‘ENGAGE FOR CHANGE’: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RADICAL CHANGE

ENGAGEMENT (RCE) MODEL

ABSTRACT

This paper reports on the management and outcomes of a radical change programme within a

public sector agency. The findings reveal a significant divergence between management and

employee experiences of the change process, and significant differences in outcome

perceptions. While management remain adamant that radical change has been achieved,

employees report much more limited, incremental change - a position supported by the

research findings. Using a grounded theory approach, the paper seeks to explain the reasons

for radical change failure, and based on these proposes a ‘Radical Change Engagement’

(RCE) model for use during such periods. While based on public sector research, it is

contended that the model has implications and applicability for any organisation undergoing

radical change.

Keywords: Radical Change; Employee Engagement; Communication; Public Sector

1

Introduction

This paper presents the results of research designed to identify, dissect and classify the

critical success factors in what had been hailed by the senior management of a public sector

organisation as a highly successful radical change programme. Using a grounded theory

approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001) the findings reveal a ‘contested terrain’

between management and employees in regards to both the change process and its outcomes.

These are used to propose a ‘Radical Change Engagement’ (RCE) model for use by

management in planning and implementing such change.

Through its applied nature the paper addresses three gaps in the change management

literature. First, Pollack (2015) identifies a scholar – practitioner gap in which academic

research focusses on ‘generalized models’ and the concept of ‘organizational change’ (p. 70),

while practitioners emphasise individuals, teams and the specifics of delivery – i.e. ‘change

management’, rather than ‘organizational change’ (p. 70). Second, authors such as Kuipers et

al (2014) and Tsoukas and Papoulis (2005) have identified an under-representation of public

sector change research within the change literature. Many public sector organisations adopt

models and processes developed within the private sector, even though the public context

offers particular difficulties due to its environmental and structural characteristics. Third, it

has been suggested that methodologies developed within the private sector may not be

appropriate for public sector application (Van der Voet et al, 2014; Sminia and Nistelrooij,

2006). Indeed, Kuipers et al (2014) have called for more ‘in depth empirical studies of the

change process’ within the public sector context (p.16). In particular they suggest a need for

studies which both ‘provide details of change interventions and the roles and behaviours of

those involved in the change process’ (p. 16), and also offer practitioners empirically based

models of best practice which deliver ‘practical guidelines that are rigorously grounded’

(p.17).

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The grounded theory approach adopted addresses these concerns by facilitating

researcher immersion in a public practitioner environment to understand the way in which

change occurred. This then facilitated assessment of the suitability of private sector models

for use in the public sector, and from this the development of specific recommendations for

the latter. It is argued, however, that the model proposed and the recommendations have

practical implications for the broader change management domain.

The paper is structured as follows. First, as context, radical change is defined followed

by a discussion of the change context within the organisation – referred to as the ‘Agency’

from here. The methodology adopted for the empirical investigation is then detailed, and key

findings presented. In keeping with the grounded theory approach the radical change and

communication literatures are then used to explain the findings, before moving on to theory

building and the proposal of the RCE model. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion

of the management implications and proposed directions for future research.

Planned radical change

The nature of planned radical change and proposed models for managing it have been

comprehensively discussed in the literature. Radical change represents the transformation of

the organisation from an existing ‘orientation’ (Johnson, 1987; Miller, 1982, 1990) beyond

simple incremental changes to existing processes and systems (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer,

1997). It involves ‘either a redefinition of organizational mission, or a substantial shift in

overall priorities and goals to reflect a new emphasis or direction’ (Gioia et al., 1994: 364). A

more contemporary view is provided by Mantere et al. (2012: 173) who categorise radical

change as manifesting in two ways – changes to the organisation’s ‘interpretive scheme’, and

changes to its structures, routines and practices (the ‘structural change’ process). Mantere et

al.’s model is returned to in depth in the theory building section of the paper and is not

reviewed in detail here – given the grounded research approach adopted in which the aims of

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the research were not specific theory or proposition testing.

Organisational context

The background to this research lies in a public sector change management conference

attended by the authors. The sector has faced much pressure to change in recent years (Buick

et al, 2015; Argyriades, 2010), largely due to policies of fiscal austerity and the desire to

deliver market-based efficiencies (Bryson et al, 2014). Change initiatives within the sector,

however, have a chequered history of success, to say the least (Giauque, 2015; Sminia and

Van Nistelrooij, 2006).

