unilat & hard power good 06-07

8/3/2019 Unilat & Hard Power Good 06-07

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Bing Debate 06-07 IndeMatt Malia

Unilateralism & Hard Power Good

Uniqueness: No Multilat Now.....................................................................................................................................US Is Winning War In Iraq..........................................................................................................................................Unilat Key to Peace.....................................................................................................................................................

AT Multilat Key to Peace............................................................................................................................................Multilat Kills Heg **Arms Sales**.............................................................................................................................Arms Sales Impact Extension......................................................................................................................................Arms Sales Extension AT Small Arms Balance Peace............................................................................................Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Bolton**................................................................................................................1Bolton Extension EU Link.......................................................................................................................................1Bolton Extension Exceptionalism Key....................................................................................................................1Bolton Extension Snowballs....................................................................................................................................1Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Cumbersome**......................................................................................................1Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (1 of 3)................................................................................1Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (2 of 3)................................................................................1

Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (3 of 3)................................................................................1Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Public Support/Isolationism**..............................................................................1**Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (1 of 2)**......................................................................1**Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (2 of 2)**......................................................................2AT Anti-Terror Cooperation Key...............................................................................................................................2AT China Relations DA..............................................................................................................................................2AT Dont Need Hard Power to Stop Terror...............................................................................................................2AT EU Relations DA..................................................................................................................................................2AT Fiscal Overstretch (1 of 2)....................................................................................................................................2AT Fiscal Overstretch (2 of 2)....................................................................................................................................2AT Force Overstretch.................................................................................................................................................2AT Multilat Prevents Terror/Anti-Americanism........................................................................................................2AT Should Cede to Europe/Legitimacy Good............................................................................................................2Hard Power Key to Econ............................................................................................................................................3Hard Power Key to Effective Multilat........................................................................................................................3Hard Power Key to Peace (1 of 2)..............................................................................................................................3Hard Power Key to Peace (2 of 2)..............................................................................................................................3Hard Power Key to Soft Power..................................................................................................................................3**Hard Power Is All That Matters (Soft Power Useless)**.......................................................................................3AT Soft Power Key to Bases......................................................................................................................................3AT Soft Power Prevents Terrorism............................................................................................................................3AT Solf Power Solves NoKo......................................................................................................................................3**Cant Solve Soft Power Anyway (1 of 2)**...........................................................................................................3**Cant Solve Soft Power Anyway (2 of 2)**...........................................................................................................4Preemption Prevents Prolif/Terror..............................................................................................................................4Prolif Impact Extension..............................................................................................................................................4AT Preemption Will Snowball into Bigger Wars.......................................................................................................4Treaty Exceptionalism Key to Heg.............................................................................................................................4UN Bad (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................4UN Bad (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................4Tax Cuts Trade-Off With Bush Doctrine...................................................................................................................4


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Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard PoweGoo

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Uniqueness: No Multilat Now

(__) Bush administration is firmly committed to the Bush Doctrine recent rhetoric proves.

Philip H. Gordon, Aug 2006, senior fellow @ Brookings, The End of the Bush Revolution, Foreign Affairs 84.4, p proquest

Reading over President George W. Bush's March 2006 National Security Strategy, one would be hard-pressed to find much evidence thathe president has backed away from what has become known as the Bush doctrine. "America is at war," says the document; we will "figour enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country" and "support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture,"with the ultimate goal of "ending tyranny in our world."

Talk to any senior administration official, and he or she will tell you that the president is as committed as ever to the "revolutionary" foreignpolicyprinciples he spelled out after 9/11: the United States is fighting a war on terror and must remain on the offensive and ready to actalone, U.S. power is the foundation of global order, and the spread of democracy and freedom is the key to a safer and morepeaceful world.Bush reiterated such thinking in his 2006 State of the Union address, insisting that the U.S. will "act boldly in freedom's cause" and "never surrender to evi

(__) The US has broken from multilateral constrains and international law.

DavidHenrickson

, Summer 2005

, prof @ Colorado College & leading member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, TheCurious Case of American Hegemony, World Policy Journal 22.2, p http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj05-2/hendrickson.html#author

The administration also argued that democratic government and the liberal ideals with which it was associated were of universal validity and that the United States has aright, perhaps even in some cases a duty, to impose such a government by force against tyrants. Though the administration insisted that the Iraq war was launched to

safeguard American security, it was also continually represented as a noble cause. Never in history, proponents said, had so many been freed at so little cost. Bush alsobroke dramatically from the constraints of multilateral organizations, insisting that no foreign government could control the decisions of the United Statein matters of war and peace. After it became apparent that the United States could probably get only 4 votes (out of 15) in the U.N. Security Council to approve the use of

force against Iraq, one administration official said, "We will want to make sure that the United States never gets caught again in a diplomatic chopoint in the Security Council or in NATO." (10) In keeping with this attitude, the administration had previously withdrawn from or scuttled a range ofinternational treaties, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. And why not? As John

Bolton, the fox whom Bush nominated in 2005 to guard the U.N. henhouse, observed in 1999, "It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to internationalaw even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do sobecause, over the long term, the goal of those who think that internation

law really means anything are those who want to constrict the United States." (11)

(__) Bush administration is ideologically opposed to multilateralism.

George Soros, 2004, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY, pp. 82

That is not how the Bush administration sees America's role in the world. It has a visceral aversion to all multilateral arrangements. Itbelieves that international relations are purely relations of power, not law, and since America is the most powerful nation, multilateraltreaties and institutions impose undue limitations on the exercise of American power. The only form of cooperation the Bushadministration can live wit h is one in which the United States decides and others follow. This attitude has led to the Bush doctrine.

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http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj05-2/hendrickson.html#authorhttp://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj05-2/hendrickson.html#author


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US Is Winning War In Iraq

(__) The US is over-whelming winning the war in Iraq the insurgency poses no real threat to the establishment olegitimate government that the US has pursued.

Frederick W. Kagan, 8-8-2005, resident scholar @ American Enterprise Institute, Stay the Course, Mr. President, LA Times, p L/N

Despite what you may have read, the military situation in Iraq today is positive--far better than it ever was when we were fighting guerrillas inVietnam, or when the Soviets were fighting the Afghan mujahedin, or in almost any other major insurgency of the 20th century.With few exceptions, the insurgents in Iraq are not able to undertake militarily meaningful attacks on U.S. troops. They cannot preventU.S. forces from moving wherever they want in the country nor can they keep U.S. forces from carrying out the operations they choose pursue aggressively. This situation contrasts markedly with both the Vietnam and Soviet-Afghan wars, in which insurgents actually besieged U.S. forces at Khe Sanhand isolated a large Soviet garrison at Khost for nearly the entire conflict, among other incidents.

Yes, the Iraqi insurgents have inflicted a steady stream of casualties on U.S. troops with improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, and car bombs, but they are notable to hold ground or attack prepared U.S. forces and fight them toe-to-toe as the North Vietnamese and mujahedin did regularly.Another piece of good news from Iraq is that the insurgents are offering a mainly nihilistic message. Most skillful revolutionaries promiconcrete benefits from their victory. Insurgents frequently worknot only to terrorize local villagers but to help improve their lives in small waysThe Iraqi insurgents offer only fear. They oppose formation of the new Iraqi government but have not offered any alternative. In January2004, insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi said, "We have declared a bitter war against the principle of democracy and all those who seek to enact it.Eight million Iraqis defied him and voted instead. Today, most Iraqis remain committed to finding a way to make the new government work

One reflection of this is that Iraqis continue to wait in long lines to join the nascent Iraqi army and police forces, despite a campaign bythe insurgents to explode bombs at recruiting stations. Not all recruits are idealistic--many are simply seeking work or the prestige of being a member of thearmy or police. But their presence at the recruiting stations proves that the insurgents have neither offered them an alternative, terrorized them sufficiently nor de-legitimizthe government enough in their eyes to keep them away.

