UnIntnivetern

S 

ersitnati

prin

1 

tyoiona

ng2

ofFlalR

201

loridevie

1

daew

Ass

Pro

UF 

Th

Univ

Columb

Facu

Dsistant Prof

ovost EmeriDir

 Internatio

he Networks

Pa

Rutge

Unive

New Yo

New Yo

versity of M

ia Universit

San F

We

ulty Adv

Dr. Jeffrefessor of Po

Adv

Dr. Dtus, Seniorrector, Reu

Prof

onal Revie

k of Global student jou

articipatin

rs Universit

ersity of Flo

ork Universi

ork Univers

Michigan, M

Duke U

ty, Underg

 Francisco S

ellesley Col

2 

 

 

isor and

ey Samuolitical Scie

 visory Bo

 David Cor Vice Presidubin O’D. Asessor of Hi

 

ew is a fou

Affairs Jouurnals of glo

g Univers

ty, Global A

orida, Intern

ity, Journa

sity, Journa

Michigan Jo

University, E

raduate Jo

tate Univer

lege, IR Co

d Super

uel Barkinnce, Unive

oard 

lbum dent, Univeskew Institustory 

unding m

urnals is a obal affairs

ities inclu

Affairs E-J

national Re

l of Human

al of Globa

ournal of Po

Eruditio

ournal of P

rsity, IR Jo

ouncil Jour

rvisor 

n rsity of Flor

ersity of Floute 

ember of

consortiums.

ude

Journal

eview

n Rights

l Affairs

olitical Scie

Politics and

ournal

rnal

rida 

orida 

f the 

m of

ence 

d Society

3 

Staff may be reached at: ufinternationalreview@gmail.com 

Ian Charles Proctor, Editor-in-Chief Mr. Proctor is a senior double‐majoring in Political Science and History, with a minor in Business Administration and a certificate in International Relations. After graduation in May 2010, Ian plans to enter the international development field before pursuing his Master's Degree. He has interned through the U.S. Department of State at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. He is the Vice President of UF’s Model United Nations and his academic interests include Security Policy, Conflict Studies, and Disaster Response. His outside interests include reading and movies, and he is an addicted soccer player. 

Mel Rose Burat, Associate Editor Ms. Burat is a third year Political Science and Anthropology major who is also pursuing minors in European Union Studies and East‐Central Europe Studies with a certificate in International Studies. Aside from the International Review, she also is an active member of UF's Model United Nations and serves on the Executive Board for Gator Model United Nations, a conference put on for high schoolers from across the state of Florida. Melissa plans on going to law school and eventually hopes to work for the United Nations. 

 

Ross Mittiga, Associate Editor Mr. Mittiga is an honors student majoring in Political Science at the University of Florida. His research interests include critical and continental political theory, international institutions, state development, and international political economy. He is currently the President of The Dynamo, UF’s first student‐led think‐tank, a Senior Fellow with the Economic Development Center of the Roosevelt Institute Campus Network, a national think‐tank and policy research group, and an Associate Editor for the University of Florida International Review, a journal that features undergraduate research in international relations. Ross’ interests include political philosophy, public policy, cooking, music, movies, and running. Ross intends to pursue graduate education and doctoral research in the field of Political Science, with the hopes of eventually becoming a successful professor and author.

Gayane Margaryan, Associate Editor Ms. Margaryan is a senior majoring in public relations and political science. She is a part of the Bob Graham Center for Public Service and Journalism College Ambassadors, and she is also a Campus Representative for Victoria's Secret PINK. Upon graduation in May, Gayane hopes to enter the nonprofit world and work in development/fundraising. 

 

Yevgen Sautin, Associate Editor Mr. Sautin a local Gainesvillian and is a junior history, economics and political science triple major. His primary research interests are security studies and the history of diplomacy. In addition to his interest in politics, he is an avid basketball player. He interned at the Kennan Institute which is part of the Woodrow Wilson Center. He has a strong interest for diplomatic history and working on a thesis on the subject. 

 

4 

TableofContents

Masdar‐CityoftheFutureMicheleRamirez 5 

TheEuropeanUnionandStrategiesforCounter‐Terrorism:Discourse,Development,andDeficiencyinEuro‐MaghrebiSecuritizationinaPost‐9/11WorldClaudiaDaSilva 15 

EditorHighlight:ComparingthePeacekeepingMissionsinAngolaandNamibiaIanProctor 26 

Victim,Demon,orSavior?TheVictim‐Soldier‐TerroristSpectrumanditsConsequencesBrittanyFox 37 

GlobalizationandChinainAfricaMichelleThereseB.Asuncion46 

 

5 

Masdar‐CityoftheFutureMicheleRamirez  Since the Brundtland Commission convened in 1983, the concept of “Sustainable

Development” has become an ongoing notion that countries around the globe are working

towards. The Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as, development that “meets

the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their

own needs.” The report outlines two major concepts- the priority of the world’s poorest

countries to meet their needs, and the concept that development puts limitations on the

environment’s ability to provide for the present and future. The city of Masdar, located in the

United Arab Emirates, is a community being developed with the latest and most cutting edge

technology to accomplish the highest level of sustainability in all aspects. How is Masdar,

Abu Dhabi being sustainably designed to conserve energy, reduce waste, cut water

consumption, and slash carbon emissions? Creating a city with the capacity to tackle these

challenging areas is extremely complex. The design of this city holds such great importance

because it is bringing together the most advanced and pioneering institutions in the world to

create a model of what cities will need to become in the future. It will be designed in a way

that considers the highest level of sustainability possible for almost every aspect of living.

Masdar was carefully premeditated by the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company to conserve

energy through solar, photovoltaic, and geothermal plants, to reduce waste with their unique

recycling system, to cut water consumption with desalinization plants, and to drastically slash

carbon emissions through thought out transportation plans (World Commission on

Environment and Development 1987, 8).

I. Energy

6 

Energy is one of the most complicated and crucial factors in the world’s passage towards

sustainability. It encompasses almost every aspect of state’s social, economic, and

environmental concerns. The city of Masdar has been delicately constructed, by the Abu

Dhabi Future Energy Company, in a way that uses our most up to date knowledge on

alternative energy sources to meet the needs of its inhabitants. Due to the location of Masdar,

it is in a position that receives a very high concentration of sunlight, approximately 2044

(kWh/m^2) of global solar irradiation per year (Mokhtar 2010, 3772). This makes the use of

solar power extremely logical and useful to supply the area with much of its energy needs.

The city will get 170MW of energy from solar or “photovoltaic” sources, and will need less

than 30kWh per capita per day of energy. (Abu Dhabi Future Energy Co. 2010). This is

estimated to be about nine times less than what the United States of America uses in one day.

Masdar aims to use 100% renewable energy solutions. According to the Abu Dhabi Future

Energy Company, the city’s energy will be drawn from four primary sources: 26%

concentrated solar energy, 7% from waste turned to energy, 53% from photo voltaic sources,

and 14% from an evacuated thermal tube collector (ADFEC 2010). This division of energy

sources is something new and tremendously significant in regards to where cities derive their

power from. Most cities currently obtain their energy from sources such as coal, natural gas,

and nuclear power. Each of these sources have proven to have negative impacts on the

environment, therefore, Masdar’s ability to divide its energy needs into four areas in which

none of them contain the use of fossil fuels or nuclear power, is a bold step towards a

sustainable future for other cities. The designers of Masdar have been able to incorporate

energy efficiency in almost every aspect of the city including the city’s actual construction.

For example, when constructing the Masdar headquarters building, the roof will be built first

complete with photovoltaic solar panels. The energy generated by those solar panels will then

supply the energy needs required to finish the construction of that building. Creating a

7 

geothermal resource by drilling a hole in the ground is also being discussed. This system

would pump water into the ground through tubes that would pass underneath the earth and

come back up supplying high temperature water. By striving to be sustainable in every

process of the city and not overlooking even the smallest details, the designers and scientists

behind Masdar are setting a bold precedent for future developments to replicate globally

(Nader 2009, 3953).

II. Waste

In addition, Masdar has uniquely designed the city to produce the least amount of waste

possible, and to deal with the waste it does generate in the most efficient way feasible. Even

in the development of the city, as we learned with the use of solar power for construction

energy, the city aims to drastically cut assembly waste. Some of the goals set for waste, while

the city is being built, include: the recycling of all metals and steel, all wood will be reused or

collected for transformation into energy, and all leftover concrete should be recycled. In order

to construct a city, massive amounts of resources are used and often left over as waste that

gets sent to the landfill. Masdar’s goals to deal with their waste during this process will set an

example for other cities to observe and replicate. The city has incorporated several options for

dealing with this problem in daily life, in order to strive towards its goal of being zero waste.

For example, a majority of biological waste created in Masdar will be used to make fertilizer

and nutrient-rich soil, while the rest can be used for power by being burned in a waste

incinerator. The biological waste will be processed by EnerTech’s SlurryCarb, which is a type

of technology used by the corporation EnerTech Environmental, based out of the United

States. In June 2008 Masdar declared its interest in having this same facility built in order to

deal with their sewage in a manner that turns waste into energy. All other types of waste will

8 

be recycled or reused for other purposes. Public areas will contain vacuum waste systems that

will remove the garbage from where it was used and sort it on the spot. The sorting process

has three main sections: biomass, recyclables, and non-recyclables. Seventeen percent will be

biomass that is composted for future fertilizer uses, fifty percent will be recyclables that

remain on site to be recycled as close to its original location as possible, and all other non-

recyclables will consists of about thirty-three percent that can be sent to the waste-to-energy

plants similar to EnerTech Environmental. As a whole, this reduces the left over waste to zero

and eliminates the overall need of landfills completely. The disposal of trash around the world

has become an ever increasing problem. Countries such as the United States and China deal

with most of their waste by taking it to landfills and burying it; however, these landfills can

no longer store the massive amounts of garbage produced daily by the people that use them,

and are overflowing. Trash, therefore, ends up piling up and often lands in our oceans. This

makes Masdar’s ability to reduce their waste stream to zero percent very significant and

valuable. In the future, not only will cities want to come up with a waste system that brings

their percentage down to zero, for sustainability reasons, but it will be completely necessary

because there will be no where to take it otherwise (Blumenburg 2010; Crampsie 2008, 53).

