u.s. attorneys' bulletin vol 47 no 02, cumulative index · we are pleased to present the...

USABulletinMarch 1999 Cumulative Index

In This Issue

Interview with Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. “Jack” KeeneyAGAC: Beyond the MassacreHerbert Brownell and the Little Rock CrisisThe Evolution of Jury PowerThe Trial of the CenturyCumulative Index (July 1996 through January 1999)

Letter from the Editor

We are pleased to present the cumulative index to the United States Attorneys’ Bulletin. We hope thatyou will find the index useful in locating articles on legal issues of interest to you. A special thanks goes toManaging Editor Jennifer Bolen for putting the cumulative index together.

This issue serves another important purpose. It contains inspirational stories of federal prosecutorswith long and distinguished service in the Department. Our focus is on our history and tradition, and thetiming couldn’t be better. This is an era in which federal prosecutors dedicate entire careers serving thenation. Attorney General Reno’s tenure is the longest of any Attorney General in the 20th century. Ourfeatured interviewee in this issue is Deputy Assistant Attorney General John “Jack” Keeney, whoseDepartment career began in 1951. Former Harvard Law Professor Ernest Brown began a "one year" stintas a professor in residence at the Tax Division in 1970 that continues today. Special Litigation CounselBrown is quick to point out that there are other lawyers in the Tax Division who have served longer, but hehas a special claim of seniority— Mr. Brown is 92 years old!

Many thanks to all of you who continue to give us your comments and suggestions for the Bulletin andour publications program. Please feel free to call me with your comments at (340) 773-3920 or on Emailat AVIC01(DNISSMAN)

DAVID MARSHALL NISSMAN

Contents1 Interview with Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. “Jack” Keeney8 AGAC: Beyond the Massacre

11 Department of Justice History: Herbert Brownell and the Little Rock Crisis

13 The Evolution of Jury Power16 Department of Justice History: The Trial of the Century18 Cumulative Index (July 1996 through January 1999)

Published by theExecutive Office for United States Attorneys

Washington, DCDonna A. Bucella, Director

United States Attorneys’ Bulletin Staff, (803) 544-5155David Marshall Nissman, Editor in Chief

Jennifer E. Bolen, Managing Editor

Send distribution address and quantity corrections to:Jennifer E. Bolen, National Advocacy Center, 1620 Pendleton Street,

Columbia, SC 29201-3836(803) 544-5155 or fax (803) 544-5110

Jack Keeney

Interview with Deputy AssistantAttorney General John C. Keeney

For 26 years, John C. “Jack” Keeney hasbeen the Deputy Assistant Attorney Generalof the Criminal Division. He was born inWilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He received a

Bachelor of Science Degree from The Universityof Scranton in 1947 and, in 1949, he received hisLL.B. from The Dickinson School of Law. In 1953he received is LL.M. from George WashingtonSchool of Law. Keeney joined the Department ofJustice in 1951. From 1943 through November1945, he served the country as a Navigator, U.S.Army-Air Force and saw active duty in the 8th AirForce in 1944.

In the current bestseller, The GreatestGeneration, author Tom Brokaw chronicles theexperiences and accomplishments of our WorldWar II veterans. United by a common mission thatrequired putting the good of all above individualinterests, these Americans share some very specialqualities. Brokaw comments that

they are unusually modest, dedicated, and havemade remarkable accomplishments in all fields.

Our featured representative of this groupepitomizes these and other special values. Jack Keeney was a navigator aboard a B-17 bomber that was shot down over Germany. He became aPOW. When you walk into his office today you seea framed picture of a B-17 on his wall, but whenyou ask him about his war experiences hisresponses are modest. He simply says he "was oneof the fortunate ones."

Keeney's dedicated service to his countryincludes an incredible 48 year (and counting) career at the Department of Justice. Asyou read the interview you will see that he is partof the can-do generation that, when confrontedwith problems, even of epic proportions, quietlymanufactured solutions. Circumspect, modest,unassumingly honest, he speaks of his experiencesprosecuting communists in the 1950s, the earlyyears of our organized crime program, the behindthe scenes anguish at the Department during theWatergate era, the development of internationalcooperative agreements, and many otherfascinating historical subjects. As we pay tribute toa career in progress, our purpose is to inspireothers to dedicate their energies to solving theproblems facing us in the spirit of service to ourcountry.

Keeney (JK) was interviewed on October 13,1998, by Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)David M. Nissman (DN), Editor in Chief, UnitedStates Attorneys’ Bulletin.

DN: I want to take you back to March 19, 1951,your first day of work at the Department. Whatwere your impressions?

JK: Just kind of bewildered. I came in at 9:00 inthe morning and reported to Bill Foley, who wasthen the head of the Internal Security Section in theCriminal Division. I don’t remember very muchother than that. It was a long time ago.

DN: What was your first job at the Department?

CUMULATIVE INDEX USABULLETIN 5

JK: We were doing internal security file reviewsand cases under the Smith Act. We did a lot of filereviews in those days and I did cases. When I camein there was an Internal Security and ForeignAgents Registration section within the CriminalDivision. In 1954 the section was split out of theCriminal Division and a separate Internal SecurityDivision was created. It operated from 1954 untilthe 60’s.

DN: Was everyone in the Department housed inone building?

JK: No. We actually spent a lot of time in the oldpost office building. We were not all in onebuilding. I don’t think we went beyond oneadditional building.

DN: And the FBI was in the main building?

JK: Yes.

DN: Was there a physical barrier between the FBIand the rest of the Department?

JK: No. Hoover’s office was on the fourth floor. Ithink where Civil Rights is now. No, there were nobarriers.

DN: So if you needed to go see an FBI agent, youjust took the elevator up and found him?

JK: I never recall ever doing that. There were nophysical barriers but there were other kind ofbarriers between the Department and the FBI atthat time. Hoover discouraged fraternization withthe Department lawyers.

DN: Why was that?

JK: I was never sure exactly what it was but heliked to keep his people separate.

DN: You mentioned doing file reviews as part ofyour job with Internal Security. Were thesereviews of registered aliens?

JK: Of potential security risks was really what it

was. For a period of time, I was executivesecretary of the interdepartmental committee oninternal security that was based here in theDepartment but had representatives from the otheragencies. The committee addressed interagencysecurity problems such as security at the border,customs inspections, things like that.

DN: The McCarthy era is a very interesting periodof American history. How were the cases selected?

JK: Actually, the FBI controlled the selection oftargets. They would periodically come over to thesection with a memorandum similar to a prosmemo. They would have compiled all of theinformation that they believed would support aprosecution of particular individuals and theywould give it to us. Then we would examine it andsee what we could do with it. What usuallyhappened was that we would accept most of therecommended targets and then go out in the fieldand start presenting the case, meet with some oftheir informants, some of the defectors. We got anopportunity to assess the case and the credibility ofthe witnesses. By the time I got into it, they werequite a few defectors who turned out to be keywitnesses. Also, some of the convicted defendantscame around.

DN: Were the informant issues during that periodof time different than the informant issues today?

JK: Yes. Disclosure of informants, Brady, and soforth, was not really the law at that point. As amatter of fact, even the Jencks Act came aboutbecause in one of our cases we didn’t turn over the302s and other reports of witnesses that we used ordidn’t turn them over in a timely fashion. The longand the short of it was that we got slapped downon that and then the Congress enacted a statutewhich codified what the Supreme Court did in theJencks case and created a set of procedures helpfulto the Government in that we were not required toproduce a witness list before trial and did not haveto turn over some of the statements until after direct examination. It wasa positive step because it was fairer.

6 USABULLETIN CUMULATIVE INDEX

DN: What kind of discovery was given in thosedays?

JK: As little as possible. The defendants weren’tsurprised as to who the witnesses were because alot of the people that we used as witnesses hadappeared publicly in Congressional testimony. Ifthere was a surprise witness, it would be a realsurprise, because it was so unique. The only realsurprise was when somebody defected almostsimultaneously with the trial.

DN: Describe what these cases were about?

JK: The Smith Act cases only addressed theprosecution of avowed Communists. What wecharged them with was teaching and advocatingthe overthrow of the government by force andviolence. We had to. The Supreme Court in theleading decision of Dennis said we had to provenot just advocacy of the Communists’ programsand principles - but advocacy of action. We had toprove that they had taken some action along theroad leading toward violence.

