united states district court alexandria division baby … · 11. recently, a federal court judge...

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UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTEASTERNDISTRICTOFVIRGINIA

ALEXANDRIADIVISIONBABYDOE,byhisnextfriend,FatherDoe; )YASEENKADURA; )ANASELHADY; ) CaseNo.OSAMAHUSSEINAHMED; ) Hon.GULETMOHAMED; )AHMADIBRAHIMALHALABI; ) MICHAELEDMUNDCOLEMAN; )WAELHAKMEH ) CLASSACTIONCOMPLAINTMURATFRLJUCKIC; ) ANDJURYDEMANDADNANKHALILSHAOUT; )SALEEMALI; ) SHAHIRANWAR; ) SAMIRANWAR; )MARIAMJUKAKU; )MUHAMADHAYDAR; )JOHNDOENO.1; )JOHNDOENO.2;and, )JOHNDOENO.3; ) ) Plaintiffs, ) )v. ) )CHRISTOPHERM.PIEHOTA,Directorofthe )TerroristScreeningCenter;inhisindividual )capacity; ) )ROBINC.BURKE,formerActing‐Director )andformerPrincipalDeputyDirectorof )theTerroristScreeningCenter;inher )individualcapacity; ) )TIMOTHYJ.HEALY,formerDirectorof )theTerroristScreeningCenter;inhis )individualcapacity; ) )STEVENMABEUS,PrincipalDeputy )DirectoroftheTerroristScreeningCenter; )inhisindividualcapacity; ) )

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ANNVESSEY,formerActingPrincipalDeputy )DirectoroftheTerroristScreeningCenter; )inherindividualcapacity; ) )DONALDTORRENCE,formerPrincipal )DeputyDirectoroftheTerroristScreening )Center;inhisindividualcapacity; ) )RICKKOPEL,formerPrincipalDeputy )DirectoroftheTerroristScreeningCenter; )inhisindividualcapacity; ) )G.CLAYTONGRIGG,DeputyDirectorof )OperationsoftheTerroristScreening )Center;inhisindividualcapacity; ) )DEBORAHLUBMAN,FormerActing‐Deputy )DirectorofOperationsoftheTerrorist )ScreeningCenter;inherindividualcapacity; ) )CINDYCOPPOLA,FormerActing‐Deputy )DirectorofOperationsoftheTerrorist )ScreeningCenter;inherindividualcapacity; ) )SCOTTCRUSE,FormerDeputyDirector )ofOperationsoftheTerroristScreening )Center;inhisindividualcapacity; ) )CORYNELSON,FormerDeputyDirector )ofOperationsoftheTerroristScreening )Center;inhisindividualcapacity; ) )BRYANLYNCH,FormerDeputyDirector )ofOperationsoftheTerroristScreening )Center;inhisindividualcapacity; ) ) JAMESG.KENNEDY,Director,Transportation )SecurityRedress(OTSR),Transportation )SecurityAdministration(TSA),UnitedStates )DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS),and )DirectoroftheDHSTravelerRedressInquiry )Program(DHSTRIP);inhisindividualcapacity; ) )MATTHEWG.OLSEN,Directorofthe ) NationalCounterterrorismCenter,in )hisindividualcapacity; )

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UNIDENTIFIEDFBIAGENTS,intheir )individualcapacities,jointlyandseverally; ) )UNIDENTIFIEDTSCAGENTS,intheir )individualcapacities,jointlyandseverally; ) )UNIDENTIFIEDNCTCAGENTS,intheir )individualcapacities,jointlyandseverally; ) ) Defendants. )

CLASSACTIONCOMPLAINTANDJURYDEMAND

Plaintiffs,Baby JohnDoe,byhisNext Friend, FatherDoe;YaseenKadura;Anas

Elhady;OsamaHusseinAhmed;GuletMohamed;AhmadIbrahimAlHalabi;Michael

EdmundColeman;WaelHakmeh;MuratFrljuckic;AdnanKhalilShaout;SaleemAli;

ShahirAnwar;SamirAnwar;MariamJukaku;MuhamadHaydar;JohnDoeNo.1;John

DoeNo.2;andJohnDoeNo.3;forthemselvesandonbehalfofallotherssimilarlysituated,

throughtheirattorneys,CouncilonAmerican‐IslamicRelations,Michigan(“CAIR‐MI”),The

LawOfficeofGadeirAbbas,andAkeelandValentine,PLC,stateasfollows:

Introduction

1. Ourfederalgovernmentisimposinganinjusticeofhistoricproportionsupon

theAmericanswhohavefiledthisaction,aswellasthousandsofotherAmericans.Through

extra‐judicial and secretmeans, the federal government is ensnaring individuals into an

invisiblewebofconsequencesthatareimposedindefinitelyandwithoutrecourseasaresult

of the shockingly large federal watch list that now include hundreds of thousands of

individuals.

2. Indeed,many Americans, includingchildren,enduponthesesecret federal

watchlist–whichtheDefendantshavenamedtheTerroristScreeningDatabase(“TSDB”)–

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basedonmereguesses,hunches,andconjectureandevensimplybasedonmattersofrace,

ethnicity,nationalorigin,religionortheexerciseoftheirconstitutionalrights.

3. These consequences include the inability to fly on airplanes, to go through

securitywithouthavingallscreenersreceiveamessagefortheremainderofalistee’slife

that she is a "known or suspected terrorist," to obtain licenses, to exercise their Second

Amendmentrighttoownafirearm,andtobefreefromtheunimaginableindignityandreal‐

life danger of having their own government communicate to hundreds of thousands of

federalagents,privatecontractors,businesses, stateand localpolice, thecaptainsof sea‐

faringvessels,andforeigngovernmentsallacrosstheworldthattheyareaviolentmenace.

4. Andunfortunately,thefederalgovernmenthasdesigneditsfederalwatchlist

to be accountability‐free. Persons placed on the federal watch list have no means of

removing themselves or challenging the basis for their inclusion. Indeed, people on the

federalwatch listsonly learnoftheirplacementwhentheyfeel thewebofconsequences

burdeningtheirlivesandaspirations,andtheyneverlearnwhy.

5. Media accounts have made clear that the secret federal watch list is the

productofbigotryandmisguided,counterproductivezeal.Americansaredumpedontothe

watch list without being charged, convicted, or in some stomach‐churning cases, even

subjecttoanongoinginvestigation.

6. Instead, two recently leaked government documents and a governmental

report,whichincludetheMarch2013WatchlistingGuidance(Exhibit2),theDirectorateof

TerroristIdentities(DTI):StrategicAccomplishments2013(Exhibit3),andtheDepartment

of Justice's March 2014 Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of

TerroristWatchlist(Exhibit4)revealthatthecarethefederalgovernmenttakesincreating

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its federal watch list is void of proper processing, which in turn results in life‐altering

consequencesthatflowfromtheseillegalactions.

7. Infact,uponinformationandbelief,Dearborn,acityoflessthan100,000and

aplaceArabAmericansandMuslimAmericanshavecalledhomeforgenerations,contains

the second highest concentration of Americans on the federal government's watch list.

Moreover,therehavebeenmorethan1.5millionnominationstothefederalwatchlistsince

2009andthat,in2013forexample,theTerroristScreeningCenterconverted98.96percent

ofthosenominationsintowatchlistplacements.

8. Uponinformationandbelief,evidencealsoshowsthatthefederalgovernment

uses guilt‐by‐association presumptions to place family members and friends of listed

personsonthewatchlist.

9. Moreover,traveltoMuslimmajoritycountries—travelthatAmericanMuslims

areverylikelytoengagein—isalsoabasisforwatchlistplacement.

10. In 2009, the federal governmentmade 227,932 nominations to its federal

watchlist.In2013,thatnumbermorethandoubledatanalarminganddangerousrateto

468,749.

11. Recently,afederalcourtjudgeobservedinGuletMohamedv.EricR.Holder,Jr.,

etal.(UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,EasternDistrictofVirginia,CaseNo.11‐cv‐00050(2011)),

that“[a]showingofpastorongoingunlawfulconductdoesnotseemtoberequired,…But

the Court has little, if any, ability to articulate what information is viewed by TSC as

sufficiently‘derogatory’beyondthelabelsithasprovidedtheCourt.Insum,theNoFlyList

assumes that there are some American citizens who are simply too dangerous to be

permitted to fly, nomatter the level of pre‐flight screening or on‐flight surveillance and

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restraint, even though those citizens cannot be legally arrested, detained, or otherwise

restrictedintheirmovementsorconduct.”SeeUnitedStatesDistrictCourt,EasternDistrict

ofVirginia,CaseNo.11‐cv‐00050(2011);Dkt.70at19;attachedasMemorandumOpinion

(Exhibit1).

12. Moreover,theCourtwentontofindthat“[i]nclusionontheNoFlyListalso

labels an American citizen a disloyal American who is capable of, and disposed toward

committing,warcrimes,andonecaneasilyimaginethebroadrangeofconsequencesthat

mightbe visitedupon such aperson if that stigmatizingdesignationwereknownby the

generalpublic…TheprocessofnominationtotheNoFlyListisbasedonasuspectedlevelof

futuredangerousnessthatisnotnecessarilyrelatedtoanyunlawfulconduct.”SeeUnited

StatesDistrictCourt,EasternDistrictofVirginia,CaseNo.11‐cv‐00050(2011);Dkt.70at14,

17;attachedasMemorandumOpinion(Exhibit1).

NatureoftheAction

13. This action is necessary to compensate Plaintiffs and all other Americans

similarly situated for the injuries Defendants inflicted against them. Defendants have

violatedtheconstitutionallyprotectedlibertyinterestsofPlaintiffsandallotherAmericans

similarlysituatedasaresultofbeingdesignatedonthefederalwatchlistandbeingfalsely

stigmatizedas“knownorsuspected”terrorists,andasaresultofbeingdeniedameaningful

opportunitytochallengetheirdesignationonthefederalwatchlist.

14. ThereasonfornotjoiningallpotentialclassmembersasPlaintiffsisthat,upon

informationandbelief,therearethousandsuponthousandsofpotentialplaintiffsmakingit

impracticaltobringthembeforetheCourt.AllPlaintiffsareUnitedStatesCitizens.

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15. Therearepotentially thousandsuponthousandsofpersonswhohavebeen

similarlyaffectedandthequestiontobedeterminedisoneofcommonandgeneralinterest

to many persons constituting the Class to which Plaintiffs belong, and the group is so

numerousastomakeitimpracticabletobringthemallbeforetheCourt,forwhichreason

PlaintiffsinitiatethislitigationforallAmericancitizenssimilarlysituatedpursuanttoFed.

R.Civ.P.23.

16. Issues and questions of law and fact common to themembers of the Class

predominateoverquestionsaffecting individualmembersandtheclaimsofPlaintiffsare

typicaloftheclaimsoftheproposedclass.

17. ThemaintenanceofthislitigationasaClassActionwillbesuperiortoother

methodsofadjudicationinpromotingtheconvenientadministrationofjustice.

18. Plaintiffs and their attorneys, Council on American‐Islamic Relations,

Michigan(“CAIR‐MI”),TheLawOfficeofGadeirAbbas,andAkeelandValentine,PLC,will

fairlyandadequatelyassertandprotecttheinterestsoftheClass.

Parties

19. Plaintiff Baby Doe is a 4 year old United States Citizen toddler born an

AmericanMuslimfamily,residinginAlamedaCounty,California.Venueisproperbecausea

substantialpart of the events or omissions giving rise tohis claims occurredwithin this

districtwhich iswhere the federalwatch list is compiled. PlaintiffBabyDoebrings this

actionbyandthroughhisnextfriend,FatherDoe.

20. PlaintiffYaseenKadura isa26yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslim

residinginCookCounty,Illinois.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsor

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omissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederal

watchlistiscompiled.