III. Water

Water posses an interesting problem for this region specifically because it’s being built in

a drought ridden area. The scientists behind Masdar’s water conservation plan have used the

most cutting edge research in designing a system that would meet the inevitable needs of its

inhabitants. The outline aims to reduce water consumption to less than 80l/p/d, which is less

than the USA, Germany, Sweden, the UAE, and Syria (ADFEC 2010). Two aspects of the

plan include reducing water leakage to 3% and recycling 90% of the city’s grey water

(ADFEC 2010). Masdar will get its fresh water from a desalinization plant that is completely

powered by the sun. Desalinization plants are typically very expensive to operate and often

9 

are not considered sufficient due to the large amounts of energy required to run them. By

creating desalinization plants that are able to run off of solar power, the high cost of finding

energy to operate these plants is no longer a problem. Although these plants can solve the

problems dealing with lack of fresh water, the amount of energy needed to run them has

deterred numerous countries from implementing the infrastructures. The amount of water

consumed by Masdar is estimated to only be about half as much as other cities close to the

same size. One way this will be accomplished is by carefully constructed fixtures in all public

and private places that provide maximum water efficiency. The average flow rate of a

washroom tap is 14.0L/min, while the flow rate at the Masdar Institute is only 3.0L/min. In

addition, domestic showers at the institute only use 6.0L/min in comparison to 16.0L/min, and

single flush toilets use just 4.8L compared to the average 12.0L (Whittier 2010). Aside from

this, buildings will be equipped with electronic sensors that are able to identify cracked pipes,

dew catchers to collect any excess moisture, and rainwater harvesting stations. Overall, water

consumption is being reduced by 54% relative to the rest of the United Arab Emirates

(Whitter 2010). In order to cut back on the need for water all together, lawns in Masdar will

be replaced with drought-resistant plants that require very little hydration. The level at which

Masdar has assessed the problems of fresh water shortages is significant when you compare it

to other cities around the world. Most cities derive their water from underground aquifers and

wells, and deliver it through systems that may run pipes from several different areas. Many of

these systems are not constructed as carefully as the piping done in Masdar, therefore, a large

amount is lost to leakage. Poor water systems and over drainage have led to the formation of

sinkholes in countries around the world, including China, Guatemala, and the U.S. Water

remains a scarce resource internationally, and it is only depleting further; therefore, not only

should we change where we derive our freshwater, to avoid sinkholes problems, but also our

overall need for freshwater. By tackling the issue from the consumer’s position and installing

10 

fixtures that only provide a certain amount of water per person, preventing loss of water

through leakage, and slashing the need for water with drought-resistant green areas, Masdar

addresses the predicament in ways other places have not (Blumenburg 2010; Pool 2009 ,49).

IV. Transportation

Masdar’s aim is to be carbon neutral, although it is not the first city to accomplish this

goal, it will be the first to meet this target on such a large scale. At its completion, the city is

expected to inhabit 90,000 people, of which 40,000 will actually live in the city and 50,000

will go back and forth into the city each day (Reiche 2010, 380). In order to respond to the

transportation needs of these 90,000 people, Masdar will be equipped with a unique system

called “Personal Rapid Transportation.” This consists of pod-like cars that are located on a

magnetic route underneath the city. The pods are driverless devices that can fit up to four

passengers and respond to a button that is pressed by residents of the city when they need

transportation. This innovative transportation system was designed by the Dutch company

“2GetThere,” where they made each pod with Lithium-Phosphate batteries that recharges

when it returns to the station. There will be approximately 3,000 pods, 85-100 Stations, and

an estimated 135,000 trips per day serving 5,000 people per hour (ADFEC 2010). Although

the original plans for the city, established in 2006, declared the Personal Rapid Transportation

system as the sole means of transportation for the city, the developers have recently revised

their design to allow electric vehicles. Since the whole concept of Masdar’s design is such a

new model in sustainable development, the various elements of its plan will continue to

change as innovative research is done and discoveries are made regarding sustainable

transportation. In addition to the PRT, there will also be a Light Rail Transit system that will

connect Masdar and the local airport. This system will travel through Abu Dhabi, connecting

a few of the upcoming cities, and pass through Masdar. There will be six stations for the Light

Rail Transit system around the city, located in high traffic areas. Besides the availability of

11 

rapid transportation, the city of Masdar is also being constructed in a way that promotes

walking. Sidewalks will be made in a way that is shaded from the surrounding infrastructure

to promote usability. From the center of the city, a walker could reach shops, playgrounds and

a Personal Rapid Transportation station all within 150m. Neighborhood centers, schools,

work places, and churches are all located only 500m from the center of town (ADFEC 2010).

This city design eliminates the need for cars and encourages alternative modes of

transportation, such as biking and walking. The layout of this city is key in promoting

alternative transportation, due to the fact that most cities are built in a design that often

separates locations of housing from locations where people often work or attend school.

When cities are built in this way, whether they want to or not, the people are forced to use

cars or busses as a way of commuting from home to work. Cities do not have to necessarily

pack their housing, school, churches, shops, and work places together in order to promote

walking; they simply have to design it in a way that meets its inhabitant’s needs. Masdar was

designed in a circle formation, similar to most Arabic urban cities, to maintain the culture of

Abu Dhabi (Aster 2011; Reiche 2010, 380).

V. Criticisms

Masdar has undoubtedly accomplished elements of conservation and sustainability on

a level that other cities have not, however, the overall philosophies and development of it has

not been without criticisms. Due to the fact that Masdar is one of the first of its kind, when it

comes to the sustainability of cities, its practices were designed with the intent to be used by

other cities in the future. Many critics have a problem with the achievability of this plan.

Their biggest reason for this is the fact that the United Arab Emirates is an immensely

wealthy country economically. Not every country around the world is going to have $22

billion to put towards making a city sustainable. Critics of the project also point out that other

cities around the world are not governed by the same political systems as those in Masdar. In

12 

the U.A.E, the government does not have to ask its people for permission when making major

financial or social decisions. Much of the world is not lead in this manner, so a project like

this has a small chance of being agreed upon by enough people to actually make it happen.

Since Masdar is not constrained by these boundaries of money or politics, the designers and

master minds behind the project are given the ability to construct this city as they please. As

Pool describes, “Planned eco-cities have already been pessimistically labeled mere

playgrounds for the rich” (Pool 2009, 49). In addition to the special circumstances that

Masdar was constructed under, there have also been criticisms surrounding some of the

specific features of the city. For example, Masdar is located in an area that frequently receives

sand storms. During the development in 2009, the city was hit with a massive sand storm that

covered the solar panels and reduced the amount of power being generated by 40% (Laylin

2010). After an expensive process of having the panels cleaned was performed, the

performance of the panels went back up to normal levels. Critics question whether or not the

solar panels are even valuable if this expensive process has to be done each time the city

encounters and storm. This poses another critic of the city and how feasible it can be used as a

model. As pointed out, solar power works exceptionally well for Masdar because of the city’s

location in the world and the high amounts of radiation it receives. If other countries, such as

those in Europe, were to replicate the same design as Masdar, they may not reap the same

benefits. Even while the solar panels are covered in sand in Abu Dhabi, they could be

absorbing more sunlight than perfectly performing solar panels located in cloudy Europe.

Although some critics may have a point when it comes to whether or not this design could

work for other cities, they may be doubting the functionality of some of its features too soon.

Masdar is scheduled to be finished and ready 2016, so whether or not the city with operate

efficiently at its intended capacity of 90,000 people, is yet to be determined (Stilwell 2008;

Laylin 2010).

13 

VI. Conclusion

Masdar city has been planned out and developed with the highest level of

sustainability in mind. The most technological institutions in the world such as, Massachusetts

Institute of Technology and the Abu Dhabi Energy Company, have come together to help

design this city of the future. Although energy efficiency, waste reduction, water conservation,

and alternative transportation, among others, have each been altered specifically for Masdar to

reach maximum sustainable development, the scientists behind the designs wanted to make

sure this did not impact the overall quality of life. The city may be designed to use fewer

resources and create less of an environmental impact than other cities, but it was not designed

to take away the overall enjoyment of the people that live there. The designers of Masdar

never intended for life in this city to be about lack of resources, or inhabitants worrying about

using less water. The city is meant to be about innovative ideas enjoyed by families and

people that can enjoy a pleasant place of shops and food that is surrounded by rich culture.

Masdar simply happens to be designed in a way that makes living less critical on the

environment. Although this exact design may not be replicated the same way in other cities

around the world to meet the same levels of sustainability, it does represent a high standard of

sustainable development that other cities in the future will need to strive towards.

Development on its own is something we cannot afford to continue as a whole, without the

incorporation of sustainability in everything we construct. The environment cannot provide us

with infinite amounts of resources, while we continue to fill our land and seas with garbage,

exhaust our freshwater resources, and emit ozone depleting gases into our air. Masdar is an

example of what we are capable of doing with great knowledge and cooperation across the

globe. As former president of the U.A.E, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan described, “We

cherish our environment because it is an integral part of our country, our history, and our

14 

heritage. On land and in the sea, our forefathers lived and survived in this environment”

(ADFEC 2010).

Michele Ramirez is a third year Political Science major with minors in Environmental Studies 

and Sustainability Studies. She is highly involved in the sustainability initiatives on campus. 

She runs and coordinates UF’s Sustainability Hut as an intern with the Office of Sustainability. 

After graduation in the Spring of 2012, she plans to pursue a job in the Environmental Sector.

