University of Nigeria Research Publications

Aut

hor

OFOR, Luke

M.ENG/2000/OW/0009

Title

Safety and Risk Management in The Oil and Gas

Industry in Nigeria

Facu

lty

Engineering

Dep

artm

ent

Mechanical Engineering

Dat

e

December, 2006

Sign

atur

e

SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN ?'HE OIL AND

GAS INDIJSI'I<Y IN NIGEIUA

OFOR LUKE

Reg. No. MENC/2000/OW/0009 b

DEPARTMENT OF MECIIANICIAL LNG INEEIXING

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

NSUKKA

SAFETY ANTI RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE OIL AND

GAS INDUSTRY IN N1Gk:ItlA

OFOK LUKE

Ree. No. MENG/2000/0WIOOO9

DEPARTMENT OF MECI-IANICAL ENGINl3EItING

IJN1VERSTTY OF NTGEKIA

NSUKKA

DECEMBER 2006

CEiRTlFlCATlON

Ofor Luke, a Post Ciraduatc Student in the ~ e p a r ~ ~ l c t i t of Mechmical Engineering

and with the Registration Number PG/MENG/2000/OW/0009 has satisfac1o1-ilv

completed the requir-crncnts for tllc Courses and rcsearcli work for thc dcgrcc of

master of Engineering ad Managerncnt (Mechanicai Engineering). 'Thc work

embodied in this project rcport is originaI arid has not becn submitted i u part or

full for any other diploma or degree for this or any other University,

Engr. Pro' A.P. Onwualu Prqicct S~~pervisor

...................................... Prof. S.O. Enihe Hend of Departrncnt

...................................... Prof. E A Onyerrgorn P:xternat Examiner

Date

........................................... Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

'I'his study was accomplislied due to the support and cooperation of individuals

and corprate organizations. I cornrnend the efforls of my supervisor, Profcssor

A.P Ur~wualu who, in spite of his busy schedules at the Nigeria Raw Matcrial

Research Council, ensured that the prqject was completed, I also acknowledge the

e~icouragemen t and con tri bu t iom of the co-coordiriator, I'rofessor, J . C

Agurlwarnba who devoted more time in educatirlg me and ensured that the projcct

is completed by assisting with reference materials. 1 thank ihe management of

Chevron Nigeria Lirnitetl and Sliell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria

[,irnited who granted mc access to thcir instaltatioris to interview the workers and

obtairl the requircd data. I owe irnme~ise gratitude to t t~c work.ers at Inda, Idarna,

Mcrcn production platforms of Chevron Nigeria 1,imitcd for their cooper-ation and

support in responding t o the questionnaires. In the same vciu, I acknowlcdg thc

support of wor~kcrs at Forcados North Bank and Escravos flowstations of' Shell

Pctrolerm Dcvelop~ncnl Company of Nigeria Limited for their s~~ppor t .

My dcar wife, Mrs. Nkern Ofbr is not leR out. Slic cricouraged me to complete the

clitire program. I also appreciate the support of my children, namely: C:hinonye

Ofor. Anramchi Ofor and Philo~nc~ia Otbr who stood by their dad all tl~is time in

prayer.

I:ir~nlly I give tha~iks to the Almighty God for his guidatice and direction i n this

stl~dy.

,iBSrrlUCT

OiZ and gas exploitation is associated with rnuch risks which t c q u i ~ subslantial

financial and Runtan resources for mitigation. Various companies in this business

are con!inuously in search of solutiotls to eliminate or at least r u h x the

associaled risks in their operation. 'This project is, therefore, a risk assesstnerit

carried out on of'fshoreionshote oil and gas production ~nstalialions in Nigeria. The

assesstnent. involvcd visiting various oil and gas irlstallatiori ,fadit ies and asking

'the workforce about their attitudes to risk, safety iilanagemenl, supen~ision,

procedural conlpliance, risk perception, physical working environment,

occupational health, and so on. This assessment was cart-ied at Chevron Nigeria

Limited oil production platbnns (Inda, Meren arid Idama production platforms)

and Shell Petroleum Company of Nigeria Limited production stations at Forcaclos

North Bank md Escravos. Analysis of response from ~vorkfoce in these

installations indieale key facl1or.s in safely rnanagelnm and itlfonued the

reconunendafions and conclilsion rnade in this paper which crul be uxd as safety

condition monitorulg and knclunark for oil and gas busirlcss in Nigcria.

TABLE OF CONTEN'TS

CHAPTER W O : LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 General Perception of Safcly and Risk - - - - 6

2.2 liisk Perccplion Studics in the Offslior-e Enviro~lt~icnt - - 10

2.2.1 Study on Norwegian Offshore Plat-fbrms - - - - I0

2.2.2 Follow-up Study 011 the Norwegia11 Co~ilinen~al SheYf - - 13

2.2.3 Perceived Risk arid Attitudes to Safety an United Kiigdorn Contineritat

Sllcl f (UKCS). - - - - - - - 15

2.3 Illtrnan Factor - - - - - - - 20

2.3.1 Orgaziimtional Safety Culture. - - - - - 2 1

2.3.2 h4ultiplicity of Safety Culluses - - - - - 2 3

2.4 Elcrncn~s of Safety and Risk Managenlent. - - - 2 8

2.4.1 Traini~ig - - - - - - - - 28

2.4.1. I Safety Orientation - - - - - - - 29

2.4.1.2 Persorule1 Prcrtectivc Equipment (PPF,) - - - - 3 3

- 2.4, f .3 Emergency Response. - - - -

2.4.1.4 Workfor-ce with Incident Free Mindset - - -

2.4.1.5 Uehavior Rased Safety Program (BBSP) - - -

- - 2.4.2 Pre-Job Planning - - 7

- - 2.4.3 Audits arid Reviews. - - -

- 2.4.4 Management Commitment - - - -

2.4.5 Accident Reporting lnvestigatioti and Record Kecping -

2.5 Cranc, Rigging arid Lifting Operation - - -

2.5.1 Conducting Crane and Rigging Operation - -

2.5.2 Rcconuwmkd Kiggirrg Procedum - - -

2.5.3 Inspection Frequency atid Record Keeping - -

CHAPTER TIIREE: METIIODOLOGY - 3. 1 Qucstioririair~ Design - - - - - 5 1

3.2 Tlie Questionnaire - - - - - - - 5 2

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS Sample CImacteristics - - - - - -

I'csceptio~i of the Risk of l-Iuardous evcnls in the Ins~allatioil -

Perception of the probability of Injury 10 Personnel from

I lazardous Evcnts - - - - - - -

Pcrccption of Risk Associated with Work 'I'ask - -

Accidcnt statislics (Historical Data) of tlw l~istallation - -

Effect of Type of Instalraficsn [Occupation and Exyeriencc

on Risk Perception - - - - - - -

Type of l~lslallatiori - - - - - - -

Carrses of Acciderit - - - - - - -

4.7 Personal Accident Dab -

4.8 Accident Cost and Frequency

4.9 (icnerrtl RecommendaZions

4.9.1 Cornmunication - A

4.9.2 Sihlat~onal hwareriess -

4.9.3 Tcam Work - - -

4.9.4 Decision Making - -

4.9.5 1,eadership - - -

4.9.6 Persorial L,irnitations -

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATZONS 5 .1 Conclusion - - - - - - - - 74

5.2 Recotnrnerrdation - - - - - - - 75

REFERENCES.

vii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I , t BACKGROUND T O THE PROBLEM

In geoeral te~ms, decisions in the oil and gas productio~l industry are always under

conditions or risk and uncertainty, For instance, Shell D'ilrcy (now called Shell

Petrolcurn Developrnalt of Nigeria 1,td.) began prospccti~iy for oil in soutlicnl Nigeria

with the optirnism of finding oil in cornrnercial quantity at locatiorls in Oghe (Eriugu

State), llluo (Imo State). Months later, it discovered that these locations I w c more of

gas reserve than crude oil. This search continued with attendant losses until January,

1956 when a successful oil wefl was drilled at OIsibiri (Dayclsa Stale).

Similarly in 1968, tlic American oif indusiries began oil prospecting in the Santa

Barbara channel, off ihe coast of California. At the time 3f initial lease salcs. i t

seemed to be a general consensus within the industry that the oil potential of the

charulel was n virtual certainty. But when drilling bcgan, the story changed.

The economic md paliticaI sih~afiorr at any pint in linw prescnts anothcr determinant

factor. As cvidcncd by the ncvcr-bcforc-cxperienced instability of the world crudc

oil prices since 1980, the factors da t ing to developnlenl and exploitation of a

discovery can Be dillicult to predict. It is no Ionger valid to assumc that future cnde

oil prices can be predicted with certainty or that it wilI only fllrctuate duc to local

rnarkct dernaticl and supply pattenls. It is now clear that cr-udc oil psiccs are subject to

tnuch larger world widc set ofpolitical and economic factors and conditions.

More risk factors emerge when thc oil and gas have been found in commercial

quantity. 'This risk relates to producing the oil; otherwise called "operational risk."

I'I~lman reliability factors and sometimes natural disasters havc made oil and gas

installations highly vulnerabfe to unccrfainties of safety and security. According to

Kathryn Mcams (1995X "sucioteclinical systems in the oil indushy have become

increasingly complex and although hardware reliabilrtics have unproved suhtantially,

human reliability issues remain a precipitating factor of well publicized organimtiorial

disaster".

Attendant losscs arising front equipment f'aillilure, hurnan factors and nahlral disasters

have beconie al~tiost uquantifiable even in our local ci~curnstmces. Operating oil and

gas industries wor!d wide have encountend colossal losses as a result of fire.

equipment failure arid the like.

The Pipcr Alpha Oil Platform disaster of July 1988 is a case in point. The explosion

and desbuction OF this oil platfonn killcd 167 people, injured and trautnatized thc G 1

s~u-vivors. Sirnilarb. the fire incident of 24' July 1944 at Texaco Refinery (Penlbroke.

Wales, WK) prwcnts ruiotlier loss definition that called for world attention.

In Nigeria, similar incidents have been recarded in Chevrcm-Texaeo tank fanri at

I'scravos [DcTta .Stale) in July 2002 when a cmdc oil tauk was struck by lightening:

thus resulting lo explosion arid fire. Shell Fetroleu~n Devcloprnent Company,

Exxonh~lobil arid otlicrs have also recorded aiinilar incidents at different tirnes due to

structural integrity of installations, fire, air, water (marine) and land transportation,

dl-illing operat ioa and so ,011.

Ilelicopter col~ld not be recovered becausc depth of water at point of incidcnt was

2008 mctcrs.

Similar incidents h a w w c ~ r m d at various times in many oiVgas; i~istaIIatiorls in the

country rcsuIting in huge losses. These iilcidents/accidents sig118y that adcquate

safety measures are not yet in place to guarmtcc the safety of tlic worker and thc

installations. Therefore, it becomes imperative to study the risk and "safety status" of

oillgis installatioris in Nigeria by interviewing the workers in the i~istallations and

obtaining data on safety issues snd nlatcd mafkrs. Information horn such study

would form a bench mark f ~ r safety ~narragement regdatiori In the country's oillgas

industry to mitigate fiiture occulrcnces.

1-4 O~JI;*,,CFTIVE OF STUDY

Records of acciderits or incidents in the Nigeria oil and gas i~idustry are pre-rquisites

For form~ilating safety regrrlation in this sector. Periodic assessment of the safcty

status of the country's d g a s itistaIlatiot~s is irnpcrative as it informs decisions for

safcty management. Health, environmental protection and safety of the workforcc in

this sector are essential ingedicnts for sustenance i r ~ this indushy.

Over thc years, various incidents have occurred in various instal .atior~s in this sector

nnd it makes scnse to evalaate the impact frorn tirne to time, 4 lot of financial

resources have bccn committed over time in managing safety in these installations and

effecting recovcry measures when the incidents occur.