DN: Did you develop any type of specialty duringthis period?

JK: I became a specialist in, of all strange things,contempt of Congress cases. We had maybe a halfdozen referrals from Congress for contempt bypeople who appeared before Congress who hadCommunist leanings. I got indictments on a coupleof them and actually tried one against a ProfessorYellin from Indiana, and it went to the SupremeCourt.

DN: What did you do after the Smith Act cases?

JK: I left the Internal Security Division in May of1960. I went into the organized crime section.

DN: Why?

JK: I didn’t see any future in the Smith Act unitand I wasn’t going to go any further. So I wasinterested in what was then a more attractive area.

DN: Was the FBI responsible for investigatingthose cases at that time?

JK: There is a little bit of history there. At thatpoint, Hoover would not admit there was such athing as organized crime. We built the programwith, primarily the Internal Revenue Service andwe used the Customs and ATF to some extent. TheFBI played a limited role early on in the organizedcrime cases.

DN: What kind of criminal activity were youinvestigating?

JK: We were looking for what we now call LaCosa Nostra, the mob, in the various cities. Wetried to create a focus on particular cities and theleadership in the cities. I think at that time therewere about 18 cities where there was an organizedcrime group operating and we tried to focus onthem.

DN: How did you gather information?

JK: The agencies had their own intelligence fileswhich were not all that good. We got them and putthem together and were able to define at least whothe targets should be in the individual cities. Wedidn’t have much in the way of insiders or anythinglike that. The cases that we made to a considerableextent were tax cases where they didn’t pay theirtaxes, sometimes didn’t even file. Some of themwere rather easy to make in the gambling area. Ihad gambling cases in Las Vegas where thegambling was legal in Las Vegas but usinginterstate wires to gamble was illegal. So we werejust able by the collection of toll records and soforth, to get an idea of how they were operatingand then we could concentrate on the individualbettors, immunizing them if necessary, to make thecases against people who were operating ininterstate gambling networks.

DN: You were part of a very small group oflawyers who, because of a variety of factorsincluding a lack of statutory weapons, faced greathurdles. How do you view your efforts todismantle the Cosa Nostra?


JK: I view it as being unsuccessful as far as I wasconcerned. I had the Las Vegas beat and we werehell bent to try and get the people we knew wereskimming money out of the casinos. While I wason the beat, we just didn’t do it. We did later andto a large extent, got the mob out of Las Vegas. Ireally cannot claim much credit for that.

DN: How long a period of time did you work inthe organized crime section?

JK: From ‘60 until I became Chief of the FraudSection in ‘69.

DN: During this period of time, did Hoover changehis view of organized crime or did the FBI becomemore involved with your investigations?

JK: The FBI did become more involved. From myperspective, the principal impetus was the creationof the organized crime strike forces which werestarted in September 1966 by Henry Peterson, theAAG of Criminal. I always viewed it as an end runaround Hoover. Petersen went to the InternalRevenue Service, the Customs Service, ATF, andother agencies, and got a commitment from them tojoin in a strike force, the first of which was inBuffalo. We ran into a snag in that Don Bacon,who, I believe, was the principal deputy in theInternal Revenue Service, told us that ‘we’re gonnahave trouble selling this in the tax area so let’s callit a study group.’ We actually called the strikeforces study groups at first until we got themgoing! There was as an operation in Buffalo and Ithink it forced Hoover to recognize that there wasas an organized crime problem and the FBIgradually became involved in the strike forces.

DN: What role did Bobby Kennedy play in thefight against organized crime?

JK: Well, he didn’t create the strike forces (theycame after his time) but he gave life to theorganized crime program. When he came in ‘61,the section wasn’t doing much except gettingnewspaper clippings and putting them in files.

DN: What was the relationship between the

Attorney General and the lawyers?

JK: The relationship between God and men.Kennedy opened it up. Line attorneys got to talk tothe Attorney General which was unheard of. TheAttorney General was almost in isolation. We usedto meet periodically with Kennedy in what is nowthe conference room up there. If we had a problemhe would ask “what can I do?” And you would saywell, we need some help from the IRS and we’renot getting it so he would call the Commissionerand the problem would be taken care of. If you hada problem in Labor, he would get Secretary (laterJustice) Goldberg and he could move things. Wegot a lot of cooperation. We did a lot of unusualthings. For example, speaking of Goldberg, wedidn’t have immunity statutes to speak of in thosedays, so one of our attorneys used one of the laboradministrative statutes and immunized somewitnesses. I used some of the interstate commercestatutes to immunize gamblers. I did it myself. Alot of us did it. It was a rather common technique.We didn’t have the immunity statutes until later.We didn’t have legal wire tapping at all.

DN: What else did you do to immunize witnesses?

JK: There was as an immunity statute in thenarcotics area. We also used the Federal AviationAct, things like that, to investigate skimming inLas Vegas.

DN: How did that relate to gambling?

JK: One of the gamblers in Las Vegas was movingmoney from Las Vegas into Panama andSwitzerland and we were focusing on that at onepoint. We had an investigation which indicated thatsome travel agents had some information. So welaid a foundation for an investigation under theFederal Aviation Act and we were able toimmunize one of the key people. Ultimately, wewere able to indict one of the leaders in Las Vegason that, but that is as an example of how we had tostretch. I’ve always said Congress has been verygood to us in the statutes that they have given us. Icall them the cornerstones, wiretapping, immunity,witness protection, and the RICO statute. It took


us a long time to learn how to use the RICOstatute. Now we use it very effectively.

DN: You mentioned the fact that you wereworking without a wiretap statute. Tell us aboutthe “illegals,” as they came to be known andexplain what it was like to have to defend these incourt?

JK: The FBI had been tapping, more importantlythey had been bugging. They had a theory: buggingwas unconstitutional but was not illegal.Wiretapping under the Communications Act notonly required an interception but a divulgence aswell, and the theory was that disclosure within theDepartment was not divulgence within this statute.That is how they got around it but we wereunsuccessful in defending those in court.

DN: How many Attorneys General have youworked for?

JK: I think something like 16. Remember some ofthe people have become AG who were myimmediate bosses. I was in this position when BenCiviletti was the Assistant AG and became theDeputy and Attorney General. I was Thornburgh’sdeputy. So I knew some of them rather well andothers not so well.

DN: You’ve served over five and a half years atvarious times as Acting Assistant Attorney General(AAG) for the Criminal Division. That’s more timein recent memory than any

Presidentially appointed AAG in the CriminalDivision has served.

JK: That may be true and it is certainly true forthe last 30 years because the average AAG tenuresince 1972 in the Criminal Division is about twoyears and I have served longer. But before 1972, the AAG frequently served through the term of thePresident and sometimes well into the second term.For example, when Jack Miller was AAG underKennedy and then Fred Vinson was AAG underJohnson, they served pretty much the four years.After that it has been about a two year period for

the AAG.

DN: When did you serve as the Acting AAG?

JK: First time I was acting was after HenryPetersen resigned and retired at the end of ‘74 andDick Thornburgh didn’t come in for about sevenmonths. In this Administration, I served a longtime until Jo Ann Harris came in, and then I serveda longer time after she left. In between and invarious transitions I have served quite awhile. BenCiviletti was out of the country a lot on the Park investigation in Korea so I was acting duringthose times.

DN: You became a Deputy AAG in 1973 duringWatergate. What was happening at theDepartment?

JK: It was in turmoil. I was involved in theWatergate investigation which, at the time, wasbifurcated. I was Chief of the Fraud Section andwe had the dirty tricks part and the part involvingmoney that was being moved through Mexico. Wewere a little bit restricted in what we could dobecause the primary thrust was the investigation inthe United States Attorneys Office in D.C.involving obstruction of justice.

DN: Who was doing that?

JK: Henry Petersen was the AAG at that time. Inthe United States Attorney’s Office, Earl Silbert,Don Campbell, and Sidney Glazer were working

on the investigation and they kept it until it wastaken over by Archie Cox.

DN: What happened when Archie Cox began hisinvestigation?

JK: When the independent counsel came in we justgave him everything that we had going with respectto the investigation of Watergate and anythingrelated to it.

DN: What role, if any, did the Department have inthe investigation thereafter?


