turner toward a general sociological theory of emotion

8/7/2019 TURNER Toward a General Sociological Theory of Emotion

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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour29:200218308

Toward a General Sociological Theory ofEmotions

JONATHAN H. TURNER

Over the last two decades, the sociology of emotions has become one of the

leading edges of micro-level theorizing. Building upon this theoretical momentum,

this paper draws together key ideas from diverse theories and presents a synthetic

theory of emotional dynamics in encounters of face-to-face interaction. Emphasis

is on overt emotional arousalthat is, on emotional states visible to the parties

involved. Such arousal shapes the mutual signaling and interpreting of gestures

between individuals, especially gestures that can be read visually; and in so

doing, emotionally-laden gesturing determines the flow of interaction. Yet, as

will be emphasized, emotional displays are only surface manifestations of

complicated and covert emotional dynamics, operating through the neurology

of the brain. The theory to be developed pulls together arguments of several

theoretical traditions, including mainstream symbolic interactionism (e.g., Mead,

1934; McCall & Simmons, 1966; Stryker, 1980; Stryker & Serpe, 1982; Burke,

1980, 1991; Heise, 1979; Smith-Lovin & Heise, 1988; Smith-Lovin, 1990),

psychoanalytic variants of symbolic interactionism (Scheff, 1988; Scheff &

Retzinger, 1992; Turner, 1994), interaction ritual theory (Collins, 1988, 1993),

dramaturgical analysis (Goffman, 1959, 1967, 1974; Hochschild, 1979), powerand status theories (Collins, 1975; Kemper, 1978; Kemper & Collins, 1990),

and expectation-states theories (Berger & Zelditch, 1985, 1998; Berger, Webster,

Ridgeway & Rosenholtz, 1986; Wagner & Berger, 1993; Wagner & Turner,

1998). My view is that each of these approaches has captured an important

dynamic of emotions as they influence the flow of face-to-face interaction, but

at the same time, none has delineated the full range of emotional forces operating

on participants during an encounter.

In Figure 1, a very skeletal outline of the argument is presented. For any

given cycle of emotional arousal, the process begins with expectations frommany diverse sources; in turn, these expectations are collated as part of the

definition of a situation into a generalized expectation about what will or should

occur in the encounter. Self is a special type of expectation because when its

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Sociological Theory of Emotions 135

expectation-state reserach has been conducted in task-oriented experimental

groups, although there has been some effort to move to less controlled situations

(e.g., Berger, 1988). In Table 1, some of the forces generating expectations in

natural settings are listed. This listing does not mean, of course, that parties to an

encounter always have well-defined expectations before they interact; obviously,people can enter interactions with few or vague expectations about what is to

occur; and under these conditions, individuals only begin to form expectations

as the interaction unfolds. And even when expectations are well defined before

individuals enter the encounter, expectations may change, although there are

limits and patterns to change as the large literature on expectation sttes

documents. Thus, Table 1 only emphasizes that as expectations formwhether

before, during, or after an episode of face-to-face interactionthey will become

organized along the dimensions listed in the Table. That is, individuals will

develop expectations with respect to demography, structure, culture, and trans-

actional needs; and as will be emphasized shortly, individuals will also bring to

an encounter, and develop within the flow of the interaction, expectations about

their own self as well as the selves of others. For the moment, however, let me

review just the forces enumerated in Table 1.

(1) Demographic forces revolve around the number and nature of individuals in

an encounter, particularly a focused encounter but an unfocused one as well

(Goffman, 1961). The expectations for a situation are influenced by the number

of individuals present, and equally important, the categories of individuals as

friends, intimates, and strangers who exhibit other characteristics like gender,

ethnicity, class, and age. Affect control theory (Heise, 1979; Smith-Lovin &

Heise, 1988; Heise & Smith-Lovin, 1981; Heise & Smith-Lovin, 1995) is correct,

I think, in emphasizing that others are also assessed with respect to their likely

level of activity, their potency, and their relevance as objects of evaluation.

(2) Structural forces include the nature, number and relationships among status

positions that can become implicated in an encounter. As Kemper & Collins

(1990) have stressed, power (authority) and status (prestige) considertions are the

driving force behind the activation of emotions. As Table 1 suggests, power andstatus are only one set of many forces generating expectations about what

individuals can and should do, a conclusion that follows from expectation-states

theory (e.g., Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1994). Moreover, power and status in a

situation exert much of their influence on emotions by making self highly salient;

that is, when encounters place individuals in hierarchies of power or status, they

become more self aware. And as the salience of self increases, so does the

potential for emotional reactions to behaviors that do not affirm the power and

status orders (Ridgeway, 1982, 1994). Thus, it may be that the effect emphasized

by Kemper & Collins (1990) of power and status on many emotions is due tothe increasing salience of self in power/status encounters. In addition to power

and status, the density of connections among positions is important, because

high density network ties create expectations that are very different than those

The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999


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136 Jonathan H. Turner

Table 1. Sources of Expectations

1 Demographic forces: the number and nature (categories) of others present in anencounter, especially with respect to the imputation of their activity, potency, andevaluation.

