unfinished business: merkel’s germany and europe’s …€¦ · 11/09/2013 · it is about the...

UNFINISHED BUSINESS: MERKEL’S GERMANY AND EUROPE’S FUTURE September 11, 2013 | Brussels, Belgium MODERATOR: Jan Techau, director, Carnegie Europe SPEAKERS: Judy Dempsey, nonresident senior associate, Carnegie Europe Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist, Financial Times.

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UnfinishedBusiness:Merkel’sGermanyandEurope’sFutureJANTECHAU:Welcome,all, toCarnegieEurope. This is therentrée, Iguess; it’sout therelikeahairybeastanditgetsusallbackintotheconferenceroomsandoffices,thankfully,alsotoCarnegieEurope.I’mverygladthatallofyouareheretotalkaboutsomethingthat’soneverybody’s minds. It’s not the big, invisible elephant in the room; it’s the very visibleelephantintheroom,andthatisGermany,ofcourse.Ithinkthat’sgood.Wehaveelectionsaheadofus,andtheseelectionshaveparalysedthecontinentforacoupleofmonthsinvariousfields.Somanytimesandsooftenhaveweheardthesentence,nothingwilleverhappenuntiltheGermanelectionsareover.Wewilltalkaboutthispartly,Iguess.GermanyhasbeencalledbyGideonRachman,who’shererightnexttome,thevegetarianinaworld full of carnivores. RogerCohenof the IHTcalledGermany theGhostofEurope,aghostofinternationalaffairs.Atthecentreoftheghostisthechancellor,awomanthatalotofpeople findverydifficult to read, almosta ghost‐like creatureherself, somebodywhosewayswecan’tpredict.JudyDempsey,who’ssittinghererightnexttome,who’swithCarnegie,asallofyouknow,Iguess,justrecentlypublishedabookinGermanyonAngelaMerkel,aportrait. Wedecidedthat we wanted a condensed version of this out in English, which is the one that youhopefullyfound.It’sthisonehere,andyou’llfinditoverthere;thereisacopyforeverybody.Itisaboutthequestionofunfinishedbusiness,thequestionofMerkel’sagenda,theGhost’sagenda,ifyouwill,andtowhatextentshe’sbeenabletocompletetheagenda.Judy isof theopinionthat ithasn’tbeenfinished, that there isunfinishedbusiness. That’sonewayof saying thatGermany is not livingup to expectations,which is anotherbig redthread,acommoncurrentinthedebateaboutGermany,thatGermany,thebiggestcountryinEurope,hugeeconomy,isnotlivinguptoitsrole,neitherinEuropenoralsoasageopoliticalplayerinthewiderworld.Wearegoingtotalkaboutallofthesequestions.We’lltrytodoalittlebitofMerkelastrology,asI’vecalledit,trytoalsolookbeyondtheelectionsanddoalittlebitofaglimpseintothecrystalballandseewhat’snextforus.Judyiswithus,asyouknow. She’sbeenwithCarnegieforthelastone‐and‐a‐halfyearsasourchiefbloggerfortheStrategicEuropeblog,andis,ofcourse,aresidentofBerlin,whichmakeshertheperfectsourceforthekindofstuffwewanttotalkabout.Thenthere’sGideonRachman,whoprobablyhasajournalist’sdreamjob‐Idon’tknowhowmanytimesyou’veheardthisbefore,Ithinkit’sverymuchhowIlookatit–goingtoallofthehotspotsoftheplanet,beinginvitedtoallof[overtalking].GIDEONRACHMAN:Itrytoavoidthereallyhotspots!JANTECHAU:He’scloseenoughtothehotspotsandhasaccesstotherealkindsofpeople,andwritingthecolumneveryweekoninternationalaffairs,andalsoablog,obviously.He’soneof thebig explainers ofwhat’s goingon thatpeople actually rely on; that’s oneof thethingsthatpeopleinthistownreadreligiously.It’sgreattohaveyouhereonboard.


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JudywillpresentthefindingsofherstudyonMerkel,themainkindsofpointsshewantstomake.Gideonwillgivehiscomments,andthenwe’llopenituptoyou,aswealwaysdo.Wehopeyouhaveagreatdebate.One final thing before we start, Carnegie Europe is starting a German Election seriestomorrowontheweb.We’llbepublishinganumberofarticles;we’llstartwithtwoarticlestomorrow,plusJudy’spiece,andthenonsubsequentdays,wayintonextweek,we’llpublishanumberofpiecesonvariousaspectsoftheelectioncampaignandGermanpolicy.Withthat[inaudible],I’llnowhanditovertoJudy.JUDYDEMPSEY:Firstofall,thankyouverymuchforcoming,andthankyou,Jan,fortellingmetowritethispaper;itwasgreatencouragement,becauseyoujustneedtobemotivated.Irealisedthispaperhadtobewrittenbecausethere’sverylittleknown,insomeways,barringwhatGideonandJanwrite,andafewothers,aboutGermany,aboutwhatisMerkel’sagenda.It’sclearwhatheragendawasinthefirstterm‐essentiallymendtherelationswithUS,pickup all the broken pieces that her Social Democrat predecessor, Schröder, had left; mendrelationswithEasternEurope,whichshedid;put climatechangeback in theagenda. Shethrivedonthisinthefirsttwoorthreeyears,and,aboveall,sheputvaluesverymuchatthetopofheragenda,humanrightsandbeingtoughwithPutin, toughwithChina,visitingtheNGOs. The Germans really liked this because they felt: oh, we’re liked again. There’ssomething...whenyou’relivinginBerlinandyoutalktoGermans,theywanttobeliked.Just,in brackets, that’swhy they likeMerkel, because she doesn’t insult them and she doesn’tmakemistakes.However,I’djustliketoclosethebracketsonthis. Now,hersecondterm,verybriefly,hasbeentotallydominatedbytheEurocrisis.Shegotasenseofrealglobaleconomicswiththefinancial crisis,whichshewasvery, very slow to react to, and theEurocrisishasbeenanenormousshocktoher.Now, we have a problem with Angela Merkel today, because while she’s in this strangepositionofbeingTheLeaderinEurope,TheLeaderwhosetsthepoliciesfordealingwiththeEurocrisis,TheLeaderwhotellstheothercountrieswhattodo,actually,it’sverydifficulttoknowwhatMerkelstandsforwhenitcomestoEurope.Idoseea trendwhereshehasmoved increasinglyaway– itwasbegununderSchröder–fromthecommunautairepoliciestointergovernmental.Iseethisparticulartrendbecomingmuchmore pronounced underMerkel. It’s not only national interest; it’s about how sheperceivesEurope–asstatesratherthanthewholeideaofintegration.It’sgoingtobevery,veryimportantifshe’sgoingtoactuallydealwiththisunfinishedbusiness.This isoneaspectof theunfinishedbusinessofAngelaMerkel:wheredoesshestandwithregard toEurope? Is shegoing tobe intergovernmental? What sortof rolewillGermanyplayinselectingthenewheadsoftheinstitutionsnextyear?Willsheactuallygodowntheroad of political integration? I think this is a great debate, and Iwould love to hear yourviewsonthis.


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I’mscepticalatthemoment,forreasonsIwillexplainlater. Thisisthefirstbigunfinishedbusiness:wheredoesAngelaMerkelstandwithEurope,whatdoesshewantfromEurope?Thisdoesn’t onlymeanEurope; it actually spins into themost important issuesofEuropetoday,itsforeignandsecuritypolicy.It’salongtimesinceIhaveknownofachancellorwhohasshownsolittleinterestinsecurityaffairs, defence issues and strategic thinking. The idea of security and defence seemscompletelyalientoMerkel.Shetookalongtimetounderstand,toevendiscusswhysomanyGerman troopswere sent toAfghanistan. She didn’twant to be asked aboutAfghanistan.Afghanistan’snearlytaboo,usingthewarwastaboo.Shewasneverfullyengaged.Interestingly,overthelasttwoyears,becauseofthephasingoutoftheconscription,which,actually,wasintheCoalitionTreaty,Merkelstoodabsolutelyawayfromthisdebatebecauseshewanted to sense thepublicmood. Shehardly supportedherDefenceMinisteron this.Thiswasabigthing,gettingridofconscription,becauseitwasthekindofbindingelementofGermansocietyafter1945.SheneverunderstoodorcontributedtotheroleofthenewGermanBundestag:whydoyouhaveanarmy?Whatdoyouwanttodowithit?Aboveall,whatdoyouwanttodowithitina European context and NATO context? This has never been discussed. I think this is acrucial aspect and is another very crucial dimension of Merkel’s unfinished business.European defence and security policy will go nowhere until the next German chancelloractually has an open debate and decides, actually, what is the role of the German armedforceswithinEuropeandpurposeoutsideEurope?Thethirdissueistwoaspectsoftheforeignpolicy. IknowObamahascomeinfora lotofcriticismlately,butthereissolittlechemistrybetweenthesetwoleaders.ObamahasgoneoutofhiswaytotalktoMerkel;it’sshewhohephonesmostofthetimeforcrisis.Nomatterwhathe’sdone,peacemedals, invitations to theWhiteHouse, shenever reciprocatesonalevelofevenstrategicthinking.Obamaiscleverenoughtoknowthathecan’taskMerkelformoneyorhecan’taskGermanstogotowar,buthewantstoknowwhereMerkelstandsoncrucialissues,particularlyNATOandthetransatlanticrelationship,and,aboveall,Europeansecuritypolicy.AmericawantsastrongEurope from the securityanddefencepointof view. WithoutGermany involved inthis,America’snotgoingtogetit,butAmericaisn’tgoingtowaitforEuropeeither. IthinkthestrategicinterestsofAmericaaredriftingawayfromEurope.ThefinalpointIwouldliketomake,justtosumupthisunfinishedbusiness,andIdon’tputthisintomyrecommendations,Merkel...thetitleofmyGermanbookwasThePhenomenonofMerkel.IcalleditthisbecauseMerkelverymuchpersonalisespolitics.I’mnotconvincedshe likes Obama, but a lot of leaders don’t like other leaders but they get on with them.SomehowshehasmadethatstepwiththeUnitedStates.She clearly doesn’t like Putin and she has allowed her CDU to be absolutely outspokenagainst what is taking place in Russia. Above all, she has clearly indicated that the oldGermanostpolitikisover.Fine,butstrategicallyshehasn’treplaceditwithanything.She’sbeencriticisingRussia–Idon’tmindhercriticisingRussia,butshe’sbeencriticisingPutinfar