Perhaps the best news from the region these days is that the Iraqi army is finally producing units able to fight on their own.According to Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, there are now more than 170,000 "trained and equipped" Iraqi police and military personnel, and more than 105 police and army

battalions are "in the fight." Over the next few months, tens of thousands more Iraqi troops will be able to take the field in the struggle againstthe insurgency. They should number around 250,000 by next summer.By waging a terrorist campaign, the insurgents have designed a war they can sustain for a long time. Obtaining explosives, making bombs andsetting them off does not require much skill, money or even courage. The next year will probably not see a significant reduction in the number of explosions, and it's

possible, as the Palestinian intifada and the three-decade-long campaign of violence by the Irish Republican Army show, that this situation may last for many years. It is th

unwise to measure progress in Iraq by the number of deaths or bombs in a given period. Progress must instead be measured in the establishment of a stabland legitimate government and the creation of state structures able to function even in the face of attacks.One big problem, however, is the paucity of coalition troops. Commanders, as a result, are required to make hard choices among such critical tasks as sealing borders,

keeping critical lines of communication clear, defending their own troops, training indigenous forces, clearing insurgent-infested areas and attacking promising insurgenttargets.

If the U.S. were to keep its troop levels constant over the next 18 months, the manpower[sic] available to perform all of these critical taswould increase dramatically as Iraqi forces became available to handle basic security functions.Unfortunately, it does not appear that the Bush administration favors such a course. Repeated rumors--including a report about U.S. plans to withdraw, leaked by the BritisMinistry of Defense recently, and statements by the new U.S. ambassador to Iraq--indicate that the administration would prefer to pull U.S. troops out of Iraq as Iraqi forc

become available in larger numbers.

Understandable though that desire is, it is wrongheaded. Now, above all, is the moment when determination and perseverance are most needed. If the U.S. beginspulling troops out prematurely, it runs the risk of allowing the insurgency to grow, perhaps becoming what it now is not--a real militarythreat to the government.If, on the other hand, Bush stays the course and pays the price for success, the prospects for winning will get better every day.

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Unilat Key to Peace

(__) American unilateralism is the exception to global norms unilateralism is key to maintaining peace abroad.

Robert Kagan, 2003, Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for Peace, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPEIN THE NEW WORLD ORDER, p. 75-76

The United States is already operating according to Cooper's double standard, for the very reasons he suggests. American leaders, too,believe that global security

and a liberal order- as well as Europe's "postmodern" paradise cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous

Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe. What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role inbringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter the paradise itself. I

mans[sic] the walls but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with theSaddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jon Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving most of the benefits to others.

(__) Unilateralism is key to US balancing multiple conflict flashpoints it is the only way to ensure global peace.

Charles Krauthammer, Winter 2003, IR expert and winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "The UnipolaMoment Revisited," THE NATIONAL INTEREST, p L/N

The form of realism that I am arguing for-call it the new unilateralism-is clear in its determination to self-consciously and confidentlydeploy American power in pursuit of those global ends. Note: global ends. There is a form of unilateralism that is devoted only to narrow American self-interest and it has a name, too: It is called isolationism. Critics of the new unilateralism often confuse it with isolationism because both are prepared to unashamedly exercAmerican power. But isolationists oppose America acting as a unipolar power not because they disagree with the unilateral means, but because they deem the ends far too

broad. Isolationists would abandon the larger world and use American power exclusively for the narrowest of American interests: manning Fortress America by defendingthe American homeland and putting up barriers to trade and immigration.

The new unilateralism defines American interests far beyond narrow self-defense. In particular, it identifies two other major interests,both global: extending the peace by advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort. Britain was thebalancer in Europe, joining the weaker coalition against the stronger to create equilibrium. America's unique global power allows it to bethe balancer in every region. We balanced Iraq by supporting its weaker neighbors in the Gulf War. We balance China by supporting thering of smaller states at its periphery (from South Korea to Taiwan, even to Vietnam). Our role in the Balkans was essentially to create a

microbalance: to support the weaker Bosnian Muslims against their more dominant neighbors, and subsequently to support the weakerAlbanian Kosovars against the Serbs.Of course, both ofthese tasks often advance American national interests as well. Thepromotion of democracy multiplies the number of nation

likely to be friendly to the United States, and regional equilibria produce stability that benefits a commercial republic like the United States.America's (intended) exertions on behalf of pre-emptive non-proliferation, too, are clearly in the interest of both the United States and the international system as a whole.

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AT Multilat Key to Peace

(__) Multilateralism is too slow to prevent conflict escalation.

FrankSchuller and Thomas Grant, 2003, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 79, p 39

The opposing principle, that ofmultilateralism, equally miscasts international policy in a world where circumstances may indeed warrantunilateral decisiveness. In the 1920s and 1930s, the League of Nations nurtured multilateral discussions, producing only futility. Rather thanmounting individual effective actions against the provocations ofJapanese empire-building in China, Italian aggression against Ethiopia orNazi trial runs for Blitzkrieg and Holocaust, European leaders endlessly consulted one another, grasping for a common denominator thatno consultation would ever achieve. In current circumstances, some unilateral actions override soothing diplomatic nattering. The attacks o11 September on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon count as an incident deserving of response regardless of the sentiments and sympathies of other nations. TheUnited States, as the superior power in the world, must assume the responsibility of deploying its might for the benefit and welfare of itself and the rest of the world.

(__) Multilateralism is too slow and ineffective when action is needed multilat responses are never efficient.

Alexander A. Pikayev, March 2003, NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE POST SEPTEMBER 11TH ERA, p http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/default.asp

The United States, given its overwhelming economic, political and military supremacy, is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with a needof looking for consensus among dozens of countries as it is required by multilateral mechanisms. Very often, such consensus is verydifficult to achieve, it requires long and painful negotiations, and the nature of the achieved multilateral deal could be far away from theoriginal US expectations. In other words, Washington perceives multilateral regimes as very slow and often incapable to provide withresolute and efficient response when needed.

(__) Theres a bipartisan consensus that multilat cant provide peace.

Business Week, 4-21-2003, p L/N

But if it is a mistake, it is an understandable one. The multinationalists have failed dismally to make a case for their approach to solving the world's problems. The truththat the institutions and procedures of global multilateralism don't workvery well. They rarely have. And it isn't just the Bush Administration, withits unilateral impulses, that thinks so. President Bill Clinton complained bitterly about the inability of the U.N. and NATO to act in Africa anthe Balkans to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. And British Prime Minister Tony Blair has complained about the failure of multilaterinstitutions to solve problems.

(__) Multilat institutions have no resources.

Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003, p proquest

Moreover, most people have unreal expectations of the power of global multilaterals. Such institutions are often extremely poorlyresourced and, at the same time, badly overstretched. In addition, a great number of them suffer from low staff morale these days as wel

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Multilat Kills Heg **Arms Sales**

(__) Multilateralism is the prime motivator of US arms sales.

Lora Lumpe & JeffDonarski, 1998, Consulting Senior Associate with the International Peace Research Institute and Member of the AdvisoryBoard for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project & Project Associate at the Arms Sales Monitoring Project @ the Federation of American Scientists, TheArms Trade Revealed, p http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover.html

Unfortunately, in the seven years since the Persian Gulf war (and the cold war) ended, the US government and other major arms exporting governments have apparently

decided that no fundamental re-evaluation of the role of military force in international relations is advisable. Instead of placing greater emphasis on the rule of

law and non-military diplomacy during the past decade, the United States and other key military powers have increased their reliance omilitary force through UN operations and/or regional alliances. Multilateral military operations, and the need for interoperable fighting

forces, now provide one of the principal justifications for arms exporting and military training-by the United States in particular.

B) Arms sales hurt US leadership by increasing proliferation and decreasing the effectiveness of the US military.

Lucien J. Dhooge, 1999, Assist Prof of Bus. Law @ U of the Pacific and LL.M. International and Comparative Law from Georgetown

U Law Center, We Arm the World, 16 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 577, p L/N

Even close allies of the United States have transferred weaponry without authorization. n778 For example, Israel is alleged to have incorporated Utechnology into its own weapons and exported those weapons without U.S. approval. n779 Included in these weapons are the Python 3 air-to-air missile based upon theU.S.-made AIM-9-L Sidewinder missile and the MAPATS anti-tank missile based upon the U.S.-produced TOW-2 missile. n780 Additionally, Israel allegedly cooperatedwith the former apartheid regime in South Africa regarding the development of ballistic missiles and transferred armaments in violation of U.S. law to Chile, Ethiopia,Thailand, and Venezuela. n781 Finally, in perhaps one of the most underreported recent news stories in the armaments field, Israel is alleged to have transferred U.S.-

produced weaponry to the Peoples' Republic of China, assisted the Chinese military in developing a laser-guided anti-tank missile, and improved the guidance system for tChinese CSS-2 ballistic missile. n782 Ironically, the Peoples' Republic of China subsequently transferred several of these improved missiles to Saudi Arabia. n783[*670] 3. Proliferation Through the Creation of Indigenous Armaments Industries

Arms transfers also increase proliferation by enhancing global weapons production capacity. By engaging in co-production and

development, the United States is diffusing its production capacity and technology to other countries. n784 The United States has recognized thnegative impact of such transactions upon nonproliferation efforts, which is demonstrated by its requirements that the degree of protection afforded sensitive technology an

the potential for unauthorized transfers and misuse be determined prior to the initiation of co-production and development activities. n785 Nevertheless, the

armament industries of U.S. allies in Europe as well as Israel, Brazil, Taiwan, and India have benefited from U.S. co-production anddevelopment transactions. n786[continues]4. Armament Exports and the "Boomerang Effect"

U.S. armaments exports also serve to enhance the capabilities of potential adversaries, thereby needlessly placing U.S. military personneat risk. For example, the American forces that invaded Panama in December 1989 encountered a military that received 44% of its

weapons from the United States between 1984 and 1989, and $ 33.5 million in U.S. military aid during the 1980s. n800 In addition, more than 6,600Panamanian military personnel received training under the International Military Education and Training Program between 1950 and 1987 at a cost of $ 8.3 million. n801

In the Gulf War, the United Nations coalition encountered an Iraqi war machine equipped to a significant degree by the United States.

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Arms Sales Impact Extension

(__) American arms exports make mass human rights violations, regional conflicts and proliferation possible.

Lucien J. Dhooge, 1999, Assist Prof of Bus. Law @ U of the Pacific and LL.M. International and Comparative Law from GeorgetownU Law Center, We Arm the World, 16 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 577, p L/N

The United States supplanted the Soviet Union as the world's leading armament exporter in 1990. n27 Between 1985 and 1995, U.S. armamentexports totaled $ 157.3 billion and averaged $ 14.3 billion annually. n28 The United States sold $ 15.6 billion in armaments in 1995 which amount was three times that ofthe next supplier and 49% of the global marketplace. n29 These exports yielded $ 7.7 billion in profits to American defense contractors in 1996, an industry record anddouble the amount of profits earned by such contractors in 1985. n30The second cause for the increase in armament transfers in 1995 was increasing demand in the developing world. Armament imports by developing countries increased by5.6 billion in 1995 to $ 21.3 billion, an increase of 36%. n31 Between 1985 and 1995, the developing world imported $ 323 billion in armaments, with such importsaveraging $ 29.3 billion annually. n32 The top five importers in 1995--Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand--purchased $ 13.9

billion in armaments that constituted 65% [*582] of global imports. n33 These imports constituted a combined 51% of the value of all imports for these countries. n34

These armament transfers have had a catastrophic effect upon the developing world. American armaments have been utilized in thecommission of human rights violations committed throughout the world including Egypt and the Occupied Territories, East Timor,Turkey, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. Furthermore, American armaments have served to maintain repressive governments in the MiddleEast, Asia, and South America. Armament exports have also served to inflame regional tensions and increase proliferation throughunauthorized transfers and creation of indigenous armaments industries. Finally, U.S. armament exports have retarded the economicdevelopment of some of its leading customers.

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Arms Sales Extension AT Small Arms Balance Peace

(__) Conventional arms are unable to provide consistent balancing inevitable asymmetries mean conventionalarms only increase the risks of conflict.

Lora Lumpe & JeffDonarski, 1998, Consulting Senior Associate with the International Peace Research Institute and Member of the AdvisoryBoard for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project & Project Associate at the Arms Sales Monitoring Project @ the Federation of American Scientists, TheArms Trade Revealed, p http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover.html

First, the United States-as noted above-is not the only arms supplier. American weapons shipments very often engender a response fromother buyers and sellers. For example, the Pentagon has channeled billions of dollars of sophisticated weaponry to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirain the 1990s, reputedly to help these countries deter attack by Iraq or Iran. At the same time, however, Iran's threat perception has increased accordingly, spurring Tehran tseek more weaponry. Because Iran (unlike Iraq) is not under a UN arms embargo, it finds willing suppliers-principally in China and Russia. Arms sales to Iran are then sato be "destabilizing" and to warrant more arms transfers from America, again in pursuit of an elusive strategic arms balance.

Granted, the ability to create regional balances is undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that the United States is arming both sides in manyregional competitions-Greece and Turkey, Persian Gulf sheikdoms and Israel, Egypt and Israel, China (to a limited degree) and Taiwan. Until their recent nuclear testhe administration appeared ready to supply arms to both India and Pakistan.

A second problem with this argument is the fundamental relationship of weapons to warfare. Weapons are useful not only for self-defense, but also foraggression and repression. What is important, then, is the nature and stability of the regime to which the arms are flowing. US forces havbeen deployed several times recently to combat former US allies-and recipients of US weapons, technology and military training-in Panam

Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Liberia. None of these states were democracies at the time of US arms supply, and all had egregious human rights records.A bill pending in Congress would attempt to keep the United States from making potentially disastrous exports by identifying characteristics of less stable governments.Under the "Code of Conduct" (see p. 83), the four conditions a country must meet in order to be eligible for US weapons are: democratic form of government; respect for

basic human rights of citizens; non-aggression (against other states); and full participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The President may exempt a countrywhich fails to meet these criteria, but he must notify Congress of the exemption before weapons could be exported. While this legislation might not block all dangeroussales, it would increase scrutiny on weapons supplied to those governments that may be less stable because of repressive or aggressive practices.

