~~E~T~TIN~l~. Vol. 16. No. 2, pp. 135-141. 1992. Printed in Cheat Britain.

0197-3975192 $5.00 + 0.00 @ 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd

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NICHOLAS J.O. MILES and JAMES P. ARTHUR Gilmore Hankey Kirke Ltd, Hong Kong

INTRODUCTION

Urban planning in developing countries is of urgent importance. Urban population growth rates in developing countries remain high and urban areas are contributing more to national output than ever before. Urban areas are the home of an increasing proportion of people in developing countries and are driving many economies of the developing world. Indeed, rapid urbanisation is a key characteristic of development.

However, urban infrastructure is generally poor, and in many cases deterio- rating; urban management institutions are often weak and underdeveloped, and monetary and human resources devoted to urban management and planning are consistently limited. Without improvements in urban management and planning, it is likely that urban economic growth prospects will be compromised and living standards for the majority of urban dwellers will fall or continue to stagnate.

The practical problems involved in devising and implementing urban management, planning and physical works projects in developing countries are the focus of this paper. The paper is based on our joint consultancy experiences in Asia (Dr Miles is an economic planner and Dr Arthur an engineer and urban development specialist).

The paper begins by briefly outlining recent trends in urban planning as experienced through our consultancy work and continues by highlighting a number of problems which can compromise urban planning and physical works implementation. We concentrate on one set of difficulties, namely issues of political expediency and legitimacy in plan and project implementation. From problems, we turn our attention to new directions for urban planning, and conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the new directions on consultancy in the 1990s.

Parts of the paper are intentionally exaggerated and, as such, provide us, and hopefully others, with useful focal points of debate concerning the problems encountered by urban planners and the possible responses that can be marshalled against such difficulties.

TRENDS IN URBAN PLANNING

Master plans and high infrastructure standards

Urban planning in developing countries has evolved over the last two decades.

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136 Nicholm J. 0. Miles rend James P. Arrhur

The types of plans used and the way they are implemented have changed. The 1970s and early 1980s saw a move away from large and lumbering sector and area master plans, towards smaller and more flexible structure plans, which act as guiding frameworks for time-bound ‘action programmes and projects’. Further- more, rigid planning controls and high infrastructure standards gave way to more compliant responses to urban development pressures: responses which recog- nised the cost penalties of inappropriate and high standards, and which tolerated a certain degree of ambiguity or ‘mess’ in urban development.

Accompanying the master plan was an emphasis on large public sector capital works and a strong focus on the sectoral allocation of resources and the planning and implementation of physical works. The inefficiencies associated with uncoordinated sector investments and the inappropriateness of large capital projects, conceived within a master plan which quickly became redundant as political priorities and financial resources changed, contributed to a re- assessment of urban planning in the 1980s.

Integrated urban development projects and enabling environments

Integrated urban development projects (IUDPs) characterised urban planning in the 1980s. There are five elements to an IUDP: a structure plan, a group of related, time-bound action programmes and projects, the financial management plan for the executing agencies, the institutional development plans (including staff training) for these agencies, and specific cost-recovery plans associated with the action projects.

Emphasis in IUDPs is on the sectoral and spatial integration of ‘action’ projects, creating government financial and managerial capability and introducing direct-user public service charges and cost-reflecting charging for those services. A step further is the move to ‘contract-out’ public services to the private sector. Good ‘governance’, support for the private section, a balanced budget and improved infrastructure maintenance programmes are seen as necessary preconditions for the success of urban development projects.

Market-based decision-making is now a common underpinning for plan implementation. As direct and - arguably - unconsidered intervention and control by governments is abhorred, so their new role as ‘facilitators’ or ‘enablers’ is trumpeted. ‘Enabling’ often means changing the incentive structure which motivates people. As such, both macro- and micro-economic policy reforms are high upon the agenda of International Lending Agencies, such as the World Bank.

Associated with an enabling role adopted by government is the rise of new forms of public-private partnerships and institutions. In order to reduce the fiscal burden on the State, release individual and group initiative, and draw people away from the paralysing dangers of a dependency culture, it is hoped that tertiary (and perhaps secondary) infrastructure can be designed and implemented, not only with local people but often directly by local people. The Community Development Councils implementing various aspects of the Million Houses Programme in Sri Lanka is one example.