21. Plaintiff Anas Elhady is a 22 year old United States Citizen and a Muslim

residinginWayneCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheevents

oromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederal


22. PlaintiffOsamaHusseinAhmed isa24yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenanda

MuslimresidinginWayneCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartof

theeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswhere

thefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

23. PlaintiffGuletMohamed isaUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresiding in

Fairfax County, Virginia. Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events or



24. PlaintiffAhmadIbrahimAlHalabiisa37yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenanda




25. PlaintiffMichaelEdmundColemanisa44yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenanda




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26. PlaintiffWaelHakmeh is a 37 year oldUnited States Citizen and aMuslim

residing inOaklandCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecausea substantialpartof the

eventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethe

federalwatchlistiscompiled.

27. Plaintiff Adnan Khalil Shaout is a 55 year old United States Citizen and a

Muslim residing in Jordan. Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events or



28. PlaintiffSaleemAliisa43yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresiding

inWayneCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecausea substantialpartof theeventsor



29. Plaintiff Shahir Anwar is a 36 year oldUnited States Citizen and aMuslim

residing inMacombCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecauseasubstantialpartof the



30. Plaintiff Samir Anwar is a 29 year old United States Citizen and aMuslim

residing inMacombCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecauseasubstantialpartof the



31. PlaintiffMariamJukakuisa32yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslim

residinginAlamedaCounty,California. Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartofthe

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32. PlaintiffMohammadHaydarisa34yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslim

residinginAlamedaCounty,California. Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartofthe



33. Plaintiff JohnDoeNo.1 isa51yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslim

residinginWashtenawCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartofthe




residing inOaklandCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecausea substantialpartof the




residinginWashtenawCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartofthe



36. Defendant Christopher M. Piehota is the current Director of the Terrorist

Screening Center (“TSC”). Defendant Piehota was appointed in April, 2013. Defendant

Piehotadevelopsandmaintainsthefederalgovernment’sconsolidatedTerrorismScreening

Database(the“watchlist”),andacceptsnominationsofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituated

American citizens made to the federal watch list. Defendant Piehota also oversees the

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dissemination of the stigmatizing label attached toPlaintiffs and other similarly situated

Americancitizensof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”tostateandlocalauthorities,foreign

governments, corporations, private contractors, gun sellers, the captains of sea‐faring

vessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals.DefendantPiehotaisbeing

suedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

37. Defendant Robin C. Burke is the former Acting‐Director of the Terrorist

ScreeningCenter(“TSC”).DefendantBurkeservedasActing‐DirectorfromFebruary,2013

toApril,2013. Additionally,DefendantBurkeservedasPrincipalDeputyDirectorof the

Terrorism Screening Center from November, 2010 to July, 2013. Defendant Burke

developed and maintained the federal government’s consolidated Terrorism Screening

Database (the “watch list”), and accepted nominations of Plaintiffs and other similarly

situatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantBurkealsooversawthe

dissemination of the stigmatizing label attached toPlaintiffs and other similarly situated

Americancitizensof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”tostateandlocalauthorities,foreign

governments, corporations, private contractors, gun sellers, the captains of sea‐faring

vessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals.DefendantBurkeisbeing

suedinherindividualcapacity,only.

38. DefendantTimothyJ.HealyistheformerDirectoroftheTerroristScreening

Center(“TSC”).DefendantHealyservedasActingDirectoroftheTerroristScreeningCenter

fromMarch,2009untilhewasappointedDirectoronMay14,2009.DefendantHealyserved

untilFebruary,2013.DefendantHealydevelopedandmaintainedthefederalgovernment’s

consolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”),andacceptednominationsof

Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens made to the federal watch list.

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Defendant Healy also oversaw the dissemination of the stigmatizing label attached to

PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”

tostateandlocalauthorities, foreigngovernments,corporations,privatecontractors,gun

sellers, the captains of sea‐faring vessels, among other official and private entities and

individuals.DefendantHealyisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

39. Defendant Steven Mabeus is the current Principal Deputy Director of the

Terrorist Screening Center (“TSC”). DefendantMabeuswas appointed inOctober, 2013.

Defendant Mabeus develops and maintains the federal government’s consolidated

TerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”),andacceptsnominationsofPlaintiffsand

othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantMabeus

also oversees the disseminationof the stigmatizing label attached toPlaintiffs and other

similarly situatedAmericancitizensof “knownor suspected terrorists” to stateand local

authorities,foreigngovernments,corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptains

ofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals. Defendant

Mabeusisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

40. DefendantAnnVesseyistheformerActingPrincipalDeputyDirectorofthe

TerroristScreeningCenter(“TSC”). DefendantVesseyservedfromJuly,2013toOctober,

2013.DefendantVesseydevelopedandmaintainedthefederalgovernment’sconsolidated

TerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”),andacceptednominationsofPlaintiffsand

othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantVessey

also oversaw the dissemination of the stigmatizing label attached to Plaintiffs and other



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Vesseyisbeingsuedinherindividualcapacity,only.

41. Defendant Donald Torrence is the former Principal Deputy Director of the

TerroristScreeningCenter (“TSC”). DefendantTorrenceserved fromDecember,2009 to

November,2010.DefendantTorrencedevelopedandmaintainedthefederalgovernment’s

consolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”),andacceptednominationsof

Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens made to the federal watch list.

DefendantTorrencealsooversaw thedisseminationof the stigmatizing label attached to

PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”

tostateandlocalauthorities, foreigngovernments,corporations,privatecontractors,gun

sellers, the captains of sea‐faring vessels, among other official and private entities and

individuals.DefendantTorrenceisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

42. DefendantRickKopelistheformerPrincipalDeputyDirectoroftheTerrorist

ScreeningCenter(“TSC”).DefendantTorrenceservedpriortoandthroughNovember,2009.

Defendant Rick Kopel developed andmaintained the federal government’s consolidated


othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist. DefendantRick

Kopel also oversaw thedissemination of the stigmatizing label attached toPlaintiffs and

othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”tostateand

local authorities, foreign governments, corporations, private contractors, gun sellers, the

captains of sea‐faring vessels, among other official and private entities and individuals.

DefendantRickKopelisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

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43. DefendantG.ClaytonGriggisthecurrentDeputyDirectorofOperationsofthe

Terrorist Screening Center (“TSC”). Defendant Grigg began serving in September, 2013.

Defendant Grigg developed and maintained the federal government’s consolidated


othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantGrigg





Griggisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

44. Defendant Deborah Lubman is the former Acting Deputy Director of

Operations of the Terrorist Screening Center (“TSC”). Defendant Lubman served

intermittentlybetweenFebruary,2013andSeptember,2013.DefendantLubmandeveloped

andmaintainedthefederalgovernment’sconsolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the

“watchlist”),andacceptednominationsofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican

citizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantLubmanalsooversawthedissemination

ofthestigmatizinglabelattachedtoPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens

of “known or suspected terrorists” to state and local authorities, foreign governments,

corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongother

official and private entities and individuals. Defendant Lubman is being sued in her

individualcapacity,only.

45. DefendantCindyCoppolaistheformerActingDeputyDirectorofOperations

of the Terrorist Screening Center (“TSC”). Defendant Coppola served between June and

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September, 2011 and intermittently between February, 2013 and September, 2013.

Defendant Coppola developed and maintained the federal government’s consolidated


othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantCoppola





Coppolaisbeingsuedinherindividualcapacity,only.

46. Defendant CoryNelson is the formerDeputyDirector of Operations of the

TerroristScreeningCenter (“TSC”). DefendantNelsonservedprior toand throughApril,

2009.DefendantNelsondevelopedandmaintainedthefederalgovernment’sconsolidated


othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantNelson





Nelsonisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

47. DefendantBryanLynch is the formerDeputyDirector ofOperations of the

TerroristScreeningCenter(“TSC”).DefendantLynchservedfromMay,2009toSeptember,

2009.DefendantLynchdevelopedandmaintainedthe federalgovernment’sconsolidated


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othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantLynch




ofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals.Defendant

Lynchisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

48. Defendant James Kennedy is the Director of the Office of Transportation

Security Redress (OTSR), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), United States

DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS).DefendantKennedyalsoservesastheDirectorof

the DHS Traveler Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). Defendant Kennedy is responsible for

overseeing DHS TRIP, the administrative complaint process to challenge nominations of

PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist,and

coordinatingwithothergovernmentagencies,includingtheTerrorismScreeningCenter,to

resolvethecomplaint.DefendantKennedyisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

49. Defendant Matthew G. Olsen is Director of the National Counterterrorism

Center (“NCTC”). Defendant Olsen is responsible for Defendant the nominations that

resultedintheplacementofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthe

federalwatchlist.Olsenisbeingsuedinhisindividualcapacity,only.

50. DefendantsUnidentifiedFBIAgentsareemployedbytheFederalBureauof

Investigation(“FBI”),and includeagents involved in thenominations thatresulted inthe

placementofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatch

list.TheUnidentifiedFBIAgentsarebeingsuedintheirindividualcapacities,only.

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51. DefendantsUnidentifiedTSCAgentsareemployedbytheTerrorismScreening

Center(“TSC”),andincludeagentsinvolvedinacceptanceofthenominationstothefederal

watch listandthedisseminationof thestigmatizing labelattachedtoPlaintiffsandother



of sea‐faring vessels, among other official and private entities and individuals. The

UnidentifiedTSCAgentsarebeingsuedintheirindividualcapacities,only.

52. Defendants Unidentified NCTC Agents are employed by the National

Counterterrorism Center (“NCTC”), and include agents involved in the nominations that

resultedintheplacementofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthe

federal watch list. The Unidentified NCTC Agents are being sued in their individual

capacities,only.

JurisdictionandVenue

53. Under U.S. Const. Art. III §2, this Court has jurisdiction because the rights

soughttobeprotectedhereinaresecuredbytheUnitedStatesConstitution.Jurisdictionis

properpursuantto28U.S.C.§1331,Bivensv.SixUnknownNamedAgentsofFederalBureau

ofNarcotics, 403U.S.388 (1971),et seq., 5U.S.C. §702,5U.S.C. §706, theUnitedStates

Constitution,andfederalcommonlaw.

54. Thisactionseeksdamagespursuantto28U.S.C.§1343(a)(4)and28U.S.C.§

1357.

55. Asubstantialpartoftheunlawfulactsallegedhereinwerecommittedwithin

thejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofVirginia.

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56. Venue is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as to all Defendants because

DefendantsareofficersoremployeesofagenciesoftheUnitedStatessuedintheirindividual

capacities and because this judicial district is where a substantial part of the events or

omissionsgivingrisetotheclaimsoccurred.

FactualBackground

TheFederalGovernment’sTerroristWatchList

57. InSeptember,2003,AttorneyGeneralJohnAshcroftestablishedtheTerrorist

ScreeningCenter(“TSC”)toconsolidatethegovernment’sapproachtoterrorismscreening.

TheTSC,whichisadministeredbytheFBI,developsandmaintainsthefederalgovernment’s

consolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”).TSC’sconsolidatedwatchlist

is the federal government’s master repository for suspected international and domestic

terroristrecordsusedforwatchlistrelatedscreening.

58. Thewatchlisthastwoprimarycomponents:theSelecteeListandtheNo‐Fly

List.PersonsontheSelecteeList,includingmanyofPlaintiffs,aresystematicallysubjectto

extrascreeningatairportsandlandbordercrossings,andoftenfind“SSSS”ontheirboarding

passesprintedbyairlineemployeeswhich ismarked to indicateapassenger’swatch list

status to airline employees and screeners. Persons on the No‐Fly List, including the

remainder of Plaintiffs, are prevented fromboarding flights that fly into, out of, or even

throughUnitedStatesairspace.

59. TSCdisseminates records from its terroristwatch list toothergovernment

agencies that in turn use those records to identify suspected terrorists. For example,

applicableTSCrecordsareprovidedtoTSAforusebyairlinesinpre‐screeningpassengers

andtoCBPforuseinscreeningtravelersenteringtheUnitedStatesbyland.

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60. Uponinformationandbelief,TSCdisseminatedtherecordsofPlaintiffsfrom

itsterroristwatchlisttoothergovernmentagencies,includingtheTSAforusebyairlinesin

pre‐screeningPlaintiffs, andCBP foruse in screeningPlaintiffsuponentering theUnited

States.

61. Uponinformationandbelief,Defendantsdisseminatedtherecordspertaining

toPlaintiffsfromitsterroristwatchlisttoforeigngovernmentswiththepurposeandhope

that those foreign governments will constrain the movement of the Plaintiffs in some

manner.

