unclassified//for official use only · merkava mk-iv tanks. after two years of active employment,...

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1




COMMANDER’S NOTES

Marines,

Our feature article is a spotlight on China's Airborne Corps. China is modernizing at a rapid rate, and it

appears determined to develop its airborne capability to rival both Russia and the United States. They

are expanding their airlift capacity, honing methods and equipment for delivery of heavy materials,

modernizing equipment, and reorganizing their force. They also make a concerted effort at

training. They have matured their airborne capability to be a force that is viable for employment in any

contingency operation.

We next focus on two capabilities for the GCE. The Marine Corps and US Army are experimenting with

the Trophy active protection system. Both will field a small number of systems over the next few years

to provide an initial capability. We also spotlight counter-battery radar systems employment. This

article is intended to raise awareness on planning considerations and doctrine relative to counter-

battery radars. It also covers the various capabilities we currently possess and are in the process of

fielding.

We want to challenge paradigms with an article on UAS organization considerations. Most major

ground forces have organic UAS capabilities residing inside their land force. As we field more and more

UAS capabilities, it is clear that many of these should reside as organic to the GCE. This article surveys

various ground forces and presents some considerations relative to force organization.

As always, we welcome your feedback.

Semper Fidelis,

Col Tim Barrick Commanding Officer Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group


1 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

China’s Airborne Corps ................................................................................................................................. 2

Trophy Active Protection System .................................................................................................................. 7

Counter-Battery Radar ................................................................................................................................ 11

UAS Organization Considerations ............................................................................................................... 15

RPG-30 Kryuk “Hook” Antitank Disposable Launcher ................................................................................. 18

Doctrine Update .......................................................................................................................................... 21

l

Cover Photos Chinese Airborne Corps: http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/CD2JS3N6051597ER.html Trophy APS: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14966/images-emerge-of-m1a2-abrams-tank-equipped-with-trophy-active-protection-system

Counter-Battery Radar (AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR): Pictures of the G/ATOR were provided by Marine Corps Systems Commander Project Executive Office Land Systems PM G/ATOR

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3045445/Kim-Jong-Un-climbs-North-Koreas-highest-mountain-state-media.html%0c

http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/CD2JS3N6051597ER.html

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14966/images-emerge-of-m1a2-abrams-tank-equipped-with-trophy-active-protection-system

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14966/images-emerge-of-m1a2-abrams-tank-equipped-with-trophy-active-protection-system



hina’s Airborne Corps is one of the

country’s premier combat capabilities for

crisis response and contingency operations.

The Airborne Corps is a strategic asset, separate

from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and is

instead a People’s Liberation Army Air Force

(PLAAF) asset. It is intended as a strategic

capability for rapid response and decisive

operations. In recent years, China has devoted

significant effort to modernize and reorganize the

Airborne Corps to enhance its capabilities. As

evidence of this focus, in the 2017 International

Army Games, the Chinese airborne platoon

finished first place, winning 11 of 12 events, even

beating out Russian competition.1 China

endeavors to make its Airborne Corps on par with

Russian and US airborne units, and has developed

a respectable capability.

As an example of this ongoing focus, just last

year in May 2017, China reorganized its 35,000-

strong 15th Airborne Corps.2 China eliminated the

43rd, 44th, and 45th Airborne Divisions’

headquarters and transformed the force into a

brigade-based structure. The new corps

organization, no longer the 15th Airborne but

simply “Airborne Corps,” now comprises six

maneuver brigades (with 18 airborne battalions),

a special forces brigade, a support brigade, and an

aviation brigade (see Figure 2).

The Airborne Corps has improved its heavy

drop methods to enable effective delivery of its

ZBD-03 airborne infantry fighting vehicles that are

in its 133rd and 134th Abn Mechanized Brigades.

Additionally, the corps is improving its ability to

operate in high altitude environments (i.e., Tibet).

Another aspect of this modernization effort is

the transition to a combined arms organization,

similar to what the Russians adopted with their

battalion tactical group construct. This Synthetic

or Composite Infantry Battalion concept, as the

Chinese refer to it, incorporates enhanced fire

support, mobility, armor, air defense,

engineering, NBC defense, information warfare,

and command and control capabilities into a

combined arms construct. 3 The standard

airborne battalion is approximately 500-550

soldiers. As this modernization evolves, this will

likely grow.

