understanding five decades of migration from turkey to … · understanding five decades of...

FIRST DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION © 2011, Ibrahim Sirkeci

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Understanding five decades of migration from Turkey to Germany

Ibrahim Sirkeci*

Introduction

In our most recent book with my colleague Jeffrey Cohen at Ohio State University, we have

questioned and challenged the existing discourses and understanding of migration (Cohen

and Sirkeci, 2011). Our main criticism was that the current terminology was restricting and

missing the dynamic nature of human mobility while also being heavily loaded with negative

connotations. Instead we have proposed a “cultures of migration” framework using the term

human mobility instead of migration, identifying and linking the movers and non-movers

instead of dichotomous categories of migrants and non-migrants. Thus along with individual

backgrounds identifying the context-specific characteristics and events which shape human

mobility which we tend to see as a function of conflict. Thus mobility is conceptualized on a

continuum running from staying put to international migration. Similarly conflict is also

visualized over a continuum ranging from cooperation to violent acts/events which may

occur at micro (individual), mezzo (household, community), or macro (regional, national,

global) levels. Human mobility therefore is a response to the conflict as perceived by the

prospective movers and others. Non-movers are crucially important here as they often have

an influence on the movement of others and others‟ moves affect them too. Non-movers

and movers relationship is not a straight and easy one. Some non-movers are perceived by

others as part of the movers (2nd and 3rd generations in diasporas) while also some past

movers might have returned and became non-mover as some non-movers may be moving in

the future. In such a framework we do hope to capture the dynamic nature of human

migrations as an on-going process.

In this paper, I have attempted to revisit the Turkish international migration regime with

reference to such a culture of migration perspective. I focused on the last 50 years, reflecting

on the period since the first bilateral labour exchange agreement signed by Turkey and

Germany in 1961 marking the beginning of Turkish mass labour migration to Europe.

Nevertheless, the readers should bear in mind that Turkish international migration can be

* Professor of Transnational Studies and Marketing at Regent‟s College, London, UK and Editor of Migration Letters journal. E-mail. [email protected]


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dated back to early 19th century. One may even go further back to 15th century revisiting

Jewish migration from Spain to Turkey, then Ottoman Empire, in 1492.

Turkish mobility regime in the last five decades has been characterized by rapid urbanization

in the 1950s, exporting excess labour in the 1960s, family reunifications in the 1970s and

1980s, refugee movement in the 1980s, asylum-seekers in the 1990s, and irregular migrants

in the 2000s. Now perhaps we are entering a new era which is yet to unfold and yet to be

studied. If I may speculate a little, this new era is characterised by increasing freedom of

mobility for Turkish citizens. Since parallel to the economic growth Turkey has been

securing bilateral visa-free mobility regimes with many countries while also relatively better

off now are able to overcome entry barriers. Also, this final phase is marked by significant

return migrations and immigration to Turkey.

The building blocks of Turkish culture of migration are the socio-economic deprivation,

ethnic conflict, rapid urbanization and domestic mobility, and transnational migration

networks. It is important to remind the audience that I use “Turkish” as a term referring to

all populations in Turkey rather than one of the ethnic segments in the country. Therefore,

Turkish migration flows refer to those of the Turks, Kurds, Arabs and others as ethnic

groups forming the population in Turkey. This paper draws upon a series of studies carried

out in the last 15 years: Environment of human insecurity (Sirkeci, 2006), households and

cultures of migration (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2005 and 2011), Turkish diaspora (Sirkeci, 2005),

Kurdish population in Turkey (Sirkeci 2000), socio-economic development and migration in

Turkey (Icduygu et al., 2001), shift in Turkish migration destination (Icduygu and Sirkeci,

1998), ethnic question in Turkey (Icduygu et al., 1999) and immigration and return migration

(Sirkeci, 2009).

