uribe's democratic policy
TRANSCRIPT
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UNIVERSIT CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE
FACOLT DI ECONOMIA (SEDE DI PIACENZA)
Programma Internazionale di Doppia Laurea con Universidad deLa SabanaCorso di Laurea Magistrale in Gestione dAzienda
Uribes Democratic Security Policy the new phase of Colombias
economic recovery.
Relatore:Chiar.mo Prof. Francesco Timpano
Tesi di Laurea di:
Daniela Quintero Camelomatr. n: 4009145
anno accademico 2011 / 2012
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Abstract
Colombia has been a country with many problems along the years some of
them are corruption, guerrilla and drug trafficking that have been part of its
economic failure. Within this thesis it will be described the factors that have
affected Colombias economy, the crisis and political governments of three
presidents since 1998 to 2011. It will also be analyzed how the democratic
security policy from the ex president Uribe helped Colombia to a economic
recovery and which are the problems that still face the country.
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Thanks
This thesis is an effort in which, directly or indirectly, involves several people
reading, correcting, giving encouragement and accompanied at all times.
First, I want to thank God for all the good things I have lived all this year, my
Mom for giving me the opportunity of being here and for all her support and
encouragement. And finally, Professor Francesco Timpano for being my
tutor.
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INDEX
INTRODUCTION
1. CHAPTER 1: PROBLEM
1.1. Defining the problem
1.2. Objectives
1.2.1. General Objectives
1.2.2. Specific Objectives
1.3. Hypothesis
2. CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCEAND SECURITY IN COLOMBIA
2.1. The guerrillas and groups outside the law
2.1.1. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
2.1.2. Army of National Liberation or ELN
2.1.3. 19 Movement or M-19
2.1.4. Paramilitarism
2.2. Causes and effects of the crisis2.3. Drug trafficking (Marihuana and Cocaine)
2.3.1. Drug Cartels
2.3.1.1. Medelln Cartel
2.3.1.2. Cali Cartel
2.3.1.3. Norte del Valle Cartel
2.3.1.4. Coast Cartel
2.4. Corruption3. CHAPTER 3: CRISIS OF THE ECONOMIC GROWTH (1995-2000)
3.1. Nineties period
3.2. Colombias recession
4. CHAPTER 4: PRESIDENCY OF ANDRES PASTRANA
4.1. Plan of Government
4.2. The peace process
4.2.1. Zona de Despeje
4.2.2. La silla vacia (Empty Chair)
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4.2.3. Results
4.3. Plan Colombia
4.3.1. Development
4.3.2. Financing
4.3.3. War against drugs
4.3.4. Results
4.4. Pastranas Economic Indicators
5. CHAPTER 5: PRESIDENCY OF ALVARO URIBE
5.1. Governance
5.2. Democratic Security Police
5.2.2. Results
5.2.2.1. First years of presidency
5.2.2.2. GDP rate
5.2.2.3. Unemployment rate
5.3. Building up the security and national control
5.4. Operations against insurgent illegal groups
5.4.1. FARC
5.4.2. ELN
5.5. Foreign Direct Inversion (FDI)
5.6. Poverty
5.7. Corruption
5.8. Public Administration
6. CHAPTER 6: NEW PRESIDENCY OF JUAN MANUEL SANTOS
6.1. Presidency
6.2. Economy
7. CONCLUSIONS8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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INTRODUCTION
During 1990 2000 period, Colombia experienced a phase of terror by
insurgent groups, who were guardians of the countryside and the country's
roads, projecting fear, mistrust and uncertainty in the Colombian population.
By the other hand the crisis of 1998 and the policies of President Andres
Pastrana led to negotiations with the FARC, which he only succeeded in
magnifying the power of the armed group by giving part of Colombian territory
contributing to further deterioration in the macro and micro economic agents
in the country.
It is very important to mention that the process undertaken by the government
to fight these armed groups was not effective, which was evidenced in the
2001 elections, when Colombias population chose Alvaro Uribe as the new
president. In his program of presidency he offered a radical fight to the
insurgency and the recovery of the safety of the population in an environment
of economic growth.
Shortly after the new government formed, control started to be evidenced
primary in the road network and the recovery of the territory granted by the ex
president Andres Pastrana to the insurgency (El Caguan), this became the
end ofthe famous pesca milagorsa which was a form of gaining money by
making roadblocks to kidnap people and then ask for ransoms.
By the other hand, there were imminent offensives to the FARC first thekilling of the blocks insurgent leaders and second a massive eradication of
illicit crops, this caused the deterioration of the finances of the group outside
the law.
These advances in safety, made the expectations of employers and
consumers improve, achieving a substantial increase in investment, leading
to a reduction of unemployment, and an increase of the incomes and
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consumption of the country, which has resulted in growth rates of 4.8%
(average) over the past 5 years.
It highlights that over the years, the government has kept interest rates in a
low level, creating an opening of household consumption, passing from a
negative variation of 5% to a positive variation of 6% in 2008, which can be
attributed to the confidence generated by the good economic performance
and the increase of credits acquired by Colombian families.
Nowadays, Colombia's economy is a leading emerging economy in the
international arena; it has been able to attract foreign investment into the
country in the past few years. Colombia has increased the investment 250%
since 2000. It is the fourth largest economy in Latin America, after Brazil,
Mexico and Argentina and sixth in the American continent. In the international
classification is within the 30 largest in the world.
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CHAPTER 1
PROBLEM
1.1. Defining the Problem
The Colombian territory has been immersed in an atmosphere of war
and social injustice, which has harmed the farmers and the poorest
population, who work the land and were the ones that provide the
country with the basic products such as food crops that werecultivated in the most affected areas of the country.
With the mandate of Andres Pastrana (1997 - 2001), the priority was
the negotiations with the FARC, seeking peace talks with these
groups outside the law, and making arrangements so they will stop
attacking civilians. Pastrana ceded too much to these insurgent
groups, including part of Colombian territory, where they were the law.Within this, they didnt respect the peace agreements and instead
they used the space provided by the government to commit even
more crimes and be able to hide in that territory without any problems,
because there was no presence of any Colombian authority.
This situation of war, lead to a force displacement of people from rural
areas to big cities, this population was the one who cultivated theland, thereby this caused an imbalance in the economy. In addition, it
was the 1998 crisis which evidenced a marked deterioration in the
Colombian economic indicators, due to high interest rates and tight
monetary policy of the Bank of the Republic, this lead to a busting in
the economy and industry causing a hence in the economic and
finance stability of the people. Within these, it was very visible and
evident the financial situation of the population, the cities were full of
displaced people from the countryside, there was a high rate of
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unemployment (19.4% - 1999), a negative economic growth rates (-
4.2% - 1999) and little chance of recovering the country's economy
because of its image of insecurity and fear that was transmitted to the
world.
However with the right mandate it began a process of economic
recovery and security confidence that generated an increase in the
foreign investment, creating employment in the country and therefore
increasing the income and consumption. But most important,
Colombians could return to their roads and territories, which they were
displaced because of the serious security problems evidenced in the
past years.
1.2. Objectives
1.2.1. General Objective
To know in detail the economic, political and social situation in
Colombia to define clearly the pros and cons of the government
policy in Uribes mandate and how is the situation nowadays
with president Santos.