In recent years they have trained their

airborne battalions in both airborne and air

assault operations. The Airborne Corps’ aviation

brigade consists of both fixed-wing transports (Y-

20, IL-76, Yu-8/Yu-9, and Yu-12) and helicopters

C

China’s Airborne Corps

Figure 1. PLAAF Airborne Corps.

By Col Timothy E. Barrick, Commanding Officer

Foreign Military Organization & Capabilities



Figure 2. PLAAF Airborne Corps Organization.

(AS332 Super Puma, SA 321 Super Frelon [Z-8], Z-

9, and Mi-17). The Y-20 transport is a new

acquisition made in 2016 (they now have four)

which provides a capability nearly on par to the C-

17. These transports give the Airborne Corps a

lift capacity for up to two light airborne brigades,

or about two mechanized airborne battalions.

Figure 3. ZBD-03 air-droppable Infantry Fighting

Vehicle with 30mm gun.

2011 RAND Study

“Airborne…missions can include seizing enemy strategic points; seizing airfields, bases, and ports to facilitate landing operations; conducting sabotage, undermining the enemy’s wartime potential or cutting off its forces; and undermining the enemy’s command system and transportation hubs. The PLA probably would use airborne operations in a cross-strait conflict, either against the main island of Taiwan or against some of the smaller Taiwan-held islands in the Taiwan Strait area.”1



Figure 4. Type 96 towed 122mm howitzer.4

Figure 5. New PCP-001 motorized 82mm self-

propelled rapid mortar.5

Figure 6. New self-propelled 120mm mortar based on the ZBD-03 air droppable chassis (a similar light tank variant has a 105mm gun).6

Figure 7. Paratroopers in CS/VP4 8x8 all-

terrain vehicles (ATVs).7

Figure 8. ATV with 107mm Rockets.8

Figure 9. LYT2021 fast attack vehicle.9

The mechanized airborne brigades employ

the ZBD-03 airborne infantry fighting vehicle (IFV)

with a 30mm gun, coaxial 7.62 machine gun,

antitank guided missile, and a capacity for four to

five troops. While available information is

limited, the mechanized brigades are likely

configured into three battalions with three

companies each and 10-12 ZBD-03s per company,

for a total of 90-100 IFVs in a mechanized

airborne brigade. The air assault brigades also

utilize 4x4 and 8x8 all-terrain wheeled vehicles,

with various configurations, to give the force

mobility. Each airborne battalion possesses the

full array of infantry weapons—anti-tank guided

missiles, mortars, and machine guns.

Each airborne brigade’s artillery battalion

leverages the venerable Type 96 (a Chinese-

produced D-30) 122mm towed howitzer and

towed Type 63 multiple rocket launcher (MRL)

(107mm). As part of the modernization effort,

China is exploring motorized 82mm self-propelled

mortar and MRL variants, as well as modern light-

weight 122mm and 155mm towed and self-

propelled howitzers. A self-propelled 120mm

mortar based on the



Figure 10. Offloading an ATV from an Mi-17.10

Figure 11. IL-76 dropping a ZBD-03.11

Figure 12. Type-87 25mm AA Gun.12

Figure 13. Airborne Soldier with AT Rocket.13

ZBD-03 chassis was recently produced by Norinco.

Additionally, the company has developed a

105mm mobile assault gun or light tank variant to

the ZBD-03.

The Chinese continue to examine new

equipment acquisitions for the Airborne Corps,

aiming to modernize and enhance its overall

warfighting capability. With its modernization

effort, a focus on exercises and training, and

enhanced transportation capabilities, the PLAAF

Airborne Corps represents a very capable (though

untried) rapid response force for China.



Figure 14. Airborne Brigade on Parade.

Sources:

1 - http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/china/9/20170810/15621.html 2 - https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htinf/articles/20170526.aspx 3 - “Synthetic Infantry Battalion in China's Current Military Transformation - Building China's Basic Combat

Unit for the Future” 2015-11-11 http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-20-615287-1.shtml 4 - Image Source: https://3g.163.com/idol/article/CTSUGJCB0512EGQQ.html 5 - Image Source: http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/CD2JS3N6051597ER.html 6 - “Military Change-9”; 16 May 2017: http://www.sohu.com/a/141029796_600506 7 - Image Source: http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_8645189_1.html 8 - http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_12601929_1.html 9 - Image Source: http://mil.eastday.com/a/170903153435810.html 10 - Image Source: Ibid. 11 - http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/CD2JS3N6051597ER.html 12 - http://k.sina.com.cn/article_6011462873_1664fa4d9001002ay2.html 13 - Ibid.