Conceptual framework

In our recent book, Cohen and I debated the migration discourse and asserted that the

relationship between the movers and non-movers as well as internal and international

migrations needs to be underlined (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011). Migration scholarship so far

provided a static framework despite the fact that it has been frequently underlined that

migration is a process. Migration, internal or international, is not an event but a process

which generates its own dynamics as it unfolds (Anthony, 1990; Vertovec, 2003; Levitt and


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Schiller, 2007). We suggest conflict as a key driver in understanding human mobility – in

other words migration as a function of conflict. Conflict, when taken in a broader sense, can

reflect that dynamic nature we seek in migration. Linked with household model and

cumulative causation model, migration is a function of conflict. Conflict and migration are

inherently connected. Hence they affect each other; produce and reproduce each other. Here

the reference is not to a single form of conflict. Rather it refers to a broad range of situations

where incompatible demands, conflicting demands are on table. These can be as latent as in

the case of a young person‟s dislike of her or his parents‟ choices or as manifest as in the

case of an ethnic war. One can imagine these on a continuous scale of conflict which

dependent on the perception of the situation is reflected on another continuous scale of

environment of human insecurity. Perception of the conflict and corresponding

environment of human insecurity prompts for strategic options among which migration is

one.

CONFLICT Violence Tensions - Disagreements Cooperation MACRO

Environment Environment of Human of Human MESO Insecurity Security

MOBILITY OPTIONS MICRO

Socio-economic development and migration relationship is assumed widely among scholars

and there is a substantial literature investigating this nexus (for an overview, see Castles, 2008

and Raghuram, 2009). Recently Faist described immigrant associations as development

agents (Faist, 2008). There have been a number of studies carried out on Turkish migration

and development (Martin, 1991; Paine, 1974). I am convinced that most migration

scholarship points out that migration continues increasingly at least for a long while as the

sending countries or areas develop economically. However, there are still others who tend to

see development as a cure for migration (Delgado-Wise and Guarnizo, 2007). On the other

hand, Bauman (1998) has argued that the poor often stay at home while the wealthier are

mobile while de Haas (2006) reports that policies promoting development as a way to reduce

or stop migration are bound to fail. We have carried out a study about a decade ago and

concluded that neither prosperous segments nor poor segments were dominant in migration


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flows but those in areas which falls within the lower-middle socio-economic development

group were more likely to migrate (Icduygu et al., 2001). In that study we have not looked at

individuals‟ or households welfare statuses but district level socio-economic development

levels. However, in later studies (e.g. Sirkeci, 2006), I have also visited the individual and

household levels and confirmed that those towards the bottom or top ends of the ladder are

less likely to migrate. This is also in line with the human and social capital arguments as often

those who are financially able and with the right qualifications and connections do move

across borders.

Another conceptual note relates to the ways in which international migration and migrants

are categorised and thus periodization is characterised. Classifications such as labour

migration and refugee flows as well as the 12 months-qualifier for international migration are

misleading and not so helpful in understanding international human mobility. These

categories are mere reflections of legal structures imposed to control migration (which often

-if not always- failed). Nevertheless, migration process is dynamic hence the causes and

repercussions of this process change too. Human behaviour is complicated; so is the

decision making processes. The above mentioned continuums of conflict and environment

of human insecurity are characterised by a variety of indicators and variables which at the

end all may play a part in migration decision. This is why migration motivations are often

mixed. Therefore, it is difficult to find migrants who moved for only economic, or cultural

or political reasons. Migrant narratives provide us much more than such single line

explanations. The Turkish migratory regime offers us some examples for that too.

International migration from Turkey to Germany

According to the latest statistics from Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security, by

2009, 3,849,360 Turkish citizens were living abroad and 1,713,551 of whom reside in

Germany and these figures do not include those who were naturalised in the destination

countries (CSGB, 2010:50-55). According to an earlier report by the Ministry, the number of

Turkish citizens acquired citizenship of their host countries was 1,480,256 by the end of

2006.

Due to a variety of definitions and different organisations involved in registration and data

collection we often have an array of figures for international migration. Figure 1 does not


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show the naturalised Turkish citizens in Germany, neither it shows the refugees and asylum

seekers. For example according to UNHCR, there were 161,919 refugee Turkish nationals in

Germany by 2009. Besides, between 1980 and 2009, Germany received 412,598 asylum

applications from Turkish citizens. Since the 1970s, a significant number of Turkish citizens

switched to German citizenship. According to the Federal Statistics Office, 810,481 Turkish

citizens were naturalised between 1972 and 2009 (FSOG, 2011).1 Between 1996 and 2005,

the largest numbers reported as a total of 609,533 Turkish citizens opted for German

citizenship in a decade (CSGB, 2007:26). Yet, undocumented immigrants are beyond our

ability to capture statistically. Perhaps one should draw a line here and say we cannot

possibly know accurately the size of Turkish population in Germany, which can be well over

three million. Nevertheless, Figure 1 shows that the stock of Turkish citizens in Germany

has been declining since the mid-1990s. Some of this can be attributed to naturalisations

while the rest is probably due to return migration.

