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Military History of Swarming

January 13, 2003

Sean J.A. EdwardsNational Ground Intelligence Center

Email – JWICS: fredwsa@ngic.ic.gov, NIPRNET: fredwsa@ngic.army.milPhone - DSN: 521-7577, Commercial: (434) 980-7577

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General Types of Swarming

General Type Example

Social

Biological

Police/Fire Departments

Terrorist

Military

Bees, wolves

Smart mobs, “Critical Mass,” cell phone-based social groups

Horse archers, U-boat “wolfpacks,” Spitfires defending Britain

Al-Qaida cells

Response to bank robberies, fires

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Military Swarming

Basic characteristics

– Attrition based - light swarm units avoid close combatAttacks designed to disrupt cohesion of adversary

– More fluid with common tactics being feigned withdrawal, ambush, feint, ruse, infiltration

– Similar to double envelopment but not the samesustained pulsing, not sustained close combat

– Not a siege, involves maneuver

Definition: “Swarming occurs when the scheme of maneuver is a convergent attack of several semi-autonomous (or autonomous) units on a target”

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Difference Between Swarming and Guerrilla Tactics

Swarming• Several or more units • Sustainable pulsing• Dispersed, non-linear

Guerrilla tactics• Only a few units involved• 1 raid or ambush only • Dispersed, non-linear

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What Can the Past Tell Us?

When did swarming work and when did it fail? Are there any "dominant factors" which appear most

frequently across many cases? How do swarmers do against non-swarmers? Does swarming work more frequently on offense rather than

defense? Does swarming success vary according to terrain? How did swarmers satisfy their logistical requirements?

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Scythians vs. Macedonians, Central Asian campaign, 329 - 327 BC Parthians vs. Romans, Carrhae, 53 BC Seljuk Turks vs. Byzantines, Manzikert, 1071 Seljuk Turks vs. Crusaders, Dorylaeum, 1097 Mongols vs. Eastern Europeans, Liegnitz, 1241 Woodland Indians vs. US Army, St. Clair’s Defeat, 1791 Napoleonic Corps vs. Austrians, Ulm Campaign, 1805 Boers vs. British, Majuba Hill, 1881 U-boats vs. British convoys, Atlantic, 1939 – 1945 Somalis vs. US Commandos, Mogadishu, 1993

Historical Cases Completed

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Two Types of Tactical Swarming

“Massed Swarm”(Eurasian horse archers)

“Dispersed Swarm”(Somali Militia)

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Example of Massed Swarming – Arsuf, 1191

“they are like tiresome flies which you can flap away for a moment, but which come back the instant you have stopped hitting at them”

Classic “Marching” battle Elusiveness based on Turkish

horse archer Excellent leaders on both sides Conventional Crusader army

adopts combined-arms box formation

Crusader cohesion never disrupted

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Mongols Manchus

Seljuk Turks

ScythiansHuns

AvarsParthians

Sarmatians

Nomadic Swarmers from Central Asia

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Example of Dispersed Swarming – Mogadishu, 1993

Command and Control:• Burning tires• Runners• Cell phones• Megaphones• Smoke from crash sites• Sound of firefights

Elusiveness based on:• Urban terrain• Noncombatants• Home turf• Roadblocks, narrow alleys

equalized mobility

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Basic Pattern Analysis

Situational awareness

Elusiveness (mobility or concealment)

Standofffirepower

Woodland Indians Napoleonic Corps

SomalisBoers

U-boat (1939-42)Seljuk Turks I

MongolsScythiansParthians

Seljuk Turks II

Countermeasures: negation

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Feigned retreats and ambushes are common swarm tactics Swarming strategy usually based on attrition – knockout

blows rare Common problems are strongpoint reduction, fratricide Logistics a constraint

– Mongol toumens could not find enough forage in Germany or Syria

Terrain often key to elusiveness

– Heavy woodlands, urban areas, ocean, grasslands

Conclusions from Preliminary Research

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Modern Concerns

Dependence on reliable communications

– Bandwidth concerns

– Electromagnetic threats include EW, EMP Terrain restrictions Logistics – swarming has never been done solely with

ground vehicles? Minefields Unit morale

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Why is Swarming Relevant?

Natural for future battlefield environment

– Greater dispersion

– Nonlinear

– Command and control networked, decentralized

– Small autonomous units operating independently

– Greater reliance on aerospace firepower Potential for “medium” rapid reaction forces who must

– avoid direct fire battles

– use standoff fires as much as possible

– rely on elusiveness for survivability

How do LAVs fight tanks?