1.2.2. Specific Objectives
Collect relevant information from government publications,
newspapers, journals, reports, forums and reviews of Uribes
mandate.
Identify Pros and Cons of government policy managed until
this date.
Identify weaknesses, opportunities, strengths and debilities of
the Colombian economy as a guarantor of improving the
quality of life of Colombians.
Make conclusions to refute or affirm the hypotheses.
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1.3. HYPOTHESIS
1. Was the democratic security strategy of president Alvaro Uribe the
key factor of his mandate?
2. Where his policies sustainable over time?
3. Can it be maintained the confidence generated in the foreign
investment?
4. Can the new president maintain Colombias economy and foreign
trust?
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY
IN COLOMBIA
2.1. The Guerrillas and groups outside the Law
2.1.1. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Las Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armedforces of Colombia) or more commonly known as FARC started
their activities as a movement in 1966. The founding of this
organization was the source of a series of transformations from
groups that had appeared as a consequence of social fights
between popular and bourgeois sectors and the neglect and
violation of the peasant rights by the state. This was a clear
motive for the insurgence group to fight and make justice.
The communist ideology by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels began
to spread and reached Latin America. Colombia was a key country
to accept this idea because it possessed qualities that matched
perfectly with the communist philosophy; one of them was the anti-
American sentiment that had arisen due the independence of
Panama in 1903 by the U.S.A. motivation. Another conditions thathelped the spread of this ideology were social inequality, poverty
and corruption.
In 1948, the murdering of the presidential candidate Jorge Elicer
Gaitn unleashed the biggest violent wave in the history of
Colombia. This violence was extended in all the territory; the
massacres generated by the parties were multiplied. Communists
groups, forced army and traditional parties (liberals, conservatives)
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were participants in one of the most violent stages in Colombia. As
a consequence, it was created clandestine groups from the same
parties that assaulted anyone that didnt think equal.
In those groups it existed a liberal guerrilla; a young liberal boy
became part of this organization, his name Pedro Antonio Marin
better known as Manuel Marulanda Velez alias Tirofijo. He will
become one of the principals heads of this organization later on.
The liberal guerrillas split in two: the clean liberals and the
common liberals (communist ideology). The clean liberals resigned
their arms when Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (the only military president)
guarantees to give them amnesty in 1953. The common liberals
and their leaders decided to continue the fight and moved to
various parts of the country such as Antioquia, Cordoba,
Cundinamarca and Tolima. Years later some leaders were
captured or shot down while Tirofijo planed and develop his
ambushes, assaults and kidnappings. In 1964, Manuel Marulanda
helped establish the remote Communist republic of Marquetalia.
When the Colombian military launched an attack against
Marquetalia the guerrillas scattered, but would soon regroup. Two
years later, in 1966, the Communist guerrillas had reformed.
Tirofijo, was widely respected for his leadership in earlier battles
against the Colombian army so he was made Chief of Staff of the
newly named and reorganized Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia.
FARC did not rise quickly. They launched opportunistic strikes on
military units in order to obtain weapons and supplies. They began
taking hostages for political leverage and assassinating any
opponents or informers who came within their reach. In the 1980s
a new source of power presented itself, cocaine was a way to
obtain money and international connections. Many FARC unitsbegan to work as efficient cocaine producers and smugglers.
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Since then, the FARC has been on a steady growth in the number
of rows, fronts, territorial extension, the businesses, military and
political strategy. Today is the oldest and largest guerrilla group in
Colombia and the world. Due their actions they have became
protagonist of the most important chapters of Colombian history.
Today, the ideological and socio-political motivation found in the
early days of the FARC may have been tainted, but they remain a
potent force.
2.1.2. Army of National Liberation or ELN
The Ejercito Liberal Nacional (Army of National Liberation), or
commonly known as ELN, was inspired in the Cuban revolution of
1959 and has Marxist ideals. Six Colombian students that received
scholarship from Fidel Castros government traveled to Cuba
forming the brigade Jos Antonio Galn. Its leader was Fabio
Vsquez Castao.
The ELN's ideology contains elements such as the use of armed
conflict to expose and promote the solution of the social needs of
the population by national and international governments, as well
as pointing out other flaws and inequities within a democracy that
they dont considered as one.
In 1964 the ELN started as guerrilla in Colombia, headed by Marco,
Antonio and Fabio Vsquez Castao, in that moment there where18 combatants. In 1965, the insurgent group attacked the town of
Simacota, Santander, there they presented a manifest in which
they explained the reasons of their armed fight.
Various priests joined the group, some of the where Spanish. They
where inspired in the Liberty theory, among them where Camilo
Torres, Aurentino Rueda, Domingo Lan, Jos Antonio Jimnez,Diego Cristbal Uribe, Bernardo Lpez Arroyave y Manuel Prez.
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In 1973 the armed forces made Operation Anor in which the ELN
was practically disjointed. Fabio Vsquez was a refugee in Cuba
and was destitute of his charge, his brothers Marco and Antonio,
died in combat. After 10 years it started the reconstruction of the
organization with the reunion of National Heroes and Martyrs of
Anor and tow years later it was established the new organizational
structure, its leader was a Spanish priest called Manuel Prez.
The ELN has 48 fronts and 7 companies that are present in the 22
departments and that historically is the epicenter of their activities.
Peace talks between Bogota and the ELN started in 1999 and
continued through 2001 until Bogot broke them off. The
negotiations were resumed in Havana, Cuba, by the ends of 2001.
ELN had different activities such as kidnapping, hijacking, bombing,
extortion, and guerrilla war. They annually made hundreds of
kidnappings for ransom, especially foreign employers of large
corporations, mostly petroleum industry.
Their major attacks were to the energy infrastructure; they have
damaged pipelines and the electric distribution network. ELN has
an estimated of 3,000 to 5,000 armed combatants and unknown
supporters. They are located in rural zones and mountain areas
such as the north, northeast and southwest of Colombia. They also
are in border regions of Venezuela. Cuba being their allied
provides ELN fighters medical cares and offers politicalconsultation to its leadership.
2.1.3. 19 Movement or M-19
M-19 was created in 1970 as a result of an alleged election fraud.
It was created as rebel group and political movement but later on
then it became an armed movement.
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Jaime Bateman an ex-military from the FARC, Carlos Toledo Plata
representative of the social movement ANAPO and other
conformed the M-19; since the beginning they made notable
activities that were notorious such as the robbery of the swords of
Simn Bolvar when they invade the Quinta de Bolivar in 1974,
they proclaimed this action as Bolivar, your sword comes back to
the fight1.
Their objective was to combine weapons with politics. They didnt
want to the isolated in the rural areas such as the FARC and the
ELN. They didnt use the Marxism-Leninism and Cuban revolution,
they adapted a national and singular posture.
During the government of Julio Csar Turbay (1978-1982) they
built a tunnel that reached a military garrison known as Cantn
Norte in Usaqun. In 1978 they robbed 4,076 weapons of the
National Army.
