Elena Bogdanova

Centre for Independent Social Research/University of Eastern Finland

Bogdanova.nova@gmail.com

Eleanor Bindman

Queen Mary, University of London

e.bindman@qmul.ac.uk

NGOs protecting children in contemporary Russia: Policy

entrepreneurship under regime hybridity

Working paper. Please, do not quote without permission!

Abstract

Non-governmental organizations in contemporary Russia operate within both specific

institutional conditions and the frequently contradictory conditions imposed by a hybrid political

regime. Legislation and funding policy at the federal and regional levels veers between

restricting and enabling their ability to act and raises questions about the extent to which NGOs

can operate independently and participate in the development of a more robust civil society in

Russia. In the particular sphere of child protection, which remains very much within the domain

of the state, NGOs must to cooperate closely with the authorities in order to implement their

projects and, whether formally or informally, often become providers of state social policy as a

result. This article explores how NGOs involved in the protection of children living in state

institutions interact with state actors in their policy networks and the extent to which such

networks may offer these NGOs some scope to act as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ with some degree of

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influence over the direction of policy development and practice in their area of expertise. It

presents the results of empirical research on the activities of NGOs working with vulnerable

children in St Petersburg and Samara which reveals the interactions between these organisations

and the authorities to be a complex, multi-layered process which nevertheless allows them some

space for autonomy and development of policy options.

Introduction

In recent years NGOs in Russia have been forced to function within the conditions of what has

been called a ‘hybrid’ or ‘electoral authoritarian’ regime which contains elements of both

democracy and authoritarianism yet behaves quite differently from more straightforwardly

democratic or authoritarian political systems (Bogaards 2009; Hale 2010). Where civil society is

concerned, this hybridity is also apparent in terms of how the Russian authorities treat domestic

NGOs (Daucé 2014). On the one hand, since 2010 the state has stepped up its efforts to promote

collaboration between the federal and regional authorities and certain categories of NGO, namely

those deemed to be working in areas such as the provision of social and cultural services which

align with the interests of the state (Krasnopolskaya et al 2015). This has involved creating a

registry of ‘socially-oriented’ organizations, distributing direct federal and regional grants

amongst this category of NGO, and improving the legal framework for them to participate in

tenders for government and municipal service contracts (Benevolenski 2014). On the other hand,

a set of newly adopted laws, the best-known of which is the ‘Foreign Agents’ law of 2012, has

introduced restrictions on those NGOs which receive funding from abroad, forcing them to

undergo onerous official checks and to register themselves as ‘foreign agents’ or risk large fines

and the suspension of their activity.1 Given that the law thus far has been used primarily

(although not exclusively) against NGOs working on human rights and environmental issues, it

1 ‘Federalniy zakon 121 ob’ innostrannykh agentakh’ [Federal Law 121 on foreign agents], RIA Novosti, 16th June 2014, http://ria.ru/spravka/20140616/1011656413.html [accessed 10th November 2015]

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has been seen as a campaign of ‘administrative oppression’ against those civil society groups

deemed to be pursuing interests which run counter to those of the state (Daucé 2014).

A further issue which is seen as complicating the position of NGOs in Russia is the impact of the

legacy of Russia’s Soviet and immediate post-Soviet experience on domestic civil society

development. Civil society was essentially nonexistent in the Soviet Union because the state

controlled many aspects of social life, and the need for civic groups to address citizens’ concerns

and interests was not recognised (Albertie 2004). The majority of NGOs which then appeared

during and after perestroika in the late 1980s and early 1990s were either Soviet-era

organisations such as veterans’ groups or those that supported people with disabilities which

repackaged themselves as civic organisations but retained close ties with the state (Tarasenko

and Kulmala 2015) or were established and supported by foreign donors. As a result, in Russia

and other countries emerging from state socialist regimes, a small and isolated community of

professional advocacy NGOs dependent largely on Western donors developed alongside a larger

number of non-governmental groups which had to rely on the authorities for technical and

financial support (Henderson 2002; McIntosh Sundstrom 2005; Hemment 2012). As Dill

(2014:1195) argues, in the context of post-socialism ‘fiscal and political realities have anchored

the role of the state as a major source of funding and legitimacy for nongovernmental

organisations, precluding an independent nonprofit sector.’

In this article we explore the ways in which NGOs working in the social sector in Russia manage

their relationships with the authorities and consider how their activities are structured, their role

within the policy process, and the extent to which they have opportunities to influence the

implementation and direction of social policy in the regions where they operate. Using empirical

data from interviews conducted with NGOs in the major Russian cities of Samara and St

Petersburg, we argue that interaction with state agencies is unavoidable for NGOs working in the

sphere of child protection, yet may also offer them some opportunities to act as policy

entrepreneurs within their specific policy network.

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Policy Entrepreneurship

The idea of close cooperation between NGOs operating in the field of social policy and state

institutions, and of such NGOs functioning as direct providers of social services, is nothing new.

As Bode (2011) points out, this type of partnership between state and non-state actors in welfare

governance has long been the norm in Continental Europe, while Salamon (1995) and Rhodes

(1996) have traced the emergence of this ‘new’ form of public governance in Anglo-Saxon

countries since the early 1990s. More recently, scholars have begun to trace how this form of

governance has begun to emerge in more authoritarian regimes such as those in Russia and

China (Krasnopolskaya et al 2015; Bode 2014). As Rhodes (2007) points out, within this model

of ‘network’ governance the boundaries between the public, private and voluntary sectors

become increasingly blurred and policy networks involving both formal and informal

relationships between state and non-state actors develop around particular issues or areas of

public policymaking. Policies are developed through bargaining between the different members

of the network and non-state actors such as NGOs join the network because they need ‘the

money and legislative authority that only government can provide’ (Rhodes 2007: 1244). Within

the policymaking process surrounding a particular area of state social policy, Kingdon (1984)

argues that a ‘garbage can’ model applies in which there are three components to the process of

setting the agenda for action in that particular policy area: problems, policies and politics. While

these streams generally function independently, a policy issue will only get on the agenda when

they are ‘coupled’ and ‘a problem is recognized, a solution is available, and the political climate

makes the time right for change’ (Kingdon 1984:93).