JK: Once Bob Bork took over there was greattension between Bork and the independent counselgroup. Henry Petersen, who was the CriminalDivision AAG, and Bork both wanted to keep thegroup investigating Watergate at the Department intact. I was in on some of the meetings they had inour conference room where they were in factpleading with Cox’ group to stay on and carry on.Ultimately, it worked out but there was a lot ofmistrust there. One of the favorable things was thatmany of the people on the special prosecution teamhad worked for Henry and that helped a little ingetting over the rough spots. It was pretty raw andnasty at that point. They were just thinking ofwalking out and that would have slowed down theprocess considerably.

DN: Who was thinking about walking out?

JK: The staff of Archie Cox. There was a feelingby Cox’s staff that the Department would useCox’s firing as an opportunity to reinsert itself intothe investigation. Robert Bork was the one whofired him. Incidentally, Bork fired him and did notresign from the Department on therecommendation of Attorney General Elliot L.Richardson, who told Bork to stay on becauseotherwise the Department would be in totaldisarray. Richardson waited awhile before headmitted that but now he says that he did ask Borkto stay on. Bork was the Solicitor General and hewas the third in line when the order came to fireCox. Richardson refused and resigned.Ruckleshaus, the deputy, was told to do it. Herefused and resigned and then Bork, the thirdperson in line became the Attorney General. Withmore soul searching and consultation withRichardson, Bork did fire Cox and carried out the

presidential order. So there was bitterness towardsBork by Cox’s staff.

DN: What were the feelings of the people in theCriminal Division while all of this was going on?

JK: There was quite as an uproar. We werethankful to Bork for not resigning because therewas a strong feeling if Bork resigned there would

be a test of manhood for every other AAG andthat they all would resign. I think that may havebeen true, so to that extent, we were grateful thathe didn’t.

DN: How did the Department get back tobusiness?

JK: Well, when the special prosecution forcesdecided to remain intact and Jaworski wasappointed special prosecutor, things settled down.

DN: As you look back on your years here, what doyou feel are the most significant contributions thatyou have made to the Department.

JK: The most significant contribution was that Iwas the Department’s representative on thenegotiation of the treaty with Switzerland incriminal matters. That was the first criminalmatters treaty we had with any foreign country.From 1969 to 1973 we negotiated that. Weencountered great difficulties because we weredealing with three separate languages and banksecrecy was so sacrosanct to the Swiss. We hadtrouble working out the mechanics that wouldallow us to get access to banking records in thesame fashion as their prosecutors would get accessto their banking records. That is how we finallyunraveled the mechanical problem - getting them toexplain how they did it in their criminalprosecutions and then try to modify it for us. Theinteresting thing is that we had as an additionalhurdle, the so-called Economic Espionage Act. TheSwiss were very zealous and protective of theirsecrets and they didn’t like giving any bank secretsto a foreign nation. We had to work around thatand that is why it took so long.

DN: Well how did you ultimately overcome thathurdle?

JK: We got around it by, in effect, creating anexception for major criminal investigations. Theywere very sensitive about organized crime andorganized crime money being in Swiss banks. Theydidn’t like the idea of being accused of protectingracketeers and their money. During this period Bob


Morganthau testified before the Congress and heunloaded on the Swiss for protecting organizedcrime. They really resented that. There was apicture of an individual getting on a plane and thecaption ‘there goes the money to Switzerland’ orsomething like that. They were anxious to come tosome accommodation. We kept the primaryemphasis on organized crime— if we made ashowing that organized crime was involved, itexpedited the process of getting access. Since thenthings have worked pretty well and we have used itfor a lot of violations besides organized crimecases.

DN: After that, were you involved in any otherinternational agreements?

JK: I was involved in the executive agreements,which were in effect treaties. They are agreementswith the Ministry of Justice of some foreigncountry and the Department of Justice. I think wehad 27 of them. The foreign bribery investigationsinitially started by the SEC that took place in thelate 1960’s used the executive agreements to getinformation. Those were pretty successful and westill use them occasionally.

DN: What message would you like to give federalprosecutors?

JK: I guess the big message is trust. You’ve got tocarry yourself in a manner so that people trust you.If they trust you, a lot of potential problems won’tdevelop or if they develop, they will go away.

DN: What would you like to say to federalprosecutors who are just beginning their careers atthe Department?

JK: It is a great place to work. Obviously, I thinkthat or I wouldn’t have stayed as long as I havestayed. The work is interesting and the people are fine lawyers and fine people. It is a pleasure to beone. It is amazing the number of people,Republicans, Democrats, who have been here whostill feel very kindly toward the Department. I getcalls from people that go back 20-25 years andthey are very supportive. I have been up on the Hill

and the people really come out of the woods tosupport the Department. It is a good place to work.

DN: You’ve been with the Department almost 50years, including 25 as a Deputy AAG. What areyour plans for the rest of your career?

JK: To do what I’ve been doing for the last 25years. I don’t have any plans of leaving any timesoon. ò

† Reprinted from the August 1995 United States Attorneys’ Bulletin.


AGAC: Beyond the Massacre†

David W. Downs, Deputy Director, OperationsExecutive Office for United States Attorneys

"Watergate produced many bizarre events, butthe Saturday Night Massacre was doubtless themost bizarre." Though most of the facts ofWatergate have long since been made public,Richard Kleindienst's assessment still speaks formost Americans. What exactly happened thatweekend in October 1973 that earned it a monikerreminiscent of a gangland shootout? Those fewdays marked the turning point for the nation andfor a small, newly-organized group of UnitedStates Attorneys called the Attorney General'sAdvisory Committee (AGAC).

Several thousand miles away in New Mexico,United States Attorney Victor Ortega was havingdinner in a local restaurant before leaving the nextday for Washington to attend the regularlyscheduled meeting of the AGAC. Some acquain-tances came up to his table and asked if he hadheard his boss just resigned. That was the first heheard about Attorney General Elliot L.Richardson's resignation, who had recently createdthe AGAC, but Ortega and his colleagues weresoon swept up in the Saturday Night Massacre andbecame a part of that now famous chapter inAmerican political history.

Members of that first AGAC arrived inWashington as scheduled on the Monday morningafter the resignations of Richardson and DeputyAttorney General William Ruckelshaus, who hadresigned rather than fire Special WatergateProsecutor Archibald Cox as requested byPresident Nixon. They assembled Mondaymorning, October 22, 1973, in the Civil Divisionconference room then on the first floor next toConstitution Avenue. The 16 members convenedand began an hour-long informal discussion aboutthis latest episode in the Watergate affair and itsimplications for their work. At that point, then

Solicitor General Bork entered the room withCriminal Chief Henry Peterson. Former UnitedStates Attorney Bert Hurn remembers feeling thetension heighten when the Acting Attorney Generalbegan his comments with the "formal and neverused term, 'Gentlemen.'” He gave the United StatesAttorneys a first-hand account of what hadhappened, keeping his comments and instructionsshort. He emphasized that the most important thingat that point was to restore stability within theDepartment of Justice by appointing a replacementfor the position of Special Prosecutor. Bork thenasked the AGAC for their help, made it clear hewanted their recommendation within a few hours,and left. One United States Attorney commentedlater that he had never seen a man so scared orworried. Bork revealed some of his concerns in a1990 interview, saying, "I told Richardson andRuckelshaus that I was going to fire Cox and thenresign, but they persuaded me that the Departmentneeded continuity."

Everyone was worried about the resignations.Former United States Attorney Lincoln Almondsaid that people in the field and in Washingtonworried that the massacre would trigger massresignations and jeopardize the Department.Another member stated it more bluntly, "Weworried that the whole Department was about to goto hell."

Some members of the committee initiallydoubted that their charter empowered them toprovide such a nomination to Bork, but adiscussion of candidates' names soon began. Thesituation so unnerved the United States Attorneysthat many still disagree as to what occurred next.Some say they divided the country into regionscorresponding to federal judicial circuits fromwhich they named one prospective nominee per


circuit. Others said there was no time for that.Most members of the Advisory Committee deniedthat the discussions contained a political tint, but atleast one United States Attorney remembereddifferently. "There was some discussion," CharlesAnderson recalled, "that the new special prosecutorneeded to be a Truman Democrat and not someonefrom the Kennedy clan.” "The committee did this,"Anderson stated ironically, "in order to avoid theappearance of politicizing the issue."