http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-20-615287-1.shtml



n this issue, we examine Marine Corps

initiatives that are in the works relative to

active protection systems (APSs), specifically

Trophy. On the modern battlefield, the

enemy’s ability to employ advanced antitank

guided missiles (ATGMs), rocket propelled

grenades (RPGs), and recoilless rifles poses a

significant threat to US ground combat vehicles,

up to and including the main battle tank. This

advancement in threat capability highlights the

need to add an APS capability to existing

passive protective measures to defend against

these threats. The Marine Corps’ participation

in the Army’s Expedited APS program is the

most rapid and effective means to field an APS

capability. The Marine Corps is currently testing

the Trophy APS to fill this capability gap in the

protection of ground combat vehicles.

Trophy Background Russia was the first nation on record to

employ APSs in combat, fielding the “Drozd”

system in Afghanistan in the 1980s following

over a decade of development and testing.

During the same period of time, Israel

accelerated the development of their own APS

in response to tank and armored vehicle losses

during the Yom Kippur War, and later in the

second Lebanese War of 2006. Israel began the

development of the Trophy APS in the early

1990s, finally fielding it in 2009 on their

Merkava MK-IV tanks.

After two years of active employment,

the first recorded use of the Trophy APS in

combat demonstrated the first successful

interception of a RPG by this new system. Later

in 2014, during “Operation Protective Edge,”

Israeli Merkava MK-IV tanks located near the

central Gaza Strip were fired upon by Hamas

antitank teams on multiple occasions using

various antiarmor weapon systems. Over the

course of these engagements, Israeli forces

reported zero casualties.

After decades of independent testing

and development, the US Department of

Defense determined that the Israeli Trophy

system met US military requirements as a

commercial off-the-shelf hard-kill system. For

the Marine Corps, the Trophy APS provides

added protection through a layered vehicle

protection system approach, in conjunction

with the Marine Corps M1A1 main battle tank’s

passive armor.

I

Trophy Active Protection System

Problem: “(The Marine Corps’) Current and future ground combat vehicles lack the capability to detect incoming antiarmor threats and defeat the threats before impact. There is a need to engage incoming projectile threats both vertically and horizontally. Passive and active protection systems will improve the survivability by detecting and defeating antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), high-angle incoming air-to-surface missiles, mortars, low-angle trench-fired/other close-in munitions, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)...” (D-UNS for VPS 15218DB, 6 Aug 2015)

By GySgt Christopher R. Boyette, Tank Advisor, Maneuver Division

Figure 1. Soviet T-54/55 with Drozd.



How Trophy Works The technology an APS utilizes to defeat

threats is not new. While new to ground

platforms, it is already in use by aircraft and

naval warships. When Trophy detects and

identifies an incoming antiarmor threat, it is

able to automatically intercept and neutralize

the threat by launching an effective

countermeasure without any required input

from the vehicle crewmembers. Each Trophy

launcher is loaded with multiple

countermeasures, with additional

countermeasures in the auto-loader. This

capability allows the Trophy APS to neutralize

multiple threats simultaneously. Trophy also

alerts the crew to the hostile fire point of origin.

Although it does not provide a grid to the point

of origin, it does provide the direction of attack

in relation to the vehicle’s position.

Figure 2. Major Components of the Trophy APS.

Employment Considerations

Understanding the success and

durability of the Trophy system has led to its

implementation, along with other upgrades to

the Marine Corps M1A1 main battle tank. It

should be noted that this system may require a

future update to tank employment doctrine,

since there may be a risk to dismounted

infantry operating within close proximity to

tanks employing any APS. Current doctrine

outlines the interdependence of infantry and

tanks when operating within an urban

environment for mutual security and support.

To mitigate the risk of fratricide to infantry

operating alongside tanks outfitted with the

Trophy system, certain tactics, techniques, and

procedures (TTP) employed by our ground

combat element (GCE) may have to be

adjusted. It should be noted that in the Israelis'

combat experience, whose infantry and tank

TTPs are similar to the Marine Corps’, they did

not have to adjust those TTPs when Trophy was

employed alongside their infantry.