In this context ‘policy entrepreneurs’ emerge: persistent, well-connected members of a particular

policy community who are perceived to have expertise relevant to that policy area but could be

elected or appointed officials, or interested parties such as NGOs or research organisations

operating outside the formal government system (Kingdon 1984: 129). They have a crucial role

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to play in ensuring that the streams are linked by framing and defining a policy problem in a

particular way and presenting a credible solution to it in order to persuade policymakers to place

an issue on the agenda (Roberts 1991:159). Policy networks of actors who share an interest in a

particular policy area thus serve as a vital forum for such entrepreneurs to present their definition

of a problem and their corresponding solution to government actors, build coalitions with these

actors and shape the terms of the policy debate and the appropriate policy responses that are

identified (Mintrom 1997). Muccioni (1992), however, cautions against applying Kingdon’s

garbage can model, which was developed in the very specific context of the US policymaking

process, wholesale to other polities and emphasizes the need to take into account political,

economic and social structures which also influence which issues get on the agenda. In countries

where institutions are more centralized, bureaucrats and other institutional actors which tend to

be stable and are not subject to removal from office as elected officials are, have an important

role to play in terms of whether or not issues reach the agenda in the first place. As a result,

solutions advocated by policy entrepreneurs which do make it onto the agenda need to have a

‘‘good fit’ with the perceived needs and goals of policy makers’ (Mucciaroni 1992:474). This is

particularly important in the context of the policy area of child protection in Russia, where

executive agencies such as ministries at the federal and regional level, committees and

inspectorates underpinned by an extensive bureaucracy dominate the field and administer the

system (Sirotstvo v Rossii 2011). As we argue below, the way in which this policy network is

constituted in the Russian context creates some constraints for NGOs attempting to act as policy

entrepreneurs, but also creates some opportunities for them to take up this role and promote the

policy options they deem most appropriate.

While much of the existing literature on policy networks focuses on the policy process in

systems conforming to a model of advanced liberal democracy, public policy making and

windows of opportunity for potential policy entrepreneurs in hybrid/semi-authoritarian regimes

of the type that Russia is generally seen as conforming to remains an under-explored area.

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Nevertheless, some scholars have explored the role of NGOs as policy entrepreneurs in the

Chinese political system. Mertha (2009:996), for example, argues that those who were

previously excluded from the policy making process in China such as NGOs, activists and

journalists now play an active role in this process and its outcomes as they have learned to abide

by the ‘rules of the game’ and to operate within a system of ‘fragmented authoritarianism.’ Within

such a system policy change tends to take place incrementally and through bureaucratic

bargaining (Mertha 2009), while He and Thogerson (2010:675) argue that the Chinese

government has been willing to open up some consultative space for NGOs and other civic

groups in order to bolster the legitimacy of the state without in any way jeopardizing the Chinese

Communist Party’s monopoly on political decision making. While the Chinese political system is

more overtly authoritarian than the Russian system, the two cases nevertheless have some

parallels. Under the centralized, semi-authoritarian system which has developed during President

Putin’s tenure the state operates largely autonomously from society at large and elites are

insulated from the public (Greene 2014). At the same time, within Russia:s federalized system

regional governors have an important role to play in both ensuring social and economic stability

in their regions and delivering votes to the political regime at the center (Sharafutdinova 2010).

Regional budgets are largely responsible for financing Russia’s extensive system of social

services and benefits, including children’s homes, and social policy is perceived to be an

important tool in ensuring regime stability (Remington et al 2013). As a result, Krasnopolskaya

et al (2015:23) argue that ‘regional administrations have decided to invest in grant programs to

support non-profit organisations in order to strengthen their political legitimacy both in the

opinion of the local population and of the federal authorities.’ In this way, socially-oriented

NGOs now have opportunities to engage as participants in policy networks at the regional level

which were previously much more limited.

Socially-oriented NGOs and child protection: the policy background

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While a federal-level funding scheme of presidential grants for civil society groups, including

those working on social projects, was established in 2006, official attempts to involve NGOs

more formally in the provision of social services in Russia were stepped up in 2010 with the

passing of legislation aimed specifically at enhancing funding for socially-oriented NGOs and

cooperation between the government and this type of organisation (Krasnopolskaya et al 2015).

In 2011 a state list (reestr) of socially oriented non-commercial organisations was established.

The state currently offers three types of grant and subsidy for NGOs:

• subsidies supporting socially oriented NGOs at the expense of the federal budget;

• subsidies to cover utility payments made by NGOs and the rental of office space;

• targeted funding of NGOs by regional and municipal authorities (Tarasenko 2013:15).

In 2011 in St.Petersburg the list included 170 organisations, in 2012 – 215. A total of 364

projects were supported in 2011, and 384 in 2012 (ibid.).

Since 2011 the federal government and regional authorities have been conducting grant

competitions for ‘socially-oriented’ NGOs to take on the provision of certain social services

traditionally provided by the state. NGOs specializing in child protection have frequently been

successful in winning funding through such programs, and, alongside other socially-oriented

organisations, can receive funding on either a competitive or uncontested basis from regional-

level committees such as the local Committee on Social Policy or the Committee on Youth

Policy (Krasnopolskaya et al 2015). In addition, under new legislation passed in 2012, all levels

of government must use small and medium enterprises and socially-oriented NGOs to provide

15% of the total annual value of their contracts for social service provision (Benevolenski 2014).

A further set of laws has been adopted more recently to increase (at least formally) the

significance of NGOs as actors within the social policy system, and to improve the dialogue

between state and non-state actors. The Federal Law of Russian Federation No. 212 “On the

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origins of public control in Russian Federation” [Ob osnovakh obshchestvennogo kontrolia v

Rossiiskoi Federatsii] was signed on 21 July 2014. Some significant amendments were

incorporated the same day (21 July 2014) into the Federal Law “On Public Associations” [Ob

obshchestvennyh ob’edineniiakh]. These laws prescribe the establishment of public oversight

councils within different executive bodies, and the obligatory inclusion of NGOs as members of

these councils.

The increasing involvement of socially-oriented NGOs in the provision of social services has had

two major consequences. Firstly, the state has strengthened its control over non-state

organisations acting in this sphere. Secondly, the state has made channels for cross-sectoral

collaboration more open. These measures have undoubtedly had some influence on the

independence of NGOs, but some researchers consider the effects of these recent legal initiatives

to have certain positive implications for such organisations, particularly at the local level. For

instance, in the case of St Petersburg, Anna Tarasenko argues that the role of civic associations

in solving social problems has increased, although organisations working with high-priority

vulnerable groups such as war veterans tend to be the most successful at gaining funding from

the local authorities (Tarasenko 2013:16). In addition, previous research conducted by one of the

authors between 2011 and 2015 indicates that many socially-oriented NGOs, while recognizing

the necessity of applying for and receiving state funding, nevertheless remain keen to defend

their ability to operate as independently as possible. They also felt that their increasing

involvement in public oversight councils and other interactions with the authorities had led to

some positive developments in social policy and emphasized the importance of continuing this

and other types of collaboration with local officials in particular (Bindman 2015).