'l'liis study, therekre, is aimed at assessing safcty and risk management in thc Nigeria

oil/gas industry.

'I'lie study a h ~nalyzes the accidenthncident historical data of some oil and gas

instalIations in the country and the costs associated with such cvcnts over a 3 ycar

pcriod.

1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Thc rcscarcli for subject study was an extensive one. It involved visiting operational

oillgas ir-lstallations at different locations. Thcsc locations arc remote and only

accessible through the water way or Helicopter flight. Company permits were

req~ircd to visit and coriduct surveys with thc workcrs in ~liese installations. This

proccss caused some delays in early completion of data acquisition.

1,itemlure for project revicw was not found in statc govcrnrnent libraries. Rallier

materials were sormcd tiom operating companies and the intemct.

Some of the workcrs issued questionnaire did riot complete thc fortns while olliers had

no inlcresl at alL Present hosfrfitics in the Nigcr Delta region also preserlted a

problcm. Visits to thc i~istallations was only rnlrdc when securiv situation was

acceptable. This study focuscs on only operational risk.

CHAPTER TWO

LITEKATURE REVIEW

2.1 GENERAL PEHCEP'TION OF SAFETY AND RISK

Two factors are often stressed in the definition of risk.. . .the probability of an adverse

event and its possible consequences. I3asically, there is risk inherent in every activity,

but risks wluch are involuntary, uncertain, unfamiliar and poteritially catastrophic are

thc most dificult to accept.

'Those who promote and regulate health and safety need to ~mderstand how people

think about and respond to risk. Without ~ u c h rn understanding, well intentiorled

safety policies may tum out to be ineffective. Technologic:d cxperis mc an

intellectual discipbe h o w n as risk assessment 10 analyze the special qualities of

today% modern Aazards. However, people r e 5 on intuitive risk judgnent, known as

risk perception l o asses and evaluate hazards LI their every day life.

Itecently, inore attention has k e n paid 10 the rolc of risk perception in accident

involvement. In Illis circumstance, it is often useful to make a disthtiofi between

objeclive risk and sub-jective or perceived risk. Objective risk call be expressed in

tertns of annual fatalities, probability of death per hour of exposure and loss of life

expectancy.

Perceived risk i s thc subjective interpretation of the probability of a pariicular type of

accident murripg m d the extent to which the individ~~al is ccncemed about the type

of the accident. It is of interest to discover how a pcrson's subjective interpretation of

the riskiness of a situation affects his decision-making processes and thereafter his

behavior.

IGsk pcrccptiori is a mmplex subject arid cultural, social, physical, political and

psychological factors ctmtributc to how a pcrsoti perceives risk and bchavcs in

response to it. Thc research literature on the sub-ject is extensive because risk

perception and accident itivolve~nent has been asscssed with rcgasd to road safety,

industrial safety in nianufactluing, in construction, and thc oil industry.

Risk p~cept ion and attitudes f'or~n a special problem. People are bad at judging

probability and especially at judging risk. Typically, they are tco hghtened of strange

situations a d too cast~al about familiar ones. 'They also under-~slirnate risks that they

chose 10 rake cornparcd with those imposed upon them. Peopk with different roles in

the work place also judge risks diffcrcntly; trainees may sce risk quitc differently

from supervisors. Thesc differences bctwcen pcople arc riot rnercly CUI-iosities.

€[owever, these is evidence that accidcnt rates are high in g p i i p ~ who cstirnatc risk as

low.

Tllcrc is yct another side to this risk asscssnlent. I t is not "risk" pel- sc that arc

pcrceived but h m d s or various feah~res of decision problems which Icad to feelings

of danger or safety. Hazards have been defined as threat to peoplc and thiogs they

value. and it is the characterislics of hazards rathcr than an abstract concept of risk

that people appear to evaluate. Risk perception is tlius the study of pcople's kliefs,

attitudes, judgments and fceling about hazards, danger and risk-taking within the

wider context of social and cdtural values. Both cognitive psycholoo (study of

human memory, scnse perception, thought md reasoning) a d study of hu~nan

decision-making behavior has contributed to krlowledge about risk perception.

A recent marlell developed by Mearns md Flin hi 6995 has outlined various phases of

risk prccpfion process (see figure 1) and identifies sorne of the social and cognitive

fkctors which can contribute to safe or unsafe behavior (and ultimately accident

invdvement) in the work place.

Fig. I Risk perception modcl (Mearn and Flin, 1995)

The model suggcsfs that at vcry basic level, it is first irnportaril to determine whether

the wurkcr is aware of the hazard. This invoIves not only dctmnining wl~cther thc

itldividual cm actually sense a hazard, but also mcasurc thc individual's "situation

awareness". Knowledge of risk inherent in any hazardous opcmfion includes the

frequency of previous events aid consequences, experience in dcaling with the hazard

and training i l l coping with the hazard.

Knowledge about risk may bc a dcfcnnining feature of the attitude the individwd

holds in rclation to the risk, although attitudes arc also likely to be influenced by

social and culhlral' factors such as commitment of tnanagerncrit and co-workers to

safety, job satisfaction. Unsafe acts, Iapses and mistakes arc eventual causes of

accident. Howcver, carefulness and safcty consciousness pronlotc good behavior and

reduce cliances of accident occurrence. bl any case, attitudes to safety at work place

w i I I be constrained by values, norms, n~lcs and regulations that the system has in

place. In con~bination, all these factors will reflect the safety cdtur-e of the

organiicatkn i n cpcstim. Attcmpls havc been made to rncasirrc safcty ci~lture in

various high-hazard, high-rcliabiliiy industries i11cIuding the cheniical, nuclear and

offshore oil industries. Thew studies have suggested that "pcreeived risk" partly

reflects tlic safety cuhre of an orga~~iation, though it may not nccessarily be tile

prime influeticc in detcrrnining the unsafe behavior and accident involvctnent.

2.2 RISK PERCEPTION STUDIES IN THE OFFSHORE ENVIRONMENT

With regard to the offshore envirorunent, what are the hazards and risks that personnel

arc exposed to? The offshore enviroru~lerit is unique in that it combines the tllreat of

major industriar dangers with tfmse specific la the ail a11d gas txpToratior1 and l o ttic

marine environment. Thcse hwxds i.nclade lrhrcar to Uic stnlcturai integrity of the

installation, fire explosion, blow-ont, accidents; associated with transport of personnel

and supplies, dangers associated with drilling operations, diving accidents and falls.

But how do tliase living and working on offshore platforms perceive the risk inhcrerit

in their remote locatiori and work activities? Do Lhcir risk perceptions match in any

way thc ob-jcctiver risk calcdations arid accident statistics for the offshorn indushy?

Furthtr more, what factors cmtributc 20 feeling of safety and [or lack of them) in the

offshore workforce, and do these feelings, attitudes and perceptions correlate in any

way with accident involvement? h s w e ~ s to lhese queslioris can bc deduced from

studics caiducted on Norwegian olTshore Platforms and United Kingdom Coritinerl[al

Shelf as discussed below.

2.2,l STUDY ON NORWEGIAN OFFSHORE PLATFORMS

Marek, et al (1985) conducted a study of 238 employees (operators staff', drillers,

caterers and crew on the floating acco~nmodatiorl barge) on a Nonvegian oflsfshore

platform, who were askal to evaluate 20 risk sources on a live-point scale ranging

from 'my safe to 'very unsafe'. The results showed that, in gerieral, G I percent of all

respondents considered tlieir work situation ta be safe, while 10 percent considered it

msafe and 28 percent felt neither safe nor unsafe. There were substantial differences

ktween the favr groups of employees, both regarding evaluations of overall safcty

and more detailed assessmnfs of the 20 specific risk sources. Thcre was also

considerable variation in the nunl'ber of risk sources which difyerexit occupational

groups felt sdc or rmafe about. For examplc, catering persome1 felt unsafe about 17

sources of risk, whereas floating and operator groups felt r~nsafe about five. The four

wcupational groups surveyed were thus found to live arid work i n their own 'worlds

of risk' and considcrcd safety from within their own speciiclc Frameworks. Tllcsc

frameworks were dependent an the individual's knowledge of the techmlogy,

processes and operations ion the North Sea platform; prcscnt work conditions and

tasks, organizational and administrative practices; and prior professiolial background.

Again, in W90, a questiomairc sulvey was conducted by Ruridnio on 915 pcrsorzncl

on a range of occupations, employcd on eight Norwegain platIon-ris operatcd by iivc

companies

The aims of the project were:

to measure risk perception (feeling of safety) in offshorc pc~sontiel

to measure their experience of accidents/ ncar misses and

to study the relationship betwcen perceived risk, accidents and iacidents.

The question~laire collected information 011 d~mo~raphics, job sbess, the pl~ysical

working environment, accident involvement, assessment of safcty on board. attih~des

to safety arid perception of the risk associated with rllajor hw~ards, occr~~ational

accidents and specific work tasks. As in previous study above, respondents were

asked to rate trow safe they felt with regard to these hazards on a fivc point scale.

The rcsults indicated that personnel gcncrally fclt safe living and working offshore.

tIowever, p-sonnel must frequently perccivcd risk i n connection with disasters and

major ~ccidents because they focused on the consequences of an accident rather than

the probability WE it occurr-ir~. 'I'he activity that personnel fclt rrlost msafe about was

flying in a helicoptcr; though a number of personnel also felt urlsafc about specific

risk resources that could lead to occupational accidents. Fur-thcrnmre, contractor staff

fclt less safe than operator staff and personnel working on oicler installations rind

installations in start-up phase felt less safe tharr personnel wosking on irrstallntions

that had been irl aperlttiori for four to eight years.

About 25% of persoririel reportcd having had an accidcnt offslicjre and 40% of this

group ~xiportcd more h n one (most respondents had at least five years' expcrierrce

oflshare). Liftitig operations, repair work and ~~taintenance led to most of the ili~jurks

and these operations wcre ~ l s o considered the most risky 011 thc platfonn. Personnel

who felt least safe wcre exposcd to the highest risk and had the most accidents. The

accident ratc was higher on platforms in start-up phase and on oldcr platforms than

those that have heed in aperation for four to eight years.

Conditions such as occupation, employer (that is contracloboperaror) and age of the

platform affected the rclatfonshiys. Ihose with greatest physical workload (drillers,

consbuction and maintenance personnel) experie~lce the most risk and had the niost

accidentdnew misses. These people have the most dangerous jobs and are well aware

or the nctuat risk involved in their occupatiotls.

Furthcnnore, job stress and high levels of perceived risk secm to be related to

accidents and near misscs. Good safcty and emergency response measures were

important for crcating feclings of safety and has a direct effcct on accident prcvcntion.

With respect to this, i t is interesting to note that nearly half the respondents werc

dissatisfied with emergency response training onboard the platforms.

111 conclusion, the s~sul t showcd that perceived risk and organizational stressors made

R considerabk corrtribution to injuries and crrors amongst offshore personnel.

Ftrrtlicnnore, g o d safety and emergency response rncasurcs were particr~larly

irnpo~tant for the personnel's perception of risk. On thc basis of these results, it was

proposed that the operatirig companies should concentsate on the following factors,

Organizational factors, in particular allowing personrlel ro ir~fluencc how the

work is dortc and knowing what others cxpect from you arid what you car1

expect from others.

Safety and nincrgency response measures, in particular crcating confidalcc in

evacuation procedures, emergency response trairii~lg and alarm systern

jpadcularly on the older platfbnns).

Physical stressors, in particular the ergonomics of lifting (wllich lcad to most

injuries).

~t was suggested that these tluec areas should be prioritized for maintellal1ce,

construction, and drilling persollnel.