Figure 1: Migration from Turkey to Germany, 1963-2009

Source: Akkoyunlu (2011); Sirkeci (2006); UNHCR.

1 These exclude Turkish children who were German citizens by birth. According to CSGB (2007: 26) 99,717 Turkish children were registered as German citizens between 2000 and 2004.


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Nevertheless, Turkey-Germany migration corridor is not a one way street. The thin red line

in the figure shows net flows while the green line follows the out-migration of Turkish

citizens from Germany. Most of these are likely to be return migrations and like the

immigration, they are responsive to policy changes and crises. Hence we see peaks, for

example after the 1973 energy crisis and around 1983, when a new law was introduced to

promote return migration (i.e. Das Gesetz zur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft). Since the early

1980s, for the first time, Turkish emigration from Germany overtook Turkish immigration

in 2006 and remained negative in the last 5 years. Overall in-flows and out-flows of Turkish

citizens appear to be similar for more than a decade now. However, the actual net figure can

be different due to some people having dual-citizenship. Some evidence for large Turkish

out-flows from Germany comes from the Turkish censuses. The last two censuses in 1990

and 2000 report 1,133,152 and 1,260,530 foreign-born individuals in Turkey representing

11% increase in a decade (Sirkeci, 2009: 12-14). 997,676 of those reported in the 2000

Census were Turkish citizens born outside Turkey while 85,354 were German citizens.

Therefore, without a detailed and accurate picture of return migration from Germany to

Turkey is drawn it is not possible to speculate further.

The conflict in Turkey and the Kurdish migration

Despite significant changes in legislation and liberalisation of Kurdish language and linguistic

rights for Kurds, still the official Turkish discourse often refer to Kurdish as “a language

other than Turkish”.2 Similarly academic literature, particularly those produced in Turkey,

used to refer to a „homogeneous‟ Turkish population without acknowledging the ethnic

diversity within. The causes behind this are not in the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is

important to note that Turkish international migration is also Kurdish international

migration. Kurdish movement and the armed conflict between the Kurdish forces and the

Turkish army over decades have been an underlying reason for high participation of Kurds

in the Turkish international migration regime. Hence it is expected that the proportion of

Kurdish among immigrants from Turkey are larger than the share of Kurds in the total

population of Turkey (Sirkeci, 2000 and 2006). The role of ethnic conflict in Turkey in this

international migration regime will be visited in the following section.

2 In a recent trial, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) case, for example, the judge refused defence statements in “a language believed to be Kurdish”. (Hurriyet, 2011, April 19).


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The conflict between the Kurdish insurgents and the Turkish state made a huge impact on

Turkish culture of migration. The overrepresentation of the Kurdish within the Turkish

diaspora is an indication of that. The Kurds are overrepresented in the internal mobility too.

While there was hardly any Kurdish in major cities of the western parts of Turkey, now, they

constitute up to a quarter of some cities. Pro-Kurdish political parties almost always get the

largest share of their votes from big cities in the west such as Istanbul, Izmir, Antalya,

Mersin and Adana.

The migration flows from Turkey to Germany and other destinations have been -

unsurprisingly- sensitive to the conflicts in Turkey. Following the military intervention in

1980, an upsurge in refugee and asylum seekers from Turkey was evident. Nearly half a

million people fled the country in the four years following the intervention, which

particularly crushed the Kurdish political movements and organisations and imposed a

martial law in Kurdish speaking regions in the East and Southeast. Therefore, a large

Kurdish segment existed among the asylum seeking flows throughout the period. This was

particularly evident in the flows during the 1990s, the peak of the clashes between the

Turkish army and the PKK.

The infamous guest-workers of the 1960s and 1970s have proven that they were not guests

anymore and an influx of their families followed. Then, a mass migration of refugees got on

the record following the 1980 military intervention in Turkey. This has followed by a steady

outflow of asylum seekers at first and then clandestine migrants into the 2000s.

Nevertheless, individual migrants‟ narratives show that guest-workers originally from

Kurdish speaking provinces of Turkey arrived in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s were

equally concerned about the conflict –not as intense then- in Eastern Turkey (Sirkeci, 2006).