62. Uponinformationandbelief,Defendants’intentionindisseminatingwatchlist

records,includingthoseofPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,aswidelyas

possibleistoconstrainPlaintiffs’movements,notonlywithintheUnitedStates,butabroad

aswell.Forexample,somecountriesdetainindividualslistedonthefederalwatchlistwho

enter theirborders, question those individuals at thebehestofUnitedStatesofficials, or

altogetherpreventthoseindividualsfromevenenteringthosecountries.

63. Thus, while the TSC maintains and controls the database of suspected

terrorists,itisthefront‐lineagenciesliketheTSAthatcarryoutthescreeningfunction.In

thecontextofairtravel,whenindividualsmakeairlinereservationsandcheckinatairports,

the front‐line screening agency, like TSA and CBP, conducts a name‐based search of the

individual,includingeachofthePlaintiffs,todeterminewhetherheorsheisonawatchlist.

64. Whileagenciesthroughoutthefederalgovernmentutilizethefederalwatch

list to conduct screening, listed persons are subject to a comprehensive portfolio of

consequencesthatcoverlargeaspectsoftheirlives.

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65. Indeed, the federal government disseminates its federal watch list to both

governmentauthoritiesandprivatecorporationsandindividualswiththepurposeandhope

that these entities and/or individuals will impose consequences on those individuals

Defendantshavelisted.

66. Upon information and belief, the status of Plaintiffs and similarly situated

Americancitizensasknownorsuspectedterroristsonthefederalwatchlistdiminishesand

evenimperilstheirabilitytoaccessthefinancialsystem.

67. Bankshaveclosedthebankaccountsofindividualslistedonthefederalwatch

list and financial companieshavedeclined toallowsome listed individuals tomakewire

transfers.

68. Moreover, upon information and belief, the citizenship and green card

applicationsofPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensaredelayed indefinitely

due toan “FBInamecheck”andnotadjudicated, therebydenyingPlaintiffsandsimilarly

situatedAmericancitizensof therights the flow fromcitizenship, including theability to

travel freely as a United States citizen and to sponsor for lawful permanent residency

immediaterelativeslivingabroad.

69. Amongtheentitiesandindividualsthatthefederalgovernmentdisseminates

its federal watch list are state and local authorities, foreign governments, corporations,

privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongothers.

70. Upon information and belief, because the names of Plaintiffs and similarly

situated American citizens are included on the federal watch list, their names were

disseminated to state and local authorities, foreign governments, corporations, private

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contractors,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesand

individuals.

71. Becausethefederalgovernmentdisseminatesitsfederalwatchlisttoforeign

governments, listedpersons, includingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,

areoftennotallowedtoenterothernations.ThisisbecausetheUnitedStatesistellingother

nations,withoutanymodicumofdueprocess,thatthousandsofitsowncitizensare“known

orsuspectedterrorists.”

72. Thefederalgovernmentdisseminatesitsfederalwatchlisttostateandlocal

policeofficers,includingPlaintiffs,whichallowsthoseofficerstoquerythenamesofpersons,

ifforexample,thelistedindividualispulledoverforroutinetrafficviolations.

73. Disseminatingthefederalwatchlisttostateandlocalpoliceofficerscreatesa

dangeroussituationinsofarasthefederalwatchlisteffectivelydirectsstateandlocalofficers

totreatthousandsofAmericans,includingPlaintiffs,chargedorconvictedwithnocrimeyet

listedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist”andasextremelydangerous.

74. Withtheadventanddeploymentofautomaticlicenseplatereadersbypolice

departments across the country, local and state authorities have relied heavily upon a

driver’s watch list status as the basis of a traffic stop, including Plaintiffs and similarly

situatedAmericancitizens.

75. Beingonthefederalwatchlistcanpreventlistedpersons,includingPlaintiffs

andsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,frompurchasingagun.Forexample,NewJersey

passed a law in 2013 that banned persons on the federal watch list from owning guns.

Additionally, Connecticut is in the process of setting up an institutional mechanism to

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preventindividualswhosenamesareincludedonthefederalwatchlist,suchasPlaintiffs,

frombeingabletobuyaguninthestateofConnecticut.

76. Accordingly,PlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensareunableto

purchasegunsinstatesthatbanpersonsonthefederalwatchlistfromowningguns.

77. Because the federal government conducts a security risk assessment that

includesqueryingthefederalwatchlistpriortoissuingalicensetocommercialdriversto

transporthazardousmaterials,beingonthefederalwatchlistcanpreventlistedpersons,

including Plaintiffs and similarly situatedAmerican citizens, from obtaining or renewing

theirHazmatlicense.

78. Being on the federal watch list can also prevent listed persons, including

PlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,fromaccompanyingminorsorpassengers

withdisabilitiestotheirgate,fromworkingatanairport,orworkingforanairlineinsofaras

listedpersonsarenotallowedtoenterso‐called“sterileareas”ofairports.

79. Beingonthefederalwatchlistcanalsoresultinthedenialorrevocationofa

FederalAviationAdministration(FAA)licenseofPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmerican

citizens.

80. AlthoughTSA,CBP,andotheragenciesmayusetherecordsprovidedbythe

TSC,itistheTSCthatmaintainsandcontrolsthedatabaseofsuspectedterrorists.

81. Two government entities, including the Unidentified FBI Agents and

UnidentifiedTSCAgentsemployedbythosegovernmententities,areprimarilyresponsible

for“nominating”individualsforinclusionintheterroristwatchlist—theNCTCandtheFBI.

TheNCTC,whichismanagedbytheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,relieson

informationfromotherfederaldepartmentsandagencieswhenincludingallegedknownor

23

suspectedinternationalterroristsinitsTerroristIdentitiesDatamartEnvironment(“TIDE”)

database.TheNCTCreviewsTIDEentriesandrecommendsspecificentriestotheTSCfor

inclusioninthewatchlist.TIDEisthemainsourceofallinternationalterroristinformation

includedinthewatchlist.

82. TheFBI,includingtheUnidentifiedFBIAgents,inturn,nominatestothewatch

list individualswithwhat it characterizes as suspected ties to domestic terrorism. TSC,

includingDefendantHealyandUnidentifiedTSCAgents,makesthefinaldecisiononwhether

anominatedindividualmeetstheminimumrequirementsforinclusionintothewatchlistas

aknownorsuspectedterrorist.TSCalsodecideswhichscreeningsystemswillreceivethe

informationaboutthatindividual.

83. DefendantHealyhastestifiedthatinevaluatingwhetheranindividualmeets

the criteria for inclusionon the consolidatedwatch list, theTSCdetermineswhether the

nominated individual is “reasonably suspected” of having possible links to terrorism.

AccordingtotheTSC,“reasonablesuspicionrequiresarticulablefactswhich,takentogether

withrationalinferences,reasonablywarrantthedeterminationthatanindividualisknown

orsuspectedtobeorhasbeenengagedinconductconstituting,inpreparationfor,inandof

orrelatedtoterrorismandterroristactivities.”

84. Defendantshavenotstatedpubliclywhatstandardsorcriteriaareappliedto

determinewhetheranAmericancitizenontheconsolidatedwatchlistwillbeplacedonthe

No‐FlyList,SelecteeList(“SSSS”)orotherlistthatisdistributedtotheTSA,CBPorother

screeningagencies.

85. The standards for watch list inclusion do not evince even internal logic.

Defendantsdefinea“suspectedterrorist”asan“individualwhoisreasonablysuspectedto

24

be,orhavebeen,engagedinconductconstituting,inpreparationfor,inaidof,orrelatedto

terrorismandterroristactivitiesbasedonarticulableandreasonablesuspicion.”Inother

words, Defendants place American citizens on the federal watch list based upon a

“reasonable suspicion” that they are “reasonably suspected” of nefarious activities. This

“reasonablesuspicion”basedona“reasonablesuspicion”standarddoesnotevencontain

internallogic.

86. Thefederalgovernmentutilizesguilt‐by‐associationasabasisforwatchlist

inclusion.Forexample,theimmediaterelativeoflistedpersonscanbelistedwithoutany

derogatory information—other than the bonds of family. Nonetheless, such designation

suggeststhattheimmediaterelativeishimorherselfengagedinnefariousactivities.

87. Being a known associate—a friend, colleague, fellow community member,

etc.—ofalistedindividualcanalsoprovideabasisforwatchlistinclusion.

88. EvenifanAmericancitizenisacquittedofterrorismchargesorthosecharges

areotherwisedismissed,thefederalgovernmentretainsforitselftheauthoritytocontinue

toincludetheminthewatchlist.

89. Forreasonsunknown,Defendantsalsoplacewhattheycall“non‐investigatory

subjects”onthefederalwatchlist,Americancitizensthattheyhavechosennottoinvestigate.

90. Under these practices and standards, the number of records in the

consolidatedwatchlisthasswelled.Over1.5millionnominationstothewatchlisthavebeen

submittedbyfederalagenciessincefiscal2009.

91. In2013,DefendantTSCaccepted98.96percentofallnominationsmade.

25

92. Becauseoftheseloosestandardsandpractices,thefederalwatchlist’srateof

growthhasincreased.Infiscal2009,therewere227,932nominationstothewatchlist.In

fiscal2013,therewere468,749nominations.

93. Uponinformationandbelief,in2001,therewere16peoplewhothefederal

governmentsystematicallypreventedfromflying.In2013,thatnumberincreasedto47,000.

94. Once anAmerican citizenhasbeenplacedon thewatch list, the individual

remainsonthelistuntiltheagencythatsuppliedtheinitial informationinsupportofthe

nominationdeterminestheindividualshouldberemoved.

95. A2007GAOreportfoundthatTSCrejectsonlyapproximatelyonepercentof

allnominationstothewatchlist.1Assuch,thewatchlistisgrowingatarateofapproximately

20,000entriesperyear.

96. AtaMarch10,2010SenateHomelandSecurityCommitteehearing,RusselE.

Travers,DeputyDirectoroftheNationalCounterterrorismCenter,statedthat“[t]heentire

federalgovernmentisleaningveryfarforwardonputtingpeopleonlist,”andthatthewatch

listis“gettingbigger,anditwillgetevenbigger.”

97. ThefederalwatchlistalsodisproportionatelytargetsAmericanMuslims.

98. Defendantshaveutilizedthewatchlist,notasatooltoenhanceaviationand

bordersecurity,butasabludgeontocoerceAmericanMuslimsintobecominginformantsor

forgoingtheexerciseoftheirrights,suchastherighttohaveanattorneypresentduringlaw

enforcementquestioning.

1 See United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters entitled Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List, GAO‐08‐110, October 2007, at 22.

26

99. Public examplesof thisphenomenonabound. SeeLatifv.Holder,2014U.S.

Dist.LEXIS85450,*19(D.Or.June24,2014)(anFBIagenttoldStevenWashburnthathe

“wouldhelpremoveWashburn'snamefromtheNo‐FlyListifheagreedtospeaktotheFBI”);

Id.at*21‐22(FBIagentstoldIbraheimMashalthat“hisnamewouldberemovedfromthe

No‐Fly List and he would receive compensation if he helped the FBI by serving as an

informant.”):Idat*22‐23(FBIagentsofferedAmirMeshal“theopportunitytoserveasa

government informant in exchange for assistance in removinghisname from theNo‐Fly

List.”). SeealsoFikrev.FBI,2014U.S.Dist. LEXIS73174 (D.Or.May29,2014) (Emirati

officialstoldYonasFikrethathe“couldnottraveltotheUnitedStatesbyairbecauseheison

theNo‐FlyList”andanFBIagenttoldFikrethat“theFBIcouldtakestepstoremove[him]

fromtheNo‐FlyListifheagreedtobeaninformant.”);Tanveerv.Holder,et.al.,No.13‐cv‐

6951,Dkt.15(April22,2014)(NaveedShinwari “declinedtoactasan informant for the

FederalBureauofInvestigationandtospyon[his]ownAmericanMuslimcommunitiesand

otherinnocentpeople.”).