Where the sphere of child protection is concerned, this is an area of social policy which remains

very much within the remit of the state. The current political discourse constructs the problem of

child protection as one of the most important challenges for contemporary Russian society. This

is hardly surprising given the number of children living without parental care: as of 2010, they

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numbered 731,000, with 260,000 of these living in long-term institutional care. While the federal

government provides funding for these institutions, the allocation of this funding and the

provision of social services in this area is largely the responsibility of regional and municipal

authorities (Sirotstvo v Rossii, 2011). Interest in the topic increased sharply in mid-2012. Partly

that was caused by the beginning of foster reform in Russia, the main points of which were

announced by the Order of the President of the Russian Federation No. 761 “On a National

Strategy of Action for Children 2012 - 2017" (adopted on 1st of June 2012).2 Soon after, in

September 2012 a “Coordinating Council on the Implementation of a National Strategy for

Action for Children 2012-2017” was established.3 The Council involved both state officials and

leaders of the most influential NGOs in the sphere of child protection. Partly, interest towards the

problem of children protection was prompted by an international scandal which took place

between Russia and the US in 2012 and which also attracted another wave of official interest in

the problem of child protection. Law No. 272 «On measures against persons involved in

violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, rights and freedoms of citizens of Russian

Federation», also known as the “Dima Yakovlev Law” was signed on December 28, 2012. The

Law imposed a ban on the adoptions of Russian orphans by American citizens (Art. 4) and was

passed in retaliation for the US adoption of a law sanctioning Russian officials alleged to have

been responsible for the death in custody of the lawyer Sergey Magnitskiy. It was named after a

Russian child who had been adopted by US parents and died in 2008 due to negligence.4 In

January 2013 the United Russia party, which holds the majority of seats in Russia’s parliament,

initiated the project “Russia needs all its children” (Rossii vazhen kazhdiy rebenok) which was

aimed at improving domestic adoption rates and living conditions for children in the care of the

state.5

2 The Order of the President of RF No. 761 “On National Strategy of Action for Children 2012 - 2017", 1st of June 2012, available at <http://base.garant.ru/70183566/>.3 See the Provision on the Coordinating Council here: <http://state.kremlin.ru/council/36/statute>.4 ‘Russian parliament passes anti-US adoption law,’ The Moscow News, 26th December 2012, available at http://themoscownews.com/russia/20121226/191064431.html [accessed 2nd December 2015]5 ‘Rossii vazhen kazhdii rebyonok,’ Edinaya Rossiya [United Russia], available at https://er.ru/projects/rossii-vazhen-kazhdyj-rebenok/ [accessed 2nd December 2015].

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The problem of protecting children living without parental care is thus recognized as one which

is both legitimate and extremely important at the state level. The national strategy defines the

main aims of the state’s policy towards the protection of children in care, which has become the

conceptual basis for proposed reforms of the institutional and foster care systems:

• priority placed on family-based care for children currently living in state institutions;

• reform of institutions for orphaned children, including children with physical and learning

disabilities;

• establishment of a system of post-institution support (post-internat).

The problem of child protection for those in care has also become part of the more general

official discourse on demographic policy, the protection of motherhood, and traditional family

values. In 2014, the "Concept on State Family Policy in the Russian Federation for the period

until 2025" was adopted.6 The concept indicates that a traditionalist view of ‘family values’ has

become a steady trend in the transformation of gender relations in modern Russia. Zhanna

Chernova argues that in current public and political discourse ‘the traditional family model and

patriarchal gender relations have become idealized (ibid.). A Concept adopted in 2007

declareded the main the principles and aims of the state’s policy towards young families. In

particular “the principle of continuity of the generations orientates the state and young families

towards the preservation and maintenance of the relationship between the generations, respect

and reproduction of traditions of family education in young families, and the transmission and

continuity of Russian socio-cultural values” (Conception 2007). It also interprets the aim of state

policy towards young families as “strengthening the institution of the Russian family on the

basis of people’s traditional socio-cultural values, spirituality and local way of life” (ibid.).

Since the very beginning of the 1990s, NGOs have played a significant role in the sphere of child

protection in Russia. The structure of Russia’s institutional care system for children offers rather

6 Chernova Zhanna. 2010. Molodaia semia kak ob'ekt / sub'ekt semeinoi politiki. Полит.ру, November 30 (http://polit.ru/article/2010/11/30/family/).

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broad opportunities for such organisations to assist in this area. Every stage of the process of

placing a child in this system has a place for NGO activity such as: working with mothers who

have abandoned their children, with ‘problem’ (neblagopoluchnaia) families, and with adopting

families. NGOs also support children in shelters and children’s homes, and after they leave the

care system (Sirotstvo v Rossii 2011). Leaders of NGOs such as the Foundation to Support

Children in Difficult Life Circumstances 7 (also known as the Marina Gordeeva Foundation) and

the National Foundation for the Prevention of Cruelty Against Children 8 [previously: Assistance

to Russian Orphans (ARO)] are involved in federal public councils, which advise the president

and monitor the implementation of the National Strategy on Action for Children.9 Approximately

30 private and corporate charity foundations provide financial support for children in the care

system: these include Viktoriia, Rasprav’ kryl’ia, and others. Some foundations do not have their

own equity, but fundraise instead: Otkazniki, Detskie domiki, and various others (Sirotstvo v

Rossii 2011). Some of the federal-level NGOs have a substantial volume of opportunities to

deliver services, and may be regarded as providers of State social policy. Some of them are

included in the federal Public Chamber (Obshchestvennaia Palata), or other public councils at

the federal level. There are more than 1,000 NGOs and charity foundations which deal solely

with problems in the care system functioning at the regional level (Sirotstvo v Rossii 2011).

Description of the field research

The empirical research this article is based on was conducted as part of an international research

project on “Network governance: A tool for understanding Russian policy-making?”10 During the

field research 50 interviews were conducted with experts (researchers, politicians, and

journalists), officials at different levels, and the heads of NGOs in St.Petersburg, Samara and

7 <http://www.fond-detyam.ru/>.8 <www.nfpcc.ru>.9 For ex. the Coordinating Council on Implementation of the “National Strategy for Action for Children 2012-2017” 11 September, 2012.10

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Moscow. In this article we use data from interviews with 9 NGOs (3 in Samara, 4 in

St.Petersburg, and 2 in Moscow with NGOs functioning at the federal level), and also some

expert interviews in which the particular problems of cooperation between NGOs and

governmental bodies were discussed.