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too longwithout sitting downwith her aides and advisors and the broader foreign policycommunityinGermany:whatsortofpolicydowewanttowardsRussia?WeseenowthatthisdriftinEuropeisallowingRussiatopickandchoosehowit’sdoingtheEasternPartnershipcountries. Again, this isa fundamentalunfinishedbusinessofMerkel,andwhoeverbecomesthenextchancellor,whethersheorsomebodyelse,theyhavealottopickupon.I’llleaveitatthat.JANTECHAU:MayIaskyouonemorequestion?JUDYDEMPSEY:Yes.JANTECHAU:YoualludedtoconscriptionandtokeepingtheGermanmilitaryoutoftheseoperations, and Russia and so on. The chancellor is credited with having an incrediblefeeling,averysensitiveantennaforwhatpeoplethinkandforwhatshecangetawaywithpoliticallybackhome.Do you think that in all of these decisions,where she actuallymadedecisions, to positionGermany,shewas100%inaccordwiththegeneralpopulation;orcouldshegetawaywithmorepoliticalleadershiponthesethings,ifonlyshewantedto?JUDYDEMPSEY:IthinkI’dgowiththelatter.Ithinkhertraitissoanti‐risk,andhertraitisso determined to get the public behind her, the consensus, rather than shaping theconsensus.Sheallowstheotherpartiestodoalltherunningandtosee...andifshegetsthesensethatthepublicisn’tthere,evenifshebelievessomethingisright,shewon’tpushit.That’s the interesting thing aboutMerkel’s second term:what does she believe in? Whatconvictionshassherelayed? I’mreallynotsosure if she’sanyconvictionsapart fromthewholeissueofpower. Ifyouhavepowerit’sveryimportanttousethepossibilitiesandtouse thepotentialofpowerand thepotentialofGermany. I think this iswhereMerkelhasfailedEurope,nottappingintotheGermanyanditsleadership.JANTECHAU:Now,a finalquestionbeforewemoveontoGideon;youweretalkingaboutthe first term and then how the second term was markedly different: now what’s youroutlookforthethirdterm,ifthereistobeone,whichmostpeopleexpect?Isthisgoingtochange? Will she have the desire to create a real legacy and therefore become moreproactive,orwillweseecontinuity?JUDYDEMPSEY:Itwillbeterribleifweseecontinuity.ItneedsabigcrisistojoltGermanyintoaseriousleadershiprole,anddespitethehugeEurocrisis,ithasn’tjoltedthechancellorenoughtodecide:thisiswhatwewanttodo.MygutfeelingisthatunlessMerkelhasanewteamofreallysolidadvisorsthatchallengeher,wemayhaveabitmoreofthesame.JANTECHAU: Judy, thanks a lot. Gideon, you’ve just been to Berlin. You’ve talked to anumberof people there at various levels. YoumetwithPutin after yesterday aboutwhatyou’vebroughtbackfromBerlin. HowdoyoulookatthesethingsandhowdoyoulookatJudy’s[inaudible]assessmentthatthereissomuchunfinishedbusinessfortheGermans?


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GIDEONRACHMAN:Thanksforinvitingme;it’snicetobehere.Iguessmybroadtake,andwecandiscussthisfurtheroverthecourseoftheevening,isI’mabitmoresympathetictoMerkelandthewayshe’shandledthings,andtoherlackofambition,ifyoulike.Ithinkit’spoliticallyrealisticandprobablydesirableatthisstage,butI’llexplainwhytowardstheendofmyremarks.Ithoughtitmightbeuseful, justbriefly,since,asyousay,everybody’sbeenhangingontheGermanelection,tosetoutwhatIthinkpeople’sexpectationsoutsideGermany,expectationsandhopes, are for theGermanelection,what theyhopewillhappen,what I thinkactuallywillhappen,andthenmaybeafewremarksonwhatIthinkshouldhappen.Ithinkit’sclearthatthereareperhaps...certainlyinrecentmonthstherehavebeenstrongexpectationsandhopesbuiltupinSouthernEurope,inParis,slightlydifferentlyinLondon,andinWashingtonaboutwhatmighthappenafterMerkelwins,assumingshedoes.Ithinkthatthosehopesarebeginningtodissipateaspeoplerealisethat,actually,maybeMerkel’sforrealinhercaution.IthinkintheSouthernEuropean/Frenchaxisthere’sahopethatyou’llgetaGermanythat’smore committed toEuropean integrationafter the election, thatwill backwhat’s aproperbanking union, not just regulation but actually also a deep resolution fund andmaybe atsomepointdepositinsurance.There’safeelingthatthebitthatGermanysigneduptoisonlyone of three elements and they need to go further. There’s a hope that Germany mightcommittothefamousEurobondsaftertheelection.There’sevenahopethatatsomepointitwilldevelopapan‐Europeansocialsecuritysystemtobackupthelabourmarket.Thosearethehopes.Londonhasaslightlydifferentsetofhopes,verydifferentsetofhopes. They’rehopingforwhatyoumightcallOperationRescueCameron, thatonceMerkel’s inshecanturnaroundandsay,okay,wecandoadealwiththeBrits;thisiswhatthedealis;andthatthatwillgetCameron,byextension, theUK,off thisplankthatthey’rewalkingoutonwhichmight leadthemoutoftheEuropeanUnion.InWashington, I think slightly less expectation but perhaps a bit of hope that, okay, youknow,we’ve got the Syria crisis on, she’s in themiddle of an election;we all know aboutGermany’shistoricreluctancetodeploymilitaryforce.Shecan’tdomuchnow,butgiventheMiddleEasterncrisisisgoingtobewithusforquiteawhile,thatmaybeaftershe’swonherthird mandate, she can begin to make the argument for more expansive German foreignpolicywhereGermanyisn’tjustasortofbystanderinthesedebatesabouttheuseofmilitaryforce.Thosearethehopes.I think the reality,my guess,maybe she’ll surprise us, but I think, actually, notmuchwillchange. I thinkthatthat’sbecauseMerkel isn’t justmakingtheseargumentsfrompoliticalexpedience;Ithinksheactuallybelievesinthem.OntheEurobonds,Eurosocialsecurity,asyousaid...IwasjustinBerlin;Iwastalkingtosomeofheradvisors.Specifically,oneofthemorememorablemoments,Iraisedthisquestionofapan‐Europeansocialsecuritysystemtosomebody in the chancellery, who just said, no way, forget it, not going to happen.EssentiallytheyseeitasaveryshortroutetothetransferunionandanefforttogetGermantaxpayerstofundthesocialsystemsofSouthernEurope,whichthey’renotreallyupfor.


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Onbankingunion,thelineIwastold,and,again,Ididn’tdoubtthesincerity–maybeIwasbeingspun–isthat,actually,thisregulatorybitofthebankingunionisabigtaskinitself.It’snotjustonelittlestepandthenontotheotherstuff;it’sveryimportant,verydifficulttogetitright. Of course, the other two steps – the big fund to bail out banks, and the commondeposit insurance – are, again, steps towards transfer union, so regarded with deepsuspicion,notgoingtohappen.Howaboutthisideathatinthelongrun,oncewe’vegotthroughtheimmediatecrisis,you’regoing to have to underpin thismonetary and economic unionwith a real political union.That’safairlystandardsentimentinthistown,asIrecall.Again,itgotverylittlehouseroominBerlin.Iwastoldthatthat’sbasicallynonsense,thatalltheideasthatareputforward‐thestandardstepsinpoliticalunion,likeanelectedcommissionpresidentormajorityvotingonforeignpolicy,thesekindsofaspirations...thequestionwasturnedbacktomeandsaid,well,how would that solve the Euro crisis? It’s not relevant to the Euro crisis, so why is itnecessary?Averyscepticalattitudetothat.WhenIsaidtooneofmyinterlocutors,whowasEngelMussdau[?],yousoundveryBritishon this, they laughed and said, well, what’s so bad about that? It was not something I’dexpectedtohearinBerlin,although,ofcourse,delighted,butIwassurprised.ThisbringsustotheUKandwhatdoesCameron’shopethattherecanbesomesortofdealwithGermany...isthereanythinginit?Idon’tthinkyoushouldunderestimatetheextenttowhichtheBritsarebuildingalltheirhopesandtheirplansontheGermans. TalkingintheBritishForeignMinistrytosomeonereasonablysenior, theybasically justsaid,she’sgottowin;allourchipsareonher.They do believe that ‐ although I think you’re probably right that she doesn’t have aparticulargoodrelationshipwithObama,ornonaturalrapport‐forsomereason,shedoesgetonwithCameronandtheyhopethatsomethingcanbedonethere.IthinkthattherearegroundsforhopeontheBritishpart,butIthinktheyprobablyshouldn’tgettheirhopesuptoohigh.I think the Germans genuinely do not want to see Britain leave the European Union, arebeginningtotaketheideaseriouslythatitcouldhappen,butbelievetherearelimitstohowfartheycango.TheyarenowconsciousofjusthowlongtheshoppinglistofdemandsfromtheToryEuro‐scepticscouldbe.WhateverCameronthinks,hecouldbeforcedintomakingallsortsofdemandsthattheGermansjustfeeltheycan’tdeliveron.Actually,ratherthansayingtotheBritish,wewanttohearnowwhatyouwant, theywanttheBritishtoshutupforquitea longtime,becausetheirfearisthatassoonastheBritishshoppinglist isoutthere,itwillsimplybeaddedto,sotryandkickitoffintothedistance.There’safearinBerlinthatthere’llbewhattheycallasortofaccidentalBritishexit,wherethe British don’t want to leave, the Germans don’t want them to leave, but the wholesituationgetsoutofhandandthat’swhathappens.There’ssomegoodwill,butIthinkalsoaconcernthatitcouldgetoutofhand.