By noon, a representative of the committeecarried an envelope containing three names toBork's office, including a state attorney generalfrom the Midwest and two others: ThomasMurphy, who was former Police Commissioner ofNew York City and the prosecutor in the AlgerHiss trial, and Leon Jaworski. Bork stated thatJaworski's name might have originated with theAGAC, but he also remembered Jaworski's namehaving surfaced in other circles. Bork himselfstudied a list of past presidents of the AmericanBar Association, discounting one name or anotherbecause the person was too old or lackedprominence. "I realized," Bork stated, "that it hadto be a recognized name."

Whether or not the committee first suggestedJaworski's name, Bork's solicitation of advice fromthe fledgling Advisory Committee about such animportant national matter confirmed its leadershiprole. The Attorney General, who had been soinstrumental in the committee's inception, had justresigned, and no one knew if the experiment wouldcontinue. But the performance of the United StatesAttorneys under difficult circumstances increasedthe AGAC's credibility throughout the Departmentand ensured its survival. While the Saturday NightMassacre proved difficult for the nation, it enabledthe AGAC to assume a larger role in Departmentaffairs. "People at the top in the Department weredesperately looking for guidance and leadership,"one United States Attorney stated, "and they turnedin part to the [AGAC]."

Perhaps the confusion of that week in Octoberwill remain as much a part of history as the eventsthemselves. Even those at the heart of the crisiscontinue to disagree on what happened. Reflectingon the events, former Attorney General Elliot L.Richardson stated, "Bork believed the President

had the right to fire Cox." When asked if thatcontrasted with his view, he replied, "Well, Ithought the President had the power."

HEARSAY Quotes

ë Bert C. Hurn, former United States Attorney for theWestern District of Missouri:

Hurn stated that during the chaotic days ofWatergate and its aftermath, the joke in the UnitedStates Attorneys' offices involved phone calls fromWashington. Anytime a secretary buzzed a UnitedStates Attorney on the intercom and said that theAttorney General was on the phone, the favoriteresponse was, "Get his name and I'll call him back."

ë Robert J. Roth, former United States Attorney forthe District of Kansas:

Similar to Hurn's story, Roth stated that he andhis wife attended the United States Attorneys’Conference in New Orleans one year. At a formalfunction Roth introduced his wife to the AttorneyGeneral. But Attorneys General changed so frequentlyduring those days, Roth's wife did not recognizeSaxbe's name or face and asked which district he wasfrom.

ë Ralph F. Keil, former United States Attorney forthe District of Delaware:

Keil was chairman of the AGAC's Subcommitteeon Proficiency. Keil stated that during a meeting of theAGAC, Dick Thornburgh once said to him, "I don'tknow what you and your committee do, but it soundslike a good idea."

ë Victor Ortega, former United States Attorney forthe District of New Mexico:

Ortega remembers the first meeting of the AGACwith Attorney General Richardson and his DeputyWilliam Ruckleshaus. According to Ortega, theAttorney General spent the whole day with the newCommittee. But Ortega kept noticing that an aidewould enter the room and inform Richardson of aphone call, a scene repeated several times during theday. Ortega and the other United States Attorneyslearned later that those phone calls were part of theplea bargaining and resignation of Vice President


Spiro T. Agnew.

ë Lincoln C. Almond, United States Attorney for theDistrict of Rhode Island:

Lincoln Almond remembers one of the earliestAGAC meetings, held in San Francisco in April 1974,the exact week when Patty Hearst was filmedparticipating in a bank robbery. Almond remembersthat all of the members got together and went over toview the bank film at Jim Browning's office. Browningwas then United States Attorney for the NorthernDistrict of California. When the film was over, theyconducted a straw poll on whether or not Hearst was awilling participant or was coerced. When asked whatthe majority opinion was, Almond responded, "Shewas involved."

ë Charles H. Anderson, former United StatesAttorney for the Middle District of Tennessee:

During one AGAC meeting, Charles Andersonrecalled several of the United States Attorneys meetingwith Attorney General Richardson and complainingabout "all the rinky-dink" tax cases the Departmentpeople were sending down to the field. To theirsurprise, Richardson shot back, "Well, if you don'tthink they're worth trying, then send them back." Anderson said the United States Attorneys repliedmeekly, "We didn't know we could send them back."

ë Trivia:

Beginning AUSA salary during those years: $9,000 per annum. ò

ABOUT THE AUTHORë David Downs is the Deputy Director ofOperations for the Executive Office for UnitedStates Attorneys. In 1989 EOUSA hired Mr.Downs to write the "Bicentennial Celebration ofthe United States Attorneys," a history of theOffice of United States Attorneys. In 1990 hebecame the Special Assistant to the Director ofEOUSA, in charge of congressional inquiries.From 1991 to 1997 he served as the DeputyDirector of OLE. He received his Bachelor of Artsfrom Samford University in 1976, his Masters inDivinity from Southern Seminary in 1979, and hisMasters in Theology from Southern Seminary in1980. He conducted his Doctoral Studies atOxford University in 1981 and received his Ph.D.from Southern Seminary in 1984. a

† Reprinted from the July 1996 United States Attorneys’ Bulletin.


Department of Justice History:Herbert Brownell and the Little RockCrisis† Ed Hagen Executive Office for United States Attorneys Office of Legal Education

Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell,who died on May 1, 1996, at the age of 92,ought to be remembered by everyone in the

Department as a model of courage under fire.Brownell, who grew up in Nebraska, becameinvolved in New York politics after graduatingfrom Yale Law School. After serving in the StateAssembly, Brownell managed Tom Dewey'ssuccessful campaign for governor. Dewey laterintroduced Brownell to Dwight Eisenhower.Brownell served as a key advisor in Ike's 1952presidential campaign, and was appointed AttorneyGeneral after the election. Eisenhower later wrotethat the selection "was practically a foregoneconclusion in my mind, if he would agree to serve.He had become a close friend, and possessed analert mind. Moreover, I so respected him as a manand lawyer that I did not seriously consider anyoneelse for the post."

Brownell was an intense man who kept somepeople on edge. One colleague recalled: "Did youever get into a poker game with a man whoremembered every card played in every hand, howeach player bet each hand, who figured all the oddsinstantly in his head, and was lucky besides? It'sexasperating, because a guy like that usually wins,and when the game is over you don't quite trusthim, no matter how pleasant he seems." OnBrownell's first day in Washington he saw anAfrican-American being thrown out of arestaurant. Outraged, he coordinated legal andpolitical measures that ended segregation in public

accommodations in the District of Columbia. This was only the beginning of Brownell's

fight for civil rights in the Eisenhoweradministration. He helped persuade Eisenhower toappoint progressive Earl Warren as Chief Justiceof the Supreme Court in 1953, and filed apersuasive brief for the Justice Department in the1954 Brown v. Topeka case. After the Brown casewas won, Brownell lobbied for the appointment ofFederal judges who would enforce schooldesegregation laws. Brownell made headlines in1956 when he declared that segregation on localbuses would be prosecuted as "a crime against theUnited States." The next year he drafted the CivilRights Act of 1957, the first important civil rightslegislation to pass Congress since Reconstruction.The DOJ's current Civil Rights Division was aBrownell initiative.

The positive civil rights measures championedby Brownell met stiff resistance in the South,leading to a dramatic confrontation in 1957, whenGovernor Orval Faubus called out the ArkansasNational Guard and placed it around Central HighSchool in Little Rock to prevent the entry of 12African-American students. The JusticeDepartment immediately went to court seeking aninjunction.

Faubus, stalling, sought a meeting withEisenhower. Brownell strongly opposed themeeting, arguing there was nothing to discuss withFaubus, an untrustworthy character whose actionswere clearly unlawful. Eisenhower nevertheless


met with Faubus. Faubus later wrote thatEisenhower appeared to weaken at one point, andturned to Brownell asking if the court proceedingscould be delayed. Brownells tight-lipped response:"No, we can't do that. It isn't possible. It isn'tlegally possible. It can't be done." Faubus thenagreed to change his orders to the National Guardtroops and admit the students.

