlling mind at cnvolvement in the

while tightening the actual alli- and channeling the rising tide The contribution of each Eastance by a more thorough inte- of East European nationalism 5 European country would havegration of East European forces While the Kremlin could take to be weighed separately byinto Soviet operational plans solace in the fact that token the Soviets since there areand deployments."4 1 The SNIE East German, Polish, Bulgar- wide variations in reliability.concluded that Moscow was Ian, and Hungarian forces had Soviet concern on this accountsucceeding in this effort despite obeyed orders to provide "fra- may result in broad changesthe growth of East European ternal assistance," the August in Warsaw Pact organization

Studios in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 4 (Extracts-December 2007) 35


Uncertainty surrounding the Kremlin's course of action in the'af-termath of the 1968 invasion initially prompted disagreement measures to improve NSWP

within the IC on the issue of NSWP reliability. reliability were taken. A- detailed 1972 USAREUR study

on the Warsaw Pact's northernand troop dispositions, but it Others qualified this judg- tier, for example, concludedis still too early to predict. ment, arguing that "in certain that the East Germans would'them.4 7 cases these forces would be reli- respond to a call by the War-

able-for example, Polish forces . saw Pact for hostile actionThe SNIE's conclusions ech- in contingencies which raised against the West and would be

oed a number of familiar the specter of East Germany's particularly effective in thethemes-from whether and how reunification with West short run. As with earlier ICMoscow might employ NSWP Germany."49 assessments, the 1972 studyforces to variations in the reli- acknowledged that East Ger-ability of each of the East Euro- Disagreement over Non-Soviet man reliability in a longer con-pean militaries. Nevertheless, Warsaw Pact reliability was fed flict or one in which setbacksthese issues required reexami- by reports that East German- were experienced mightnation in light of the 1968 Polish relations had-deterio- deteriorate. 5 2 Similar conclu-events, potential Soviet rated seriously as a result of sions were drawn about the Pol-responses, and the military and West Germany's Ostpolitik for- ish and Czech armies.53

political implications for the eign policy, changing SovietWarsaw Pact and NATO. security considerations, and the The 1975 NIE 'Warsaw Pact

rise of a more assertive East Forces Opposite NATO" echoedUncertainty surrounding the Germany. Reliable reporting many of the same themes. The

Kremlin's course of action in indicated that the Poles had estimate concluded that thethe aftermath of the 1968 inva- implied to the Soviets that armed forces of Eastern Europesion initially prompted dis- were loyal to their nationalagreement within the IC on the the East Germans were unre- regimes and that, should a gen-issue of NSWP reliability. The liable members of the Bloc, eral war erupt, the East Euro-1970 interagency study, "The alleging in this conne n peans would fight:54 On-the

both that the East German peswolfih; 4 OteWarsaw Pact Threat to NATO," army was ideologically other hand, the NIE qualifiedacknowledged that impure and that East Ger- this judgment by asserting that

man propaganda had.been the basic question of whether or

some analysts doubt that East soft on [Czechoslovak Prime not an East European regimeEuropean forces would prove Minister] .Dubcek.so would commit itself to Pactreliable in a variety of contin- wartime operations would begencies while others consider While IC analysts acknowl- "heavily influenced by the per-that the East Europeans edged that such charges proba- ceptions of the national leaderswould be reliable in most bly had been "exaggerated by and the political circumstancescircumstances.4 8 the Poles for polemical pur- leading to war."55

poses," they viewed theseElaborating, the study went on charges-voiced secretly to The NIE also acknowledgedto note that some members of Moscow-as indicative of intra- the limitations of the IC's anal-the estimate's working group Pact strains that could under- ysis:believe that the other East mine reliability.5'European forces in the Central We cannotjudge the enthusi-Region could probably become These doubts largely dissi- asm with which Eastalmost totally unreliable for use pated over the next five years Europeans will support theagainst NATO.: as Soviet and East European conflict. Neither can we fore-



The Warsaw Pact's last years were reminiscent of its rocky ori-see how they would view their gins, with concerns over unrest and questions surrounding theown national interests in the reliability and effectiveness of non-Pact forces dominating.course of a conflict nor theinducements that would berequired to make them quit the Berlin Wall and spark the tance in resolving its "Polishthe war.5 6

1989 East European revolu- problem." 59

Lions.The estimate was more confi- Between 1977 and the Decem-

dent in its assessment of NSWPBewn197adt-Dcmmilitary contributions and the IC assessments during this ber 1981 imposition of martial

Kremlin's reliance on these period likewise mirrored ear- law in Poland, over a half-dozen

forces: lier patterns, shifting from pes- NIEs or substantial intelli-simistic views of political gence assessments addressed

While Soviet leaders may turmoil and Warsaw Pact disin- the dilemma Moscow faced with

have private doubts of tegration to acknowledgement Poland and overall NSWP reli-

whether the Pact cohesive- that Soviet and East European ability and its bearing on theness would withstand the control mechanisms had proven larger question of the militarystrains of war, they have com- effective in yet another intra- balance of power in Europe andmitted themselves to relying Pact operation. Moscow's perceived moreon East European forces to aggressive foreign policy. ICcarry out wartime functions The IC was quick to recognize assessments repeatedly pointedpotentially critical to the the approaching political out that the Pact's numerical

ac wr success in upheaval in Poland and the advantage in ground forces inramifications for the Warsaw Central Europe was tempered

The military importance of Pact. A June 1977 assessment, by the questionable reliability

NSWP forces and the ability of "Probable Soviet Reactions to a of the East European forces. An

Moscow to commit these forces Crisis in Poland,"concluded assessment in 1977, for exam-

by bypassing their national that Moscow would first search ple, noted that "they [the Eastregimes became a key IC focus for a nonmilitary solution in Europeansi probably wouldin the years ahead and an addressing labor unrest and respond with a total military

important variable in the com- political dissidence: The Krem- commitment only to a clear and

munity's assessment of NSWP lin, it asserted, recognized that present danger to their

reliability. an invasion of Poland-with its homelands."smuch larger population ofintensely nationalistic and anti- The IC also saw the impact of

1977-1989 Soviet people- would pose the unreliability of NSWPmuch more serious challenges forces on the Kremlin's willing-

The Warsaw Pact's last years than those faced in Czechoslo- ness and. ability to go to war.were reminiscent of its rocky vakia. Any intervention would, "Doubts that its East Europeanorigins, with concerns over East with near certainty, "be met allies might not fight loyallyEuropean unrest and questions with widespread and bloody and effectively" a 1978 assess-surrounding the reliability and opposition, including some from ment argued, "constrain Mos-effectiveness of NSWP forces elements of the Polish army."58 cow's planning for aggressivedominating. As it had before, Although this assessment var- war. "e Several estimates sug-Moscow successfully dealt with led some over the next four gested that the problems inthe immediate challenge of years, the IC remained confi- Poland or elsewhere in EasternPoland but ultimately could not dent in its judgment that Mos- Europe would severely under-stem the political and economic cow could not count on the mine the capacities of theforces that would bring down Polish military for much assis- Soviet war machine. The



Ultimately the [1983] NIE came down where so many other ear-lier IC assessments had on the issue of reliability. maintained that the Soviets

had grave concerns about resis-tance from the Polish army if aWarsaw Pact invasion had

refusal of an East European ments. For example, a March occurred. Yet it conceded Mos-ally to participate fully in an 1982 SNIE asserted that cow probably was encouragedoffensive against NATO would that "the Polish military per-tie down Soviet forces on the Moscow's concern about the formed as expected by its corn-territory of the recalcitrant ally willingness of Polish Arny manders and when and aswith "policing" and logistic and internal security units to required by its government."6transport responsibilities. maintain control In Poland