2 Structural forces: the nature, number, and relationships among status positionsimplicated in an encounter, particularly with respect to:

a differentiation of power/authority among positions or actorsb differentiation of prestige/honor among positions or actorsc density of connections among positions or actorsd diffuse status characteristics that actors in positions can claim and use

3 Cultural forces: sets of symbols that individuals are cognizant of, or that they intendto invoke in an encounter, especially with respect to:

a the appropriate ways of behaving (norms) and evaluating such behavior (values)b the appropriate type and intensity of sanctions to be employed

c the appropriate type and intensity of sentiments, or feeling rulesd the appropriate type of ritualse the appropriate frames to be keyed and rekeyed

4 Transaction forces: the intensity of, and relative proportions among, need states thatindividuals seek to meet in an encounter, especially with respect to:

a the need for profitable pay-offs of relevant resourcesb the need for predictability in the actions of othersc the need to trust that others will meet obligations and expectationsd the need for intersubjectivity in order to presume that others experience a

situation in similar ways, or if different, that these differences can be understoode the need to feel implicated and included in the ongoing flow of interaction in an

encounter.

for low density networks. At a minimum, as Collins (1975) has emphasized, high

density networks make conformity to normative expectations more likely and

sanctioning more effective. Finally, as expectation-states theory has documented,

authority, prestige, and other social characteristics of actors outside the encounter

are often brought into the interactions as diffuse status characteristics; and

these characteristics will influence the power-status hierarchy and the behaviorsof individuals in this hierarchy.

(3) Cultural forces are those systems of symbols that provide instructions and

standards for behavior among those participating in an encounter. Some are

behavioral or normative standards about how self and others are expected to

behave; others are more evaluative and stress value standards about what self

and others should do in a situation. Additional cultural sets indicate how

demographic, structural, and self forces are to be deployed in an encounter.

Related to both normative and value standards are sets of symbols indicating

the appropriate type of sanctions (both positive and negative) as well as the formand intensity of sanctioning to be employed in a situation. A very special set of

normative and evaluational standards is, as Hochschild (1979, 1983) first

emphasized, the feeling rules or the expectations that individuals have about



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the nature and intensity of emotions that can, or should, be displayed in an

encounter. Yet another set of symbols defines the appropriate use of rituals, or

stereotyped sequences of behavior that guide the flow of interaction (Goffman,

1967). Ritualized opening, closing, repairing, forming, tracking, keying, framing,

totemizing and other interpersonal processes are conducted through rituals(Turner, 1988), with normative and value standards circumscribing the range of

rituals to be employed in an encounter. Finally, again following Goffman (1974),

cultural codes dictate frames demarking what is to be part of the interaction and,

conversely, what is to be excluded; and particularly important, I think, are what I

have termed body frames (the relevance of body to the flow of interaction) and

personal information frames (the relevance of biography, intimacy, and self

involvement) to be used to structure the boundaries of what is inside and outside

the flow of interaction in an encounter (Turner, 1996b). All of these cultural forces,

then, create expectations about what is to transpire in a situation.

(4) Transactional forces are fundamental need-states that individuals activate in

all encounters and that they expect to be met during the course of interaction.

Previously, I saw these needs as what motivates individuals (Turner, 1987, 1988,

1994), but more recently, I see motivation as a much more inclusive process,

revolving around the emotional dynamics to be examined in this paper. Yet,

individuals do have what I now term transactional needs, or needs for receiving

payoffs of relevant resources (typically in accordance with cultural standards of

equity and justice), for feeling that they can predict the responses of others, for

trusting others to meet their obligations, for presuming (however inaccurately)

that self and other are experiencing the world in similar ways for the purposes

of the interaction, and for sensing that self is minimally included in the ongoing

flow of the interaction. These transactional needs are listed in Table 1 in their

order of importance to the rhythmic flow of an interaction and to individuals

sense of satisfaction; and like the other forces in Table 1, they generate

expectations about what should transpire in the encounter.

In sum, we can begin to develop a theory of emotions by recognizing the

importance of expectations. As a general proposition, we can say that the greateris the number of expectations that form an individuals definition of a situation

and the higher is the salience of these expectations in an encounter, the greater

is the potential for emotional arousal by an individual and for affective displays

of emotions to others in the encounter. However, as we will see, this general

proposition is qualified by the other forces outlined in Figure 1. For a review of

the theory as a whole, consult the sixteen propositions in the conclusion.