Works Cited

Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (ADFEC). “Building the World’s Most Sustainable City.” September 2010. Accessed: 13 March 2011. Aster, Nick. “Personal Rapid Transit in Masdar City.” Triple Pundit. 18 January 2011. Accessed: 20 February 2011 Blumenburg, Bennet. “Masdar: The Zero Carbon, Zero Waste City of the Future.” Environmental Graffiti. 2010. Accessed: 23 February 2011. *Crampsie, S. “City of Dreams.” Vol. 3, Issue 15. Pg. 50-55. Engineering and Technology. 6 Sept 2008. Accessed: 23 March 2011. Laylin, Tafline. “Masdar City: Small Hiccups, Or Total System Failure?” Green Prophet. August 2010. Accessed: March 2011. *Mokhtar, Marwan. “Systematic Comprehensive Technoeconomic Assessment of Solar Cooling Technologies Using Location-Specific Climate Data.” Vol. 87, Issue 12. Pg. 3766 - 3778. Dec. 2010. Accessed: March 2011. *Nader, Sam. “Paths To A Low-carbon Economy- The Masdar Example.” Vol. 1, Issue 1. Pg. 3951-3958. Energy Procedia. February 2009. Accessed: 23 March 2011. Oppenheimer, Micky. “Masdar- Future Renewable Energy City.” ICentrus. 20 March 2010. Accessed: 24 February 2011. *Pool, R. “A Tale of Two Cities.” Vol. 4, Issue 7. Pg. 46-49. Engineering and Technology.”April 2009. Accessed: 22 March 2011. *Reiche, Danyel. “Renewable Energy Policies in the Gulf countries: A case study of carbon- neutral “Masdar City” in Abu Dhabi.” Energy Policy. Vol. 38. No 1. Pp. 378-382. January 2010. Accessed: 23 February 2011. Stilwell, Brian and Shawn Lindabury. “Masdar: Evaluating The World’s Most Sustainable City.” Dec. 2008. Accessed: 23 March 2011. Whittier, Jack. “Building the World’s Most Sustainable City.” The Integration Conference. 6- 10 December 2010. Accessed: 24 February 2011. World Commission on Environment and Development. “Our Common Future.” New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Print.

 

 

15 

TheEuropeanUnionandStrategiesforCounter‐Terrorism:Discourse,Development,andDeficiencyinEuro‐MaghrebiSecuritizationinaPost‐9/11WorldClaudia Da Silva 

  While the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 may not have physically impacted

the European Union (EU), the reverberations of those attacks were greatly felt throughout the

EU, and acted as catalysts for several terrorist attacks by radical Islamic groups; amongst

which the most notable are the metro bombings of Madrid, Spain in 2004 and those of

London, England in 2005. Although these attacks were originally deemed to have been

perpetuated by homegrown terrorist cells, the origin of the groups was found to have been

located in the western region of Northern Africa, comprised of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania,

Morocco, and Western Sahara; more formally known as the Maghreb. In addition to the

European Union’s emergence as a hot spot for terrorist attacks, it has also evolved as a

breeding ground for foreign terrorist cells. While these terrorists may live and work in the

European Union, they were recruited by radical Islamist cells (Kaunert, 287). This alarming

development, recruitment, and activation of European branches of Maghreb-based or Islamic-

focused terrorist cells has thrown into focus the necessity of reformulating and reinvigorating

relations between the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean region of the

Maghreb. Nonetheless, the European Union has made great strides towards the formulation of

effective counter-terrorism legislation, machinations, and tactics, and the development of an

effectual partnership with the Arab world, in general, and the Maghrebi states, in specific, in

16 

regards to counter-terrorism methods; however, it has still come to be regarded as an

“ineffective counterterrorism actor” (Kaunert, 288), unable to make any defining advances

into the issue.

As a reaction to the development of modern terrorism, security has shifted to the

forefront of all foreign policy agendas, emphasizing the need for transnational cooperation

and a common foreign security policy, in order to take effective counter-terrorism measures.

In the past, the European Union has taken extensive steps towards securing their borders

against terrorist attacks through the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and

subsequent Association Agreements. Euro-Maghrebi discourse began in December 1973, with

the launch of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, between the League of Arab States and the European

Community. However, any progress was annulled by increasing political strife within the area,

which eventually led to the Gulf War, and increasing tensions between Israel and the Arab

World. Eventually, discourse was initiated once more in 1995 at the Barcelona Conference,

which led to the adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Process).

The EMP “[aimed] to enhance cooperation between the EU and Southern Mediterranean

countries with regards to three key areas: political and security issues, economic and financial

issues, and social, cultural, and human issues” (Kaunert, 290). However, due in large part to

politics surrounding the EMP, it focused more on economic stability, as opposed to security,

and therefore, proving ineffective for the purposes of counter-terrorism (Bicchi, 190). In

conjunction to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, bilateral Association Agreements were

also developed between the European Union and various Mediterranean partners. These Euro-

Med Association Agreements more thoroughly detailed country-specific action plans, such as

Article 90 of the EU-Algeria Association Agreement, for the purpose of combating terrorism,

through economic, social, and political reform (Kaunert, 291). However, the social and

economic focus of pre-9/11 legislation altered radically after the attacks.

17 

Before the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, most legislation and plans of

action set in into motion by the European Union, in regards to terrorism and the Southern

Mediterranean states, were characterized by a focus on the economic or migration side of the

partnerships. However, after the gruesome attacks of 9/11, there was a dramatic shift in

counter-terrorism strategy towards that focusing on the securitization of EU states, and the

threat of terrorism to “open and democratic societies” (Monar, 293). Originally, the threat was

viewed as a threat by Al-Qaeda to Western Societies, but later expanded into a threat to the

EU by all radical Islamist terrorist cells. Since this shift in perception, all efforts towards the

Southern Mediterranean have been viewed through four key elements set forth by the EU

Action Plan against Terrorism, created in 2001, which called for: (1) “the combination of

internal and external measures;” (2) “the combination of legislative and operational measures;”

(3) “the combination of repressive and preventive measures;” and, (4) an emphasis on

“strengthening institutional capacity” (Monar, 307). Nonetheless, most action since then is not

unique to any one key element, but rather, is a combination of any of the four. The first

element implies that through the joint efforts of the second pillar of the European Union (it

must be noted that the pillar system that has been rendered obsolete by the Lisbon Treaty of

2009, but was in use at the time of the development of the Action Plan), the Common Foreign

and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third pillar, Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal

Matters (PJCC), relating to external and internal security (Wolff, 142), respectively, the

European Union is more capable of preventing terrorism on EU-soil because most radical

Islamic terrorism has roots in the Maghreb (external), with homegrown cells in Europe

(internal). Thus by pooling the resources of the CFSP and the PJCC, the European Union is

more competently able to track terrorist movement through Mediterranean borders, and

prevent them (Monar, 303). The second element of the Action Plan not only defines terrorist

acts, but also creates and enforces punishment for involvement in any terrorist act or

18 

organization; such punishment entailed “minimum maximum custodial penalties for directing

(15 years) or participating in (8 years) a terrorist group” (305). This enforcement in

conjunction with legislation such as the Execution of Orders Freezing Property or Evidence,

which took unprecedented steps to restrain the funding for terrorist organizations (Official

Journal 2003), and the European Arrest Warrant of 13 June 2002 “[generated] one of the most

advanced cross-border law enforcement instruments of the Union” (Monar, 305). The third

element deals with the balance of repressive and preventive measures with the EU’s counter-

terrorism strategy. This balance of repression and prevention shifted more definitely towards

prevention with the adoption of the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization

and Recruitment to Terrorism. This legislation focused largely on dialogue with the Maghrebi

community, as well as Muslim community at large. It centered on talks with moderate

Muslims to ensure they did not stray to radicalism and on the promotion of “security, justice,

democracy, and opportunity for all” (307). Finally, the fourth element incorporated

“strengthening institutional capacity to deal with the common threat” (307). As such, the

European police, Europol, and the European cross-border prosecution unit, Eurojust have

been reinforced through analysis and support. The creation of the Office of the European

Union’s Anti-Terrorism Coordinator in 2003, for the purpose of monitoring and coordinating

the counter-terrorism efforts of the EU and its member states, has enhanced cooperation

between the national authorities and the agencies; thus, making the counter-terrorism

machinery both more effective, and more reliable.

Even so, in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, it was difficult to

formulate or execute any adequate action plan, due to the lack of a comprehensive definition

for terrorism. The first such definition came as a result of the European Council of the

European Security Strategy (the Solana Strategy), adopted on December 12, 2003. The Solana

Strategy recognized terrorism not solely as perpetuated by Al-Qaeda, but also, as a multi-

19 

dimensional problem, encompassing “violent religious extremism,” the pressures of

modernization, social and political upheaval, and other factors; all of these leading to terrorist

cells both in the Southern Mediterranean States, and homegrown cells found in member

countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain France, Belgium, and Italy. The phenomenon of

the Solana Strategy is that is that it recognizes the “complexity of the threat” (Monar, 295),

and works to rectify the major issue encountered by the European Union in counter-terrorism:

“Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism” (295). Therefore, it also attempts to

take measure to rectify the use of Europe as a breeding and recruitment ground for terrorist

cells, particularly those based in the Maghreb, by using “a mixture of intelligence, police,

judicial, military, and other means” to address the interrelated threats of terrorism: weapons of

mass destruction, organized crime, and state failure (296). Prior to the Solana Strategy, the

European Union “had always treated terrorism largely as an external, criminal issue” (Jackson,

237).

Furthermore, while the Solana Strategy and previous counter-terrorism legislation may

have alienated radical-Islamist groups as the main terrorism concern, the Strategy for

Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism went to great lengths to emphasize

that Islam itself was not an issue. It stated that: “while religious factors play a role, the threat

is not essentially an ‘Islamic’ one and any idea of terrorism as a clash with Islam and the

Muslim world must be rejected” (298). This legislation helped to fortify Euro-Maghrebi

relations by succinctly stating that the European Union was tolerant of Islam, reinforced their

willingness to have a strong Euro-Med partnership (298).

In conjunction with the Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to

Terrorism, and initiated by the aforementioned Euro-Med Association Agreements the

European Commission developed European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), for which the

Maghreb features highly as a region of importance. The ENP was created with the goal of

20 

complementing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and it follows the EU’s emphasis of

working with their neighboring African and Arab nations to formulate mutually-satisfactory

action plans (Kaunert, 288). The ENP developed with the intention of “creating a ‘ring of

friends’ compromising the countries to the… South of the EU” (288). It seeks to tie countries

together through political-economic means; much like the European Union does now, but

without the full membership benefits that come with a membership to the European Union,

such as the Euro. It offers financial aid to countries meeting the European standards of

governmental and socio-economic reform, and that were involved in a Euro-Med Association

Agreement. However, the offer for these political and economic partnerships has been viewed

as the European Union’s attempt to ensure the securitization of their neighborhood.

Nonetheless, the agenda of the ENP is a transformative one, seeking to uphold democracy

(289).