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Onthequestionof,willtheGermansbemorewillingtojointheUS,asortofsub‐sheriffoftheworldinthisroleofglobalpolice?Again,Ithinkafairlystrongnowayonthat.There’snorealwillingnesstochallengeGermanpublicopinion,whichisstronglyagainsttheideaofnotjustSyriabutalsoaLibyanstyleoperations‐infact,ifanything,goingthroughaslightlynewresurgenceof anti‐Americanismbecauseof thewholeNSA row, rather thanwillingness togetinvolved.You say that the Germans want to be loved, and I think that’s probably true. In somerespects,they’requitesuccessful,actually. TherewasarecentBBCpollwhichshowedthatGermanyisthemostpopularcountryintheworld,surprisingly.IthinkthereisadangerofGermanisolationism,toGermany.Ifyoulookattheirkeyrelationships,theAmericanshavetodiscountthemonthisglobalpolicemanaspect;theFrenchrelationship’snotworkingverywell; there’s a lot of resentment towards Germany in Southern Europe. As you say, therelationshipwith Russia’s not great. I think there’s only one country at themoment thatthey’rereallygettingonwellwith,whichisPoland,whichisimportant,butit’sprobablynotenough.Ontheotherhand,isthisdangeroustoGermany?No,notyet,becausetheserelationsaren’tterrible,there’snobodythreateningGermany,butthereisasensethatGermany’sdriftedofffromalotofitskeyrelationships.Whatshouldtheydo?ThisiswhereIthinkIslightlydisagreewithJudy.IthinkthatMerkelhas played it quite well, given the Euro crisis that she was confronted with, which hasnecessarilydefinedhermostrecentterm.Ithinkwhatshe’sbeentryingtodoisto,A,keeptheshowontheroad,prevent therebeingamassiveeconomiccollapse,whichwouldbeadisasterforeverybody;but,also,tobalanceherobligationstoEuropewithherobligationstotheGermanpeople.I think that, in away that’s slightly taken people by surprise in this town, she’s adjustedtowardsherobligationstowardstheGermanpeopleandtheGermantaxpayers,butIdon’tthink that that’s a bad thing to do, and I think, in someways, it’s a politically responsiblethingtodo.Ithinkthatshehasasensethatifshecommitstothistransferunion,ifitallgoesterriblywrong,iftheGermantaxpayersarepresentedwithsomeginormousbill,iftheyfeelthattheireconomichealthhasbeenseriouslyimperilledbycommitmentsthattheymadeingoodfaith,that’snotgoodforEurope,it’snotgoodforGermany.She has to be very cautious about what commitments she makes, because if the chequecomes inandtheyhavetopay it, itwouldbedisastrous,actually, forGermany’s long‐termrelationship with Europe. I think that she’s right to realise there’s a limit to what theGermanswilldoforEuropeandthatexceedingthatlimitispoliticallyandsociallydangerous.Now,whereyoudrawthelineisdifficult,butIthinkifyoulook,asweweresayingearlier,atwhat’shappeningintheNetherlands,acountrywhichisn’tburdenedbythehistoricguiltofGermany, it’s gone much further towards Euro‐scepticism – on immigration, on transfer.That’savisionof,Ithink,whereGermanycouldendup,andit’sslightlyworryingwhenit’stheDutchwhoareafoundermemberstate,etc,butthey’reamedium‐sizedcountry.IfthiswasGermanywhichwashavingaFreedomParty,afarleftpartyreallysurginginthepolls,thatwouldbearealcauseforanxietyacrossEurope.


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I think it’s toMerkel’s credit that the political debate and the election debate that you’rehavinginGermanyisreallyquiteacalmone,quiteaboringone.YouhavethisalternativeforDeutschlandParty,but,as farrightpartiesgo, it’s rathersweet that their farrightparty ismade up of university professors and constitutional lawyers; it’s not skinheads, althoughyou’llhearpeoplesaying,oh,behindthemtherearesinisterforces.Nonetheless,it’saprettyresponsible,intellectualparty,makingargumentsthatprobablydoneedtobeoutthere.ThefactthattheGermanpoliticaldebateisstillprettycentred,isn’trushingoffdespitethefactthatthey’reunderenormousstress. Idon’tthinkoneshouldunderestimatetheextentwhich, beneath this calm exterior of German policy‐making, they were really, reallyconcernedacoupleofyearsagoandmaybestillare...Iwasmuchstruck,talkingtoaseniorGermandiplomatabout18monthsagowhodescribed theEuro tomeas:amachine fromhellthatwecan’tturnoff.Theywereveryworriedthatthiswholethingcouldspiraloutofcontrol.Ithinkthey’refeelingabitbetternowthatthesituation’sundercontrol.Ithinktheyalsofeelthatthey’vegotallsortsofnotterriblyusefuladvice,fromWashington,fromLondon,eithersaying,ditchausterity,commit to transferunion,andtheywereright;theyheldthelineagainstthatunderalotofrhetoricalpressure,andthatthey’refeelingabitvindicatedabout that. Equally, theydidn’t gooff in theotherdirection,whichwas to say,well, let’s justkickGreeceoutof theEuroandbreakthewholethingup,whichalsowouldhavebeendangerous. I think,withsomereason, they’re feelingvindicatedandthey’renotcocksure,theydon’tthinkthey’rethroughtheend.Theyknowthere’salottobedone.Lastthought:whyhasn’tMerkelgotthisbigvisionthatJudywants?Ithink...JUDYDEMPSEY:No,Idon’twantavision.GIDEONRACHMAN:Well,amorestrategic...IthinkthatsomebodysaidtomeinBerlinthat,well, she’s got a physicist’s approach to politics, bywhich theymeant she’s experimental:she’ll try something, if itdoesn’twork she’ll tryanotherexperiment. That’s theway she’sbeen feeling her way through the Euro crisis. I don’t think that’s such a bad way ofapproachingit.I’dgiveherslightlyhighermarksthanJudy.JANTECHAU:Gideon,you’rebasicallydescribingacountrythatisgoalistinitsinclinationsandinstincts,butthenagainthegoalistcountriesofEurope–FranceandBritain,toacertainextent, ifyouwanttocall itgoalist ‐at leastgiveusthebenefitofoutward‐lookingforeignplans.Herewe’vegotagoalistcountrythatdoesn’tevengiveusthebenefitof[inaudible].My related question that I have on this point is, Germany likes to believe that it is themultilateralist player in its foreign policy position. TheUN is amantra; NATO, they stillbelievein;andtheUN,theystillbelievein;andGermanycanneverdoforeignpolicyallonitsownandaloneandisolated.Thathasbeenthepost‐warconsensusfortwogenerations.At the same time, this multilateralist country is not investing an awful lot into thesemultilateralistorganisationsthatarepartoftheforeignpolicyfield.ItisdisconnectedfromtheintellectualdebateinNATOandaboutNATOanddefenceissuesandstrategicquestionsbehindit,andit isnotputtinga lotofenergyandjuiceintothedevelopmentofEUforeign


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policyeither. Wehaveamultilateralist lipservicewithoutan investment intomultilateralorganisations. Isthataproblem,or is thatsomethingthatEuropecancompensateforanddealwith?GIDEONRACHMAN:I’dsayacouplethingsthere;firstly,Ithinkit’s...Icanseewhatyou’regettingatwhenyoudescribe themasgoalist, but there’s an importantelementof goalismmissing,whichisthevisionofLaGrandeNation,thedesiretobestompingaroundtheworldandsettingthetoneinthebigglobalproblems.Idon’tthinkGermanywantstodothat.Infact,that’spartoftheproblem,thattheydon’tactuallyseethemselvesashavingthatrole.I think, actually, oneof the reasons that itmaybe increasinglyproblematic isbecause theexpectation,untilrecently,wouldbethatastheburdenofhistory’sgraduallybecomeslightlylessheavy,Germanywouldbecomemoreliketheotherwesternpowers,morewillingtoact,duh‐duh‐duh‐duh.Ithinkwhatwe’rebeginningtoseeisthattheotherwesternpowersarebecomingmorelikeGermany,inthesensethattheirpublicopinionsareincreasinglysaying,well,why thehell shouldwebedoing this? Why shouldwebe intervening in theMiddleEast,andsoon?You’vegotatthemoment–Ithinkit’sreallyonlyjustbeginningtoemerge–areallybiggapbetweentheforeignpolicyelite,intheUKandinWashington,whosay,well,ofcoursewe’vegottodothisstuffandthere’llbeallsortsofmalignglobalconsequencesifwedon’t,andwhoare still trying tomake the case, but actually failing tomake the case: if Cameron loses inparliament, Obama probablywould’ve lost in Congress, although hemay have got off thehooknow.That’sbecauseretailpoliticiansarerespondingtoapublicopinionwhichistwo‐thirdsagainstintervention.Now,theGermans,inthatsense,areaheadofus,becauseMerkeldoesn’tevenbothermakingtheargument;sheknowswhatGermanpublicopinionis.She’snotevengoingtoattempttotry topersuade them. I think thedanger is thatGermanywasokay in thisworldbecausethey could rely on the... it was a rather comfortable position; you could say, oh, bloodyAmericans, they’reway toomuscular, far too interventionalist; and yet itwas helpful thatthere was somebody out there with a bit of muscle who was prepared to get involvedoccasionally.Although thatargumentwas, I think,boughtby theGerman foreignpolicyelite, thepublicneverboughtit,really.Theforeignpolicyelitedoesn’tmaketheargument.Now,iftheBrits,theFrenchandtheAmericansstartsbackingoff,thenthere’salackof...thenwe’reinanewworld. Wediscovermaybeit isn’tdangerous,maybeitwillbe fine,butmaybeitwon’tbe,actually.Itwas interesting, talking to the foreignpolicy‐makers inBerlin lastweek;my impressionwasthattheywerequitealarmedbythethoughtthatCongresswouldvoteagainstthis.Theysaid,look,thewholeofworldsecurityisbuiltonAmericanredlines,thefactthattherearethesehundredsofAmericanmilitarybasesallovertheworldandthatthey’renotjusttherefordecoration.Theymaynotbeused,butthey’rethere.Ifonesuddenlygetstheideathat,well,actually,they’regoingtogohome,orthey’renevergoingtoleavethebase,you’reinanewworld.