Moreover, the Soviets, accord- probably has been allayed by The estimate described a "pro-in ooeassmn,"rb- the lorces' effective perfor- h siaedecie po

wog to one assessment, "proba~ mnce in implementing gressively more elaborate set ofbly would have to bring in martial law.... [and] the sub- statutory and military com-additional forces from the stantial and well-trained mand and control procedures"USSR prior to hostilities, thus forces of the Ministry of Inter- instituted by the Kremlin toaffording NATO additional nal Affairs have acted minimize the potential for Eastwarning and reaction time."6 effectively in implementing European military

martial law, and we believe unreliability."70 According toThe potential problems and they-with continuing sup- the NIE, the Soviet control sys-

implications were even greater port of the Army-have a tem was "considered pervasiveif Poland was that "recalcitrant good chance of maintaining in the Pact" and "certainlyally." As a July 1981 assess- order afforded Moscow a high degreement indicated: The assessment acknowl- of control over a chain of coin-

edged that "the Soviets proba- mand that is virtually all-Because Poland's role in bly have some doubts about the Soviet by definition."7'Soviet plans for war against ability of the regime to mobi-NATO is critical, a Soviet lize Poland if it were called to Ultimately the NIE cameInvasion could do substantial support military operations down where so many other ear-damage to the warfighting against NATO."" However, lier IC assessments had on thecapab11tes of the Warsaw unless the situation in Poland issue of reliability-initial

military units stood abso= deteriorated dramatically, it NSWP compliance, albeit with

lutely aside during a Soviet concluded, the "Polish role in variation among its members,

invasion (which we regard as Warsaw Pact warfighting strat- with subsequent performance

unlikely), Moscow would not egy will probably not change."67 and continued allegiance deter-

be able to interpret that pas- mined by multiple, conditional

sive response as ensuring the A more sanguine assessment factors:continuation of Poland's cur- was reflected as well in the IC'srent role in Warsaw Pact . 1983 NIE "Military Reliability We believe that Soviet ordersplans for war.6 4 of the Soviet Union's Warsaw to go to war would be success-

Pact Allies."68 In the first and fully transmitted from the

The declaration of martial law most extensive national-level Soviet Genera Staff to NSWP

in December 1981 and Gen. work on the issue of reliability in n obey ths orders atheWojciech Jaruzelski's initial since 1966, the NIE concluded least during the initial stagessuccess in its implementation that Moscow had probably ofa conflict with NATO.was somewhat surprising and drawn mixed lessons.from the However, we also believe thatforced the IC to back off its ear- experiences of the past several NSWP military reliabilitylier, more pessimistic assess- years in Poland. The estimate could be degraded by a static

38 Studies In Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 4 (Extracts-December 2007)


The IC's analytic focus shifted somewhat during the Warsawfront, and substantially Pact's last five years.degraded by Warsaw Pactreverses. 72

The NIE ended by expanding Soviet fiat, however, cannot Soviet President Mikhail Gor-

on this last issue, identifying a close the wideninggap bachev's decision in the late

host of potential East Euro- between modern Soviet forces 1980s to reduce Soviet generalpean vulnerabilities that NATO in Eastern Europe and those purpose forces and defense

might exploit to amplify Krem- of Soviet allies. Thi ispar spending had implications for-

in concerns about NSWP most pronounced in Eastern NSWP reliability. On the onereliability.73 Just as in the past, Europe's southern tier and in hand, these developments less-the potential return from such Poland. It will probably lead ened the importance of the reli-efforts was considered high: to operational adjustments in ability issue by reducing the"Without reasonable assurance Sovietplans against NA TO in likelihood of conventional con-of participation by most Pact the years ahead.77 flict in Europe. On the other,forces, we believe Moscow is lower defense budgets and forceunlikely to initiate hostilities Eastern Europe's widespread reduction treaties made it evenagainst NATO." 74Consequently economic problems thus had more critical that the remain-the IC launched multiple stud- not only spurred labor unrest Ing forces be capable and reli-les to examine the nature and but they had also adversely able. As the February 1989 NIEextent of these vulnerabilities affected the willingness and "Trends and Developments inand what factors might pre- ability of these nations to mod- Warsaw Pact Theater Forces"vent their exploitation] 5 ernize their military forces in asserted:

accord with Soviet dictates. The

The IC's analytic focus shifted IC recognized that despite The Soviets almost certainlysomewhat during the Warsaw Soviet pressure, "none of the are aware of the operationalPact's last five years. Although East European forces have kept price they will pay if theirNSWP reliability continued to pace with Soviet force improve- NSWP allies are not able tobe assessed, several factors led ments" and that this disparity perform their assigned mis-the IC to look more closely at would probably worsen in the sions alongside Soviet forces.the growing capability gap years ahead. The impact of these force defi-between the East European ciencies on operational

forces and their Soviet counter- The community also grasped planning will become more

parts. One was the perceived that this gap, like the reliabil- apparent to the Soviets after

success of Soviet control mecha- ity issue, created potential their force reductions in Cen-

nisms instituted in the early weaknesses that might prompt tral Europe and the western

1980s to specifically address changes in Soviet war plans. USSR are completed."

reliability concerns. A 1985 NIE "Because the East Europeansnoted that will have difficulty in adopting The revolutions that swept

the latest Soviet organizations throughout Eastern Europe

the Soviets apparently ha ve in or operational concepts," the during the remainder of 1989place with most East Euro- 1985 estimate concluded, "the made this point largely moot. Inpean forces a system that Soviets may increasingly be an anti-climatic coda; the IC'seffectively places the NSWP forced to augment or replace final judgment on the NSWPforces under Soviet control first-echelon East European reliability issue was deliveredfrom the outset of hostilities. 76 forces with their own forces in April 1990. In a National

drawn from the western Intelligence Council memoran-The.estimate went on: USSR."79 dum, "The Direction of Change



IC analyses compared favorably with work done by multiplescholars and think tanks during the late 1970s and 1980s. tin than an asset. Daniel Nel-

son perhaps summed it up best,noting in 1984: "After almostthirty years, I think it is fair to

in the Warsaw Pact," IC spe- roles they could play in War- regard the Warsaw Pact ascialists concluded: saw Pact military operations. more a symbol of Soviet weak-

ness than of Soviet strength....Recent political events in In retrospect, IC analyses In short, there is little aboutEastern Europe will further compared favorably with work which Moscow or East Euro-erode Soviet confidence in done by multiple scholars and pean rulers can be fully assuredtheir allies. Moscow cannot think tanks during the late in the Warsaw Pact."85

rely upon Non-Soviet War- 1970s and 1980s. Much like thesaw Pact forces; it must IC, they found the NSWP reli- The IC's Judgments concern-question its ability to bring ability question difficult to ing NSWP reliability also haveSoviet reinforcements through answer. As Condoleezza Rice fared well in light of the evi-East European countries acknowledged in her 1984 dence that has emerged fromwhose hostility is no longer study of the Czech military: East Bloc archives since the falldisguised or held in check. 8 "The search for indicators of of the Berlin Wall. These snap-

reliability continues, but there shots from Warsaw Pact files

An Assessment of IC Work is, in the absence of conflict, no suggest Moscow's assessment ofway to test the potency of the the reliability of her NSWPexplanations explored."82 allies, on one hand, was even