NGOs working in the sphere of child protection in Russia are numerous and diverse. During the

field research we sought to collect materials about different NGOs, from local volunteer

organisations to NGOs functioning at the federal level, in order to tease out tendencies in their

relations with the State and operational conditions which might be the same or similar for

different NGOs. In preparing a list of informants, we tried to select the most active and well-

known NGOs in the two regions. To identify informants, we used the results of participant

observation of regional cross-sectoral meetings, and preliminary expert interviews with regional

researchers, journalists, and politicians. In terms of the type of NGO profiled in this study, a

number of scholars have reviewed the type, structure, and scope of Russia’s NGOs, and, despite

using different labels, their characterizations are very similar, with each researcher identifying

three specific types of organisation (Crotty 2009:90). The researchers highlight grassroots

organisations which focus their campaigning activity almost exclusively on local or single

issues; professional policy or advocacy organisations whose members are often drawn further

into the international NGO circuit through conferences and training overseas; and government

affiliates or GONGOs, which are closely linked to the operations of the state (Cook &

Vinogradova 2006, Henry 2006). The following NGOs took part in this research project:

Samara:

NGO_Samara_1 – Charity foundation Radost’. The organisation declares its mandate to be

primarily charitable, although members of this NGO are involved in many different types of

activities, including local politics. The leader of this NGO is a member of the regional Public

Chamber, and also heads a special section of the Samara regional legislature, which is open for

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discussions among state and non-state actors. In some senses the organisation acts as a

professional NGO.

NGO_Samara_2 – Domiki Detstva is a relatively new NGO which first appeared as a volunteer

organisation several years ago. The organisation is active in the improvement of their own

projects, and their leader is included in many formal and informal collaborative networks

between state and non-state actors. According to Cook and Vinogradova’s typology (2006), this

NGO falls under the definition of a grassroots organisation.

St. Petersburg:

NGO_SPb_1 – Non-state children’s home Derevni SOS. This is one of several children’s villages

which operate in different regions of Russia and other countries around the world. The NGO has

a foreign founder and has operated in St. Petersburg since 2000. The NGO is not a grassroots

Russian organisation, nor does it act as a professional NGO. The cross-regional charity Russian

Committee on SOS Children’s Villages, which is the umbrella organisation leading all 6 SOS

Children’s Villages in Russia, does, however, function as a professional NGO.

NGO_SPb_2 – “Vrachi detiam” – A highly skilled professional NGO, acting in St. Petersburg

since 2001, when it was established by volunteers of international humanitarian organisation The

Right to Health. At present the organisation provides professional social services and develops

different projects on child protection, including protection of orphans and children at risk. The

staff of this organisation consists of professional social workers, psychologist, doctors, speech

therapists, etc. Professional NGO.

NGO_SPb_3 – “Partniorstvo kazhdomu rebionku” – A professional NGO with extensive

experience in the development of social projects and advocacy activities, and the provision of

professional social services. At the end of the 1990s the organisation was established in St.

Petersburg as the Russian branch of the UK organisation Every Child, and worked under this

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name until 2009. The staff of this organisation consists of professional social workers,

psychologist, doctors, speech therapists, etc.

NGO_SPb_4 – “Roditel’skii most” appeared as a civic organisation in the mid-1980s. The

organisation is focused on charitable activities and is well-known in both St. Petersburg and

Russia more widely for working with foster families, and actively improving adoption rates.

In addition to the interviews, we conducted participant-observation of various types of

cross-sectoral communication. These included meetings of councils, teams, and working groups.

In selecting events to observe we were guided by our goal of observing communication and

practices of collaboration between state and non-state actors. We tried to select the best-known

fora and during the meetings we paid attention to spatial segregation, the distribution of roles and

credentials, the general tone of the conversation, topics suggested for discussion, and the

dynamics of the discussion. In coming to the meetings we had a chance not only to observe, but

also to communicate with other participants. Some of the talks were recorded and transcripts

analyzed. The talks gave us information not only about how this communication took place, but

also provided stories about successful or failed collaborations, and about the dynamics of

relations between state and non-state actors. We observed the following fora for cross—sectoral

communication:

1. Public Chamber in Samara (Public Chamber_Samara);

2. Council on problems of fatherhood, motherhood and childhood at Samara City Duma

(Council_Expert_Samara);

3. Expert Council of the Children’s Ombudsman, St. Petersburg;

4. Open city supervision, organized by the NGO “Partniorstvo kazhdomu rebionku” in St.

Petersburg.11

11 The Public Chamber in Samara is a state institution relevant for all three policy areas covered in this article (Olisova 2015). The chamber formally has independent status, but the selection process of candidates and the way the chamber operates links it closely to the authorities. Its proclaimed purpose is to ensure public oversight over the executive and legislative branches, and public participation in governance. The chamber is subdivided into a number of commissions which at times also raise public discussion on issues concerning the three policy areas. This

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Discussion

“It always has to come from above, there is no sense in starting from the bottom"12

Our interviews with the leaders of various NGOs in Samara and St. Petersburg indicate that the

main and, indeed, only possible way of sustainable development for NGOs in the sphere of child

protection is close cooperation with the authorities. The contemporary legal field creates specific

spaces for communication between the authorities and NGOs, with the Law “On the origins of

public control in Russian Federation” prescribing the establishment of “instruments of public

oversight,” or expert councils, in all regions, at all levels of executive power, and in regional

heightens attention to said issues among media and decision-makers, and the chamber sometimes gives policy recommendations. The main emphasis of the public chamber is on giving advice to authorities, particularly by calling the attention of the authorities to specific problems, as well as on monitoring. It has quite weak potential for coordination of different sectors and institutions. Members are generally considered loyal to the state and ready to compromise, and the chamber has rather close links to the regional governor. Implementation of social policy is not part of the functions of the chamber, and it has no decision-making power.The Samara city parliament’s Council on problems of fatherhood, motherhood and childhood was established in 2013 as a response to the need for an arena to discuss problems related to child welfare. Council members include officials, heads of children’s homes, the Children’s Ombudsman, and NGO representatives. The council is headed by an NGO leader. Meetings are held 4-5 times a year and typically consist of reports made by specialists on specific problems and subsequent discussion, followed by recommendations as to how the issue should be resolved. The advice function of the policy system is therefore highlighted. While not decision-makers as such, the council produces recommendations that legislators and policy-makers are required to consider, though not obliged to follow. Coordination is a key task of the council. It coordinates activities and ideas among officials, specialists, and NGOs. The council is not involved in the direct implementation of social policy; neither does it have a formal monitoring function.The Expert council under St. Petersburg’s Children’s Ombudsman This council is intended to facilitate discussion of different problems related to child welfare. Participation is rather flexible. There is a set of core members, but external experts are also invited when certain issues are being discussed. Participants include officials, experts, politicians, and NGOs. The agenda is set by the Ombudsman apparatus. The council has decision-making authority; the decisions are recorded in protocols and it is obligatory for executive organs to implement them. The advisory function is important—the council produces recommendations addressed directly to the executive organs. It also coordinates the solution of particular problems raised for discussion. The status of these recommendations is quite high, and the council can thereby have an important influence on how social policy is implemented, though indirectly (through recommendations rather than direct involvement in policy implementation). Its monitoring role consists in observing the implementation of its decisions and recommendations, and reporting to the mayor and executive organs about the decisions.Child welfare supervisions, St. Petersburg is a regular open event organized by the NGO “Partniorstvo” in St. Petersburg. The state is involved through the participation of municipal guardianship departments, social workers, and other representatives of the municipal services. NGO representatives and international experts also participate in the supervisions. Supervisions are a monthly forum for discussing social problems, usually by focusing on individual cases with general applicability. The arena produces advice on how to improve skills of practitioners, e.g. in working with orphans, families, and children with specific problems. The advice given does not have to be taken into account, but may influence both the norms of social work practice, as well as practitioners’ professional standards. Supervisions play a relatively important role in coordination of solutions of the above-mentioned problems. The forum monitors and evaluates the usefulness of the recommendations that they produce in the meetings, through repeated participation of the same participants.12 From the interview NGO_SPb_2.