100. Additionally,governmentrecordsshowthatDearborn,Michigan—whichis40

percentArab—isdisproportionatelyrepresentedonthefederalwatchlist.Infact,Dearborn

isamongthetopfivecitiesinthecountry,alongsideChicago,Houston,NewYork,andSan

Diego,representedonthefederalwatchlist.

101. Defendants’ 2013WatchlistingGuidancealso indicates that “[t]ravel forno

knownlawfulorlegitimatepurposetoalocusofterroristactivity”canbeabasisforbeing

listed.Whilea“locusofTerroristActivity”isnotdefinedbythedocument,uponinformation

andbelief,itlikelyincludesanyplacewheremanyMuslimsreside.

27

102. Thefederalwatchlist’sinclusionstandardsaresopermissiveandpliableand

the selectee list's efficacy is at best fleetingly marginal that the inclusion standards

themselvesviolatePlaintiffsproceduralandsubstantivedueprocess.

103. Thefederalwatchlistdiminishes,ratherthanenhances,ournationalsecurity

becausethenumberofinnocentAmericansonthelistisbecomingsovoluminousthatthe

purposeofhavingalistissignificantlyunderminedasallarebeingtreatedasthesame.

104. Theconsequencesofbeingonthefederalwatchlistaremetedoutpublically.

Membersofthepubliccanwitnesstheextrascreeningtowhichindividualsonthefederal

watchlistaresubject,includingbeingpulledoutoftheircaratgunpoint,beingorderedto

leave one's vehiclewith one's hands held above his/her head, among other stigmatizing

measures.

105. Inpractice,frontlinescreenersdisclosethestatusofindividualsonthefederal

watchlisttostateandlocalauthorities,aswellasairlineemployees.

106. Theoperationofthefederalwatchlistenlistsaircarrierstoassistthefederal

governmentintrackingthepassengeronthefederalwatchlist.

107. DefendantsapplythefederalwatchlistagainstMuslimAmericansinamanner

thatisdifferentfromhowitusesitslistagainstpeopleofotherfaithbackgrounds.

108. Defendantsuseimpermissibleandinaccuratereligiousprofilesincompiling

thefederalwatchlist.

109. Defendants who contributed to the placement of Plaintiffs and similarly

situatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatchlistknewthattheiractionsviolatedclearly

establishedfederallaw.

28

110. Defendants knew at the time they acted unlawfully that Supreme Court

precedent required that,whenever a citizen is deprived of a liberty interest, the federal

governmentmustatleastprovidethedeprivedwithsomeformofnoticethatadeprivation

occurred.

InadequacyoftheDHSTravelerRedressInquiryProgramProcess

111. The government entities and individuals involved in the creation,

maintenance, support, modification and enforcement of the federal watch list, including

Defendants,havenotprovidedtravelers,includingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmerican

citizens,witha fairandeffectivemechanism throughwhich theycanchallenge theTSC’s

decisiontoplacethemontheterroristwatchlist.

112. An individual, including Plaintiffs and similarly situated American citizens,

whohasbeenpreventedorhinderedfromtravelbybeingplacedonthefederalwatchlist

has no clear avenue for redress, because no single government entity is responsible for

removinganindividualfromthelist.TheTSC,whichisadministeredbytheFBI,doesnot

acceptredressinquiriesfromthepublic,nordoesitdirectlyprovidefinaldispositionletters

to individuals on the selectee list, including Plaintiffs on the selectee list and similarly

situatedAmericancitizens,whohavesubmittedredressinquiries.TheNCTCwhichmanages

theTIDElistdoesnotacceptredressinquiriesfromthegeneralpublic.

113. Individualswhoseekredressafterhavingbeenincludedintheterroristwatch

list must submit an inquiry through the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (“DHS

TRIP”).DHSTRIPprovidesindividualswitha“RedressControlNumber.”

114. DHSTRIPistheonlyredress“process”availabletoindividualsincludedonthe

terroristwatchlist.

29

115. DHSTRIPsubmitstravelercomplaintstotheTSC,whichdetermineswhether

anyactionshouldbetaken. TheTSChasnotprovidedanypubliclyavailableinformation

abouthowitmakesthatdecision. TheTSC is the finalarbiterofwhetheran individual’s

nameisretainedonorremovedfromthewatchlist,includingthoseofPlaintiffsandsimilarly

situatedAmericancitizens.

116. TheTSCmakesadeterminationregardingaparticularindividual’sstatuson

thewatchlist,includingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,andDHSinturn

respondstotheindividualwithastandardformletterthatneitherconfirmsnordeniesthe

existenceofanyterroristwatchlistrecordsrelatingtotheindividual.Thelettersdonotset

forthanybasisforinclusioninaterroristwatchlist,donotstatewhetherthegovernment

hasresolvedthecomplaintatissue.

117. ThegovernmentdoesnotprovideanAmericancitizenwithanyopportunity

toconfront,ortorebut,thegroundsforhisorherpossibleinclusiononthewatchlist.As

such,DHSTRIPoffersnomeaningfulreviewofthewatchlistdesignationandineffectshields

theTSC’sactionswithrespecttotheindividualnominationsorclassesofnominationsfrom

meaningfulreviewbyanyindependentauthority.

118. Moreover,thegovernment’sowninternalauditsofthesystempointtoserious

flaws.Forexample,aMarch2008DOJOfficeoftheInspectorGeneralreportentitledAudit

oftheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeTerrorismWatchlistNominationProcessesfoundsignificant

problemswiththenominationandremovalprocess.

119. Thus,theonly“process”availabletosuchindividualsistosubmittheirnames

andotheridentifyinginformationtoagovernmententitythathasnoauthoritytoprovide

30

redressandtohopethatanunspecifiedgovernmentagencycorrectsanerrororchangesits

mind.

120. Asallegedbelow,eachofthePlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens

aredesignatedonthewatchlist.

PlaintiffBabyDoe

121. BabyDoeisa4yeartoddler.

122. Hewasseven‐monthsoldwhenhisboardingpasswasfirststampedwiththe

“SSSS” designation, indicating that he had been designated as a “known or suspected

terrorist.”

123. While passing through airport security, he was subjected to extensive

searches,patdownsandchemicaltesting.

124. Everyiteminhismother’sbabybagwassearched,includingeveryoneofhis

diapers.

125. BabyDoe’smotherfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIPonhisbehalf.

126. ShealsofiledaCivilRights/CivilLibertiesComplaintwiththeOfficeofCivil

RightsandLibertiesoftheTransportationSecurityAdministration.

127. AtnotimewasBabyDoe,orhisparents,givennoticeofthefactualbasisfor

his placement on the federalwatch list, and at no timewas he or his parents offered a

meaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

128. Moreover, at no time was Baby Doe, or his parents, given notice of the

deprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

31

129. Uponinformationandbelief,BabyDoe’snominationtothefederalwatchlist

was made based solely upon a hunch (based upon his race, ethnicity, national origin,

religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffYaseenKadura

130. OnSeptember22,2012,Mr.YaseenKadurawassurroundedbyeightarmed

CBPofficers,handcuffedanddetainedinaholdingcellfornearlyeighthoursattheborder

stopinPortHuron,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabrief

triptoCanada.

131. CBPofficersconfiscatedhisphoneand informedMr.Kadurathathisphone

wasbeingforwardedtoICEandwouldbereturnedtohimin24to48hours.

132. Uponinformationandbelief,theCBPofficersdownloadedthedatafromhis

phone.

133. OnOctober22,2012,Mr.KaduraappearedatChicagoO’Hare International

Airport,inordertotraveltoLibya.

134. Mr. Kadura had previously purchased a plane ticket for a Turkish Airlines

flight to Istanbul, andhewas to then fly toLibya from IstanbulonTurkishAirlines. Mr.

KadurapresentedhimselfattheTurkishAirlinesticketcounterhoursbeforehisflight.

135. TurkishAirlinespersonnelwereunabletocheckMr.Kadurainforhisflight

anddidnotissuehimaboardingpass.

136. ThepersonnelinformedMr.KadurathathewasontheNo‐FlyListandthathe

couldnotboardaplane.

137. BeforeMr.Kadurawasdenied theability toboardhis flightonOctober22,

2012,hedidnotreceiveanynotice,fromagovernmentagencyoranyoneelse,thathewould

32

beunabletoboardhisflightorthathisnamewasplacedontheNo‐FlyList.Mr.Kadurahad

beenablepreviouslytoboardflightsintheUnitedStateswithoutdifficulty.

138. OnoraboutNovember14,2012,SpecialAgentArkinFout,HomelandSecurity

Investigations (“HSI”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement, directly contacted Mr.

Kaduraandharassedand intimidatedhim inanattempt tocoercehim intoarrangingan

“informalmeeting”atanundisclosedlocationwithoutthepresenceofhisattorney.

139. Special Agent Fout proceeded to pressure Mr. Kadura into becoming an

informantinLibya.

140. SpecialAgentFoutindicatedthatifMr.Kadurawantedtoremovehisname

fromtheNo‐FlyList,itwouldbenearlyimpossibleforhimtodosounlessheagreedtowork

asaninformantinLibya.

141. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Kadura’snamewasaddedtotheNo‐FlyList

inordertoleveragehisstatusonthefederalwatchlisttoputpressureonMr.Kaduratoact

asaninformantinLibya.

142. OnNovember30,2012,Mr.KadurafiledacomplaintthroughDHSTRIP.

143. OnMay8,2013,Mr.Kadurareceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph116

aboveandwasassignedaRedressControlNumber.

144. Mr.KadurafiledatimelyDHSTRIPappealonJune5,2013.

145. BecauseMr.KaduradidnotreceivedaresponsetohisDHSTRIPappeal,Mr.

Kadurafiledafederallawsuit,alongwithfourotherMuslimAmericans,onAugust14,2014

seeking his removal from the federal watch list or any other database that burdens or

preventshim fromflyingorentering theUnitedStatesacross theborder. (UnitedStates

DistrictCourt,EasternDistrictofMichigan,CaseNo.14‐cv‐13128(2014)).

33

146. OnSeptember4,2015,Mr.Kadura’sattorneyreceivedaresponsetotheDHS

TRIPappealthatstated“AsyourequestedinconnectionwithMr.Kadura’sredressinquiry

challengingtheredressprocess,DHSTRIPreevaluatedMr.Kadura’sredressinquiryandis

nowprovidinganewdeterminationinaccordancewiththenewlyenhancedprocedures.At

thistimetheU.S.GovernmentknowsofnoreasonMr.Kadurashouldbeunabletofly.”

147. On January 15, 2016, Mr. Kadura attempted to check in online for his

commercialflighttoNewYork,howeverhewasunabletocheckin.

148. Mr.KaduraappearedlaterthatdayatChicagoO’HareInternationalAirportin

ordertoboardhiscommercialflighttoNewYork.

149. Mr.Kadurawasunabletocheckinatthekioskstationedattheairport. He

approachedanairlinerepresentativetobecheckedinmanually,andafterspeakingonthe

phonewithaDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(“DHS”)representativefornearlyanhour,

his boarding passwas stampedwith the “SSSS” designation, indicating that he has been

designatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

150. HewasthentakenintoaspecialsecurityroombyanumberofTSAagentsfor

aprivatesecuritycheckbeforehewasallowedtoboardhisflight.

151. Upon information and belief, Unidentified TSC Agents disseminated the

stigmatizing label of “known or suspected terrorist” attached toMr. Kadura toWestern

Union,andasaresult,heisunabletoconductwiretransfersatanyWesternUnionbranch.

152. AtnotimewasMr.Kaduragivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement

onthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontest

hisdesignation.

34

153. Moreover,atnotimepriortoApril,2015wasMr.Kaduragivennoticeofthe

deprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

154. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Kaduraremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

155. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Kadura’snominationtothefederalwatchlist



PlaintiffAnasElhady

156. Mr.AnasElhadyisroutinelyreferredtosecondaryinspection,handcuffedand

detainedbyCBPat landbordercrossingswhenheattemptstore‐entertheUnitedStates

fromCanada.

157. CBPofficersroutinelysubjecthimtoaprolongeddetentionandquestioning

forapproximatelyfourtotwelvehourseachtime.