In summary, the IC's 40-year more pessimistic than that heldeffort to assess NSWP reliabil- Most academics came to the in the West. Col. Oleg Penk-ity had come full circle. In the same conclusions as the IC did ovskiy's posthumously pub-1950s, the community correctly on NSWP reliability. After sur- lished memoir repeatedly notedconcluded that the East Euro- veying 59 former.East Euro- Soviet concerns about East Ger-pean satellites were largely pean servicemen and man forces. Penkovskly, forunreliable, possessed limited conducting exhaustive research, instance, cited Gen. Kupin, themilitary capabilities, and held a A. Ross Johnson and Alex- Commander of the Soviet Tankminor part in Soviet war plans. ander Alexiev asserted: "This Army in Dresden and othersA decade later this assessment study thus provides empirical stationed in East Germany ashad evolved, recognizing the support for earlier studies con- asserting thatprogress of Soviet and East cluding the USSR can rely onEuropean efforts to mold more NSWP forces-but very in case of a Berlin crisis or aloyal and capable. forces. NSWP conditionally." 83 war we would have to killforces were considered-at least both West and East Ger-

initially in a conflict-to be Non-IC research also painted mans. Everything is ready tolargely reliable, militarily profi- ra picture of reliability that var- Gany ut Eaot nr anycient, and important players in led among countries and even as well, because the GermansMoscow's strategy for defeating among levels within individual have anti-Soviet sentiments.sNATO. By the late 1980s, how- country's militaries.84 Schol-ever, the IC's findings had arly assessments of NSWP reli- Similarly, a series of after-returned largely to where they ability-again mirroring the action reports on the July 1968had been three decades earlier, IC-also evolved over time. military maneuvers codenamedwith NSWP forces assessed as These studies recognized that Sumava-a prelude to the 1968less capable, of uncertain reli- NSWP forces were increasingly Warsaw Pact invasion of Czech,ability, and constrained in the more of a liability for the Krem- oslovakia-cast significant



IC assessments of NSWP reliability not only scored high in rele-doubt on the reliability of other vance when they were written but retain their relevance in theWarsaw Pact armies if their post 9/11 world.readiness were ever tested in aconflict with NATO.81 Two Hun-garian generals reported to but were confident they could The "So What"-Then ... .their Politburo in July 1968: still achieve their military

objectives in a war with NATO IC assessments of NSWP reli-The experience of the entire without the participation of key ability not only scored high inexercise unfortunately con- NSWP members. In an inter- relevance-a key measure offirmed that there are intelligence analytic trade-unacceptable shortcomings, view more than a decade after Itliec nltctae

the Pact's collapse, Kulikov craft-when they were writtenirregularities, and inade. but retain their relevance in thequate provisions in the would assert that, from the mil- post 9/11 world.Warsaw Pact. All this clearly itary point of view, Solidarity'sdemonstrates that sooner or coming into power would have IC analyses of NSWP reliabil-erode the dignity of the Soviet made no difference and ity appeared to have played aUnion and undermine the Poland's departure from the role in informing and shapingPact. 1 alliance would have been "a US national security policies

mere inconvenience rather than during much of the Cold War.And yet, much like the West, a serious blow to Soviet mili- IC and theater-level intelli-

Moscow's confidence varied tary plans." In a war with gence on NSWP reliabilityover time, with the ally, and NATO, he maintained, "Mos- served to educate key decision-even among elements of the makers at each level. Its focusNSWP militaries. For example, cow would have had enough and findings went beyond sim-Soviet officers sent to Poland to advance warning to secure the ply counting tanks and bomb-assess the military's attitudes passage of its troops through ers. Reliability andwere satisfied that the coun- Poland without difficulty."91 vulnerability analyses high-try's officer corps-though not lighted the critical relationshipnecessarily the troops-could be A 1982 Soviet war-game sug- between political, economic,counted upon. 89 In another gests Kulikov was not spouting social, and military factors atinstance, a 1984 East German propaganda. geplay behind the Iron Curtainintelligence agency . The exercise and made clear that the War-(Staatsicherheit [Stasi]) assumed that "an extremely saw Pact's military prowessreport-citing a NATO study it unstable situation" had devel- was inherently linked to its suc-had acquired on Warsaw Pact oped in Poland and Romania cess in the political realm.reliability-did not contradict and that both countries wantedNATO's assessment that "reli- to leave the Warsaw Pact. A Four decades of IC studyability in general is high and report on the exercise noted made US decisionmakers awarethat the internal structure of that "one of the goals of this that the Warsaw Pact was notthe Warsaw Pact forces is exercise obviously consists in "ten feet tall" and that theresettled."90 testing whether the opera- were multiple vulnerabilities

tional-strategic tasks of the that potentially could beOn the other hand, formerly exploited to deter conflict or aid

classified Soviet memoranda Unified Armed Forces can also in winning a war should itand exercise data indicate that be accomplished without the erupt. On the other hand, theseGen. Kulikov and the Soviet Polish Army and the forces of same studies documented thatmilitary were planning for the the Socialist Republic of Moscow had made progress inworst case scenario in Poland Romania." 9

2. improving the military reliabil-



IC assessments of NSWP reliability also appear to have influ-enced the way the United States prepared for a potential conflict Respondent testimony sug-and actually waged "cold war." gests that there is

considerable unrealizedpotential for Western infor-

ity and usefulness of its allies NSWP reliability even fac- mation sources, primarilyand that at least initially, key tored into National Security radio broadcasting, to affect

units would fight. This body of Council discussions in 1959 on the outlook and reliability of

work-stretching from the a nuclear policy for Eastern NSWP soldiers, in peacetime

1950s to the 1980s-also made Europe. The State Department as well as in crises.7

clear that not all East Euro-. argued that an automatic deci-pean economic, military, politi- sion to attack the bloc coun- ... and Nowcal, or social vulnerabilities tries at the advent of war wouldwere easily exploited. "tie the hands of the United Possible lessons learned from

States in advance" and would the IC's four-decade long effortThe caveats the IC advanced result in war on these coun- to assess the reliability of

with their analyses were as tries whether or not they actu- NSWP forces stand out in atimportant as their findings. ally engaged in hostilities least three areas.The IC recognized the diffi- against the United States onculty of making these judg- the side of the Soviet Union- Determining whether andments and attempted to provide how well Moscow's allies wouldnuanced understanding of Some of these Bloc countries fight resembles.many of the dif-likely outcomes given a multi- might actually take the oppor- ficult intelligence problems con-tude of independent. variables tunity ofgeneral war to rebel fronting the IC today. Analyststhat changed over time and in' against Soviet domination in then worked with limited data,response to developments on the event ofa war in which fought for scarce HUMINT col-the ground, they are not attacked by the lection, and wrestled with

U.S.9 source bias. Although nationalIC assessments of NSWP reli- systems provided some insight

ability also appear to have Similarly, formerly Top Secret into the weapons of NSWPinfluenced the way the United national security documents forces and the disposition ofStates prepared for a potential reveal contingency planning in Soviet units, they ultimatelyconflict and actually waged the aftermath of the 1956 Hun- could never answer the most"cold war." Intelligence assess- garian Revolution to support basic question about the fight-ments early in the Cold War the Polish military-even ing will and ability of Eastsupported efforts to encourage employing American conven- Europeans.defections among East Euro- tional air strikes-should thepean satellite military forces Soviet Union invade Poland 95 Much like many of today'sand other psychological war- Nearly three decades later, reli- most difficult intelligence prob-fare initiatives. 93 Resistance ability and vulnerability assess- lems, assessing NSWP reliabil-potential and vulnerability ments responded to US senior- ity defied simple answers. Instudies likewise facilitated level policy interest in and initi- many ways it was more a "mys-unconventional warfare plan- atives to exploit East European tery" than a "puzzle."9

6 Provid-ning, helping to refine the tar- vulnerabilities in the wake of ing a penetrating analysis ofget focus for resistance Poland's Solidarity crisis and the reliability issue requiredelements to nurture behind the the 1983 Soviet-American war analysts to understand theIron Curtain during the "cold scare. 96 A declassified study of intricate relationship betweenwar" as well as those to employ emigres produced in 1986 political, military, economic andin wartime. reported: social issues in the multiple



IC analysts might benefit from reviewing the variables and fac-tors used to determine NSWP reliability.