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legislative bodies. Execution of the law is uneven in different regions and at different levels of

authority, although in the Samara region during the last two years, these councils have been

established in all the main governmental bodies of the city and the region, including the city

Duma, the Samara regional Duma, and the regional ministry for social demography and family

policy. In addition, dozens of different public councils and special working groups have been

established at the lower levels of executive power: these are open to NGOs, and some are even

managed by the leaders of NGOs. All the NGOs which took part in the research stressed the

availability and importance of participation in these public councils. Belonging to a public

council does not in and of itself guarantee participation in administrative decision-making, and a

public council may not produce any decisions at all, but the opportunity to take part provides a

channel of communication between NGOs and the authorities, and is valued on its own merit.

Meanwhile, according to the interviews, the legal field establishes the order in which cross-

sectoral collaboration takes place and the distribution of roles among the participants. According

to one of our respondents:

We can say and write anything—for example that we are establishing independent public

structures. But still you need to realize that objectively the forums are functioning in the

government. This means they are all consensus structures and they were established with

the purpose of finding consensus. People practicing constructive approaches to

interaction with the authorities must take part there. Not those who are oriented toward

confrontation or contradiction, but those who have another vision of the problem, other

ideas about how to deal with them, but with the desire to reach an agreement (Public

Chamber_Samara).

Participation in meetings of the public councils or other such platforms facilitates

communication between members of NGOs, policymakers, and politicians. Decision-making in

these fora appears, based on the interviews, to be a complex, non-linear process, with regular

discussions helping to gather ideas and issues in need of resolution. It depends on many different

16

components, including in-depth research of the problem, an initiative group formed of

specialists, which meets within the framework of the local public chamber or a public oversight

council within the regional legislature, and the opportunity to engage with local politicians. One

interviewee, who was both the head of an NGO promoting foster care and a member of the

Samara regional Duma’s Working Group on Parenthood and Childhood, described the discussion

process which usually took place at meetings of her group:

Various officials take part in our work including representatives of the [regional]

Ministry for Demographic Development, they are always there. Representatives of the

State Duma who work on community issues also always come, and people from the

regional Duma, the regional governor’s office, and if necessary from the regional

Ministry for Health. Then of course there are all those who represent non-

governmental organizations which work with children. We develop recommendations

for amending the relevant legislation and so on—it’s not simply a box-ticking

exercise, these are vital questions (Council Expert_Samara).

Another respondent was also positive about the work of such fora in terms of influencing the

development of regional social policy:

The Public Chamber gives us an additional forum through which we can engage. We

work with whoever is in power, we are very pragmatic. We should be using any

opportunity we have to express our opinion and the Public Chamber is a high-level

body, it gives us more access to those in power and over time our relationship with

them has grown closer. It’s a really good new forum for us that we’ve had for 6 years

now and they do listen to us (Public Chamber_Samara).

In terms of specific policy developments, this same respondent talked about a project run by

their organisation which sought to increase the number of free places in kindergartens available

for children from young families. An initiative group at the Samara Public Chamber put a great

17

deal of effort into implementing the project over a number of years, but it only really moved

forward when a new (and ultimately successful) mayoral candidate was made aware of it:

We always used to invite the previous mayors to our conferences and so on, they would

always say ‘yes yes yes’ but nothing would happen. Then, when we were in the process of

electing Azarov,13 he came to the [Samara Oblast] Public Chamber to tell us about his

election manifesto. We said our project was a priority, one which should be included in

his manifesto. It was included… and they started to build more kindergartens, we saw

them ourselves in Samara (Public Chamber_Samara).

In communicating and investigating particular problems together, state and non-state actors may

organize working groups, which strive to solve problems as a single force. During such

interactions the boundaries between the state and non-state actors seem to disappear. Such

foundations as efficiency, dealing with the bureaucratic apparatus, and the common goal of

making the lives of children better, appear to be much more significant.

Some cases in our research show how people can move from one sector to another:

Q.: Why you have moved from the state service to the non-governmental organization?

A.:I interacted with them [NGOs], even being on the municipal service, well ... It

happened so easily. I feel comfortable in these working conditions, and a see lot of

opportunities to realize myself creatively. We are not exhausted here. That is, when we are

preparing the project, in principle, we know the problem, and we ourselves are looking for

the way of solving. We are free in it. That is interesting. (NGO_Samara_1).

People like this are extremely valuable for the NGOs, since they know formal and informal rules

of collaboration with the state agencies, they save their informal contacts in the state agencies,

and became a valuable conductor of cross-sectoral communication.

13 Dmitriy Igorevich Azarov, the United Russia mayoral candidate, was elected mayor of Samara in October 2010 and served until 2014.

18

Where the St. Petersburg case study is concerned, the number of public councils is considerably

fewer in comparison with Samara. Nevertheless, communication between NGOs and the local

authorities is equally important. Leaders of NGOs try to use the platforms available to them for

communication with state actors. According to interviews conducted in St. Petersburg, the

regional public chamber, child ombudsman, or even platforms at the federal level can act as

spaces in which strategic or particularly urgent questions can be addressed to the authorities in

general, or to specific officials:

Since 2010 the [St. Petersburg] Committee on Social Policy has given out a subsidy

which covers your expenses in terms of feeding children and providing them with

clothes, but there is not any specific law which sets a mandatory amount or which is

calculated on the basis of the number of children needing care. So every year this

decision has to be taken in a particular way, in accordance with the current legislation

and mechanism of law drafting. Every year we are forced to appeal to the [regional]

Child Ombudsman so that she will remind the officials on the Committee of our existence

(NGO_SPb_1).