2.2.2 FOLLOW-UP STUDY ON THE NORWEGlAN CONTINENTAL

SllELF

Four years later, follow-up sludy was conducted by Ilundmo, T on Norwegian

contineiital shelf involving a sarnple aE 1 t78 persoiincl cliiployed by ten companies

on 12 platf'onns. The aim of this project was to rnanitor changes in risk perception,

organimtional factors and job stress in the working e ~ ~ v i s o r ~ m e l ~ bchveen 1990 and

1994 and to asses the reasons for thcse changes. The questionnaire used in thc survey

was si~nijar to thc one used in the first shrdy; however, thc ncw questionnaire also

included questions fibout job satisfaction, satislaction with safety and emergency

response masurcs, current job situation, social support and risk behavior ( that is

tcndcncy to take chances a? work).

'T'lic rewlt showed that, overall, perssnrieT feIt safer in 1994 than in 19901; though one

in four employees sfill did not fed sak Perception of risk i:l relatim to rnajos

disasters had decrcased. The reason for thesc greater feeling of safety did not seem to

be due to increased experience on ihe job, but rather due to the pcriod of time that

had clapscd (G years) since the Piper Alpha disaster [an offshor-c platform explosion in

whic11 167 people were kilkd) occurred. With regard to organizationrtl factors,

personnel sectn to be exposed to less job stress in 1994 than in 1990, tllough 25% still

cxpericnccd job shcss. There was dso a decrease in the proportion of workcrs who

experienced physical strail1 in the working ct~vironmcnt.

The factors affecting perccived risk were nearly identical to those found in the 1990

study, with both studies showing that organimtiaial and social factors were critical

for feeling of safety an thc platforms. General satisfaction with management.

rnasage~netlt corn~nihnent and involvenmt ill safcty and social support g a ~ e r ~ t e good

feeling of safely and make the workcrs cany our thcir task in a more safe rnmncr.

Thc relatimlship betwcen job stress, perceived risk, behavior and safety is an

interesting one. The first two factors are seen as contributing lo strain (perhaps ill

fonn of anxiety) which lcad to ~ncntal and physical tensions for the indiGdua1

concerned. These reactions affcct bchavior and ultitnatcly safety. As Kund~no (1989)

puts i t "If pcrsoru~el realize h y are exposing themselves to risk, they experieocc

strain which impairs their judgment and incrcases the probability of accident. They

thcreforc feel unsafe which fullher rduces their coritrol over the situation. Tinis,

paradoxically, the red risk can actually increasc because personnel perceive the risk

accurately and know diat in cellain ci~urnstames, various factors can inflr~crlce thcir

ability to perceivc and respond to h~ards" . In other words, personnel are aware of

the risk and also aware of the factors which can impair- their risk perception.

2.2.3 PERCEIVED RlSK AND A131rI'UDES 1'0 SAFETY ON UNITEI)

KINGDOM CONTINENTAL, SIIELF (UKCS)

Althougli the Norwegians have been studying risk ptrccption in their offshore work

force since the early 1980s, little conrparable work has been done in the United

Kingdom sector. In the mid-to-late 1980s the emphasis oe UKCS was on

investigating the relationship between the occupational stress, mcntal hcaltll and

accidents in offshore p c r s o ~ e l . The 1990s, however has wittiesscd a shift i n above

emphasis, partly duc to the Piper Npha disaster m d the Gcwemrncnt legislation

stetnmirrg from i t . For cxarnple, a study orr the effectiveness of ofTshore safcty was

corshclucted by Wright, eh a1 (1992). The study showcd that 71% of respondents

considered the of'fshore working environme~i t to bc safe, 77% considered the

irrstallations they worked on (last trip) to bc safc and 82% considered their

departmenVwork site (on the installation) to be safc, but only 6 1'10 fclt that safety was

given sufficient priority oK~hore. In addition, 5G% believcd that irldividual

carekssness had led to unsafe workit~g conditions and 29% Yarned oucnvork or

tiredness for accident occurrence. lnadquale !mining, insufficicnl or in appropriate

inrimnation and ignorance of safety regulations werc also given as reasons for lack o f

safety. It was clear that the individuals considered that they had responsibility for their

own safefy, although workmates, safety oflicers, immediate superiors of offslshorc

installalion management were also perceived as sharing s m e r s f the responsibility

sirice tlshcse same ycopk m-c thc oncs who sliould make decisions bout safety.

A recornmendation in the public inquiry into the Piper Alpha dis~sier statcs rhat "it is

e~s~lshtial to create A corporate ahnospliere or culturc in which safcty i s understood 10

be. and ~cccpled as tlic number onc priority" (page 300 of the recommendation). As a

rcsult one UK operating company has attmpted to measure its "safety culture" as

parl of its safety management system review protocol. In the study made by

Alexander, et al(1995). a total of 558 onsfshore a~id offslshore cinployees (5 1% w,spollwe

rate) completed a questionnaire which included questions on sociademograpliic and

crnployrnent charactelistics, accident involvement and attitudes to safety. The authon

reported that a measure of rlie safety culture cordd not be reliably detmutrated but

they identified six key factors which underpiinled employee's atfih.de to safcty. These

were:

0vc1.t management commitment

Personal need for safety.

Personal appreciation nf risk

Attributions of blame

Co~iflicl and controi

A supportive environment.

With regard to conflicts and control, Alexander, ct al (1 995) reported that those with

snpervisoiy and managerial responsibility appeared less reluctant to take risk and

cornpromisc safety than those without such responsibility. Furthemorc, managers nnd

supervisors seemed more convinced that a "no-blanie" culturi: cxistcd within the

cotnpray and perceived production bmals as compatible with safety goals.

Again; follirwi~lg the UK safety case legisistation, a comprehensive study of risk

perception and safety in the UK oiI and gas irldushy was can-icd orlt in 1994 using a

qucstinnnairc sirnilar to that used in Norwegian offshore platforms (1990). The strrdy

survcyed a sample of 622 workers on six oil and gas platfcmls on thc United

Kingdorn Continental Shelf (UKCS) in order to: (I$ describe thc risk perception by

work force and comparc them with objective risk calcrrlations that had k e n carried

out in safety case preparation arid (2) examine the relafionship between pcrceivcd

risk, historical accident data, quantitative risk assessment and attitudes in safety on

production platforms. The results indicated that this samplc of offshore workers

generally fclt safe and their risk perception appeared to be reasonably accurate when

compared with the rclalive risks calculated Cbr their platfonn's safety case and fron~

historical accidenr data. With rcgard to hamrds to the installation, pcrsormel felt less

safe wi~lr regard to the possibility of being injured by an cxplosivr~ arid the installation

bcing l ~ t by a vesscl. Regarding hazard In the individual, person~icl fclt lcast safe

about being hit by a falling object and slipping. As in No~wegian study,

organizational factors ..... management comiment to safety, attitudes to safcty

versus production and so on had the greatest direct cffcct on workers' perception of

risk and their satisfaction with safety measures. Purlhcrrnore the individual factors

which had a direct erect (alFtcit small) on previous accident i~ivolvetnent incl~~ded

safety attitudcs, risk perception and satisfaction with safcty.

The section of h e questioruiairc which dealt wit11 safety attit~~dcs revealed some

interesting results. Respondents were asked to what extent they agced or disagced

with a set of statements regarding safev and accidents, on a iivc-point scale ~~anging

from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". It was interesting to note that about half

the sample agreed with statements which implies that productio~l was solnetiltm pllt

before safety. In addition, personnel secm to bc aware of the cal~scs of accidents. that

is attributing theln to some extent 10 negligence, lack of care ~ l l d attelltioll, bad

plannillg and managcment. P~rsonnel tended to not have fatalistic attitude tow~rds

accidents, disagreeing with statemenfs which implied #hat accidents were bcyond their

control. However, 56% of the sample still ayrecd that some peop!c are accident-prone.

The study also showed a slight difference betwcen s~~pelvisors and non-supervisors

in tenns of feeling of safety while canybig oul their work tasks and a significant

difference between supervisors and non supervisors regarding attitudes towards

productio~~ vcrsus safety. Supervisors felt that there was less pressure to "somctinles

put production before safety" than non supcrvisq staff. Furthennore a sample of'

onshore managers felt that thme was Icss prcssure la put production beforc safety than

the supervisors.

This result i s interesting because it irdicates fllat either tllc nianagcmcnt are not

communicating this attitude to their work dorcc andlor other perceived factors are

cxcrling their effect on the behavior of the work force,

In conclusion, the results gavc a general overvicw of the perceived state of sakty on a

sa~nple of six offshore oil and gas production platforms and identified the followi~lg

core areas as being worthy of furdm investigation:

Knowledge

lThis shows how individuals perceive ham&, how individuals share and

cotnnlunicate infomation a b u t hazards.

+ Situstion awnreness

This is the perception of the work e~lviror~~mcnt rvllicll illfluences ]low d e c i s h s

are made and deftlies patterns of intmaction at work.

Organizational culture

This illvolves safety attitudes, safety cdtulure and comnlihnenl of matiapers and

fellow workers Lo safcty.

2.3 HUMAN FACTOR

A recent survey carried out on 200 offshore installations in United Kingdom by

O'Dea and Flin (1 9981, both of industrial psycho lo^ at the Universi~y of Aberdcen,

United Kingdom revealed that the greatest diniculty in safety management is

worker's acceptance of safety procedures. Wde supervisors and senior mangers

undoubtedly set the tone and tempo for safety improvement, cstabfish priorities ar~d

allocate resources, there is little evideiice from accidents in the indushy how workers

have responded ui practical terns.

Previous studies by Rundrila (1992) and Flit1 (1996) have shown that workers have

fairly accurate perceptions of the risk they face but that this does not provide a

sufficient explanat ion of why some workers continue to take risk.

However, sornc analysts have advanced soinc r e m m for the recorded risk bchavior

of workers. One of these reasons is competence of rhc worker in his task. 'T'lie geiicral

level of worker's qualification, skill and kmwledge form an essential tool of this

competence factor, with associated aspects rclati~lg rcr selection and twining. 'This also

is likely to be influenced by broader economic conditioils such as the labor inarkct

and available training bud@, In high reliability settings like the oil indust~y, there is

increasing emphasis on competence wen in nan-iechnical skills (leadership, deeision-

7iming) which nrc considered as contributing factors in oricrltating the worker

towards safc practice.

2.3.1 ORGANJZATTONAL, SAFETY CULTURE

In recent years, increasing cnlphasis has been placed on tl- c role of contcxt and

culture it] shaping both the perception and expericricc of risk. Culture was derived

from symbolic intcractioriisrn and has its roots in sociology and social a n t l i r o p o l ~ ~

(Mead, 1934). According to Morari and Volkwein ( 1992), socia' psychologists have

focused on how the individual apprehends and discriminates attributes of the

organization through perceptions, pcrccptuat processes, cues, and cognitions. The

cultural approach analyscs the rmderlying structure of symbols, rnytlis. social drama,

and rituals manifested in dlc shard values, norms, and meanings of groups.