NSWP countries. Integrated, tion on the reliability questionholistic analysis was required emerged from the work of theseto assess these complex links- non-IC organizations as well.9

the same approach needed forunderstanding and evaluating Finally, given four years ofthe sources and resiliency of war in Iraq and a strategy thatterrorism and extremism in relies increasingly onBagh-today's world. dad's forces to conduct its day-

to-day combat operations, ICThe IC's efforts to overcome analysts might benefit from

these Cold War analytic chal- reviewing the variables and fac-lenges also offer guidance for tors used to determine NSWPthe Director of National Intelli- reliability. Although manygence and other senior Intelli- years and marked cultural dif-gence Community leaders. The ferences separate the eras,IC initially turned to and drew using some of the key variablesheavily on valuable social sci- employed to assess NSWP reli-ence expertise found only in ability during the Cold War-academia and think tanks to unit morale and discipline, theassess vulnerabilities and resis- nature of the conflict, the oppo-tance potential behind the Iron nents faced, and battlefield suc-Curtain. cess-may aid in developing .a

similar approach for predicting

Later, the IC benefited not the performance of Iraqi Secu-

only from contracted studies rity Force units. For whilebut also from the rich academic American forces in Iraq maydebate that emerged in the never have to worry that-1980s on the subject. These unlike the Soviets-their alliesexchanges helped better define might "shoot in the wrongthe reliability issue and the direction," they will have tomethodological approaches continue to wrestle with theemployed, infusing needed ana- same question that Moscow didlytic rigor. Recommendations for 40 years-will they fighton how to better exploit collec- and how well? oo



End Notes

1. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions of the Senate For-eign Relations Committee, (Historical Series), Vol. XI (860 Congress, First Session-1959), (Wash-ington, DC: GPO, 1982), 32.

2. One of the first and most prolific authors on the Issue was A. Ross Johnson. He, Ivan Volgyes,and Dale Herspring wrote extensively on the subject. Among the most significant works in thisbody of literature were: A. Ross Johnson, "Has Eastern Europe Become A Liability to the SovietUnion? (1)-The Military Aspect," in Charles Gati, ed., The International Politics of EasternEurope (New York: Praeger, 1976), 37-58: Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "The Military asan Agent of Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Framework," Armed Forcesand Society, Vol.3, No.2. (February 1977), 249-70; Dale R: Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "PoliticalReliability in the East European Warsaw Pact Armies," Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1980),270-96: Dale R. Herspring, "The Warsaw Pact at 25," Problems of Communism, September-Octo-ber 1980, 1-15; A, Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe,"July 1981, RAND/P-6583; Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: TheSouthern Tier (Durham, NC: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1982); Thomas 0. Cason, "The WarsawPact Today: The East European Military Forces," in Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan,eds., The Warsaw Pact: Political Purposes & Military Means (Wilmington, DE: ScholarlyResources Inc., 1982), 137-62; Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Soviet Allies: The WarsawPact and the IssueofReliability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Jeffrey Simon, Wazsaw Pact Forces: Problemsof Command and Control (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1985); Daniel N. Nelson, Alliance Behav-ior in the Warsaw Pact (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Douglas A. MacGregor, "UncertainAllies? East European Forces in the Warsaw Pact," Soviet Studies, vol. XXXVIII no.2, (April1986), 227-47; Edward B. Atkeson, "The 'Fault Line' in the Warsaw Pact: Implications for NATOStrategy," Orbis (Spring 1986), 111-31: Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, "East EuropeanMilitary Reliability: An Emigre-Based Assessment," RAND/R-3480, October 1986; Dale R. Her-spring, "The Soviet Union and the East European Militaries: The Diminishing Asset," in Robin F.Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann, eds. Soviet Foreign Policyin a Changing World (New York: AldinePublishing Company, 1986), 549-69; and Daniel N. Nelson, Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

3. Indicative. of such scholarship are: Chris Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane: Toward the Unknown: ANew History ofthe Early Years (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2000); David Christopher Arnold,Spying from Space: Constructing America's Satellite Command and Control Systems. (CollegeStation: Texas A&M University Press, 2005); Norman Polmar, Spyplane: The U-2 History Declas-sified (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing, 2001); David T. Lindgren, Trust But Verify: ImageryAnalysisin the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000; and Curtis Peebles, ShadowFlights: America's SecretAir War Against the Soviet Union (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2000).

4. Unless otherwise indicated, all NIEs referenced in this paper can be found online athttp://www.foia.cia.gov/ "Reliability of the USSR's East European Allies," (SNIE 11-15-66), 4August 1966; "Military Reliability of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies," (NIE 12/11-83), 28June 1983.

5. Among these estimates were: "Probable Developments in the European Satellites ThroughMid-1956," (NIE 12-54), 24 August 1954: "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-62," (NIE 11-4-57), 12 November 1957; "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-63," (NIE 11-4-58), 23 December 1958; "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961-66," (NIE 11-4-61), 24 August 1961; "Capabilities of the Soviet Theater Forces," (NIE 11-14-62), 5December 1962; "Capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1963-69," (NIE 11-14-63), 8January 1964; "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1964-70," (NIE 11-14-64), 10December 1964; "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-65), 14 April 1965; "MainTrends in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-66), 16 June 1966; "Warning of Soviet Intention toAttack," (NIE 11-10-66), 18 August 1966; "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces," (NIB11-14-66), 3 November 1966; "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-67), 20 July 1967;"Main Issues in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-68), 19 September 1968; "Capabilities of theWarsaw Pact Against NATO," (SNIE 11-17-68), 8 October 1968; "Soviet and East European Gen-eral Purpose Forces,' (NIE 11-14-68), 12 December 1968: "Soviet and East European General Pur-pose Forces," (NIE 11-14-69), 4 December 1969: "The Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO," InteragencyWorking Group 5 for National Security Study Memorandum 84. Final Report of the WorkingGroup, 1 May 1970; "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," (NIE 11-14-75), 4 September 1975;



"The Balance of Forces in Central Europe," (SR 77-10100), Intelligence Assessment, 1 August1977; "Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications," (NIE 4-1-78), 10 April 1978; "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," (NIE 11-14-79), 31 January 1979;"The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s," (AnIntelligence Assessment), 1 April 1981; "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," (NIE 11-14-81), 7July 1981; "Soviet Ground Forces Trends," (SOV 84-10177), CIA-DIA-Army Assessment, 1 Octo-ber 1984; "Soviet Strategy and Capabilities for Multi-theater War," (NIE 11-19-85/D), 1 June1985; "Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces, 1985-2000," (NIE 11-14-85), 1September 1985; "Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and DoctrineThrough the 1990s," (NIE 11-14-89), 1 February 1989.

6. Examples include: "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure," (NIE 12-57), 19 February 1957;"Political Stability in the European Satellites," (NIE 12-59), 11 August 1959; "The Outlook inEastern Europe," 9 November 1961; "Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact," (NIE 12-65), 26August 1965; "The Soviet Approach to Force Reductions in Europe," (NIE 11/20-73), 11 January1973: "Implications of a Soviet Invasion of Poland," (PA 81-10297, 24 July 1981; "Soviet Goals andExpectations in the Global Power Arena," (NIE 11-4-78), 7 July 1981; "Poland's Prospects over thenext 12 to 18 Months," 25 March 1982; "Instability and Change in Soviet-Dominated EasternEurope," 1 December 1982; "The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interests," (NIE 11/4-82), 10August 1982; and "The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact," (NIC M 90-10002), 1 April 1990.