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That’s, I think,thedanger. It’snotsomuchthatGermany’schangedfundamentally, Idon’tthink;it’sjustthattheothersarebecomingabitGerman.JANTECHAU:Youbothalludedtopublicopinion.Thisismyfinalquestionbeforeweopenittotheaudience.WhenIaskedyou,yousaidthatMerkelcouldprobablygetawaywithalotmoreleadership,ifonlyshewasstrongenoughandmadethecase,andthenthepublicwouldcomearound.YoubasicallysaidthatsheknowsexactlywheretheGermansstand,andshebasicallygivesthemtheforeignpolicyposturethattheGermanssecretlydesiretohave.Now,thisis...I’vebeenusing[overtalking].GIDEONRACHMAN:Notsosecretly.JANTECHAU:Well,notsosecretly.Here’smyquestion:Iwondertowhatextentthatistrue,becausethereis...thisisthekindofexampleI’vebeenusingnowforacoupleofyears;afterthe last election four years ago,Germanswere asked:do you thinkGermany shouldbe inAfghanistan? Predictably, about 75% of the people said no, they didn’t like the idea thatGermantroopswerethere.Someofthemevensaid,getout.Atthesametime,whenyouaskedthemhowimportantitwastothem,only2%or3%saidthat thiswas important enough for them to actuallymake their decisionwho to vote for,basedontheAfghanistanissue. That’swithinthemarginoferror; that’salmostnegligible,2% to 3%. Themessagewas,wedon’t like it, but, also,wedon’t caremuch. In that gapbetweenwedon’t like it, butwe alsodon’t think it’s really awfully important, there is theroom for leadership. Thatwould be the kind of space that an assertive chancellor, if shewantedto,couldoccupy.Isthisjusttootheoreticalaconstruct,orisitapossibility?JUDY DEMPSEY: The Afghanistan thing is very interesting because never once did theparliamentfailtoextendthemandate;theyalwaysvotedfortheextensionofthemandateinAfghanistan despite the public antipathy towards Afghanistan. This is such a disconnectbetweenthepublicsentimentsandtheparliamentarysenseofsolidaritystill,actually,withNATO,theobligation:thetroopsarethereandweshouldcontinuewiththis.Ithink,asGideonalludedto,andwediscusseditearlier,there’sagrowingantipathytowardwarand intervention,not justbyGermanybutby theothercountries. I think this isvery,verydangerous.We’renottalkingaboutintervention,militaryorwar;it’sdangerousforthewhole ideaof security architecture forEurope. Germany, being thebiggest, isn’t injectinganykindofdiscussionintothis.Much more serious is this gap, increasing gap, and Merkel knows, Merkel is very clever,there’snogapbetweenthepublicandthe leadership inGermany,becauseMerkelhas thisterrific sense, a wonderful sense of it, there’s such a gap between Hollande’s public andBritain’spublic.ThepoliticaleliteissooutofsynchnowwiththepublicinGreatBritainandFrance,and,asGideonandIbothagree,it’sbecomingverymuchlikeGermany.Ithinkthisishighlydangerous.


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I think ifMerkel knows thepublic sowell, shemust also know that she canpersuade thepublic. She’s already had them twice now to give her thismandate. We remember howFischer, against all the odds, persuaded the public to back theNATObombing against theSerbs inKosovo. It is doable if youdeploy the kind of...well, he had to deploy themoralarguments.Merkeldoesn’tevenexplainwhereshestandsonSyria,andsheneverexplainedfullywhyGermanyabstainedinLibya.What I find interesting aboutMerkel is the lack of transparency in explaining the lack offoreignpolicydecisions.JANTECHAU:This isalmost like theperfectstorm;wehave thewesterncountries, so thetraditionalleaders,BritainandtheUnitedStates,becomingmoreGermanicintheirwaysonforeign policy; we have Germany that is becoming evermore important, butwhich has aleadershipandapopulationthatdoesn’twanttobecomemoreimportant.We’regoingfromGermanelectoralpoliticstothedeclineinthewest.GIDEONRACHMAN:Yes, but one also has to be conscious that Syria’s a very specificchallenge,becauseit’salmosttooeasyforusinthiskindofforeignpolicyworldtosay,well,thepublicareobviouslywrong.They’renotobviouslywrong.Maybeit’stherightdecisiontonotgetinvolved,actually.I would narrowly say that you should, but that’s maybe because I’m brainwashed by thepeopleImixwith.Therearelotsofvery,verydifficultquestionsaboutthiswhicharenot...youcan’tjustbrushasideandsay,well,clearlytheleadershipthingtodowouldbetomakethestrikes.JUDYDEMPSEY:Gideon,mayIinterrupt?Merkelcouldeasilygetaroundthisidea.Merkelknowsshecan’tmentionthewordintervention. Nobody’saskinghertointervene,butshecouldat leastgiveamuchmorecleardirection in termsofhelping Jordanandhelping theneighbours over the refugees, and giving that kind of humanitarian response. She hasn’tgiventhisdirection.Thiswouldhave...shecouldusesoftpowermuchmoreeffectively.GIDEONRACHMAN:Also,tobehonest,IwasabitstruckbythelackofoutrageinGermanyontheuseofchemicalweapons.YouoftenhearfromGermansabouttheburdenofhistory,andthey’vebeenactuallyremarkableaboutcontinuingtokeepthatattheforefrontoftheirforeignpolicy.TheweekIwasthere,thepresidentwasinFrance,atOradour‐sur‐Glane,andallthat’sstillgoingon. YouhearontheNSA,well,we’reverysensitiveaboutitbecauseofourownhistoryandtheGestapoandtheStasi–well, theuseofchemicalweaponsshouldalsohaveacertainresonanceinGermany,butthathistoricalechowasnot...JUDYDEMPSEY:Onepoint‐thisismyblogfortomorrow–it’sveryinterestingyousaythis.Germany is The Supporter of disarmament and upholding international weaponsconventions. There has been none of this debate taking place after the Syrian use of theweapons.Icompletelyagree,thisblindness,becauseiftheyspokeaboutit,theywouldfeelobligedtodosomethingaboutit,it’sveryinteresting,thisselective...JANTECHAU:Tobehonest,therewasnotreallyanywhereahugeoutrageaboutthisinthewest.


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JUDYDEMPSEY:No,it’sastonishing.JANTECHAU:It’snotonlyaGermanphenomenon.JUDYDEMPSEY:Yes.GIDEONRACHMAN:I think there’s a horrible legacy of cynicism about... people are sounwilling...it’samixtureof,A,they’revery,veryunwillingtobelieveintelligenceonanythingnow.Also,becausethey’resodesperatenottogetinvolved,they’releaningoverbackwardsto say,oh,well,maybe itwas theopposition. Whywouldone trust theCIA,orwhatever?Theyreallydon’twanttobelieveit’strue,evenifthere’squitealotofevidenceofit.JANTECHAU:WeendedupwithSyriahereonthepanel,whichissomethingthathappensthesedays. I’d like toopen itnow to theaudience. Ihope thatyou’vegotyourquestionsready.NICHOLASTWIST: Thank you.Nick Twist; I’m from the Irish Permanent Representation,butspeakinapersonalcapacity,Ihastentosay. Youmentionedthemilitarydimensionaswell. Just, first, thatremark ‐ I thinkoneofHelmutKohl’selectionsloganswasWeiterso,Deutschland.IthinkpossiblyAngelaMerkelistakingthesameapproachashermentor.Myquestion is, given that youhad this grave continuity betweenSchröder andMerkel, intermsofnon‐engagement,whereasFranceandnowtheUK,toanextent...youcanseeflip‐flop despite Cameron’s desires. Obviously, the UK hasn’t had a continuity of policy sinceBlairandIraq.Iwonder,withaviewtotheEuropeanCouncilinDecember,whichismeantto concentrateondefenceand security, doyou thinkgiven thedifferentpositions and thelackof enthusiasm in the centralplayer, that the temperswill settle, full‐stop, rather thannewimpulsetoEuropeanUnionontheforeignpolicyside.DUŠANRELJIĆ:Thankyou. IamDušanReljić fromtheGermanInstitute for InternationalAffairs and Security. One comment andonequestion; the comment is about theGermanslovingtobeloved.Ifinditdifficulttoimagineapersonoranationthatdoesn’twanttobeloved.Thereisacompetitionforlovegoingout,Isuppose‐softpowerandsoon,whateveryouwanttocallit.On amore serious issue, a question: Judy, did you try topredict in your analysis how theotherEuropeanstatesandhowtheothermajorinternationalactorswouldreacttoamoreassertiveGermanrole,especially,forinstance,in2014,100yearssincethebeginningoftheFirstWorldWar,it’sbeingcommemorated,and75sincethebeginningoftheSecondWorldWar?WoulditbeevencounterproductiveifGermanywouldtrytopositionitselfintheheartofthedecision‐making?Thankyou.JANTECHAU:Twogreatquestions;oneontheDefenceandSecuritySummitandtheotheroneonhowmuchtoleranceisthereforanassertiveGermany?JUDYDEMPSEY: I’ll take the second one. First, nice to see you, Tochan. IfMerkel is re‐elected,I’mprettyconvincedthatshewillnotfeedintotheDefenceSummit.I’mconvinced