When admission as migrant workers became difficult or impossible a „sudden‟ increase in

asylum numbers were witnessed in Germany and elsewhere. For instance, in the two decades

from 1990, 52,120 Turkish citizens immigrated to the United Kingdom (UK) while another

33,347 applied for asylum and 54,585 were granted British citizenship against only about

45,000 settlement visas granted to Turkish citizens. Among the asylum seekers, I believe a

large segment were the Kurds.3 By definition, they would be classified as political migrants,

nevertheless, coming from relatively deprived parts of Turkey, many of these Kurds changed

3 Stevens (2004) argues for the period between 1980 and 1993, the majority of asylum applications made by Turkish nationals in the UK are expected to be made by those with Kurdish origin.


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the fast-food scene in the UK, where now one may find more kebab shops than McDonalds.

Personal narratives reveal mixed motivations among which the ethnic conflict and

discrimination in Turkey stand as a key component, sometimes a qualifier component as the

conflict serves as an “opportunity framework” for the members of the ethnic group

suffering from it (Sirkeci, 2005). In other words, in the absence of other routes for

migration, many Kurds and Turks applied for asylum to realise their migration plans

irrespective of their suffering from the conflict.

The figures 2 and 3 plots the outflows from Turkey to Western Europe and Germany

against the violent event count in Turkey as recorded by Reuters (Jenkins et al., 2006).4 One

can argue that there is some degree of correspondence whilst migration out-flows seemingly

follows the changes in violence count with some lag (Figure 2). A similar pattern can be

identified in asylum-seeker flows from Turkey to Germany too (Figure 3). However

speculative these correlations can be, they still represent some direct relationship between

violence (i.e. one of the representations of conflict in our conflict model of migration

described above) and migration flows.

Figure 2: Turkish immigration to Germany and violence count in Turkey, 1991-2002.

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Source: MPI and Craig et al., (2006)

4 The violence count data comes from the study carried out by Craig Jenkins and his team at Ohio State University (see Jenkins et al., 2006).


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Figure 3: Asylum seeker flows from and violence count in Turkey, 1991-2000.

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Turkish Kurdish migration to Germany

Kurdish migration from Turkey to Germany has been largely driven by the environment of

human insecurity which was perceived either as a threat so unbearable or an opportunity

framework facilitating emigration. Material and non-material environment of human

insecurity thus appear as a key driver for migration from Turkey. Kurdish speaking

population suffered from it more than others as most of the clashes happened to be in the

regions mostly they live. When the emigration maps from the 1970s and 1990s compared

evidently higher emigration rates moved towards the East (Sirkeci, 2006:66). Moderate

estimations indicate that about 18% of the population in Turkey is Kurdish speaking

(Sirkeci, 2000) and they largely live in the socio-economically most deprived areas (Sirkeci,

2006: 53).

Relative deprivation along with ethnic conflict seemingly resulted in higher emigration rates

for the Turkish Kurds, at least in the 1990s. According to the Turkish International

Migration Survey carried out in 1996, migrant households (i.e. those with at least one

member migrated abroad) represent 30.3% among the Kurds compared to 12.9% among the

Turks (Sirkeci, 2006: 132). This evidently means much higher emigration propensity for the


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Kurdish speaking segment that constitute possibly up to half of the total emigration flows

from Turkey. Nevertheless, we do not have data to accurately measure that. The volume of

the stock of Kurdish immigrants in Germany is thought to be ranging from half a million to

over a million (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Sirkeci, 2006). Meyer-Ingwesen (1995) claims that

in the early 1990s, there were about 580,000 Kurds living in Germany. Nevertheless, if once

projects the results from the Turkish International Migration Survey (i.e. half of the outflows

are Kurdish), then these guess-timations appear to be very conservative.

The socio-economic development/deprivation in Turkey

There are past and current studies on development, poverty and migration patterns. Piore

(1979: 135-140) found that middle-classes from middle level developed regions emigrating,

while Portes and Bach (1985: 4-5) uncovered that the bulk of immigrants from Latin

America to the US were from somewhat developed regions. Hammar (1995: 176) argued

that emigration may increase when poverty becomes less extreme and referred to human

capital improvements as necessary conditions for migration (for debates on social and

human capital, see Palloni et al., 2001: Pieterse, 2003; McKenzie and Marcin, 2007). Hence

migration propensity is expected to be low among the poorest and wealthiest segments of

populations. Also international migration requires certain resources to be available as

crossing borders is costly and movers need to have networks (social capital) and knowledge

(human capital). Once these are in place, migration occurs and in due process a culture of

migration may develop (Massey et al., 1993; Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011).