Faubus reneged on the agreement as soon as hegot back to Little Rock. This enraged thePresident, who told Brownell, “Yes, you wereright, Herb. He did just what you said he'd do— hedouble-crossed me.” Eisenhower wanted to go tothe press to expose Faubus' duplicity. Brownelltold Eisenhower this would not be necessary. Acourt hearing that week was likely to result inFaubus being ordered to admit the students. Itwould be better to wait for the ruling and then actdecisively.

At the hearing, Faubus' lawyers contested thecourt's authority. The judge ruled from the bench,and the National Guard troops were orderedremoved. The following Monday, however, theschool was surrounded by a violent, racist mob.The students were slipped into the school by a sidedoor, and when the mob learned this they stormedpolice barricades. The mayor ordered the police toremove the students.

That afternoon Brownell called Eisenhowerand briefed him on the events in Little Rock. Somedisagreements arose over how to best protect thestudents. Brownell wanted to use local NationalGuard troops, because any other troops were six tonine hours away from Little Rock. Eisenhoweropposed the use of local troops. Ultimately, a mixof regular Army and National Guard units fromother parts of the state was deployed. Order wasrestored and the school was integrated.

The extraordinary and historic measure ofusing Federal troops to enforce the law wasreceived with outrage throughout the South,decried even by moderate politicians like LyndonJohnson. Mississippi Senator James Eastlandcompared Eisenhower to Hitler, although othersfocused on Brownell as the villain. HistorianStephen Ambrose recounts that one local politicalboss called for secession, but that "calmer headsreminded him that this time around the Feds had

atomic weapons." In mid-October, as the crisiseased, Brownell resigned to pursue private legalpractice. He had expressed a desire to leave onearlier occasions, but had been persuaded to stay.This time Eisenhower let him go.

Faubus, on the other hand, became anArkansas hero and ended up serving six terms.There were still bad feelings about the case in1969 when President Nixon (whose 1952 VicePresidential nomination had been a Brownellinitiative) considered Brownell for the position ofChief Justice of the Supreme Court. Reportedly,concerns about Southern opposition to Brownellcaused Nixon to change his mind and nominateWarren Burger.

In retrospect, the politics of the decision arenot important. Brownell's advice was morally andlegally correct. His wisdom and courage served thenation well.

ABOUT THE AUTHORë Ed Hagen is an Assistant Director for theExecutive Office for United States Attorneys,Office of Legal Education. Prior to joining OLE in1995, he was a state prosecutor in Oregon. He isthe co-author of two books: The ProsecutionFunction (DC Heath and Company 1982) and TheLaw of Confessions (Clark Boardman Callaghan1994). He is responsible for many aspects ofOLE’s Publication Unit, including the developmentand maintenance of the USABook computerresearch program. a


The Evolution of Jury PowerDavid Farnham, Senior Trial AttorneyOffice of Consumer LitigationU.S. Department of Justice— Civil Division

The idea of jury nullification is generallyviewed as an abuse of power by twelvecitizens whose only legitimate role is toapply the law as given to them by a

judge to the facts that they find in a case. Yet it hasnot always been so. There are legal, historical, andphilosophical arguments to justify a jury’sright— as opposed to its inherent power— to nullifythe judge’s instructions on the law.

Medieval English juries were notcalled to sit in impartial judgment of factspassively presented to them. Instead, they weresupposed to render a verdict based upon their ownknowledge of the facts. Jurors were called from thelocation of the crime, which was the origin of thenotion of a trial venue and which is the veryopposite of the modern concept of a trial juryignorant of the facts, parties, and witnesses.

Nonetheless, problems arose withjurors because of the costs involved with serving.Jurors had to pay for their own transportation tothe town where the court was sitting, and had tobear their expenses of room and board for theduration of the case. Consequently, wealthierlitigants were tempted to “help” jurors with thesecosts. As the line between assistance and briberybecame blurred, there necessarily arose the need toreverse corrupt verdicts. The only means thenavailable was by a writ of attaint, in which asuper-jury of twenty-four was summoned not onlyto reconsider the facts disputed in the first trial, butalso to try the first jury for perjury. If the firstjudgment was demonstrably false, then the firstpanel of jurors must have violated their oath to tellthe truth about the facts known to them. Ifconvicted, the original jurors faced severe penaltiesfor their malfeasance, such as imprisonment andforfeiture of all possessions to the King.

The logic for such severepunishment ebbed as the function of the jury changed. With theincreased presentation of evidence and testimony toassist the jury’s fact-finding effort, jurors were nolonger expected to act based on their ownknowledge. Thus, a “wrong” verdict was morelikely to result from a good faith mistake than fromjuror “perjury,” and at a time when there were thebeginnings of an appeal process. Although attaintfell into disuse, it did not disappear from the law.Instead, it became viewed as a means ofcontrolling an obstinate jury.

Even Draconian punishment couldnot always guarantee a verdict in strict accordancewith the law when powerful political sympathieswere involved. For instance, in 1544 Sir NicholasThrockmorton was acquitted on charges of hightreason by a London jury, although there was nodoubt he played a prominent role in the offense(Wyatt’s Rebellion),† and in spite of the judge’sinstructions. Sir Nicholas went free and could notbe tried again. However, his twelve jurors werecalled before the Court of the Star Chamber on awrit of attaint. Four of the jurors recanted theiracquittal and went free. The other eight stood bytheir verdict and were fined and imprisoned.

In the next century, the courts’ability to punish an independent jury was relegatedto history by Chief Justice Vaughan in Bushel’sCase, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). WilliamPenn and another Quaker leader were tried at OldBailey Courthouse for disturbing the peace byholding an unlawful assembly. They were

† Wyatt led a popular Protestant uprisingagainst the hated “Bloody Mary,” the Catholic Queenof England whose name derived from the amount ofProtestant blood she shed in her effort to returnEngland to Rome’s ambit.


acquitted despite undisputed evidence that they preached to several hundred fellow Quakers in apublic street.

The Court instructed the jury thata meeting of such size in such a place waslegally a disturbance of the peace, and heinstructed the jury to find so. The jury,however, refused to convict, and after beingthreatened by the judge and imprisonedwithout food, drink, or heat, they acquitted thedefendants. The jury was imprisoned again,this time on a writ of attaint, until they paid aheavy fine. Four of the jurors refused to pay,and spent several months in jail, until one ofthem— Bushel— obtained a writ of habeascorpus from the Court of Common Pleas.

In discharging the attaint andfreeing the jurors, Chief Justice Vaughan reachedback to the medieval notion of jurors as quasi-witnesses. He wrote that jurors, as neighbors of thedefendant and the witnesses, might haveindependent knowledge of the facts or of thecredibility of the witnesses.

Vaughan also rested his decisionon the alternative ground that a criminal acquittalis a general verdict— as opposed to a specialverdict, where the judge applies the law to the factsfound by the jury— and it would be impossible tosecond-guess the jury’s application of the law tothe facts, since no one else could know how thejury resolved the facts.

Bushel’s Case found favor withlawyers in the American Colonies, and its impactis known to many through the 1753 libel trial ofJohn Peter Zenger, the publisher of the New YorkWeekly Journal. Although the Zenger trial isremembered for establishing truth as a defense tolibel, it did so only because defense counselsuccessfully appealed to the jury to nullify thecontrolling law. Nullification was not, however,new to colonial juries. For years colonial juriesnullified prosecutions brought under theNavigation Acts, until jurisdiction was removed toAdmiralty Court, which had no juries. So Zenger’sattorney, Alexander Hamilton of Philadelphia,found a receptive audience for his plea. As supportfor his invitation to nullify the libel law, Hamiltonrelied on Bushel’s Case. See A Brief Narrative of

the

Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger (NotableTrials, 1989), pp. 75, 91-92.

John Adams was another coloniallawyer of note who held an expansive view of thejury’s role. His notes of authorities for a 1771 casecontain quotes from Bushel’s Case and fromBlackstone’s Commentaries to support his plannedargument that the jury could decide the law andfind the facts. Thus, at the time of the Revolution,and among the lawyers who helped to bring itabout, the idea of the jury as the conscience of thecommunity with the right and obligation to decideboth the law and the facts was conventional.