SELF AND IDENTITY

My conceptualization of self follows the general line of argument in most

theories within the symbolic interactionist tradition. Self is a set of images that



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individuals have about themselves with respect to (1) who they are, (2) what

they can do, and (3) how they should be treated. Stated in this way, the

formulation is rather vague and, hence, requires elaboration.

The first issue to be addressed is whether or not self is a cognitive or emotional

construct that individuals hold about themselves. So stated, the implied questionis rhetorical because the obvious answer is that self involves both cognitive and

emotional elements. Indeed, as studies on the process of forming cognitions and

remembering them now document, cognitions cannot be remembred without

corresponding emotional tags (for accessible summaries of the neurological

literature see: Damasio, 1994; Le Doux, 1996; Turner, 2000); and for a highly

salient cognition like self, the cognitive and emotional dimensions are so

neurologically embedded in each other that it is impossible conceptually and

empirically to separate them. Thus for my purposes here, self is the activation

of images about oneself as an object, both in the present and from long-term

memory, variously charged with different types and valences of emotion.

A second issue that needs to be addressed is the nature of these images.

Symbolic interactionists have, at times, tended to emphasize self as a verbal

construct. My view is that linguistic designations are only a special and limited

property of self; and in fact, it would be impossible for self to be only verbal

images because the human brain does not think in terms of conventional

language. If humans did think only in words, they would seem very dim-witted,

since language is an auditory mode of communication and, hence, sequential

and very slow (Turner, 1996a, 1999). Humans are a primate and, by virtue of

this fact, they are visually dominant (Maryanski & Turner, 1992:3368; Turner,

1996a, 1996b, 2000); and I have little doubt that humans think in terms of

patterns that better reflect the wiring of the brain around the visual sense

modality that receives, processes, and stores information as gestalts. Indeed,

regardless of the visual bias to thought, the neurology of consciousness in general

appears to generate gestalts and configurations of sensory information. Sensory

stimulation of visual, auditory, haptic, and olfactory receptors in the present are

integrated in association cortices, such as the interior parietal lobule, and sentto working memory simultaneously, with this simultaneity giving consciousness

the character of configurations of sensations and, if tagged with emotions from

the activation of subcortical limbic systems, configurations of feelings as well

(Geschwind, 1965a, 1965b; Geschwind & Damasio, 1984; Damasio, 1994). If

working memory seeks to activate long-term memories, which have been created

by the hippocampus in assigning emotional valences to past configurations of

sensations and feelings, the process appears to involve stimulating clusters of

neurons containing shorthand codes of an unknown nature that, once stimulated,

organize a reactivation of sensory cortices in a manner that reproduces in anearly but far from exact way the previous inputs that had once entered

working memory. This refiring of the sensory cortices leads to the simultaneous

convergence of sensations and associated feelings in short-term or working



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memory, thereby imposing new images from long-term memory on those being

immediately received in the present.

Because primate neuroanatomy is organized in ways that make vision the

dominant sense modality, it is most likely that the first languages among hominids

were visual (e.g., hand, face, and body movements); and to this very day, humansrely upon visual cues as much as linguistic utterances in role taking and role

making. The existence of two discrete areas on the left side of the brain

Brocas area in the frontal lobe for speech production and Wernickes area next

to the inferior parietal lobe for speech comprehensionindicates that the brain

must use translation boxes to convert more gestalt-based brain thinking into

sequential speech, although other areas along the Sylvian Fissure are also

essential to speech comprehension and production (Kimura, 1993). Thus, self is

mostly images of oneself couched in the brains way of thinking, revolving

around coded neurons reactivating sensory cortices to reproduce images about

self; and these images are organized as configurations of cognitive-emotional

states. These images can be translated into linguistic modes, as when people

talk to themselves. Indeed, this capacity to slow the process of thought down

by translating brain thinking into linguistic constructions is important in

understanding emotional dynamicsa point to which I will return.

In this context, let me offer a side comment. One of the reasons that theories

of self have proven so difficult to test empirically is that measurements rely on

languagethat is, on utterances that represent translations of the brains way

of thinking. In an old test like the Twenty Statements Test, for example,

subjects were being asked to translate into words what they feel in the brains

way of thinking, and given the nature of self images as cognitive-emotional

constructs and the operation of defense mechanisms (to say nothing of diverse

interpretations of the tests directions by subject), it is not surprising that TSTs

only grossly measured some of the images that individuals have about themselves.