Figures 4 and 5 displays average emigration rates and average socio-economic development

scores for districts in Turkey. The districts are classified into deciles by their scores and we

have found that most migration happens in deciles 6 to 9 while the lowest ranked and higher

ranked districts reporting significantly lower emigration rates.

Figure 4: Emigration and socio-economic development by deciles, 1990


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Source: Icduygu, Sirkeci, Muradoglu (2001)

Figure 5: Emigration and socio-economic development levels, 1990


The ethnic question and socio-economic development levels are not separate in the Turkish

case. The provinces and areas where Kurdish speakers are dominant are often relatively

deprived compared to other parts of the country. For example Eastern and South-eastern

Turkey are mostly populated by the Kurds and at the same time, least developed compared

to the other regions (Figure 6). This may also explain, to an extent, why there is high

emigration from this region despite being the least developed: The ethnic conflict and

decades long armed conflict in the region triggers exit options such as migration to another

part of the country or abroad.

Figure 6: Emigration and socio-economic development levels by region, 1990


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Diversified destinations and return migration

Turkey has registered uninterrupted economic growth nearly for a decade and widely

accepted as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Some credit can be given to

this growth for increasing immigration to Turkey. Rest of the story can be linked to the large

immigrant stocks in many countries and migration networks built over the last five decades

because these have contributed to the Turkish culture of migration. Diversification of

destinations for Turkish migration is explained by changes in immigration policies in Europe

and elsewhere, so we have seen Australia (1970s), Arab countries (1980s), former Soviet

republics (1990s) and others (2000s) added to the portfolio over the last forty years.

Turkish immigrant stock in Germany was representing 75% of all Turkish citizens living

abroad in 1980 (Gitmez, 1983: 23). During the following 30 years, this share has declined to

45% (CSGB, 2009). Nevertheless, Germany continued to host the largest Turkish immigrant

population. Therefore it is no surprise that 158,309 (12.5%) among all foreign-born people

in Turkey by 2000 were born in Germany (Sirkeci, 2009). Total foreign-born population in

Turkey was 1.26 million, 79% of whom were Turkish citizens. It is very likely that a

significant flow of return migration from Germany to Turkey exist. Figure 1 shows a steady

outflow of Turkish citizens from Germany since the 1960s. These flows are about 40,000

per annum for the last two decades. Surely not all of them return to Turkey as some might

have migrated to other countries. Despite the fact that we are unable to comment on re-

migrations, it is possible to claim the existence of a large return migration stream.


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Conclusions

International migration from Turkey in general and to Germany in particular has been

responsive to the socio-economic and political environment in the Turkey. Therefore, over

the five decades, the source areas for emigration from Turkey moved towards the Eastern

provinces corresponding to a) development in these regions (i.e. growing social capital and

human capital), b) ethnic conflict in the East and South East. There is still much room to

analyse the role of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in the international migration flows from and

to Turkey.

A growing number of return migration and overall out-flow of Turks from Germany is

evident. Further studies are needed to understand possible role played in this trend by a)

economic growth in Turkey, b) discrimination and/or other difficulties in Germany;

particularly during the global financial crisis. Second and third generation Turks and Kurds

from Germany are quite visible in for example among high level footballers, celebrities, and

entrepreneurs. Perhaps it is the time to reconsider long term development outcomes of

migration in the Turkish case.

Turkish migration to Germany and in general evolved from guest-worker movements in the

1960s and 1970s through asylum-seeking and clandestine mobility in the 1980s and 1990s to

contemporary moves which are characterised by multiple motives and types creating and

utilising transnational networks and spaces more than ever. Nevertheless, this is still a

relatively understudied era. Again increasing prosperity of Turkey and Turks, strengthening

migration networks and relative ease of travel are key areas to investigate in relation to

international migration moves.

Finally, over the last 30 years, migration destinations for Turkish citizens have diversified. In

response to changes in admission regimes and Turkish economic growth led many to move

new destinations. Arab countries in the 1980s, former Soviet republics from the 1990s

onwards, and many more other countries in the 2000s were added to Turkish destinations

portfolio. Thus, Germany‟s share has been reduced from about 75% in 1980 to 45% in 2009.

As early as 2000, total foreign-born population in Turkey was 1.26 million, 79% of whom

were Turkish citizens. Hence immigration to Turkey including returnee flows shall be

appealing to migration researchers.


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