158. Moreover, he is routinely asked questions about his religious beliefs and

practices,whatsectofIslamhebelongsto,whatmosquehepraysin,amongotherthings.

159. Moreover,everytimeMr.Elhadytravelsbyair,hisboardingpassisstamped

withthe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspected

terrorist.”

160. Mr.ElhadyfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

161. OnMay11,2015,Mr.Elhadyreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph116


162. Shortly afterwards,Mr.Elhadywasagain referred to secondary inspection,

handcuffedanddetainedbyCBPattheborderstopattheAmbassadorBridgePortofEntry

35

inDetroit,Michigan,forapproximatelysixhourswhenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnited

StatesafterabriefvacationinCanada.

163. AftertheCBPofficersconfiscatedMr.Elhady’sjacketandshoes,theydetained

himinasmall,freezingcoldholdingcellwithbrightlights.

164. Afterseveralhours,Mr.Elhadyknockedonthedoorrepeatedlyandbegged

forsomeonetohelphim.Hispleasforhelpwereignored.

165. Afterwards,hisbodybeganshakinguncontrollablyandhefellunconscious.

166. CBPofficersfinallyopenedthedoorandwokehimup.

167. Mr.Elhadyrepeatedlybeggedforanambulancetotakehimtothehospital,but

hispleaswereignored.

168. Finally,Mr.Elhadywastakentoanambulance,onlytobehandcuffedtothe

bedinsidetheambulance.

169. Mr.Elhadywastakentoalocalhospital,wherehewashandcuffedtoachair

inthewaitingroomofthehospital.

170. After being attended to by nurses and physicians, and prescribed the

medicationthatheneeded,Mr.Elhadywasagainhandcuffedtoachairinsideavehicleand

transportedbacktotheAmbassadorBridge.

171. OnDecember2,2015,FBISpecialAgentJoshAllencontactedMr.Elhadyand

informedhimthathisphonewasbeingtappedandthatallhiscallswerebeinglistenedtoby

theFBI.

172. Mr. Elhady’s boarding pass continues to be stamped with the “SSSS”

designationwhen travels by air, indicating that he has been designated as a “known or

suspectedterrorist.”

36

173. Additionally,everytimeMr.Elhadytravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondary

inspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

174. AtnotimewasMr.Elhadygivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

175. Moreover, atno timewasMr.Elhadygivennoticeof thedeprivationofhis

libertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

176. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Elhadyremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

177. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Elhady’snominationtothefederalwatchlist



PlaintiffOsamaHusseinAhmed

178. On or about February orMarch, 2011,Mr. Osama Ahmed appeared at the

DetroitMetropolitanAirport,uponreturninghomeonacommercialflightfromYemen.

179. Mr. Ahmed was escorted from the gate to an interrogation room and

interrogatedbyFBIagentsforapproximatelysixtosevenhours.

180. The FBI agents confiscated his USB drive that he hadwith him, and upon

informationandbelief,downloadedtheinformationfromhisUSBdrive.

181. Severaldayslater,FBIagents,includingSpecialAgentJoelKelso,appearedat

Mr.Ahmed’shome.

182. TheFBIagentstookhimtoanearbybd’sMongolianGrill,andattemptedto

recruitMr.AhmedintobecominganinformantinYemen.

37

183. TheFBIagentstriedtoenticeMr.Ahmed,whowasonly18yearsoldatthe

time, intobecomingan informantbyoffering to teachhimhowtoskydive,amongother

things.

184. SpecialAgentKelsoinformedMr.AhmedthathisnamewasontheNo‐FlyList,

andthatifhecooperated,hisnamewouldberemovedfromthelist.

185. OnApril29,2011,Mr.AhmedfiledacomplaintthroughDHSTRIP.

186. OnMay2,2011,Mr.Ahmed’sattorneyspokewithSpecialAgentKelsowho

informedheratthattimethattherewasnobasistoincludeMr.AhmedontheNo‐FlyList,

andthathewouldmakearrangementstoremovehisnamefromthefederalwatchlist.

187. OnMay10,2011,SpecialAgentKelsoinformedhisattorneythatMr.Ahmed’s

namewasremovedfromtheNo‐FlyList.

188. AsaresultofbeingaddedtotheNo‐FlyList,Mr.Ahmedwasunabletoapply

foremploymentattheairportwherehisbrotherwasemployedatthetimeuntilhisname

wasremovedfromtheNo‐FlyList.

189. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Ahmed’snamewasaddedtotheNo‐FlyList

inordertoleveragehisstatusonthefederalwatchlisttoputpressureonMr.Ahmedtoact

asaninformantinYemen.

190. Onorabout2015,Mr.Ahmed’sboardingpassesarenowstampedwith the

“SSSS” designation, indicating that he has been once again designated as a “known or


191. AtnotimewasMr.Ahmedgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

38

192. Moreover,atno timewasMr.Ahmedgivennoticeof thedeprivationofhis


193. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Ahmedremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

194. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Ahmed’snominationtothefederalwatchlist



PlaintiffGuletMohamed

195. On December 20, 2010, Mr. Gulet Mohamed arrived at the Kuwait

InternationalAirport to renewhisvisa, justashehaddoneevery threemonthssincehe

arrivedinKuwait.

196. Afteranabnormally longwaitofseveralhours,Mr.Mohamedcontactedhis

brotherinVirginiaviaemailtoinformhimthatthevisaprocesswastakinglongerthanusual.

ThisisthelastcommunicationanyonereceivedfromMr.Mohamedformorethanaweek.

197. Whileat theairport, twomen incivilianclothesapproachedMr.Mohamed,

handcuffed him, blindfolded him, escorted him to a waiting SUV, and drove him to an

undisclosedlocationapproximatelyfifteenminutesfromtheairport.

198. DuringMr.Mohamed’sabduction,hewasrepeatedlybeatenandsubjectedto

severetorturebyhisinterrogators.Mr.Mohamed’sinterrogatorsstruckhiminthefacewith

their hands regularly and in Mr. Mohamed’s estimate more than a hundred times. The

interrogatorswhippedhisfeetandforcedbyhisinterrogatorstostandforprolongedperiods

oftime.Atonepoint,theinterrogatorsthreatenedtoruncurrentsofelectricitythroughMr.

Mohamed’sgenitals.Inanotherinstance,Mr.Mohamed’sarmsweretiedtoaceilingbeam

andleftinthatpositionuntilhelostconsciousness.

39

199. Mr. Mohamed’s interrogators inflicted these beatings, torture, and grave

threatsontoMr.Mohamedformorethanaweek.Mr.Mohamedremainedblindfoldedand

handcuffedmostofthetime.

200. Thesubjectmatteroftheinterrogators’questioning—communicatedbyone

interrogatorinperfectAmericanEnglish—indicatesthatDefendantsUnknownTSCand/or

UnknownFBIAgentsnotonlyfacilitatedMr.Mohamed’sillegaldetention,interrogation,and

torturebutparticipateddirectly. TheEnglishspeaking interrogatoraskedMr.Mohamed

detailedquestionsabouthisAmericansiblings,referencingnon‐publicfactsregardinghis

family.Forexample,theinterrogatorknewtheeducationalattainmentofseveralsiblings,

theirnames,andindicatedthathewasawarethatMr.Mohamed’sfatherwasdeceased.

201. Furthermore,Mr.Mohamedwasaskedquestionsnotabouthisactionswithin

Kuwait but questions pertaining to individuals such as Anwar Al‐Awlaki of particular

interesttotheUnitedStates.It ishighlyimplausiblethatKuwaitiofficialswouldasksuch

questionsandtortureanAmericancitizen—inlightofthedependentrelationshipKuwait

maintainswiththeUnitedStates—withouttheknowledgeandapprovaloftheUnitedStates.

202. OnTuesday, December 28, 2010,Mr.Mohamed’s interrogators transferred

him to a deportation facility. In this facility, Mr. Mohamed was placed with individuals

awaiting deportation, receiving visits from family, and benefiting from the facility’s

reasonabletreatment.

203. At this deportation facility, Mr. Mohamed conversed with a prisoner who

covertlykeptamobilephoneinhiscell.Mr.Mohamedaskedtouseit,becausehisfamilystill

knewneitherwhathappenedtohimnorhispresentlocation.Mr.Mohamedmadeacallto

40

hisfamily,tellingthemwherehewasandwhathadhappenedtohim.Hespokewithand

retainedanattorneysoonafter.

204. KuwaitiofficialstoldmembersofMr.Mohamed’sfamilythattheyareholding

himatthebehestoftheUnitedStatesgovernmentandarewillingtoreleasehimsincethey

have no interest in keeping him in custody. Kuwaiti officials attempted to deport Mr.

MohamedbuttoldmembersofhisfamilythattheUnitedStateshasplacedhimontheNoFly

Listwhichispreventinghisdeportation.Mr.Mohamed’splacementontheNoFlyListwas

confirmedbytheUnitedStatesinconversationsreportedinthepress.

205. Also on December 28, 2010, FBI agents visited Mr. Mohamed. Once he

informedthemthathewasrepresentedby legalcounsel intheUnitedStatesanddidnot

wishtoanswertheirquestions,theFBIagentssuggestedthattheyhadsomecontroloverhis

detentionby tellingMr.Mohamedthat theycouldexpeditiouslyprocurehisrelease from

detention if Mr. Mohamed spoke to them. The agents told Mr. Mohamed that he would

remainindetentionindefinitelyifhedidnotspeaktothem.

206. OnoraboutJanuary12,2011,FBIagentsagainvisitedMr.Mohamed.Again,

Mr.Mohamed informed theagents that hewouldnot answer theirquestionswithout an

attorneypresent.TheFBIagentspersisted,askinghimquestionsforseveralhoursdespite

Mr.Mohamed’srepeatedentreatiesfortheinterrogationtostopandessentiallycontinuing

theinterrogationwhereMr.Mohamed’storturersstopped.TheFBIagentsthreatenedMr.

Mohamedwith future interrogations, criminal charges, and during the interrogation the

agentsphysicallyintimidatedMr.Mohamedbycrowdinghimandyelling.AKuwaitiofficial

intervenedtocalmtheFBIagentsdownandrequestthattheinterrogationbebroughttoan

end.

41

207. On January 16, 2010, at the direction of Kuwaiti officials, Mr. Mohamed’s

family purchased a ticket for him back to the United States and delivered that ticket to

Kuwaitiofficials.WhenKuwaitiofficials tookMr.Mohamed to theairporton January16,

2010,however,Mr.MohamedwasnotallowedontotheUnitedAirlinesflight.

208. AfterMr.Mohamedcommenceda legalaction(UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,

Eastern District of Virginia, Case No. 11‐cv‐00050 (2011)), Defendants allowed Mr.

MohamedtoreturntotheUnitedStatesonJanuary21,2011.

209. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Mohamed’snamewasaddedtotheNo‐Fly

ListinordertoleveragehisstatusonthefederalwatchlisttoputpressureonMr.Mohamed

toactasaninformantuponreturningtotheUnitedStates.

210. AtnotimewasMr.Mohamedgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

211. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Mohamedgivennoticeofthedeprivationofhis


212. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Mohamedremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

213. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Mohamed’snominationtothefederalwatch

listwasmadebasedsolelyuponahunch(baseduponhis race,ethnicity,nationalorigin,


PlaintiffAhmadIbrahimAlHalabi

214. EverytimeMr.AhmadAlHalabitravelsbyair,since2004,hisboardingpass

isstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“known

orsuspectedterrorist.”

42

215. Moreover,Mr.AlHalabi is frequentlyunable toboardhis flightsuntilhe is

“cleared”byDHStoboardtheflight,aprocessthatoftentimestakeshours.

216. Moreover, Mr. Al Halabi has missed his flights and incurred additional

expenses on multiple occasions after having been subjected to prolonged searches and

interrogations.

217. On June 25, 2014, Mr. Al Halabi was surrounded by armed CBP officers,

handcuffed in front of his children and detained in a freezing cold holding cell for

approximatelytwotothreehoursandinthewaitingareaforanotherthreetofourhoursat

theAmbassadorBridgeportofentryinDetroit,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐enterthe

UnitedStatesafterabriefvacationinCanada.

