U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYOffice of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability

May 18, 2015

Stewart Cedres

SYMPOSIUM IN HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSEAchieving Resilience in America’s Critical Infrastructure

A More Resilient Electric Grid

Mission – OE’s Core Purpose

OE drives electric grid modernization and resiliency in the energy infrastructure.

OE leads the Department of Energy’s efforts to ensure a resilient, reliable, and flexible electricity system. OE accomplishes this mission through research, partnerships, facilitation, modeling and analytics, and emergency preparedness.

OE ORGANIZATION

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Infrastructure Security & Energy Restoration

(ISER)

Deputy Assistant Secretary

(Emergency Preparedness & Response (physical & cyber), Authorities Execution (HSPD),

Mitigation Deployment (EMP/GMD))

National Electricity Delivery (NED)

Deputy Assistant Secretary

(Transmission Planning, Development, Siting, Technical Assistance to State, regional & tribal governments, Authorities Execution (EPACT), NEPA/Presidential Permits, export authorizations, Smart Grid Policy)

Immediate Office of the Assistant Secretary (OAS)

Patricia HoffmanAssistant Secretary

Corporate Business Operations (CBO)

Chief Operating Officer

(Budget, HR, Communications, Procurement, Corporate Policies, IT Governance, Training, Audits, Daily

Operations, etc…)

Energy Infrastructure Modeling & Analysis

(EIMA)

Deputy Assistant Secretary

(Grid Modeling, Environmental Modeling & Analytics, Clean Energy Transmission & Reliability,

Energy Infrastructure & Risk Analysis, Visualization)

Advanced Grid Integration (AGI)

Deputy Assistant Secretary

(Smart Grid Investment Grants (SGIG), SGIG Cyber Security Plans, Workforce Training, Net Metering)

Power Systems Engineering

Research & Development (PSE R&D)

Deputy Assistant Secretary

(Energy Storage, Smart Grid Demos, Power Electronics, Grid Cyber R&D, Grid Team

Topics, Smart Grid Hub, Adaptive Networks, Intelligent Systems)

OE ‘s advisory body, Electricity Advisory Committee, was established under FACA in 12/2007 as authorized under EPACT 2005. The Committee consists of 29 members.

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Grid Upgrades T&D

Developing New Hardware

Integrated Systems, Modeling & Analysis

Secure Communications and Data Privacy• Cybersecurity R&D and Ops

OE’s Portfolio Approach Covers Wide Spectrum: Policy, Operations, Analytics and Research

Resiliency and Emergency Preparedness & Response• Sector Specific Agency

Natural Disasters

• NOAA (2015) reported that there were 178 weather related disasters with overall damages of at least $1B (1980 to 2014) – hurricanes, high winds storms, floods, droughts, heat waves, ice storms,

wildfires

• Property Claims Services (2013) listed the ten most costly catastrophes in U.S. history– 1994 Northridge earthquake ranked on the top 5

High Frequency or Low Frequency

Source: DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability

Source: DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability

Source: DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability

But there is more…

All posing a threat to the electric grid

Space Weather Events

Cyber Threat

Technological Accidents

Dependency on Other Systems Pandemics

Terrorism and Sabotage

This is the same grid…

• largest interconnected machinery • 7,000 power plants; 3,200 electricity

providers; 300,000 miles of power

lines• linked to a universe of systems• keeping the lights on

Described by Presidential Policy Directive 21 as

“uniquely critical due to the enabling functions it provides across all critical sectors”

The Numbers Don’t Lie!

• $75 million – Silicon Valley

• $20 trillion – Chicago

• $6 billion – Northeast

• 3.5 million gallons – San Diego

But not everything is about $ and ¢

Presidential Policy Directives (PPD) 8 and 21

“the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions” – PPD 8: National Preparedness and PPD 21: Critical Infrastructure Security & Resilience

Defining Resilience

Must also understand resilience!!!

Understanding Risk and Criticality

• Risk: Function (T, C, V)

• Criticality:o Impact base – does not necessary translate into vulnerabilityo Dynamic – time and event driven

Unless mandated by regulation, investment on resilience tends to be on what’s both: critical and vulnerable (based on the likelihood of biggest threats to the system)…it is based on Risk.

SIMPLE ENOUGH?

Not that Simple…

• Vulnerabilities and threats impacting the grid are not always obvious– What about bad policy?

• Market Structures• New Government Policies and Regulations• Development of Advanced Technologies

• Dependencies on other critical infrastructure and technologies• Lack of systemic understanding • Emerging disrupting technologies

Intersecting

North American Grid is one of the most Complex Systems on Earth!

Failures – Systems vs. Systemic

• Last 50 years, the grid has experience several widespread blackouts as a result of or leading to systemic failure

• Forensic analysis of major widespread blackouts often shows – root cause to be a handful of components– many times the failed components are

geographically located far away from where the impact is felt the most

Society can probably accept system failure; but systemic failure pose a far greater challenge to both the U.S. economy and security

Systematic, Strategic, and Innovative

• The grid is VERY reliable• The century old grid is going through a transformation…what we do

within the next 10 years will have an impact• We cannot afford to be reactive• We cannot invest on Resiliency by sacrificing– Reliability– Efficiency– Flexibility– Affordability

All five are linked adding complexity to the grid…but also making the grid better!

Resilient Grid

Coordinated Effort

DOE SLTT

Assets Owners&

Operators

Trades Organizations

Academia Industry Research Centers

VendorsCanada

NGOsRegulators

Vendors

NERC

OthersFederalGovt.

Other CI