A third flaw with the balance of power rationale lies in the impossibility of establishing military parity among regional states that have adramatic disparity in territory, population, financial resources and the possession of nuclear armaments. Most observers agree, for example, thatthe Gulf monarchies lack the population, training and military tradition necessary to defend their territories. The former Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear AdmiralEdward Sheafer, said that despite "long-term plans to expand their military with the purchase of equipment..., it is doubtful that the Saudis would be able to counter threat

from Iran and Iraq completely." Similarly, in Southeast Asia, several states are justifying an expensive round of military purchases on the basisof a need to deter Chinese adventurism. In reality, though, if China-the world's most populous state and a nuclear power-were determineto attack Singapore (for example), no amount of modern conventional weaponry could deter it. A better bet for Singapore would be to puits energy into strengthening diplomatic and legal means for heading off and resolving any future disputes.

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Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Bolton**

(__) The US only maintains its freedom of action by not giving into demands to abide by international norms andvalues this refusal to play the game is key to preserving US autonomy.

John R. Bolton, fall 2000, former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN, Should we take Global Governanc

Seriously? 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 205, p L/N

Although some regulatory schemes were adopted and some were not, the "code of conduct" approach largely failed in its broader objectives because thdeveloped world, and the Reagan Administration in the United States in particular, simplyrefused to play the game. As a consequence, internationregulatory efforts faded in the 1980s and 1990s, largely because they had failed to produce the expected bonanza of "free" resources and technology that thethird world had been expecting. However, the underlying statist, regulatory impulse itself has not only not disappeared, but it has seized theopportunity to resurrect itself as part of the larger impulse toward global governance that emerged during the 20th century's last decade.Although space constraints permit only brief mention of a few contemporary issues, there should be no doubt that, bagpipe-like, the field of substantiveinternational regulatory policy is simply waiting for the breath of Globalist inspiration to expand again. Ever since the 1992 Conference onEnvironment and Development (the "Rio Summit"), the environment has seen the largest increment of regulatory initiatives, including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on GlobalWarming. n46 But others are also hard at work. The WHO, for example, has progressed from breast-milk substitutes, and is currently considering adopting a FrameworkConvention on [*220] Tobacco Control. n47 The ILO is still negotiating conventions on labor standards, and the Clinton Administration has been hard at work attemptin

to persuade the Senate to ratify the extensive legislative backlog of existing conventions, several of which have been pending for decades. In short, for virtually everyarea of public policy, there is a Globalist proposal, consistent with the overall objective of reducing individual nation-state autonomy,

particularly that of the United States.

B) The internationalist agendas success will constrain US autonomy and freedom of action it would be the endof US heg.

John R. Bolton, fall 2000, former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN, Should we take Global GovernancSeriously? 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 205, p L/N

Globalism, in effect, represents a kind of worldwide cartelization of governments and interest groups. Even though its proponents purportedlyabjure global government as such (at least rhetorically, and only for now), the consequence is, for all practical purposes, the same.Should we, therefore, take global governance "seriously?" Sadly, the answer is yes, not only today but far into the foreseeable future. It is well past the point when the

unrestrained and uncritical acceptance of Globalist slogans ("global solutions for global problems") can be allowed to proceed. The costs to the United States--reduced constitutional autonomy, impaired popular sovereignty, reduction of our international power, and limitations on our domestic anforeign policy options and solutions--are far too great, and the current understanding of these costs far too limited to be acceptable.Whether we are ready or not, the debate over global governance, fought out at the confluence of constitutional theory and foreign policy, is the

decisive issue facing the United States internationally.

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Bolton Extension EU Link

(__) The EU seeks to constrain US heg European consolidation of power should be avoided to sustain USunipolarity.



In many respects, the European Union of the 1990s and the next decade has replaced the Developing World (and its NIEO and NWICO) as the leadingsource ofsubstantive Globalist policy. Faced with sweeping international economic change, European Globalists have found that the internationalpower of their states is too insignificant, their currencies too weak, and their social-democratic welfare systems too expensive to withstand. The Europeanreaction, especially on the left, has been to aggregate state power through the EU mechanism, precisely the opposite of the [*221] instinctiveAmericanist inclination. For the Europeans, there is also a strong economic logic to an integrated continental market, as they have observed in the United States, but thescompelling, indeed powerful, business reasons are also tinged with a discernable anti-Americanism, a desire to have a state strong enough tobe a separate pillar in the world.As political elites in Europe grow increasingly comfortable in ceding large areas of national competencies to EU mechanisms in Brussels, they have also felt more

comfortable in propounding worldwide solutions consistent with the direction of EU policy. Thus, not content alone with transferring their own nationalsovereignty to Brussels, they have also decided, in effect, to transfer some of ours to worldwide institutions and norms, thus making the

European Union a miniature precursor to global governance.

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Bolton Extension Exceptionalism Key

(__) Multilateral decision-making is the easiest way for the internationalist agenda to become entrenched itremoves important decisions from the sole authority of the US.


A. The Use of Force: Legitimacy and Authority. To make "Our Global Neighborhood" hospitable, an important predicate is to restrain the use offorce, not in the old-fashioned, balance-of-power way among nation states, but by constraining and limiting the nation-states themselvesSince decisions to use military force are the most important that any nation-state faces, limiting their decisions or transferring them toanother source of authority is ultimately central to the diminution of sovereignty and the advance of global governance. Here is where theAmericanist-Globalist divide is the deepest.

(__) The internationalist agenda frowns at US heg it would seek to constrain the USs intervention capabilities.


Although two Americans were members of the Commission, n5 the report's anti-American tone is unmistakable, a fact we can and should legitimately consider in assessin

the Globalist agenda. The Co-Chairmen[sic] say, for example, in abjuring "global government" that they seek to avoid a world that is "moreaccommodating to power [and] more hospitable to hegemonic ambition." n6 At a time when "hegemony," whether used in Beijing, Moscow

or Paris (or even by well-meaning Americans) is a code word for the United States, n7 the animus is clear. The Co-Chairmen[sic] pose asalternatives: (1) "going forward to a new era of security that responds to law and collective will and common responsibility"; or (2) "goibackward to the spirit and methods of what one of our members described as the 'sheriff's posse'--dressed up to masquerade as global action." n8Leaving aside apparently trivial problems such as how to measure the international "common will," the Co-Chairmen[sic] have taken direct aim at what the

[*208] United States did in the 1991-92 Persian Gulf War, n9 and at what was broadly believed by many Americans to be an accurate description ofAmerica's role in the post-Cold War world. n10

(__) Internationalist NGOs will raise the costs of using US heg to unacceptable levels if theyre given theinternational credence needed to pursue prosecution of the US.