Evidence from a nurnbcr of industrial psyclrofogy studics indicates that workcrs'

perceptions of risk are influenced by the contcxt and culturc of their work

environment, lcading to differenf 'worlds of risk' between professio~~al groups and

levels of seniority within the work organin~tion. If perception of risk and safety is not

a unified phenomenon within organizational settings, how docs o m achieve the

'shared attitudes, perceptions and bcliefs with respect to risk and safety' which are

considered fundamental to the development and proper morlitor-ing in acciderlt

prevention. Witllin the work envimnrnen~, the ability to cornrnlrr~icate to otllcrs about

potential hwards and the ability to take cogniarre of slrcl~ warnings is fundarnental

to controllin€! risks. Professional and social barricrs, however, can often prevent such

a positive statc being achieved.

he notion of a common organizational safety eulture, in whicl~ all members sllare

anitudcs, beliefs, perceptions and bcbavior corlcernit~g (he inlpoltance of safety, has

generated much attention and debate over the past two decades. Wllat beconles

apparcnt once the notion of safety culture is investigated nwrc closcly. is that

organizational members do not necessary have 'a shared nieaning system a b o ~ t

hazards and danger ..,' ('Tuntcr et a!. 19891, but l e d to havc different perspectives on

risk and safety which are dependent apon a range of potential factors. These include

demographic factors such as age, sex, experience, occupation, profession, seniority

and I or situational factors such as work pressure, pccr pressure and the physical

working environment. Indccd, the cxistcncc of safcty si~kulrures within organizations

should not come as a surprise since organi-atbnal rcscxchers havc becrl rnaking

reference to the existence of subculh~res for a umber of years (e.g. Dcnison, 1996).

Pidgeon, 998, makes the following reference to subcultures, which essentially

epitomizes the arguments prcsentcd hi this paper. "We should be vely waly of

viewing culture as an over-arching organizational 'entity'. That notion only ever

existed as corporate rhetoric. Subcuhurcs, their in~errction and tbc nctwork or powcr-

relations that help to define them, arc increasingly importalt considerations in the

field". Tllcre is a dilenuna here between the need for n unificd vision (to

pmn~ote collective activity) and for diversity of thought to cenl with ckange.

Subcultures arc likely to bc a valuable resource for dealing with collective blind-

spots, precisely becalm they can provide diversity of thought on the emerging safety

problems. But note, also, that if the power relationships on a broader organitadonal

canvass (or as imposed externally by the institutional esvironment) cmpllasize

secrecy, exclusion and the 'need to know', sub-cultural exclusivity and blocks to

learning will be the result.

The tenn 'worlds of risk' appears to have first k e n used by a group of Norwegian

psychologists from the University of Bergen fdlowuig a study of the work

environment on Statfjord A -- an oil and gas production platform located on the

Norwegian Continental Shelf. As part of a wider remit of work, Marek ct al. (1985)

measured 'feelings of safety' (risk perception) in four different occepational groups

working on the Statnord A platform; administrative stnv, catering staff, flotel crew

and drillers. They found that each group lived and worked it1 their own 'worlds of

risk' which were constnicted according to thcir:

Knowledge of the technolow, processes and opera ti or?^ 011 a North Sca

Present work conditions and tasks;

Current organizational a11d adniinistrativc practices and

Prior professional background.

Other studies carricd out in the offshore oil industry also reflcct this separation

of the offshore workforce into subcultures. This is not surprising given that at1

offshore installation is work and home to many dinerent t y p s of personnel, who are

employed by the operating cunlpany, contracting companies ;and subcontracting

companies, across a range of professions and occupations. In a questhntraite survey

of 722 UK offshore c~nployces on ten different installations, Mearns e l a!. ( 19%)

measuscd perceptions of thc job situation (work pressure, work clarity, job

communication, job security, risk taking a( work); risk perception; satisfaclioti with

safety measures and safety aHitudcs. They concluded that employees' responses to the

questionnaire reflected different safety climates as widenced by perceptions of the

state of safety on each instalfation involved in thc survey, Furthennorc, perceptions of

the safety climate were, in part, determined by the pa~ticular subculture to which

individuals belonged. Although all the personnel srmeycd could rclalc to the

underlying dimensions which consrih~tcd the safety climate, their. perspectives on all

dimensions with the exception of feelings of safety about a catastrophe occurring

varied significantly according to employer, occupation, supervisory status and

previous accident involvement.

Evidence for the multiplicity of safety cuItures, has also been denionstratcd by

Cillerardi et a!. (1996). They compared the form and conlcnt of explanations for

accidents provided by building cngilreers and site managers at an Italian consh-uction

firm and found that each group addressed problems of safety and .isk from different

interpretative perspectives. The site managers viewed safely in relational t e n s

implying that risk should be dcalt with by protection-oriented organizational

behaviour. The engineers viewed safcty rnaidy in terms of planning and considered

that it should bc dealt with by organizational hllavioor oriented towards co-

responsibility.

Gherardi et al., consider safety to be the outcome and plmess of social activity,

mediated by technologjcal artifacts, situated in interactional contexts and based on

specific working activities not separated from other activities. They point out that

within any organization's structure one cm expect to find several colnnlunit ies each

with a specific safety culture based on:

A particular system of beIiefs, attitudes and copitions sf danger arid safcty

used in their working practices;

A particular social organization of the practices whereby the activity is shaped

by the distribution of knowledge, power, authority ~ n d replation;

A particular expertise required tu become a competent member of that

community.

Wagcnaar (1992) illustrated how practices and activities are shaped by the

distribution of knowledge, power and authority when be consideml how different

hiemrchical levels within an organization might respond to risk. Wagnaar argucd that

bcllaviors leading to accidents oodd possibly occur at three levels: opel.atio~lal,

tactical and strategic. At the operational level, workcn rarely make adequate risk

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i d e r a t i o n s in their cxecutio~i o f routine, skilled, automatic tasks. At the tactical

25

level, middle rnanagcrnent apply mles which are: largely dictated by circums~ances, so

specific assessments of risk may not necessady take place each time a rule is applied.

At t hc strategic level (top management), there are oIterr many risk considcrations,

tradc-offs bctwccn safety and costs and sornetirnes cvcn deliberate acceptance of

calculated risks. Wagner argucs that althougf~ risk-taking i s the cause of most

accidents, those invoIved at the sharp end of the system are rarely in a position to

fully evaluatc the risks they are taking. Since they are carrying out most of their

activities at an automatic, prc-attentive level, there is sunply no capacity for a

conscious consideration of risk. This may be rather an ovcr-sitnplification of thc

situahn, since it depends very much on the type of job being undertaken. tlowever, it

i s perhaps worthwhile noting that workers often lack sufficient information about the

fuller organizational context in which Ihcy are canying out tllcir activities, since they

arc very much focused 011 eomptcting specific tasks at thcir own parlict~lar work-site

within their own particular area of expertisc. Relevant information cornn~unicated by

othcr individuals or groups working at the samc site or from otlw locations within the

organimt ion, may heIp broaden perspectives and givc a morc comprehensive picture,

particularly with respect Ir, risk mtl safety.

In all, while human error is a significant co~itributor to accidents, i t is also impo~iant

to understand that work culture and rnanagemcnt pressrues may crcate conditions

likely to increase errors. Therc is need to have a stcong corporate safety culture and

senior ~uanagernent support to make safcty implementation cffcctive.

Many organizations are yet to move from safety rncasures purely based on

retrospective data or "fagging indicahrs" such as fatalities, lost time incident rates to

"leading indicators" such as safety audits and regular performance rcvicws. It can be

argued that these arc predictive measures enabling safcty conditior~ tnonitori~lg which

will reduce the need to wait for a system to fail before identifying weaknesses and

taking remedial actions. This can also be conceptualized as a switch from "feedback"

to " feed forward'' control (Falbruch and Wilpefi1999). I! i s becoming a clear fact

frorn "Root Cause Analysis" that orgarlizationa! and managerial atten tion to safe&

rathcr than teclmical failures are the prime cause of most accidents.

The explosion and destruction of Pipcr Alpha oil platt'ornl in July, 1998 which resulted

in the death of 167 people (the biggest death toll in industrial accident in United

Killgdo~n for ovcr 50 years) is a case in point The multing public enquiiy (Cullen,

1990) was exemplary in its thoroughress and esrablishcd the most probable sequence

of events that occurred on the night lcading to Bc disaster. This uiquily revcaled

managerial, training and legislative inadequacies that led to latent failure in the

system which allowed these events to occur. Anording to Barret (1991), prior to the

Piper Alpha disaster, the principal management objective was the maximizatiorl of

production with safety ~pec'dtion as co-objective. Now i t is beconling clear that ili$er

production can be obtained through safe operation, thus giving safe@ thc dominant

position over production.

2.4 ELEMENTS OF SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT

2.4.1 TRAlNlNC

This is one of the leading indicators in safety and risk managcmcnt. l'raining mnkn

the worker competent in his area of operation. Coinpelent eniployecs can bc described

as those who are provided with appropriate training lo perform the mponsibilitics of

their position iu a safe arid efficient mamcr at all times. These trainings should

include the following:

Safety Orientation

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), including r~pi ra tory protectioii

Pe~rnit to Work and Job Safety Analysis

Emergency Response Procedures and training for emergency management

Tools and Equipment usage

I lazard communication (example: Material Safety Data Sheet, H a m d Material

infonnation System showing potential exposure and ~nitigatiori measures)

First Aid and Cardiopuhnonary resuscitation (CPR)

Fire Watch

Helicopter and fixed wing Aircraft Safcty

Motor vehiclc and Marine vessel safcty

Fall protection

Drug and Alcohol policy

House kecping

Swing rope and persorme1 basket safe utilization

Use of personal Floatation Device

Confined spaces and I-ecpirctnents

Abrasivc blasting and Hydro blasting

Scaffolding crcction and inspection procedures

Skills/craft training certification (e.g Welding, fitting etc)

Water and Safety survival tsaining

Pre-employment medical evaluations

in some instances, some of the above reconunendcd training may not be reqrrir-ed.

Depending on the nature of service rendered, management has the discretion of

knowing thc training appropriate for the employee. However it is recornmended that it

is better to over train a worker than under train him or her.

2.4.1.1 SAFETY ORIENTATION

The orientation given depends largely on the functions of the e~nployee. I-lowever. for

any particular work sitdproduction facility, orientation should include the following:

I . Objective of Project or Facility

- Scope of the entire projectifacility

- Scope of worker's present assignment

Teams, contractors or stakeholders on the site.

Work duration

Work organization and responsibilities

- 'Team safety goals.

2. Site Cfiyou t

Site layout drawings, maps, and pictures

Access and exit ways, m i r e s a11d canals

- hcation of various services and conveniences

Eating areas

Various work areas

Out-of boutid areas

Muster points

3. Safety Hazards

- Types of ongoing production operations

- General gas and hydrocarbon li~im

- Cranesandhoists

Tag lines

Barricades

Non-smoking areas

Housekeeping

Waste disposal

4. Fcrsonsl Protective Equipment (PYE)

General Dress code

Hard hats

Eye protection

Steel-toeshoes

- Hand gloves

Safety hanms

- Personal Floatation Devices (PFDs) (for sites in thc swamp)

5. Work Permits

Gerieral work Pem~it

Hot work

Excavation

* Confined space entry

Vehicle entry

G. Emergency Pr~paredness and Response (EPdkK)

Emergency contact numbers and radio cat 1 sig~ls

* Notification procedure

Fire extinguishers.

- Caution arid danger signs

- Fire watch (where necessa~y)

Speed limits

Muster points

Safety audits

Notice boards

Drug and Alcohol Program

Prohi bitcd drugs

Pre-employn~ent tcsts: drivers, equipment operators, firc watches.

Pos t-acciden t tests

Random searches and tests

Authorized alcohol consumpt iorl location and t imcs

Consequences of violations

Required Certifications

Cranes and hoists

Eartlmoving equipment

Vehiclcs

Skilled personnel: equipment operators, drivers, riggers atid firc watches

First Aid and Medical Facilities

First aid box

Rep-ling injuries

Eyewash and safety shower stations

Safety Meetings

Tool box meetings

Frequency

Attendance

Documentation

Seruritv

ID Cards and badges

* Prohibited item: guns? other weapons, drugs, etc.