Along with the European Neighbourhood Policy, the 2005 European Counter-

Terrorism Strategy was also developed, as a way protect the European Union from any attacks

by Islamic or “lone wolf” terrorists. The Strategy consisted of a four-pillar plan: prevent;

protect; pursue, and respond. The main challenge of each pillar is as follows, respectively: to

prevent the development of radical religious sects, and subsequent recruitment within member

states, and any funding or advertisement efforts; to protect the people and infrastructure of the

European Union by monitoring terrorists, assessing threats, and securing borders and transport;

to pursue the gathering of intelligence on impending attacks, and the cooperation of any

European judicial and police forces; and finally, to respond promptly to any attacks, and to

develop early warning systems for such attacks (Main Achievements).

In further development of the European Neighborhood Policy, the ENP Action Plan

for Morocco, 2005, detailed further Euro-Maghrebi interaction through the involvement of

Europol in an agreement to increase tactics in order to combat terrorism (Kaunert, 294).

21 

Furthering, Euro-Maghrebi relations was the development of the EuroMed Justice Programme

in 2004. The program enforced judicial cooperation between the EU and its Southern

Mediterranean neighbors, and focused on the “transmission” of good legal practices from the

EU to the Maghrebi states (296). Moreover, a technical mission was sent to Morocco to

advance counter-terrorism aims and take on the issue of radicalization in such close

environments such as prisons and universities (Wolff, 149). More missions were also sent to

Morocco and Algeria, as well, for the purpose of training the states on border control and

maritime security (149).

In addition, as a part of the Valencia Conference, 2002, held in Algeria, the Euro-

Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) was formulated (Wolff, 148). The EMAA

emphasized a Euro-Maghrebi partnership between the foreign ministers of the states involved,

during which they agreed to cooperate with each other, and with another major supranational

actor, the United Nations, in regards to terrorism (Joffé, 160). The Valencia Program also

infused a large amount of money into Euro-Mediterranean relations (Gillespie, 111). It was

the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement that ultimately gave rise to the Hague

Programme, for the upholding of freedom, security, and justice in relations with the

Mediterranean partners. The Hague Programme focused on everything from citizenship rights,

to terrorism, migration, and the control of organized crime, and ultimately gave birth to the

aforementioned EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Regardless, of all the steps that the European Union may or may not be taking towards

the goal of improving security through the strengthening of Euro-Maghrebi relations, it has

ultimately not done enough. The European Union has tried, but it has also failed (Kaunert,

288); and, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been largely “criticized for its lack of

effectiveness” (291). It has developed an unsustainable solution to the problem by focusing on

short-term solutions as opposed to long –term solutions: supporting temporary programs for

22 

securitization, as opposed to long-term programs towards democratization, which would

stabilize the Southern Mediterranean region, and decrease the risk of fostering terrorism (289).

The original goals of the EMP and the ENP of long-term-political and economic reforms

within the Maghrebi states –the “duty narrative”- have been neglected in favor of the

securitization of the European states –the “threat narrative” (290). Even though terrorism is

viewed by the EU as a “threat to democracy, human rights, and economic and social

development” (Monar, 294), the EU has conveniently forgotten their stated goal of

democratization, in favor of their own securitization. This failure is in large part due to the

external-internal divide of the EU’s approach to counter-terrorism (294). While at one point

the European Union may have blindly claimed terrorism to be solely an external issue

(Jackson, 237), it now focuses on its own internal defense. Another issue of the EU’s counter-

terrorism, is that it focuses its resources on countries like Morocco and Israel, who are already

more-developed than other countries in the region, and who do not, necessarily, need as much

aid and support as the poorer, more unstable countries in the region. What the European

Union has yet to get right, is the proper balance between internal and external securitization;

the balance between securitization and democratization; the difference between helping out a

region, and singling out specific actors.

In the European Union’s willingness to overlook democratization in favor of

securitization, it has helped to perpetuate a never-ending cycle of terrorism, and limited the

transformative agenda of the European Neighborhood Policy (Kaunert, 289). Because the

European states view the Southern states as a “buffer” from the Gulf Region (289), they have

developed a marked tendency to “‘[acquiesce], rather than [challenge]’ authoritarian practices”

(289). However, in doing so, and ignoring the socio-economic branches of external security

partnerships such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the European Neighborhood

Policy, they perpetuate the destabilization of their partner states. By acquiescing to dictators

23 

instead of trying to replace them with an open system of democracy, they continue the

tradition of unstable nations in the Southern Mediterranean (289). It is this instability that

fosters the correct social conditions for the creation of terrorism: an unhappiness of the

citizens with the state, and a sense of unjust treatment by the state, within the citizens

(Crenshaw, 384). Therefore, the destabilization created by the focus on securitization, in lieu

of democratization, breeds terrorism and rebellion, which in turn perpetuates further

securitization, which in a very cyclical manner, fosters even more terrorism. This is

unfortunately a cycle that the European States have embedded themselves into, in regards to

the Maghrebi states, because of their focus on security over democracy.

Moreover, another reason as to why the Euro-Maghrebi relationship still remains in its

“infancy” (Kaunert, 289), is state’s sovereignty (Monar, 293). The powers and capabilities of

the European Union to do anything related to counter-terrorism, still lies in the hands of the

individual members, and not the EU as a whole (293). Therefore, terrorism can be fought at

the discretion of the member nations. The problem with this unilateral ability to fight

terrorism is the fact that terrorism itself can be viewed differently through the eyes of the

member states, as it is subject to the different perceptions and discourses of the individual

states (293). Simply put, what the French view as civil unrest, may be viewed as a terrorist

attack by the Germans, and vice-versa. Therefore, until these powers can be communalized

under the scope of the European Union, it will be difficult for the EU to come up with a truly

comprehensive and effective counter-terrorism strategy. This focus on national sovereignty

and territoriality also affects the fight against terrorism in that it limits the ability for the

European Union to militarize against terrorism and terrorist threats, much like the United

Nations (294). As long as the member states continue to prioritize territoriality over security,

counter-terrorism strategies will be weak at best, and the European Union’s vulnerability to

24 

terrorist threats from Maghrebi and Southern Mediterranean based terrorist cells will continue

to exist.

In recapitulation, the European Union has taken great strides towards combating the

security threat inherent in their geographical proximity to the Maghrebi and Southern

Mediterranean states. They have enacted legislation such as the European Neighborhood

Policy, the Euro-Med Partnership, as well as several country-specific action plans, in order to

fight the growing threat of terrorism both within their borders, and within those of their

neighbors to the south. However, due to their willingness to overlook stability and democracy

in order to emphasize of security, they have created the perfect conditions for the cyclical

perpetuation of terrorism within these nations. In short, the European Union has tried to

counter terrorism, but has proven to emerge as a “paper tiger” (Kaunert, 288): from the

exterior, the European Union seems powerful. However, from the interior, bureaucracy,

disputes over state’s sovereignty, and warped priorities, have rendered the European Union

almost ineffective in the fight to counter terrorism at home and in the Southern Mediterranean.

Claudia Da Silva is a rising senior majoring in Political Science with a minor in Business 

Adminsitration and pursuing the International Relations certificate.  She is the incoming 

President of the Model United Nations organization. Her interests include travelling, which 

she does at any opportunity. A native Spanish speaker, she has learned English, French, 

Italian, and a little Portuguese. 

 

Works Cited

Bicchi, Federica, and Mary Martin. "Talking Tough or Talking Together? European Security Discourses towards the Mediterranean." Mediterranean Politics 11.2 (2006): 189-207.

Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." Print. Rpt. in Comparative Politics. 4th ed. Vol. 13. 1981. 379-99. Print.

European Union. Commission of the European Communities. The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Main Achievements and Future Challenges. Brussels, 2010. Print.

Gillespie, Richard. "The Valencia Conference: Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process?." Mediterranean Politics 7.2 (2002): 105-114. Sociological Collection. Print.

Jackson, Richard. "An analysis of EU counterterrorism discourse post-September 11." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20.2 (2007): 233-247. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 15 Apr. 2011.

Joffé, George. "The European Union, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in the Maghreb." Journal of Common Market Studies 46.1 (2008): 147-71. Print.

25 

Kaunert, Christian, and Sarah Leonard. "EU Counterterrorism and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Appraisal of the Southern Dimension." Terrorism & Political Violence 23.2 (2011): 286-309. Print.

Monar, Jörg. "Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Its Problems." Government & Opposition Summer 2007.3 (2007): 292-313. Print.

Official Journal of the European Union, L 196, 2 August 2003. Wolff, Sarah. "The Mediterranean Dimension of EU Counter-terrorism." Journal of European

Integration 31.1 (2009): 137-56. Print.

26 

EditorHighlight:ComparingthePeacekeepingMissionsinAngolaandNamibiaIanProctor

A multitude of scholars recognize that failing and failed states pose the greatest threat

to international security and the stability of the global system. “Addressing the problem of

failed and failing states will undoubtedly yield significant security and humanitarian

dividends for the international system.”1 An understanding of the history behind United

Nations Peacekeeping Missions will facilitate future policy makers in their attempt to stabilize

weak and failed states the world over, and these should be taken on a case by case basis. What

important lesson can be gathered based on comparing the failures of the United Nations

Mandate and Peacekeeping mission in Angola and the successes of the United Nations

Mandate and Peacekeeping mission in Namibia? One can draw important lessons about the

necessity of organizational learning, the importance of situational factors, and the pivotal role

political forces play in state-building.

The history of the conflict in Angola is entrenched in civil war and deep cultural

divides. Angola has always felt the cold blade of expansionism, dating back to the native

Khoisan who were pushed out by the West African Bantu. From this era of African

expansionism, several kingdoms rose and fell throughout the region’s history, taking the

regional name of the BaKongo Kingdom, which developed a close trading relationship with

the surrounding kingdoms along the west coast of Africa. Throughout the Middle Ages in

Europe, the kingdom sent emissaries to Portugal, and the European power grew increasingly

                                                            1 Piazza, James A. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 3. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Hoboken, NJ. ©2008: 469.