In 1980, there was a celebration in the embassy of Dominican
Republic in Bogot. A squad of 16 armed men in command of
Rosemberg Pabn alias Commandant One entered the embassy
and took as hostages all the persons that were there including 17
ambassadors. For their recue they asked for 50 million dollars and
the liberation of more than 30 of their people. The take over lasted
60 days and it was solved by a negotiation between government
and M-19.
In November 6 1985, the M-19 sends 35 of their men in control of
Andrs Almarales, to take by the force the Justice Palace
captivating hostages and claiming to take to court the President.
This caused an immediately reaction from the army causing an
armed combat, in which mostly of the guerrilla members were
1Historia del M-19. Caracol Radio. November 19, 2005http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/historia-del-m19/20051102/nota/217510.aspx
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taken down. There were other 53 persons who died that day,
including ministers of the Supreme Court.
By this time it was made the Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera
(CNG), years after they restructures and formed Coordinadora
Guerrillera Simn Bolvar (CGSB) in association with the FARC,
ELN and EPL. Their purpose was to present a united group to the
peace negotiations made with the government and also to make
joint military actions.
After being involved in a peace process in the Virgilio Barco
Vargass government (1986-1990), the M-19 gave up their
weapons in their camp, they demobilized and became a political
group that was known as Democratic Alliance M-19. The M-19 do
not exist formally as a military or political movement, however,
many of their old members make part of the left coalition known as
Independent Democratic Pole.
2.1.4. Paramilitarism
Paramilitarism was a response to the guerrillas mobilization.
Colombian state developed a strategy promoted by civil defense
laws and decrees in 1978, this contained the fundaments for
combating the guerrilla groups by a national defense, which was
conformed by landowners and drug traffickers. Even though itstarted as a good process, paramilitaries used this as strength to
become powerful.
When the government realized that this trend was becoming illicit
they outlawed self-defense forces in 1987, but this failed because
of the growing influence of the paramilitaries. In 1997 Carlos
Castao, a former Medelln cartel operative, announced the
formation of the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in
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an attempt to bring central coordination to paramilitary activities
nationwide. This movements increased rapidly and strength during
the1990s. There were around 2,000 full-time paramilitary fighters
in 1989 and around 8,000 to 10,000 by the end of the decade.
Many of the worst human rights abuses of that time were
committed by the paramilitaries. This group gained money by drug
trafficking, stealing state resources and extortion of legitimate
businesses.
2.2. Causes and Effects of the Crisis
Colombia like many states had became weaker due internal problems,
such as corruption, drug trafficking, exclusionary political system,
economic crisis and the high levels of social and economic inequality.
Like many developing countries, the problem of national security in
Colombia is primarily an internal problem. This chapter will board the
source of the crisis and give a general explanation of how insurgent
groups, drug trafficking and corruption affected security in Colombia.
Colombias history has long been marked by violence, since 1899 wars
between liberals and conservative parties have left many scars that
affected social and political aspects. This violence was driven by many
factors: political loyalties and rivalries, control of land and economic
resources, clashes over the role of religion, and personal vendettas.
Colombian authority in rural area was minimum and governments didntpay much attention to it because they were fighting over power control.
This lack of authority caused the insurgence of two rebel movements,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC that has been
the largest and most successful group and Army of National Liberation
or ELN inspired in Cuba and founded on principles of liberation.
After years of sustained economic growth and positive trends in
reducing inequality and social exclusion during the 1960s and 1970s,
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Colombia entered into a period of slow economic growth during the
1980s. The combination of the parallel rise of the illegal narcotics
economy and the growing power of the insurgencies and drug cartels
began to make pressure in the Colombias weak institutions of
governance.
During the 1980s, the variable of drug trafficking began to exert an
increasingly large influence over national security in Colombia. Newborn
drug cartels started to be a challenge to the legitimate state authority
across the country and frontiers. The emergence of the cartels raised a
parallel growth in paramilitary organizations. A new insurgent group the
M-19 started to be a threat to Colombian government. Attacks against
the government were started; the most notorious one was the violent
takeover of the Supreme Court in Bogot in 1985. Violence and criminal
behavior related to the production and drug trafficking threaten the state
institutions and the legal economy. The mixture of armed insurgency
and drug trafficking becomes a direct challenge to the state and causes
damages to the internal stability. By the late 1980s, Colombia was in a
vicious cycle of violence, the cartels persistent fight with the
government, the guerrillas and paramilitary fighting over the control of
the national territory and the increasingly routes of drugs, and the
Colombian armed forces trying to recuperate control of the country.
The 1990s werent so different; its accelerated deterioration was
caused by many factors. Even though Colombia received help from
United States and could break some cartels, their illegal business wascarried on by a series of decentralized criminal gangs. Colombia
evolved from a processing and transshipment point for cocaine to the
worlds largest producer of coca leaf. Coca cultivation rose dramatically,
from some 51,000 hectares in 1995 to more than 101,000 in 1998 and
then to 122,000 in 1999, according to U.S. government estimates at the
time. The explosion of the drug business in Colombia had the effect of
further weakening legitimate state authority while supercharging theinsurgents, paramilitaries, and drug gangs.
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The constitution of 1991 gave new life and strength to the political
process and improved the public access to the justice systems, but it
also fell into the hands of the paramilitaries and insurgents by providing
them large amounts of fiscal resources where the state had little or no
authority, this funds were captures by the illegal armed groups. The
FARC and the ELN took advantage of periodic peace offers and cease-
fires to consolidate their strength but in the end reached no deal with the
government.
The breaking point of deterioration was during the presidency of Ernesto
Samper (1994-1998). Its legitimacy and effectiveness was damaged
since the beginning of his administration due to the contributions of the
narcos in his campaign. This caused a rupture in the relationship with
the United States causing the stop of their aiding. This was the perfect
opportunity for the insurgence to make a strike to the government. The
FARC opened new attacks to reclaim more territory and expand their
operations through all the national territory and facilitate the movement
of drugs and weapons.
The FARC began to invade the Colombian army and police by capturing
police stations and military bases. In 1996, the FARC made a surprise
attack and took over the Colombian military base at las Delicias
(Putumayo), killing and capturing more than 100 soldiers. Attacks from
the FARC were intensifying in 1997 and 1998, which showed a capable
army that could unbalance the political, social and economical aspectsof the country.
The low presence of the government in many parts of the country
helped the armed groups to take control of rural areas, making even
harder the situation of Colombia. In 1995, 58% of Colombias
municipalities contained a guerrilla presence, compared with the 17%
ten years earlier. At the same time a quarter of the municipalities did nothave presence of police. In many rural areas or small towns the
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The use of cocaine leaf, marihuana and other plants, had been part of
the life style of many indigenous in South America, but the world drug
demand during the decades of 1940 and 1970 increased the production
in Colombia. In that period of time Colombia had emerged as a major
supplier to the United States. By the end of that decade 70% of the
marihuana reached United States coast. In the 1980s, Colombia was
catalogued as the major narcotics trafficker center. Between 30,000 and
50,000 small farmers along Colombias Caribbean coast became
dependent of marihuana cultivation for their livelihood. Also around
50,000 Colombians made a living from it.