Thus, it was refreshing to attend a presentation by the Director of the Agency which

detailed a successful process of radical change. Over the course of the past decade the

Agency - a major revenue collection and benefit payment organisation - has received much

criticism regarding its operations, including: time taken to process casework; inefficiencies

and difficulties associated with operational procedures and IT systems; and failure to meet

established objectives. In response a comprehensive radical change programme was designed,

aimed at transforming the way in which cases are processed and developing a culture of

empowerment with a closer focus on the organisation’s espoused primary objectives of

revenue collection and meeting client/customer needs.

The case was presented as a model of good practice. Following the presentation the

authors met with the Director, and were successful in negotiating full access to the Agency

and its employees for the purposes of identifying, classifying and categorising the reasons for

the programme’s success. In short, the opportunity was presented to carry out a detailed,

analysis of the radical change process. Expected outcomes included a report for senior

management within the Agency, the development of a model of best practice, and, for the

authors, useful case study material for educational purposes.

4

Empirical setting and methods

The claims of success attributed to the programme contrast sharply with other reported

findings from the sector, and for radical change programmes more generally (see, for

example, Giauque, 2015; Grady and Grady, 2013; Sminia and Van Nistelrooij, 2006). This,

coupled with the extent of access granted, led the researchers to enter the process with an

exploratory mind-set, and therefore a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967;

Corbin and Strauss, 2008) was adopted. This facilitates research and discovery through direct

contact with the social world coupled with a rejection of a priori theorising (Locke, 2001),

and ‘puts a high emphasis on theory as process; that is, theory as an ever-developing entity,

not as a perfected product’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 32). The context met the three criteria

identified by Carson et al (2001) for grounded theory to be applicable, namely that: the

research should be interpretivist, should be about complex social processes between people,

and, finally, there should be virtually no existing theories about the phenomena or that

existing theories should be demonstrably inadequate.

The role of extant literature and theory within the grounded approach has been much

debated; some (for example Glaser 1992) argue there to be no need for prior literature review

of theorising, while others (such as Corbin and Strauss, 2008) argue the need for some review

to sharpen focus; Lempert (2007) and Gartner and Birley (2002) argue for sufficient depth of

knowledge to enter the theoretical conversation, and to provide a framework both for asking

questions and probing how the data answered those questions. As academics/practitioners in

the area, complete divorce from extant theory on the part of the authors was not possible.

However, care was taken to avoid the formulation of specific research questions or

propositions - the aim was immersion in the organisation and to be led (in terms of theory

development) by the experiences of staff on the ground.

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Case study strategy

Case study methodology was adopted for the primary research as this facilitated the

study’s aims by: increasing the quality and quantity of data obtained and allowing in-depth,

holistic analysis of plural relationships and social processes (Yin, 2009; Orum, et al., 1991)

facilitating the study of phenomena in their real-life context and dealing with ‘the flesh and

bones of everyday life’ (Patton and Appelbaum, 2003: 62); and by allowing for data

triangulation from multiple sources. As case study methodology allows researchers to

‘understand a single phenomenon completely, not by controlling variables but rather by

observing all of the variables and their interacting relations’ (Dooley, 2002: 236) it provides

great potential for theory generation, important in the present research.

The constraints of using case studies in management research have also been widely

discussed (see Gerring, 2004; Riege, 2003) and relate to three prime areas of concern:

generalisability, validity and reliability. With these in mind, the three linked elements Cepeda

and Martin (2005) recommend for conducting case study research were utilised. First, a

‘Conceptual Framework’ which informs the development and formulation of the data

collection process and ensures all voices are heard (unrestrained by extant models or

predetermined research questions) was developed. Second, the four stages of their proposed

Research Cycle (see below) were utilised in order to facilitate the final stage of the protocol -

theory building. Using this approach internal validity was achieved through the choice of a

case which represents the phenome, the collection of data from multiple sources and making

clear relations between concepts. Construct validity was achieved through the authors

experience of researching in the area which informed the data collection methods described

below, while, finally, external validity was established through the use of ‘thick’ descriptions

and outlining the interactions between concepts as can be seen in Tables 2 – 7 which contrast

management and employee views (Cepeda and Martin, 2005).

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Research cycle

Plan. Initial meetings were held with the Agency’s Directors and senior management to

discuss and agree access and contextual issues, and receive official documentation relating to

the change.