For the first 60 years of thenation’s existence, federal juries had the right todecide the law. In Georgia v. Brailsford, ChiefJustice John Jay instructed the jury:

It may not be amiss, here,gentlemen, to remind you of thegood old rule, that on questions offact it is the province of the jury, onquestions of law it is the province ofthe court to decide. But it must beobserved that by the same law, whichrecognized this reasonabledistribution of jurisdiction, you havenevertheless a right to take it uponyourselves to judge both, and todetermine the law as well as the factin controversy. . . . [B]oth objects arelawfully within your power ofdecision.

Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1, 4 (1794).In 1798, Congress enacted the

Sedition Act, which approved the jury’s right todecide the law: “the jury who shall try the causeshall have a right to determine the law and the fact,under the direction of the court, as in other cases.”1 Stat. 597. As the last four words suggest, theFederalist legislators did not believe that they werecreating a special role for juries in seditious libelcases. Instead, they adopted the prevailing right ofAmerican juries to judge the law.

Nullification remained arespectable legal principle until the Civil War,


because it was widely applied to acquit thosecharged with aiding escaped slaves under theFugitive Slave Act. However, nullification’s deathknell was finally sounded by the Supreme Court’sdecision in Sparf and Hanson v. United States,156 U.S. 51 (1895), where the Court upheld themurder convictions of two sailors. At trial, thejudge instructed the jurors that although they hadthe power to convict of any lesser included offense,there was no evidence to support such an offense.Thus, if they found the killing to have beenfelonious, the jury was required to convict ofmurder rather than manslaughter. Justice Gray’sdissent pointed out the long history of nullificationin the United States, and that the majority’sdecision would raise an anomaly whereby thedefendant is presumed at his peril to know the law,but the jury is not considered competent on thelaw. Id. at 168, 174-75.

Since Sparf and Hanson, judgesdo not instruct juries on nullification and counselcannot argue for it. This also means thatprosecutors cannot argue the grounds against iteither. Yet it does not mean that juries do notexercise the power of nullification in cases thatoffend their sensibilities.

In contrast to pre-Civil War juriesthat refused to convict individuals who aidedescaped slaves, recent juries have refused toconvict KKK members of crimes against blackcitizens. See Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize:America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965, at 38-57, 221-25 (1987). Likewise, nullification hasplayed a major role in death penalty and batteredspouse cases, and in cases involving minimummandatory sentences and the newly favored three-strikes laws. For instance, a mistrial was declaredin a California three-strikes case when the jurorsrefused to deliberate on the validity of thedefendant’s two prior convictions.

In People v. Jones, Cr. No. 15792(January 1995), a San Francisco jury convictedJones of attempted carjacking, but were then toldfor the first time that it was a three-strikes case.The jurors stated that they felt violated by thesystem. Such reluctance by juries to ignore theirmoral sensibilities and become judicial rubberstamps forced the law to introduce discretion into

death penalty decisions. Legislation followed andcodified the fruits of jury activism. See Woodsonv. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).


Conclusion

The concept of jury nullification iscurrently enjoying a resurgence of popularity. Forinstance, The Fully Informed Jury Association,based in Montana, has promoted legislation thatwould require state judges to instruct juries ontheir right to determine the law. Associationmembers have also been charged with jurytampering for passing out leaflets advocatingnullification to a potential jury pool in front of aSan Diego courthouse. In Colorado, a juror washeld in contempt of court for concealing her beliefin jury nullification, thereby causing a mistrial, andfor giving a nullification leaflet to a fellow juror.People v. Kriho, No. 96CR91 (February 1997).

It is arguable that conscientious jurors wouldbe better off receiving instruction on their ability todetermine, or nullify, the law from the judge, withelucidating arguments from both the prosecutionand the defense, than from pamphlets written bylaymen who may have a hidden political agenda.But the shortcomings of the leaflets and theirinformation are a byproduct of the consolidationof judicial power begun in the mid-nineteenthCentury. The fact is that juries are exercising thispower anyway, for good reasons, for bad reasons,and sometimes for no reason at all. The legalsystem might be better served if the jurors weregiven guidance by the courts and, if theprosecution were allowed to put forward counterarguments to defense invitations (sometimes onlysubtly hinted at), to nullify.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ë David Farnham is an attorney with the CivilDivision, Office of Consumer Litigation. Prior toworking for the Civil Division, he spent thirteenyears with the Tax Division, Southern CriminalEnforcement Section. He has written extensivelyfor EOUSA’s Office of Legal Education and theAmerican Bar Association. For a more completehistorical discussion of the evolution of jurypower, see the author’s article “Jury Nullification:History Proves It’s Not a New Idea,” in CRIMINALJUSTICE, vol. 11, no. 4 (Winter 1997). a

† Reprinted from the July 1996 United States Attorneys’ Bulletin.


Department of Justice History:The Trial of the Century†

Ed HagenExecutive Office for United States AttorneysOffice of Legal Education

In this era of sensationalizedcriminal trials, the term "trial ofthe century" gets used pretty

loosely. But the recent passing of Judge ThomasMurphy is a reminder of a truly historic casesuccessfully handled by Murphy when he was anAssistant United States Attorney almost 50 yearsago.

Thomas Murphy, the grandson ofa police officer, grew up in New York City. Hisyounger brother, Johnny Murphy, was a star reliefpitcher for the New York Yankees. Standing 6 feet4 inches tall, heavy set with a walrus mustache,Tom Murphy made an imposing presence, but wasquiet and unassuming.

In 1949 Murphy, then an AUSAin New York City, was assigned to prosecute AlgerHiss for perjury. Hiss, who had clerked for JusticeOliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was a rising star in theState Department, playing notable roles at theYalta conference and in the formation of the UnitedNations. In 1948 he was accused of espionage forthe Soviet Union by an editor of Time magazine,Whittaker Chambers, himself an admitted formerSoviet agent. Hiss denied the allegations in ahighly publicized hearing where he was closelyquestioned by a then obscure CaliforniaCongressman, Richard Nixon. After Chambersrepeated the charges in a public forum, Hissbrought a libel suit, which, unfortunately for Hiss,resulted in the discovery of corroborating evidence.This, in turn, led to a grand jury proceeding, inwhich Hiss again denied having been a Sovietagent.

Although the then existing statuteof limitations ruled out any prosecution of Hiss forespionage, he was indicted for perjury based on hisgrand jury testimony. The case became a nationalsensation, focusing as it did on the momentousissue of whether the government had beeninfiltrated by Soviet agents at the highest level.Although Murphy had significant corroboratingevidence--he was able to show that sensitivedocuments had been retyped on Hiss' typewriter,with interlineations in Hiss' handwriting--Hiss wasably defended, and enjoyed the support of manyprominent people. Character witnesses for Hissincluded two sitting Supreme Court Justices and aformer presidential candidate (Murphy was notamused when the trial judge shook JusticeFrankfurter's hand in front of the jury asFrankfurter began his testimony for the defense).

The six-week trial resulted in ajury deadlock, hung eight to four for conviction.The case was tried again four months later.Murphy's resolve hardened for the second trial.Chambers later wrote:

His grasp of the intricacies of theHiss case was now firm and supple.He was at ease with it with therelaxed authority of a man who hasmastered an art and now wants topractice it. He understood the case,not only as a problem in law. Heunderstood it in its fullest religious,moral, human and historicalmeaning. I saw that he had in himone of the rarest of human seeds--the


faculty for growth, combined with afaculty almost as rare--a singularmagnanimity of spirit. Into me,battered and gray of mood after ayear of private struggle and publicmauling, he infused new heart, notonly because of what he was, butbecause he was the first man fromthe Government who said to me ineffect: "I understand." I needed nomore.

The second trial lasted ten weeks.Murphy worked late every night, analyzing thecourt record and dictating detailed notes oneverything that had taken place during the day. Hisresulting cross-examinations masterfully extractedcontradictions and inconsistencies from witnesses.The defense called an eminent psychiatrist, Dr.Carl Binger, who offered the expert opinion thatChambers was a psychopath prone to repetitivepathological lying. Murphy's cross-examinationwas aggressive. When Binger initially resistedMurphy's suggestion that "psychopathicpersonality" was a "wastepaper basketclassification of a lot of symptoms," Murphyconfronted Binger with a psychiatric monograph sodescribing the condition. Binger indicated he hadnot read the work, but "agreed with every word."Murphy then painstakingly kicked at theunderpinnings for Binger's opinion. For example,Binger had watched Chambers testify, and in hisdirect testimony cited Chambers' tendency to gazeat the ceiling during the testimony as"confirmatory" evidence of a psychopathicpersonality. Murphy quietly instructed an assistantto watch Binger's testimony; the assistant counted50 glances at the ceiling in less than an hour.Murphy asked Binger whether this established apsychopathic personality. Binger replied, "Notalone."