27 

entwined in the region, establishing a colony in present day Angola in 1575, and the ensuing

three hundred years brought about a series of bloody battles between the native Africans and

the colonial power. Portugal assumed complete colonial control in 1885 after the Berlin

Congress, and its reign began to solidify through the early 20th century. Portugal’s colonial

empire in the area ended with the guerilla-led war for independence from 1961 to 1975.2

“A rushed independence agreement cited the need for a transitional coalition

government, but independence was granted ‘to the people,’ with no framework, means or

details for the transfer of power, disarmament procedures, governing bodies, or elections.”3

This sudden independence coupled with a complete disengagement of the former colonial

power led to a complete breakdown internally. Within a few months of negotiating

independence and establishing a government in 1975, the three main factions that contributed

to Angola’s independence broke down into civil conflict that rattled the new country for the

next twenty five years. These parties were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of

Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National

Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Over the course of a decade between

1989 and 1999, the UN attempted four different mandate implementations, all of which failed

in some regard because they were not able to establish a lasting ceasefire and a peaceable

solution to the conflict. While the factions tried numerous times to cooperate and achieve a

national unity, outside pressures from Cold War opponents combined with personal and

economic interests in continuing the conflict prevented a successful implementation of the

mandate until 2001.4

                                                            2 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 648. 3 Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008: 36. 4 Scherrer, Christian P. Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War. Greenwood Press. ©2002: 335.

28 

The failed case of Angola provides vital insight into the “situational difficulty,

Security Council disinterest, and UN first-level organizational dysfunction.”5 Situational

difficulties arose from the competing factions wishing to control the majority of the power in

the newly independent state. First and foremost, outside interference in the domestic conflict

exacerbated tensions between the parties. Due to domestic pressures, Portugal’s

disentanglement from its colonial possession left a huge vacuum of control politically, and led

to the collapse of many industries which were run by the European trading network. Cuba

exercised inordinate control in the conflict, contributing a vast number of troops to the MPLA

side of the war, and this was backed by USSR and its communist allies. In fact, one entire

mission and mandate (United National Angola Verification Mission- UNAVEM I) was

focused on the draw-down and withdrawal of foreign forces and involvement. From 1989 to

1991, Cuba slowly withdrew 50,000 of its forces from Angola, while the US, its European

allies, a segregated South Africa, the USSR and Portugal negotiated the Bicesse Accords that

established a peace between the MPLA and UNITA. However, it failed in establishing a

transitional government that could monitor the turnover of power. Absent in all of these

proceedings is the integral involvement of the African parties. Because of a large-scale

international involvement, Angola was not able to establish a national identity around which it

could rally. Other contributing situational difficulties include the economics of continuing the

war. UNITA profited greatly from the hyper-inflated diamond mining industry. The MPLA

drew great profits from arms trading with its communist allies abroad.

A disinterested Security Council also drove a nail into the Angolan coffin. Aside from

the involvement of the Cold War powers, and their attempt to pit the sides of the conflict

against each other, the other members of the Security Council only showed slight interest in

ending the conflict. While initial interest in resolving the conflict was intense, the UN also

                                                            5 Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008: 36.

29 

took on a significant number of other projects, and thus, its attention and more importantly, its

resources, were divided.6 Particularly, the UNSC also placed sanctions on UNITA’s

international trade, and the group obviously favored the western-backed MPLA. While the

United States exercised almost complete control over the UNSC proceedings, the legislation

passed over the course of the UN’s involvement was slim, giving the impression of limited

overall UNSC interest.7 As Jean-Marie Guehenno notes, this case taught us that “it is one

thing to deploy a peacekeeping operation with the full support of all the permanent members

of the Security Council, and quite another when those same members have diametrically

opposing views on a conflict and varying degrees of commitment to bring it to an end.”8

The third contributing factor to the failure of the Angolan mission was the ground-

level organizational dysfunction. While the first UNAVEM was successful in that its

mandate was to work towards the reduction of Cuban troops involved in the conflict,

subsequent mandates were broad in their scope and unspecific in their itinerary.9 Further, the

additional mandates themselves were incompletely implemented, and left much to be desired

by the parties involved in the settlement. This culminated in the downsizing of the UN’s

involvement in the area with the adoption of MONUA (United Nations Observer Mission for

Angola), when what was actually necessary was a large-scale involvement of UN

peacekeeping troops.10 Other contributing factors include the slow deployment of resources

to the ground teams in Angola and the large and undesirable ratio of military personnel to

civilian-task-oriented workers.

                                                            6 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 648. 7 Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008: 39. 8 Guehenno, Jean-Marie. “On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, Issue 2. ©2002: 70. 9 Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008: 39-40. 10 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 647-648.

30 

The UN also fail to realize the situation between the two major parties (MPLA and UNITA)

called for a breaking of traditional UN impartiality, and the coordinating office was inflexible

in breaking strict UN mandate orders.11

Namibia is a success despite the overwhelming odds stacked against it. The regional

destabilization of the apartheid South Africa to the south and the failing Angola to the north

would give evidence that Namibia should not have seen success in its UN Mandate

implementation. Namibia’s story is similar to that of Angola. Local tribes dominated the

region until the West African Bantu tribe migrated into the region and set up a more concrete

governance system. A series of local populations rotated through the locus of control before

the Boers from the south Dutch settlements began to intrude on native populations. No real

colonial interest was expressed in the area until the Germans wished to isolate the British and

their naval holding in Walvis Bay. Under the Berlin Congress in the mid1880s, the continent

was divvied up between the European powers, and the Germans gained access to the entire

colony, which they termed German Southwest Africa. The Germans retained control of their

colony up until the first World War when South Africa took administrative control over the

territory. Over the next few decades South Africa became intricately entwined in the affairs

of Namibia, and resisted pressure from both the League of Nations and the United Nations to

withdraw. In the face of decolonization that took place over the 1950s and 1960s South

Africa remained steadfast in their control, and even wished to incorporate Namibia into their

national boundaries.12

The present day conflict in Namibia traces its roots back to this conflict of interest

between the European colonizers, the South African territorial ambition and domestic longing

for independence. Several parties worked and fought for the independence of Namibia, the

                                                            11 Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008: 40. 12 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 648- 649.

31 

most significant of these were South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and

the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). While entertaining some notions of

granting independence during the 1970s, South Africa never fully engaged in the

independence process as they failed to incorporate several key political positions specially

those of SWAPO. Furthermore, in the actual electoral/administrative process South Africa

did not recognize SWAPO and disarmed political faction boycotted the elections. This

standstill between the South African authorities and SWAPO militants stagnated for 20 years

as battles waged between the armed factions on both sides.13

The success of the implementation of the UN mandate is largely based on the

mission’s ability to learn while on the ground. “The mission differed from all previous UN

peacekeeping operation in that its primary means and purpose were political (in overseeing a

democratic transition after decades of civil war and colonial rule), rather than military (where

monitoring a cease- fire is the primary task).”14 That being said, a number of contributing

factors allowed Namibia to become a success story. Thanks to the relative cultural unanimity

of the country the overall opposition to South Africa occupation, and the cooperation between

international avenues of aid, Namibia was not set up to fail. Indeed the only possible reason

for its failure could have been the regional tensions happening in countries surrounding

Namibia. Granted, the amassing of South African troops exasperated tensions between the

two countries, internally Namibia remained intact.

“Learning was possible in part because of all the preconditions for learning were

satisfied.” 15 “The four central components of the mission included (1) overall establishment

of UNTAG offices, (2) military disbarment and civilian policing, (3) refugee return, and (4)

                                                            13 Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008: 53-54. 14 Ibid 15 Ibid; 62- 63

32 

preparations for, and the holding of, elections.” 16 What can be drawn from the

implementation of the mandate is that the UNSC has a clear plan going into the conflict,

mainly the independence of Namibia and the holding of free and fair elections. The mandate

remained flexible to those on the ground, particularly because the UN did not wish to see a

repeat of the Angola crisis in Namibia. One integral part of this peacekeeping operation was

that military and political objectives concurrently, which kept public image and opinion at an

all time high. In addition, the coordinator on the ground was given broad control with limited

involvement from the Secretary- General good offices. In one of the firsts for UN

peacekeeping missions, the mandate asked for security information in the form of nationally

accessed information system to update the Namibian public and a foreign advisory board.

Another crucial point to emphasize is the forced drawn down of combatants and the

subsequent increase in the civilian policing force. This process was sped up by the overall

cooperation of all parties involved, as they were all weary from prolong combat.17

“UNTAG’s ultimate success, in spite of its troubled start and the incomplete disarmament of

forces, was facilitated by the parties’ commitment to the settlement plan and their confidence

in the ultimately firmly established mission.”18

The level of security council interest and the relatively stable internal relations also

aided Namibia in the peacekeeping process. While this peace process had been in the works

for a long time, it was only after decades of conflict that the security council chose to

intervene. This moderate level of involvement proved essential to Namibia’s success. Instead

of the great global powers playing off against each other, the security council instead

implemented a contact group that allowed Namibia close access to countries similar to it and

allowed the permanent members of the UNSC to actively disengage from taking sides on the

                                                            16 Ibid; 63 17 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 649-651. 18 Ibid; 655.

33 

conflict.19 Another key factor emanating from the Security Council aspect is the vast

disparity in funding. While the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)

received an initial devotion of $416 billion dollars in 1989, UNAVEM II received a fourth of

that sum two years later. These budget constraints placed on the Angola missions proved to

be a pivotal point to the failing of UN Missions in Angola.20 The ground-level mission in

Namibia received adequate funding that kept the mission afloat while Angola received such

paltry sums that the leaders of the militant factions actually saw economic utilization of

continuing the conflict. This is addition to the fact that Angola is a larger, more populous,

and much more intricate problem.21

As is evident from these two historical comparisons, there are stark differences that

contribute to the success or failing of a mission. Successes can be derived from adequate

funding, a moderate level of Security Council interest coupled with rivals disengaging from

the conflict and refusing to declare outright for one side or the other, and a great deal of

involvement of the parties involved. This last point is something to harp on. “The

peacemaking process should devise a mutually acceptable and satisfying peace deal… A

peace operation cannot be a panacea for situations where one or all of the belligerent parties

desire to fight on.”22 A key difference between the two missions was the involvement of the

regional parties and non-state actors in the case of Namibia. This is important because the

peacekeepers deployed in the field and the district offices must respond to the perceived needs

of each side in order to reach an accord. Without this understanding, standstills may occur

where the parties are not being helped and choose to continue the fight because the peace

                                                            19 Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008: 56. 20 Cilliers, Jakkie. “Resource wars – A New Type of Insurgency.” Cilliers, Jakkie & Dietrich, C., eds. Angola’s War Economy. The Role of Oil and Diamonds. Institute for Strategic Studies. Pretoria. ©2000: 322. 21 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 652. 22 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 659-660.