- Secnrity codcs

- Personnel movement and monitoring procedure

Visitors

Safe keeping of valuables

Security personnel

2.4.1.2 PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)

The PPEs should include but not limited to the followings;

J Safety shoe

Rain boot

J Coverall

J Eye glasses

4 Hand gloves

J Safety hat

J body harness

J Bee suites

2.4.1.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Emergency response plan shalI include the rninirnunl require1 nents necessary lo

rescue pcrsonncl from site to safety in emergency sitirations without any sigrlificant

assistance from outside the work environment. As part of the Safety Orientation,

workers shotild be briefed on the Emergency Response Plm. An ernergcricy response

drill shoufd be carried out at regular iritervals 10 reinforce understanding of the plan.

The safety plan shall include an emergency rcspoose plan that is specific to the work

environment.

Any work grol~p shall pmactivcly plan how to respond to incidents sllch as:

3 fire outbreak

> body injuries

'i. fatalities

> other serious emergencies.

.The issucs to discuss in thc emergency plan include but not ili~nited to the

following:

v muster point

3 dedicated transportation systcm for evacuation

'i erncrgency contact nilrnkrs and call sig~ies

'$ notification procedure

2 fire extiguishersifire fighting facilities

9 medical facilities.

'74 t.4 WORKFORCE WITH JNCJDENT FREE MINDSET

This should be incorporated as part of the trainhg given to the worker. I! reouires

that:

erliployees accept responsibility for their own safety and the sarcty of their co-

workers.

enlpIoyees have a rnitldset that all irlcidcnts arc preventable, and that

compliance with all elements of safety regulation is mandatory.

ernployees accept and work towards incident-free perfonriance every day.

empfoyees are obligated to intervene R I I ~ stop unsafe acts, behaviors and

actioris before they result. to incident.

2.4.1.5. REllAVlOR BASED SAFETY PROGRAM [BBSP) I

l'hls program is aimed at reducing incidents by removing hazardous situations and

unsafe bchaviors. This is done by observing thc safe and ~ ~ n s a f e bchaviors that

workers exhibit on the job; dacu~acn~ing ihc observations for management analysis

and communicating positive reinforcement back to workers to strengthen safe

behaviors and discourage unsafe acts/coaditions. Bchavior Based Safety Program

should be based on the following principles:

all injuriesloccl~pational illness can be prevented

sarely i s every om's responsibility and is a condirion ofenlploy~neni.

training is m essential element for safe work plxes

safety audits must be conducted

safe work practices should be reinforced and all unsafc actsiconditior~s must be

corrected promptly.

Incidents and near misses must be invcstigatcd

safety off the job is an important part of overall safety program

preventing injurics/illncsses is good business.

people are the most critical clemcnt m health envirotimental safety programs.

For any adopted BBSP, observations a b u t unsafe acts 01. conditions ~ 1 ~ 1 1 focus on

the following:

personnel Protective Equipment

positions of People

+ conditioduse of hand tools and equipment

* procedures and orderliness

reactions of People

recornrncnded act ion to prevcnt IOCCUIT~RC~.

2.4.2 PRE-JOB PLANNING

All work activities should be planned. This planning phase will involve pre-tour arid

pre-task safety meetings by all key pnonnel tor such work activity. 'l'he widely

accepted tool for this planning are Work permits, 'l'ask Specific Procedures, and Job

Safely analysis.

Work Permits urovide assurance that a11 safety precautions rue in place and that

appropriate work site supervisors are fully aware of the taskoob to be performed and

all the related and required safety prccaulions are i rr place. It also cnsurcs that #he

work site sttpctvisor does not initiate a task or job that may have negative safety

consequences with another on-going work activity in lhc same site. Work I'ermits

identify the responsible persons ahat ensure that work is pcrforrned as required a ~ ~ d

with all safety precautions in plam.

Task Specific Procedures identi@ the specific steps, tools and equipment required for

performing a specific task ar job. They also identify the specific JSAs (Job Safety

Analysis) related to the task. 'This identifies the hazards and means of contdlirlg

them. A well organized field reference binder is the most acccptabk means for having

these procedures readily available for supervisors and workers to review.

-1 JSA (Job Safety Analysis) is a way of reviewing the work scope, idcritifying

llazards and putting remedial measures in place to reduce the risks. With any work

site, identified hazards can change on a rrequent basis. Consequently. the JSA process

should illcluck provisio~is for updating .the JSA as conditions change.

2.4.3 AUDITS AND REVIEWS

Work site audit and review is important in ensuring contpliance to safccy rules and

regulations, This involves an internal inspeclion of an exisling facility to ensure that

the facility is in a safe state for operation. It is often importa~~t and neccssaiy to

conduct thc audit any time a facility has undergone an extendcd shu\dswr~ or facility

turnaround or major modification. Generally, a facility is a work unit or installation

where operatiom and activities create health, environment and safety risks. Examples

p~odllotion platforms, well jackets, lcrninal a d other oil llatldling

installafions.

gas plants and other processing plants

rnaintcnancc shops, warehouses and construction sires

contractor workshops and yards

cons~ruction work Barges

seismic crew and drilling rigs

buildings, other ~ s s e f s within and oficehousing compotmd.

Audit and compliance assurance programs should include, but not limited to the

following:

safety audit and inspection process

safety audit and inspection schedule for workers, Supvisors ~ n c i managers

sarety audit and inspection spread shectkheck list For equipment and work

areas [see appendix 1).

tracking system for responsible persons and closing out action items.

In addition, there should bc hformal on-site safety rnonitori~lg by sopervisors and

workers to ensure that work continues in a safe manncr and this will include:

ensuring that hmuds are being identified and addressed

audit bchavior-based-safety observations.

reviewing work practices and reinforcing standards

providing opportunity for irnniediate feed back

erlsuring corrective action follow-up

I t i s thc duty of management to cnsure that all supervisors and employees cornpIy

with this requircrnent by putting in place a we11 documented plan that can be used as

rcfcrence for coinpliance.

2.4.4 MANAGEMENT COMMITIMENT:

One method of management strategy in safety promotion is called "participative

management". This incorporates a number of interrelated activities, the m s t critical

being rnanagcment invohemcnt in work and safety activities, as well as frequent,

infonnal corrlrnunications bctwccri workers and manage~ncnt. 'l'hese interactioris scrvc

n numkr of useful functions. They demonstrate the managers' concern for safety,

tllcy scrve as a franle of reference for the workforce to guide the approp~iate task

behavior, and they roster closer ties between managers, supervisors anti workers.

Murc recciit evidence suggest that i t is not just management participation and

invo1verncnt in safety acfivities that is important, but the extent to which mar~age~l~erlt

encourage the involvement of workrorce. A g o d nlanAgement, thcreKorc, can ensure

implementation of safety rules and guidelines by:

visiting sites regularly and engaging the ernpfoyces (let tliern know that you

care about their safety)

ensure that safety is always the first and last topic of any disctlssion

~rovide safety feedback recognition as wcll as opportunities for i~nprovement

penonally use proactive safety process

recognize ctnployees rtsc of proactive safety prooess

ensure campliancc with contractor safety expectations

inspirhotivate anployces regarding safety focus

rr~arlagcmenl focrls on leading indicators to irnprolvc safety performance

management creates an open ahnosphere, activdy listening to cancems and

ensuring action arc taken to mitigate issucs

itnpIernent a cc~lification process to reinforce responsibilities

management backs up the dccision of the employee who intervene to stop

unsafe bchavior and actions before incident occurs

2.4.5 ACCIIIENT REPORTING, INVESTIGA'K'ION AND RECORD

KGEPING

An accidenthcident investigation proccss should be put in place and this will include

the following:

accidentflncident reporting process that includes near misses and hazard

identification

accident'lncident investigation process that addresses thc toot causc of the

incident

tracking system for remedial measures close out

rnontllly statistical reporting process for lost time, restricted duly, medical

ii!juries, motor vehicle accidents, and near misses.

a system to report actual hours worked on monthly basis.

2-5 CRANE, RIGGING AND LIFTING OPERATION

A good PerccWF of mordable accidents in the oi7/gas upstream sector is

attributabk to lift and @ging operations.

Betulccn 1'' April 1993 and 31" Match. 1994 there was 52 seriorrs iniwics rcwrted

on the Lhited Kixigdo~n Continental Shelf, Of these incidents, 54.2% were reported

undca four cafegoricsr JiAingkrane operations (20%), slips, trips and falls (IS%),

falling clhjccts (9.6%), handling gods m d materials (9.6%). The study carried out in

five oil and gas installations in Nigcria (chapter 3) indicated h a t about 40%

respondents have had m accident during their career and 15% of these accidents were

attributed to craw-related activities.

This guide bas been prepared to providc consistency and to manage risk during crane

and rigging operation. Because the consequences of a loss incident involving erancs

atld lifting operations may be scvere, only qualified persomel should be allowed to

olrrate the equipment and rig loads. Supervisors should bc responsible for the safe

operation of cranes at their facilities and are responsible for desiEYatM qualified

persolulc] to these duties. All cranes operators a d r i&Ws should have

completed classroom and hands-on training before being allowed to pe r fon crane

operation.

2.5.1 CONDUCTING C M N E AND RIGGING OPERATION

There should be up-to-date inspection records for cranes before they are

allowed CO bc used at facilities.

Bypassing of the boom kick-out, anti-~o-bfock or other- limiting deviccs on a

maric should never be allowed.

r Thc supervisor in charge OF the facility where crane is to be used should be thc

only authorized person to appoint a qualified person for difficult lifts.

Examplcs of dificult lifts arc: (1) IiRs that require special handling due to

equipment configuration or dcsign configuration of the lifting points (2)

cargoes with unusually high cctlters of gravity or instability (3) unusd ly

bulky cargoes (4) blind persor~nel lifts.

When unablc lo sec thc load properly, the crane o v a t o r shodd be aided by a

qualified rigger acting as a signalman.

rn New cratlcs shall have the manufacturer's load chart pstcd in the cab before

they are placed in service. Revised load charts shall be prepared by the

manufacturer whenever cranes are re-rated or modified. Each wvised load

chart shall reflect thc rigging configuration of the crane and shall be postcd in

the crane cab.

Weight indicators tire required on Drilling Division cranes and are

recornttiet~ded for every company crane. Potable weight indicators are

acceptable in lieu of fixed weight indicators.

Weight indicators should be maintained in operational condition.

All qualified crane operator should be knowledgeable of in the use of weight

indicators on their crane.

Anti-two-block devices should be installed on cranes to prevent the main hoist

load block and the headache ball from coming UI contact with the boom tip

sheaves.

Boom kick-out devices should be installed on cranes to prevcnt thc boom from

moving outside its designed operational range.

Thc main hoist load block and auxiliary hoist headache ball should be paintcd

with fluorescent paint such as Dayglow Blazc Orange for rnaxi~niim visibility.

'The walk-around area adjacent to the controls on cranes should be clear of

obstructions and slipping and tripping hazards. Thc tail swing area should be

kept clear of obstructions during crane operation.

Vuring periods of bad weather such as lightning high w i d , or when the cr.me

operator's ability to see the signalman or the rigger is impaircd by darkness,

fog or rain, crane operations should stop.

Vessel stability should be the primary conccnl when loading a vessel. The

captail, of the vessel has the responsibility to ensure the vessel's stability is

for cargo placed upon its deck. The cargo should be positioned on

deck of the vessel to facilitate ease of rigging during off-loading

~~e ra t i ons . Radio Wm-nunication should be between cmne operator,

captain and riggers on thc vessel.

Where crarlcs are positioned in the proximity of helicopter deck 01.

approachhkc-off zones, crane operation should not be srarted while a

lielicopter is landing, taking off or rullni~g on the l~licopter deck.

I f a crane is in use and helicopter operalions kgin, the crane load must be

larlded and securcd before the aircraft lands.

At offshorelonshorc production facilities, cratlcs not in use Jlould havc their

booms cradled.