In both regions, communication with the authorities is recognized as an integral part of the

strategic work done by NGOs working on child protection. Indeed, according to our

interviewees, the success and sustainable development of particular NGO projects depends

entirely on communication with the authorities. Often the issue of financial support is a key

aspect of this relationship. In the current situation, the state’s federal and regional grant and

subsidy programs are the main—and frequently the only—source of project funding available to

this type of NGO. Nevertheless, success in competing for such funding is by no means

guaranteed, making fundraising one of the most complicated aspects of NGO activity:

We have written applications for a variety of grants, including government and

presidential schemes. However, grant funding has its pros and cons. The downside is that

you do not know whether you will receive the grant or not, how big it will be, whether you

19

have a subsidy or not, when it will be announced, and when the money will arrive. And the

most important thing is that subsidies cover the organisation’s expenses. It means that first

the organisation has to find the means to provide services throughout the year. And only

then can it request reimbursement of expenses. So we must constantly and actively work to

raise funds, which of course takes a lot of time and effort (NGO_SPb_3).

As a result of the uncertainty of NGOs’ financial position, any long-term project which needs

sustainable financial support to survive has to be discussed with the authorities. Some NGOs use

a proactive approach, discussing potential projects with officials before they have started. Here

the NGOs often have to find a compromise between their own project and the needs of the state

social service system. This process involves not only close collaboration with the authorities, but

also the expectation that the NGO will provide a service which in some way conforms to the

aims of state social policy. One of our respondents explained how their NGO had managed to

persuade the municipal authorities to finance their project:

In 2006 we opened the city's first social hostel for minors, and initially we made contact

with the administration of the Kalinin district [in St. Petersburg]. We told them ‘we are

going to apply to one of our donors with a project. If you are willing to provide the

premises, we are willing to repair it, educate the staff, and support this project for the

first 2 years. After 2 years, are you prepared to finance this hostel from the municipal

budget?’ And in fact that's how it was opened (NGO_SPb_2).

Achieving this kind of funding is, however, complicated by the fact that child protection for

children in the care system is managed by several different ministries and other bodies at the

federal and regional level. A project may be rejected by one ministry, even if several others

strongly support the project, but approval is required from all the relevant ministries whose

responsibilities may be affected by the project:

Even if the Committee on Social Policy supports us, there is the Committee on Finance.

20

And the Committee on Social Policy has to explain to the Committee on Finance why such

a big budget item should be approved. This means the Committee on Finance has to really

want to understand what the project is trying to achieve, and the Committee on Social

Policy needs to really explain this properly. And if this is not a priority for any of them

personally, the chances that someone will be willing to justify it and the others to listen is

very small. So there are a lot of conditions (NGO_SPb_3).

If an NGO wants to initiate an independent project which has not been agreed with the

authorities in advance, developing the project is a difficult and time-consuming process.

According to our interview with the head of the NGO “Partniorstvo”, her organisation wanted to

extend a social program it offered for families with disabled children called “Breathing Space”

[Peredyshka]. The program initially offered a service for parents who are unable to leave their

children without care, even for a short period of time, and was established to train specialists

who could stand in for parents of children with severe disabilities for a certain period of time in

order to give the parents a break. The service is provided by the NGO for free, and they make

considerable efforts to maintain its availability. Finding regular funding for this program is one

of the NGO’s main concerns, as it also runs various other projects and the problem of finding

financial support for “Breathing Space” has to be resolved each year. According to our interview,

the NGO puts a lot of effort into improving the program:

We use all available opportunities for improvement of this service. In the competition for

the Gordeeva Foundation we had three minutes to prove the necessity of this program.

We did it, and we won. We needed to publish an article in the foundation’s newsletter,

and we did that too. We sit in the Public Chamber and observe what is happening there

(NGO_SPb_3).

The program gained support on many levels: the President, the Legislative Assembly, and the

Regional Committee on Social Policy confirmed the importance of the program. “Breathing

Space” was included into the president’s program from 1 June 2012, No. 761 “On National

21

Strategy of Action for Children 2012 - 2017".14 However, until now the program has not been

included in the list of mandatory programs financed by the state budget. Money for the program

comes through different charitable channels, including on-line donations.15 Since September

2015, the Committee for press and cooperation with the media in the Government of St.

Petersburg has supported “Breathing Space” with public announcement and media coverage.

Meanwhile, the leaders of NGOs recognize the connection between budgetary funding and

independence. Some of them regard government funding as a partial benefit, which may entail

both positive and negative consequences:

Q: Is full governmental funding desirable for your NGO?

A: This is a moot point. From the perspective of sustainable development—yes. From the

viewpoint of control—no. Because we have all the checks by the prosecutor's office,

sanitary and epidemiological stations, fire inspections, tax inspections already now [the

NGO is partly funded by the state – E.B.]. … Because we also communicate with

colleagues from organisations, and we see that they're inundated with paperwork.

Planning, reporting, etc. Thank God, we can minimize the paperwork that we do.. 14 http://base.garant.ru/70183566/.15 See the website of the program: http://peredishka.ru/donate

22

Because we do not work with papers, we work with children. Therefore, when it comes to

funding from the state, there is a risk that the state will climb all over everything and tell

us ‘where we must plant pansies, and where roses’ (NGO_SPb_1).

The contemporary legal field creates opportunities for direct collaboration between NGOs and

state bodies. Since 2012, St. Petersburg has regularly held competitions among NGOs for the

execution of state powers. In the event of winning one of these competitions, the NGO assumes

the function of providing services on behalf of the state social system. From one perspective, this

could mean the total loss of independence for such organizations. However, empirical research

shows that NGOs may combine the execution of state powers with their own projects, and still

understand themselves as a part of civil society.

It is impossible to identify NGOs which are solely managing their own projects or solely

executing state social programs. One NGO may have a “state” project which provides the NGO

with a certain stability—not only financial stability, but also legitimizing its activities in general.

During the period of that project, the NGO may develop their own projects which bring

something new to the state social welfare system, rather than simply assisting state bodies in

running their own services.

Leaders and members of NGOs argue that successful work by NGOs protecting children in

today’s Russia is impossible without close communication with authorities. However, leaders of

NGOs tend to interpret the current transformations in the legal and social policy fields in two

ways. From one side, the penetration of the state into the projects and activities of NGOs is

understood as a violation of their independence. From the other side, NGOs tend to see the

“domestication” of NGOs as an invitation for collaboration, which, while it may be nominal and

formal, may also bring real results in solving problems.

Different NGOs practice cooperation with state bodies on different levels: from simple

communication to the substitution of state social services. Nevertheless, none of these strategies

23

means the rejection of independence and of membership in civil society. In trying to preserve

some autonomy, NGOs devise and implement complex strategies to improve their own projects.

Policy networks surrounding child protection are active on formal and informal levels. Active

members of NGOs have a wide variety of opportunities for meetings and discussions with state

actors at different forums. Informal communication between state actors and NGO

representatives helps solve everyday problems, and helps to form a common vision of particular

difficulties. Although the formal participation of non-state actors in official platforms like Public

Chambers or Councils creates the chance to develop strategic recommendations, and access to

policy making, it still entails a lot of barriers—including enormous bureaucracy, the complicated

structure of ministries and distribution of responsibilities, legal restrictions, and the necessity of

waiting for the appropriate moment to propose recommendations.