34 

accords do not adequately relate to them.23 Other successful points of UN Peacekeeping

missions include the implementation of a Contact Group that can relate to the plight of the

country and intervene unbiased if need be. This proved to be a trail run during the Namibia

intervention, and it went over with such success that the UN now mandates some form of a

contact group in each of its missions.24 Lastly, the understanding for the need for internal

stability via the transfer of active militants into internal civilian-run police forces is crucial to

instituting a lasting peace that can stand up when the UNSC and its peacekeeping troops

choose to withdraw. Admittedly, these are all situations specifically related to the Namibia

case, but these lessons can be derived and applied broadly.

Some failures to analyze in the Angola case are the obvious under-financing of the

mission, the failure to bring both sides of the conflict to the table under equal terms, the

pressures mounted by the Cold War powers and the obvious residual effects of their influence,

and the inability of the UNSC to build on the success of UNAVEM I and implement an

effective solution to the present Angolan issues. In addition to these, situational factors such

as the close involvement of Cuban troops and the large number of native militants present

contributed to the stress environment. What the UN failed to do is see to the turnover of arms

and the demilitarization and incorporation of ex-combatants into their respective communities.

“A key prerequisite for peace operations is the formulation of a realistic, well-defined and

comprehensive mandate. The mandate and resources of UNAVEM II and MONUA were

grossly inadequate for the complex Angolan project. This restricted the missions’ capacity to

ensure compliance with the major provisions of the peace agreements.”25

                                                            23 Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008: 57. 24 Muggah, Robert and Krause, Keith. “Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence Reduction Agenda.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, Issue 1. ©2009: 142. 25 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 660.

35 

To conclude, a good level of understanding of previous missions will enable future

UN Peacekeeping Missions to succeed at stabilizing states. By taking the historical context of

each case, and then analyzing the implementation methods, one can draw lessons to be

learned from each scenario. These can prove vital, because those successful cases, where

peace is lasting and the sides of the conflict have become sides in a political process, can give

examples for entering other states in similar regions with similar histories. It is through a

comprehensive case study that peacekeeping scholars can make constructive and beneficial

policy recommendations.

Works Cited

Adebajo, Adekeye and Landsberg, Chris. “Back to the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, Issue 4. ©2000: 161-189.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. “An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later.” Orbis. Vol. 37, Issue 3. ©1993: 323-333.

Cilliers, Jakkie. “Resource wars – A New Type of Insurgency.” Cilliers, Jakkie & Dietrich, C., eds. Angola’s War Economy. The Role of Oil and Diamonds. Institute for Strategic Studies. Pretoria. ©2000.

Durch, William, ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. Macmillan. London. ©1994.

Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, Issue 4. ©2004: 644-663.

Guehenno, Jean-Marie. “On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, Issue 2. ©2002: 69-80.

Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. New York, New York. ©2008.

Muggah, Robert and Krause, Keith. “Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post- Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence Reduction Agenda.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, Issue 1. ©2009: 136-150.

Piazza, James A. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 3. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Hoboken, NJ. ©2008.

Scherrer, Christian P. Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War. Greenwood Press. ©2002.

36 

Schutz, Barry M. “Peacekeeping In Africa: Breakthrough or Politics as Usual?” TransAfrica Forum. Vol. 8, Issue 3. ©1991: 49-61.

Sibanda, P. “Lessons From UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From UNAVEM to MONUA.”

Cilliers, Jakkie & Mills, Greg, eds. From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies.

Peace Support Missions. South African Institute of International

Affairs, Johannesburg. ©1999: 119–20.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Victim,Demon,orSavior?TheVictim‐Soldier‐TerroristSpectrumanditsConsequencesBrittanyFoxIntroduction

“I wanted to kill hajis. They wanted to kill us, so I was ready to go kill them.”

37 

-US Soldier, on why he joined the Air Force1

At its most basic essence, the line between victim and terrorist is thin at best, shakily

and obscurely drawn at worst. The explanation of ‘why they fight’ (both state actors and

terrorists alike) and how the victimization of terror evolves in the minds of not only actual

victims, but of the very combatants waging the terror, does not have a one-size-fits-all answer.

There are, however, noticeable parallels between the victim-terrorist relationship; I will argue

that though having quite different motivations for waging violence, the victim-soldier-terrorist

spectrum is much more similar than it may appear on the surface. Though the victim of terror

is originally plagued with isolation, fear and uncertainty, a multitude of cases show that these

emotions can and do lead to a reverse in the spectrum—that is, the victim employs tactics

from the terrorist’s toolkit in order to either 1) survive or 2) be freed of the oppression. In this

way, the victim, the soldier, the individual, and the state can all expose themselves to and

partake in the psychology of terror.

Why Violence: A Social Order Outlook

“Do you consider yourself to be a terrorist?”

“Yes, a terrorist. What’s the problem with that? If I want to terrorize the enemies of Allah, what’s the problem with that?”

-Interview with Shehadeh Jawhar, former Al-Qaeda official2

Though numerous theories exist, the respective relationships between victimization,

terrorism, and vengeance comes down to human biology and social organization. In “Demons

and Martyrs”, Mark Juergensmeyer speaks to the basic human organizational need of an “in-

group” and “out-group”, or an ‘us versus them’ mindset (basically the need for belonging).

From hunting and gathering to religious sacrifices, humans have been boxing each other in as

enemies and friends for centuries, the primary reason being survival (Juergensmeyer 172-173).

In the context of war, this opens the door to the religious underpinnings of sacrifice, from

38 

Latin sacrificium, or “to make holy.” (170) Juergensmeyer argues that sacrifice is more than

killing, but “ennobling”:

“The destruction is performed within a religious context that transforms the killing into something positive. Thus, like all religious images of sacrifice, martyrdom provides symbols of a violence conquered—or at least put in its place.” (170)

The idea of martyrdom (from the Greek word “witness”, as in a witness to one’s faith) is most

commonly associated with self-sacrifice; however, it is interpreted by different sides in

different ways. For example, while military personnel and United States media, citizens, and

government would most likely characterize suicide bombers as the aggressors responsible for

destruction and murder, several ‘terrorists’ Juergensmeyer interviewed classified themselves

as victims. The rationale is simple: no one wants to believe they are the bad guys. “This

[seeing self as victim] allows the terrorist to justify his action ‘morally within his own mind.’”

(170) Others, including Osama bin Laden in his 1998 fatwa against America, use the same

defensive argument to justify violent acts. By condemning American occupation of Arab

territory as an injustice where “crimes and sins” had been committed against the Muslim

people in the Middle East, bin Laden and his fighters could rest easily believing their jihad

was defensive and “noble.” (170) Moreover, sacrifice/martyrdom/murder

(however you choose to look at it) leads to greater social cohesion for a community, as it

reduces feelings of hostility toward ‘in group’ members by providing an outlet to release the

aggression on the ‘out group’ (171) and bind the home group into a closer knit community

with shared bonds and a unified goal. This, in essence, is exactly what war allows for:

creating a versus scenario “to give those who believe in [the cause] a sense of empowerment

and hope…these feelings cannot be generated without an evil foe, a negative reference which

one can hope to triumph.” (174). Animalistic and primal, human instinct calls for protecting

ones own if and when they are in danger; for a government or a terrorist organization with an

39 

agenda, this can also mean an enemy must be created to unify a cause or a people. As

Juergensmeyer puts it best, “the struggle must have a foe.” (174)

A Terror Trio in Three Perspectives

“It is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force.” -Franz Fanon, “Concerning Violence”3

The Victim

There may be no better example of victimization than the countless tragedies of

the Holocaust as seen in concentration camps. Primo Levi, himself a survivor of Auschwitz,

showcases his classification of victims in “The Drowned and the Saved” from Survival in

Auschwitz. Levi sums it up in simple terms: “Here the struggle to survive is without respite,

because everyone is desperately and ferociously alone.” (Levi 67). Put into a situation of

sheer desperation, the human instinct of survival can erupt; it can also sink along with the

myriad of victims who “drowned”. “To sink is the easiest of matters,” Levi states, by

choosing to live normally, accept the fate handed down, and not fight (68). The “saved”, on

the other hand, present a more interesting case study, as the fight for survival and the terror of

isolation combine to push victims into the aggressor’s playbook:

“One has to fight against tire current; to battle every day and every hour against exhaustion, hunger, cold and the resulting inertia; to resist enemies and have no pity for rivals; to sharpen one's wits, build up one’s patience, strengthen one's will-power. Or else, to throttle all dignity and kill all conscience, to climb down into the arena as a beast against other beasts.” (70) Levi speaks of four types of the saved who did just this: Schepschel, Alfred L., Elias, and

Henri. Schepschel, when the opportunity presented itself, would throw others under the

proverbial bus (informing on misdeeds) in hopes of gaining favor and position from the

camp’s leaders (70-71). Alfred L. (or just “L.”), an intelligent engineer, would make himself

appear as clean and put together as possible, despite not having enough to eat—as if to present

himself as a Prominent. By separating himself from the other prisoners, L. took on a ‘dress for

40 

the job you want’ strategy—this paid off, for his was given a post at a laboratory; Levi

assumes L. was saved, “living his cold life of the determined and joyless dominator.” (71-72).

Elias, the strongman, the “madman” survived because of his brute force and insanity—“[He]

has survived the destruction from the outside because he is physically indestructible; he has

resisted the annihilation from within because he is insane.” (74). In a prison world where there

were no laws, no asylums, and no free will, Elias thrived, even though he would have most

likely failed in a real world environment. Henri, like L., took on a strategy of wits to survive.

Young, intelligent, multi-lingual, yet thin and pitiful-looking, Henri used his strengths to the

fullest and exploited his weaknesses (75). Speaking with the guards in their own language,

playing the pity card and winning over hearts and minds through his gift of charm, Henri

became a skilled diplomat—by knowing everyone and playing each like a chess game, he

may have won survival, but he did not win friends, as Levi concludes, “I have always left

with a slight taste of defeat…having been…not a man to him but an instrument in his hands.”