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thatshewillnottakeonthisleadershiprole.She’saverypersuasiveperson,andanytimeatthecouncils,shehasagreatreputationforfindingcompromisesandbeingpolitebutfirm.Ithinkthereasonis,it’snotherpast;Ithinkshe’sbeenverymuchscarredbythisEurocrisis.TheEurocrisishasexposedafragilityofthepost‐wararchitectureinEurope.ThefactthattheGreeksandsomeotherSouthernEuropeannationscanputaNaziuniformonMerkelanddepict,oh,thisisthenew,greathegemoninEurope,itisreally...IrememberGideon’spieceseveral months ago on this, and my talks in the Foreign Ministry – they feel disgusted,saddenedandshocked.It’smadethemveryreluctanttogodowntheroadofthisleadership.You’ve got the reluctance on the Germans’ side, and on the other side of the Europeans,frankly, they would like Germany to pay up; that’s their role of leadership. They knowGermanywon’tdothesecurity,butGermany’sdamnediftheydoanddamnediftheydon’tinthistermofleadership,andthat’sthegreatestdrawback.ImustsayonethinginabigdefenceofGermany,and,ofcourse,nomemberstatewantedtodiscusstheKosovo‐Serbnegotiations–Germanygavefull,unqualifiedsupporttoAshton:getonwithitanddoit.ItwasthefirsttimethatAshtoncouldreallypulloffsomething,becausethememberstatesdidn’tintervene.Sometimesalackofleadershipbyamemberstateisaverygoodthing.GIDEONRACHMAN:I was just thinking, actually, as you were talking, that there’s someanalogybetweenthekindsofleadershipthatotherEuropeansdemandfromGermanyinthemonetaryareaandwhattheymightacceptintheforeignpolicyarea.Inotherwords,whenitcomestoEuro,there’sasortof,toputitcrudely,ahopethattheGermanswilljustpayupbutnotbetooassertive,andjustwriteachequebutdon’tactuallytelluswhattodo.Similarly,IthinkthatpeopleperhapswhoaskforamoreassertiveGermany,behindthatisanassumptionthattheGermanswillfallintolinewiththekindofforeignpolicythat’seitherconsensual, inwhich theyhavea relatively small say, or that isdreamtup inWashington,London,Paris,etc.Germanmuscle‐thanksverymuch,butwe’renotactuallythatinterestedinyouropinion.JUDYDEMPSEY:Yes.GIDEONRACHMAN:I think that that, clearly, is unrealistic, so that if a more, quotes,assertiveGermanyoramoreinterventionalistGermanywasalsoaGermanythatalongwiththatbegantohaveamoreclearly‐definedviewofitsownnationalinterest,asFrancedoes,asBritaindoes,thatisnotapurelyEuropeaninterest,notjustthesumoftheEuropeanparts,Ithinkpeoplewouldgetnervousaboutthat,evenasyousay,essentiallyafter1914.Peoplehaven’treally thought it through,perhapsbecause theyhaven’tyethadto,becausetheredoesn’t seem tobemuch evidence thatGermany’s going to... other thanKosovo andAfghanistan.EvenoverAfghanistan,although,asyousay,itwasverycontroversial–you’dgo there, the Germans were famous for never leaving their base, not because of all thecaveats,nothingtodowiththekindofbraveryorotherwiseofthetroops,buttheywerekindofstuckupinthislittlezoneandtheyweren’tallowedtodrivearoundatnight.


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JANTECHAU:Before,ifwetakesomemorequestions,there’sJamieup,behindthere.IjustwantedtomakethequickannouncementthatJamiehasjustenteredtheroom;notonlyishea Brussels legend, but it’s also his 60th birthday today, and he’s here at Carnegie. Youshouldn’tbeheretoday,Jamie.Whatthehellareyoudoinghere?JAMIESHEA:Judyinvitedme,andifJudyinvitedmeIalwaysturnup.Thankyouverymuch.I’mwearingmydinosaur‐in‐residencetieaswell,Jan,tomarktheoccasion.Thankyouverymuch, indeed, for that. My question is twofold, if you don’t mind; if a Große Koalitionemerges after the elections and Mrs Merkel was seen to smile on that, would it changeanything intermsofgivingthechancelloramoresolidpoliticalplaceathomeonwhichtohaveperhapssomemore,Iwouldn’tsayadventurousorassertive,Idon’tlikethosewords,butmaybeamoreforward‐leaningpolicy?Theotherthingis,whenyoulookattheGermancommunitytoday‐andwe’vebeentalkingall the time about the chancellor as if only one, admittedly, very dominant politicalpersonalitycounts‐doyouseewithinthepartiesanewVolkerRühe,anewzuGuttenberg,somebodyemergingatleastoutofthesecuritypolicycommunitytotrytoopenthedebateand drive the forward, or arewe seeing the chancellor reflecting a total consensus of theGermanpoliticalclass,anideabelowthelevelofthechancellor,atthepartylevel,ifthereissomekindofdebate?Thesecondthing,ifImay,abusingmyveryadvancedagenow,istojustmakeapoint.Inthepast,myexperience,fromtheNATOperspectiveofGermany,isthatwhentheydidn’twanttoengageinoneparticularoperation,theyalwaysmanagedtosatisfythealliancesomewhatbycompensatingbyengaging somewhereelse. Obviously, theydidn’twant togo to Iraq,butthentheywereoneofthefirsttogointoAfghanistan,evenbeforetheNATO‐ISAFmission.Theydidn’twanttoengage inLibya,but thenthey increasedthenumberof their forces inAfghanistantoshowthatnonethelessGermanywasagoodallyandagoodcitizen.Do you see the same sort of compensation mechanism at play in terms of other CFSBmissions, likeMali orpiracyoperations, orwill theGermans continue to tryat least tobesomewhere, to show that they’re ticking thebox? This sort ofmoodof introspection thatyou’redescribing–doesthatmeanthatGermanyisunlikelytobeanywhereinaCFSBoraNATO‐related mission in future? Thank you very much, indeed, for listening to my twoquestions.JANTECHAU:Thankyou,Jamie.We’lltakeprobablyonemore.REMKORTEWEG: Thank you very much. My name is Rem Korteweg at the Centre forEuropeanReforminLondon. Idon’taskmybankeraboutadviceonsecuritypolicy,somyquestionis:towhatextentisthisaGermanproblem,andtowhatextentisthisaEuropeanproblem?IhavethefeelingthatGermanisolationismorGermanfree‐ridingisbeingusedasanexcusefortheotherEuropeannationsnottoeitherpickuptheballorshowleadership.ItseemstobeabitofanargumentofconveniencetopointattheGermansandsay,well, theGermansaren’tplayingballonSyria,sotheDutchshouldn’tparticipateeither,orthePolesshouldstayonthesideaswell.


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Isn’tthissimplyaproblemoflisteningtoomuchtoAmericaandGermanyonsecuritypolicyaffairswhereaswe know that, given the burdenof history, they’re not very soon going tochangetheirattitude?Inotherwords,shouldn’twebelookingatCameron,orHollande,orperhapsSikorski,orwhoever,butnotatGermanyforsecuritypolicyefforts?JANTECHAU:Afewgreatquestionsagain.Judy,doyouwanttostart?JUDYDEMPSEY:Jamie,mayIaskthisonefirst,becauseyou’vegototherones?Thankyoufor this. I think it’s really interesting, the question raised about the German free‐riding.Whenthere’saproblem,onetendstolookatthebiggestcountryinEurope:oh,they’renotpullingtheirweight. Actually,whathashappenedoverthepast fouror fiveyears,andwesaw this around 2004, 2005, this enormous change taking place, for instance in theNetherlands, over troops. They sought troop reductions, they had the whole defencerestructuring, reducing... just the whole attitude of defence and security... and thetransatlanticismaswellisbeingwatereddown.Ontheotherhand,acommitmenttowardsEuropeisbeingchanged.Thisisvery,veryimportant,what’shappeninginHolland.Icompletelyagreewithyou,withPoland,aswell:bigcountry,ambitious,verycarefulaboutLibya, it didn’t go into the Libya thing;Mali, forget it. There are other countries... so fewcountriesparticipated in theLibyanmission. Germany’seasybait,but itmeans thatwhenyoucriticiseGermanyit’sdisingenuousbecauseyoutakeyoureyeofftheball,onwhat’snothappeningintheothercountries,whichIthinkisverylazy,andItakeyourpointonthis.Abitof free‐riding–we’veheard that for somanyyears. I actuallydon’tagreewith that,becausewhentheGermansdidmakeuptheirmindstogotoKosovo,whichwasahugeissue,itwasmajor,and itwas theSPDthatpushedtheGermans intoAfghanistan. Germanycanchangewithpersuasion,but,frankly,itneedstheotheralliesaswell.Jamie,IthinkI’llleavesomeofyouranswerstoGideon...GIDEONRACHMAN:No,Ican’tanswerthatone,soyou’dbetteranswerthat.JUDY DEMPSEY: The Grand Coalition is... this coalition was bad enough with the FreeDemocrats.TheGrandCoalition‐firstofall,taxeswouldgoupondefence,andsecurityandforeignpolicy.IthinktheSPDmightbeabitmorepushedtowardsEuropeanintegration.Ithinktheywouldstartthisdebate,finally,onEuropeanintegration.I’m not convinced about NATO at all, about this. In fact, if there’s any consensus goingaroundallofthepoliticalpartiesnow,it’sthisindifferencetowardsNATO–Idon’tknowifthisisthesenseyouget–indifferencetowardsNATO,butatthesametime,there’squiteanindifferencetowardsCFSP.Ireally,reallyfeelthis.Icompletelytakeyourpointonwhywecan’tdoMali,but,yes,we’dsendafewmoretroopstotheGulf,totheAtalantaMission.It’soneofobligationratherthan:thisissomethingthat’sworthwhilebuildingfortheEuropeansecurityanddefence.Yes,there’sabitofcompensatingtolookgood.Theotherquestionyouraised...