At the end of the trial, Murphy'scommand of the evidence was such that he wasable to deliver an organized and compelling twoand one-half hour summation without the use ofnotes. The jury later returned with a verdict ofguilty as charged, and Hiss was sentenced to fiveyears of prison. Chambers later wrote:

When Thomas Murphy decided,somewhat reluctantly, to take theHiss Case, almost nobody had heardof him. Within the JusticeDepartment he was known as a manwho had never lost a case.Otherwise, he was a man who jostledno one, for he seemed withoutambition beyond his immediatework. . . . Yet when the historicmoment came, Murphy was waitingthere at the one point in time andplace where he could bring all thathe was and all that life had madehim to bear with decisive effect forthe nation.

Murphy's career did not end with the Hiss case.Less than a year later, the New York City policedepartment was rocked by gambling and briberyallegations. The mayor made Murphy PoliceCommissioner and told him to clean up the mess.Murphy replaced all 336 plainclothes officers withyounger officers, and instituted a merit system forpromotions. Murphy went after the "venal rascalswho bring harm to other loyal workers as well asviolate the public trust," while standing up for thehonest majority. "For every cop who will take abuck from a bookie, there are hundreds who willstand up for you and me and take a bullet." He leftafter less than a year, gaining unanimous praise fora job well done, and was appointed to the U.S.District Court by President Truman.

He served with distinction formany years as a trial judge. The media coverage ofthe Hiss case, although extraordinary for its time,falls short of what we have today. There would beno movie or book contracts for Murphy. Shortlyafter the trial, Murphy stepped out of a taxi inNew York. The driver asked the other man in thecab, "Who's the big fellow?" "That's Tom Murphy,the man who just convicted Alger Hiss," the manreplied. "Oh," said the driver, "you mean JohnnyMurphy's brother!"

ABOUT THE AUTHORë Ed Hagen is an Assistant Director for theExecutive Office for United States Attorneys,


Office of Legal Education. Prior to joining OLE in1995, he was a state prosecutor in Oregon. He isthe co-author of two books: The ProsecutionFunction (DC Heath and Company 1982) and TheLaw of Confessions (Clark Boardman Callaghan1994). He is responsible for many aspects ofOLE’s Publication Unit, including the developmentand maintenance of the USABook computerresearch program. a

General Topic Volume No. Page

Civil Matters

The Civil Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 2

ADR Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 7

Removing Barriers to the Use of AlternativeDispute Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 9

Qui Tam Litigation— A Billion Dollar Industry . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 15

Thoughts on Current Bankruptcy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 18

Why Criminal Folks Should Love to Work withCivil Folks (and Vice Versa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 22

The Office of Consumer Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 25

Defending Federal Employee WageGarnishment Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 28

Challenges to Constitutionality of Prison LitigationReform Act Require Intense Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 33

ACE: Past and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 35

Recent Developments in Litigation AgainstFederal Employees and Government Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 37

Church Arsons and Hate Crimes

Overview of the National ChurchArson Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 7

The ATF and its Role in Church ArsonInvestigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 12


Church Arson Investigation InsightsInterview with ATF Deputy Assistant Director Mark Logan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 14

The FBI’s Response to CivilRights Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 16

The Community Relations ServiceA Task Force Partner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 19



Church Arson Investigations: AnOfficer’s Perspective— Interviewwith William F. Graham, (SLED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 22

The Anatomy of a Church Arson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 25

Church Arsons: A Prosecutor’sPerspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 28

Things I Learned from Those WhoPlay with Matches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 31

The Do’s and Don’ts of InvestigatingRacially or Religiously MotivatedCrimes Against Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 33

Interstate Commerce Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 36

Juvenile Prosecutions inFederal Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 41

Victim-Witness Response toChurch Arsons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 43

The United States Attorneys’Hate Crimes Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 45

An Ounce of Prevention is Wortha Pound of Cure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 47

GIS and the National ChurchArson Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 50

Courtroom Technology

Quicken Adds Efficiency and Accessibility to Complex Transaction Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 25

Madison Wisconsin High Tech Courtroom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 35

OLE’s Interactive Video to Teach Trial Advocacy . . . . . . . . . 44 3 38

Litigation and New Technology: Can the Two Mesh? . . . . . . . 44 4 9

Prosecution Exhibits Presented to the Jury on Video . . . . . . . . 44 4 15

Visual Presenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 17



Transcript Presentation Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 18

ATTVIEW— Managing and Imaging Documentsfor Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 19

Preparing Trial Charts for Closing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 20

Display of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 22

“Operation Senior Sentinel” Assists Investigationsand Prosecutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 22

Maps and Other Graphics for Effective Presentations . . . . . . . 44 4 23

The Expanded Role of the Microcomputer as a Criminal Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 24

Camcorder and Mounting Platform: An Alternativeto Commercial Visual Presenters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 36

Orchestrating an Automated LitigationSupport Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4 48

Director’s Awards

1997 Director’s Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 1 11

1998 Director’s Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 6 73

Electronic Surveillance

The Office of Enforcement Operations— Its Role in the Area of Electronic Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 8

Electronic Surveillance Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 19

Don’t Forget to (An Electronic Surveillance Guide) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 24

Defending Wiretaps: “Think in the Beginning Whatthe End Will Bring” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 26

Electronic Surveillance: Does it Bug You? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 32

So You’ve Always Wanted to do a Wiretap:Practical Tips If You Never Have . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 39

Wiretap Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 41



Common (and Uncommon) Problems EncounteredDuring the Course of Title III Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 45

Keeping Pace with the Mafia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 2

Operation “Shattered Shield”: Investigative and TrialTechniques Used to Jail “Dirty Cops” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 4

The Story of “Operation Zorro II” and Some Practical Suggestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 7

Was Cellular Telephone Cloning a CrimeBefore October 1994? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 12

Supervising and Litigating a Foreign LanguageElectronic Surveillance Interception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 17

Community Prosecution in Washington, D.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 21

Ethics and Professional Responsibility

Brady Disclosure Obligations RegardingUnconfirmed Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 92

Misconduct Toward Judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 92

Gifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 58

Representations to Opposing Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 58

Unintentional Misstatement to Appellate Court . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 58

Trial Conduct— Improper Inferences from Defendant’s Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 66

Threatening Criminal Action in Civil Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 66

Alteration of Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 66

Grand Jury— Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 59

Pro Bono Legal Work— Identification asDepartment Attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 59

Litigation Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 60

Examination of Witness— Questions about MaritalPrivilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 87



Statements Before Grand Jury— ExpectedWitness Perjury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 87

Cross Examination— Good Faith Basis for Questions . . . . . . . 45 1 87

Grand Jury— Attempt to Improperly Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 74

Grand Jury— Statement that Witness WouldCommit Perjury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 74

Grand Jury— Characterization of Evidence— Callingof Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 74 Closing Arguments— Misleading Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 74

Government Lawyers— Private Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 75

Perjured Testimony and Relationships with Witnesses,Subjects, and Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 39

Ethical Issues for Appellate Attorneys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 44

Federal Bureau of Investigation

DNA Advisory Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 2

Racketeering Records Analysis Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 4

LABNET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 7

Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 8

DRUGFIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 9

Computer Analysis and Response Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 10

Forensic Science Information Resource System . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 11

Directory of FBI Laboratory Division Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 12

Health Care Fraud

Tips for Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 5

Who’s Who at DOJ in Health Care Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 8

Health Care Fraud Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 10



Multi-district Investigation and Prosecution ofMedicare Fraud: The Benefits of Taking the TeamApproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 12

Operation LABSCAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 14

The Tao of the Health Care Fraud Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 18

Practicing in the Field of Injunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 23

A Basic Remedy for a Health Care Fraud Headache . . . . . . . . 45 2 32

The Federal False Claims Act as a Remedy to Poor Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 36

Determining “Loss” in Medicare Fraud Prosecutions . . . . . . . 45 2 40

Enforcement of HHS Inspector General Subpoenasand Authorized Investigative Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 43