7. Various vulnerability and resistance potential studies examined the reliability of East Euro-pean militaries, including: "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary," Project NR:9570, March 1956, US Army Military History Institute (USAMHI); "Anti-Communist ResistancePotential In the Sino-Soviet Bloc," (NIE 10-58), 25 Ap-il 1958; "Anti=Communist ResistancePotential in the USSR and Eastern Europe," (NIE 11-6-66), 27 January 1966; and a series ofDefense Intelligence Agency (DIA) vulnerability studies completed during the 1980s: DIA, "Bul-garian Vulnerability Study," DDB-2260-16-85. November 1985; DIA, "Romanian VulnerabilityStudy," DDB-2260-0218-85-SI, March 1985; DIA,"Hungarian Vulnerability Study," DDB-2260-18-87-SI, May 1987; and DIA, "Polish Vulnerability Study," DDB-2260.0217-85-SI, July 1985.

8. See "USAREUR Intelligence Estimate-1965"; "USAREUR Intelligence Estimate-1962";"USAREUR Intelligence Estimate-1961"; "USAREUR Intelligence Estimate-1960"; "Special Intel-ligence Estimate Number 1-59: Soviet/Satellite Military Courses of Action in Europe Through1960," 1 February 1959; Periodic Intelligence Report 3-58, 1 October 1958; and Periodic Intelli-gence Report 1-59, 1 April 1959. These reports can be found online athttp;//www php.isn.ethz ch/collectlons/index cim Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security(PIHIP) under "NATO Military Planning Collection." The Parallel History Project posts declassifiedmaterials from US, NATO, and former Soviet Bloc archives. Also see USAREUR, "Poland, A Reli-ability Study," (U), April 1982, cited in Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, "East EuropeanMilitary Reliability: An Emigre-Based Assessment (Annex)," Rand, R-3480/1, October 1986, 4,found at http://ww.foia.ciagy

9. "Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Reliability, Northern Tier" APO New York: Headquarters, USArmy, Europe and Seventh Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, 1972, USAMHI.

10. USAF sponsored RAND studies included: Thomas W. Wolfe, "The Evolving Nature of theWarsaw Pact," Memorandum RM-4835-PR, December 1965; and JF. Brown, "Relations Betweenthe Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey," R-1742-PR, November 1975, AReport Prepared for United States Air Force Project Rand. A brief reference to the "Achilles" pro-gram can be found in G. Murphy Donovan's "Soviet Military Vulnerabilities," Studies in Intelli-gence 31, no, 1 (Spring 1988): 22.

11. "Soviet Attack Now Doubted by Smith," New York Times, 22 October 1953, 17:1.

12. "Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact Against NATO," (SNIE 11-17-68), 8 October 1968, 3-4. Seealso: "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-1962," (NIE 11-4-57), 12 November1957, 42; "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-65), 14 April 1965, 12; "Reliability ofthe USSR's East European Allies," (SNIE 11-15-66), 4 August 1966, 10;."Capabilities of the War-saw Pact Against NATO," (SNIE 11-17-68), 8 October 1968, 3-4; "Soviet and East European Gen-eral Purpose Forces," (NIE 11-14-69), 4 December 1969, 27; "The Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO,"1 May 1970, 59: "The Balance of Forces in Central Europe," (SR 77-10100), 1 August 1977, 6;"Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications" (NIE 4-1-78),10 April 1978, 1, 16-17; "The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Pros-



pects for the 1980s," (An Intelligence Assessment), 1 April 1981, 20; "Moscow's Polish Problem:An Intelligence Assessment," 1 June 1981, 1; "Implications of a Soviet Invasion of Poland" (PA 81-10297), 24 July 1981: 4-5.

13. For examples, see: "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," (NIE 10-58) 25 April 1958 and "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the USSR and Eastern Europe,"(11-6-66), 27 January 1966.

14. Intelligence and academic analyses increasingly focused on the rising East European nation-alism in the mid-1960s. See "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces. 1964-1970," (NIE I1-14.64), 10 December 1964, 33; "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-66), 16 June1966, 3, 7-8; and "Reliability of the USSR's East European Allies," (SNIE 11-15-66), 4 August1966, 4, and Thomas W. Wolfe, "The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact," Memorandum RM-4835-PR, December 1965, The Rand Corporation, and JF. Brown, "Relations Between the SovietUnion and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey," R-1742-PR, November 1975, A Report Pre-pared for United States Air Force Project Rand.

15. "Warning of Soviet Intention to Attack," (NIE 11-10-66), 18 August 1966, 15.

16. For a discussions of the policy changes initiated by Khrushchev and the Kremlin in the 1960sthat significantly affected Soviet general purpose forces and the Warsaw Pact, see Thomas W.Wolfe, "The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact," Memorandum RM-4835-PR, December 1965,The Rand Corporation; Robin Alison Remington, "The Warsaw Treaty Organization's ThirdDecade: Systemic Transformation," in Nelson, 49-51; Jeffrey Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces: Prob-lems of Command and Control, 13-24; Bradley R. Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power in East-ern Europe: The Soviet/Communist Control System (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 18-30;A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe," July 1981,RAND/P-6583, 6-17; Dale R. Herspring, 'The Warsaw Pact at 25" Problems of Communism. Sep-tember-October 1980: 1-15. VoJtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle: AnInside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991 (New York: Central European University Press,2005). IC analysis of this issue is contained in "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces,1964-1970," (NIE 11-14-64), 10 December 1964, 3-4, 32; "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy,"(NIE 11-4-66), 16 June 1966, 2; "Reliability of the USSR's East European Allies," (SNIE 11.15-66),4 August 1966, 4-6; "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces," (NIE 11-14-66), 3 November1966, 1; "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-67), 20 July 1967, 3, 10; "Soviet andEast European General Purpose Forces," (NIE 11-14-68), 12 December 1968. 1; and "The Develop-ment of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s," (An IntelligenceAssessment), I April 1981, 19-21.

17. "Military Reliability of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies," (NIE 12/11-83), 28 June 1983,2.

18. See: "Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid 1956" (NIE 12-54), 24August 1956; "The Outlook in Eastern Europe," 9 November 1961, 2-3; "Capabilities of the SovietTheater Forces," (NIE 11-14-62), 5 December 1962, 23; "Capabilities of Soviet General PurposeForces, 1964-1970," (NIE 11-14-64), 10 December 1964, 32; "Main Trends in Soviet Military Pol-icy," (NIE 11-4-65), 14 April 1965, 3; "Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact," (NIE 12-65), 26August 1965, 5; "Reliability of the USSR's East European Allies," (SNIE 11-15266), 4 August 1966;"Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces," (NIE 11-14-69), 4 December 1969, 27; "War-saw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," (NIE 11-14-75), 4 September 1975, 33; "Warsaw Pact Conceptsand Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications," 4/10/1978, 4; "Implications of a SovietInvasion of Poland" (PA 81-10297), 24 July 1981, 5, "Poland's Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18Months," 25 March 1982, 3-4; and "Military Reliability of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies,"(NIE 12/11-83), 28 June 1983.

19. The academic community approached the issue with more structure and depth. Dale Her-spring and Ivan Volgyes, for example, clearly delineated that reliability should be considered infour different contexts: internal-offensive, internal defensive, external-defensive, and external-offensive. Their joint research also was slightly different, with greater emphasis placed on issuessuch as "the political socialization of the armed forces" and "their normative commitment" to theirrespective regimes. See Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the EastEuropeanWarsaw Pact Armies," Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1980): 270-96. Dale R. Her-spring and Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: AComparative Framework," Armed Forces and Society 3, No.2. (February 1977): 249-70. Daniel N.