Data Collection. The initial data collection stage involved the review of secondary data

and documented meetings with Directors and senior management (see Table 1). This

facilitated identification of the ‘official’ rationale and objectives of the change programme

and the implementation approach adopted, and facilitated the identification of seven focus

groups, selected on a cross-functional and cross-hierarchical basis. These semi-structured

discussions form the basis of the primary data collection. An average of six participants

attended each focus group session, with participants (i) encouraged to share their experiences,

(ii) outline lessons learned and (iii) reflect critically on the success of the programme from

inception, through implementation, and assessment of outcomes. Interviews were also

arranged with a trade union representative and a senior Training and Development manager

(see Table 1 for full details of the data collection process).

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The aims of this strategy were to ensure that the views and narratives of all stakeholders,

including the less powerful who may not always have the opportunity to relate their

experiences (Dawson, 2003), were heard, and to establish through a process of sense-making

both the official and unofficial outcomes of the change programme (Gabriel, 1999). Data

collected would also form the basis for theory building (see below). Participants were given

the freedom to relate their experiences of the change within their own terms of reference, and

to take the dialogue in whichever direction they felt appropriate.

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Analysis and reflection. The focus group and interview discussions were recorded and

transcribed verbatim. Each transcript was independently analysed by two of the authors and

key themes identified, following which checks were made for consistency and key findings

agreed. As advised by Cepeda and Martin (2005) and Bazely (2013) a period of reflection

was then used to allow for the triangulation of data from multiple sources. Chunks of ‘thick

data’ were clustered into categories and subcategories, and from these clear and

representative quotations and remarks from the various participants were selected which form

the basis of the findings.

Findings

The initial presentation by the Agency’s Director and meetings with senior management

reported a highly successful and well managed radical change. However, operational

employees reported very different experiences and perceptions of the process, its

management, and outcomes. Discussions with senior management and review of

documentation identified that the Agency had adopted a PRINCE 2 (AXELOS, 2009)

methodology to plan and implement the change. The findings are therefore broadly presented

in line with this (reflecting Corbin and Strauss’, 2008, guidelines on the use of existing theory

in grounded methodology) and are considered under four headings: rationale;

implementation; reinforcement/support, and outcomes. In respect of each, the views of

‘Management’ (Directors and Senior Management, the Change Programme Team, T&D

Manager, Middle Management, and official documentation) and ‘Operational Employees’

(comprising Team Leaders, Operational Level Staff, and the Trade Union Representative) are

reported.

Rationale for the change programme.

The official rationale for the change programme highlighted the radical nature of the

proposed changes - a fundamental reassessment of the Agency’s purpose and relationship 8

with stakeholders, alongside significant revisions to operating systems (see Table 2).

Responses at management level revealed a common understanding of both the rationale and

objectives.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

In contrast, operational employees held very different perceptions, interpretations and

understandings, which were characterised by cynicism, and described a ‘cosmetic exercise’,

deisgned to ‘run the place down’ and ‘reduce costs’ rather than a programme designed to

deliver radical change. The programme’s central aims were not clearly understood at this

level.

Implementation of the change.

Findings in this area are divided into three sections: visibility and communication,

consultation and engagement, and training and support.

1. Visibility and communication. Management reported an effective, tailored

communication strategy, centred on weekly employee “team-time” briefings (Table 3).

Interestingly, emphasis was on downward communication and the flow of information from

management to staff officers, team leaders, and operational staff. No reference was made to

upward communication flows, reflected in operational employees’ reports of a top down

process, characterised by information overload, over-communication, and a lack of tailoring.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

2. Consultation and engagement. The unanimous management view was that as

implementation rolled out significant consultation and engagement occurred. In contrast

employees reported much frustration, a lack of meaningful engagement, and that

management lacked understanding of how the changes would affect operations (Table 4).

Employees felt removed from organisational processes and systems, with consultation

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unanimously seen as a cosmetic lip-service exercise, decisions having been made by

management in advance.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

3. Training, support and quick wins. Management believed the various programme

milestones to have been well communicated and monitored, short-term wins effectively

utilised to sustain momentum, and training to have been well directed, timely and effective.

Employees’ experiences, however, were of rushed implementation without piloting, a

‘faddish’ and ‘moving the goalposts’ management style, and incomplete training and support

(Table 5).

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Reinforcing the change.

Success was celebrated at management level. However, operations employees commonly

reported dissatisfaction at the absence of tangible and intangible rewards, spoke of no serious

efforts having been made to ‘make the change stick’, and displayed what can best be

described as ‘change fatigue’, and a belief that further change was sure to follow in the near

future (Table 6).

INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Outcomes of the change process.