During “Operation Euphrates Shield,”

the recent conflict in Syria between ISIS and the

Turkish Armed Forces, Turkey lost

approximately 10 German-built Leopard 2A4

tanks, with 60% damaged or destroyed by



Figure 3. How Trophy Works.

antiarmor threats. These tanks were not

equipped with APSs, highlighting the risk to

modern armored vehicles in a threat

environment laden with advanced antiarmor

capabilities.

Although Trophy has the ability to

address many of the current advanced

antiarmor threats being employed, the current

battlefield still poses additional risks to armored

ground vehicles. Planners must take into

consideration all of the possible adversary

tactics and weapons, to include the

employment of antitank mines and improvised

explosive devices, while the Marine Corps

continues to close our capability shortfalls.

Figure 4. Turkish Leopard 2A4, destroyed by ISIS ATGM fire.



Potential Transportation ChallengesAny APS employed by Marine Corps

ground combat vehicles must be expeditionary,

especially via ship-to-shore connectors. As

currently configured, when the Trophy APS is

installed on the Marine Corps M1A1, the overall

turret width is increased. This width increase

prevents the use of the M1A1 deep water

fording kit, as well as the use of the current

landing craft, utility (LCU) for ship-to-shore

movement. Another potential constraint is that

the increased weight of the M1A1 may not

allow for movement via the landing craft, air

cushioned (LCAC) when both Trophy and a

front-end attachment (such as the track-width

mine plow) are installed. Currently,

transportation aboard US Navy amphibious

ships requires a weapon system explosive

safety review board approval for the Trophy’s

countermeasures, and further testing of the

amphibious ready group’s capacity to transport

the system will be needed. Due to its size,

weight, and power constraints, the Trophy APS

can only be installed on the M1A1, and will not

be used with other ground combat vehicles.

Fielding and Implementation

In FY17, the Marine Corps began testing

the Trophy APS on the Marine Corps M1A1,

setting the conditions for a future program of

record. In FY18-19, the Marine Corps will

procure up to nine systems for developmental

testing, TTP experimentation, system

optimization, and integration into the GCE. The

Marine Corps currently plans to procure a total

of 56 systems as special mission kits, capable of

outfitting four tank companies in a specific

theater of operations, depending on

operational requirements.

The M1A1 Trophy APS is the first

increment in this nascent technology. As this

technology progresses, the Marine Corps plans

to take advantage of future system

advancements to apply to other ground combat

vehicles.



ield artillery target acquisition radio

detection and ranging (RADAR) systems

are located in the radar section in the

target acquisition platoon of the field artillery

regiment, organic to the Marine division. These

assets are critical to the division commander’s

reactive counterfire (i.e. counterbattery) fight

and are typically employed in general support

of the division. Incorporating these assets into

the division’s collection plan enhances coverage

of the force and increases force protection.

The current fielded USMC target

acquisition RADARs are the AN/TPQ-54 Light

Weight Counter Mortar RADAR (LCMR) and the

AN/TPQ-46 FireFinder RADAR. Additionally, the

AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR RADAR will be fielded to the

artillery regiments over the next 10 years, with

a one-for-one exchange with the AN/TPQ-46

FireFinder RADAR.

Figure 1. LCMR Counter-Battery RADAR.

Target acquisition RADARs are not

intended to work independently, but as a

system of systems, providing a tactical

capability to the force. Careful consideration is

required to ensure the proper sensor-to-

shooter links and approval processes are

established. The RADAR plan is developed by

the radar officer, concurrent with the operation

order and its fire support plan. Subordinate

units should coordinate all requests for radar

support with the artillery regimental operations

section and/or the division fire support

coordination center (FSCC). When required, the

RADAR section has the ability to task-organize

to provide a detachment in support of a

regiment or battalion.

Figure 2. Setting up the LCMR.

If a RADAR detachment is provided to a

subordinate unit, it is important to include the

RADAR detachment leader early in the planning

process. The RADAR detachment leader should

work with the supported unit’s S-2, S-3, FSCC,

and S-4 to plan for the following considerations:

Placement of the target processing

center (TPC) and RADAR teams.

RADAR zone placement/enemy indirect

fire (IDF) assets to be monitored.

Counterfire processing.

Security for the teams.

Logistics.

Tactical employment.

Capabilities.

F

Counter-Battery Radar

GCE Capabilities

By CWO2 Alex Molina, GCE Effects Targeting Officer



Figure 3. AN/TPQ-46 FireFinder.