This was an important source of wealth to the Caribbean coast, its
population was generating income, comforts and economic stability from
its production and distribution. The port cities of Barranquilla, Santa
Marta and Riohacha, experiences prosperity, meanwhile the Guajira
was in a dramatic upsurge in drug related violence, police disintegration
and their judicial institutions were falling apart because the corruption an
bribery. The food production was declining because the thousand
hectares were converted to marihuana cultivation. Many legitimate
businesses such as banks, hotels, restaurants, airlines and casinos
were bought by narcotraficantes or Mafiosos and were used for
laundering illicit profits.
After that Colombia implemented prohibition laws to suffocate the
negative effects of drugs to the society and also to punish the agents
that cultivate, posses, commercialize and distribute them. But eventhough their efforts to retain this illegal production, many factors helped
the increase of these cultivations such as the increasing demand, the
internal conflict and the insurgence of guerrillas and paramilitaries. The
control of national territory by the guerrillas helped them to cultivate
drugs and generating incomes by its distribution.
The cocaine trade followed the same footsteps of the marihuana
traffickers. In the late 1960s, a small cocaine network, in control of exile
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Cuban criminal organizations based in Miami, jumped out. Smuggling
was carried out largely by individual carries or mules, which
transported few cocaine kilograms in commercial airlines.
In the 1970s, the demand of cocaine in the United States increased
rapidly, but the limited raw coca suppliers production in Colombia were
increased with the coca paste that was imported from Bolivia and Peru,
then it was refined in kitchen laboratories and finally smuggled into the
United States. In addition Carlos Lehbder and Jorge Luis Ochoa worked
with Medellins criminal networks to transform the cocaine transportation
system from small activities such as mules into huge airlift operations.
Font: http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/pdf/861/86100806.pdf
Many drug cartels in Colombia, started to buy bigger and betterairplanes and boats for transporting drugs, they bought more
sophisticated electronic communications devices and radars to escape
detection, and also paid big amounts in bribes for protections. Also they
installed their own middlemen in Miami so they could coordinate and
move drugs easily into United State territory.
By the early 1980s, the marihuana traffic was being left a side by thecocaine trade. Cocaine also generated criminal organizations that were
more profitable, vertically integrated, hierarchical in structure, and more
ruthless in their systematic use of bribery, intimidation and assassination
that the marihuana traffickers. Drug mafia provoked new levels of
violence in Colombia such as the relying on paid assassins, known as
sicarios. The drug traffickers not only fought among themselves but also
launched a campaign of murder and intimidation against Colombias
government authorities. In that period this drug traffickers effectively
http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/pdf/861/86100806.pdfhttp://redalyc.uaemex.mx/pdf/861/86100806.pdf -
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paralyzed the countrys system of justice and helped to the devaluation
of life, converting murder and brutality into a regular source of income.
The marihuana money was concentrated along the Caribbean coast, but
cocaine money was being spread into the major metropolitan areas
specially were the drug cartels where such as Barranquilla, Medellin and
Cali. Not being enough with the enormous economic power, the drug
traffickers reached out for a large quota of political power. In addition to
corrupting the political and economic systems, drug trafficking was
generating a growing domestic drug problem in Colombia.
2.3.1. Drug Cartels
With the prohibition of drugs in Colombia, producers and
traffickers formed armed clandestine cartels. During the
increase of the demand in the 1980s, the cartels expanded and
organized in criminal groups usually lead by one or more
capos (leaders). Some of these organizations started a warwith the Colombias government to try to avoid the extradition
treaties with United States. This caused many terrorist acts
against the civilian population, and also extended to wars
between cartels. In the decades of 1990 and 2000 several of
these cartels infiltrate the State institutes and also made
alliances with groups outside the law such as the guerrilla and
the paramilitaries.
2.3.1.1. Medelln Cartel
It existed since the 1970s decade and disappeared in
1993. Until that year it controlled 95% of the cocaine
shipments from Colombia to the United States, Mexico
and Spain. It was catalogued as the most dangerous
criminal organization of the planet, because its leader
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Pablo Escobar was catalogued one of the 5 richest
men in the world in 1985. This cartel ended when the
Colombian police killed Pablo Escobar, but this gave
free way to the Cali cartel to control the market. Its
principal members were Pablo Escobar maximum
leader, Gonzalo Rodrguez Gacha, Carlos Lehder, and
the brothers Ochoa (Fabio, Jorge Luis and Juan
David).
2.3.1.2. Cali Cartel
The brothers Miguel and Gilberto Rodrguez Orejuela
formed this cartel. In their golden period, the North
American authorities pointed this cartel because they
were responsible of sending 35% of the cocaine that
reached their country. For this reason, it was
catalogued the most dangerous criminal organization
of Colombia after the Medellins cartel fall. It existed
since 1985 until 1995, when the Rodrguez Orejuela
brothers were captured.
2.3.1.3. Norte del Valle Cartel
Its principal operations are in the North of the Valle del
Cauca, the southeast of Colombia. In 1990 it had an
important increase after the fragmentation of theMedellins and Calis cartels. This cartel had a great
impact in 2008 when his boss Wilber Varela alias
Soap was killed on January 28. It is known as one of
the most powerful organizations engaged in the
business of drug trafficking. Currently is led by
brothers Luis Enrique and Javier Antonio Calle Serna,
alias The Comba.
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Between 1989 and 1999 corruption in Colombia summed 3.5 billion
USD in frauds and a loss of 1% in its GDP. Other aspects that
corruption has affected are the loss of credibility in the Colombian
government and politicians. The tight bonds between politicians and
drug traffickers has made even more difficult to stop corruption in the
country. In some cases this alliance facilitate the operation and
management of drug crops.
Even though the government tries to control the corruption the results
are insufficient, this has caused a big trouble to Colombian society
because they see corruption as major problem for doing business. This
chart shows how was corruption since 1998 until 2010.
Font: http://revistasupuestos.uniandes.edu.co/?p=1755
According to the Perception of Corruption index 2011 Colombia ranks
80 with a score of 3.4. where 0 means that a country is perceived as
highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean.3
Levels of corruption have increases steadily since 2009 and they
continue getting worse because the General attorney and the
comptroller discovered corruption at almost every level of the
government. In 2009 48,000 government officials were being
investigated for corruption (800 government officials and 30 governors).
Colombias modern corruption takes place mostly in business between
3http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults
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By the other hand other factors that contributed to Colombias crisis
was the sudden outflow of capital from the country and the region due
the financial crisis of Asian (1997) and Russia (1998), among others.
This reduced significantly the access to external credit and made
difficult to maintain levels of domestic spending and the financing
imbalance of the current account.
Real interest rates rose into extraordinary levels in Colombias
macroeconomic history during the last decades and aggravated the
debt problems of the different agents. The result was a contraction in
domestic spending; despite the negative supply shocks associated
with sharp increases in real wages and nominal devaluation, inflationfell from 20.7% in June 1998 to 9.2% in December 1999. In fact, the
only component of domestic spending that increased was government
consumption, while private consumption and public and private
investment reported a dramatic drop.7
The result was a process of macroeconomic adjustment that combined
increases in interest rates, higher devaluation, fall in international
reserves and contraction of economic activity. The current account
balance as a percentage of the GDP passed from a deficit of 6.7% in
the first quarter of 1998 to a surplus of 1.2% in the last quarter of 1999.