Post project review documentation prepared by senior management reported many

operational improvements, including 34 key ‘Activities and Achievements’. Three broad

categories of success were highlighted by Directors: a ‘sharper focus for clients’, an emphasis

on ‘developing staff and creating the appropriate culture’, and the creation of ‘a strong

performance delivery culture’. This clearly indicates the perception of successful radical

change, alongside which a range of improvements in performance metrics were also listed,

although the key metric extolled was an increase of almost 30% in revenue collection.

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These perceptions were not shared at operational level where no reference was made to

culture change; instead, employees reported mechanical compliance with new operational

procedures (in cases where employees could not revert to old behaviours), and expressed

concerns around new system performance. The outcome experienced was thus one of often

inappropriate and impractical incremental change, implemented in a top down, bureaucratic

manner (Table 7).

INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Summary.

The key findings of the research are summarised in Table 8. Management reports of

successful radical change (grounded in consultation and engagement) contrast sharply with

employee experiences of top-down, management imposed, incremental procedural change.

The ‘Discussion’ section, below, addresses the question of how the radical change

programme envisioned became derailed into one of systemic and operational change only.

INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

Discussion and theory generation

In keeping with the grounded theory approach this discussion is approached inductively

with the aim of theory generation, mindful of the possibility of being influenced by ‘pre-

existing conceptualizations of [the] subject’ (Suddaby, 2006: 235). That said, extant radical

change literature provides a useful start point for theory generation, and a brief review of

relevant literature is presented below.

Radical organisational change represents a significant shift in an organisation’s mission

and strategies, its goals and priorities, together with a corresponding transformation of

systems and processes (Feng et al, 2016; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Gioia et al, 1994).

The literature consistently argues such change requires a shift in the organisation’s

underlying cognitive template, described by Mantere et al (2012: 173) as its ‘interpretive

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scheme’ – comprising ‘central assumptions and beliefs about an organization that define and

legitimize its activities, structures and expressed goals’. Alongside this, organisational

systems, processes and operations must also be realigned (Clark et al, 2010). Thus, Mantere

et al (2012) conceive radical change as unfolding through a process of interpretive change

(sense-breaking, sense-giving/sense development and acceptance of the new interpretive

scheme) alongside a process of structural and systemic change (see Figure 1). The two tracks

of the model do not exist in isolation and, for example, changes to operating systems can

facilitate the processes of sense-breaking and sense-making, and vice versa.

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The findings, revealed the delivery of systemic change only, alongside an erroneous

perception on the part of management that radical change had been achieved. So, in terms of

the model, the programme was only successful in progressing the structural change process,

with operational improvements resulting from employee compliance with imposed systemic

change. The original bureaucratic interpretive scheme has survived intact, with little or no

evidence found for employee commitment to the changes. The erroneous belief on the part of

senior management that radical change had been delivered was underscored in a follow up

meeting in which they disputed and contested findings from the operational level.

Thus, the failure to deliver radical change rests with failure to progress the interpretive

change element of Mantere et al’s model (2012) (structural/systemic change was realised).

The findings also showed that failure in this regard first occurred at an early stage in the

change process. Indeed, this initial failing subsequently prevented any meaningful progress in

respect of interpretive scheme change, as the model builds sequentially through the processes

of ‘sense-breaking’ (in parallel with the commencement of structural change), ‘sense-giving /

sense development’, and consolidation of the new interpretive scheme (Mantere et al, 2012).

By their very nature, each of these stages is dependent on the use of effective communication

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and engagement, and so it is contended that the key fail-point in not achieving radical change

was ineffective engagement and communication between management and employees.

While findings revealed a widely understood need for change, and that management

were successful in galvanising the change programme, understanding of the change rationale

was not universal, and significant differences in perceptions are apparent (see Table 2). The

communication strategy adopted by management at this stage can best be described as one of

‘spray and pray’ (Clampitt et al, 2000), whereby headline targets and figures were

communicated in a standardised way. A strategy of ‘withholding and upholding’ (Clampitt et

al, 2000) was reported by employees in relation to more substantive issues, with information

guarded and employees presented with a consistent management line emphasising cosmetic

issues (see Tables 2 - 4). Employee perspectives were not garnered at this stage, nor

misconceptions addressed. In consequence, in-depth understanding of the original

interpretive scheme (from all perspectives) was not developed, and differences in

understanding left unresolved. The failure to establish a shared understanding of the original

interpretive scheme and effective engagement precluded the possibility of sense-breaking,

and the derivative stages of sense-making and (new) sense-consolidation.