Nelson in "The Measurement of East European WTO 'Reliability'" in Nelson, Soviet Allies:'TheWarsaw Pact and the Issue ofRe'llability likewise attacked the methodological and definitionalissues surrounding NSWP. reliability. For Nelson, the key question was "one of linkages betweenmilitary performance on the battlefield" with what he called "mobilization potential." Nelson saw"mobilization potential as the principal limitation on force availability, and thus the key determi-nant of reliability." Nelson subsequently introduces and discusses six indicators to ascertainmobilization potential: scenario of hostility; duration of involvement in hostile action: systemicintegration; domestic socioeconomic conditions; domestic political conditions; and military pre-.paredness. For other works that address many of these factors see: Alexander Alexlev and A. RossJohnson, "East European Military Reliability: An Emigr&Based Assessment," RAND/R-3480.October 1986, and Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern

- Tier, 3-11. Academic research on the issue of NSWP reliability also was evident at the war col-leges. See Wing Commander Peter M. Papworth, RAF, "The Integrity of the Warsaw Pact," AirUniversity Review (March-April 1977); Roger E. Kanet, "East Europe and the Warsaw TreatyOrganization:-The Question of Reliability" (Carlisle Barracks. PA: Strategic Studies Institute USArmny War College, 1978).

20. "The Outlook in Eastern Europe," (NIE 12-61). 9 November 1961, 7: "Anti-Communist Resis-tance Potential in the USSR and Eastern Europe," (NIE 11-6-66), 27 January 1966, 7: "WarsawPact Forces Opposite NATO," (NIE 11-14-75), 4 September 1975. 33; "Military Reliability of theSoviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies," (NIE 12/11-83), 28 June 1983, 1; Paul Kecskemeti, "The Mill-tary Reliability of the Hungarian Armed Forces," RAND, RM-2204, 1958.20 USAMHI.

21. For insight into the USMLM mission and collection efforts during the early Cold War, seeJohn A. Fahey, Licensed to Spy: With the Top Secret Military Liaison Mission in East Germany(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 183-92. Covering the mission later in the Cold Waris James R. Holbrook, Potsdam Mission: Memoir ofa U.S. Army intelligence Officer in CommunistEast Germany (Cork Hill Press, 2005).

22. Declassified NIEs do not contain reference, or source, citations. The description of sourcesupon which they were drafted is based on my analysis of sources used in declassified vulnerabilitystudies such as "Resistance Factors and-Special Forces Areas Rumania," Project NR: A-1570,.1958, and "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Bulgaria," Project NR A-394, USAMHI.In these studies, multiple CIA HUMINT Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) are referenced,with the ultimate source of information identified as local newspapers, communist party newspa-pers, refugees, defectors, and escapees, some whom had served In the armed forces or borderguards. A few "confidential" sources are also included. Other sources identified included lettersreceived from relatives behind the Iron Curtain and reports from travelers and correspondents.US embassy and defense attache reporting, military intelligence (Ml) unit products, foreign intel-ligence service reporting, and translated information from Radio Free Europe and the FBIS alsoappear. Collection opportunities occasionally increased in the aftermath of Eastern Europe'spolitical unrest. In 1957, Paul Kecskemeti, was able to administer questionnaires to 75 formerHungarian officers and enlisted men, gathering key data on their attitudes on reliability. See Kec-skemeti, "The Military Reliability of the Hungarian Armed Forces," RAND; RM-2204, 1958, 1-2,20, 123. Yet the IC also did not always make the best use of the limited sources they had: A 1986declassified assessnient noted: "Emigre and defector debriefings conducted in U.S. government(USG) channels are generally focused on 'harder' issues rather than 'softer' issues like reliability.Thus more attention to some 'soft' factors in official debriefings may be warranted." See AlexanderAlexiev and A. Ross Johnson, "East European Military Reliability:.An Emigrd-Based Assessment(Annex)." Rand. R-3480/1, October 1986, 1.

23. Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiv Papers (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) andBenjamin Weiser, A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid toSave 1-1s Country (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).


25. During the 1950s, the military and intelligence communities drew heavily on work done atMIT, Georgetown, Indiana, and RAND. Examples of such research include MIT's Center for Inter-national Studies (CENIS), "The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union.and its European Satellites toPolitical Warfare," Vois I-V, July 1952, CD 385 Political Warfare 1952, Records of the Office of theSecretary of Defense, Record Group (RG) 330, Box 367, National Archives Washington, DC(NAWDC); Georgetown University, Project 9570: "Hungary Resistance Activities and Potentials,"



March 1956, RG 319, Box 240, NAWDC. Project 9570 also references a Georgetown study entitled"Resistance Potential: Hungary" dated July 1953; Indiana University, "Psychological WarfareVulnerabilities of Soviet Satellite States". referenced in "Terminal History of ARCS," I July-31December 1953, 31 December 1953, Vol. I, K318.8 53/07/01-53/12/3 L USAF Collection, Air ForceHistorical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; Paul Kecskemeti. "The Military Reli-ability of the Hungarian Armed Forces," RAND, RM-2204, 1958, USAMHI. Not all-within theIntelligence Community viewed these academic and think tank efforts as particularly valuable.Some analysts felt that academics and contractors "took our data and sold it back to us" with littleor no value added.

26. For a discussion of the decreased emphasis on psychological warfare in the wake of the Hun-garian Revolution, see James D. Marchio, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration

- and Unrest In Eastern Europe, 1953-1959," Ph.D. Dissertation. American University, 1990, 407-67. It is probably not mere coincidence that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, not any of theservices, asked for the 1966 SNIE on the "Reliability of the USSR's East European Allies," (SNIE11-15-66), 4 August 1966. Also of note, General John W. Vessey, Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff 1982-1985, was a strong advocate of the DIA vulnerability studies at this time. Althoughnot from the special operations community, General Vessey' s service in Laos in 1972 to coordi-nate all US military operations there probably gave him a good apprecialion of resistance forcesand the challenges they faced.

27. Weekly Summary, 23 August 1946, in Woodrow J. Kuhns, ed. Assessing the Soviet Threat: TheEarly Cold War Years. (Washington, DC: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997), 74.

28. "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1959," (NIE 11-4-54), 14September 1954 in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS); 1952-1954, Vol. VIII EasternEurope; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), 1,250.

29. John Scott wrote: "During the summer of 1954...] found senior Western military leadersextremely worried about the satellite armed forces, which a year or so earlier they had happilywritten off as riddled with defection and completely unreliable." John Scott, Political Warfare: AGuide to Competitive Coexistence (New York: The John Day Company, 1955), 63; Gen. Alfred M.Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, told a congressional committee that "in thepast three to four years there has been very little numerical increase In the Soviet strength." Buthe said there had been a "very material increase In the effectiveness of Soviet forces." lie testifiedthat the Russians also had put a "great deal of effort" into building up armed forces in their satel-lite countries with "a mutual security program of their own," He said these troops were not "firstclass" now but would be in a few years. Gen. Gruenther predicted there would be no repetition ofthe 1953 anti-Communist riots in East Berlin because the Russian had "learned their lesson" andnow had the situation "under control." The Russians, he said, were "concentrating repeatedly" onthe indoctrination and disciplining of young Germans. "Gruenther Warns of Russian Power," NewYork Tines, 12 July 1954, 3:5.

30. "Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956," (NIE 12-54), 24August 1954, 2.

31. Reports that other East European military forces proved unreliable during the 1956 Hungar-ian Revolution were investigated by the IC and, in at least one case, found to be inaccurate:"Expectations that the Rumanian Army might prove as disloyal to the Communist cause as theHungarian Army led some Western newspapers in October 1956 to declare, on the testimony of'very reliable' sources inside Rumania, that many units of the Rumanian armed forces had beentemporarily disarmed during the height of the fighting in Hungary. These reports were subse-quently investigated by Western military attaches and found to be.groundless: The attaches wereunable to confirm or disprove other newspaper reports in October 1956 claiming that while theRumanian Army retained its arms, it was temporarily deprived of ammunition." "Resistance Fac-tors and Special Forces Areas Rumania." Project NR: A-1570, 1958, 34, USAMHI.

32. "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure," (NIE 12-57), 19 February 1957, 9.

33. Ibid.

34. USAREUR, Special Intelligence Estimate Number 1-59: Soviet/Satellite Military Courses ofAction in Europe Through 1960, 1 February 1959, 9-10.