The economic difficult conditions faced by Colombia, particularly since
mid-1998 were the result of adverse external environment and
inadequate macroeconomic management in previous years but also
the new administration of Pastrana was responsible for deepening intothe recession. The economy was weak due two factors, first the
implementation of the new "fiscal adjustment program" (characterized
by having higher taxes, cuts on the public investment and increases in
operating costs) and second the lack of rapidity in decision-making.
7http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3211_1.pdf
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CHAPTER 4
PRESIDENCY OF ANDRS PASTRANA
4.1. PLAN OF GOVERNMENT
In 1998 Colombia was living one of its worst crisis after the
presidency of Ernesto Samper. Guerrillas and Paramilitaries
increased their power and extended their illicit activities. Also the
relationship with United State was broken after they knew that
Samper was accused of having drug trafficking money in his
campaign.
In June 1998 Andrs Pastrana was elected as president of
Colombia. Pastrana inherited a number of grave problems among
these was the guerrilla war, carried out by aggressive and well-
financed left-wing rebel groups and a powerful narcotics industry,
whose illicit drug money infiltrated almost every level of society.
Pastrana based his campaign on a peace process with the FARC;
this was a very attractive appeal that favored him with all the
citizens. During nearly all of his administration he made changes in
the reform of the armed forces that resulted in considerable
improvements in force strength, morale, and capability. Pastranas
point of focus throughout the period was the peace negotiationsand, while he permitted military operations to go forward, his
central objective was to pressure the FARC to engage in talks,
without elaborating a military plan to bring that about.
During his government he passed the National Development Plan
1999-2002, Change for building peace, in which he established
four main strategies:
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reasons, later it was known that the real reason for his absence
was that he didnt want to send the wrong message that the
peace was near. But later the real reasons learned that did not
make the appointment because her presence would "send the
wrong message that peace was near." The same day, the
second in command of the FARC and a spokesman for the
negotiating table, Raul Reyes gave a speech called "Agrarian
Reform of the guerrillas."
Talks between the FARC and the Pastranas Government
began officially in January 1999 only to be suspended by the
FARC two weeks later, resumed in April, suspended in July,
and then continued in a stop and go pattern for another year
and a half. This gave a clear idea that the FARC was using the
Zona de Despeje as a command and control center for
operations, zone in which they were stationing thousands of
troops, having an industrial scale coca production and was a
holding point for kidnapping victims. Eventually, the FARC
continued their military action against the Colombian territory, it
was becoming more frequent the kidnappings, assassinations,
and attacks on civilians. The lack of meaningful progress in the
peace talks turned public opinion against the Despeje and
Pastranas popularity started to decrease. Pastrana finally
declared an end to the peace process on February 20, 2002,
and ordered Colombian forces into the Despeje.
4.2.3. Results
The failure of the peace process was probably predestined.
Since the beginning the process was judge severally because
the permissibility of president Pastrana to the FARC. By the
other hand the FARC judged that it had the military and political
advantage over the government and in fact had no intention ofdemobilizing under any circumstances. One of their purposes
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9 The price tag for Plan Colombia was $7.5 billion, $4 billion to
be provided by Colombia and $3.5 billion requested from
foreign assistance, including from the United States.
Even though the plan had many criticisms, its results were very
successful. Plan Colombia proved to be a positive factor in
reversing Colombias decline and also it helped restore the
effectiveness and credibility of the state. By the other hand it
also promoted a closer and more positive relationship between
the United States and Colombia.
4.3.2. Financing
Between 2000 and 2005, Plan Colombia received $2,800
million dollars, and with the support of the Defense Department
its total average amount was $4,500 millions dollars. The Plan
Colombia funding included $860 million specifically for
Colombia this was the largest amount being some 403 millionfor a massive counternarcotics effort in the Caquet and
Putumayo departments. This support also included two more
counternarcotics battalions that were equipped with 16 UH-60
Black Hawk and 30 UH-1H Huey helicopters.
This package also included $115,6 million for the Colombian
Police, $58,5 million for economic aid and alternative
development projects (counter-drug effort in Putumayo), $47,5
for assisting displaced people, $53,5 million for improving
human rights and $3million to support the peace process that
was on track. In 2005, the Bush Administration asked for
9 Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State; Lessons from Colombia; A Report
of the CSIS Americas Program, Plan Colombia page 15.
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program included the fumigation and eradication of 1300 square
km of coca plantation in 2003. This has prevented the
production of 500 metric tones and also denied the income of
around $ 100 millions of Colombian pesos to the drug traffickers
and illegal organizations.
4.3.4. Results
Plan Colombia didnt achieve the expected results that were
initially proposed. For cultivations the goal was to reduce them
around 50% through 2000 and 2006. According security
agency CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) the cultivation of
poppy and the production of heroin decreased by 50% but coca
cultivation increased by 15%. The reason of this increase was
because coca farmers started to cultivate in remote places
inside the jungle to avoid the eradication. The cocaine
production increased by 4% during the same period but
according to data from the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, ONDCP, the production of cocaine didnt maintain the
same parallel growth of coca crops due the impact of manual
eradication in the area.10
According to the U.S. authorities, Colombia improves their
safety through its anti-narcotics strategy, military and police
actions and finally other efforts such as programs for
demobilization. With this plan and the next president during2000 and 2007, the Colombian government reports that the
number of kidnappings and killings had reduced to 1/3, and
there were no more oil pipelines attacks.
10United States Government Accountability Office GAO: Plan Colombia
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdf -
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Font: http://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/resultados_politica_usa_diciembre1.pdf
One of the mayor components of the policy was the
demobilization and reincorporation of guerrilla andparamilitaries to a civil life. The objective was to reduce
the number of members of the illegal armed groups and
give them a flexible alternative to restart their life and
recuperate their families.
During the year of 2003 the total amount of members
that left this groups were around 2,538, increasing by80% the number of rehabilitated members compared to
2002.
Font: http://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/resultados_politica_usa_diciembre1.pdf
http://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/resultados_politica_usa_diciembre1.pdfhttp://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/resultados_politica_usa_diciembre1.pdfhttp://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/resultados_politica_usa_diciembre1.pdfhttp://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/resultados_politica_usa_diciembre1.pdfhttp://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/resultados_politica_usa_diciembre1.pdf -
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Also with the generation of national and international
trust and confidence the GDP indicators increased
notoriously since ex president Pastrana.
Font: http://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/documents/ResultadosGobiernoUribe.pdf
As Uribe announced in his campaign program, the
recovery of the countrys trust and the perception of
national security had a positive effect in the reactivation
of the economy. Colombia has been increasing its
growth of GDP since 2002.
The increase in the GDP for 2007 was of 7,5%; the
reason of the increase of Colombias economy is due
the construction that expanded 18,96%. In second place
was the manufacture industry that increase 13,30% and
in third place was commerce that reached an increase
of 11,53%. The good behavior of the internal demand
was reflected in the house buying, cars and appliances
goods.
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Because the global financial crisis and the weakening
demand for Colombias exports, its economy only grew
2,5% in 2008 and 0,4% in 2009. After experience that
crisis, the Colombias economy rebounded to around
4.4% in 2010. 17
5.2.2.3. Unemployment rate
In terms of unemployment, during the last 10 years
Colombia has been on top of 10%, this related with the
other countries of South America is really high as seenin the table 1. 18 But also the chart show that since Uribe
was in the presidency the rate slowly decreased from
18,1% to 14,8% in a 2-year period. A rise in 2009 due
global crisis made that the rate increase 1,5% and
slowly decreases to 12,4% in 2010.