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400 BC 200 BC 1000 12001100100 BC300 BC 14001300 16001500 18001700 20001900

Th

eo

r etic

al K

illin

g C

ap

aci

ty p

er

ho

ur

20

50

100

500

1000

5000

10K

10M

1000K

500K

100K

Hand-to-Hand Weapons

Sarissa

SwordGladius

Smoothbore cannons

18th Century 12-pounder

17th Century 12-pounder

16th Century 12-pounder

Smoothbore small a

rmsFlintlock

Rifl

ed s

mal

l arm

sMinie Rifle

Mac

hine

gun

Rifled

artill

ery

155mm Long Tom

WW2 tank

Tan

k

French 75mm

Fighter-bombers

The Trend in Lethality

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Historical Trend in Area per Soldier

Theoretical area per soldier

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1000000

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

Year

Sq

uar

e m

ete

rs p

er m

an Antiquity – 10 sq. meters per man

Gulf War – 426,000 meters per man

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Linear

Non-linear “phases”

No

n-li

nea

rity

Dispersion

Swarming

Low

High

Low High

Non-linearity and Dispersion

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Concluding Remarks

Given historical trends in dispersion, weapon lethality, and nonlinearity, swarming seems a natural fit

Potential operational concept for rapid reaction missions (“Halt” scenario)

– Rapidly deployable joint forces will need to be elusive when “halting” heavy armor threats

Understanding swarming will also help to counter adversarial swarming

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Backup Slides

Backup

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October 17, 1805. Capitulation of Ulm

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Magyars vs. Germans, Lechfeld, 955 Seljuk Turks vs. Crusaders, Hattin, 1187 Seljuk Turks vs. Crusaders, Arsuf, 1191 Mamluks vs. Mongols, Ayn Jalut, 1260 Conquistadors vs. Aztecs, Mexico city, 1520 English Navy vs. Spanish Armada, 1588 Patriot Militia vs. British, Lexington and Concord, 1775 Zulus vs. British, Isandhlwana, 1879 Chechens vs. Russians, Grozny, 1994,1999

Cases in Progress

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Case Study and Time(assume AD unlessotherwise noted)

Terrain Swarmer Description NonswarmerDescription

Uniqueness of Example

Scythians vs. Macedonians,Central Asian campaign,329 - 327 BC

steppe, desert bow cavalry heavy infantry phalanxsupported by heavycavalry

horse archer againstMacedonian phalanx withsupporting light cavalry

Parthians vs. Romans,Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC

steppe, desert bow cavalry heavy infantry in legions horse archer againstunsupported legions

Seljuk Turks vs.Byzantines, Battle ofManzikert, 1071

open,rolling

bow cavalry bow cavalry, cataphracts,bow infantry

horse archers againstcombined-arms opponent

Turks vs. Crusaders, Battleof Dorylaeum, 1097

desert bow cavalry heavy cavalry horse archers against heavycavalry, supporting lightinfantry

Mongols vs. EasternEuropeans, Battle ofLiegnitz, 1241

steppe, plains light and heavy cavalry heavy cavalry andinfantry

tactical and operationalswarming

Woodland Indians vs. USArmy, St. Clair’s Defeat,1791

woods tribal warriors (lightinfantry)

light infantry, some fieldartillery

swarming light infantry verselight infantry

Napoleonic Corps vs.Austrians, Ulm Campaign,1805

wooded,mountains,steppe

The tactical unit wascombined arms (musketinfantry, cavalry, horseartillery); the operationalunit was the semi-autonomous Corps

combined arms (musketinfantry, cavalry, horseartillery)

“operational” swarmingcombined with conventionaltactics

Boers vs. British, Battle ofMajuba Hill, 1881

rollinggrasslands

dismounted cavalry infantry guerrilla warfare withswarming-like tactics

U-boats vs. British convoys,1939 – 1945

naval “Wolfpacks” of U-boats convoys of merchantships guarded bydestroyer teams

naval example

Somalis vs. US Commandos,Mogadishu, October 3-4,1993

urban tribal militia (light infantry) light infantry, lightvehicles, helicoptergunships

peacemaking operation

Historical Cases Examined

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Backup Slides

Backup - linearity

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Linearity and Land Warfare

• Linear armies conduct offensive operations on a continuous front in one direction at the tactical-operational level

• Armies and tactical formations have become more linear in order to:

– Maximize combat power

– Reduce their vulnerability to incoming missiles

– Decrease fratricide

– Ease command and control

– Flank or avoid being flanked

• In general, tactical deployment has evolved from dense phalanxes, maniples, and tercios to thinner and longer lines