Indeed, complaints alleging that NATO in fact committed the crime of aggression have been submitted to the Prosecutor of one of the ICC's predecessor courts. Althoughthe Prosecutor, in response to news reports, subsequently denied that she was conducting a "formal inquiry" into NATO's actions, her carefully worded statement only rais

more questions about what she was actually doing. n18 Even her [*211] subsequent refusal to indict NATO officials does not finally resolve the matter. n19NGOshoping to change Pentagon behavior as much as the international "rules" themselves, through the threat of prosecution, hope to constrainmilitary operations, and thus lower the potential effectiveness of such actions, or raise the costs to successively more unacceptable level

by increasing the legal risks and liabilities perceived by top civilian and military planners of the United States and its allies undertakingmilitary action.

(__) America is powerful because it maintains its exceptional nature.

Economist, 11-8-2003, p L/N

On this view, America is not exceptional because it is powerful; America is powerful because it is exceptional. And because what makeAmerica different also keeps it rich and powerful, an administration that encourages American wealth and power will tend to encourageintrinsic exceptionalism. Walter Russell Mead of the Council on Foreign Relations dubs this impulse "American revivalism". It is not anexplicit ideology but a pattern of beliefs, attitudes and instincts.

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Bolton Extension Snowballs

(__) Every time the US gives in to international pressure it sets a powerful precedent for future constraints on USpower every instance is critical.



The Globalists' second approach is specifically targeted against the United States, in an effort to bend our system into something morecompatible with human rights and otherstandards more generally accepted elsewhere. This conscious effort at limiting "Americanexceptionalism" is consistent with the larger effort to constrain national autonomy because the United States as a whole is the most important skeptic these efforts. Every time America is forced to bend its knee to international pressure, it sets a significant, and detrimental, precedent forall of the others.

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Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Cumbersome**

(__) Multilat ends effective military deployment.

Ekaterina Stepanova, 2003, senior researcher @ Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and InternationalRelations, UNILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, eds. Malone and Khong, p 190-1

There are many technical problems associated with multilateral military actions: Multilateralism slows down the use of force and, in this sense, is not aforce multiplier; it also exacerbates the problem of optimal division of labor between participants. In addition, in cases that involve (ormight involve) large-scale combat, multilateral coalition is not just supportive of, but often relies on, the exclusive military capabilities o

the United States which gives Washington one more argument for keeping the unilateral option open.

(__) Multilateralism trades-off with American moral resolve.

Tobias Harris, 5-20-03, Editor of Concord Bridge Magazine, "Gulliver Unbound," Concord Bridge Magazine, phttp://people.brandeis.edu/~cbmag/Articles/2003%20May/Gulliver%20unbound-%20May%202003.pdf

There are several possible explanations as to why force (or hard power) has become so objectionable to international opinion. Among these explanations is the developmeof an international norm against the aggressive use of force; a reply based on the impotency of much of the world in the face of Americas overwhelming militarysuperiority; and anti-Americanism that has accompanied the unipolar moment, signifying that opposition is more to the American unilateral use of force rather than to anyuse of force per se. Reality probably lies somewhere in the midst of these options. Clearly the rise of legalized institutions within the Free World since the end of World W

II has delegitimized the use of force, as nations have come to view institutions as more capable of resolving international disputes than force-ofarms. Force has become bte noire especially among the nations of Europe, who, through the European Union, have seen the supposed bounty of institutionalizedmultilateral cooperation. To them, force is the bluntest tool in the foreign policy toolbox, often causing more problems than it solves. Engagement and discussion aseen as softer tools that ensure an equitable outcome for those involved, forestalling warand its attendant train of miseries, including civiliancasualties, refugee flows and economic disruption. The international community and many Americans view the associated costs of war as far outweighing any benefits of

military action, and thus nations must go to great length to avoid international conflict. In short, multilateralism is Europeanism writ large, as pointed out by RobertKagan in Of Paradise and Power. It is consensus-driven because, after all, consensus means no one loses. But consensus precludes the possibiliof firm moral positions, as decisions reflect the lowest-common denominator among actors. American foreign policy has long had amoralistic strain that seeks to improve the world, by force if necessary. Decisions are not made between two relatively equivalent choicbut between what is right and wrong. Thus unless America can convince the international community to accept the virtues of its mora

stances, multilateralism necessarily entails moral equivocation and watereddown positions.

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Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (1 of 3)

(__) Unilateralism is the best way to achieve international cooperation and maintain US power necessary to sustaiunipolarity and freedom of action legitimizing multilateral constrains sets precedent for future constraintsand does not ease anti-Americanism.

Charles Krauthammer, Winter 2003, IR expert and winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "The UnipolaMoment Revisited," THE NATIONAL INTEREST, p L/N

A THIRD critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. Theare prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but

because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rule-making functions with others.12

I have my doubts. The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get UN support, share decisionmaking, assemble coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region?Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition?The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and dits utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because theextremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of ourmanagement of it.

Pragmatic realists also value international support in the interest of sharing burdens, on the theory that sharing decision-making enlists others in ourown hegemonic enterprise and makes things less costly. If you are too vigorous in asserting yourself in the short-term, they argue, you are likely to injure yourself in thelong-term when you encounter problems that require the full cooperation of other partners, such as counter-terrorism. As Brooks and Wohlforth put it, "Strainingrelationships now will lead only to a more challenging policy environment later on."13

If the concern about the new unilateralism is that American assertiveness be judiciously rationed, and that one needs to think long-term, it is hard to disagree. One doesnot go it alone or dictate terms on every issue. On some issues such as membership in and support of the WTO, where the long-term benefit both tthe American national interest and global interests is demonstrable, one willingly constricts sovereignty. Trade agreements are easy calls, howevfree trade being perhaps the only mathematically provable political good. Others require great skepticism. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, would have harmed thAmerican economy while doing nothing for the global environment. (Increased emissions from China, India and Third World countries exempt from its provisions would

have more than made up for American cuts.) Kyoto failed on its merits, but was nonetheless pushed because the rest of the world supported it. Thsame case was made for the chemical and biological weapons treaties-sure, they are useless or worse, but why not give in there in order build good will for future needs? But appeasing multilateralism does not assuage it; appeasement merely legitimizes it. Repeatedacquiescenceto provisions that America deems injuriousreinforces the notion that legitimacy derives from international consensus, thusundermining America's future freedom of action-and thus contradicting the pragmatic realists' own goals.

America must be guided by its independent judgment, both about its own interest and about the global interest. Especially on matters of national security, war-making andthe deployment of power, America should neither defer nor contract out decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve permanent structural constrictions sucas those imposed by an International Criminal Court. Prudence, yes. No need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do so in Afghanistan andin Iraq. No need to act the superpower on steel tariffs. But there is a need to do so on missile defense.The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous

high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. Countries will cooperatewith us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpoweWarm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the Americaninvestigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating amultilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not aresult of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind ofheretofore recalcitra

states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat inhand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the higroad to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he

was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itselfcreated a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing.Unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possible. Unilateralism simply means that one doesnot allow oneself to be hostage to others. No unilateralist would, say, reject Security Council support for an attack on Iraq. The nontrivial question that separatesunilateralism from multilateralism-and that tests the "pragmatic realists"-is this: What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you? Do youallow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national-- and international-security?