Target Processing Center The RADAR detachment may come with

a TPC and any variation of RADARs. The TPC is the command and control node for all RADAR assets that process counterfire targets; it provides liaison between the supported unit and RADARs. The TPC can be located at one of two locations—with the senior artillery headquarters to expedite cannon response to counterfire missions, or with the FSCC to take advantage of available intelligence and facilitate clearance of counterfire with ground and air units. The RADAR detachment leader will advise the staff on the best location for the TPC. RADARs can operate dispersed, but the distance is restricted to the limitations of the organic communications assets.

RADAR Zones RADAR zones are prioritized areas for

locating hostile weapon systems. The RADAR

detachment leader makes recommendations for

zones’ size and placement in coordination with

the supported unit’s S-2 and S-3. There are

three types of priority zones. In order of

precedence, they are:

Critical friendly zone (CFZ)

Call for fire zone (CFFZ)

Artillery Target Intelligence Zone (ATIZ)

Figure 4. AN/TPQ-46 FireFinder.

A CFZ is an area established around a friendly unit or location that is critical to the success of the combined arms commander’s plan. When the computer predicts an enemy round will impact in a CFZ, the RADAR generates a fire mission on the location from which the round was fired and sends it to the controlling field artillery headquarters. The CFZ does not have to be within the RADARs search zone.

A CFFZ designates a search area in which the commander wants to attack hostile firing systems. A CFFZ would be placed around an enemy fire support position identified by the intelligence preparation of the battlespace as a high-payoff target. When the system identifies a target inside a CFFZ, it generates a fire mission. A CFFZ must be in the RADAR’s sector of search.

An ATIZ is an area in enemy territory that the commander wishes to monitor closely. Any weapon detected in an ATIZ will be reported ahead of all acquisitions, other than those from CFZs or CFFZs.

Counterfire Processing The target information from RADAR

assets will include a point of origin (POO) and

point of impact (POI), and will be collected and

processed by the TPC. If no coordination is

required for enemy IDF to be prosecuted at the

POO, the TPC will transmit a fire mission to the

supporting artillery unit for prosecution. If



coordination is required, the TPC will transmit

the fire mission to the supported unit’s FSCC for

deconfliction.

Figure 5. AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR

Because of its small size, a RADAR team

cannot provide its own security in every tactical

situation. Therefore, the supported unit is

required to provide security when needed. The

RADARs are also susceptible to identification by

enemy electronic attack and radio direction

finding. This requires close coordination

between the RADAR detachment leader and the

supported staff. The RADAR detachment leader

must be able to perform cueing based on the

enemy assessment from the S-2 and reports of

incoming enemy IDF from the S-3 or FSCC.

Based on the enemy electronic warfare and IDF

capabilities, the RADAR team may have to

conduct survivability moves.

Figure 6. AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR

The supported unit supplies Class I, III,

and V for the RADAR detachment. The TPC is

responsible for tracking the consumption rates

of the individual teams and providing that

information to the supporting unit’s S-4.

Radar Capabilities

RADAR Minimum

Range

Maximum Range at

360°/6400 Mils

Maximum Range at

90°/1600Mils

IDF Type

LCMR 500 meters 10 kilometers Can be adjusted to

less than 6400mils

Mortars, Artillery, Rockets

FireFinder 750 meters N/A 24 kilometers Mortars, Artillery, Rockets

G/ATOR 750 meters 32.5 kilometers 60 kilometers Mortars, Artillery, Rockets



RADAR Emplacement Displacement Personnel Equipment/Transport

Requirements

Comms assets

LCMR 20 Mins 10 Mins 2 Marines

(2-0842)

3 large cases with D00337K;

able to be air lifted in to

battlespace via all aslt sprt

assets except H-1

VRC –110/OE254

FireFinder 10 Mins 6 Mins 8 Marines

(7-0842 &

1-2887)

3 D00337K, 1 D00307K, 2

MEP 813 Generator w/

trailers, 1 Antenna Trailer

Group (size of D00337K);

able to be air lifted via MV-

22/CH-53/fixed wing

PRC-119/OE254/

OE201B, VRC-

117G /RF291

G/ATOR 10 Mins 7 Mins 8 Marines

(7-0842 &

1-2887)

1 D00037K w/ MEP 1070, 1

Communication Equipment

Group D00337K, 1 D00337K,

1 D00307K, 1 RADAR

Employment Group (size of

D00037K); able to be air

lifted via MV-22/CH-53/fixed

wing

VRC-110/OE254/

OE201B, VRC-

112/ RF291



ver the past decade, the use of unmanned

aircraft systems (UASs) worldwide has

significantly expanded, and is expected to

exponentially increase over the next several years.