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Non-Linearity vs. Linearity Non-linear warfare:

– Maneuver-based

– Multi-directional fighting

– No stable front, flanks, and rear

– Units are dispersed and relatively more independent

Linear warfare

– Attrition-based

– Siege like

– Methodical

– Units heavier, slower, rely on stable supply

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Linear versus Non-Linear Tactics

X

X

Phase Line Charlie

X

Linear Non-Linear

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

units on line units converging

fluid approach

close combat stand-off

avenue of approach 100 km

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Linear versus Non-Linear Operational Art

seaport

airfield

X

X

Phase Line Alpha

Phase Line Bravo

Phase Line Charlie

X

X

X

seaport

X

X

X

X

Avenue of Approach

Line

of C

onta

ct

Linear Non-Linear

X

X

100 km

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The Linear Roman Legion

Hastati

Principes

Triarii

1200’

250’Maniples of 120 men

Maniples of 60 men

120 men total12 man front10 man depth

60 men6 man front

10 man depth

Each maniple consisted of 2

centuries

1 Triarri maniple

250’

60 men

60 men

Centuries can fill in the gaps

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17th and 18th Century Linear Formations

Prussian Processional March

Platoons of the second line

Platoons of the first line

Direction of march

Individual platoons

French Battalion of Column-of-Divisions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Skirmishers

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Linear Control Measures Today

XX

XXP

L

FE

BA

FS

CL

AC

A

CFL

Delta

ZF-2

ZF-1

RFL

XX

X

XX

IIIIII

X

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Non-Linearity in Military History Swarming operations Guerrilla and partisan operations Airborne, airmobile, and special operations 20th Century maneuver warfare - has introduced

non-linear “phases”

– Hutier tactics

– Blitzkrieg

– Soviet Deep Operation theory

– Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs)

– AirLand Battle

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Infiltration Tactics from the First World War

2) Storm troops infiltrate and by pass

3) Support troops mop up centers of resistance

1) Hurricane artillery barrage preparationof poisonous gas, smoke and high

explosive shell

4) Regular infantry troops and reserves clear trenches, relieve storm units

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Blitzkrieg in the Second World War

Lin

ea

r d

efe

ns

ive

fro

nt

Penetration

Exploitation

Penetration

Encirclement

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Maneuver Warfare and Non-linearity

1) Initial assault

2) Breakthrough and exploitation

3) Eventual reestablishment of defensive line in the rear

Non-linear phase

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Soviet “Deep Battle” in the Second World War

Operational depth

Mobile forceBreakthrough force

Holding force

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Backup Slides

Backup - Lethality, dispersion

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Technology and Weapon Lethality

Impact of weapon technology usually only felt after a period of assimilation

Weapon lethality remained relatively flat throughout history Artillery became the king of lethality in late 19th century

– Breech-loading, rifling, recoil-systems, smokeless powder, and high explosive shells

“Technology of technology” systematizes weapon development by the end of WW2

Air-delivered, precision guided munitions (PGMs) in the late 20th century rendered concentrations of vehicles vulnerable

– Cluster, top-attack, self guiding IR, MW, GPS sensors

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Area occupied by deployed

force 100,000 strong

Antiquity Napoleonic

Wars

U.S.

Civil

War

World

War I

World

War II

October

War

Gulf

War

Square km 1 20.12 25.75 248 2,750 4,000 213,000

Front (km) 6.67 8.05 8.58 14 48 57 400

Depth (km) 0.15 2.50 3 17 57 70 533

Men per square km 100,000 4,790 3,883 404 36 25 2.34

Square meters per man 10 200 257.5 2,475 27,500 40,000 426,400

The Trend in Dispersion

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Timeline of Gunpowder Weapons 1200 1228-29 Sixth Crusade 1242 Roger Bacon writes down formula for gunpowder 1300 1300 Muzzle loading artillery predominates until 1850s c.1300-c.1450 Most cannon wrought iron, and fired stone

shot 1326 First illustration of a cannon 1338 Outbreak of Hundred Years War 1346 English use cannon at Crecy 1400 c.1450-c.1850 Most cannon cast in bronze, iron, or brass 1415 Battle of Agincourt 1411 Earliest illustration of simple matchlock 1453 End of Hundred Years War 1440 Matchlock Arquebus 1494 Italian Wars begin Matchlock musket used 1500 Metal cannon shot gains in use 1559 Italian Wars end 1550 Rifling in limited use 1568 Revolt of the Netherlands 1600 1610 True flintlock ignition emerges, matchlocks still used 1618-48 Thirty Years War 1620 Gustav Adolphus uses light, leather-bound cannon 1642-48 English Civil War 1650 Flintlocks widely used 1700 1701-14 War of the Spanish Succession 1756-63 Seven Years War 1775-83 American War of Independence 1775-83 Use of rifled muskets by skirmishers, snipers 1792 French Revolutionary Wars begin 1796-1815 Napoleanic Wars 1784 Invention of the Shrapnel shell – main anti-personnel

shell until WW1

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Timeline of Gunpowder Weapons II1800