O~ishorc rnobifc cranes shalf be Eevelcd and shall extcrld and pre-load

outriggers bcfore moving the boom or making a l i f t . A ycllow band should be

pintcd on each outrigger beam lo provide a positive indication or when

outriggers are firlly extended.

Cnnes should be inspccted, maintained and repaired in accordance with

ANS[/ASME 830.5, the manufacturer's recommendation and applicable

standards.

cranes under repair or with known safdy defect shollld be locked taaed

out of service

For m y change in crane corlfigurafion (as boom length, cable size and the

like), a load test shall be performed by a qualified operator and accurate chart

reflecting the change posted in the crane cab for further crane use.

Loads should be outfitted (pre-slung) with an appr-opriate lifting geai-irigging

system. Rigging system should be fitted by a qualified rigger and shall

terminate UI a single point lifi connection with a tag line.

Rigging equipment should bc certified mid idcrltificd by the

manufactur-erisupplier. The rated capacity of slings should be based on the end

design of the end connections. All wire rope slings shoilld bc identified by a

permanent metal tag with the following infortilation: (1) description, size and

length (2) pertinent working load limits (3) supplier's name (7) proof test

certification number and date.

A11 sling tags shodd reference thc ratcd capacity at a ~ninirnum sling angle of

45 degrees (~neasured forrn horizontal planc). Ilowever. thc optimum anglc for

rigging pract.ices is 45-75 degrees.

All in-use rigging and lifiing cquipnicnt (loose gcar) arid pcrsorlnel baskcts

shoirld be inspected and documented rnonthly by a q~~alified riggcr.

All slings sllould be visually inspected by a qualified riggcr each day that they

are used and whenever it is saspccted that they are damaged during a lift.

Load hooks (main hoists, alixiliaty hoists, cable hoists a11d stingers) should

Iiavc safety latches

Cargo containers should be designed according to recognized industry

standards. Specifications should be detailed in drawings arid includc: ( 1 )

container dirnensions (2) material of construction (3) maxj~nurn weight

capacity (SWL) of the container (4) Pad eye or lifting Iug locahms and

dunensions (5) space for lifting the container with a data platc (6) reasonable

space for ~narking total wcight of the container and its cargc.

Horizontal plate clarnps should be used for moving shcets or plate rnetal when

the sheets are liftcd horizontally with a b u r pint lift. Holcs should be cut for

sliackles or padeyes welded (not tacked) to the shect rnetal if the platcs cannot

be lifted horizontally.

f,ifting equipment such as shackles, hooks, and padeyes shot~ld not be altered

by weld uig or cutting.

Minbcontainers, drum baskets, (and cargo ncts ate the preferred means of

lifting dt-urns offsltorc. Drums loaded in mini-containers should otlly be placed

on the floor, not stacked on top of other d r u m or cargo.

Pallet and dnirn hook Iifts should riot be allowed to and fi-oln boats at ofkhore

facilities due to l iamds associated with dynamic lifts. Howcvcr, pallets can bc

used to movc materials around an offshore facility

Compressed gas cylinders (acetylene, oxygen, nitrogen ctc;.) shouid only be

transported in a 4-point prc-slung racks desigticd for the lifting and trxnspol-t of

cylinders. Caps should be in place when ~ r a i s p r t i n g cylinders and the

cylinders mast be secured in place to prevent tnovernent.

Loose itcnrs such as sacks, valves and buckcls should be secured in containers

or in baskets to makc loading and offloading safcr and eas'er within facilities.

Swivel typc or collar type shoddercd eyebolts are acce?tabk but should be

used to rift equiprnerll only in special. Their use is discouraged Ixrcause

rotation of the b a d tnay cause the cycbolt to disengage. A tag line should

always be uscd to help prevcnt rotation of the load. Eyebolts should never be

used under dynamic toad conditiorls. Dynamo type un-shouldcrcd eyebolts are

unacceptablc because any angular pool whatsocvcr will bend the screwcd

shank and lead 10 failure.

Temporary lifling equipment such as beams, chair1 hoist md jacks should bc

siiitable for the intendcd purpose. Bcarns shotdd be fistencd in place with

clamps or tack welds. Use of unsecured beams has caused personal h j r q in

the past and is forbidden.

2.5.2 RECOMMENDED RIGGING PROCEDlJRES

Only qualified riggers should be allowed to rig loads at locations and should be

the only personnel allowed in cranc operation work arcas during rigging

operations.

The rigger, signalman and the crane opcrator should w e API RP 2D lland

signals.

A tag linc should bc used to control the load clr~rir~g lining operations, Tag

lines shall r~ot haw any knots in the free length. A baskel or box (small load)

should have at Icast onc tag line attached to a point on the load. A heavy load

shalf h a w at lcast two fag hies attxlied to the load Cat tllc lower part of the

load).

Prior to making a l i f l , craw operators or riggcrs shall cxarninc the cargo

(irrcluding slings, padeyes and cargo cmtaincrs) arid should rcruse to lift m y

cargo they judge ia be unsafe.

A stinger should bc attttchcd to the load hook ta keep thc main hoist load block

or the auxilia~y Iloist headache ball from corni~ig in contact with the personnel

rigging toads on the dcck of a vessel in an offshore (dynamic) envirorunent.

Slings shall be attached to loads with shackles (no liooks) except when:

I . A s~irrger is attached directly to a load for a one-point lin.

2. Adjustable cl~okcr- slings are uscd.

3. Using pipe hooks to load, unload or handle casing at drilling or work

over rigs and line pipcs at lay barges.

Never replacc a shackle pin with bolt. Bolts may bend and fail during a l i f t .

Shackle pins are designcd not to bend.

Slings should be removed from the load hook (main hoist load block hook,

auxiliary hoist line hook, or stiriger hook) before harldling any cargo from the

deck of a vessel,

Cargo should be rigged for a one-point hook-up in ordcr to redricc cxposure to

personnel rigging loads on the dcck of a vessel. Slings intended to rcmain

pcnnarlently fixed to loads shouid be attached with screwed pin saFery

shackles. Only shackles with the manufacture's name or logo and load bearing

capacity embossed in raised letters on the shackle body should be used.

All cargo contairlers and skid units should be prc-slung prior to bcing

trarrsported 20 the dock Rrea. Thc SWL (safe working load) of the sling

assembly should k ad least 1.3 times the rnaximuril gross wcight of the cargo

container or the skid unit.

Equiprrtent and containers shoriid be lifted ws desig~~cd, using all proper lifling

points, regardless of whcther containcrs arc empty or full.

Multiple sling cycs mf part of a bridle sling assernbly should bc attached to the

hook using a shackle. 'The eyes should be placcd in sllackle bow arid the pin

put on the hook. TO shackle through a padeye, p i t the pin tiuotrgli a pad cye,

then hook into the shackle bow.

2.5.3 INSPECTION FREQUENCY AND RECORD KEEPING

Crane file or rccards should be maintained on all cranes. Filcs and records should be

kept at the appropriate facility by the supervisor, cxcept for hislorical repair and

inspection infinnation kept by Operations maintenance nlechruicr. Crane filcs and

records should consist of tlrc ro!lowir~g:

1 . Crane manufacturer's names, addresses and telephone t~umber.

2. Manufacturer's model and serial ilurnber.

3. The rlarnc of each qualified crane operator authorizecl to operate the crane,

specifically noting those authorized to operate the crane for personnel

transfer.

4. A copy of the rated load chart for. existing reeving confjguration and boon1

length R L corresponding load radii and boom angles.

5 . Copies of caclr annual inspection r-ecocd.

6. Copies of the ~narttrufaclurcr's original installalion cert'fication and cuncnt

qxrational tests.

7. Montl~ly inspection records for in-use r i a n g equipment and personnel

baskets.

8. Copies of crane wire rope certificates.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

1

- 9 . 1 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

The st-i~dy was carried out at three oil and gas installatiori platfb~tiis (Inda, Mercn, and

Idarna) operated by Chevron Nigeria Limitcd and two installatioris (Forecados North

Yank and IZscravos flowstations) operated by Shell Pctroleum Dcvelapnient Company

Limited on k h a l f of Nigeria National Pctroleum Corporation. For each of tllc five oiI

and gas installations involved, their accident statistids horn 1995 to 2005. and their

safety risk data were cxarnit~ed.

A series of semi-structured interviews were carried out between 3eccmbcr, 2005 and

January, 2006 in order to ensurc that current worker perceptions of risk werc

adequately covered by thc qucstionnaire. These inte~views were also used to ensure

t h e the tenns being used in the qucstionnaire were understood. For each of tile five

insraIFations involved in the study, a sarnplc of tcn interviews was conducted. 130th

contractor and operator personnel were involved. Each interview took one hour. and

respmdents were asked to co~nrnent on tiic clarity of the questions as well as any

topic arm omitted. Respondents were informed that interview data will be treated as

anonymous and only aggregated rcsults from all 50 interviews would be produced.

Tlir questionnaires werc finally reviewed and pilot-tested by sending it to a sample of

50 oil and gs workers working at Abiteye flowstation (Chevron Nigeria Limited

oillgas installation) and Odidi flowstation (Sliell Petrolcum Development Company

I.ilnitd1 oillgas instdlation) which are difl'erent oillgas installatio~~s from the five

selected for this study. A total of thirty (30.) workers Rorn the two flowstations

returned thc qucs t io~a i t c (60% response ratc), arid the rcsdts showed that only

minor tnoiiificahm to the questionnaire were required. Finally, the questionnafrcs

were modified and five hundred (500) cogics of the questionnaires were produced and

sent to the five participating oil/gas installations.

3.2 THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The final version of thc qucstioririaire had 14 sections. Respor-dents were riot asked

for their names and wcrc told that individual responses wodd not be identified in the

rcsu'lting reports. They werc asked to give a true account of their opinion without

giving an idealistic picture of working conditions or tl~ernselvez. The contcrlt of the

questionnaire i s described below.

D~nrographic Drrtnils

Respondents were asked to give information regarding tlicir sex.. age, marital status,

number of children, job title, employer (operating or contracting company), shift

pattern or rotation pattern (weeks d o f f ) , whcther or riot they wcre a supervisor- or a

safety representative, m d the extent of their cxperience (years workcd in the

instalfation and number of installations worked on).

Current Joh Situation

This section had 18 items that asked about individual's job in tenns of perceived work

demands, dccisiorl latihlde and conirniulicatiori.

Physics1 Working Gnvironment

Kespordents were asked to rate, on a five-point scale, how exposed thcy were on I I

physical stresson in their work placc (noise, cold, heat atid so on).

Perception rrl' Risk.. ... llazards

In order ta mcasure personnel's perception of how safe they felt from king in-jured

from hazards on the installat'ion, an 18-item scalc was used. Here rcsporidents were

asked to rate on a five-point scale how safe they feel against being exposed to injurics

r.esuIting from a numbcr of hazardous circumstances.

PrnbsMlity nf Injury

This section of 8 i t e m assessed respondents' probability ratings c f i~ijury occurring to

tlienlseives in event of major h;v,arrfs.

Perception of Ri~kq....Work

Respondents were asked to rate how safe they fclt (on a five-point scalc) when

performing 25 work tasks (see table 3 in results), and werc given the option "xiot

applicable" to tick if thcy did not pcrfonn such activities. 'I'licy were also asked to rate

on a 15-point scale how safe 'elley fclt in thcir job, taking accounl of h e circutnstances

referred to above,

Job Satisfaction

This section of 16 items consisted of a 7-point scale rating describing worker's

satisfactiosl-dissatisfactiori on the job.

Sw fety Facilitiw and Others' Concern for Safety

In order to assess how satisfied workers were wit11 the safety facilities on board, an

18-itctn 5-poiot scale was uscd. An additional subsectiorl of cight items wcre included

in order to assess respondents" pcrcepiiort of how concerned othcrs on ihc installation

(safety representativcs, fc'cllow workers) were for their- safcty.