From this point on both management and employees reverted to the original,

bureaucratic interpretive scheme, and senior management – from a position of relative

ignorance of operational issues - assumed top-down responsibility for the design,

development and implementation of the change. The original hierarchy remained intact, and

formal (pre-existing) lines of communication - characterised by ‘withhold and uphold’ and

‘spray and pray’ strategies were followed in a top-down fashion, relying on the use of non-

rich media (Daft and Lengl, 1986). As a consequence, despite being presented as radical, the

change process in reality closely mirrored that of rational–linear change (Miles, 1997),

culminating in improvements in specific performance rubrics (primarily revenue collection) –

13

the very rubrics which the amended procedures addressed. These improvements have,

however, come at a cost, with evidence emerging that compliance with the new performance

emphasis has been at the expense of other aspects of the Agency’s work (such as accuracy)

and has created conflict between operational teams. The absence of meaningful engagement

in the design stage has also resulted in operational employees being able to engage in work

avoidance and work-around practices, especially in relation to difficult cases, and has created

disillusionment and frustration on the part of employees.

Confirmation of the continuance of the bureaucratic interpretive scheme and failure to

establish meaningful communication and engagement, came from an unexpected source

when senior management were presented with the findings. Remaining adamant in their view

that radical change had been achieved, they continued to extol the mechanisms created to

bring about engagement, for example team time and the project management group. In

reality, however, such perceptions, coupled with their rejection of much of the findings, serve

only to confirm the conclusions of a detached senior team, lacking in knowledge of

organisational realities and deploying a top-down bureaucratic mind-set. It is unsurprising

that management felt they had communicated well – in reality they did not hear any message

to the contrary because the formal mechanisms established were not appropriate to engage

the informal organisation. The change programme delivered operational improvements in

respect of certain performance metrics, and senior management were content – within their

bureaucratic mindset – to classify it as a success on this basis alone.

Theory building

The final stage of the grounded methods approached is theory building. The radical

change process failed due to ineffective engagement and communication, and a failure to step

outside the existing interpretive scheme. To overcome these issues a model for Radical

14

Change Engagement (RCE) is proposed, which integrates Mantere et al’s (2000) radical

change model with Clampitt et al’s (2000) strategy for communicating about uncertainty (see

Figure 2).

INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

The two strands of radical change - interpretive scheme change and operational change –

are positioned in the upper and lower segments. Stages involved in interpretive scheme

change – sense-breaking, sense-giving and refreezing - require the use of richer forms of

communication. ‘Initiation of strategic change’ must fully involve all key stakeholders, acting

also as the initial stage of the sense-breaking process, with no issues pre-decided, but rather

discussed, debated and agreed by all stakeholders. This requires senior management

accepting Hassard’s (1991:227) argument that ‘the social world is best understood from the

viewpoint of the participant in action’, that they cannot define other organisational

stakeholders’ or members’ realities and, instead, create space for meaningful engagement

tapping into the localised knowledge and expertise held throughout the organisation. This

requires a conscious step outside the existing interpretive scheme, and setting aside existing

hierarchical and role requirements in pursuit of radical change solutions. Thus, the early

stages of radical change must be rooted in an ‘explore and underscore’ communication

strategy allowing for a two way process, the active participation of everyone, and a creative

approach to issues (Clampitt et al, 2000).

As the process unfurls sense-giving may be facilitated through the use of a tell and sell

style, and the delivery of a more focused set of messages coalescing around (agreed)

outcomes at the sense-breaking stage. This guarantees senior management the space to

continue to play their role as guardians of the organisation’s mission, but in a manner which

reflects a shared understanding of organisational realities and which explains the relevance

and importance of messages communicated. Refreezing the new interpretive scheme can be

15

facilitated through an ‘identify and reply’ strategy, which continues to narrow the focus of

attention but ensures that employees’ concerns are heard and addressed.

The RCE model proposes the ‘withhold and uphold’ and ‘spray and pray’ strategies to be

of limited or no use when it comes to the issue of interpretive scheme change. However, as

evidenced by the case, such strategies can be useful in delivering systemic and operational

change either within the prevailing interpretive scheme or, possibly, in the latter stages of a

radical change process (once new sense has been established to facilitate interpretation of the

‘sprayed’ information).

Seen in this light, it can be concluded that senior management in the Agency lacked the

courage to take these steps and in consequence missed the opportunity to achieve radical

change.