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(__) Multilateralism constrains US freedom of action by imposing norms and limitations that only apply to the US

Charles Krauthaumer, April 2004, IR expert & winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, DEMOCRATICREALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD, p http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pd

Moral suasion is a farce. Why then this obsession with conventions, protocols, legalisms? Their obvious net effect is to temper Americanpower. Who, after all, was really going to be most constrained by these treaties? The ABM amendments were aimed squarely at American advances anstrategic defenses, not at Russia, which lags hopelessly behind. The Kyoto Protocol exempted India and China. The nuclear test ban would have seriously degraded theAmerican nuclear arsenal. And the land mine treaty (which the Clinton administration spent months negotiating but, in the end, met so much Pentagon resistance that evenClinton could not initial it) would have had a devastating impact on U.S. conventional forces, particularly at the DMZ in Korea.But that, you see, is the whole point of the multilateral enterprise: To reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to,dependent on, constricted by the willand interestsof other nations. To tie down Gulliver with a thousand strings. To domesticate the mostundomesticated, most outsized, national interest on the planetours.Historically, multilateralism is a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones. Butmultilateralism imposed on Great Powers, and particularly on a unipolar power, is intended to restrain that power. Which is precisely whyFrance is an ardent multilateralist. But why should America be? Why, in the end, does liberal internationalism want to tie down Gulliver, to blunt the pursuit of Americannational interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests?

(__) Multilat constrains threaten to erode Americas ability to leverage military power and threaten the use of forc not submitting to such constrains is key to maintaining US heg.

David B Rivkin Jr& Lee A Casey, Fall 2003, partners in the Washington, DC office of Baker & Hosteller LLP and write frequently oninternational law and defense issues and both served in the Reagan and Bush, Sr. administrations, Leashing the Dogs of War, The National Interest 73, p proquest

These efforts have taken the form of multilateral conventions, such as the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) or the

1997 Ottawa anti-landmine convention, and of new interpretations of existing treaties (such as the UN Charter), or of customary norms. Although the United Statehelped to negotiate a number of these treaties, it has steadfastly rejected the most sweeping innovations, favoring instead more traditionaljus ad

bellum and jus in bello norms. In particular, the United States has clearly asserted that it will use force, where necessary, to defend itsinterests with or without UN Security Council approval, and has rejected agreements that could be interpreted as contrary to key aspects of U.S. military doctrin

This reticence is not part of a nefarious American effort to achieve immunity from international law, as critics have sometimes asserted.Unlike many countries, which embrace new international conventions with little intent to comply thereafter, the United States hasalways taken its obligations seriously-refusing, for example, to ratify treaties it does not plan to implement, whether because of policy orconstitutional concerns. What the critics fail to realize is that binding international legal obligations must be based on the consent of the affected states. They cannot bimposed. In eschewing many of the new international legal norms accepted by Europe, the United States has simply acted within its legal rights as an independent soverei

Nor does the American refusal to follow Europe's lead in this area stem from any lack of humanitarian zeal. Rather, it can be traced to recognition by the United States that

the world remains a dangerous place, and that adoption of a "policing" model for warfare would hamper, if not cripple, America's abilityto defend itself-and its allies. Peacetime norms, which guide the conduct of police and security establishments in modern democracies, are far more restrictive thanthe laws of war because they operate in an environment in which the state has an effective monopoly on the lawful use of force, and in which the damage that any singleindividual or group can inflict is limited. The laws of war, by contrast, apply in a context in which the state does not have a monopoly on either the lawful right to use force

or on the use of the most destructive weapons. War and peace remain different worlds, each with a unique logic and distinct imperatives thatrequire dissimilar rules.Accepting a "policing" model for warfare would undermine the key tenets of American strategic thinking. For starters, the fundamentalAmerican doctrine of "decisive force" would have to go. Any robust use of force is certain to cause some civilian casualties, and, under amodel of armed conflict better suited to "managing" problems than winning wars, decisive force would be considered "excessive" and subject to sanction

Similarly, the high value the United States places on force protection would be suspect under these rules. Indeed, one of the principalallegations leveled against the United States is that it has improperly sought to shield its soldiers from the dangers of combat-for examplby operating its aircraft at heights well beyond the range of enemy air defenses, making it difficult in many cases to distinguish betweenmilitary and civilian targets. Overall, the importance of this Euro-American doctrinal divergence cannot be overestimated. For the first timemodern history, the principal military powers differ fundamentally over the proper rules governing warfare.

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(__) US heg is guaranteed as long as the US does not bind itself to institutions that would limit US power.

Eliot A. Cohen, Jul/Aug 2004, Prof and Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies @ JHUs School of AdvancedInternational Studies, History and the Hyperpower, Foreign Affairs 83.4, p proquest

In the end, however, the applicability of a particular term (debates about empire tend to degenerate into semantic squabbles) does not matter. The fact of the

overwhelming power of the United States does. No potential adversary comes close to it, and, for the moment, there is no question of acountervailing coalition to block, let alone replace, it. Its roots lie in a growing and extraordinarily productive population, a stable political system, and a

military that is unsurpassable in the foreseeable future. And the United States will not, as some hope and others fear, bind itself to aninternational institutional and legal order that will domesticate and restrain it. If nothing else, domestic politics would prohibit it. No U.Sleader in the next decade or two will call for a dramatic reduction in defense spending or deny that this country must be the strongest inthe world, ready to exert its power globally and act unilaterally if necessary.

(__) Unilateralism is key to global leadership and effective military action multilat would destroy that.

Ekaterina Stepanova, 2003, Research Associate at Carnegie Endowment for Peace, UNILATERALISM & US FOREIGN POLICY:INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, ed. b. Malone and Khong, p 183-184

Retaining the capability to apply force unilaterally and demonstrating periodically the willingness to use it remains a cornerstone of theU.S. military strategy. For the United States, unilateralism in the use of force is first and foremost an essential element in a compellingdemonstration of U.S. strategic independence and global leadership. Given U.S. military superiority and the significant technological gathat exists between the United States and even its closest Western allies, the U.S. political-military leadership often views unilateralism aa technical prerequisite for effective command and control of military action. More important, in a world more complex than thebipolarity of the Cold War, the political interests of countries tend to be diverse and fragmented, even within the Western community of

nations. For the United States, even partial accommodation to these interests, which is essential for any multilateral cooperation, presena number of serious political, military, and technical constraints in the use of force.

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Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Public Support/Isolationism**

(__) Multilateralism stokes isolationism amongst the public that would end US global leadership.

Michla Pomerance, spring 2002, Professor of International Law @ Hebrew U, "U.S. Multilateralism, Left and Right," Orbis 46.2, p ScienceDire

The exercise of the requisite unilateralism in the launching of U.S.-led multilateral actions, resisting as needed the multilateral initiativesof others, does not equate to "isolationism." Only excessive concern about being "isolated" in multilateral arenas may induce a moreisolationist American posture in one of two ways. First, it might spark the kind of sulking unilateral isolationist hangover which, scholars othe Realist school have noted, often follows periods of crusading interventionism. Second, and more probably, it could persuade Americans tireof leadership to revert to a multilateral isolationism, in which a virtuous but anodyne deferral to "world opinion" is used as an excuse todo nothing. Were either of these forms of isolationism to reemerge, the only winners would be dictators, rogues, and terrorists.

(__) Multilateralists cant maintain support for hegemony uniltateralists can.