There are many different ways to employ UASs.

The purpose of this article is to examine organic,

joint, coalition, and adversary methods of

employing UASs, and provide considerations for

alternate employment methods or command

relationships that could improve support to the

MAGTF. Given the brief scope of this article, a

summary will only be provided on one joint,

coalition, and adversary UAS service or nation.

Marine Corps In the early 1980s, Marine Corps UASs, then

known as remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), were

organic to artillery regiments. During this period,

RQ-2B Pioneer RPV detachments were attached to

the 10th Marine Regiment’s Target Acquisition

Battery, serving as spotters for artillery. In the mid-

1990s, RPV companies were placed in the Marine

aircraft wing (MAW) and given the title, Marine

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU).

There are two types of employment

configurations. The centralized configuration

involves launch, recovery, and control from a single

location. The distributed configuration involves

operations from a forward split site or ground

control station which provides improved

coordination with the supported unit, improved

line-of-sight to the unmanned aircraft, and/or

improved communications to the supported unit

that are not affected by terrain.

The primary VMU platform is now the RQ-

21A, which is either employed in support of MEUs

as part of the aviation combat element (ACE), or in

support of a regiment. Typically, the supporting

VMU squadron or detachment determines the best

employment method to be utilized when

supporting the MAGTF scheme of maneuver—

centralized or distributed.

US Army In the US Army, the primary combined

arms, close combat force is the brigade combat

team (BCT). The primary brigade-level aviation

maneuver organization is the combat aviation

brigade (CAB) [similar to the MAW], which provides

scalable support to BCTs based on METT-T analysis.

The primary Group 3-5 platforms in the Army UAS

inventory are the RQ-7B Shadow (typically

employed at the company level) and the MQ-1C

Gray Eagle (typically employed at the division level),

which are organized into companies and placed

beneath the CAB alongside various rotary-wing and

fixed-wing platforms. Each BCT has a brigade

aviation element staffed by a UAS subject matter

expert, whose responsibility is to incorporate UASs

into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver.

Based on METT-T analysis during planning, UAS

companies or platoons are generally attached to the

supported unit, with the size of the UAS company or

O

UAS Organization Considerations

Problem: VMU supporting relationships may not facilitate optimal support to the MAGTF. Background: UASs are operated by joint, coalition, and adversary forces. Each force, even the adversary, potentially have sound doctrinal processes/procedures that could be considered by the Marine Corps for implementation. Solution Description: Consider VMU supporting relationships and whether or not the supporting relationship optimizes support to the MAGTF commander.

By Maj Christopher Perry, UAS Officer

Organization of the Force

https://vcepub.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/msc/magtftc/mctog/gcecoi/MCRP/MCRP%203-20.5%20Unmanned%20Aircraft%20Systems%20Operations(Formerly%20MCWP%203-42.1).pdf



(Source: ATP 3-01.81, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques)

platoon scaled in accordance with the ground

scheme of maneuver.

Australia Australian Group 3-5 UASs include the RQ-

7B, MQ-9, MQ-4C, and Heron, which are organized

into UAS batteries, an organization similar to a

VMU. The UAS battery is scalable and supports

Army combat brigades by providing attachments to

each supported unit. Detachments that are

collocated with maneuver elements are provided

communications, force protection, and logistics

support. UASs that cannot be launched and

controlled from a forward location are launched

and recovered at the UAS battery main

headquarters echelon, the centralized location for

launch and recovery operations, and headquarters

for UAS operations. To facilitate simplified planning

and integration with the ground scheme of

maneuver, the UAS battery S-3 section/detachment

is located within the joint fires effects coordination

cell, an organization similar to the fire support

coordination center.

Russia Russian UASs are comprised of Group 1-3

UASs (Group 4 and 5 UASs are in development, and

projected to be available in 2020), are organized

into companies, and are organic to brigades and

battalion tactical groups. Russian UASs are placed

beneath a battalion/squadron and attached to

ground combat units as required for each mission.

Each motorized rifle brigade has its own UAS

company. Multiple rocket launcher (MRL) units also

have their own dedicated UAS, with each UAS

matching the capability/range of the MRL. As an

example, Group 2 UASs are placed with BM-21 Grad

units, and Group 3 UASs are placed with BM-30

SMERCH units. Of note, this arrangement resulted

in artillery inflicting 80-90% of Ukrainian casualties.