1807 Dr. Forsyth patents percussion ignition c.1840 Percussion caps used widely, replaces flintlock 1858 French adopt rifled artillery 1860s New methods of reinforcing artillery barrels with

wrought iron collars allowing bigger charges 1854 Crimean War 1850s Rifled muskets based on Minie ball renders

smoothbore muskets obsolete 1861-65 American Civil War 1860s Development of the metal-cased cartridge, which

makes possible the later repeating rifle, machine gun, and quick-firing artillery

1862 First successful hand-cranked machine gun (Gatling) 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War c.1870 Breech-loading artillery predominates 1883 Maxim patents fully automatic machine gun 1884 First smokeless powder 1888 Long-recoil cylinder developed 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War 1900 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War 1914-18 World War 1 1914-18 Most combatants use bolt-action repeaters,

machine guns/barbed wire defenses dominate 1918 First submachine guns developed 1939-45 World War 2 Self-loading rifles, recoilless artillery, and tank and anti-

tank guns all become vital 1947 AK-47 assault rifle

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Quantifying Theoretical Lethality

If one assumes that lethality is the inherent capability of a given weapon to kill personnel or make material ineffective in one hour, where capability includes range, rate of fire, accuracy, radius of effects, and battlefield mobility, then quantitative measures can be computed to compare dissimilar weapons

Weapon Killing Capacity

Sword 20

Javelin 18

Simple bow 20

Longbow 34

Crossbow 32

Arquebus 10

16th C. 12-pounder cannon 43

17th C. matchlock musket 19

17th Century 12-pounder cannon 229

18th Century flintlock musket 47

18th Century 12-pounder cannon 3,970

Weapon Killing Capacity

Minie rifle, muzzle-loading 154

Late 19th Century breech-loading rifle 229

Sprinfield Model 1903 rifle (magazine) 778

WW1 machine gun 12,730

French 75mm gun 340,000

WW1 fighter-bomber 229,200

WW2 machine gun 17,980

US 155mm M2 "Long Tom" gun 533,000

WW2 medium tank 2,203,000

WW2 fighter-bomber 3,037,900

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Ancillary Technology

CommandYear

Ox, mule, horse

Logistics and Mobility General Advances

1850s

Internal combustion engine

Steam engine

Radio effective

Telegraph

Quality cheap steel

1840

Field telephone

Portable timekeeping piecesLate 1600s

Horse drawn cart/horse collar

1769

1887

Radar effective

1940

1944

Motor truck and tanks effective

Military maps with contour lines Late 1700s

1200

More surfaced roads

Antiquity

Late 1800s

1914 Aerial photography

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Non

- line

arit y

Dispersion

Traditional Linear Linear with dispersed units

Non-linear dispersed Non-linear 1. 2.

3. 4.

Categories of Non-Linearity and Dispersion

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Summary of Land Warfare Trends

CommandExamples

18th Century musket infantry

Linearity Dispersion

WW1 Storm troops using hutier tactics

WW2 Panzer Divisions

Very linear, single front,

units contiguous,attacks in waves,tactics sequential

Nonlinear phases with multiple fronts,

attacks in spearheads,bypass strong points

encirclements, more mixing of

enemy and friendly units

Decentralized, use of mission order,

reactive,high initiative,

high articulation

Centralized,methodical,deliberate,

preplanned, hierarchical,

low articulation

Low dispersion,high density,

shoulder-to-shoulder, files of menWW1 trench warfare

More dispersion,squads of men,

open order formations

Roman legion

Future forces? Longer non-linear phases?

Non-hierarchical, networked?

Highly dispersed,maneuver by fire, pulsing?

OMGs, AirLand Battle

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Backup - tactics

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Tactics and Operational Art Based on Logistics

Tactics have evolved to cut or threaten vulnerable supply lines

– Turning movements– Encirclements

Encirclement

Turning Movement

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1.

3.

2.