218. CBPofficersconfiscatedhisphone,anduponinformationandbelief,theCBP

officersdownloadedthedatafromhisphone.

219. Mr.AlHalabino longer travelsbyairnordoeshe travel toCanadaby land

unlessabsolutelynecessaryforbusinesspurposesinordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtothe

abovetreatment.

220. Mr.AlHalabifiledmultipleredressrequeststhroughDHSTRIP.

221. Mr.AlHalabireceivedmultiplelettersasdescribedinparagraph116above

andwasassignedmultipleRedressControlNumbers.

222. AtnotimewasMr.AlHalabigivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

223. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.AlHalabigivennoticeofthedeprivationofhis


43

224. Mr. Al Halabi’s boarding passes continue to be stamped with the “SSSS”

designationeverytimehetravelsbyair.

225. Additionally,everytimeMr.AlHalabitravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondary


226. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.AlHalabiremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

227. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.AlHalabi’snominationtothefederalwatch



PlaintiffMichaelEdmundColeman

228. On or about May 2, 2015, Mr. Michael Edmund Coleman appeared at the

DetroitMetropolitan Airport, in order to board a commercial flight for his trip to Doha

InternationalAirport.

229. Mr. Coleman was unable to check in online or at a kiosk stationed at the

airport.

230. Heapproachedanairlinerepresentativetobecheckedinmanually,andafter

speakingonthephonewithaDHSrepresentativetoobtainclearancebeforehecouldfly,his

boarding pass was stamped with the “SSSS” designation, indicating that he has been


231. During Mr. Coleman’s flight connection at the Philadelphia International

Airport,Mr.Colemanwasunabletoboardhisnextflightuntilhewasonceagain“cleared”by

DHStoboardtheflight.

232. Mr.ColemanfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

44

233. Asofthedateofthisfiling,Mr.ColemanhasnotreceivedaresponsefromDHS,

norhashebeenassignedaRedressControlNumber.

234. Mr. Coleman’s boarding passes continue to be stamped with the “SSSS”


235. Additionally,everytimeMr.Colemantravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondary

inspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearches,questioningandchemicaltesting.

236. Mr.Colemanisfrequentlyinterrogatedabouthisreligiousactivities.

237. AtnotimewasMr.Colemangivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

238. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Colemangivennoticeofthedeprivationofhis


239. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Colemanremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

240. Mr.Coleman limits travelsbyairandby land toCanadawhennecessary in

ordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatment.

241. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Coleman’snominationtothefederalwatch



PlaintiffWaelHakmeh

242. On or about April, 2014, Mr. Wael Hakmeh appeared at Chicago O’Hare

InternationalAirportuponreturningonaflightfromabusinesstripinTurkey.

243. He was referred to secondary screening and subjected to a prolonged

interrogation.

45

244. Additionally, tothebestofhisrecollection, in June,2014,hisboardingpass

wasstampedwiththe“SSSS”designationforthefirsttime,indicatingthathewasdesignated

asa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

245. OnoraboutOctober,2014,Mr.Hakmehappearedtohavebeenremovedfrom

thewatchlist,ashisboardingpassforhisflightwasnotstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation.

246. However, inJanuary,2016,Mr.Hakmeh’sboardingpasswasagainstamped

withthe“SSSS”designation.

247. AtnotimewasMr.Hakmehgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

248. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Hakmehgivennoticeofthedeprivationofhis


249. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Hakmehremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

250. Mr.HakmehnolongerconnectsthroughChicagoO’HareInternationalAirport

to DetroitMetropolitan Airportwhen returning home toMichigan from overseas travel.

Rather,Mr.HakmehdrivesfromChicagoO’HareInternationalAirportforapproximatelyfive

hourstohishomeinWayneCounty,Michiganeachtimeinordertoavoidbeingsubjectedto

theabovetreatmentatmultipleairportsandriskarrivinglatetohisplaceofemployment.

251. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Hakmeh’snominationtothefederalwatch



46

PlaintiffMuratFrljuckic

252. Onor aboutOctober, 2012,Mr.Murat Frljuckicwas referred to secondary

inspection,handcuffedanddetainedbyCBPattheborderstopattheBlueWaterBridgePort

ofEntryinPortHuron,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesaftera

briefvacationinCanada.

253. CBP officers subjected him to a prolonged detention and questioning for

approximatelythreetofourhours.

254. Similarly,onoraboutAugust,2014,Mr.Frljuckicwasreferredtosecondary

inspection,handcuffedanddetainedbyCBPattheborderstopattheBlueWaterBridgePort

ofEntryinPortHuron,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesaftera

briefvacationinMontenegro.

255. Moreover,everytimeMr.Frljuckictravelsbyair,sinceapproximatelyMarch

orApril,2012,hisboardingpassisstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathe

hasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

256. Mr.FrljuckicfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

257. Asofthedateofthisfiling,Mr.FrljuckichasnotreceivedaresponsefromDHS,

norhashebeenassignedaRedressControlNumber.

258. Mr. Frljuckic’s boarding passes continue to be stamped with the “SSSS”


259. Additionally,everytimeMr.Frljuckictravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondary


47

260. AtnotimewasMr.Frljuckicgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

261. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Frljuckicgivennoticeofthedeprivationofhis


262. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Frljuckicremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

263. Mr.FrljuckicnolongertravelsbyairnordoeshetraveltoCanadabylandin

ordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatment.

264. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Frljuckic’snominationtothefederalwatch



PlaintiffAdnanKhalilShaout

265. EverytimeMr.AdnanShaouttravelsbyair,since2004,hisboardingpassis

stampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownor


266. Mr.Shaoutisfrequentlyinterrogatedabouthisreligiousbeliefsandaffiliation

withreligiousgroupsduringsecondaryinspections.

267. Moreover, Mr. Shaout is frequently unable to board his flights until he is

“cleared”byDHStoboardtheflight,aprocessthatoftentimestakeshours.

268. Moreover,TSAagentsoftenconfiscatehislaptop,anduponinformationand

belief,downloadinformationfromhislaptop.

269. Onorabout,June23,2011,whileMr.Shaoutwassittingintheplanewaiting

for take‐off, despite having been thoroughly screened by TSA, TSA agents removed Mr.

48

Shaoutfromtheplaneandconductedanotherextensivepatdownandsearchofhispersonal

belongings.

270. TheentireflightwasdelayeduntiltheTSAagentscompletedthissearch.

271. Mr.ShaoutnolongertravelsbyairintheUnitedStatesinordertoavoidbeing

subjectedtotheabovetreatment.

272. Mr.ShaoutfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

273. OnNovember5,2015,Mr.Shaoutreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph

116aboveandwasassignedaRedressControlNumber.

274. Mr. Shaout’s boarding pass continues to be stamped with the “SSSS”



275. Additionally,everytimeMr.Shaouttravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondary


276. AtnotimewasMr.Shaoutgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

277. Moreover, atno timewasMr. Shaoutgivennoticeof thedeprivationofhis


278. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Shaoutremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

279. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Shaout’snominationtothefederalwatchlist



49

280. Mr.Shaoutno longertravelsbyair inordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtothe

abovetreatment.

PlaintiffSaleemAli

281. On or about October, 2015, Mr. Saleem Ali was referred to secondary

inspection and detained by CBP at the border stop at the Ambassador Bridge, Detroit,

Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabriefvacationinCanada.

282. CBPofficersconfiscatedhistwophones,askedhimforhispasswordstoaccess

thetwophones,anduponinformationandbelief,theCBPofficersdownloadedthedatafrom

hisphones.

283. CBPofficerskepthisphonesanddidnotreturnthemuntilthefollowingday.

284. Moreover,everytimeMr.Alitravelsbyair,hisboardingpassisstampedwith

the “SSSS”designation, indicating thathehasbeendesignatedas a “knownor suspected

terrorist.”

285. Additionally, every timeMr. Ali travels by air, he is referred to secondary


286. Mr.AlifiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

287. Mr.Alireceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph116aboveandwasassigned

aRedressControlNumber.

288. AtnotimewasMr.Aligivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthe

federalwatch list,andatno timewasheofferedameaningfulopportunity tocontesthis

designation.

289. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Aligivennoticeofthedeprivationofhisliberty

interestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

50

290. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Aliremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

291. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Ali’snominationtothefederalwatchlistwas

madebasedsolelyuponahunch(baseduponhisrace,ethnicity,nationalorigin,religious

affiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffShahirAnwar

292. Mr.ShahirAnwaristhebrotherofPlaintiffMr.SamirAnwar.

293. EverytimeMr.Anwartravelsbyair,since2014,hisboardingpassisstamped

withthe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspected

terrorist.”

294. Additionally,everytimeMr.Anwartravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondary


295. Mr.AnwarfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

296. OnMarch23,2015,Mr.Anwarreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph116


297. Mr. Anwar’s boarding passes continue to be stamped with the “SSSS”


298. AtnotimewasMr.Anwargivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

299. Moreover, at no timewasMr.Anwar givennotice of thedeprivationof his


300. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Anwarremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

51

301. Mr.Anwarno longer travelsbyairnordoeshe travel toCanadaby land in

ordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatmentorthetreatmentexperiencedbyhis

brother,PlaintiffSamirAnwar,describedbelow.

302. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Anwar’snominationtothefederalwatchlist


religiousaffiliation,familialstatusorFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffSamirAnwar

303. Mr.SamirAnwaristhebrotherofPlaintiffMr.ShahirAnwar.

304. EverytimeMr.Anwartravelsbyair,hisboardingpass isstampedwiththe

“SSSS” designation, indicating that he has been designated as a “known or suspected

terrorist.”

305. Mr.AnwarfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

306. OnAugust7,2014,Mr.Anwarreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph116


307. On or about February 22, 2015, Mr. Anwar was referred to secondary

inspectionanddetainedbyCBPattheborderstopattheBlueWaterBridgePortofEntryin

PortHuron,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabrieftripto

Canada.

308. Mr.AnwarhandedaCBPofficertheletterfromDHS,howevertheCBPofficer

responded that the letter does notmean anything and does not have any impact on the

situation.

52

309. CBPofficersconfiscatedhisphone,askedhimforhispasswordtoaccessthe

phone, and upon information and belief, the CBP officers downloaded the data from his

phone.

310. Moreover, Mr. Anwar was interrogated about his religious beliefs and

religiousaffiliations.

311. Mr. Anwar’s boarding pass continues to be stamped with the “SSSS”



312. Additionally,everytimeMr.Anwartravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondary


313. AtnotimewasMr.Anwargivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

314. Moreover, at no timewasMr.Anwar givennotice of thedeprivationof his


315. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Anwarremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

316. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Anwar’snominationtothefederalwatchlist


religiousaffiliation,familialstatusorFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffMariamJukaku

317. On or about March 21, 2012, Ms. Mariam Jukaku appeared at the Detroit

MetropolitanAirportinordertoboardacommercialflighttoCalifornia.

318. Ms.Jukakuwasunabletocheckinonline.

53

319. Sheapproachedanairlinerepresentativetobecheckedinmanually.

320. Herboardingpasswasstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthat

shehadbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

321. Whilepassingthroughsecurity,shewassubjectedtoextensivesearches,pat

downsandchemicaltesting.

322. Ms.JukakufiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

323. Ms.JukakualsofiledaCivilRights/CivilLibertiesComplaintwiththeOfficeof

CivilRightsandLibertiesoftheTransportationSecurityAdministration.

324. Ms. Jukaku received a letter asdescribed inparagraph116 aboveandwas

assignedaRedressControlNumber.

325. AtnotimewasMs.Jukakugivennoticeofthefactualbasisforherplacement

onthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewassheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontest

herdesignation.

326. Moreover, atno timewasMs. Jukakugivennoticeof thedeprivationofhis


327. Uponinformationandbelief,Ms.Jukakuisnolongerdesignatedonthefederal

watchlist.

328. Uponinformationandbelief,Ms.Jukaku’snominationtothefederalwatchlist

was made based solely upon a hunch (based upon her race, ethnicity, national origin,


54

PlaintiffMuhamadHaydar

329. On or about June 23, 2012, Mr. Muhamad Haydar appeared at the MBS

InternationalAirportinFreeland,Michigan,inordertoboardacommercialflighttoCalgary

InternationalAirportinAlberta,Canada.