Bruce W. Jentleson, Winter 2004, director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy & prof of public policy and PoliSci @ Duke and a seniforeign policy adviser to presidential candidate Al Gore, Tough love Multilateralism, The Washington Quarterly, p proquest

To their credit, neoconservative foreign policy strategists know the power of a paradigm. They play on national pride by framing theirpolicies in the overarching worldview of U.S. unipolarism and dominance. They advocate unilateralism as right and realist whiledismissing multilateralism as naive and unrealistic, soft and weak. Although multilateralists have had some success in conveying theflaws of unilateralism, they have yet to make the positive case for multilateralism as a credible and preferable U.S. foreign policy strategUnless multilateralists stop preaching to the choir and start getting tough on themselves, addressing the weaknesses that still cause toomany people to have too many doubts about multilateralisms viability as a realistic foreign policy strategy, they will not be trusted by thAmerican public to conduct U.S. foreign policy in a dangerous world.The broad unilateralism-multilateralism debate is about overarching ways of viewing the world and the role of the United States. The debate is important in and of itself inthat it frames and at least partially shapes positions on specific policies. The dynamic also works in the opposite direction: general worldviews are shaped by positions on

particular issues. Many issues come into play, including broad views of the United Nations, the global environment and the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal

Court, and arms control and nonproliferation; but no issue is more central to the overall debate, and none more problematic for multilateralists,than the use of force. Whether Democrats trying to close the foreign policy confidence gap, Republicans battling within the Bush administration, or Europeans wary the United States acting alone, multilateralists lack of credibility on the use of forcethe will to use it and the capacity to use it effectively

their most damning weakness.

(__) Benefits of unilateralism are immediate and the costs long-term multilateralism means immediate costs witno public benefits.

Michael Hirsh, 2003, former editor of Newsweek and Senior editor of the Washington Bureau, At War With Ourselves, p 240-41

For a long time the Bush administrations back-and-forth policies continued to be defined by the tension between its powerful hegemonists including Rumsfeld, Cheney,and Wolfowitz, and its multilateralists, mainly Powell and his small band of loyal deputies. The hegemonists dominated thinking inside the White House not least becau

their views continued to earn the president high popularity ratings. Unilateralism, after all, is much easier to sell and so much conceptually cleaner thamultilateralism. The benefits are immediate, including a strong leaderly image for the president, and the costs long-term and diffuse: thedistant threat of weapons of mass destruction, the distant notion that Europe or China may tip into opposing US hegemony decades hence, the degree-by-degree warming

the globe, and so on. As for multilateralism, on the other hand, its benefits are long-term and diffuse, and its costs immediate: an image ofcompromise and indecisveness.

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**Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (1 of 2)**

(__) International cooperation has always been dependent on resolute unilateralism it spurs countries into actionMultilateralism first locks countries into inaction.


More fundamentally, those who have understood the concept of "multilateralism" best have always emphasized the dependence ofmultilateralism on unilateralism. Thus, the foremost American scholar of international organization, Inis Claude (author of Swords intoPlowshares), has written that despite the worlds bias against unilateralism, "unilateralism is, in fact, indispensable to effectivemultilateralism."13 "Effective multilateralism starts with resolute unilateralism; the mission of the leader is not respectful deference to thmajority but determined pulling and hauling at it."14 Or as Thomas Friedman wrote in 1995:

If the Clinton foreign policy team has learned anything these past two years I hope it is this: there is no multilateralism without unilateralism. Unless youfirst show people that you are ready to go alone, you will never have partners to go with you . Repeat after me: The UN is us. The UN is us.15From this perspective, the ones who were paying lip service to multilateralism were not Bush and his Republican followers, who understood this important lesson

instinctively, but rather all those who insisted on untainted "humanitarian" motives for multilateral actions. Theirs was a prescription forinaction and could provide its pretext.That multilateralism can readily serve as a restraint on U.S. power, as a reason and pretext for inaction, and as a conscience-soothingsubstitute for action is a lesson that Israel, for one, long ago learnedor should have learned. The events preceding the Six-Day War furnished oneunforgettable illustration of the problem. While the Johnson administration vacillated, seeking to mobilize an unattainable multilateral

naval task force to break the Egyptian blockade, the threat to Israels security was becoming more palpable daily. A less well-known, but notless meaningful, lesson could be garnered from the subsequent scheme by Senator Fulbright for limiting (indeed, emasculating) Americas security commitment to Israel banchoring it in a formal treaty placed in a multilateral casing. The United States would grant the guarantee bilaterally, but only to supplement and repeat a previously

adopted UN Security Council resolution; and the guarantee would be implemented only multilaterally.16 In this respect, it may be noted that the disparateperspectives of Right unilateralists and Left multilateralists may easily lead to similar results. The Right would more readily hesitate togrant commitments in the first place, while the Left would extend the commitments but, by placing them in a multilateral framework, latfail to implement them.

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**Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (2 of 2)**

(__) Multilateralism is most effective when its motivated by an uncompromising unilateral stance the war onterror proves.


But if Durban furnished ammunition for the Right multilateralist camp, did September 11 obliterate it and tilt the balance toward the Left multilateralist contentions,validating them retrospectively? Should one conclude (as did Thomas Friedman) that "the unilateralist message the Bush team sent from its first day in officeget rid of t

climate treaty, forget the biological treaty, forget arms control, and if the world doesnt like it thats toughhas now come back to haunt us"?55 Would an earlier,more multilateralist approach by the Bush administration have more greatly facilitated the post-September 11 multilateral cooperation itdesperately sought? The assumption, though widely held,is unproven, unprovable, and highly improbable. Such international cooperationwas mustered by the administration in its counterterrorism campaign was motivated by an acknowledged convergence of interests in battling a scourgfrom which no state was exempt and, in some cases no doubt, fear of incurring U.S. wrath. The Bush teams earlier unilateralist messagewas simply irrelevant. There was therefore no more need after September 11 than before to embrace multilateralism obsequiously rather than instrumentally.September 11 did not invalidate the occasional need for unilateral abstentionism. On the other hand, it accentuated yet again thedependence of multilateralism on unilateral American activism.

(__) Hard power and unilateralism is key to successful coalition-building which avoids the disads ofmultilateralism while incurring the benefits.

Charles Krauthammer, winter 2003, IR expert, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," The National Interest, p L/N

The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous

high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. Countries will cooperate with us, first, ouof their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzyfeelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the USS Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the Americaninvestigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodatinand multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was noa result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore

recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers goingbegging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize isthat unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clethat he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself createdcoalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing.

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AT Anti-Terror Cooperation Key

(__) Global intelligence cooperation increases the risk of war on terror failures through bad info.

Steven E. Miller, winter 2002, director of the International Security Program @ JFK School of Government, Harvard, THEWASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p proquest

For one thing, the barriers to intensive intelligence collaboration are considerable. U.S. agencies are reluctant to share information witheach other, much less with foreign governments and foreign intelligence bureaucracies. When sensitive information is involved, the police are out ofthe loop, Congress is eyed warily, and other federal agencies are not routinely on the distribution list. Assessing the intimacy of information-sharing arrangements between

governments is impossible for outsiders, but intelligence professionals suggest that the United States does not share everything even with its closest alli

and that even states with close ties to the United States may not be enthusiastic or generous about turning over information to their U.Scounterparts. Washington was deeply frustrated, for example, that the government of Saudi Arabia was not more forthcoming in assisting the investigation of the 1996terrorist attack on U.S. military personnel at Khobar Towers.Moreover, the current loose coalition that has formed in support of the U.S. battle with terrorism includes a motley collection of states-some that are close to the United

States but many that are not. Indeed, many of the states that might be in the best position to possess and provide information about terroristactivities in the Middle East or South Asia-such as Iran, Libya, and Syria-are states that have uneasy, or even hostile, relations with the

United States. The barriers to collaboration must be enormous in such cases, with reluctance likely in both directions to forging the most sensitive sorts ties between unfriendly states. In circumstances where deep trust between governments does not exist, concerns will inevitably arise that information is bein

manipulated, withheld, parceled out to maximize the price, shaded to advance the interests of the providing state, or even falselymanufactured. When genuine and useful information is provided, it may reflect only partial truths or be misleading and self-serving in some way.