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JANTECHAU:Thequestionaboutpersonnel,how[inaudible].JUDYDEMPSEY:Iftheywerewaiting...We’vegotoneproblemwiththeCDU,it’sthatMerkeltoleratesvery,verylittledissentandoppositionintheparty.Thereareyoungpeoplecomingup,butthey’recertainlynotintocertainforeignpolicy;foreignpolicyisano‐winnerforanyyoungpersoncomingupthroughtheranks.SPD– I haven’t seenany. There’s a dearthof foreignpolicy thinkers there. 17of the so‐calledforeignpolicypeopleareleavingtheBundestag,andthere’sactuallynobodytoreplacethem. We have a serious problem:whoever gets elected in October,what sort of foreignpolicypeople,whoonearthisgoingtobeontheForeignAffairsCommittee?Ihavenoidea.It’savery...80millionpeopleandthere’sjustsolittleforeignpolicyinput.Ican’tseethem,Jamie.I’msorry.JANTECHAU: Just tomake the counterfactual point here; all of those people leaving alsorepresentedtheoldstatusquo. Is theremaybeevenachance thatoutof thoseoldhands’experience, transatlanticism and so on...? They’re all gone, but maybe that’s also a goodthing.JUDYDEMPSEY:Wehaven’tseenthemdelegateanythingtoayoungergeneration,ortrainupa youngergenerationof theBundestagdeputies,not that they’re interested. Yes, it’s agood thing some of themhave left; it’s a bad thing other have left, like ElkeHoeft [?], forinstance,andothers,who...andGuttenberg.HereallyshookuptheDefenceestablishment,inmany, many ways. He broke taboos, he changed the language, he changed the wholerhetoric. He asked questions: why do we have an army? He wanted to do the bigcooperation issues with Sweden, sharing... He was very, very important, but he was aninconvenienceandhewasjusttooambitious.Hewasinterestingandhedidstartthedebate,but,unfortunately,itwasn’ttakenup.JANTECHAU:Gideon, Ihaveonequestiontoyouwhich isrelatedtotheoffsetoperations.Howmuch longerwillGermany’sallies letGermanyget awaywith refusing toparticipate,butyou’redoingsomeotherproxythingonthesidethat’salotlessdangerous?GIDEONRACHMAN:WhatIsuspect,and,definitely,unless...itdependsonwhat’shappeningin theworld. Ifweareheading towards less interventionist,more isolationistpolicies, it’shard tostarta lectureon theGermans that they’vegot todomore. As Isay, I thinkwe’rebecomingmoreGerman,whichiswhyIwantedtopickuponthethingyousaidaboutwhydon’twejustaccepttheGermans?TheGermansarethebankers,andeverybodyelsegetsonwithit.Ithinkit’sareallyinterestingquestion,anditmademethinkaboutit.I think theanswer is twofold; firstly, that countries aren’t like individuals, theyaren’t justonething,soyoucan’tjustbeabanker,you’reeverything.Ofcourse,Germanyisinclinedtotryto,tosomeextent–it’sthethemeoftonight–toleavethataspectofnationhoodtooneside, forobviousreasons. It’snot...evenbydoingnothing,yousendamessage. That’sthesecond thing. I think the reason why Germany’s actions matter is because it has ademonstrationeffectfortherestofEurope.


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Weweretalkingaboutthatpoll–whyisGermanysopopular?WhyisGermanysoadmired?It’spartlytodowitheconomicsuccess,Berlin’sacoolplace,etc,andallofthat,butIthinkit’salso because other people look around and say, look,we don’t like getting involved in alltheseforeignwarsortheseforeigninterventions. Here’sthisbig,successfulcountryinthemiddleofEuropewhichseemstobemindingitsownbusiness,perfectlyprosperous. Whycan’twebelikethat?It’s quite striking, in the recent... therewas a debate in Britainwhere Nigel Farage, well‐knowntomany inthis town, theUnitedKingdomIndependenceParty,wasasked...hewasalsoopposingtheSyrianintervention.He,onaradioshow,toveryloudapplause,said,weshouldbelikeSwitzerland,BritainshouldbelikeSwitzerland.Wedon’twanttobeintheEU,wedon’twanttobetheAmericans’lackey.Let’sjustbeisolated,prosperousandgetonwithit.Germany'slikeabigSwitzerland,andtotheextentthattheGermanmodelworks,it’sveryattractivetotheDutch,theBritish,theFrench,etc.The trouble is, if everybody starts behaving like that, it’s difficult. I think there isdemonstrationeffectwhichisnotreallytheGermans’fault,butitdoesmatter,Ithink,whatGermanydoes,because, increasingly,peopleareconsciousofGermanyasthebiggest,mostpowerfulcountryinEurope.Just a last thing on the Mali thing; I’m not fully aware of the details of how Germanyresponded,butIthinkthere’saslightlydangerousveinofcontemptforFranceandGermanyatthemomentovertheEuroandover...aFrenchdiplomatinBerlinwassayingtomethatalotofpeoplearesayingtohim:aren’tyoujustwantingtoplayaroleinSyriabecauseyou’vegotcolonialdelusionsofgrandeur?Theywereactuallysayingthattohim.TotheextentthatFranceiswrittenoffasweakeconomicallyandstillwantingtostruttheinternationalstage,they’reevenlesslikelytosay,well,maybeweshouldgetintherewiththeFrenchandplaymoreofaFrenchrole.JANTECHAU:I’dliketomoveonthere.MarcoIncertihasthenextone,andthenDetlefPohl,andthenIthinkwe’regoingtotakeathirdoneoverhere.MARCO INCERTI: Thank you. I’m Marco Incerti from CEPS, another think‐tank here inBrussels. I have a question for Gideon, specifically. If I understood correctly, you weresayingthatperceptioninBerlinisthatthesinglesupervisorymechanismissuchacomplexarrangement that you really need to take the time to think it through and implement itproperlybeforeyoumoveontothenextbits.Myquestion is justwhetheryou’veheardanythingaboutwhethernewgovernmentwouldinsistontheneedfortreatychangetointroducethesingleresolutionmechanism,giventhatBGS[?]seemstobeoffthetable,anyway. Inthisrespect,maybebuildingonJamie’spointalso,whetheraGroßeKoalitionwouldmakeadifference,soifwecouldhaveasofterstance?DETLEFPUHL:DetlefPuhl;I’mworkingwiththe60‐year‐young[sic]manoverthere.Ihaveacommentandaquestionaswell.Mycommentis,intheopeningremarks,youseemtobetalking about two very different things; you talked about security and defence policy, andyoumainlytalkedabouttheeconomicandtheEurocrisis.Itseemstomethatthatisoneof


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the problems that we have with this unfinished business, that these two levels are notconnectedinanyway,not,inaway,appropriateforacountrylikeGermany.The question is one about your assessment on something that I would call a gap ofperception. A few months ago you could read an interview with the German DefenceMinister inDieZeit, and the titlewasGermanyLeads:EverybodyKnowsThat. Indealingwith diplomats or leading officers, I have the impression that that is really some of theprevailingfeelingintheministries;peoplebelieveweareleading,theGermansareleading,wearegivinganexampleandsoforth,which,obviously,Iconsidertobeindisconnectwithwhat people in this country, in this town and in Britain and elsewhere think about theGermanperceptionorabouttheGermanrole.Whatisyourperceptionofthat?Doyouseethatgapaswell?Ofcourse,thereisthequestionofhowtobridgethatgap,butthat’sdifferent,that’sapoliticsquestion.Doyouperceivethataswell,oristhatjustsomefantasyofmine?JANTECHAU:Thanks,Detlef.CHRISTOPHER ZIEDLER: Christopher Ziedler; I’m the correspondent for the StuttgarterZeitunginGermany,hereinBrussels.I’dliketocomebacktoyourremarksontheGerman‐French relationship and wanted to ask what your take is, what we can expect after theelection on the relationship betweenMerkel andHollande. MightHollande be a bitmoreopenbecausehenowknowshewon’tgetanybodyelse,orwillMerkel softenbecauseshecantakeabitofariskierapproach?Thankyou.JANTECHAU:Threegreatquestions;oneontreatychange:isthereenoughpoliticalcapitalin the room,maybeon theGrandCoalition? The secondone: doesGermanyneed amorestandardmodel;andthenFranco‐German.Judy.JUDYDEMPSEY:Treatychangeis justsoimportant. Letmecontradictmyself,becauseit’sinterestingasanexercise–whydoesMerkelseemsointergovernmentalatthemomentandagainstpoliticalandeconomicintegration?Heradvisorssaysheisagainstintegrationnowbecause she knows it would demand treaty changes and therefore the public would voteagainstit,andthatwouldbebye‐bye,partsofEurope.She’ssoafraidofthis.The argument is that Euro‐scepticism, in any case, would be against her. Yet the longerMerkeldoesn’tengagethepublicanddoesn’tdiscussthisideaofpoliticalintegrationandthetreaty changes, thegreater theopportunity shegives theEuro‐sceptics to fill thisvacuum.Wehaveseenthis.We’vecitedHollandeenough,andsofarsogood,withGermany.ThenewintakeofCDUisgoingtobemuchhigherintermsofthenumbersofEuro‐sceptics,andthisisalreadyknown. Merkelwillhave tobevery,verycarefulonhow farshecango. AGrandCoalition,infact,mightactuallybecomemuchmorearticulateinpersuadingthepublic.OneextraordinarygapintheGermanpoliticaldiscourse,oneextraordinarygapintermsofplayers,isindustry.Industry‐thebigheadsofindustry,theCEOs‐arecompletelyquietonthenecessityoftheEuroandoftheneedformoreintegration.They,privately,areextremelyworried of Merkel’s silence and lack of leadership on this issue, and they are actuallyextremely worried about the future of the Euro. This is something we shouldn’t really