Other tests of self, such as the use of the semantic differential in affect control

theory, produce better results, but perhaps not for the reason that those who

use the test generally assume (e.g., Heise, 1979; Smith-Lovin and Heise, 1988).In employing the semantic differential, subjects produce patterns of responses

to dichotomous pairs of words which mix cognitions and affect. What makes

this test more successful is the responses better reflect the way that the brain

organizes information. Translation is still occurring but the product of this

translation via Wernickes and Brocas area looks more like the way the brain

configures cognitions (particularly given the way the statistical analyses of the

tests configure individuals scores); and hence, we can have greater confidence

in such an approach, although it is still a by-product of translating visually-

organized images into words and, then via statistical analysis, back into scoresthat better approximate how the brain stores images and thoughts.

A third related issue that has been hotly debated within interactionist circles

is the way in which humans organize self images. One aspect of this issue is



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substantive: what are the dimensions along which cognitive-emotional images

are arrayed? For example, in affect control theory, activity, potency, and

evaluation are the critical dimensions; in other theories, we can find somewhat

different, though overlapping, dimensions for arranging self images (e.g., Gecas,

1989, 1991). For my purposes, however, I will resist the temptations to visualizesubstantive images or self as organized along a few dimensions, although as

Table 1 suggests, humans probably organize expectations for others in this way.

A related question about the organization of self images is structural: Do

individuals organize images of themselves into hierarchies of identities (e.g.,

McCall & Simmons, 1966; Stryker, 1980, 1991; Stryker & Serpe, 1982; Serpe

& Stryker, 1987)? I suspect that some images of self are more salient and

emotionally charged than others, but just which self images become salient is

not just a reflection of clear rank ordering within the brain but also a response

to purely situational cues activating particular images from long-term memory

and, via working memory, integrating them with sensory images present in the

immediate situation. Yet another question addresses how self images are organized

and asks whether or not humans carry multiple identities and, relatedly, whether

or not there are core identities (or self) and more peripheral and situational

identities (or selves). My position is that individuals do have core selves or

identities that they seek to confirm in all interaction situations; and these

identities carry with them high-intensity emotional valences. Individuals also

have situation-specific selves, tailored to images about who they are, what they

can do, and what they can expect from others; and these too carry emotional

tags but not to the same intensity as the emotions attached to core self. Moreover,

there is a relatively high degree of consistency between core and peripheral

selves, and if this is not the case, the individual suffers considerable emotional

distress because of the incongruity (Higgins, 1987, 1989). Thus, in terms of how

the cognitive-emotional images of self are organized, the theory to be developed

here emphasizes that self is a series of emotional valences attached to images

about oneself as an object, some of which are trans-situational and fundamental

to a person and others of which are tied to particular types of situations. Ineither case, where others do not confirm self, emotions are aroused and defense

mechanisms are activatedall of which influence the nature and level of covert

and overt emotional arousal evident for a person during interaction (Higgins,

1987, 1989; Heise, 1989; Smith-Lovin, 1990).

A fourth issue is the behavioral responses that individuals make toward

themselves as objects. One very important response to others and self is

subcortical and involves activation of those of areas of the brain, sometimes

loosely termed the limbic systems (Maclean, 1990), that generate unconscious

emotional responses (Damasio, 1994; Le Doux, 1996). Another form of behavioralresponse is dramaturgical, revolving around the orchestration of gestures, both

consciously and unconsciously, so as to elicit desired and expected responses

from others or to achieve a particular goal or purpose (Goffman, 1959). Yet,



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another behavioral response is to react to oneself as an object before, during,

and after interaction (Serpe, 1991). As I will argue, self reflection is a very

important aspect of self, as all interactionist theories would emphasize, but it is

important in a sense not always stressed by these theories. Much self reflection

is, I believe, conducted in the brains mode of thinking and is not, therefore,linguistic (Turner, 1996a, 1996b); and in fact, self reflection is typically a blur

of emotionally-charged images and feelings that are not so easily put into

wordswhich is, perhaps, another way to phrase William James famous phrase,

the stream of consciousness. This stream is being activated by various

subcortical and unconscious limbic systems, thereby making emotionally-charged

images about self surface manifestations of complex neurological forces that

operate outside consciousness. The vast majority of self reflections in non-

problematic interactions operates in this way, and for the most part, avoids the

auditory mode of thought which immediately puts thinking into slow motion.

Verbalized self reflection, as an internal conversation is, however, critical to

understanding emotional arousal, especially since so many of the limbic forces

causing the arousal are subcortical and, to an individual, not easily understood

(although those interacting with an individual can often see the bodily changes

occurring as subcortical limbic systems mobilize motor and visceral responses).