Font: http://razonpublica.com/index.php/econom-y-sociedad-temas-29/2362-panorama-
del-empleo-en-colombia-.htm
17 http://www.indexmundi.com/colombia/economy_profile.html18 http://razonpublica.com/index.php/econom-y-sociedad-temas-29/2362-panorama-del-
empleo-en-colombia-.html
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Another change that helped the security was the creation of one
new army division, (with a second one in 2005), one new fixed
territory brigade, and two new mobile brigades with 10 counter-
guerrilla battalions that were assigned in Villavicencio (Meta) and
the in Bogot.20 For a major expansion and control, eight new
territorial brigades were created covering larger areas of the
country. The army added five new high-mountain battalions of
1,200 soldiers each to control key mountain passes during 2002
2005, a special battalion to protect energy infrastructure, and in
2002 seven companies assigned to patrol roadways. By the other
hand there was a particular attention to improve logistics support
and intelligence capabilities. In 2003, the government created
four new military intelligence and counter-intelligence centers and
two new intelligence units in support of operations.
The result of these changes has caused a great impact in
Colombia because since Uribe took office there was a creation of
a considerably more effective army. Also the size of the National
Police has increased and expanded into territories were there
was no presence of authority. Since 2002, 168 new police
stations and 146 substations have been created; this has helped
to consolidate security control over areas recovered from the
insurgents.
In terms of air mobility, new helicopters were included making it a
key ingredient for was against FARC. In Pastranas period theairlift capability was very small, there was an estimated of 20
functioning helicopters. With Plan Colombia new aircrafts were
added such as UH-60L Black Hawk and UH-1N Huey helicopters
to support the Counter-Drug Brigade. By 2008, Colombia
20 P
2009
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5.4.2. Paramilitaries
When Uribe started his administration, his main interest was to
start talks about demobilization but at the same time increasethe military pressure. From the governments point of view, the
demobilization of the paramilitaries would eventually eliminate
one of the major sources of violence and human rights abuses
and it will also disrupt criminal activity, and undercut the drug
industry.
In December 2002, the AUC declared a unilateral cease-fire tofacilitate talks but over the time this agreement was constantly
violated. In 2003, talks with the government began and Uribe
submitted an alternative sentencing law to Congress covering
the terms of demobilization. This law provoked an immediate
commotion in domestic and international circles for its kindness
and lack of transparency so the administration quickly pulled it
back.
With the continued violence and drug trafficking, Uribe in August
2004 threaten to stop talks and move militarily against the AUC
(even though the cease-fire) unless the group agreed to be
concentrated in a 142-square-mile zone in Crdoba department
where they would demobilize under the verification of a mission
organized by the Organization of American States.25
During 2004, Colombian forces killed and captured more
paramilitary fighters than in any year; this showed that the
government was serious about the demobilization. The AUC
25
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agreed to Uribes terms and in late 2004, 2,500 fighters turned
in their weapons.
In July 2005, the Congress passed the Justice and Peace Law
(JPL). This legislation wanted to generate a balance between
rapid demobilization and providing punishment for grave crimes
and offenses they had committed. This had little support from
Colombia and international circles because they were offering
the paramilitaries anything to encourage its demobilization. This
was hardly criticized because it was not an amnesty but instead
stipulated criminal penalties with reduced sentences for those
who admitted to having committed grave crimes. This law would
apply only to paramilitary leaders who fully confessed to their
crimes.
During 2005 and 2006, some 32,000 paramilitary fighters
demobilized and gave up in their weapons. The most difficult
challenge has been the application of the JPL and the
reinsertion process for ex-paramilitaries because leaders
testimony has resulted on information regarding past crimes.
When paramilitary leaders knew that they would in fact spend
time in prison, they encouraged many fighters to provide
unneeded testimony so they could freeze and halt the process.
The Uribe administration eventually extradited 17 top
paramilitary leaders to the United States on drug-relatedcharges when they refused to their commitments under the JPL
to cooperate. Even though all the scandals of this law, the
paramilitaries demobilize many armed men causing an
important effect on lowering levels of crime, violence, and
human rights abuses.
The government created the office of High Commissioner forEconomic Social and Economic Reintegration of Armed Groups
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(ACR); this program will help with the difficult process of
returning paramilitaries to a normal life. The ACR tracked and
monitored some 95% of demobilized persons in the
reintegration program and provided a health or educational
benefit.
When the paramilitaries started to demobilize many of them left
mid-level leaders that carry out their business for them. When
this mid-level leaders knew that their chiefs would not return
from prison or where extradited, they started to create their own
criminal bands such as Aguilas Negras, Rastrojos, Cuchillo
gang, Traquetos (some of them contain as many 5,000
members) and other groups that included AUC units that never
demobilized, former paramilitaries who later returned to crime,
or new recruits with no paramilitary background. These groups
have become one of the many challenges that Colombia will
face in the next years.
5.5. Foreign Direct Inversion (FDI)
Uribes administration proposed an investment based on social
responsibility, which combined private initiative with social
responsibility expressed in three basic areas: first a transparent
relationships between investors and the state, this mean the
respect of the contracts, concessions, taxation and conflict
resolution, second a solidarity with the community and third asocial responsibility demonstrated through a friendly worker
relationships.
With all the improvements that Uribe did and with the
democratic security policy, Colombia could restore the
confidence in the country as a destination for foreign
investment. Todays FDI is three times higher than 7 years ago
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and Colombia was one of the best performers in the region in
2009.26
The government highlighted that Colombias economy is the
fourth largest in Latin America, the income per capita raised 2,3
times and the FDI increased 50% in the last 8 years (the rest of
Latin America grew 20%).27
Font:
http://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/209_Reporte%20de%20Inversion%20en%20in
gles.pdf
The FDI in Colombia was US$6,760 million in 2010, 5% less
than in 2009 but in a general picture it was above the historic
average of the decade. This was mainly by the high
international prices of minerals and petroleum; these two
sectors concentrated 67% of the net positive revenue reportedby Colombia over the last year.28
26http://www.colombiaemb.nl/es/seguridad/documents/ResultadosGobiernoUribe.pdf27http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/economia/2010/08/100802_colombia_uribe_gobierno_balance_economia.shtml
28http://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/209_Reporte%20de%20Inversion%20en%20ingles.pdf
http://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/209_Reporte%20de%20Inversion%20en%20ingles.pdfhttp://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/209_Reporte%20de%20Inversion%20en%20ingles.pdfhttp://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/209_Reporte%20de%20Inversion%20en%20ingles.pdfhttp://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/209_Reporte%20de%20Inversion%20en%20ingles.pdfhttp://www.investincolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/209_Reporte%20de%20Inversion%20en%20ingles.pdf -
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Rate of extreme poverty
font: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2011-Colombia-Cultura-
politica-de-la-democracia.pdf
As for inequality, it was not possible to find GINI indicators that
were comparable in time; the reason was due the changes in
the methodology of calculation of this index. However, PNUD
recently produced a Human Development Report in which
Colombia ranks as the fourth most unequal country in the world
after Haiti and Angola. 29
The new measurement includes aspects such as education,
health, employment, life conditions in the childhood and youth
and housing characteristics. So with the new methodology of
poverty measurement, the results showed that poverty has been
continuously declining.