Conclusion, contribution, and future research

The paper contributes to knowledge and understanding of radical change management in

a number of ways. Through the in-depth, grounded approach adopted it addresses general

practitioner needs for research which focuses on the process of change delivery (Pollack,

2015), while also addressing the need identified by Kuipers et al (2014: 16), and others, for

‘in-depth empirical studies of the change process’ within the public sector context, which

provide ‘practical guidelines that are rigorously grounded’ (p. 17). Despite facing pressure for

change over recent years, public sector change initiatives have had a chequered history of

success, to say the least (see, for example, Giauque, 2015), and the paper sheds light on

reasons for this. It also highlights how the radical change process can be derailed into

incremental change.

The RCE model proposed presents a template for use by managers within public sector

organisations in seeking to achieve radical change. Effective employee engagement and

communication are identified as being at the core of the ‘interpretive scheme’ change process

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which is in turn at the heart of radical change. Communication and engagement strategies are

proposed as guidelines for navigating the processes of sense-breaking, sense-making and

sense consolidation (Mantere et al, 2012). While constructed within the public sector, it is

contended that the model is generic in nature, and that its implications extend beyond the

sector.

The model points to a need for further research both generically and in terms of

operational issues. From the generic perspective questions are raised as to how the existing

interpretive scheme can be set aside for the purposes of developing a new scheme. This

appears to require a significant commitment to radical change on the part of senior

management, one that was lacking in the case organisation.

Operationally, the RCE model raises a number of areas for future research. Prime among

these are the nature of interventions required at the initiation of the change; the effectiveness

of different engagement mechanisms within different cultural contexts; the extent of

interventions required at each stage in the proposed RCE model, including the amount of

time and resources required; the stage in the process at which less rich communication media

may become useful; and methods for embedding the new interpretive scheme.

Radical change is a complex and difficult process. The case highlights the importance of

genuine senior management support for the process, and willingness to see the process

through to its conclusion.

17

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TABLE 1:DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

Data Source Research Participants Data Obtained Timing

Public Sector Change Seminar Agency Director Researcher Field Notes;

Presentation slides Time 0

Semi Structured Interview Agency Director Researcher Field Notes 0 + 2 weeks

Agency Documentation N/A

Researcher Analysis of Programme Plan, Project Initiation

Document, Project Closure Paper

0 + 2 weeks

Focus Groups (Time One)

1. Agency Directors and Senior Managers (n=8)

2. Change Programme Management Team (n=4)

3. Middle Management (n=6),

4. Team Leaders/First Line Supervisors (n=8),

5&6. Operations Level Staff (two groups, n=13)

Verbatim Transcription0 + 4 weeks

0 + 6 weeks

Semi Structured Interview Trade Union Representative Verbatim Transcription 0 + 6 weeks

Semi Structured Interview

Training and Development Manager Verbatim Transcription 0 + 8 weeks

Focus Group (Time Two)

7. Agency Directors and Senior Managers (n=10) Verbatim Transcription 0 + 20 weeks

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TABLE 2: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CHANGE RATIONALE

Management

Clearly Understood Rationale; Shared Understanding; Clear Objectives

Employees

No Clear Understanding of Rationale or Objectives

Clear Vision

‘for the first time… we [had] a chief executive… [who] seemed to know the vision… he knew what he wanted to do, and that was told to us and we were directed to do things… Everything he gave you seemed to work…’ Senior

Manager

Reassessment of the Agency’s ‘purpose, [relationship with] clients, and history’ Programme Plan Document

Key goals: (1) Getting it right; (2) Keeping it right; (3) Putting it right; (4) Getting the best from the organisation. Programme Plan Document

Established Objectives

Overcome Negative Publicity and Respond to Stakeholder Pressure: ‘complaints [were] hitting the roof… lots of critics… anyone in the

organisation would have known that things weren’t [working]’ Agency Director

Improve Effectiveness / Efficiency and Accountability: ‘[nobody] thought we were doing a good job. Everybody realised change had to come, and so if it was forced or not it was better than what we were doing’ Middle Manager

Vision Confusion

‘more or less run the place down’ Operations Employee

‘streamline’ Team Leader

‘reduce bureaucracy and costs’ Team Leader

‘focus upon targets’ Team Leader

‘the new computer system’ Team Leader

Cynicism

‘a cosmetic exercise’ Operations Employee

‘I’m not sure that there was [much] enthusiasm to actually make it succeed, but there was certainly enthusiasm to make it look like it succeeded’ Operations Employee