Implementation

Our experience with IUDPs has highlighted the benefits of the following implementation ‘principles’: l Encourage project and policy complementarity. An urban development

project is more likely to succeed if the physical works project (the ‘hardware’ scheme) and the relevant policy (‘software’) environment are complementary and, indeed, coordinated. For example, a micro-enterprise industrial estate or

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the general promotion of the informal sector is likely to be compromised if prevailing rules and infrastructure standards are unfavourable, or small-scale and community-based credit facilities are lacking. Coordinated and targeted policies, projects and programmes achieve maximum benefits.

0 Integrate government (‘top-down’) and community (‘bottom-up’) approaches. Government policies and actions should enable individuals and communities to implement solutions for themselves. Indeed, top-down, government-organised enabling frameworks with community-based actions are more likely to achieve sustainable improvements in living standards. Further- more, government-supported, ‘bottom-up’ approaches are particularly appropri- ate in countries with scarce financial resources and relatively abundant labour resources. An example is the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi, Pakistan. The OPP has been able to encourage families to invest in their own sanitation facilities (Rs47.5 million up to the end of 1989) and has enabled the provision of such facilities at a fraction of the cost incurred by the Karachi Municipal Corporation in similar ‘State’-run schemes. One of the main reasons for this apparently happy state of affairs is the way in which top-down guidance enables bottom-up actions. In the OPP schemes, the beneficiaries use their own labour and the technical staff of the OPP advise on the most cost-efficient use of materials. The OPP representatives went into each gali (street), demonstrated the benefits of proper sanitation and encouraged a local ‘gali manager’ to be elected to organise the gali population, purchase materials and liaise with the OPP. The strong sense of local ‘ownership’ of the scheme and the strengthened success of OPP technical assistance ensures that the sanitation systems are rarely misused. Of course problems arise, but the OPP example is instructive. l Design incremental plans and low-cost solutions. Use the structure plan

framework to allow ‘immediate action’ projects to be implemented as soon as possible: disillusionment with government projects that never materialise is common in developing countries. However, allow a plan and associated physical works to be built up in stages as resources and managerial capabilities permit. Furthermore, use low-cost solutions. High standards are costly, and often unaffordable to the poor. This may seem obvious; nevertheless, political support for high and inappropriate infrastructure standards still exists in many developing countries. l Integrate infrastructure provision and service delivery. To maximise the

effectiveness of infrastructure, it is often preferable to focus on services and service delivery which jointly address infrastructure deficiencies and social and economic objectives. For example, encourage local builders, material suppliers and local contracting skills in conjunction with self-help housing or upgrading schemes. Encourage economic activity through addressing infrastructure deficiencies. At a general level, the principle can be expressed as also integrating production (e.g. the informal sector) and consumption (e.g. shelter) activities. l Ensure financial and administrative capability and political support. If the

relevant executing agencies are unable to fund and manage the proposed projects, very little will happen. If political support from the top is absent, nothing will happen. If the national project director is indifferent to the project, or feels threatened by the project, delay and confusion will reign. Leadership is important.

Experience with implementing IUDPs indicates to us that the disciplines of project members cannot be compartmentalised. A physical planner or a municipal engineer must be more than their strict professional definition might imply. The rise of the multidisciplinary specialist or urban project manager is briefly discussed in the paper’s conclusion.

138 Nicholas J. 0. Miles and James P. Arthur

PERSISTENT PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES

The move from the master plan to the integrated urban development plan or project is an attempt to make urban development planning more responsive to the immediacy of political priorities and the needs of the urban population, and directly take into account the limited financial and human resource capabilities of urban management institutions.

Experiences of the 1970s strongly demonstrated that without community ‘involvement’ and effective urban financial and resource management, an urban plan, no matter how well designed, is liable to fail. IUDPs are undoubtedly a positive move forward. There are, however, a number of problems which can markedly reduce the benefits of IUDPs. Within this paper, we have chosen to describe only a limited number of these problems, preferring to concentrate on the difficulty of planning in a highly charged political environment: l Community and local initiatives. Local initiatives are not always responsive

to the needs of beneficiary populations when they are the formal creation of a bureaucracy which is often the IUDP executing agency. One of the frequently heard criticisms of the Sri Lankan Million Houses Programme referred to above was that the ‘top-down’ financial and technical assistance given to the Community Development Councils was susceptible to delay, and poorly integrated into the existing social networks and ways of operating of the target community. It appears that it is still difficult to be responsive to the needs of a community within the framework of an IUDP, characterised by formal, if not rigid rules of project implementation. Furthermore, community participation or control can be threatening to the prevailing social order, and, as such, is often wearily treated by many executing agencies and their political overseers. Community development programmes do heighten political awareness, which may or may not be welcome. l Full cost recovery and access to urban services. Infrastructure projects are