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underestimate; and perhaps after the election they may well come into play if Merkelcontinuesthispolicy.Ithink,insomeways,theGrandCoalition,fromtheEuropeanpointofview,mightbeabetterbet.MayIleavethegapforasecond?TheFranco‐Germanthing–it’sgoingtobepaybacktimeforall,bigtime.Merkelhasalreadyletthemoffthehookwiththebudget,thestabilitypact,and is giving one more year to bring the budget deficit under control. She’s waiting forpaybacktime,gettingtheperformance,andit’snotgoingtobeafreerideforall,though. IthinkMerkel,unlikethe...she’swasn’tbroughtupintheFranco‐Germanaxis,andsheseesitintechnocraticterms:I’veaskedGreecetodeliver,andonedayFrancehastodeliver.Onecaveaton this, theGermansarescaredof theFrencheconomygoingdown. Theyarereallyscared;theyaresodependentonFranceasaverypowerfuleconomy.Whileitmaybepaybacktime,they’reactuallyextremelyworriedthatifHollandedoesn’tdoit,whowillgetoutofthisFrencheconomiccrisis?Thegap–Ican’tanswerthatbecauseIdon’tthinktheGermansthinkofleadership...wasthatDeMaizièrewhosaidit?JANTECHAU:Yes.JUDYDEMPSEY:DeMaizière’sreputationintheMinistryishighlyquestionable,frankly,andhe’s been so slow in introducing the reforms that never took place after getting theconscription. He’s the very one that says we must explain all the things. Frankly, theGermans...Irecallthisinterview:theGermansdonotthinkofleadership. Theydothinkofleadershipwhenitcomestoallthethingsthatthey’relikedfor, inBritain, thefootballandeverythingelse;theyworkhard;blah‐blah‐blah. Intermsoftheother,political leadership,actually,it’smoreorlesstaboo.JANTECHAU:Ontheleadership[overtalking].GIDEONRACHMAN:Yes, I think, actually, that there’s a very interesting gap, as you say,openedupbetween...IthinktheGermansarenowdefactoeconomicleaders.It’sclearthatnothing’sgoing tohappenon theEurowithouta... thedecisionwillbemade inBerlinandthenitwillhappenhere.There is a gap, with a complete lack of aspiration to lead Europe in foreign policy andsecurityterms,letalonetoplayaglobalrole. Youcouldargueiteitherway;youcouldsay,well,giventheenormityofthetaskthatGermanyhasonitshandsjustkeepingtheEuropeansinglecurrencyontheroad,that’senoughforanybody,frankly.That’sahugeinternationalresponsibility,becausethat’sthefateoftheglobaleconomy,frankly.The year beforeObama’s re‐election, the Americanswere terrified of a Euro crisis, or thepeoplearoundObama,becausethatwouldbetheireconomygoingupinsmoke.TheywerelookingatGermanytofixthat.Youcouldsay,well,that’sgoingtobethetaskforthenextfiveortenyears,andifGermanycangetthatright,weallowethemabigdebt.


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Ontheotherhand,totheextentthatwearenowmoreandmoreconsciousthatthepersoninthe room who matters is Merkel, and you hear that from other European leaders... Iremember Samaras saying tome, before he became Greek PrimeMinister, thatwhen shewalks in the roomeverybodyelse falls silent,washowhedescribed the councilmeetings.Shewasverymuchtheleader.To the extent that Germany’s leadership role on that is so transparent, nowmuch clearerthanevenwhenIwaslivingherefiveyearsago,howsustainableisitforGermanynottobetheleaderintheothersphere?Probablynotforever,butthesecontradictionscanexistforawhile andmaybe sometimes it takes an event to crystallise things; something happens, acrisis, and thenGermanyhas to step forwardornot. For themoment, untilwehave thatcrystallisingevent,we’llprobablylivewiththatcontradiction.JUDYDEMPSEY: That’s the danger, the comfort zone, thatwe don’t feel threatened. TheweaknessoftheGerman...I’mgladwedon’tusethat,butthiscreatesaterriblesenseoffalsesecurityandcomplacency.To get around this disconnect, Germany shouldn’t lead on the security and defence;whatGermanyshoulddo isbuildalliances,bring in thePoles,whoaredesperate fora strongerEuropeandefence; trytoget theDutchontheroad;bemuchmoreoutgoing inbringing inallies.That’swhattheyshoulddo.Thenthetrustcouldbebuiltuplikethis.Instead,it’s,oh,good, Germany’s at it again; militarism, blah‐blah‐blah; and this is the last thing on theirmind. They should build up clusters. There have been attempts but they’re not seenthrough,they’renotdeveloped.GIDEONRACHMAN:Ididn’tanswerthetreatychangeone,and,actually,Idon’thaveaverygoodanswertothat,inthesensethatI’mafraidIforgottoask,whichisrathersadbecauseit’sakeyquestion.Just on thebanking supervision thing, I think, firstly,my impressionwas that itwasquitegenuine;theythinkit’slikeahugetask,gettingtheregulatorybitinplace.Secondly,asensethat,asIsay,thesecondandthirdbits‐thefundandtheunderwritingofpeople’saccounts‐isatransferunion,sothey’renotinterested;also,deepsatisfaction,whichmaybeeveryonehereisawareof,withtheCommission’sapproachtoitatthemoment.SomebodysaidtometheCommissionproposalforthisbigresolutionfundstartsfromafantasyandproceedsfromthere,whichisthatthebankscandoitthemselves,andasensethattheCommissionistakingGermanfinancialmuscleforgranted,andthatcan’tbetakenforgranted.Also,onthisintergovernmentalthing,Ithinkyou’reright,thatmaybeit’satransientthingtodowithexasperationonthisparticularbankingunionthing,butarealscepticismtowardsthe Commission, whereas the Germany I knew when I lived here was always absolutelyalwaysverypro‐Commission.Somebodysaidtome,well,theCommissionshouldbeawareofwhatit’sdoing,becauseifitwantstobecomemorepolitical,iftheywanttohaveanelectedCommissionpresident,thenhowcantheysaytheyshouldbeinchargeofstateaidorcompetitionpolicy,becausethoseareregulatorythings?There’sasortofsayingtotheCommission,becarefulwhatyouwishfor.


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JANTECHAU:Iwouldliketoaskaquestionrelated,and,Judy,pleasecomeinafterwards.Ithastodowiththis,andit’sanothergapquestion.OneofthelessonsfromtheEurocrisis,ifyouwant to lookat it thisway, is thatyoucan’thaveanawful lotofeconomic integrationthat has progressed very far without also having an appropriate amount of politicalintegrationtoaccompanyit.Now,theGermanpositionseemstobemore:economicintegrationisgreat,andwe’veputallthese integrationsteps intoplace to tackle thecrisis,butwedon’twantanymorepoliticalintegration.We’vejustlearntthatwecan’thaveoneortheother,andnowtheGermansareraisingthisconceptbigtime.Whereisthatgoingtoleadus?GIDEONRACHMAN:Again, I did talk about this to the people, and, as I said, they tend tobreakdownthespecificproposalsofpoliticalandsay,well,whatdoespoliticalunionmeaninpractice?Ifyou’retalkingaboutmajorityvotingandforeignpolicy,notactuallyrelevantto theEurocrisis; ifyou’re talkingaboutanelectedCommissionpresident,not relevant totheEurocrisis.Again,I’lldefertoJudy,becauseyoulivethere,butmysenseisthatthere’sasortofalmostadisjuncture, thaton theone level I think theGermansdo still sincerelybelieve inpoliticalunionasadistantgoalandassomethingthatisanaspirationandrepresentswherewewilleventuallyget to,etc. Theyhaven’tgivenup... it’snotas inBritainwherepeoplesay,God,that’sahorribleidea;wedon’twantthat. Theyactuallysaythat’sagreatidea;itwouldbelovelyifwegotthat.I thinkwhat’sdifferentnow is that they’remuch,muchmoreconsciousofwhat itactuallymeans in termsofdemandsonGerman taxpayers,demandsonGermanvoters, argumentsGermanpoliticianshavetowin,and,also,behaviourintheotherEuropeancountries.Ithinkthat...again,talkingabouthowGermandiscoursehaschanged,I’vebeenstruckbyhowmuchmorewillingthey’rewillingtousewhatwouldhavebeenverypoliticallyincorrectlanguageaboutSouthernEuropeanswhosay,well,actually,theseguysdon’tplaybytherules,andwecouldhavehadapoliticalunionwiththemifeverybodybehavedlikeGermans,butactuallytheydon’t,andthat’soneofthelessonswe’velearntfromthefinancialcrisis.JUDYDEMPSEY:Iwonder,dotheGermansstillbelieveinthepoliticalunion?Ithinkthey’vebeen ‐ scarred is thewrongword – they see this huge, probably it’s huge, enlargement isdonetothecost,totheidea,thephilosophyofthepoliticalunion,andtheydon’tlikeit.It’sofftheagendabecauseIthinktheywanttotrytointernaliseandintegratethisenlargementwhichshouldbethelastforalongtime.That’smyimpression.TheotherremarkwhichIwantedto...I’llgobacktoitlaterbecauseIcan’treadmywriting.It’sokay.JANTECHAU:It’llcomebacktoyou.Wehaveacouplemoreminutes;Ithinkwecanmaybehavetwomorequestions,ifpossible,verybriefones.SHANEHENEGHAN:MynameisShaneHeneghan;I’matraineeattheEuropeanParliament.IjustwantedtoexpandabitonJamie’searlierquestion;hementionedaGrandCoalition.I