330. Mr.Haydarwasunabletocheckinatakioskstationedattheairport.

331. Heapproachedanairlinerepresentativetobecheckedinmanually,andafter

speakingonthephonewithaDHSrepresentativeforovertwohours,hisboardingpasswas



332. During Mr. Haydar’s flight connection at the Seattle‐Tacoma International

Airport,Mr.Haydarwasunabletoboardhisnextflightuntilhewasonceagain“cleared”by

DHStoboardtheflight.

333. Mr.HaydarfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

334. OnJune10,2013,Mr.Haydarreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph116


335. AtnotimewasMr.Haydargivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

336. Moreover,atno timewasMr.Haydargivennoticeof thedeprivationofhis


337. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Haydarisnolongerdesignatedonthefederal

watchlist.

55

338. Moreover,asofthisdate,Mr.HaydarisamemberoftheDHSTrustedTraveler

Program.

339. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Haydar’snominationtothefederalwatchlist



PlaintiffJohnDoeNo.1

340. OnoraboutJanuary,2015,Mr.JohnDoeNo.1’sboardingpassisstampedwith

the “SSSS”designation, indicating thathehasbeendesignatedas a “knownor suspected

terrorist.”

341. Additionally, every time Mr. Doe No. 1 returns to the United States from

internationaltravel,Mr.Doeissubjectedtoprolongeddetentionandquestioning.

342. Suddenly,shortlyafterMr.DoeNo.1wasdesignatedonthefederalwatchlist,

many of his individual and business bank accounts were closed without notice or an

explanationofthereasonswhytheywerebeingclosed,includingbankaccountsatJPMorgan

ChaseBank,TCFBankandPNCBank.


stigmatizinglabelof“knownorsuspectedterrorist”attachedtoMr.DoeNo.1toJPMorgan

ChaseBank,TCFBankandPNCBank,andasaresult,hisbankaccountswereclosedwithout

notice.

344. Mr.DoeNo.1filedaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.

345. Asofthedateofthisfiling,Mr.DoeNo.1hasnotreceivedaresponsefrom

DHS,norhashebeenassignedaRedressControlNumber.

56

346. AtnotimewasMr.DoeNo.1givennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


hisdesignation.

347. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.DoeNo.1givennoticeofthedeprivationofhis


348. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.DoeNo.1remainsonthefederalwatchlist.

349. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.DoeNo.1’snominationtothefederalwatch




350. On or about May, 2010, Mr. John Doe No. 2 appeared at the Detroit

MetropolitanAirportuponreturningonaflightfromatriptoTurkey.

351. He was referred to secondary screening and subjected to a prolonged

interrogation.

352. Duringhisinterrogation,CBPofficersbeganlookingthroughpicturesonMr.

DoeNo.2’slaptopandaskedhimquestionsabouthisplaceofworship,thereligiousleader

athismosque,whetherMr.DoeNo.2knewanyonewhowasinvolvedinterroristactivities,

andwhetherhehadinformationaboutothercongregantsathisplaceofworship.

353. EverytimeMr.DoeNo.2travelsbyair,sincehisMay,2010trip,hisboarding

pass is stampedwith the “SSSS”designation, indicating thathehasbeendesignatedasa

“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

354. Additionally, every time Mr. Doe No. 2 travels by air, he is referred to

secondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

57


356. OnJanuary19,2016,Mr.DoeNo.2receivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph

116aboveandwasassignedaRedressControlNumber.



hisdesignation.



359. Asofthedateofthisfiling,itisunclearwhetherMr.DoeNo.2remainsonthe

federalwatchlist.





361. EverytimeMr.JohnDoeNo.3travelsbyair,since2002,hisboardingpassis



362. Infact,in2002,uponreturningfromaninternationalflight,Mr.DoeNo.3was

escortedoffoftheplanebyFBIagents,beforehewasinterrogatedandthreatenedbyagents

fromdifferentgovernmentagencies.

363. Mr.DoeNo.3isfrequentlyunabletoboardhisflightsuntilheis“cleared”by

DHStoboardtheflight,aprocessthatcantakehours.

58

364. Moreover,Mr.DoeNo. 3 is frequently called over the loud speakers at the

airportafterhehasalreadyreachedthegatepriortotakeofftogobacktosecurity,onlyto

bedetainedandsubjectedtofurtherprolongedinterrogationsandsearches.

365. Additionally,TSAagentsconfiscatedhisphones,requestedhispasswords,and

uponinformationandbelief,downloadedinformationfromthem.

366. Onorabout2006,Mr.DoeNo.3’sJPMorganChaseBankwassuddenlyclosed

a fewdaysafterheopeneditwithoutnoticeoranexplanationofthereasonswhyitwas

beingclosed.


stigmatizinglabelof“knownorsuspectedterrorist”attachedtoMr.DoeNo.3toJPMorgan

ChaseBank,andasaresult,hisbankaccountwasclosedwithoutnotice.

368. Mr.DoeNo. 3 lost lucrative employmentopportunities as a result of being



370. Asofthedateofthisfiling,Mr.DoeNo.3hasnotreceivedaresponsefrom

DHS,norhashebeenassignedaRedressControlNumber.



hisdesignation.



373. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.DoeNo.3remainsonthefederalwatchlist.

59




375. Mr.DoeNo. 3 limits travels by airwhennecessary in order to avoidbeing

subjectedtotheabovetreatment.

ClassActionAllegations

376. PlaintiffsbringthisclassactionagainsttheDefendantspursuanttoFed.R.Civ.

P.23,onbehalfof:

a. All American citizens who are currently placed on the No Fly List

componentof the federalwatch list,whosenameswereaddedprior to

April,2015;

b. All American citizens who are currently placed on the Selectee List

componentofthefederalwatchlist;

c. AllAmericancitizenswhowereplacedontheNoFlyListcomponentof

thefederalwatchlistpriortoApril,2015,whoarenolongerplacedonthe

federalwatchlist,andwhofallwithintheapplicablestatuteoflimitations;

d. AllAmericancitizenswhowereplacedontheSelecteeListcomponentof

thefederalwatchlist,whoarenolongerplacedonthefederalwatchlist,

andwhofallwithintheapplicablestatuteoflimitations;

e. AllAmericancitizenminorswhowereplacedon the federalwatch list

whiletheywereundertheageoftenatthetimeoftheplacement;

f. ExcludedfromtheClassareallpersonswhowereplacedontheNoFly

ListcomponentofthefederalwatchlistafterApril,2015;and,

60

g. ExcludedfromtheClassareallpersonswhoarecurrentlyplacedonthe

federalwatch listwhohave been charged or convicted of a terrorism‐

relatedoffense.

377. Themembers of the Class are so numerous that joinder of allmembers is

impracticable.WhiletheexactnumberofClassmembersisunknownatthepresenttime,it

isestimatedthattherearethousandsuponthousandsofmembersintheClass.

378. DespitethenumericalsizeoftheClass,theidentitiesoftheClassmemberscan

beascertainedthroughDefendants’records.Plaintiffsandtheircounseldonotanticipate

anydifficultiesinthemanagementofthisactionasaclassaction.

379. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class.

Plaintiffsarecommittedtovigorouslyprosecutethisactionandhaveretainedcompetent

counsel experienced in class action litigation. Plaintiffs are Classmembers and have no

interestsantagonistictoorinconflictwithotherClassmembers.Plaintiffsarerepresented

bylawyerswhohavehadexperienceinprosecutingclassactionsandcomplexcivilrights

andconstitutionalmatters,andwilladequatelyrepresentthepurportedClassinthisaction.

380. Additionally,oneofthelawyers,GadeirAbbas,Esq.,hasobtainedasecurity

clearancewhichallowshimtohandleandutilizeSensitiveSecurityInformationdesignated

assuchbythefederalgovernmentandwhichheobtainedinfurtheranceoffederalwatchlist

litigationbeforethiscourt.

381. Thisactionraisesnumerousquestionsoflawandfactwhicharecommonto

theClassmembers,including:

a. WhetherDefendants’ actionsviolated constitutionallyprotected liberty

interestsbyplacingAmericancitizenslikePlaintiffsandmembersofthe

61

Classonthefederalwatchlistanddenyingthemnoticeoftheirinclusion

onthefederalwatchlist,evenafterDefendantsimposedthedeprivation;

b. Whether Defendants’ actions violated the liberty interest of American

citizens like Plaintiffs andmembers of the Class in traveling free from

unreasonableburdenswithin,to,andfromtheUnitedStates,throughland

bordercrossingsandoverU.S.airspace;

c. WhetherDefendants’actionsviolatedtherightofAmericancitizenslike

Plaintiffs andmembers of the Class to be free from false government

stigmatization as individuals who are “known or suspected to be”

terrorists,orwhoareotherwiseassociatedwithterroristactivity,when

such harm arises in conjunctionwith the deprivation of their right to

travelonthesametermsasothertravelersand/orthedeprivationoftheir

liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment in travel free from

unreasonableburdensthatarenotnarrowlytailored;

d. Whether Defendants’ actions violated the liberty interest of American

citizenslikePlaintiffsandmembersoftheClassinnonattainder(ie:the

interest against being singled out for punishment without trial).

Defendants’actionshavesingledoutPlaintiffsandmembersoftheClass

forpunishmentsthatinclude,butarenotlimitedto,inabilitytotravelby

airandunreasonableburdensplacedupontravelingbyairtoandfrom

theUnitedStates,overU.S.airspaceandat landbordercrossings,and

falseassociationwithalistofindividualsconnectedtoterrorism;

62

e. WhetherDefendants’actionsviolatedtherightsofAmericancitizenslike

Plaintiffs andmembers of the Class by being denied a constitutionally

adequatelegalmechanismthataffordsanynoticeatalloftheirinclusion

onthefederalwatchlist;

f. WhetherDefendants’actionsviolatedtherightsofAmericancitizenslike

Plaintiffsandmembersof theClass tobefree fromfalsestigmatization

when theydisseminated the stigmatizing labelof “knownor suspected

terrorists” to state and local authorities, foreign governments,

corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers, thecaptainsofsea‐faring

vessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals;

g. WhetherDefendants’actionsviolatedtherightofAmericancitizenslike

Plaintiffs and members of the Class not to be treated as second‐class

citizens;

h. WhetherDefendants’watchlistlacksacompellinginterestoralegitimate

or public purpose insofar as their true purpose is to provide law

enforcement with a tool to coerce American Muslims into becoming

informants;

i. WhetherDefendants’watch list is not narrowly tailored insofar as the

federalwatch list is entirely anddemonstrably ineffectual andobvious

alternativesexist;

j. WhetherDefendants’disseminationofthestigmatizinglabelof“knownor

suspectedterrorists”tostateandlocalauthorities,foreigngovernments,

corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers, thecaptainsofsea‐faring

63

vessels, among other official and private entities and individuals is

arbitraryandcapricious,shockstheconscience,violatesthedecenciesof

civilizedconductandissobrutalandoffensivethatitdoesnotcomport

withthetraditionalideasoffairplayanddecency;

k. WhetherDefendants’placementofPlaintiffsandmembersoftheClassis

narrowlytailoredtoachieveanycompellinggovernmentinterest;

l. WhetherDefendantshaveviolatedtheconstitutionalrightsofPlaintiffs

andmembersoftheClassbydenyingthemdueprocessoflaw;

m. WhetherDefendantsactionshavehadadiscriminatoryeffectuponand

havedisparatelyimpactedMuslimAmericantravelers,andnottravelers

ofotherfaiths;

n. Whether Defendants’ above‐described actions were motivated by

Plaintiffs’religiousstatusandonthebasisofPlaintiffs’constitutionally‐

protectedfreeexerciseofreligion;

o. WhethertheClassisentitledtodamages;

p. WhetherDefendants’whocontributedtotheplacementofPlaintiffsand

membersoftheClassareliable;and,

q. ThepersedamagesamountthateachPlaintiffandmembersoftheClass

areentitled to forbeing inflictedwith thesame injury: inclusion in the

TerroristScreeningDatabase.