Such self talk slows the process of thought and self reflection down so that

individuals ponder why they are experiencing emotions and, if necessary, so that

they can deal with problematic situations. Moreover, self talk gives individuals

the ability to anticipate and re-live the emotions aroused in a situation,

particularly when these emotions carry high valences. Additionally, and this is

important for the theory that I seek to present, self talk can often delay and, if

sufficiently frank and open, forestall the activation of defense mechanisms which

will, if activated, compress and distort emotional responses.

Yet, self talk can also sustain emotions that have been aroused in a situation,

whether positive or negative; and if self talk is sufficiently vocal about negative

experiences, emotions can be raised to a new amplitude, although eventually

fatigue and defense mechanisms will lower the emotional voltage. When selfreflection about a situation allows an individual to re-experience positive

outcomes of an interaction, however, the emotional energy generated can be

sustained and periodically reactivated; and as Collins (1988) has emphasized,

this kind of self reflection can become part of the particularized cultural capital

of an individual and, hence, set up expectations for the next episode of

interaction. The same is true for negative experiences that have been reflected

upon, although in this case, such reflection will generally lower expectations

unless defense mechanisms have so distorted the process of self talk that the

person is no longer in touch with the interpersonal realities behind their ownexperiences. In this latter case, expectations can remain artificially high, thus

setting off another round of negative experiences which only force the escalated

use of defense mechanisms. But, as will be argued later, this use of defense



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mechanisms ultimately depresses emotional energy, along several fronts: repres-

sion will eventually increase the valences for disappointment-sadness; projection

will lead to aversion-fearful responses from others or aggressive-angry negative

sanctioning from these others; and displacement of negative emotions onto

others will elicit aggressive-angry forms of negative sanctioning from the victimsof such displacement.

A final issue in the conceptualization of self is defense mechanisms, a topic to be

examined in greater detail later. Defense mechanisms seek to protect self from

unpleasant emotions, especially those directed at core self but peripheral selves as

well. Repression, displacement, and projection all distort individuals perceptions

of, and self reflections about, themselves in ways that change the overt emotional

reactions and the level of emotional energy displayed in a situation. With some

highly notable exceptions (e.g., Scheff, 1988; Scheff and Retzinger, 1992; Turner,

1994), symbolic interactionists and many other micro theories have not adequately

conceptualized the operation of defense mechanisms; and as we will see, they are

central to a theory seeking to explain peoples level of emotional energy.

Thus, when self is highly salient, the potential for activation of subcortical

areas of the brain generating emotions increases. Just whether or not this

potential is realized depends on the degree to which expectations in general and

those about self in particular have been met during the course of interaction.

To anticipate the theory summarized in the conclusions, when expectations have

been met or exceeded and when others have offered positive sanctions, or both,

people arouse a high level of positive effect towards themselves and others; and

conversely, when expectations have not been met or others have given negative

sanctions, or both, negative emotions toward self and others are activated.

Attribution processes qualify this relationship. When success in meeting expecta-

tions or receiving positive sanctions is attributed to self, self is evaluated positively,

and individuals will sustain relations with others in the encounter; when success

is attributed to internal states of others or categories of others, positive affect

towards these others will be aroused; and when success is attributed to external

causes in the situation, positive emotions will be of lower intensity. Conversely,when individuals do not meet expectations or receive negative sanctions from

others, or both, negative affect towards self, and others ensues; and this process

too is channelled by attributions. When self is blamed, powerful negative

emotions toward self ensue; when internal states of others are seen as the cause

of failure to meet expectations and receive negative sanctions, or both, aggressive

emotions toward others will be evident; and when external causes are seen to

be the cause, negative emotions toward self and others will be muted. Self talk

can increase the intensity and duration of both positive and negative emotional

arousal toward self and others; and when such self talk can target correctly thesources of emotional arousal, individuals will experience more positive emotions

toward self and others in the present encounter and in other encounters as well.

The activation of defense mechanisms generally lowers the modal level of overt



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emotional display by individuals, but increases the likelihood of short and

periodic emotional outbursts. Of course, these generalizations, summarized by

the propositions in the conclusions, get us ahead of the argument, but they give

us a sense for the direction of the theory that I seek to develop.

COLLATING EXPECTATIONS INTO A DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION

Depending upon the situation, all or various subsets of the expectations listed

in Table 1 can be operative. Moreover, these expectations are all interrelated.

For example, transactional needs for payoffs in terms of standards or equity and

justice are related to normative and value standards. Thus the listing in Table

1 represents only a rough statement of research topics on expectation states

rather than a refined and mutually exclusive categorization of variables. Yet, for

the purposes of the argument to be developed, the critical consideration is that

expectations exist along many dimensions, and humans can simultaneously

activate all of these sources of expectations, although more typically some are

more salient than others.