35. See "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1964-1970," (NIE 11.14-64), 10 December1964, 3-4, 32; and "Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces," (NIE 11-14-68), 12

49 Studies in Intelligence Vol, 51, No. 4 (Extracts-December 2007)


December 1968, 1. Also see CIA Intelligence Study: "Warsaw Pact Military Strategy: A Compro-mise in Soviet Strategic Thinking," 7 June 1965. This superb study, declassified and released inJune 2007 as part of the CAESAR-POLO-ESAU papers, argues that "the internal Soviet debateon the nature of a war in Europe has had a significant effect on the development of the missionsand force structure of the East European armies." It provides an extended and nuanced discus-sion of Soviet debate over the nature of conflict in the nuclear age, driven in part by NilkitaKhrushchev's strategic outlook and desire to reduce conventional forces. Interestingly, the studyargues that "there are signs that competing interests within the Soviet Union-rather than theWestern 'threat' exclusively-were responsible for the assignment of an offensive mission to theEast European forces." (i)

36. See Wolfe, "The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact," 7-28; Herspring, "The Warsaw Pact at25," 2,4, 7: John M. Caravelli, "Soviet and Joint Warsaw Pact Exercises: Functions and Utility,"Armed Forces and Society 9, No.3 (Spring 1983), 393-426; and "The Development of Soviet Mili-tary Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s," (An Intelligence Assessment), 1 April1981, 19-21.

37; Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1964-1970," (NIE 11-14-64), 10 December1964, 3.

38. "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-65), 14 April 1965. 12,

39. "Reliability of the USSR's East European Allies," (SNIE 11-15-66), 4 August 1966, 1.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid, 6.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid, 2.

45. The IC was still asserting 12 months before Soviet tanks and their NSWP allies rolled intoCzechoslovakia that "the Warsaw Pact has served and will probably continue to serve as a conve-nient framework within which the USSR can work to limit tendencies to independence among itsEast European allies." See "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11.4-67), 20 July 1967,11.

46. "Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Reliability, Northern Tier," 1972, 22, USAMHI; and "USAREURIntelligence Estimate 1961," 1 January 1961, 92 at http://www.php.lsn.ethz.ch/collec-tions/index.cfm.

47. "Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact Against NATO," (SNIE 11-17-68), 8 October 1968, 5. Also see"Main Issues in Soviet Military Policy," (NIE 11-4-68), 19 September 1968, for a discussion ofsome of the potential implications for the Soviet military and Warsaw Pact of the 1968 invasion of .Czechoslovakia.

48. "The Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO," Interagency Working Group 5 for National SecurityStudy Memorandum 84, Final Report of the Working Group, 1 May 1970, 7,

49. Ibid., 58.

50. CIA, Intelligence Report: "The Polish Question: East Germany," July 1971, Iii.51. Ibid., 6-8, 11.

52. "Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Reliability, Northern Tier," 14.

53. Ibid, 20, 25.

54. "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," (NIE 11-14-75), 4 September 1975; A. Ross Johnson, inhis chapter "Has Eastern Europe Become A Liability to the Soviet Union? (1)-The MilitaryAspect," concluded: "For the present, far from having become a military liability to the SovietUnion, Eastern Europe is a military asset that has appreciated in recent years and shows everysign of continuing to increase in value." in Charles Gati, ed., The International Politics ofEasternEurope (New York: Praeger, 1976). 56.

55. "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," (NIE 11-14-75), 4 September 1975, 33.



56. Ibid., 33.

57. Ibid., 32-33. The estimate describes at length some of these key contributions, such as the factthat "NSWP forces permit.the achievement of advantageous force rations without reinforcementfrom the USSR. In addition, Polish forces in the north and Czech forces in the south allow for con-centrations of Soviet forces in the critical center. Primary logistics routes run through Poland,East Germany, and Czechoslovakia and the East Europeans commit heavy resources to their pro-tection." It went on to note that "in Central Europe the East Europeans provided over half of thecombat divisions and made important contributions in the air defense and logistics realms."

58. "Probable Soviet Reactions to a Crisis in Poland," (RP 77-10141CX), 1 June 1977, li & 13 athttp://www.fola.cia.gov/.

59. For example, in June 1981 an IC assessment concluded: "The Soviets probably now doubt theycan count on Polish military cooperation. Therefore, in the event they decide to resolve the situa-tion by military force, they will try to confront the Poles with such overwhelming strength thatresistance would be futile. To project an image of unity on the part of the Warsaw Pact in reject-ing Polish revisionism, the Soviets would also want other Pact armed forces to participate in theintervention" in "Moscow's Polish.Problem: An Intelligence Assessment," 1 June 1981, 6.

60. "The Balance of Forces in Central Europe," (SR 77-10100), 1 August 1977, 6.

61. "Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications," (NIE 4-1-78), 10 April 1978, 17.

62. "The Balance of Forces in Central Europe," (SR 77-10100), 1 August 1977. 6.

63. "Implications of a Soviet Invasion of Poland," (PA 81-10297), 24 July 1981, 4-5.

64. Ibid. See also "The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospectsfor the 1980s," (An Intelligence Assessment), 1 April 1981, 20. This assessment argues: "Since theSoviets altered their concept for war in Europe (in the mid-to-late 1960s); Warsaw Pact planningfor war against NATO has assigned an important role to Polish forces.,. Polish forces are alsoassigned the critical tasks of operating and safeguarding the lines of communication from theUSSR through Poland, Soviet military planners must have reservations about the reliability ofPolish forces in wartime, and they probably have contingency plans that exclude them or assignthem less critical tasks. Nevertheless, it would be difficult for Soviet units to replace the Polescompletely withopt endangering vital wartime objectives."

65. "Poland's Prospects Over. the Next 12 to 18 Months," SNIE, 25 March 1982, 3.

66. Ibid, 3-4.

67. Ibid.

68. "Military Reliability of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies," (NIE 12/11-83), 28 June 1983.

69. Ibid., 10. Others saw the historical record as providing evidence of Soviet and East Europeansuccess. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socializationin Eastern Europe: A Comparative Framework," Armed Forces and Society 3, No.2 (February1977), 267.


71. Ibid., 22.

72. Ibid., 3.

73. Ibid, 31.

74. Ibid, 6.

75. A series of vulnerability studies were initiated by Secretary of Defense tasking after the 1983NIE. Among these were: DIA, "Bulgarian Vulnerability Study," DDB-2260-16-85, November1985; DIA. "Romanian Vulnerability Study," DDB-2260-0218-85-SI, March 1985: DIA, "Hungar-tan Vulnerability Study," DDB-2260-18.87-SI, May 1987; and DIA, "Polish Vulnerability Study,"DDB-2260-0217-85-SI, July 1986. I was the primary drafter of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, andRomanian studies, I also completed a project as part of the Director of Central Intelligence'sExceptional Analyst Program entitled: "Unrest Behind the Iron Curtain; 1945-1981: Causes and



Consequences for U.S. Exploitation Efforts," June 1987, DIA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)Case #0669-99. In addition, Ivan Volgyes notes in the Preface to The Political Reliability of theWarsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier-that "this study was originally prepared under contractfor the Office of the.Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation and forthe Office of Net Assessment of the Department of Defense during January-August 1981."

76. "Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces," 1985-2000 (NIE 11-14-85), 1September 1985, 15. See also Jeffrey Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command andControl, 184-202,

77. Ibid. See also "Soviet Ground Forces Trends," (SOV 84-10177), 1 October 1984 for more onchange in Soviet plans. For success of Soviet measures to improve reliability, see Douglas A.MacGregor, "Uncertain Allies? East European Forces in the Warsaw Pact," Soviet Studies.XXX-VIII, no.2, (April 1986), 227-47. Even MacGregor, however, concludes that "despite these suc-cesses, unqualified reliance on East European military formations to conduct sustained combatoperations against the West would still be incautious." (243). Although not focused on the issue ofexternal reliability, Catalin Razvan Cretu's, "The Behavior of East European Armed Forces Dur-ing the Crises of the Communist Order, 1955-1989," Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University,2002, argues that these militaries were largely reliable in internal crises due to their desire toinsure their institutional survival.