often targeted at low-income communities and areas and yet require full or a high degree of cost recovery, which is often a stipulation of an International Lending Agency. In Peshawar, Pakistan, for example, despite rumours that the poor can obtain money from the extended family, it is common to find that the low-income household’s capacity to pay for a plot in a site and services scheme falls well below the market price for serviced land. There seems little wrong with the public sector acting as a private developer by selling large plots at market price (well above the cost of serviced land in Peshawar) and cross-subsidising downwards. The argument that market pricing for all plots prevents speculation does not hold in London, Frankfurt or Peshawar. It merely excludes the poor. Full cost-recovery and market-based service pricing can be taken to extremes, resulting in developments which only marginally provide for those in greatest need. Perhaps the spatial unit for cost-recovery should be the city, not a specifically defined area; perhaps indirect charging for the poor may be more appropriate. l Wealth generation and purchasing power. An IUDP is often driven by and

begins with an urban infrastructure deficiency analysis. An assessment of the opportunities and constraints on economic development and business growth is frequently a secondary task. Physical projects are often seen as ‘Bankable’ projects which attract money more readily than seemingly intangible economic development projects. However, the lack of purchasing power is a fundamental constraint on infrastructure development, particularly if full cost recovery is an objective. Wealth must be created and the poor must be integrated into the economic growth process. Increasing and diffused purchasing power is the basis of a strong economy and vital for the development of domestic industry. Past experience indicates that concentrated wealth rarely trickles down, but often

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limits economic development. Economic and physical planning cannot be separated; it is, however, easy to do just this. Perhaps the order in which projects are conceived and implemented should be re-thought; micro-entreprise develop- ment before the new road? l Politics, political pressures and political expediency. Urban development

planning is political; the plan seeks to alter and improve how the urban area is designed, managed, directed or even controlled. The plan can directly affect how money is made and capital accumulated and, as such, can quickly become a focal point of political action. Such action frequently surfaces in IUDPs. The way in which political action and pressure arise and the social and economic effects of these actions will depend on the nature of the particular society in question.

The case studies given below are designed to highlight some of these difficulties: the studies are derived from our work in the countries concerned:

(1) Manila residential subdivisions. There are numerous residential sub- divisions within and surrounding Manila in the Philippines. Very few secondary roads have been built in and around the subdivision. The lack of through routes will severely constrain future urban development. Why were they not provided? The private developer who built the subdivision wanted to maximise the saleable land. The overseeing planning officials -who designed many of the subdivisions - are poor, while the developer is relatively rich. Financial inducements and political pressure ensured that the developer was able to achieve his aims and much of the subdivision planning was circumvented. There is no incentive built into either the prevailing social and economic system or, more specifically, the planning system, to encourage all actors to take a longer term view. (2) Philippines market development. As part of the World Bank funded PREMIUMED project (Programme for Municipal Infrastructure. Utilities, Maintenance, and Engineering Development, commenced 1981), a number of selected local Councils which were offered the choice of development projects often chose markets, bus terminals and slaughterhouses in towns without adequate water supplies, sanitation or solid-waste collection. The choice was frequently justified on the basis of the revenue-generating possibilities of the markets. As market revenues accumulated, attention could be devoted to sewerage, sanitation and solid waste. Furthermore, a number of the Councils were wary of assuming a debt with a 12-14% interest rate without spending the money on revenue-generating activities. To date, however, the project has provided primarily market development schemes; money has accumulated from the markets but infrastructure improvements are still required. (3) Peshawar infrastructure development. In Peshawar, Pakistan, the very localised political control over development expenditure often results in uncoordinated and, hence, inefficient infrastructure provision. Votes can be won by sinking a tube-well, regardless of where the best position is for the well or whether the well will adversely affect the underlying aquifer. Furthermore, sanctioning infrastructure expenditure is a common method of increasing an otherwise meagre public-sector salary. The ‘fault’ may lie not so much with the individual, but with social and economic structures within which those individuals operate. At one level, a solution could be to double the salaries of the planning officials, halve the staff, and strengthen the anti-corruption laws. This is a rather superficial solution. At another level, we need to consider whether and how to disengage a range of planning functions from political pressures and what constitutes political legitimacy and how that legitimacy is established and maintained. (4) Peshawar sewerage systems. As part of the UNCHS-funded development plan for Peshawar (1986-1988), the front-line executing agency, the Peshawar