Artillery adjustments were massed on a target 2-10

minutes after observation, a tempo comparable to

(and sometimes better than) Marine Corps kill-chain

tempo.

Conclusion It is noteworthy that the UAS organizations

of joint, coalition, and adversary UASs are slightly

different from the current Marine Corps UAS

organization. These services and countries

currently use a structure similar to that utilized by

the Marine Corps in the early 1980s, when RPVs

were attached to GCE units. While data showing

the efficiency of Army and Australian kinetic effects

is not available, the observed efficiency of Russian

UAS operations during the Russian-Ukrainian

conflict may be evidence that further consideration

of Marine Corps UAS organizations and supporting

relationships should be taken into account when

planning for future MAGTF operations.



Sources:

US Army: ATP 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment

FM 3-04, Army Aviation

USMC: MCRP 3-20.5, Unmanned Aircraft System Operations

Australia: LWP-CA (STA) 2-3-3 [Australian UAS Operations)

Russia: Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War; MCIA Tactics Update: Russia Volume 1; OE Watch

Volume 5 Issue 2, February 2015



Figure 1. RPG-30 Hook (Source: Jane’s Defense).

The RPG-30 is a Russian 105mm non-reloadable antitank disposable launcher (ATDL). The RPG-30 is also

an antitank grenade launcher (ATGL). Commonly known as a rocket propelled grenade, an ATGL is a

shoulder-fired antiarmor weapon. The term rocket propelled grenade stems from the Russian term

"ruchnoy protivotankovy granatomyot," meaning hand-held antitank grenade launcher.

The RPG-30 is a unique ATGL because it is designed to defeat both explosive reactive armor (ERA) and

active protection systems (APSs). When the RPG-30 is fired, a 40mm decoy rocket is launched from a

side tube, in addition to the 105mm rocket fired from the main tube. This decoy rocket acts as a false

target, tricking a target's hard-kill active protection system into engaging it, allowing the main rocket a

clear path to the target.

RPG-30 Kryuk “Hook” Antitank

Disposable Launcher By MSgt Peter Clark, Intelligence Tactics Instructor Course Chief

Weapon Spotlight

Note: Not all ATDLs are considered ATGLs. For example, the AT4 (84mm) is an ATDL that is also

a recoilless weapon. The primary difference between an ATGL and recoilless weapons is that an

ATGL round is a propelled rocket; it continues to propel itself once it leaves the launcher. A

recoilless weapon fires an un-propelled round; it receives all of its kinetic energy from the initial

launch. The AT4 recoilless weapon should also not be confused with the Russian AT-4 Spigot,

which is an antitank guided missile.



Figure 2. RPG-30 operating concept (Source: Military Analysis).

Performance: The RPG-30 has a maximum effective firing range of 300 meters. The peep sight only

goes out to 200 meters.

Rate of Fire: Single-shot disposable.

Warhead: The 105mm rocket is equipped with a tandem high explosive antitank (HEAT) warhead. A

tandem warhead is designed to defeat ERA.1

A tandem warhead is two shaped charges arrayed in tandem that are specifically designed to defeat

ERA. When a tandem HEAT warhead strikes ERA, the lead charge detonates and its molten jet is

disrupted by the exploding ERA. Now that a path is cleared to the vehicle’s hull, the second round

detonates against it with the full penetrative capabilities of its shaped charge. When detonated against

a target without ERA, the penetrative effects of the warhead are enhanced compared to a single

warhead. Most tandem warheads have a smaller lead warhead in order to decrease total weight,

because its only purpose is to detonate ERA.

Performance1:

Armor (RHA) – 900+ mm (35in) (ERA-equipped vehicle), 950+ (37in) (non-ERA equipped vehicle).

Brick – 3,000mm (10ft).

Reinforced Concrete – 1,500+mm (5ft).

Log and dirt – 3,700mm (12ft).

ERA is a passive defense system that defends against shaped charge warheads. ERA consists of an

explosive layer sandwiched between steel plates. When a shaped charge, such as a HEAT round,

detonates against an ERA plate, the ERA plate explodes, forcing the opposing plates to rapidly

separate in opposite directions. This has the effect of disrupting the flow of the molten jet created

by the detonating shaped charge, significantly decreasing its penetration. ERA typically generates

~350-400mm equivalent of rolled homogenous armor (RHA) protection. Since ERA will not

completely stop a HEAT round from penetrating, a backing layer of armor is still required.