Under state actors we include officials of low executive level: officers and heads of executive

departments. These are the state partners who are available for negotiations. The boundary

between state and non-state actors at this level is permeable. Former officials may turn into NGO

activists, and vice versa.

State and non-state actors may combine their efforts to achieve common goals. Any state actor

has such access to the vertical of power. They can act as providers of programs and give

suggestions to the higher levels of the state. Meanwhile, in one way or another officials of law at

the executive level suffer from the same barriers as the NGOs.

Reputation of the NGO: the quantity and quality of contacts with authorities

According to our interviews, reputation is a very significant component of a successfully

functioning NGO. NGOs may use different methods to build their reputation, but all of them are

somehow connected to interactions with the authorities. Connections and collaboration with

24

particular state bodies may be regarded as resources which can support the position of the NGO

in a competitive environment and bolster their reputation, as one of our respondents pointed out:

Committee on Social Policy, for example. Yes, it strengthens our position. We get a

certain support for our image. Well, for example, in the case of grants or subsidies, any

letter of support from the Committee gives weight to our organisation. If we cooperate

with state shelters, for example, this also strengthens our position in certain senses

(NGO_SPb_4).

NGOs may make plenty of effort to construct their reputation as a professional NGO, which may

then mean that they are viewed by the authorities as a more respectable and serious partner.

These efforts are combined with practical activities, but NGOs recognize these costs as essential:

This is an important part of, simply, the economic survival of the organisation. In order

to enable it to compete with other non-profit organisations, it must prove that it is doing

something socially significant. Or it should do something politically significant, well, for

the state (Center_Family_SPb).

One of the NGOs organizes independent regular meetings.16 Usually the authorities do not take

part in supervisions. However, the staff of municipal guardianship departments, social workers,

and philologists from municipal services or NGOs take part in these meetings. Supervision is

always managed by members of “Partniorstvo”. The leader of the evaluation is always positioned

as an expert. This evaluation helps to construct and support their image as a professional expert

NGO, and it also improves the popularity and significance of “Partniorstvo”—another important

way of maximizing contacts with state bodies.

Personal contacts with officials and having a background of working for state structures provides

another benefit—knowledge of how to communicate with state agencies. This knowledge is

singled out as a special and rather important skill which defines the success of the NGO and

cross-sectoral collaboration. Some specialist knowledge is needed to prepare applications and 16 Regular open child welfare supervision organized by NGO “Partniorstvo” in St. Petersburg.

25

take financial support form the state (actually the only legitimate source of support now in

Russia): “we act as an administrative resource for them. As a rule they do not know how to write

applications, somehow they can not do that. In-person work with people is what they do. We

help them” (NGO_Samara_1).

But compiling applications is a relatively small part of this body of knowledge of how to interact

with the authorities. The strategies of successful and developed NGOs are predetermined by the

goal of interacting efficiently with the state authorities. Based on the findings of this research we

can identify some of the most important skills: knowing how to craft the “right” reputation for

the NGO; formulating requests or suggestions correctly; understanding how and when to present

an idea. Each of these components requires its own hidden knowledge. Thus, constructing the

reputation of an NGO involves a number of activities: conferences, round tables, meetings, and

membership in different networks and councils. NGOs value each opportunity for public

presentation, and try to do it in the best way: “[if] I do not have time to prepare a ‘smart'

presentation, I would rather cancel my participation” (NGO_Samara_1).

Forming a proper reputation in the eyes of the authority entails NGOs competing for resources.

One’s reputation is constructed through the process of communication with the authorities—and

also, primarily, for the authorities. NGOs regard the construction of a proper reputation as a very

important component of their work, one that requires a serious investment of effort.

There is no single formula for crafting the reputation of an NGO, but analyses of interviews

suggests several key components. A proper reputation definitely requires performing tolerance

towards current state social policy and a willingness to compromise with the authorities. The

NGO has to have skills of communication with authorities, using the language and rules shared

by the authorities. In this sense, certain Russian NGOs find themselves in a similar position to

the Chinese NGOs described by Mertha (2009), in that abiding by the established ‘rules of the

game’ may offer them more opportunity to influence policy development than acting in

opposition to the existing political regime. Having a reputation as a professional NGO providing

26

unique social services gives the organisation o to be included in cross-sectoral networks.

Participation in these networks in turn gives the NGO a good chance (which is still quite modest)

of influencing political decisions. A final important component of reputation is that the NGO

must be efficient, and establishing efficiency in the current situation again requires close

collaboration with the authorities.

In constructing the “right” reputation, NGOs seek to maximize their contact with the authorities.

They use different methods to create a mutual interest between themselves and state social

services. NGOs have regular contact with the authorities, but they also try to stimulate the

interest of state social services in the NGOs by organizing their own platforms for

communication, such as the open city supervision in St. Petersburg, or the special section at the

regional Duma in Samara. Professionalism is what may attract the attention of the authorities

here. Efforts made by the NGOs to construct a proper reputation for themselves erase the

boundary between the government and NGOs. To be successful and efficient, NGOs have to be

transparent and legible to the authorities. Besides, NGOs are forced to demonstrate values such

as, for example, accountability or loyalty, which are much more important among state actors

than within civil society. The porous border between state and non-state actors may, in certain

cases, give the NGOs access to the mechanisms of governance, which would hardly be available

normally to non-governmental organisations. By maximizing contact with the authorities, NGOs

simultaneously receive certain benefits that allow for improvement of their independent projects.

A compromise and its consequences for an NGO

Collaboration between the state and non-state actors is sometimes needed not only for the

improvement of independent projects, but also for the very survival of an NGO. In the aftermath

of recent legal changes, one of our respondents, the SOS Village, appeared to be in a very

ambiguous situation, in which they were forced to defend their status as a children home as well

as a specific form of family-based care.

27

The SOS Village enjoys the support of the Children’s Ombudsman and its founder—the “Russian

Committee ‘SOS Children’s Villages’ ”. These agents lobby for the interests of the Villages at the

legislative level, and represent the Villages in different Committees and Ministries. The

development of children’s villages as a specific and successful form of care for orphans was

listed as a priority in the National Strategy:

Continuation of the reform of institutions for orphans and children without parental care,

accomplished by downsizing, creating conditions close to the family, creating new

modern children's homes in the form of a children's village in accordance with

international standards and modern methods of development, education, rehabilitation of

orphans and children without parental care…17.

According to an interview with the director of the SOS Village, recognition of this form of care

for orphans at the level of National Strategy was a result of the efforts of the “Russian

Committee ‘SOS Children’s Villages’.”