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TABLE 3:PERSPECTIVES ON VISIBILITY AND COMMUNICATION

Management Employees

High Visibility

From Chief Executive briefings

Restricted Visibility

‘[senior management] came down at the start, but we never saw them again’ Operations Employee

Effective; Tailored Communication Strategy

‘a well-orchestrated communication set up [involving middle managers] in their own domains [was

established]...’ Project Management Team Member

‘[team time is] how we communicate… how key messages are communicated to people… everybody

does [it], stops for it, so it is a way that you can make sure that you [communicate], and it is time to make

the most of’ Project Management Team Member

‘[information cascaded] through management meetings… with our staff officers, they would have meetings with their team leaders and so on’ Middle

Manager

Ineffective; Lack of Tailoring; One Way

‘[during team time employees] switch off to what they don’t need to know… it is just information overload, there are so many messages…’ Team Leader

‘[team leaders] get handed a spreadsheet… and they hand that out the same way to us… nothing is really cascaded all that clearly’ Operations Employee

‘there are certain things you don’t need to know’ Operations Employee

Hierarchical Distortion

‘[We report to] EO2, it has to go to the EO1, SO, DP, grade 7, Grade 6, it has to go right up… this should be working fine, but it isn’t, and we can only see so far up, we

don’t know where messages are getting distorted’ Operations Employee

‘the process is akin to Chinese whispers… middle management put their own take on [communications, which get] filtered off into various other things,… so the

whole thing gets a bit mixed up’ Operations Employee

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TABLE 4:PERCEPTIONS REGARDING CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT

Management

High Levels of Consultation and Engagement

Employees

Ineffective Consultation and Engagement; Marginalisation; Cosmetic Lip-Service; Staff Opinions Disregarded; Secrecy

‘[there was] strong interaction with our staff’ Agency Director

‘I think we brought the people with us, we engaged them from day one’ Senior Manager

‘you won’t get the [other parts] right if you don’t get that part [engagement] right…’ Senior Manager

‘[operations employees [were engaged with] because they are the knowledge experts… you want to have them with you [or] you are not going to make it…’ Senior Manager

‘[operations employees’] opinions would have been asked, all the different expert domains were involved and

contributed; [managers] went out week on week with a script, questions and answers… fully supported by the

Project Management Team’ Project Management Team Member

‘we were asked after decisions had been made… I was frontline and they asked your opinion, but you already knew the decision’s there to go ahead’ Team

Leader

[there were] problems in not asking frontline staff first off…’ Team Leader

‘[senior management] might have wanted to know [our opinions, but…] it was always ‘Well, that’s why we made that decision’… it was fixed… we could pass

opinions up the line, but the same standard reply would come down’ Team Leader

‘you get sort of told [information] but [were] not really supposed to know, so [told] ‘keep that to yourself’’ Team Leader

‘[senior management]… make plans above your head and [then] say to us ‘What do you think?’… but we are the ones that should be telling them…’ Operations

Employee

‘our [team leader] brought us into a room and said ‘Right, ok, what are the problems and we’ll address them’. He had about 7 or 8 pages of notes, and then nothing… It’s 6 months later – it has gone. You know it’s not going to happen.

There is no interest in changing.’ Operations Employee

‘[management have no understanding of] what it’s like to talk to a client… if [they consulted] people who are ‘coal face’, [they] might have a better idea…’

Operations Employee

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TABLE 5: PERCEPTIONS REGARDING TRAINING AND SUPPORT

Management

Well-Developed Training and Support; Effective Use of Quick Wins

Employees

Incomplete Training and Support; No Quick Wins; ‘Rush To Implement’; ‘Moving Goalposts’; ‘Changing Priorities’

‘there were a number of ‘go live’ dates which then were moved back, which actually gave greater confidence in terms of [delivery]

…’ Agency Director

‘there was good training that put our staff in a position that they were able to negotiate [with clients]… there was a huge increase in

collections because of that’ Middle Manager

‘in the early days… there were a couple of quick wins, which were battling away the negativity…’ Agency Director

‘they put everybody through a negotiation course… a trainer said that unless this is followed up with consolidation you are going to lose the effect – the consolidation never happened. Management

knew [this and] just said ‘We’ll not bother…’ Operations Employee

‘[at one stage] we had people checking everything, and then you couldn’t get anybody [to give you feedback]…’ Operations

Employee

‘the flavour of this month will be [one thing]… and then they change it’ – operations employee

‘[it’s] firefighting… [management] just keep changing priorities’ Operations Employee