(76). Regardless of whether the victims had to bend themselves into a different, perhaps less

moral people to survive, they were just that—survivors, the “saved”. At what price it cost in

moral scruples, this is something only the saved can answer.

The logic of victimization is clearly showcased in Hannah Arendt’s “Ideology and

Terror: A Novel Form of Government”. Mirroring Levi’s notion of isolation creating terror

(and terror using isolation to create more effective oppression), Arendt speaks of totalitarian

logic in the likes of Hitler and Stalin: “You can’t say A without saying B and C and so on,

down to the end of the murderous alphabet.” (Arendt) In this way, false confessions can be

obtained quite easily, since, as Arendt explains:

“For these crimes, the Party needs criminals; it may be that the Party, though knowing the crimes, does not quite know the criminals; more important than to be sure about the criminals is to punish the crimes, because without such punishment, History will not be advanced but may even be hindered in its course. You, therefore, either have committed the crimes or have been called by the Party to play the role of the

41 

criminal-in either case, you have objectively become an enemy of the Party. If you don’t confess, you cease to help History through the Party, and have become a real enemy. The coercive force of the argument is: if you refuse, you contradict yourself and, through this contradiction, render your whole life meaningless.” (Emphasis added)

Though depressingly bleak, Arendt makes a valid point about the circular logic of the ‘Catch-

22’ mentality of terror: once agreeing to the premise of ‘the Party is always right’, there really

is no going back, even if the Party is falsely accusing you—by this logic, there is no such

thing as a “false” accusation, since the Party is always right. In this case, you have been called

or made yourself available to play the role of martyr to your cause. If not, how can you say

you agreed with the original premise in the first place? How can you say you love your

country? It is this type of manipulation that can effectively silence and victimize a people.

Much like Levi’s “saved”, a similar case of the oppressed

becoming the oppressors is seen in Franz Fanon’s “Concerning Violence” from The Wretched

of the Earth. In his classic defense of violent behavior, Fanon argues that the ‘have nots’, the

colonized victims, have no other option but to rise up against the colonizing force, mainly

because violence is the only tool the colonized victims have ever seen. Beneficial to the

oppressor, an environment of “submission and of inhibition” makes policing the ‘savages’

easier, as it essentially dehumanizes them into nothing more than sheep in need of herding

(Fanon 81). Unlike Western countries, Fanon reasons that with the absence of “moral teachers,

counselors” that “separate the exploited from those in power”, the colonial countries instead

advise and counsel by means of “rifle butts and napalm.” (81) This culture of violence reaches

a point of no return, a breaking point for the colonized: they have nothing, yet the foreigners

have it all right next door. They have been turned upside down by the colonizers, which

leaves no other measure available than to turn their home right side up by the same token of

violence (80). However, the victims have one advantage: the settlers have always been the

enemy, a common unifying point of destruction. The colonists, on the other hand, are

necessary to the colony’s economic interests (82-83) and are therefore less expendable. Again,

42 

we seen violence as a binding force, “the armed struggle mobilizes the people…it throws

them in one way and one direction…of a common cause, of a national destiny, and of a

collective history.” (92). Like Levi’s saved and Bin Laden’s “freedom fighters”, the victims

have nothing else to lose, yet their entire freedom to gain.

The Demon (Or The Savior?)

Though easily and obviously seen as two separate concepts—perhaps even

opposites—the ‘demon’ and the ‘savior’ represent the final two notions of our terror

continuum. Though this may evoke the old expression, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s

freedom fighter’, I prefer to look at it as one man’s savior is sufficiently conditioned to

become another man’s demon. Levi speaks of this phenomenon with the case of the

Jewish Prominents, who exhibit tyrannical and monstrous behavior in order that they may not

be subjected to the camps’ victim pool. Withdrawn from the pool of commoners, this type

will turn against his friends and neighbors, siding with the enemy so that he may be spared—

though this evokes a notion of selfishness, Levi considers it to be a compulsion out of fear and

survival (69). As Levi states:

“He will be cruel and tyrannical, because he will understand that if he is not sufficiently so, someone else, judged more suitable, will take over his post. Moreover, his capacity for hatred, unfulfilled in the direction of the oppressors, will double back…on the oppressed, and he will only be satisfied when he has unloaded onto his underlings the injury received from above.” (69)

So, if in a state of slavery, one is offered a way out (perhaps seen as a ‘deal with the Devil’),

someone is bound to accept. As power builds, the harsher and more evil the person becomes.

Though other instigators of violence may not be considered prisoners or oppressed, the

notion of ‘absolute power’ and its consequences when facing a real or “manufactured” enemy

(Juergensmeyer 174) still operate under standard procedure, including our own U.S. military.

In the Rolling Stone article “The Kill Team”, a small group of U.S. soldiers turned from

‘liberators’ of the Afghan people to murderers by their own volition. Using rationale akin to

43 

colonizers claiming their enemies as ‘savages’, these soldiers took the victimized mentality to

a new end, one some may cite as psychotic. Staging random executions of Afghan farmers,

planting AK-47s and grenades near them to make it look like self-defense, and cutting off

fingers to keep as trophies (Boal 2, 3, 5), it is clear that these soldiers were operating on a

very different wavelength than the average soldier. Or were they? Though it is itself psychotic

to argue in favor of what the soldiers did, it is important to look at it via the victim-soldier-

terrorist spectrum. Isolated in a strange land, surrounded by a very real enemy who had killed

numerous U.S. comrades, it is not at all surprising that fear and loathing took over as

dominant emotions; the counteracting force when faced with a loss is anger, which then turns

to violence in a war environment. In such a black-and-white type of world, good versus evil,

order versus chaos, us versus them (Juergensmeyer 174), it is easier (though still not

justifiable) to see how the human brain can succumb to disastrous, immoral, and unthinkable

actions, especially if there is a lack of leadership.

Conclusion

“Beauty is in the eye of the beholder….To the oppressed impoverished people of the Niger

Delta, we are angels. If we are terrorists to the oil companies and the Nigerian government, so

be it.”

-Jomo, leader of MEND in Nigeria (Interview with Brian Ross)4

In the case of “The Kill Team”, U.S. soldiers essentially became what they were fighting

against—terrorists; killing Afghans indiscriminately because they were “savages”, “infidels”,

one in the same with those that killed their fallen brothers (Boal 1). Of course, legally

speaking the Taliban are enemy combatants and not terrorists, though the rhetoric used by

both sides showcases less certainty. In an interview with an Al-Qaeda terrorist as well as in

Osama bin Laden’s fatwa against America, the rhetoric (see Appendices) of necessary jihad

against all non-Muslims is prevalent, with the rationale being that they are all infidels because

44 

they have not joined the Muslim cause—and for this, they deserve to die. Therefore, ‘victim’

may be in the eye of the beholder. In the case of survival at Auschwitz, fighting the Battle of

Algiers, and winning the war on “terror” in Afghanistan, all showcase crucial pieces of the

victim-terrorist spectrum, and each shed light on some aspect of what can happen to an

infallible human brain when pushed to its limits of isolation, anger, and despair.

Brittany Fox graduated from the University of Florida in May with a degree in Political Science and a dual minor in History and Public Leadership. After taking the summer off, she will be attending the Florida State University College of Law in August, where she hopes to pursue a career in Alternative Dispute Resolution and National Security Law. 

Endnotes

1Irving, Washington.26 Interview with Brittany Fox and Airman 1st Class via phone. 15 April 2011. 2 Jawhar, Shehadeh. Interview with Al-Arabiya TV. MEMRI TV Project. 7 Dec 2007. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7bPacNH-zc> 3 Fanon, Franz. “Concerning Violence” from The Wretched of the Earth. P. 81. 4 Ross, Brian. “ABC News Exclusive: Online Interview with a Terrorist.” ABC News. 8 Jan 2008. < http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/BrianRoss/story?id=2778701&page=1> P. 3.

Works Cited Arendt, Hannah. “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government”. <http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/h_arendt.html> Boal, Mark. “The Kill Team: How U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent Civilians.” Rolling Stone. 27 Mar 2011. < http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill- team-20110327> Pp. 1-8. Fanon, Franz. “Concerning Violence” from The Wretched of the Earth. PDF obtained by Dr. Lynn Patyk. Pp. 80-93. Juergensmeyer, Mark. “Martyrs and Demons” from The Logic of Religious Violence. PDF obtained by Dr. Lynn Patyk. Pp. 167-178. Levi, Primo. “The Drowned and the Saved” from Survival in Auschwitz. PDF obtained from Dr. Lynn Patyk. Pp. 66-76.

Bibliography Arendt, Hannah. “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government”. <http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/h_arendt.html> Borum, Robert. Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida. 2004. Pp. 3- 22. Bin Laden, Osama. “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” World Islamic Front Statement. 23 Feb 1998. Bush, George W. “Declaration of War on Terrorism.” 20 Sept 2001. <http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/8/398253/Document-George-W- Bush-Declaration-of-War-on-Terrorism>

                                                            26 Note: name has been changed to protect soldier’s privacy.

45 

Fanon, Franz. “Concerning Violence” from The Wretched of the Earth. PDF obtained by Dr. Lynn Patyk. Jawhar, Shehadeh. Interview with Al-Arabiya TV. MEMRI TV Project. 7 Dec 2007. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7bPacNH-zc> Juergensmeyer, Mark. “Martyrs and Demons” from The Logic of Religious Violence. PDF obtained by Dr. Lynn Patyk. Levi, Primo. “The Drowned and the Saved” from Survival in Auschwitz. PDF obtained from Dr. Lynn Patyk. Smith, John.27 Interview with Kimberly Martin and 3 Iraq War Veterans. University of Florida. IDH 3931: Rethinking Citizenship. 14 Apr 2011. Irving, Washington*. Interview with Brittany Fox and Airman 1st Class via phone. 15 April 2011.