At that time, the National Strategy clearly defined a general trend towards family-based care for

orphans. Additionally, the “Dima Yakovlev Law” prioritized the adoption of orphans by Russian

citizens. As a consequence, the SOS Villages received recommendations from above,

simultaneously from the Ministry of Education and the “Russian Committee ‘SOS Children’s

Villages’,” to formalize guardianship over their pupils. This meant that the Villages were forced

to form foster families, and switch from an institutional to a family model of care. The transition

to foster families had substantial consequences for the SOS Villages. From a legal viewpoint, the

institutional children’s homes had to transform into a network of foster families. SOS mothers

were compelled to head foster families, which required greater responsibility and legal obligation

towards children as compared with the responsibilities of an employed caregiver. Currently, two

forms of families are permitted in the Russian SOS Villages: the SOS-family, in which the

17 ГАРАНТ, available at http://base.garant.ru/70183566/#friends#ixzz3oloLfpdg [accessed 8 August 2015].

28

director of the Village is the trustee of all children, and foster families, where the guardians of

children are their foster parents.

The Ministry of Education and the head organisation of the SOS project in Russia both sent

recommendations to the SOS Village. This fact indicates that the question on SOS villages was

discussed at high levels of government. Some compromises were achieved. SOS villages

continue their work in Russia. However, the status of the Villages was obviously manipulated for

state interests. Administrative and reputational aspects of the existence of Villages in Russia

become more complicated.

Ambiguity of status gives birth to involuntary mimicry. Children’s homes and associations of

foster families are legally distinct forms of organisation. The Village is forced to have two

“faces”: one for the Russian state, and one for the international founder. Legally this may entail

for them the necessity of double accounting, and manipulating the statuses of orphans, who may

be recognized as orphans, as pupils of a children’s home, or as children placed in foster families.

The last status meets the requirements of official regulations much better then the first one.

Being in opposition

The importance of the social programs promoted by the NGOs must be strongly argued to the

state authorities. In making such arguments, the current discourse of the state’s social policy has

to be taken into account. Protection of children is legitimated by the current political mood, but

still, not every project for child protection can be promoted. To be successful, the project has to

add to the public system of social service, while at the same time claiming to be outside of it.

Being in opposition is counterproductive for NGOs. Examples show that projects or actions

initiated by NGOs that violate the stable rules of state social care may lead to consequences

which are undesirable both for the activists and for their clients—children.

29

During one of the visits [to an orphanage] I met a boy who had enlarged lymph nodes. I

asked him, and he answered that he had been ill for three weeks, but nobody did

anything. Then I took him in my own car to the hospital, where the doctor wrote a list of

diagnoses and a list of necessary medications. When I brought him back with all his

medications to the orphanage, the doctor of the orphanage got angry and told me that I

shouldn’t have done that. After that, access to all the nearby orphanages was officially

revoked for me and all other volunteers of our NGO (NGO_Samara_2).

In spite of their different spheres of specialization, all the NGOs are sure that communication

with the authorities is necessary. Inclusion of the members of NGOs in different public councils

of Committees or Ministries is highly desirable. NGOs may be included in public councils as

equal members, but the impact of their inclusion may be different. Informal networks matter

here, and a member of an NGO who has personal contacts with the authorities, or experience

working in government, may be a special resource for the NGO.

Conclusions

The segment of civil society represented by NGOs protecting children in contemporary Russia is

affected by socio-political, legal and even moral discourses. Moreover, the rules of the game

which the state offers to NGOs are transforming rapidly. Legal initiatives of the last few years

contribute to a convergence between state and non-state actors, operating in the social sphere,

which includes the field of child protection. In the conditions of a declining economy the state

regards NGOs mainly as assistants in the implementation of state social policy. Nevertheless, it

would be wrong to assert that opportunities to influence policy are totally absent for non-state

actors. The results of our research indicate that there are both opportunities and restrictions for

30

NGOs where policy entrepreneurship is concerned, which also means that prospects for civil

society development in Russia may be more hopeful than they sometimes appear.

The issue of firmer control by the state is a challenging for NGOs who are willing to act as

policy entrepreneurs. Socially oriented NGOs are almost entirely dependent on state subsidies.

This means that an NGO’s reputation acquires special significance. Professionalism and the

willingness to work in a consensual manner are important components of the reputation: an NGO

has to demonstrate regularly and publicly its efficiency and indispensability. At that very

moment any NGO has to play by the rules established by the state. In such conditions policy

networking pursues a dual purpose. On the one hand, collaboration with state actors gives the

NGOs opportunities to improve certain policy options. On the other hand, cooperation with state

officials may be a vital condition for an NGO’s survival and sustainability. Besides, construction

of the ‘right’ reputation takes a lot of additional efforts and resources from NGOs, and makes

them totally transparent to the state.

Financial dependence on state grants makes socially oriented NGOs vulnerable, and

independently authored projects initiated by NGOs suffer first and foremost. Developing such

projects is a very complicated process, which has a chance of succeeding only when it aligns

with general trends in state social policy. The case of the relatively successful program

“Breathing Space” shows that great efforts to promote a unique and extremely necessary social

project may achieve an endorsement on the level of national standards of care for children, but

still comes up against limits in improvement of that to the level of state funded federal social

program. The high degree of dependence on the state calls into question the possibility for NGOs

to have independence and autonomy.

Nevertheless, socially oriented NGOs protecting children see in the process of “domestication”

of the third sector new opportunities for solving problems and improvement of policy

suggestions. The main tools of policymaking here are contacts with the authorities. Participation

in official networks - such as meetings of regular working groups and councils, and membership

31

of the Public Chamber - gives NGOs public visibility which helps to construct a proper

reputation for the NGO and establishes their credibility as policy entrepreneurs. In some aspects

model of collaboration between state and non-state actors seems bogus, although inclusion into

the formal networks allows building up new cross-sectoral contacts – this is how they get real

support and opportunities for development of policy options. Key contacts, which increase

efficiency of policy efforts may issue not from official platforms, but from informal networks,

long-term experience of working in the same field, prior experience of professional

collaboration, or simply friendly relations between individual state and non-state actors.

In the sphere of children protection representatives of NGOs have a number of opportunities to

discuss problems in state policy towards vulnerable children. NGOs have good opportunities to

express their opinions to state providers of social policy. Officials at the executive level take part

in the meetings of official cross-sectoral forums. At the lower level of executive power, the line

between non-state actors and officials is rather porous. The main problem in developing a policy

option is caused by the ‘vertical of power’ which remains very strong in Russia. The delivery of

a policy solution to the level of political decision making requires extensive efforts, and this is a

common difficulty for NGOs and low-level officials. Although this problem also finds a

solution. Such agents as NGOs operating on the federal level or Children Ombudsmen assist

NGOs in improvement of policy options.

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