Similarly, self as a special kind of expectation is also likely to be operative;

and depending on the extent to which core or peripheral self is salient, the

expectation-states for a situation will vary. Moreover, since the forces listed in

Table 1 can increase the salience of selfas is the case, for example, when

differentiation of power and prestige among interactants is high, when values

dominate expectations, or when payoffs involve intrinsic resources from others.

Equally important, multiple expectations are combined, as expectation-states

research suggests (e.g., Wagner and Turner, 1998). Just how this combining occurs

is not fully understood, but at some level, it represents a mechanism for simplifying

actors definitions of the situation. In combining expectations, some become a

more significant subset than others; and in terms of arousing emotional reactions,

Kemper and Collins (1990) are probably correct in seeing authority and status as

highly salient, but the effect of these structural forces operates, to some degree,through self and identity forces. Thus, authority/status and self would be more

likely, I believe, to dominate the formation of a subset of expectations and, thereby,

to circumscribe the inclusion or exclusion into the subset of other forces listed in

Table 1. Still, this point should not be pushed too far; and for the theory presented

here, self-expectations are the most influential on an individuals level of emotional

arousal, use of defense mechanisms, and emotional energy.

EXPECTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

Several theoretical traditions document that incongruities between what indi-

viduals expect in a situation and what they experience generate emotional



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responses. For example, B.F. Skinner observed that pigeons under a reinforcement

schedule appeared to become angry when not reinforced, a finding that

Homans (1961) originally elaborated into a law of distributive justice (i.e.,

rewards to individuals should be proportional to their investments relative to

the investments of others in a situation) and later (Homans, 1974) an aggression-approval proposition (i.e., anger and punishment are likely responses to not

receiving an expected reward, satisfaction-approval for receiving a reward, and

happiness-approval for receiving more than expected). Molm (1991) in her

ongoing research program on punishment in exchanges has reported that

satisfaction and affect in exchanges of resources are mediated by expectations

and that units of punishment have greater effects on actors satisfaction because

rewards are more common than punishments, giving punishment a kind of

shock (or surprise) value. This effect, however, is reduced as punishments

become as frequent as rewards, although the basic relationship among expecta-

tions, experiences, and emotions remains. Within the expectation states theoretical

research program, it is consistently reported that emotions escalate when

individuals do not honor the expectations associated with the distribution of

status (Ridgeway, 1982, 1994; Ridgeway and Johnson, 1990; Berger, 1988).

Among the symbolic interactionist theories, the affect control approach developed

by David Heise and Lynn Smith-Lovin (Heise, 1979, 1989; Smith-Lovin and

Heise, 1988; Smith-Lovin, 1990) is built around the level of deflection between

fundamental sentiments and transient sentiments which escalates emotional

arousal and motivates actors to reduce the deflection. Within a somewhat

different wing of symbolic interactionism, Sheldon Stryker (1980) and collabor-

ators (Stryker and Serpe, 1982) have argued that emotions are a marker or sign

that a particular identity, which an individual expects to confirm, has not

received such confirming responses. Similarly, other interpersonal theories

emphasize congruence between self and responses of others (e.g., Backman,

1985, 1988; Swann, 1983, 1990; Higgins, 1987, 1989). And, within the power-

models of Kemper and Collins (1990), the activation of either negative or

positive emotions is related to whether or not anticipated confirmations ofrelative status or power have been realized.

Thus, it is clear that emotional arousal is related to the relationship between

expectations and experience. I will simply term this force the degree of congruity

or incongruity between expectations and experiences in a situation. If there is

an incongruity below expectations for reinforcing outcomes or associative

experiences, then the three primary emotions of assertion-anger, aversion-fear,

and disappointment-sadness are activated in varying degrees of intensity and in

different combinations and ratios, as will be discussed shortly (see Tables 2 and

3). If there is an incongruity that exceeds expectations for either positive ornegative outcomes, a variant of the primary emotion of satisfaction-happiness is

stimulated. And if expectations and experiences are congruent, then comparat-

ively low levels of emotion are aroused: if expectations were for positive



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Table 2. Variants of Primary Emotions

Satisfaction-Happiness

Low intensity Moderate intensity High intensity

content cheerful joysanguine buoyant blissserenity friendly rapturegratified amiable jubilant

enjoyment gaiety

Aversion-Fear


concern misgivings terror

hesitant trepidation horrorreluctance anxiety high anxiety

Assertion-Anger


annoyed displeased dislikeagitated frustrated loathingirritated belligerent disgust

vexed contentious hate

perturbed hostility despisenettled ire desestrankled animosity hatred

seethingwrath

Disappointment-Sadness


discouraged dismayed sorrowdowncast disheartened heartsickdispirited glum despondent

resigned anguishedgloomywoefulpained

Startlement-Surprise


sudden-awareness sudden-alertness amazed

astonishedastoundedincredulous



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Table 3. First-order combinations of primary emotions