Figure 3. Function of ERA (Source: Recreated from CIAR.org).



Sights: Raised iron peep site (sighting range in meters – 50, 100, 150, 200), is compatible with Russian

night vision devices for nighttime use.

Operating Crew: 1.

Length: 3.7ft.

Weight: 12kg (26lbs).

Active Users: The RPG-30 entered service with the Russian Federation Army in 2013. In April 2015, the

RPG-30 was marketed for export for the first time at the LAAD 2015 exhibition in Brazil.2

Sources:

1 – TRISA Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG), Volume 1: Ground Systems, U.S. Army TRADOC, Aug

2014

2 – RPG-30 anti-tank rocket launcher, Anti-Tank Weapons, Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Sep 2017

Image Sources:

Figure 1 – Jane’s Defense

Figure 2 – Military Analysis - http://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/08/rpg-30.html

http://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/08/rpg-30.html



Doctrine Update

The Army and Marine Corps recently

published Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-

06/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP)

12-10B, Urban Operations as the first part of an

urban doctrine update ranging from the joint to

battalion and below levels. The Joint

Publication (JP) 3-06, Urban Operations is due

to be published later this year, and the classic

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 12-

10B.1, Military Operations On Urbanized Terrain

(MOUT) (formerly MCWP 3-35.3) is awaiting

final editing (readers may access its proposed

contents in Doctrine Circular 3-35.3, MOUT at

the following link:

https://vcepub.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/msc/magt

ftc/mctog/gcecoi/MCTOG_Products/Forms/AllIt

ems.aspx).

A brand new publication to the Marine

Corps, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, Urban

Operations targets battalion and regimental

staffs, and captures changes to urban

operations beginning with the results of Project

Metropolis in the late 1990s, and including the

lessons learned in recent US operations, those

of other nations, and the near-term impacts of

continued, accelerated urbanization.

ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, Urban

Operations still views the environment through

the classic “urban triad” of complex man-made

physical terrain, a population of significant size

and density, and dynamic supporting

infrastructure. While it greatly improves

discussion of information and a dense and

hyper-connected population, readers will need

to await the publication of JP 3-06 to see the

new “urban quad.” The “urban quad” will

formally add a connected population to the

traditional “triad.”

Recognizing that force-to-space ratio

issues will confront and stress military forces

operating in ever more expansive urban

environments, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B

addresses the reality that acting in cities and

urban areas will be less of a choice than it was

in the past. This is in line with the Marine Corps

Operating Concept, which recognizes that with

well over half of the world’s population living in

urban environments, urban terrain is the most

likely terrain on which Marine forces will

operate.

Accordingly, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B

provides readers with additional insight into

mitigating risk to smaller forces in larger cities,

New Urban Operations Doctrine

https://vcepub.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/msc/magtftc/mctog/gcecoi/MCTOG_Products/Forms/AllItems.aspx





such as controlling essential routes and

infrastructure, conducting aggressive

information operations, and avoiding attritional

battles. Published before the recent addition of

information as a seventh joint function (akin to

the warfighting functions), this publication

addresses information management within

command and control, as well as information

operations as part of a multi-domain approach

to urban activities. It also provides a very in-

depth look at the impact of urban terrain on

each of the other Marine Corps warfighting

functions.

As part of its update, ATP 3-06/MCTP

12-10B recommends methods and approaches

for battalion and regimental staffs. From

suggesting purpose-based battlespace

frameworks (shaping, decisive, and sustaining

actions) over spatial-based frameworks (deep,

close, and rear) to creating defensive depth in

the urban space, to employing different kinds of

sensors in combination with manned

reconnaissance to create more comprehensive

intelligence gathering, the publication provides

significant updates to offense, defense, and

stability activities in the urban environment.

ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, Urban

Operations provides its readers new insights

into the urban problem set and more effective

ways to create solutions. Given the rapid

urbanization and technological advancements

occurring in the world, Marine forces are likely

to see frequent updates to urban doctrine from

the squad to the joint level. ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-

10B is just such an update, and needs to be an

immediate part of each unit’s training and

professional military education program.

Feedback We welcome your comments on what you’ve read in this issue of The Sand Table. Contact

the Senior Editor: MCTOG XO, LtCol David O’Brien, [email protected]

unclassified//for official use only · merkava mk-iv tanks. after two years of active employment,...

Documents