In the period 2002 to 2010, poverty fell 12.2 percentage points
from 49.4% to 37.2%. In 2009 the decline was 3 percentage
points from 40.2% to 37.2%. In addition, the poverty of the 13
main metropolitan areas of the country has had a pronounced
29http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_ES_Complete.pdf
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2011-Colombia-Cultura-politica-de-la-democracia.pdfhttp://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2011-Colombia-Cultura-politica-de-la-democracia.pdfhttp://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2011-Colombia-Cultura-politica-de-la-democracia.pdfhttp://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2011-Colombia-Cultura-politica-de-la-democracia.pdfhttp://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2011-Colombia-Cultura-politica-de-la-democracia.pdf -
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reduction; it decreased 12.7 percentage points from 35.9% in
2002 to 23.2% in 2010. In rural areas the reduction has been
lower compared with the total evolution of the country. Between
2002 and 2010 rural poverty fell 10.6 percentage points from
60.9% to 50.3%. However, in 2010 the reduction was important,
4 percentage points from 54.3% in 2009 to 50.3% in 2010. The
incidence of extreme national poverty, showed a decline of 5.3
percentage points between 2002 and 2010 from 17.6% to
12.3%. The trend in the last year was positive. The extreme
poverty rate fell 2.1 percentage points from 14.4% in 2009 to
12.3% in 2010. In urban areas, the reduction in this period was
4.2 percentage points from 12.3% in 2002 to 8.1% in 2010. In
the 13 largest cities, the incidence of poverty has reached levels
below 5%, from 7.4% in 2002 to 4.6% in 2010 this means a
reduction of 2.8 percentage points. But the greatest reduction is
observed in rural areas that were reduced by 7.3 percentage
points, going from 32.8% to 25.5% between 2002 and 2010.30
The GINI coefficient nationwide has remained around 0.56. In
2010 it recorded a slight increase in inequality, rising from 0,557
to 0,560. In urban areas the GINI coefficient shows a coefficient
of 0.54, it had a minor increase between 2009 and 2010 from
0,534 to 0537. In the 13 main areas the coefficient passed from
0,548 to 0,528 in the last 8 years. The rural area has the highest
GINI reduction of 5.4 points between 2002 and 2010 going from
0,524 to 0,470. In 2008 Colombias GINI was 0.59, one of thehighest, if not the highest of the planet.31
The statement and the Evolution of Multidimensional Poverty
results indicate a reduction in the national multidimensional
30http://www.resistencia-
colombia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1118:jimy-rios&catid=20&Itemid=6131http://www.semana.com/nacion/desigualdad-extrema/153207-3.aspx
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poverty analyzed in the same period. The percentage of poor
people nationwide IPM was reduced by 29 percentage points
between 1997 and 2010, from 60% to 31% in this period.
Between 2008 and 2010 the incidence of multidimensional
poverty fell by 4 percentage points from 35% to 31%. In urban
areas there was a multidimensional poverty incidence of 24% in
2010, 27 percentage points lower than in 1997 and 3 points
below 2008. In rural areas the incidence in 2010 was 53%, more
than twice the percentage of poor people than in urban areas.
With all these problems, the national government promised to
reduce monetary poverty to 32%, extreme monetary poverty to
9.5% and multidimensional poverty to 22% by 2014.32
In 2010 the number of poor people according to the
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) was 13.9 million. Between
2008 and 2010 the number of poor people by IPM fell to 1.5
million. So, between 2009 and 2010, the national poverty went
from 40% to 37.2% and the extreme poverty fell from 14.4% to
12.3%. With the previous methodology it went from 45.5% to
44.1% and from 16.4% to 14.8% respectively. It can be
concluded that the poverty decreased but not inequality. This
can be explained due a higher growth, lower unemployment and
monetary support.
5.7. Corruption
In terms of corruption the balance for Colombia in 2009 wasnt
good, this does not show any improvement. By contrast, in
recent years has deteriorated. This was revealed by the Index of
Corruption Perception 2010 (ICP) published by International
Transparency, in which the country appears with a rating of 3.5
32
http://www.resistencia-colombia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1118:jimy-
rios&catid=20&Itemid=61
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on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the highest perception of
corruption and 10 the lowest.
In 2009, Colombia had a rate of 3.7 and was number 75 in the
world rankings, in 2008 the score was 3.8 and ranked 70.
According to a report released by Transparency for Colombia,
for 2010 Colombia fell from 75 to 78 among 178 countries. The
situation has brought concerns because during the last 7 years
before the report Colombia maintained its score that was 70.
And this rank does not show any improvement for 2011
because Colombia occupies number 80 within 183 countries
evaluated and is in the group of poor graded. Colombia
achieved a score of 3,4 over 10, this means one tenth less than
the measurement reported in 2010.33
The measurements of National Transparency Index also
revealed that of 138 public entities assessed in 2007-2008, only
four were located at low risk of corruption, while 41% was at
medium risk and 17% in high and very high risk of corruption.
With in this study, Colombia looses almost 4 billions of pesos
due corruption, and according to the corruption index Colombia
is located with a rank of 3,5 (being 5 the lowest) and has a level
of impunity in 4.5.
In previous studies of the Americas Barometer in Colombia, the
problem of corruption had taken secondary place between theconcerns of Colombians. However, in 2011 the percentage of
people who point out corruption as the most serious problem
facing the country increased dramatically. Other studies made
by Electoral Observation Mission, MOE, and the Observatory of
Democracy at the University of the Andes corroborated the
gravity of this. The study reported that of 157 opinion leaders
33http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/politica/articulo-314323-colombia-otra-vez-rajada-percepcion-sobre-corrupcion
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surveyed, 25% said that corruption is the most important
political problem that currently has the country followed by the
concentration of power in the executive with 20%, and
uncertainty about the third presidential term with 17%. The
graphic below shows that between 2010 and 2011 the
proportion went from 4% to 12%; by 2011 corruption appeared
in third place among the specific problems, only overcome by
violence (21%) and unemployment (20%).
Font: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2011-Colombia-Cultura-
politica-de-la-democracia.pdf
This increase is related to the multiple scandals that have
erupted through Uribes government. One of these involves
Andres Felipe Arias, who was Minister of Agriculture during the
Uribes government. He is in prison for acts related to the
irregular granting of loans that were originally intended to
promote agricultural projects but according to reports, this
money ended in the hands of large owners that had contributed
to the campaign for the nomination of the Conservative Party of
Arias. Another of his ministers of Agriculture was involved in the
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"plundering" of hundreds of hectares of land from farmers in the
northwest of the country that ended in the hands of large
companies. Another event that has had great resonance with
corruption involves the intelligence agency, the DAS. During
Uribes period, illegal actions were done such as tracks, traces
and illegal harassment against politicians, judges, activists and
journalists who oppose to his government. These facts were
added to the processes developed in recent years against
politicians, mostly members that accompanied President Uribe,
that were linked to paramilitary groups. Another case of
corruption during the Uribes administration was the deviation of
hundreds of millions of pesos from payers to accounts of
functionaries from the office of tax administration known as
DIAN. It was also discovered the scandal of false positives. The
government of ex President Uribe and in its time the Minister of
Defense Juan Manuel Santos (formal President) measured the
outcome of the fight against illegal groups by the number of
deaths. This situation led that some of the militaries kill innocent
people and the catalogued them as terrorists so they can show
results.