Satisfaction-Happiness

Satisfaction-Happiness aversion-fear wonder, hopeful, relief, gratitude, pride,

reverenceSatisfaction-Happiness assertion-anger vengeance, appeased, calmed, soothed,

relish, triumphant, bemusedSatisfaction-Happiness disappointment-sadness nostalgia, yearning, hopefulnessSatisfaction-Happiness startlement-surprise elation, exhilaration, thrilled

Aversion-Fear

Aversion-Fear satisfaction-happiness awe, reverence, venerationAversion-Fear assertion-anger revulsed, repulsed, antagonism, dislike,

envyAversion-Fear disappointment-sadness dread, warinessAversion-Fear startlement-surprise panic, consternation, alarmed, scared

Assertion-Anger

Assertion-Anger satisfaction-happiness snubbing, mollified, rudeness, placated,righteousness

Assertion-Anger aversion-fear abhorrence, jealousy, suspiciousnessAssertion-Anger disappointment-sadness bitterness, depression, betrayed

Assertion-Anger startlement-surprise offended, incited, perturbed, piqued,outraged, irate, insulted, appalled,provoked, indignant, furious, inflamed,incensed

Disappointment-Sadness

Disappointment-Sadness satisfaction-happiness acceptance, moroseness, solace,melancholy

Disappointment-Sadness aversion-fear regret, forlornness, remorseful, miseryDisappointment-Sadness assertion-anger aggrieved, discontent, dissatisfied,

unfulfilled, boredom, grief, envy,sullenness

Disappointment-Sadness startlement-surprise crestfallen, shaken, dejected, stunned,upset

Startlement-Surprise

Startlement-Surprise satisfaction-happiness delightStartlement-Surprise aversion-fear shock, alarmed, unnerved, unsettled,

agitated, vigilantStartlement-Surprise assertion-anger disgust, upset, abhorrence, irritatedStartlement-Surprise disappointment-sadness dejection, incredulity, dismay



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experiences, then satisfaction is activated; and if expectations for negative

experiences are met, then relatively low level variants of disappointment-sadness

are likely to ensue.

Aside from this gross relationship between the level of emotional arousal

and the congruity/incongruity between expectations and experiences, anotherprimary emotionstartlement-surprisecan increase the intensity of the emo-

tions aroused. Of course, incongruity between expectations and experience is,

per se, a type of surprise; and so surprise is always involved in emotional

reactions. Yet, there can be varying degrees of surprise, and the more one is

surprised by an incongruity the greater is the intensity of the emotions

experienced, at least in the short term. Part of the reason for this enhanced

intensity is that surprise activates motor and visceral system responses in ways

that feed back and feed forward to stimulate subcortical emotion systems as well

as cortical attention to stimuli (Le Doux, 1996; Damasio, 1994); another part is

that surprise highlights the incongruity between expectations and experiences;

and most significantly, surprise makes individuals more self aware, and as a

consequence, surprise increases the salience of self. And, escalating the visibility

of self in a situation raises the emotional stakes. Even when self is not originally

salient, surprise as it activates other emotions pulls at least situational selves into

the emotional response; and if more core cognitions-emotions about self become

salient, then the emotional intensity increases considerably. Some have argued,

it should be noted, that surprise may not be a primary emotion; yet, whatever

its status in this respect, surprise as a primary or learned response intensifies

emotional experiences.

Self is always hightly salient if individuals expect reinforcing and confirming

responses from others. Thus, while self can be pulled into the emotional

dynamics, thereby increasing the emotional valences involved, interactions that

begin with a high sense of self as an object in relation to others will produce

more intense emotional reactions when incongruity occurs. When self is not

confirmed, individuals will experience higher levels of assertion-anger, aversion-

fear and disappointment-sadness; when self is viewed negatively but actuallyreinforced positively, the sense of relief (and other mixtures of fear, satisfaction,

and sadness) will be more acutely experienced (see Tables 2 and 3); when more

positive views of self are confirmed, the sense of satisfaction will move to the

happiness side of this primary emotion.

As anticipated earlier, a key factor in increasing the salience of self and the

intensity of the emotions experienced is the level of direct sanctioning by others.

Often individuals simply do not realize their expectations or goals with no

sanctioning from others directly involved, but with active sanctioning by others,

whether on the positive or negative side, the emotional stakes are raised becausesanctions focus the responses of others on self, making self even more of an

object to itself. Thus, when congruities and incongruities between expectations

and experiences follow from active sanctioning by others, the emotions experi-



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enced will be more intense. If others praise self, satisfaction-happiness is more

acutely felt; and if such praise is a surprise and exceeds expectations, then the

emotional reactions are escalated further. If others react negatively to behaviors

of self, then more intense mixes of assertion-anger, aversion-fear, and disappoint-

ment-sadness ensue; and if surprise is involved, then anger or fear is even morestrongly felt, often drowning out the sense of disappointment-sadness that also

accompanies negative sanctioning.