3.3 hl ETHOD OF ANALYSIS

Safety Attitildes

In order to identi@ attiluck of workers towards safecy, risks and accidents,

rcsponden'ls wcrc asked to rate, on a five-point scale, to what degrec they agrecrl or

disagreed with statcrncnts regarding production vcrsus safety ( there is so~netitnes

pressure to put production beforc personal safety), fatalistic atlitiidcs and accident

causation.

Occupational Health

Here, there were three questions regarding tlic respondent's statc of hcalth.

Installation Safety Case rnd Accidents

'This section of nine opcn questions was inciudcd to assess respondents' view on

safety on the insta1tation and the effccts of their platform safety case. I'hcy wcre also

asked to list tlre three major risks and the riskiest operations cmied out on their

i~tstallntion, thc three most colnmou millor insuries, and the main reasons for accidents

in installations. They were asked their opinions about decisioll-nlalci~lg and leadership

in the installation, flow of communication, team work. ioductiodorientatlo~l and

minifig givm received at the start of work in the installation, iss~~iuice of persorlnel

protective equipment (PPE) and general ~ria~iagen~cnt co~nnlitmcnt about on safety.

berasnsl Accidents and Near-Misses

Rcspndetits were asked if they had ever had an accident wtwe they needed medical

attention, and if so, 10 descrik the accident and its severity on a 4-point scare: "return

to your shift irnmedi;tleIy/have the rest of the day ofr/marc than o m day

offhedivaccd off the installation". They were also askcd to state how many accidents

thcy have had in the past t w ~ years, if they had had a war miss, and if so. how many

and what typc.

Pcrannal Support and Help from Others

i7espondents were asked to rate (on a 6-point scaie) how much support various work

personnel, friends givc theril in relation to their work,

C~rnrnernts

The final page of tlic questionnaire asked the rcspot~dents to ;-riakc any additional

conllnents or to expand my section of the qucstionnairc if they so wished to cxpress

further any idea.

CMAP'l'ER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

A total of two hundrcd and thirty-five (235) workers rcspondcd and lollowing the

sample cha~xteristics, the results are presented i n relati011 to: pemptioos of the risk

of hazardous events in the installation (fable 4.1); perceptions of the probability of

irl-iuiy to penoru~el From hmrdws events (table 4.2); pcrceptiou of risks associated

with work task (table 3) and accident statistics for cach installation (historical accident

data).

4.1 SAMPLE CHARnCTERISTJCS

The distributior~ of the 255 respondents across the five oil and gas i r ~ s t a l l ~ t i o ~ ~ ~ va~-ied

due to the diflermces in numbers of personnel on board and variations in response

rate, The rnaximrrm rlurnber of responses from a single installation was GO and the

minimum was 31. ahc overall response rate was 45%. ?'he average age of the

respondents was 44) ycars (98% werc male) and they had worked on oil/gas

ir~slall~ltioris for an average of 10 years, and on the participating illstallations for an

avcrage of 5 years. Occupations represented wcre: tecblicia~ls and ineclianics (24%),

p~odu~tion (23%). mainfenance (12%), caterers (lo%), administration and

tnanagemmt (a%), drillen (8%), dcck crew (6%), auxilia~y staff (5%), ~ncdic (2%),

and logistics (2%).

Most pel-solme! worked a hvo-weeks-on - two-wccks-off rotation (67%) rather than a

hvo-wecks-on-three-~~eeks~~~ rotation (23%), and wcre rnore likely to work thc all-

day shin (38%), and the half-days-half-nights shifi pattern (35%) rather than 24-hour-

call (19%) or the all night shift (6%). A totat of 611% of t f i ~ pers~t~nel had worked on

1-5 oil/gas installations, 24% had worked on 6-10 installations, and 16% had worked

ut~ more than 10 insla'ilations. Of thc 235 respondcnts, 8% wcrc safety reprcscntatives

and 11% had acted in that capacity at vario~s times. A total of 77% of the personnel

were man-ied, 13% wero single, 5% wcre divorccd and 4% were separated (have

wives, though not living together).

4.2 PERCEJTION OF THE RISK OF FTAZAKDOUS EVENTS IN THE

Table 4.1 : Perception of thc risk of hazardous cvents in the iristallation

12 1 Exolosion

Structural failure .--

Helicopter --- crashing - Vessel hrlting installation - - --- 1 8 ( Sabotage act

X safe 1 O h neither I % unsafe I

F~E: 4-1 : Ferccption of Events in the installation

Thc resrdts (Tablc 4.1 and Fig 4.1) indicatc that pcrsonr~cl fclt safe about most of the

l~azards to [he installa~ion, with only a minority [aro~rrid 8%) indicating that they

actually felt rinsak in relation to iltcsc risk factors. The major hazards with which

pe~~sonnel felt least safe werc vessel hining the installation, explosion, helicopter

crashing. An average of abut 30% felt ncithcr safe nor unsafe.

4.3 PERCEPTION OF THE PROBARILI'I'Y OF INJURY TO PERSONNEL

FROM I-IAZARDOUS EVENTS

Table 4. 2: Probability of injury to personnel from harardous events

Serial Hazard to the individual % safe % neither n/u unsafe number I I I 2 - Fall to a lower lwei - 3 Weather conditions 4 I Medical nroblerns (3

% neither] l o - -

inn

F ~ E 4.2: Probability of Injury to Personnel

From above* personnel felt {east safe from slipping, being hit by falling objects and

weather condi~ion, Respondents also fdt most safe with regard to risk ievolviog falls

overboard and to lower deck (level). An average of about 26% felt neither safc not

unsafe (Table 4.2 and Fig 4.2).

4.4 PERCEPTION OF RCSK ASSOCIArW,D WI'FlI WORK TASK

Table 4.3: Risk associalcd with work task

Tkscription of work task I Number I % safe unsafe Neither 7 I involved (

-

Frevcntivc maintenance Cooking/serving -- - -- Clean the prerniseshause keepinq - - - - - C

Repair work -. I---

-- Inspect ion -- - Stoppocess -- -

-- - -!- I L

Manual control of arecess 1 88 1 76 I -- -

Manual li fling, handing - ----- ( 204 - 7 5 , --

Pigging - 9 1 74 ~ e c k n i c d liftim hmdlinn 72

Well intervention - - Non-routine operation - -- Process start-un

- -- -

Completing task started by others 1 202 ] 54 - ----- -- -.

FI - ing in a helicopter 2- .. . El 4 151 Working with radioactive s~~bstanccs 1 125 1 42 -.. ---

1 o % neither

nnh unsafe

E% safe

Fig 4.3: Prrccption of Risk Associstcd with Work

Result shown in table 3 and bar chart above reveal that personnel generally felt safe

carrying out their work tasks. As not all tasks were undertake11 by all personnel; table

3 shows xhc number of personnel who were involved in cach task. 'I'hc majority of the

personnel felt safe monitoring production, tjlcrf~nning preventive maintetiarlcc aid

cookindserving. llalf of the respot~dents felt safe flying in a bclicopter, and less thiul

11dF feTt safe whik working with l~dioactive substanccs.

Satnc p e r e n r a g of the personnel (38%) in drilling and use of lielicoptcr (flying)

were uricertair~ about safe or unsafe si~uations.

Insignificant nurnkr of respondents felt unsafe in production tnonitoring, preventive

maintenance, cookinglscrving house keeping, repair work, and equipmclit cicatiitlg

(Table 4.3 ~ lnd Fig 4.3).

4.5 ACCIDENT STATISTICS (IIISTORICAL DATA) OF 'I'IIE

INSTALLATION

I+ve of the installations provided incident and accident statistics for the past thrce

years. The level of detail of the accident data provided by thc installations varied, thus

tile frequency of Lost Time Accidents (number of LTAs x 1,000,000/nu1~ibcr of man-

l lous worked) was used as a lneasure as it allowed for conlparisons ~ r o s s

installations. In rile table {XIOW, the installations have been placed in oder of

itlcreasing frequency of LTAs (Lost Time Accidents) ('Table 4.4 to 4.6 and Fig 4.4 to

Fig 4.4).

Tabie 4.4: Accident1 Incident statistics of the installation

Table 4.5: ACCIDENTfINCIDENT DATA ANALYSIS (YEAR 2003 TO 20051

Inciderit ' scmv 0s Mama (C Fhwstatinn Prnduction

Platform

Meren Prmhiction

Platform

Forcados

North Bank Platform

Result shown in table 3 and bar chart above reveal that persormel generally felt safe

canying out their work tasks. As not all tasks wcre undertaken by all pe~.sonncl, table

3 shows thc number of personr~el who were irivoIveti in each task. Thc majority of the

personnel felt safe ~non iiori ng psodnct ion, perfonni tig prevcntivc riiairi tenarice md

cookindserving. Ilalf of the respondents felt safe flying i n a helicopter, and less tl~an

half felt safe whilc working with ~adioactive substances.

Some pcrcc~ltage of the pcrsomel (38%) in drilling and use of helicopter (flying)

wcre ut~certai~l about safe or unsafc situations.

lnsig~lificant nrr~nber of respondents felt unsafe in production monitoring, preventive

~naintenancc, cookindserving, house keeping, I-cpair work, and equipment cIca11ing

(Table 4.3 and Fig 4.3). t

4.5 ACCIDENT STATISTICS (HIS'I'ORICAL IIATA) OF TIIE

I NS'I'ALLATION

Five of the installations providcd incident and accidcnt slatistics for thc past thl-ec

years. lnhe lcvel of detail of the accident data provided by the installations varied, thus

the frequency of Lost Titlic Accidents (nulnber of L'rAs x 1,000,000/nrm~bcr of man-

hours worked) was used as a ~ncasrlre as it allowed for comparisons across

installations. In thc table below, the installations Iiave been placed in ordcr of

incrcasii~g frequency of LTAs (Lost 'Time Accidents) (Tablc 4.4 to 4.6 and Fig 4.4 to

Fig 4.4).

Table 4.4: Accident1 Incident statistics oF the installation

15 1 Inda wroduction wlatform. I

Serial number I 2 3 4

Table 4.5: ACCIDENTIINCIDENT DATA ANALYSIS (YEAR 2003 TO 2005)

Name of installation Escravos flowstaion Idanla production platform Meren productio~platform Forcados North Rank

Escravos Meren Production Forcados Inda Production Incident Jdama

Production

Platform

Flowstation Platform North Bank

Hit by falling

object

rrips and fall

;all overboard

3lech-ic shock

Crushed by

machinery

Total

Table 4.6: ACCIDENTIINCIDENT FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

ACCIDENTIINCIDENT

20 . ---- ----- I I" -

I INCIDENT Escravos I 1

FKEQUENCY Escravos I I d m a , I Mere11 I Forcados

- Hit by falling object Trip and fall Fall overboard Burns Electric shock Crushed by machinery

Flowstation

-- rn INCIDENT ldam Prqduction h f o r m

5 FREQUENCY Meren

0 Production Platform

o FREQUENCY Forcados North Bank

FREQUENCY lnda Production Platform

I

Flowstation

1 12 2 G 1 0

Fig 4.4: IncidentIFrequency bar chart

1 - -m- INCIDENT ldam Production Platform

FREQUENCY Meren Production Platform

Production Platfo~m 2 13 3 4 0 0

FREQUENCY Forcados North Bank

+FREQUENCY lnda Production Platform

u c t i o n Platform

Production Platfotm 3 15 3 4 I 0

Fig 4.5: Incident/freqrrency graph

North Bank 3 16 1 4 0 0

Table 4.7: COST OF INCIDENTS IN DOLLARS ($) OVER 3 YEAR PERIODPER

INSTALLATION

INSTALLATION ESCRAVOS FLOWSTATION IDAMA PRODUCTION PLATFORM

FORCAUOS 42,63 1.58 NORTH BANK

PRODUCTJON PLATFORM

2003 90,000

97,105.26

MEREN PODUCTION PLATFORM

Note: Cost of incident includes the following elements:

I) Cost of evacuating the victim

2) Cost of medical treatment

3) Loss in man hour

4) Loss in production

5) Effect on immediate family

6) Other related costs.