(__) Past intelligence cooperation didnt prevent terrorism.

Benjamin Barber, 2003, Sociologist, FEARS EMPIRE, p 202

Despite intelligence efforts and increased cooperation among national police and military intelligence services, in the period between theAfghanistan and Iraq operations there were deadly terrorist attacks against a synagogue in Bjerba, Tunisia , the Sheraton Hotel in Karachthe American consulate in Karachi, a nightclub in Bali, and a hotel and an airplane in Kenya, killing 236 people in total and woundingmany more while spreading fear in the ubiquitous world of soft targets.

(__) International anti-terror cooperation provides little benefit while only constraining US resources and freedomof action.

Steven E. Miller, winter 2002, director of the International Security Program @ JFK School of Government, Harvard, THEWASHINGTON QUARTERLY, p proquest

Washington is likely to view the coalition as a source of support and an instrument of U.S. policy, but others are likely to see it as amechanism for influencing U.S. decisions or restraining U.S. action-a possibility that is mirrored in Bush administration concerns that the coalition might

shackle the United States. Further, the United States will not find it easy to push its coalition partners to do things they do not want to do ofeel that they cannot do. Managing this coalition will be a demanding, messy, vexing, and occasionally fruitless exercise. The United States willundoubtedly continue the diplomatic maneuverings it thinks are necessary or desirable to permit and support its war against terrorism. This ungainly coalition,

however, if it will be a true coalition, is unlikely to be so potent or so appealing an instrument that Washington is certain to sacrifice other policiescomprehensively for its sake.

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AT China Relations DA

(__) US-Sino relations will remain stable neither seeks to upset the other, there is no collision course.

Shannon Tow, Dec 2004, Research Assistant @ School of Political Science and International Studies @ U of Queensland,Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.3, p 434

Robert Ross. In his article "The Geography of Peace", Ross argues that as the two most geopolitically dominant regional actors, China

and the United States preside over their own separate but complementary spheres of regional influence. He asserts that continental

Southeast Asian states have aligned with China and maritime Southeast Asian states have aligned with the United States. The geographposition of China and the United States, and the evolution of their interests and military capabilities accordingly, make it unlikely thateither country would seek to project power into the other's respective sphere. Ross therefore postulates that the emerging bipolar structuris likely to be a stable and enduring one. This portrayal of Sino-U.S. relations has been acknowledged by recent literature on Asia-Pacific security.

(__) China has responded favorably to the Bush Doctrine.

Peter Van Ness, winter 2005, visiting fellow in the Contemporary China Centre and lectures on security in the Department of IR @Australian National U, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, p proquest

Clearly, China wants to avoid a conflict with the United States. The Japanese journalist Funabashi Yoichi quotes one Chinese think tank researcher as saying: We arestudying the origin of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Why did it happen? Was there no way to prevent it? Some see that a U.S.-China cold war is inevitable, but what can we d

to prevent it? Chinas strategic response to the Bush Doctrine is not confrontational toward the United States and does not require ChinaAsian neighbors to choose between Beijing and Washington, something none of them wants to have to do.26 Thoughit is not a design forwhat realiwould call balancing against the United States, it challenges Washington to think and act in ways quite different from the policies prescribed by the Bush Doctrinewhen trying to resolve problems in international relations.

(__) The US wont engage China in an Asian war neither actor wants to see conflict anyway.


A stable Southeast Asia is also desired by the United States. Americans are aware that China's cooperation is needed in areas ofcounterterrorism and missile proliferation. Washington, moreover, remains wary of U.S. engagement in any Asian land war. Thus while Chin

and the United States compete for influence in each other's sphere by use of non-military means, neither has an incentive to resort to conflict. SinAmerican compromises on regional issues of mutual interest throughout the 1990s play to Ross' argument that the Sino-U.S. relationship is an essentially stable one.

(__) China and the US both benefit from non-interference plus Chinas navy is old and cant make moves againstthe US.


Third, though the Sino-U.S. relationship is a competitive one, Ross argues that China and the United States' complementary geopoliticastrengths simultaneously prevent them from forcefully interfering in one another's respective sphere of influence. Chinese navalcapabilities remain limited due to ageing weapons systems, inferior technology and inadequate training of personnel. Furthermore, Chinis principally concerned with modernizing its economy and therefore desires regional stability in Southeast Asia.

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AT Dont Need Hard Power to Stop Terror

(__) Nye agrees: we cannot win the war on terror without hard power.

Joseph Nye, 3-10-05, Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard, BOSTON REVIEW, p L/N

If the United States is going to win the struggle against terrorism, it will need learn again to combine soft power with hard power.Stephen Walt recognizes this, but he does not dwell on it, perhaps because his realist paradigm does not stress soft power. But better anintelligent, moderate, and mature realism than a truncated neoconservative Wilsonianism that stresses ideas but loses touch with reality.

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AT EU Relations DA

(__) Economic and security relations with Europe outweigh unilateralism.

Mohammed Ayoob, spring 2005, Prof of IR @ JMU, The Unipolar Concert, World Policy Journal 22, p proquest

An article in the New York Times on the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential election began by asserting that the predominant view in Europe seemed to be that "no matter

who wins ... the consequences for American-European relations will be bad" and that neither France nor Germany, the linchpins of the Continent's transatlantic relationshiwould be willing to come to the aid of the United States in Iraq regardless of the outcome. (1) Analyses such as this one tend to portray America's relationswith major European powers in one-dimensional terms. They assume everything hinges on Iraq and ignore the dense web of interlockinsecurity and economic interests that bind industrialized Western Europe and America together. As Harvard's Jospeh S. Nye, Jr. has said inrefuting the conservative political analyst Robert Kagan's assertion that when it comes to their approach to major strategic and international questions Europeans and

Americans are from two different planets: "In their relations with each other all advanced democracies are from Venus."

(__) Disagreements are only over policy choice not the overall objectives and goals.

Mohammed Ayoob, spring 2005, Prof of IR @ JMU, The Unipolar Concert, World Policy Journal 22, p proquest

Second, disagreements within the concert are often over policy choices, as opposed to fundamental rules of the system or basic objective

Deterring and punishing "rogue" states and denying unconventional capabilities to those outside the club are shared objectives from whino member of the concert dissents. This was very clear in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. A reading of the U.N. Security Council debates on Iraq from1991 to 2003 makes it obvious that there were hardly any differences among the club of powerful states on taking steps that would severely derogate Iraq's sovereignty aneventually bring about a regime change. The imposition of no-f

unilat & hard power good 06-07

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