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was just wondering about the result, in general. I think the main thing the Poles aresuggesting is that the CDU, CSU is going to be quite larger, those ranks are going to beswollenabit,buttherewon’tbeforeignpolicyexpertsperhaps.What will that mean, and what could the other potential coalition combinations mean: acontinuationwiththeFDP? Howwould thatgo? I think the longshot thatpeoplehaven’tmentionedthatmuchisperhapsCDUandtheGreens.That’sveryunlikely,butperhapsit’sworththinkingabout.ANTON LA GUARDIA: Thank you. Anton la Guardia, The Economist. I apologise if thepoint’sbeenraised.Icameinlate,soyoumayhaveaddresseditpreviously.Youmentionedthe sceptical intake of the CDU; you mentioned the irritation, for example, to theCommission; the desire for intergovernmentalism. To what extent does that add up tosympathyor,indeed,analliancewithCameron?There’s a notion going around London that Merkel’s on side with us, she will give usrepatriationpowers.IsthisanypartoftheGermandebate?Aretheycompletelydeludedinmakingthisargument?Howfardotheywanttogointhecontextofafuturenegotiation?JANTECHAU:Toaddtothis,Merkeljustsaidonthe16thAugustthatit’snowtimetothinkaboutwhatkindofcompetenciescouldbeactuallymovedbacktothememberstates. Shesaidthat,forthefirsttimeasoutspokenasthis.JUDYDEMPSEY: I’ll deal with the Commission. Merkel doesn’t trust the Commission toactuallypushthroughthereformsthatshewantsfromtheSouthernEuropeans.ShethinkstheCommissionwillgosoft,andsoshe’sgoingtopursueheragendaonthecompetitivenessandtheotherreformsthatshe’sactually imposedontheSouthernEuropeans,becausesheactually justdoesn’tbelievetheCommissionwilldealwiththis. Thatwillbeinterestingtosee,then,whatkindofroleGermanywillplayinthenewinstitutionleaders.It’s veryhard toknow,with these competences,would she reallygo that far? If she losespeople likeSchäubleafterOctober,and there’svery littlegenuineEuropeanness left in theCDUcamp, there’s awhole... she’skept themquiet andshe’s ruled thatpartywithan ironhand for the last eight years, to keep it together, because it is quite fragile over theEuro‐scepticring,whichwaswhythealternativeforDeutschlandstartedup.Shewouldn’tallowanykindofdissent,butshecouldn’tafforditeither,whichiswhyaGrandCoalitionmightbeevenbetter, because itmight counterbalance this Euro‐sceptic ring in the partywhichwemustn’tunderestimate.Ireallydon’tknowwhatsortofcompetencesshewouldbetackling,but,clearly,thepublicdon’tlikeSchengenanymore,there’sbordercontrols,there’s...butthereareotherissuesaswell. TheGermans do not like banking competences ormore financial competence beingtransferredtoBrussels.She’sprotectedtheirsavingsbookforthemoment,andshewantstocontinuetoprotectthem.That’soneofthereasonswhyshe’sgoingtobevotedagainst.JANTECHAU:Ithinkthere’ssomethingelse,ifImay.TheissueisthatIthinkit’sa....Firstofall, she’s not going to give the Brits as much as the Brits want, even under the best ofcircumstances. Shemightbewilling todo a little bit, yes. The second thing is that also I


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thinkit’sabitofatrap,becauseshewantssomethinginreturn,andprobablyratherpainfulthingsforBritaininreturn,especiallyonbankingstuff,perhapsontaxes.Thehopes that theBritshave thatsomethingseriousandsubstantial couldbereturnedtothememberstateswillcomewithaprice‐tagthatIthinktheyhaven’tfactoredintothehighhopesthatwehaveheardaboutalsofromyou.Theiroptimismneedsalittlebitofafootonthebrake,Ithink.GIDEONRACHMAN:Idefertoyouonthat,tosomeextent.I’llpartlyrecapandthenaddtowhatIsaid.IthinkthereisanopeningforBritain;it’squiteasmalloneandifit’splayedwithenormousskillandsoon,theymightgetthere,butIdon’thavemuchfaithitwillbe.TheopeningisthattheGermanshavebeguntofocusontheideathatBritainmightactuallyleavetheEuropeanUnion,andIdon’t thinkthey likethe idea. Partlybecausethesewholecultural issues, which used to be a taboo, about, well, Southern Europeans have differentattitudestothelaw,etc;theBritishatleast,regardedasNorthernEuropeans‐they’dliketokeepthemin.There’sadecentrelationshipbetweenCameronandMerkel, that’shelpful. Thereareevensomeissueswhereyoucansee,asyousay,immigration,welfare,thosekindsofthings,totheextent that Merkel responds to public opinion, as you say, you can see across theNetherlands,theUK,France,thereisworry...Howyoudealwithit,giventhatit’soneofthefourfreedoms,tomovearoundEurope,isvery,verydifficult,butthere’sasortof,potentially,a political... a coming‐together between politicians who say, look, this is something ourpopulationsareupsetabout,let’sseeifthere’ssomethingwecandotogether.That’sontheplussideoftheledger;there’ssomethingthatcouldpotentiallybeworkedout.IthinkthattheBritishareintheroleofdemandeur,they...we’vegotprobablymoretolosethan the Germans, and, also, I think the real difference is that we start from very, verydifferentpositions, forhistoricalreasons. TheGermansare intheEuro, they’reall in;theycan’tletthisthingfail.TheBritishactuallyaren’t,we’renot,sowecouldpotentiallyleave.For the Germans, priorities one, two and three are saving the Euro, and priority four iskeepingBritain in. To theextent thatweask things thatwewantbut thatappear tobeathreattotheoverallhealthoftheproject,thosearen’tconcessions,Ithink,thattheGermanscan make, because their first priority is to keep this thing working, and it’s very, verydifficult. IftheBritishmake...it’slikeoneofthosechildren’sgamesofstraws:iftheBritishpullatthestrawthatthreatenstobringeverythingdown,they’regoingtohavetosayno.Ifitwereleft,asever,todiplomatswhounderstandtheseissuesandhowfartheothercango,you’dprobablygetadeal.Idon’tthinktheBritishover‐confidenceextendstothepeoplewhodealonadailybasiswithGermans.Ithinktheyhaveafairlyrealisticappraisalofwhattheycanget.Thedifficultyisthatthey’llgetdrivenbythefarrightintheToryparty.That,again,IthinktheGermansarewellawareof. TheysaidthattheyfearanaccidentalBritishexitbecauseCamerondoesn’twanttoleave,butwhatifhegetsforcedbyhisownpartytocomeupwithalaundrylistofdemandsthattheycan’tmeet?


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JANTECHAU: [Inaudible] Judy, Iwant to give you the finalword, and perhaps the younggentleman had questions on future possible coalitions, especially the Black/Green variantwhichissomethingthathasbeendiscussedalotinthepast.Justmaybeafewfinalwordsonthisdomesticthingandthenwe’llcloseit.JUDYDEMPSEY:Briefly,Black/Greenatthemomentnotonthecards.Comebackto,einamonth’s name. The Greens are actually losing because they’ve got a ridiculous taxprogramme,andeventheirownGreenmembersareretreatingeithertotheSPDortheFDP.That’s ruled out at the moment. There was a possibility two years ago; it’s out at themoment.Also,Merkelhashijackedthewholeenergyagenda.CDU/FDP– they’rehanging in there, theFDP; they’vedoneagoodcampaign; theyhaven’tmadefoolsofthemselves,it’sbeenveryfocused.Theymayscrapebackagain.It’stouchandgobetweentheGrandCoalitionandarepeatofthisone,andiftheFDPdogetinagain,myGod,Merkelmaygivethemsome...willactuallymusclethem,orelsetheFDPwillhavetojustreachouttotheelectoralandsay,youelectedusfortaxreform,nowlet’sgoanddoit.JANTECHAU:Whatabouttheleftpartyasthemajoritymakerontheleft?Steinbrück inthecampaignominously left thepossibilityopenofthematsomepointdowntheroadbeingacoalition partner, perhaps not now but perhaps later. That sounds like, of course, heunderstandsabouttheleft,theGreensandSocialDemocratsarenotinthepositiontoreallyforma[overtalking]majority.Somethingneedstohappenaboutthat.JUDYDEMPSEY: Yes, I think it’s scandalous theway the left is demonised, frankly. It’s ademocraticparty–okay,aformerCommunist,but,frankly,theysticktotherulesandthey’redemocratic.That’sbeenruledoutbyKraft,theSPDpremierinNorthRhine‐Westphalia.It’samatterof timebeforeall these former communistsdie, frankly. The left isnowbuiltondisgruntledWestGermantradeunionistswhoquit theSPD,andveryoldcommunists,andtheyhaveaproblemwithyoungpeople.YoungpeopleareeithergoingtogototheGreens,theparents[?]won’tdoverywell.Thisisademographicissue,andwe’vealreadyseenthechangesinEastGermany.Domestically,we’rebacktoyourquestion,acontinuationofthesame,butIthinktheFDPhaslearnttheirmistakes,Ihope,orthere’stheGrandCoalitionandthenthingscouldchangeinEurope.JANTECHAU:Thankyouverymuch,JudyandGideon,forthistourderaisonfromdomesticelectoral politics to world politics and strategy, back to the party system. I think you’vecoveredalotofground.Ihopeit’smadeusallalittlesmarterinthisquestfordefiningtheGhostofEuropeandtheghostthatrunstheGhost.I’mverythankfulforallofyourpatience.ThanksforcomingtoCarnegieEuropetonight.As I said earlier,we’ll be continuing to coverGermany very intensively over the next fewweeksonthewebsite,sopleasetuneinthere,andexpectournextinvitationsontheseandotherrelatedsubjects.Thankyouverymuch.

unfinished business: merkel’s germany and europe’s …€¦ · 11/09/2013 · it is about the...

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