Going the Long Way: Investigating Fraud WithoutComputerized Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 45

United States v. Dr. Ivan Namihas, M.D.: He NeverCried for Us . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 5

Parallel Proceedings in Complex Health Care FraudCases: The Blue Shield of California Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 8

Treatment from the Tropics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 13

Settlement in United States v. Bruce Erickson, M.D.,the Great Falls Eye Surgery Center andGary Andregg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 15

A Qui Tam Action on an End Stage RenalDisease Lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 16

Successful LabCorp Settlement a Result of Operation LABSCAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 20

United States v. Charles M. Parrot, M.D.: A Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 24

Medicare Kickback Case Nets $2 Million Settlement . . . . . . . 45 3 28

United States v. Dr. Fred Paul Norman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 30

Failure to Repay Credit Balances: West JerseyHealth Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 32



United States v. Virginia Psychiatric Companyd.b.a. Poplar Springs Hospital. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 35

United States v. Borders: An Example of CooperationAmong Law Enforcement, the Medical Community,and the Insurance Companies in the Fight AgainstHealth Care Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 37

The National Practitioner Data Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 40

Immigration

Prosecuting Organized Alien Smuggling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 40

Litigation Arising Under AEDPA andIIRIRA Focuses on Proper Forum forConstitutional Challenges to Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 1 9

International Legal Issues

OIA’s Fugitive Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 3

Office of Professional Development andTraining in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 6

Federal Prosecutors in the Age of International Crime . . . . . . 44 5 7

Everything I Ever Needed to Know about InternationalInvestigations I Learned from Watergate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 9

Hazardous Duty: Assistant United States AttorneyKim Lindquist Promotes Judicial Reform in Columbia . . . . . . 44 5 12

Medieval Manuscript Mystery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 14

Fear of Foreign Prosecutions andthe Privilege Against Self-Incrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 17

Rendition of Omar Mohammed Ali Rezaq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 21

White Collar Crime Investigation Team (WCCIT) . . . . . . . . . 44 5 23

New Agreement on Cooperation in CriminalMatters with Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 25

Office of Professional Development andTraining in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 26

New Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Panama . . . . . . . . . 44 5 28



Requesting Assistance from Switzerlandin Matters of Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 30

OPDAT: On the Frontiers of America’s Newest National Security Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 32

OPDAT Honor Roll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 35

The Special Importance and Challenge of Export Control Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 36

A Seafood Deal Gone Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 42

International Extradition

Weaving Through the Extradition Maze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 7

A Brief Primer on International Extradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 10

Threats of War, Suspension of a Treaty, Impeachment,and Other Unpleasantries: An HistoricalLook at Extradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 13

Status of Constitutional “Separation of Powers” Challengeto Statutory Basis for the Extradition of Fugitivesfrom the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 18

Provisional Arrests in Extradition Cases: Pros and Cons . . . . . 44 6 19

The International Fugitive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 21

A Dilemma: Obtaining Testimony from ForeignWitnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 24

International Kidnappers: Are We at Their Mercy? . . . . . . . . 44 6 27

Protecting the United States’ Case When a DefendantFlees Abroad: Complying with Foreign Statutesof Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 28

International Kidnapping by Inveiglement and HostageTaking: Potential Weapons in the Prosecutor’s ArsenalAgainst Alien Smuggling? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 29

Interviews

Interview with Donald W. Thompson, Jr., Acting AssistantDirector, FBI Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 1



Interview with Deputy Solicitor GeneralMichael R. Dreeben . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 2

Interview with Office of International Affairs DirectorFrances Fragos Townsend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 2

Interview with Deputy Assistant Attorney GeneralMark Richard, Criminal Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 2

Interview with Janice Mathews Stromsem, Director ofthe International Criminal Investigative TrainingAssistance Program (ICITAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6 32

Interview with Director David Epstein, Officeof Foreign Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1 39

Interview with United States Attorney Lynne A.Battaglia, District of Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2 2

Interview with United States Attorney Donald K.Stern, District of Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 2

Interview with Director Frederick D. Hess,Office of Enforcement Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 2

Wiretaps: A DEA Agent’s Perspective— Interviewwith Special Agent Mark Styron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 28

Interview with Assistant Secretary forEnforcement Jim Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 2

Interview with AAG Loretta C. AgrettTax Division . . . . . . . . . . 46 32

Interview with Associate AttorneyGeneral Raymond Fisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4 3

Interview with Deputy Attorney GeneralEric H. Holder, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 2

Job Swapping: Rejuvenation

Job Swapping Stories by AUSAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 42

Pre-Trial Matters

Collecting and Developing Evidence: RecentDevelopments by Law Enforcement Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 26



Cyberbanking and Cyberfraud*(*Article reprinted from the ACE Reporter Newsletter, March 1996) . . . . . . . 44 3 28

The Interpretation of Blood Splatter Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 29

The Missing Eyewitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 30

“Innerviewing” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 31

Witnesses as Your Best Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 32

Crafting Helpful Indictments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4 9

Handling Informants and AccompliceWitnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4 20

The Pro Se Defendant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4 26

Reimbursement of Costs to Entitiesfor Complying with Subpoenas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4 36

Mentoring the New Civil AUSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4 42

Special Commendations Issues

July 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4

January 1998— Tribute to Former EOUSADirector Carol DiBattiste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 1

Tax Prosecutions

Reconciling the Mission of the Tax Division with theGoals of the USAOs’ in Tax Prosecutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 7

An AUSA’s Perspective on Working with the Tax Division . . 46 3 11

House Counsel: The Roles of IRS’s Office of ChiefCounsel in Tax and Financial Crime Enforcement . . . . . . . . . 46 3 13

The Gold Fringed Flag: Prosecution of the IllegalTax Protestor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 15

Appointment of Special Counsel for IllegalTax Protest Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 22

Illegal Tax Protestors: Abuse of the Judicial Process (Civil) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 23



Follow that Lead! Obtaining and Using Tax Informationin a Non-Tax Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 28

Excise Tax Prosecutions— Planes, Trains, andAutomobile Air Conditioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 36

Summons Enforcement: Some Special Problems . . . . . . . . . . 46 340

Trial and Appellate Matters

Hidden Evidence: Latent Prints on Human Skin . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 14

Shortcuts: Easier, Faster, and More Interesting Trials . . . . . . . 44 3 18

Dazzling with Plain Speaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 34

Trial Considerations Involving Informantsand Accomplice Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 6

Direct Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 11

Cross-Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 20

Effective Redirect Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 27

Tips on Closing Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 32

Attacking the Insanity Defense at Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 39

Ethical Issues for Appellate Attorneys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 44

Federal Trade Commission Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5 48

Victim-Witness

Victim-Witness Response toChurch Arsons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2 43

Why (and What) Do Prosecutors Need to Know aboutVictims’ Rights? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 62

Revising the Attorney General Guidelines forVictim and Witness Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 8

The Victim-Witness Coordinator:Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 9



If You Don’t Have a Dime, Who Pays for the Crime?The Mandatory Restitution Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 11

The Emergency Witness Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 20

The Crime Victims Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 24

The Drug Victim Initiative: Empowering Communitiesto Fight the War Against Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 27

Assisting Financial Crimes Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 29

Working with Victims and Witnesses of Bank Robberies . . . . 47 1 33

Enforcement of the Federal Domestic Violence Laws . . . . . . . 47 1 36

Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Prosecutions . . . . . . . 47 1 42

Name Changes and Related Options for DomesticViolence Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 46

Working with Traumatized Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 51

A Victim’s Voice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 54

Work-Related Stress in a U.S. Attorney’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 59

A Cooperative Response to Juvenile Sex Offendersin Indian Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 64

The Bureau of Prison’s Victim-Witness Notification Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1 70

UPCOMING PUBLICATIONSBelow you will find the current Bulletin publication schedule. Please contact us with your ideas and

suggestions for future Bulletin issues. Please send all comments regarding the Bulletin, and any articles, stories, orother significant issues and events to AEXNAC(JBOLEN). If you are interested in writing an article for anupcoming Bulletin issue, contact Jennifer Bolen at (803) 544-5155, to obtain a copy of the guidelines for articlesubmissions and publication deadline.

April 1999 Money Laundering

May 1999 Environmental Crimes

June 1999 Bankruptcy Fraud

August 1999 ADR and Related Matters