140 Nicholas J. 0. Miles and James P. Arthur

Development Authority (PDA), requested that University Town, a pres- tigious area of Peshawar, be given a sewerage system in preference to other areas in the town. The reason given was that full cost recovery was more likely in University Town as household incomes were high. Infant mortality, however, is low in this quarter, many houses possess septic tanks, housing plots are large, and the general environment is clean and well maintained. Such characteristics are rarely encountered outside University Town. Further- more, collection rates of the Urban Immovable Property Tax (property rates) in University Town are among the lowest in Peshawar. The argument for sewering University Town is thin, but the political pressure in favour of a sewerage system is enormous. Are the type of political interventions described above the inevitable outcome

of the process of development? Will it always be difficult building into embryonic and struggling economic and political systems a positive valuation of long-term benefits? The answer to the first question is yes, to the second, hopefully, no. As ‘consultants’ we are, however, still left with the task of rationalising our role in relation to urban development planning and the political realities encountered in numerous developing countries. Responses that can be adopted will depend on the position of the consultants (designers and implementors or advisers) and the nature of the society within which one is working. The national, cultural and economic backdrop and the educational levels of target beneficiaries in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Thailand are different and demand different responses; the tyranny of the template must be avoided. There may be, however, a range of more concrete actions that can be taken, some of which may accommodate such potentially pernicious problems.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN URBAN PLANNING

Given below are a few brief thoughts concerning the direction that urban planning could take to increase the value of IUDPs:

(1) Concentrate on public-private sector partnerships. Use non-govern- mental Organisations as an alternative vehicle for development. Moreover, encourage private-sector investment by seeking out common interests between the public and private sectors. For example, direct foreign investment encouraged within an urban plan should not be sealed within ‘Export Processing Zones’ or ‘Free Trade Zones’. The public sector should devise, with the investing firms, training and apprenticeship programmes, local sourcing pro- grammes, joint housing schemes and the like. The firms could, and should, be a positive catalyst in the local economy and become involved in the urban development planning process to the mutual benefit of the firms and the local area.

(2) Encourage community action. Try to involve the community in decisions concerning the provision of primary and secondary infrastructure as well as tertiary infrastructure. A wider understanding of the nature and funding of major infrastructure works should increase political accountability.

(3) Concentrate on site- or project-specific actions. Through public-private partnerships, focus attention on a specific site or group of industries, or set of economic opportunities. Split the IUDP up into partnership projects. Co- ordinate and target policies and programmes.

(4) Link top-down, bottom-up, physical and economic planning. In more theoretical terms, we need to define the interface between the top-down and bottom-up approaches and the interlinkages between physical and economic planning. Future IUDPs will be fashioned at this interface. Mechanisms whereby problems are conceptualised and action plans designed and implemented should operate at this interface.

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(5) Integrate strategic long-term planning and IUDPs. Although master planning may be a thing of the past, strategic planning is not. Such planning is absolutely essential as a framework within which the action projects of the IUDP are conceptualised, designed and implemented. But the strategic plan is not an end in itself; it must be continually updated and based on a sound and relevant development philosophy. Few plans are based on a coherent understanding of how an economy works. Such an understanding is vital. Many plans still highlight ‘end-stage’ objectives, whether they be urban form or layout, urban employment or social welfare objectives (the latter often defined by the density of social facilities). It is common for such plans to say little about the process or mechanisms of development by which those end-states are to be achieved. IUDPs of the future should address such issues.

(6) Introduce Councillor awareness projects and do not forget the insti- tutional expert. Without political support, implementing an IUDP will be difficult. However, it is the ‘right sort’ of support that is required. The people who will be ultimately responsible for the project should understand the implications of their decisions concerning that project.

URBAN PLANNING CONSULTANCY IN THE 1990s

Integrated Urban Development Programmes and projects have increased the effective and efficient use of resources in developing countries. Urban planning in the 1990s will be, no doubt, based on the IUDP concept. Improvements to IUDPs may include the suggestions given above. However, experience with IUDPs lead us to believe that the nature of consultancy based on IUDPs will change. We expect three prominent changes.

Firstly, the increasing integration of economic, financial, institutional and physical planning will ensure the continuing rise of the multidisciplinary urban development specialist. Secondly, the days of ‘routine’ engineering or planning consultancy are over; technical capability in many developing countries is expanding. Whereas strategic planning is still an outside skill required by many developing countries, ‘tactical’ planning is not. Thirdly, on-the-job training will assume a greater importance. Getting people responsible for urban planning in developing countries to think about the process of urban development in a more appropriate manner than is often encountered at present will be one of the training challenges of the 1990s. In summary, consultancy may contract but deepen. Whether a multidisciplinary urban development project manager will be better equipped to deal with the issues of political pressure, expediency and legitimacy, however, remains to be seen.