GlobalizationandChinainAfricaMichelleThereseB.Asuncion 

Forward: 

                                                            27* Note: names have been changed to protect soldiers’ privacy

46 

“The main driving force for the reduction of poverty around the world has not been aid

programs, but rather globalization. It is sometimes obscured when we look at each country as

being equal, but the number of people in China who have risen out of poverty represents the

greatest development success of the last century, and it’s almost entirely due to embracing the

free market. We should not make the mistake of thinking that liberalization would quickly

bring prosperity to Africa—there are simply too many problems there for economic

development to explode as it has in China. But nothing will work better than free markets—

both internal free markets and openness to the world economy—to unleash the incredible

unused human potential in Africa.”

 

From the beginning of the colonial expansionism to the 21st century, the global political

economy continues to be strongly affected by the significance of globalization and

international aid programs. Today, scholars are divided on the argument over which of the

factors is more effective in the mitigation of world poverty. This paper aims to analyze the

argument that the main driving force for the reduction of poverty around the world has not

been aid programs, but rather globalization. Moreover, this paper seeks to explore the

argument’s strengths, limitations and implications in the economic growth of China and

Africa through both macroeconomic and microeconomic views. The paper will discuss the

relationship between globalization and the issues of China’s economic growth, its African

Policy and the Beijing Consensus. Finally, this paper will contend that globalization

minimally alleviated China’s poverty rates but served as an impetus to China’s rise as one of

the world’s economic powers. Additionally, it asserts that the argument is very limited when

applied to developing states, in particular African nations.

Deng Xiaoping’s: Reform for a market economy

47 

The macroeconomic view argues that the transition of Communist China’s closed

economy to an open market brought advantages to its state and people. In the early 1990s,

Deng Xiaoping, leader of the Communist Party of China, criticized the vulnerabilities of the

Cultural Revolution, and urged a reform towards a market economy. Looking at the expected

utility theory of this transition, Deng placed China’s future onto a high pedestal. When asked

about the political and ideological implications of change, he starkly said, “Whether a cat is

black or white makes no difference. As long as it catches mice, it’s a good cat.” (CNN.com,

2001). Arguably, the benefits of Deng’s reform were: 1) increase in trade, 2) investment flows

and faster economic growth, 3) accelerated innovation, 4) diffusion of technological and

management skills, 5) new economic opportunities, 6) higher living standards and 7) poverty

alleviation. Internationally, the pessimists argue that China’s economic status is not all rosy,

but faulty due to explosive problems such as corruption, high unemployment domestically and

abroad such as in Africa and the US, and worsening income disparities that may continue to

result undesirable downturn such as political rebellion as seen during the 1989 Tiananmen

Square revolt.

Advantages of Globalization and Free Market

In the 1990s, increase in trade shaped China’s development in the international

political economy. This is demonstrated through the positive relationship of China with both

developed and developing regions such as the United States, the European Union, Africa and

South East Asia. Economically, these countries serve as China’s biggest consumers, raising

the demands for supply and thus yielding to mounting profits and trade surplus in the Chinese

market. As flows of trade and finance become enormous, it provided the economic giant

more profits and power. Furthermore, existence of the free movement of goods, money,

capital, people and information, and reduction of barriers to trade have made it easier for

China to prosper in the political arena and elevate its economic status. Politically, China

48 

functions as one of the decision makers in the international scene, as it is part of the United

Nation’s Security Council. Both economic and state power enabled China’s strong investment

flows and faster economic growth.

As globalization advanced with science and technology, China’s market opened with

the acceleration of innovations, and the diffusion of technological and management skills.

New technological equipment catered the mass production of commodities. Some examples

of these are Taiwan’s investment on textiles and high tech gadgets such computer software,

and China’s bead production for the Mardi Gras Festival in New Orleans (Mardi Gras: Made

in China, 2005). Due to this, hundreds of Chinese employers established manufacturing

factories, hence producing employment and skills for their population. Significantly, this

proves that globalization created immense opportunities through employment and relatively a

higher living standard for the proletariat and poor class in China.

Limitations of Globalization and the Free Market

The microeconomic view refutes the aforementioned argument. Both globalization

and free market policies have contradicting impacts on Africa and China. This view argues

that the domestic economic policy and situation of China and Africa is poor. In 2007, The

Guardian, a British newspaper, accounted that approximately 300 million Chinese were lifted

out of extreme poverty since 1990. Contrastingly, it reported that the extreme poverty in sub-

Saharan Africa rose by 60 million (Elliot, April 2007). Some scholars assert that free market

policy has guided China to its economic growth, but others counter this as a result of the

above evidence. Economic structuralism theories focus on the limitation of the policy, such as

that the alleged growth of China is only in favor of powerful capitalists or the “elites” not the

proletariat or working class. Looking at the current situation of China, it cannot be argued that

49 

its poverty rates were lowered spectacularly, as it is evident that 77% of the Chinese

population is still in dire need and millions are unemployed.

The big losers in this free market game are poor countries. Realism contends the actors

are motivated by self-interests. Moreover, economic structuralism argues that the weak is

exploited by the strong. The present trade relations between Africa and China is benefiting the

latter and degrading the first. Reppert-Bismarck illustrated this as he argues that the free

market weakens poor countries depending heavily on agriculture such as Ghana, a huge rice

market in Africa (2009, p.304-306). As Ghana adopted free-market exchanges in 1983-1986,

its farming has been set back, its country’s three-ton-per-hectare yield halved, farm income

has shrunk, and communities have been fragmented (306). Increasingly, lobbyists abroad in

places such as the US influence both domestic and foreign agricultural policies. The

suspension of aids and the establishment of liberalization have hindered economic growth

instead of promoting development and reducing poverty. The result of this decision of the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) was a failure. The 1995

abolition of fertilizer subsidies in Malawi for growing maize resulted to monetary and fiscal

crisis. This resulted to trade competition between the new free market economies with the

established capitalists. As a result, much of Africa’s domestic market halted its produce due to

the consumers’ favor to the entry of cheaper foreign imports.

The structural adjustment programme was designed to create a modernized, export-led

growth, and industrialization in developing states. It failed, however, as African states, such

as Zimbabwe, were lodged into a quagmire of debt and poor economic growth. Arguably,

IMF and WB programs were inefficient and deemed a failure, due to the outcomes of third

world development exploitation and manipulation.

China’s African Policy and the Beijing Consensus

50 

Why did China choose Africa? These three variables are important to consider here: 1)

Africa’s natural resources, particularly oil in Sudan and Somalia; 2) its lack of rule of law;

and 3) its unstable democratic governments. These are three important reasons why China

invested in Africa. Furthermore, scholars have argued that a strong government, strong fiscal

and monetary policies, and less corruption are needed for developing countries to catch up

with the first world. Having said this, a popular contentions is that Africa does not yet possess

these elements yet, which make it more vulnerable to exploitation as illustrated with China’s

interests and influence over sub-Saharan Africa.

Globalization has immense economic effects on China and downfall for Africa related

to two aspects of 1) political and economic position, and 2) foreign and domestic policies. The

economic status of China is high and influential. China, being part of the WTO and Security

Council, along with its strict foreign and domestic policies drove to its vast economic growth

and its fast paced race with the world powers. However, Africa’s low economic status and

weak policies hindered its growth. Today, Africa cannot compete yet with the wealthy nations.

The effects of embedded liberalism aided with economic determinism resulted to the thriving

nations’ successes.

The contrast of benefits is shown: liberalization gave China more advantage and

resulted to Africa’s exploitation and increase in poverty. The expansion resulted to the influx

of a Chinese workforce in Africa. Africans were not given employment due to China’s first

priority of employing its own labor force.

China and Africa, both developing states, illustrate contrasting cases of the impacts of

globalization to individual economies. Contemporarily, China’s economic expansion is

represented in its African Policy and the Beijing Consensus where Chinese investments

51 

provide assistance for Africa’s development. Ali Zhar stated that China has “built a network

of trade, aid, investment links with 50 African countries, and a rush to buy up concessions to

Africa’s natural resources” (Zafar, 2009, p.119-128). The Sino-African relationship portrays a

contemporary example of dependency theory. China depends on Africa’s materials and Africa

depends on China’s assistance. China’s investment in Africa portrays earlier colonial

investments to gain access to raw materials leading to the exploitation of the poorer actor,

Africa. Chinese foreign policy is influenced by its need for resources and its domestic

development strategies imposed on other states.

In conclusion, the argument that globalization and the free market are the major

impetuses of poverty alleviation is not compelling. Globalization to some extent had reduced

poverty levels in China; however, the figures are too small compared to the millions of people

left poor and unemployed. Also, Africa’s development is stagnant and its poverty rates are

rising. These issues are important for IR scholars as globalization and global inequality

increasingly influences both domestic and foreign policies and the international economy. As

China quickly strengthens its economic and international influence as an economic power and

a decision maker, we are left with the question, whether Africa will be able to catch up with

the Asian Dragon? As globalization increases, will third world development carry on at the

crucial expense of the people of these countries?

Bibliography:

CNN.com (2001) Visions of China: “Reformer with an iron fist”,

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/inside.china/profiles/deng.xiaoping/,

accessed on November 28, 2010.

D’Anieri, P. “Development”. University of Florida, International Relations INR 2001 Lecture.

Gainesville, Florida. 15 November 2010.

52 

Elliot, Larry (2007) World Poverty reduced by growth in India and China,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/apr/16/china.india, accessed on November 26,

2010.

Redmon, D. (Director). (2005). Mardi Gras: Made in China [Film]. Ryko Distribution.

Reppert-Bismarck, J. (2003). How Trade Barriers Keep Africans Adrift. In Mansbach, R. W.,

&

Rhodes, E. (2003). Global politics in a changing world: A reader (pp. 304-306). Boston:

Houghton Mifflin.

Zafar, Ali (2009). The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa:

Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment and Aid Links. In Moseley, W. G. (2009). Taking

sides: Clashing views on African issues (pp. 119-128). McGraw-Hill Contemporary

Learning Series. Dubuque, Ia: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.

Michelle Therese B. Asuncion is pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Antrhopology with a Certificate in International Relations under the Honors Program at the University of Florida. Asuncion is is highly interested in the issues of youth advocacy, education, development, human rights, migration, international relations, and international political economy. Currently, she is working as the ITT Specialist under EOTO World, an international human rights organization and as the Project Director for an education development initiative in the Philippines. She is a Davis United World Scholar.