382. Theclaimsordefensesoftherepresentedpartiesaretypicaloftheclaimsor

defenses of the Class. Plaintiffs have the same interests as other Class members in

64

prosecutingtheclaimsagainsttheDefendants.PlaintiffsandallthemembersoftheClass

sustaineddamagesasaresultofDefendants’wrongfulconduct.

383. Aclassactionissuperiortootheravailablemethodsforthefairandefficient

adjudicationofthiscontroversy.Commonissuespredominate.Furthermore,theexpense

andburdenof individual litigationsmakeitextraordinarilydifficult forClassmembersto

redressthewrongsdonetothemindividually.

COUNTIFAILURETOPROVIDEPOST‐DEPRIVATIONNOTICEANDHEARINGINVIOLATIONOF

THEFIFTHAMENDMENTRIGHTTOPROCEDURALDUEPROCESS(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)

384. Theforegoingallegationsarereallegedandincorporatedherein.

385. EachofthePlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenslearned

thatheorshewasplacedonthefederalwatchlistsubsequenttobeingaddedonthefederal

watchlistandsoughttochallengesuchplacement.

386. Defendants’actionsasdescribedabove inrefusingtoprovidePlaintiffsand

othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswithanynoticeatallof theirplacementwhich

deprived Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens of constitutionally

protectedlibertyinterests.

387. Defendants’ actions in nominating Plaintiffs and other similarly situated

American citizens to the federal watch list blatantly violate the requirement that

“’nominations’ must not be solely based on race, ethnicity, national origin, religious

affiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities.”49U.S.C.§114(h)(3).

65

388. PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenshavealibertyinterest

intravelingfreefromunreasonableburdensthatarenotreasonablytailoredwithin,to,and

fromtheUnitedStates,throughlandbordercrossingsandoverU.S.airspace.

389. PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenshavearighttobefree

fromfalsegovernmentstigmatizationas individualswhoare“knownorsuspectedtobe”

terrorists,orwhoareotherwiseassociatedwithterroristactivity,whensuchharmarisesin

conjunctionwiththeadditionalconsequencesthat followfrombeing listedaswellasthe

deprivation of their right to travel on the same terms as other travelers and/or the

deprivation of their liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment in travel free from

unreasonableburdens.

390. PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenshavealibertyinterest

innonattainder (ie: the interestagainstbeingsingledout forpunishmentwithout trial).

Defendants’actionshavesingledoutPlaintiffsandotherssimilarlysituatedforpunishments

thatinclude,butarenotlimitedto,inabilitytotravelbyairandunreasonableburdensplaced

upontravelingbyairtoandfromtheUnitedStates,overU.S.airspaceandatlandborder

crossings,andfalseassociationwithalistofindividualssuspectedofterrorism.

391. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens, having been

burdenedorpreventedfromboardingoncommercialflightsorenteringtheUnitedStatesat

landbordercrossings,havinghadtheirbankaccountsclosed,havingbeenpreventedfrom

making wire transfers at financial institutions, having had their citizenship applications

delayed indefinitely due to an “FBI name check,” having lost lucrative economic

opportunities and suffering from other forms of financial harm, and having sought to

challenge their placement on the federal watch list, are entitled to a constitutionally

66

adequate legal mechanism that affords them notice of the reasons and bases for their

placementonthefederalwatchlistandameaningfulopportunitytocontesttheircontinued

inclusiononthefederalwatchlist.Defendantshaveevenfailedtoprovidethemostbasic

ingredientofdueprocess,whichisnoticethatthegovernmenthasdeprivedapersonoftheir

protectedrights.

392. Moreover,DefendantshaveofficiallyimposedonPlaintiffsandothersimilarly

situatedAmericancitizensthestigmatizinglabelof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”without

aconstitutionallyadequatelegalmechanism.

393. Further,DefendantsdisseminatedthestigmatizinglabelattachedtoPlaintiffs

andothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”tostate

andlocalauthorities,foreigngovernments,corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,the

captainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals.

394. ByimposingonPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensthe

stigmatizinglabelof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”andbyfailingtoprovidePlaintiffsand

otherssimilarlysituatedwithaconstitutionallyadequatelegalmechanism,Defendantshave

deprivedPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensoftheirprotectedliberty

interests,includingbutnotlimitedtotheirlibertyinterestsintraveling,freedomfromfalse

stigmatization,andnonattainder,andthusviolatedtheconstitutionalrightsofPlaintiffsand

othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswithoutaffordingthemdueprocessof lawand

will continue to do so into the future if Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American

citizensarenotaffordedthereliefdemandedbelow.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the putative classmembers,

respectfullydemandthattheClassbecertified,thatjudgmentbeenteredagainstDefendants

67

forsuchamountsaswillfairlyandreasonablycompensatePlaintiffsandtheClassfortheir

compensatorydamagesasmaybeproven,atrialbyjury,plusallsuchotherreliefthisCourt

deemsjustandproperincludingcostsandattorneys’feesincurredinthisaction.

COUNTIIDEPRIVATIONOFPROTECTEDLIBERTIESINVIOLATIONOFFIFTHAMENDMENT

RIGHTTOSUBSTANTIVEDUEPROCESS(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)


396. BecausePlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswerelisted

by Defendants in a manner not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, Defendants’

actions as described above in including Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American

citizens on a watch list that unreasonably burdens or prevents them from boarding

commercialflightsorenteringtheUnitedStatesatlandbordercrossings,arearbitraryand

capricious,lackevenarationalrelationshiptoanylegitimategovernmentinterest,andhave

unduly deprived Plaintiffs of constitutionally protected rights, including their liberty

interestsintravel,freedomfromfalsestigmatization,andnonattainder.





398. By placing Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens on the

federalwatchlist,Defendantshaveplacedanundueburdenontheirfundamentalrightof

movement.

68

399. By placing Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens on the

federalwatchlist,DefendantshavetreatedPlaintiffslikesecond‐classcitizens.

400. Defendants’watchlistlacksacompellinginterestinsofarastheirtruepurpose

is to provide law enforcement with a tool to coerce American Muslims into becoming

informants.

401. Defendants’watch list are alsonotnarrowly tailored insofar as the federal

watchlistareentirelyanddemonstrablyineffectualandobviousalternativesexist.

402. Defendants’actionsinplacingPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican

citizensonthefederalwatchlist,officiallyimposingonPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituated

American citizens the stigmatizing label of “known or suspected terrorists,” and

disseminating the stigmatizing label to state and local authorities, foreign governments,


official and private entities and individuals, without a constitutionally adequate legal

mechanism, are arbitrary and capricious, shock the conscience, violate the decencies of

civilized conduct and are so brutal and offensive that they do not comport with the

traditionalideasoffairplayanddecency.

403. Because Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens have not

been charged with any crimes and are United States Citizens, Plaintiffs challenge their

placementandtheplacementofotherssimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederal

watchlistonabroad,as‐appliedbasis.

404. Plaintiffs’ substantive due process challenge is also facial, as there are no

circumstanceswheretheirplacementortheplacementofotherssimilarlysituatedonthe

federalwatchlistisnarrowlytailoredtoachieveanycompellinggovernmentinterest.

69

405. Defendants have thus violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the

constitutional rightsofothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswithoutaffording them

dueprocessoflawandwillcontinuetodosointothefutureifPlaintiffsandothersimilarly

situatedAmericancitizensarenotaffordedthereliefdemandedbelow.






COUNTIIIUNLAWFULAGENCYACTIONINVIOLATIONOFTHEADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURE

ACT,5U.S.C.§§702,706(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)


407. Defendants’actionsinplacingPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican

citizensonthefederalwatchlist,officiallyimposingonPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituated

American citizens the stigmatizing label of “known or suspected terrorists,” and

disseminating the stigmatizing label to state and local authorities, foreign governments,


official and private entities and individuals, without a constitutionally adequate legal

mechanism,were and are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, otherwise not in

accordancewithlaw,andcontrarytoconstitutionalrights,power,privilege,orimmunity,

andshouldbesetasideasunlawfulpursuantto5U.S.C.§706.

70





409. Defendants’failuretoprovidePlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican

citizens,whohadbeenunreasonablyburdenedordeniedboardingoncommercialflightsor

enteringtheUnitedStatesacrosstheborderandsoughttochallengetheirplacementonthe

federalwatchlist,withaconstitutionallyadequatemechanismthataffordsthemnoticeof

the reasons and bases for their placement on the federal watch list and a meaningful

opportunity to contest their continued inclusion on the federal watch list is arbitrary,

capricious,anabuseofdiscretion,otherwisenot inaccordancewith law,andcontrary to

constitutional rights, power, privilege, or immunity, and should be set aside as unlawful

pursuantto5U.S.C.§706.

410. Because Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens do not

presentasecuritythreattocommercialaviation,Defendants’actionsasdescribedabovein

includingPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatchlist

thatunreasonablyburdensorpreventsthemfromboardingcommercialflightsorentering

the United States across the border, are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

otherwisenotinaccordancewithlaw,andcontrarytoconstitutionalrights,power,privilege,

orimmunity,andshouldbesetasideasunlawfulpursuantto5U.S.C.§706.

411. PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensarenotrequiredto

exhausttheDHSTRIPprocess,undertheholdinginDarbyv.Cisneros,509U.S.137(1993).

71

SeeUnitedStatesDistrictCourt,EasternDistrictofVirginia,CaseNo.11‐cv‐00050(2011);

Dkt.70at22;attachedasMemorandumOpinion(Exhibit4).






COUNTIVVIOLATIONOFTHEUNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION

(Non‐Delegation)


413. CongresshasnotprovidedtheExecutiveBranchwith intelligibleprinciples

fromwhichtheExecutivecanimplementitswatchlistschemesregardingcivilaviationand

nationalsecurity.

414. The Executive Branch’s assignment of the watch listing function to TSC

violatesCongress’directivethatTSAdeterminewhobelongsonfederalwatchlistsandthe

consequencesthatflowfrombeingonthoselists.

415. CongresshasnotdelegatedtoTSAtheauthoritytocreateaprocessthatcan

culminateintheremovalofindividualsfromtheTSDB.

416. Inthealternative,Congress’sdelegationtoTSAtocreatearedressprocessis

defectivebecausetheExecutiveBranchhasallocatedwatchlistauthorityinamannerthat

preventsTSAfromcreatingaredressprocess.

417. Asaresult,Defendantshaveillegallyactedbeyondtheirauthority.

72






PrayerforRelief

WHEREFORE,Plaintiffsrespectfullyrequest:

1. TheClassbecertified;

2. ThatjudgmentbeenteredagainstDefendantsforsuchamountsaswillfairlyand

reasonablycompensatePlaintiffsandtheClassfortheircompensatorydamages

asmaybeproven;

3. Atrialbyjury;

4. Anawardofattorneys’fees,costs,andexpensesofalllitigation,pursuantto28

U.S.C.§2412;and,

5. SuchotherandfurtherreliefastheCourtmaydeemjustandproper.

73

JURYDEMAND

NOWCOMEPlaintiffs,forthemselvesandonbehalfofallotherssimilarlysituated,by

and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby demand trial by jury of the above‐

referencedcausesofaction.

Respectfullysubmitted,

THELAWOFFICEOFGADEIRABBASBY:/s/GadeirAbbasGADEIRI.ABBASAttorneyforPlaintiffs1155FStreetNW,Suite1050Washington,D.C.20004Telephone:(720)251‐0425Fax:(720)251‐0425Email:[email protected],notinD.C.PracticelimitedtofederalmattersCOUNCILONAMERICAN‐ISLAMICRELATIONS,MICHIGANBY: /s/LenaMasriLENAF.MASRI(P73461)AttorneyforPlaintiffsLegalDirector30201OrchardLakeRd.,Suite260FarmingtonHills,MI48334Phone:(248)559‐2247AKEEL&VALENTINE,PLLCBY: /s/ShereefAkeelSHEREEFH.AKEEL(P54345)AttorneyforPlaintiffs888W.BigBeaverRd.,Ste.910Troy,MI48084Phone:(248)269‐[email protected]

Dated:April5,2016

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