Feigned Withdrawal

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Double envelopment

Single envelopment

Oblique order

Spartan flanking maneuver

Tactics I

UNCLASSIFIEDTurning Movement

Tactics II

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Backup - Logistics

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History of Logistics Roman legion required 1,000 pack animals for transport and

12.5 oxen, 120 sheep, or 38 pigs for food every day Introduction of rapid firing small arms and artillery in the late

19th C. both increased demand and changed its nature– The Allies in one month of WW1 fired off 2x ammunition used

by the North in the entire four years of the Civil War

– Food, firewood, and fodder are 99% of supplies in 1870, only 8% in 1940

Transportation technology has played major role– Baggage animal, surfaced roads, horse drawn cart, locomotive,

motor truck, future tilt rotor?

– The locomotive is the great logistical turning point Allowed increase in size and mechanization of armies Railways became “bones of strategy”

– Motor trucks allow operational penetrations up to 3-400 miles from railhead in WW2

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Backup - Dissertation

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The Army’s Strategic Dilemma

Deployment of rapid reaction forces in the first several weeks of a crisis that is survivable against heavy force

– Kosovo (1999) and the Persian Gulf War (1990) are two examples

389 C-130s Heavy forces not air deployable

Light forces not survivable

YesNo

0.10 tons 40 tons 70 tons

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The Army’s Answer: Future Rapid Reaction Forces

Medium forces on the way

– 20 tons or less

– Transportable by C-130

– Globally deployable 96 hours after wheels up

– Interim force with LAVIII, MGS

– Objective force with Future Combat System Cannot face most enemy armor so we need new operational

concepts Army transformation motivated in part by what we think

future war will be like

2000 02 03 c. 2012 c. 2025

Start IBCTIOC IBCT

R&D PlanDesign Objective Force

complete transformation

-- R&D -- --fielding --

Expand Interim ForceTransform into Objective Force

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Our Problem: How Do Medium Forces Fight?

To survive and be effective, rapid reaction medium units must:

– avoid direct fire battles

– use standoff fires as much as possible

– rely on elusiveness for survivability But: The Army does not have the operational

concept to do this

How do these fight these?

Spam in a can?

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The Need for Rapid Reaction Force

Halt the enemy when he invades allied territory

Other time sensitive missions like stopping ethnic cleansing

Counter enemy anti-access strategies (airland inside)

Deter aggression

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Related Research in Enhancing Rapid Reaction Forces

Arroyo Center – high level simulation has focused on enhancing air-deployable forces so they can defeat enemy mechanized forces

– Defensive posture

– Tried making light forces lighter or heavier, introduced medium force

– Combination of remote indirect systems and organic fire works best

Project Air Force (PAF) - seeking ways to enhance air power’s ability to engage elusive ground targets

– “Enhancing Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets” (2001)

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The Solution Must Be Joint

The future environment and the nature of medium forces calls for a joint solution

Medium ground forces needs airpower to provide the offensive punch (the “hammer”)

Air forces need a maneuverable ground element to act:

– As the “anvil” to flush out elusive targets and force them to mass or move

– As forward air controllers

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Dissertation Objective

Outline operational concepts based on swarming for two scenarios:

Initial halt campaign: a light/medium ground force uses swarming to stop enemy mechanized forces

Dispersed operations: a light/medium ground force uses swarming against adaptive enemies who have dispersed

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Methodology

I. Complete historical research: add 30-50 more historical cases to a database and examine them for patterns and insights

II. Model dispersed nonlinear operations

III. Combine insights and provide a framework for two operational concepts based on swarming

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I. Qualitative Methods

Gather data on 40 cases Identify dominant factors and constraints Draw inferences, eliminate hypotheses, pattern-

match, make analytic generalizations Use the Qualitative Comparative Method (by

Charles Ragin)

– Place binary data in truth tables and build a boolean equation

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II. Modeling

Most models tend to emphasize attrition warfare and linear operations along well-defined front lines (based on Lanchester equations)

EINSTein is a simple agent-based model that assumes land combat is a complex adaptive system Highlights SOPs and contingency plans when units lose situational

awareness

Allows tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized command and control structures

Models network verse network conflicts when units are autonomous (more applicable to 2nd scenario)

Explore swarming tactics (like creating a golden bridge, feigned withdrawals, the half moon)

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III. Create Operational Concepts

Combine data and insights from earlier phases Formulate hypotheses, establish parameter values from

qualitative data for input to computer simulations Considering tradeoffs in:

– Schemes of maneuver

– Tactics, formations

– Command, control, and communications

– Behavioral rules, SOPs

– Sensor and weapon range

– Coordination of aerospace and ground elements

– Constraints (terrain, mission) Address concerns such as destruction in detail, fratricide, unit

cohesion, dependence on communications, logistics, minefields