‘very disorganised’ Operations Employee

‘this year [the objective] was purely on cash, ‘get credit card payments, drop everything else’, which was fine except there were [cases requiring clerical attention] who were left behind… we were just given lists, like call centres, ‘ring these people’ [in pursuit of

revenue collection]’ Operations Employee

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TABLE 6: PERCEPTIONS REGARDING CHANGE REINFORCEMENT

Management

Success was Celebrated and Rewarded

Employee

Absence of Reinforcement and Tangible Rewards; Ongoing State of Flux; Persistence of ‘Old’ Behaviours

‘we took time to celebrate success… lots of buns..’ Senior

Manager

Perception that management have been well rewarded for the programme, but that operations level employees have been excluded from rewards

‘our perception] is that this push, push from middle management is so that they can get bonuses, we [believe they] can get quite good bonuses for their section getting a lot of card payments, that is a

perception that a lot of people have’ Operations Employee

‘if we are good, work really hard or do something great to get a bonus, it’s probably £75 – and then you hear figures… about [senior management] getting thousands and thousands; [we think] a lot of these

ideas [management] come up with, it’s because they think [they’ll get] a bonus’ Operations Employee

Change perceived as a constant feature of organisational life/change never reinforced[we] never actually got to refreeze anything… things are changing so often… you have just got like a bit

of slush the whole way through!’ Operations Employee

‘we are [now] all functionalised again, and then we are multi-function again… I am here 10 years and it has changed 4 times in 10 years’ Operations Employee

Manipulation of ‘New’ System to Suit Employee Ends‘give [operations staff] a week on the new system, they work out how they don’t have to deal with a

difficult case…; ‘[operations employees are good at ensuring change] worked for them’ Team Leader

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TABLE 7: PERCEPTIONS REGARDING CHANGE OUTCOMES

Management

Major Goals All Achieved, Radical Change Realised

Employee

Mechanical Compliance; Concerns about System Performance; Goal Displacement; Conflict; Disillusionment

Major Goals All Achieved

(1) Sharper focus for clients; (2) Development of a ‘strong delivery culture’; (3) ‘Staff development and creating the appropriate culture’ Project Closure Paper and Public

Presentation by Chief Executive

‘[operations employees] will say ‘Yes, it’s much better’...’ Middle Manager

Delivery of 34 ‘Activities and Achievements’ eg ‘dedicated helplines’, call back processes’, ‘debit / credit card payment

options’, ‘[better] complaint handling’ Project Closure Paper

Increased Employee Accountability

‘they are more accountable now’ Senior Manager

Move Away from Hard, Quantitative Performance Measures

‘before... it was just very negative, all stats and targets, and it wasn’t about people... that has changed a lot’ Project

Management Team Member

Mechanical Compliance with New Operating Procedures

[when senior management visit] ‘you would be told ‘If they ask you [say] yes you are doing that…’ – but you’re not!’ Operations Employee

‘[senior management] are obsessed with stats rather than people’ Operations Employee

Concerns Relating to System Performance

‘accuracy is slipping in the drive for public collections’ Operations Employee

[we are told if a client] ‘ask[s] for a reassessment to check how many arrears they have first and ask them for a payment; if they don’t pay anything tell them

‘No, sorry, we can’t do a reassessment…’ Operations Employee

Goal displacement

‘you won’t get a well done [for resolving a difficult case], but you will get a high five when you get 45 card payments; brilliant’ Operations Employee

Operations Level Conflict

‘people would cut your throat to get a credit card payment - it’s just ridiculous’ Operations Employee

Disillusionment

‘targets and stats, that’s all it is’ Operations Employee

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TABLE 8: SUMMARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHANGE PROCESS

Dimension Management Employees

Understanding of the change process

Clearly understood No common understanding

Implementation Based on high levels of engagement, tailored

communication, high levels of support, careful planning

and scheduling

Top down, management imposed, characterised by one way communication,

absence of meaningful engagement

Reinforcement and support Well supported process; tailored support

Poor design; changing priorities; inadequate

support

Outcomes Radical change; culture change

Changed operating procedures; confusion

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FIGURE 1: RADICAL CHANGE, MANTERE ET AL (2012)

Initiation of strategic change

Interpretive change process

Organizational Meaning void Sensegiving Acceptance of strategySensebreaking Unfreezing (Nascent freezing)

Changes in organizational structure, routines and practices

Structural change process

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FIGURE 2:PROPOSED COMMUNICATION MODEL FOR RADICAL CHANGE

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