So it can be concluded that corruption is one of the main
problems of Uribes governance and that has impacted the
society. As mentioned before, corruption has become a growing
concern among Colombians and is having a great impact in the
confidence within the country and foreign countries.
5.8. Public Administration
In the presidency of Uribe it was created an instrument that
helped face the difficulties in the previous years. This instrument
was the Renovation Program of Public Administration (PRAP)
that was included as part of the National Development Plan
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2002-2006, in this part of the plan it talked about the need to
make an advance on a State Reform, in addition to
administrative reform this contemplated changes to justice and
the political regime. Act 790 of 2002 gave the president
extraordinary powers to reorganize the administrative structure
such as the abolition or merger of ministries and administrative
departments and the creation of entities.
PRAP's strategy was defined in a short term, there were created
the vertically reform interventions which means the redesign of
entities belonging to the administrative sector. These
interventions were aimed both at increasing efficiency in fulfilling
the mission of the institutions function as reducing operating
costs. Each intervention was classified into one of the following:
changes in plant or structure, merger, creation or liquidation
Vertical Reforms
Reform of public entities
The restructuring of the State can be measured by indicators
of the fiscal impact of the reform and indicators of results, in
terms of number of: Reformed bodies, number of job cuts and
savings by reducing payroll, and number of processes
liquidation.
Indicators of fiscal impact
The State reform process has contributed to save around $
24.7 billion pesos; this is equivalent to a fiscal impact of
5.36% of GDP. These savings are re-presented in lower
pension liabilities for the abolition of fees and pension reform,
improvements in the operational balance of public entitiesand in profits from the sale of assets and public Banks.
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The document also indicated that in the period 2002-2010
despite Uribe's reform that was seeking to stop the growth of
expenditure and pressures on fiscal stability, the balance of
external debt, rather than decline, increased passing from U.S.
$ 22.838 million in 2002 to U.S. $ 62,114 million approximately
in 2010. Besides, the so-called 'fiscal gap' also increased by the
end of 2009 it was at $ 9 billion. By the other hand the PRAP
also sought to strengthen the Directorate of Legal Defense of
the Nation that is in charged by the Ministry of the Interior, by
the end of Uribes period this goal was also not fulfilled.35
35 http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/politica/articulo-259433-antecedente-de-reforma
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CHAPTER 6
NEW PRESIDENCY OF JUAN MANUEL SANTOS
6.1. Presidency
Juan Manuel Santos is the actual president of Colombia for the period
2010 -2014. In previous years he was part of the liberal party until
Uribe developed the party of the U, afterwards he was the minister of
defense for 2006 until 2010 during Uribes presidency. Santos had a
clear idea that if the third reelection of Uribe would not happen he
would enter in competition with the other candidates for the
presidency. As president, Santos has highlighted five "locomotives" to
stimulate economic growth: extractive industries, agriculture,
infrastructure, housing, and innovation. His biggest challenges for his
presidency are inequality, underemployment, and drug trafficking, also
Colombia's infrastructure requires major improvements to sustain
economic expansion.
Since the beginning of his campaign, Santos based his government in
the continuation of the Democratic Security Policy, implemented during
eight years by the ex president. Santos had another big challenge his
relationships with its neighbors presidents of Ecuador and Venezuela
were very poor due his statement of the attack of the camping of Raul
Reyes in Ecuadors territory when he was the defense minister.Another crack in the relationships was the military agree of Colombia
and United States that caused great polemic with president Hugo
Chavez (Venezuela).
With his first months of presidency, the FARC launched an attack to a
prestigious radio station saying that the attack was the welcome to the
new president. The president Santos responded, There is a feelingamong many people that this (the guerrilla attacks) is something they
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want to welcome the new government. If that is welcoming, you will
see the answer to that welcome. After some months of planning and
developing operations Sodoma, in September 19 2010, the armed
forces and policy members bombed a camp of the 48 front of the
FARC in which died a big commander Jorge Briceo Suarez alias
Mono Jojoy.
Another big issue in Colombia is the displacement so in August 2010,
Santos introduced unprecedented legislation to better distribute
extractive industry royalties and compensate Colombians who lost
their land due to decades of violence.
Santos period has had many challenges one of them was that in 2010,
Colombia experienced its most severe flooding in decades, with
damages estimated to exceed $6 billion.
Santos administration continues to pursue free trade agreements with
Asian and South American partners, a trade accord with Canada was
started in 2011 and also that year it was signed the trade agreement
with the United Sates, but the negotiated trade agreement with the EU
has yet to be approved by the EU parliament. With the Improvement of
the relations with Venezuela, the worries about restrictions on bilateral
trade have ease. Also as a great goal, in October 2011 Colombia
signed a free trade agreement with United States.
6.2. Economy
In terms of the economy, Colombia has a better picture due FDI and
new strategies and projects made by the president. Colombia has
been increasing its GDP since the last fall because of the world crisis
as seen in the chart bellow:
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Font: DANE
Colombia experience a fall in its GDP from 3,5% in 2008 to 1,7% in
2009 but then it had a significant recovery to 4% in 2010 and later one
5,9 by 2011. In 2011 all the national sectors register positive rates.
The sectors that had the biggest increase were mining, transport,
storage and communications, the sectors that had a lower increase
were electricity, water and gas supply. During the same year there wasan increase in the exports by 21,5%, the exports by 11,4%, and a total
consumption to 5% compared with 2010.36
In terms of security, the member of the guerrilla groups that were
captured, killed or demobilized show a decreasing tendency from
5,474 en 2009 to 4,673 in 2010 and 3,932 in 2011. The guerrilla
actions were in 2009 a total of 161, dropped to 128 in 2010 and
increased in 151 in 2011. A big concern is the attacks to the
installations that were from 9 in 2010 to 20 in 2011. This indicates that
the conflict is increasing its impact on safety generating a big concern,
considering its symbiosis with drug trafficking. On other terms,
homicide continues the downward trend. Go from 15,817 in 2009 to
15,459 in 2010 and 14,746 in 2011, but the kidnapping comes with a
growing trend: it goes from 213 in 2009 to 282 in 2010 and 307 in
36http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/presen_PIB_IVtrim11.pdf
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attracted more FDI having an increase of 30.2% in the first quarter of 2012. In
terms of GDP it increased from 4% in 2010 to 5,9% in 2011. Another
economic indicators that increased were exports by 21,5%, and imports
11,4%. The security and homicides have showed a decreasing tendency, but
the guerrilla actions and kidnappings showed an increase.
For 2012, the economic outlook report from BBVA highlighted that the local
economy will grow about 5% in 2012; within the report it also showed that
inflation will remain stable and will end by the year at 3.4%.
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