85,263.16

INSTALLATION ---

Fig: Cost of Jncident ($) Over 3 Yr. Period Per Installation

4.6 EFFECT OF TYPE OF INSTALLATION, OCCUPATION AND

EXPERlENCE ON RISK PERCEPTION.

Escravos flowstation and Forcados North Bank flowstation are operated by Shell

Petrofeum Development Company of Nigeria Limited on behalf of Nigeria National

Petroleum Corporation. On the other hand, Jdama, Meren and lnda production

platforms are operated by Chevron Nigeria Limited on behalf of Nigeria National

Petroleum Corporation.

Overall, a majority of personnel felt safe with regards to hazards to the installation,

hazards to themselves and when carrying out their work tasks, with only a small

proportion feeling unsafe. Hazards to the installation are those major hazards that can

have potentially catastrophic effects not only to the installation, but also to the

personnel on board. Although these events are less likely to occur than eve~yday

accidents, such as slipping or tripping, they are potentialiy more severe in terms of

consequence and could be perceived differently from other hazards (including work

task hazards). This group of major hazards did emerge as a separate factor on the risk

perception scale, indicating that respondents regarded these events as a distinct

category. It is interesting to note that while only half the sample reported feeling safe

with regard to explosion and vessel hitting the platform, the perception of these

occurrences differed considerably. Respondents were also asked to rate the

probability of being injured if a major hazard occurred. The result showed that a third

of the sample thought there was a high probabifity of being injured if an explosion did

occur, whereas only minority felt this in relation to vessel collision.

46.1 TYPE OF INSTALLATION

Thus, it appears that given the apparently equivalent feelings of safety in regard to

these two events, the likelihood of a vessel collision is regarded as more likely than an

explosion. There are indication that those personnel who work on installations whose

Lost-Time-Accident calculations suggest relatively less safe working environment

than other installations tend to feel less safe regarding hazards to the installation than

those working on more "safe" installations (the greater the survivability according to

LTA calculation, the safer people feel with regard to being injured from the hazards to

the installation). The type of installation worked on was not the only factor affecting

judgment of risk and feeling of safety amongst personnel.

4.6.2 EXPERIENCE

Personnel who had worked on a riumber of installation (say 1 1 installations) were

found to feel safer with regard to the hazards to the installation than those who had

only worked on few installations (between 1 and 5). These results may indicate that

experience on many installations makes workers feel safer either because they have a

better knowledge of the probability of major hazards, they are less concerned about

them, or the most experienced workers have lower exposure to hazards.

4.6.3 OCCUPATION

There are no differences in total feelings of safety for individual hazards across the

five installations; however, there were differences between occupations. Those

personnel who were involved in administrative, management and catering jobs tended

to feel safer from occupational accidents than did deck crew, technicians, mechanics,

consh~ction and production staff, which is not surprising given their relative exposure

to outdoor and industrial work conditions.

Operati% company supenisors felt significantly safer than contractor supervisors and

non-~romoted employees. In contrast, safety representatives tended to feel less safe

with regard to individual hazards than did other respondents. This may indicate that

since they represent the workforce with respect to safety issues, they may have a

different view of the frequency of accidents or potential hazards on the installation.

A majority of the respondents indicated that they generally felt safe when completing

their work task. However, completing a task started by others, assisting in drilling

activities and flying in helicopter showed "feeling safe" responses in half of the

sample.

Most personnel indicated that they felt safe monitoring production, working on

preventive tnaintenance and cookinglserving. The more senior the ~ersonnel is, the

safer they felt with regard to the work task they carried out. However, this may reflect

the mes of tasks they tend to perform, rather than the level of responsibility they

Ilave, as supervjson tend to have monitoring and inspecting roles rather than active

roles.

Respondents7 perceptions of the most likely injuries were cuts, slips/falls, eye

injuries, sprains, bruises and back injuries.

On personal accident data, 40Y0 of the respondents admitted that they had been

involved in an accident at sometime during their career. Of this 40%, 79% reported

that the accident had occurred more than a year ago, 9% reported that it had occurred

G months to 1 year ago and 1 I% reported that it had occurred within the Iast 6 months.

On how many accidents respondents had within the past two years, 78% reported

"none" 18% replied "one", 3% reported "two" and 1% reported more than "four". On

whether respondents have had accident on the installations where they work, it was

indicated that an average of 25% of the respondents have had an accident in the

installation. Analysis of the accidents showed that 15% were crane and rigging related

accidents.

4.8 ACCIDENT COST AND FREQUENCY

Analysis of accidentlincident statistics between 2003 and 2005 show increasing

number of accidentlincident rates from Escravos flowstation, ldama production

platform and Meren production platform, Forcados North Bank to lnda production

platform. The associated costs also increase in this order over the period.

In conclusion, the Risk Assessment Questionnaire provided a useful tool for

measuring risk and safety factors in Nigeria oil/gas installations.

One significant result is frequency of accidentshcidents in these installations and the

cost involved as could be seen from table 4c and illustrated in a bar chart.

4.9 GENERAL RECOMMENDATlONS

In the high-hazard, high-reliability oil industry, individuals work in structured groups

defined as crew, as shifts or terns. In this type of environment, teams must interact

effectively with both the technology and other crew, shift or team members. These

group members who have different backgrounds, experiences and professions have to

interact and share vital information, mental models and good decision-making

processes. In other words, within the context of the over-arching organization they are

working in, these subcultures need to share 'worlds of risk' and co~nmunicate about

the means available to avoid or mitigate against potential hazards and their

consequences. Whatever the technical expertise of the team or crew members,

research into role of human factors and human error in accidents has indicated that

what is often lacking in such situations are non-technical skills such as

communication, leadership, assertiveness and decision-making. The aviation industry

recognized the importance of human error and human factors in accidents aln~ost 30

years ago, and has been instrumental in the development of programs designed to

reduce error and increase the effectiveness of flight crews, known as Crew Resource

Management (Wiener et al., 1993). For effective management of safety and risk in

the oil and gas industry, basic factors must be understood and developed across the

wider work force .These factors are: communication, situational awareness, team-

work principles, decision-making, leadership techniques, and personal limitations.

4.9.1 COMMUNICATION

This is defined as the exchange of ideas, information, or instructions, so that ot1:er

members of the crew understand a message with minimum confusion. It involves both

verbal and non-verbal skills. Using effective and unambiguous words, listening and

taking action prevents an overload of communication. The 1977 accident at Tenerife

in which two Jumbo jets collided on the ground was attributed to a breakdown in

communication and from misinterpretation of a verbal message (Hawkins, 1987).

Components of effective safety communication are:

leadership communication of personal safety values/beliefs

understanding of at-risk conditions and bellaviors

improving understanding of how to enhance workgroup performance

shearing and application of Root Cause Analyses (RCA) and lessons learned

shearing of workers personal safety experiences

improving workgroup's competency (through training drills and so on)

Progress closure of safety related items.

scheduled safety meetings

daily tool box meetings

SlTUATlONAL AWARENESS

This is the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time

space, the comprehension of their meaning, projection of their status in the future'

(Endsley,1989). Indeed, situational awareness is regarded as 'an essential prerequisite

for the safe operation of any complex dynamic system' (Sarter and Woods, 1991). It

could be argued that 'sih~ationd awareness' could be synonymous with 'risk

perception'. Hrtel et aI. (1991) found that lack of situational awareness was the causal

factor in the 2000 Navy and Marine aviation mishaps.

4.9.3. TEAM WORK

This requires combining the skills and perspectives of separate individuals in order to

produce a single effective team who will share the necessary infonnation to perform

tasks and sometimes share the necessary workload to achieve the objective.

4.9.4. DEClSlON MAKING

This is the process of selecting a course of action, implementing the decision and

evaluating the outcome. The process is influenced by the definition of the problem,

time and risk factors, and available information.

4.9.5. LEADERSHIP

This involves the leader in a given situation being a person whose ideas and actions

influence the thought and behavior of others (Hawkins, 1987). Fur example, in a study

of air crew performance in a full-mission simulation, Helrnreich et al. (1986) found

that the crews which performed well were led by captains who recognized the value

of encouraging communication in the cockpit and the importance of good

interpersonal relations between crew members.

4.9.6. PERSONAL LIMITATIONS

This includes elements relating to the recognition of fatigue, time pressure, difficult or

unexpected situations. Stress results when there is a lack of workload management

and as Merritt and Helrnreich (1996) note, it is a "predictable, universal, human

reaction to certain environmental conditions". They also point out that stress is often

regarded as a weakness and a failure to meet professional standards. An example of a

catastrophic error in which stress and fatigue were contributing factors is the

Challenger shuttle disaster in 1986. b

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSlON AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 CONCLUSION

'This study examined the safety status of the Nigeria oil and gas installations, using

five installations (Inda, Meren, idama, Forcados North Bank, and Escravos) as a case

study. Though there is a degree of risk in every activity, yet risks which are

involuntary, uncertain, unfamiliar and potentially catastrophic are the most difficult to

accept. Risk or danger is threat to people and the things they value and the risk

associated with oil and gas production in Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized.

Behaviors leading to accidents in the industry could possibly occur at three levels:

operational, tactical and strategic. At the operqtional level, workers rarely make

adequate risk considerations in their execution of routine and skilled tasks. At the

tactical level, middle management apply rules which are largely dictated by

circutnstances, so specific assessments of ~ i s k may not necessarily take place each

time a rule is applied. At the strategic level (top management), there are often many

risk considerations, trade-offs between safety and costs and sometimes even

deliberate acceptance of calculated iisks.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

From the study the following recommendations are made:

I ) There is need to have a strong corporate safety culture and senior management

support to make safety implementation effective. Many organizations are yet to move

from safety measures purely based on retrospective data or "lagging indicators" such

as fatalities, lost time incident rates to "leading indicators" such as safety audits and

regular performance reviews. It can be argued that these are predictive measures

enabling safety condition monitoring which will reduce the need to wait for a system

to fail before identifling weaknesses and taking remedial actions.

2) It is becoming a clear fact from "Root Cause Analysis" that organizational and

managerial attention to safety rather than technical failures are the prime cause of

most accidents. While supervisors and senior mangers have continued to develop

safety cases, set the tone and tempo for safety and risk management, establish

priorities and allocate resources, there is little evidence from accidents and associated

losses in the industry that the desired improvement has been achieved. This is evident

from the accidenthcident historical data from 2003 to 2005. Elimination or reduction

of this risk and step into safe conditions has remained a teething problem among

operating companies.

3) Operating oil and gas companies in Nigeria should devote more time to safety

and risk assessments in work areas. The existing situation whereby production is

given priority over safety is not acceptable. Trainings should be made a regular

budget item and given the attention it deserves in order to sustain accident-free

operation. Such training should cover areas as safety induction or orientation to

facilities, use of personal protective equipment, use of tools and equipment, first aid

haining, crane and lifting training, use of floatation devices, emergency response

training and so on.

4) All jobs should be planned with job safety analysis for all participants. The use

of permit -to -work ensures that work is performed as required and with all safety

precaution in place. Audits and regular safety performance reviews should be made

part of the operation process and should be carried out in production platfolms, gas

plants, maintenance shops, warehouses, construction sites, work barges, fabrication

yards, drilling rigs and so on. Accidentlincident reporting, investigation, record

keeping and sharing of lessons learned are vital in safety management.

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