78. "Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces," 1985-2000 (NIE 11-14-85), 1September 1985, 6.

79. Ibid.

80. "Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s,"(NIE 11-14-89), 1 February 1989, 13.

81. "The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact," (NIC M 90-10002), 1 April 1990, iii.

82. Condoleezza Rice, "Warsaw Pact Reliability: The Czechoslovak People's Army," in Nelson,125; see also Major Edgar O'Ballance, "Poland: Keystone or Weakest Link?" Military Review,April 1963, 59.

83. Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, "East European Military Reliability: An Emigrd-Based Assessment," RAND/R-3480, October 1986. The open source literature likewise mirroredthe IC's finding that the length and nature of the conflict would greatly affect NSWP reliability.Daniel Nelson concluded: "All things being equal, the longer militaries of Eastern Europe arerequired to perform, the more one should doubt the full application of their available forces."Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of RelIability, 10.

84. Gordon Drake's "Reliability of the East German Armed Forces," for example, concluded: "Onbalance it would seem that the SED's Herculean efforts at ensuring the political and ideologicalreliability of its officers field grade and above have succeeded....Reliability of the junior officers ismuch more problematic." Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) Seminar Paper, 8 June 1987,Defense Intelligence Agency Library, Washington, D.C., 32. For additional studies on how reli-ability varied among NSWP nations and even within individual militaries see Ivan Volgyes, "Bul-garia," 99-124; Condolezza Rice, "Warsaw Pact Reliability: Czechoslovak People's Army," 125-42;Henry Krisch, "German Democratic Republic," 143-83; Ivan Volgyes, "Hungary," 184-224; andJan B. de Weydenthal; "Martial Law and the Reliability of the Polish Military," 225-63 in Nelson,Soviet Alilles: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability, and Volgyes, The Political Reliabilityof the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier.

85. Nelson, 267.

86. Penkovsky, 203, 344-45: Holbrook also cites strong anti-Soviet sentiment among the EastGerman populace based on his Interaction during his United States Military Liaison Militarytour. See pages 111, 114, and 176.. In "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Pol-Ish and Hungarian Crises," Mark Kramer concludes in discussing the aftermath of the HungarianRevolution: "The remains of the Hungarian army were regarded by Soviet commanders (andKadar) as politically and militarily unreliable." (377 & 384) This was based on the testimony offormer national defense minister Lajos Czinege in Magyar Orszaggyules, A Honvedelmi Bizottsag1989 Oktoberi uiesszakan letrhozott visgalobizottsaf 1989 december 11-, 1990 januar 3-I, 1990januar 15-i, 1990 februar 6-1 ulese jegyzokonyvenek nyilt reszlete, 5 vols. (1994), Vol 1, 261, inCold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997.

52 Studies in. Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 4 (Extracts-December 2007)


87. Mastny and Byrne; A Cardboard Castle: An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, 36,286-94.

88. ]bid, 291. This excerpt shows that the Soviets at the time believed they could not rely on theCzechoslovaks, the Romanians or the Albanians when the time came to act..(294)

89. IbId, 51-2; and Kuklinskl wrote: "In conclusion, with bitterness, I must report that as much asa small group of generals and officers of the Polish Armed Forces privy to the planning of theintervention are dispirited and crushed, there hasn't even been thought of military opposition byPolish forces to the military action of the Warsaw Pact. There are even statements that the verypresence of such a large force on Polish territory can lead to increased calm." Weiser, A SecretLife: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country, 220-21.Referring to martial law., Kuklinski believed.Polish troops would resist: "In the final analysis,nevertheless, the troops will not permit a massacre of the nation. They will choose death ratherthan to live in disgrace on their knees...It would seem that both the Soviet leadership and thetraitors from the Polish United Workers Party...are aware of this. And the fact that, in theplanned intervention, it is proposed to deploy five armies, which will be commanded by Russians,Czechs, and Germans, with the Poles being excluded, testifies to this emphatically." Weiser, 227.

90. Stasi document is available at the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP) athttp://www.php. isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=17254&navinfo=15296.

91. Quoted in Mastny & Byrne, 53.

92. Ibid, 463. To the IC's credit, it essentially had reached this conclusion as-well. A 1981 NIEobserved: "Soviet military planners must have reservations about the reliability of Polish forces inwartime, and they probably have contingency plans that exclude them or assign them less criticaltasks." "The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the1980s,' (An Intelligence Assessment), 1 April 198, 20.

93. "NSC 86/1: United States Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors," 19 April 1951, PresidentialSecurity File, Subject File, NSC Reports-2, Box 195, Subject File- NSC Policies of the Govern-mient, Vol. IV, 1951, Polices of the Government of the US Relating to National Security, Harry S.Truman Library. The US Air Force's Project 'Gretna Green' provided assessments of psychologicalwarfare vulnerabilities on all East European satellites as well as ways to encourage defections.See 'Terminal History of ARCS,' 1 July-31 December 1953, 31 December 1953, Vol. 1, K318.853/07/01-53/12/31. USAF Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air ForceBase, AL. For a broader discussion of USAF efforts to foster dissent in the Soviet and Bloc militar-ies, see James D. Marchio, "Casualties of the Cold War: "Operation Think' and the Air ResupplyCommunications Service," Air Power History 39. No.1 (Winter 1992), 19-23.

94. President Eisenhower echoed this sentiment suggesting that "in his view the countries of theSino-Soviet Bloc other than Communist China actually constituted a weakness for the U.S.S.R.They would like nothing better than to have the opportunity to revolt against the U.S.S.R. if anopportunity were provided by.the outbreak of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.""NSC Discussion of NSC 5904," 5 March 1959, Summary, 3981 Meeting of NSC, Eisenhower, DD:Papers as President of the US, 1953-61. Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 11. Dwight D.Eisenhower Library, 6-10. It also is significant that NIE 1048, "Anti-Communist ResistancePotential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," contains an explicit discussion of the anticipated reaction ineach NSWP country to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

95. See JCS 2066/49 US Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC5811) 20 May 1958 and .ICS 2066145 US Policy Towards Poland (NSC 5808/1) 18 April 1958, Col-lection-JCS Papers, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C;and James Marchio, "Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contin-gency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising," Journal of Military His-tory66, No.3 (July 2002), 783-812.

96. "Military Reliability of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies," (NIE 12/11-83), 28 June 1983;DIA. "Bulgarian Vulnerability Study," DDB-2260-16-85, November 1985: DIA, "Romanian Vul-nerability Study," DDB-2260-0218-85-SI, March 1985; DIA, "Hungarian Vulnerability Study,"DDB-2260-18-87-SI, May 1987; and DIA, "Polish Vulnerability Study," DDB-2260-0217-85-SI,July 1985; and "East European Military Reliability-An Emigre-Based Assessment" I October1986.

97. "East European Military Reliability-An Emigre-Based Assessment," 1 October 1986, 7.


~1 f


98. Malcolm Gladwell, "Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much Informa-tion," The New Yorker, 8 January 2007.

99. Alexander Alexlev and A. Ross Johnson, "East European Military Reliability; An Emigre-Based Assessment" (Annex), Rand. R-348011, 1 October 1986, 1.

100. Eugene Hinterhoff, "The Warsaw Pact," Milftary Review (June 1962), 89-94, Translated anddigested from the original, published in WEHIR UND WIRTSCHAFT (Federal Republic of Ger-many), December 1961 under the title "Die Manover der Warschu-Packt Staaten." 94.


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