As noted earlier attribution processes are also involved in the relationship

among expectations, experiences, and emotions. If incongruity occurs, and the

incongruity is attributed by the individual to self, then the emotions experienced

are intensified, whether positively or negatively. If the incongruity is attributed

to the behaviors and motives of others (as a kind of internal attribution), and

the experience has been negative, then more heightened variants of assertion-

anger are aroused, often mixed with aversion-fear if the other is in a position

to apply negative sanctions. If the experience is positive, however, then other

will be viewed, and responded to, in terms of combinations and variants of

satisfaction-happiness. If the incongruity is attributed to situational forces without

reference to others or, if others are involved, to forces beyond their control,

then the emotions experienced will be lower key. Under these conditions of

external attribution, incongruities on the negative side will be more likely to

produce reactions on the disappointment end of this primay emotion and its

variants, and if anger and fear are activated, these too will have lower valances;

and incongruities on the positive side under conditions of external attribution

will qualify and mitigate happiness (see Tables 2 and 3).

To sum up, the emotional arousal stimulated by congruity or incongruity

between expectations and experiences is influenced by a number of variables:

the nature of expectations, the extent to which the incongruity exceeds or fails

to meet expectations, the extent to which surprise has been activated, the degree

to which self is salient and implicated in the experience of congruity or

incongruity, the extent to which congruity or incongruity is related to direct

sanctioning by others, and the nature of the attributions made for the cause ofthe incongruity or congruity. Yet, these variables interact in complex ways in

generating emotions, per se, and in activating defense mechanisms that distort

emotional experiences. Moreover, there are complex feedback and feed forward

relations with subcortical systems involved in the production of emotional

responses. At this point, then, we can only see the generalizations presented

above as first approximations of a very complicated process.

EMOTIONAL AROUSAL

Emotional arousal always involves activation of at least one, and typically several,

primary emotions. This arousal begins subcortically, as sensory inputs move to



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the thalamus which then activates the hypothalamus as well as various limbic

systems, such as the amygdala, septum, and cingulate gyrus; but as working

memory experiences these subcortical inputs, while activating coded neurons to

restimulate sensory cortices to reproduce images from long-term memory,

individuals experience feelings organized in terms of variants and combinationsof primary emotions. Following Kempers (1987) review of the large literature

on the primary emotions, or what can be reasonably seen as biologically-

based emotions in humans, five such emotions appear to be hard-wired into

humans neuroanatomy and, indirectly, into the endocrine system (Ekman, 1982).

Table 2 is my own adaptation of the literature on primary emotions (see

Turner, 2000, for a review). As is evident I see each primary emotion as

potentially moving from a low to a higher intensity state: satisfaction to happiness,

aversion to fear, assertion to anger, disappointment to sadness, and startlement

to surprise. This is not an issue of mere labels, because the low intensity variant

(the left side of each pair in Table 2) is, I believe, the more prevalent biological

state for most mammals; in contrast, humans and other higher mammals have

the neurological capacity to elaborate this lower intensity state to a much higher

level of amplitude. Thus, for humans, satisfaction can move from contentment

through buoyancy and cheerfulness to joyfulness and, as we will see in Table 3,

to many first-order combinations of primary emotions, such as pride; aversion

moves from hesitancy through anxiety and trepidation to terror and many first-

order combinations as well as becoming implicated in complex second-order

emotions like shame and guilt as is delineated in Table 4; assertiveness goes

through such moderate states as displeasure, frustration, and hostility to high

intensity states like loathing, disgust, and hate, while becoming implicated in the

many first-and second-order combinations listed in Tables 3 and 4; disappoint-

ment moves from a sense of being discouraged through pain and dismay to

sorrow and anguish as well as many first- and second-order combinations;

startlement goes from sudden awareness through sudden alertness to amazement

and incredulity, while being implicated in more complex combinations of

emotions and, as emphisized earlier, in the intensification of all emotions.As a basic hypothesis, I would argue that when expectations and experiences

are congruent, whether activating positive or negative emotions, the low intensity

state is the most likely node of activationthat is, satisfaction, mild aversion, mild

assertiveness, disappointment, and startlement. Conversely, as the incongruence

between expectations and experiences increases, especially as self becomes ever

more salient, the high intensity end of these emotions is activated, as are the

various first- and second-order combinations portrayed in Tables 3 and 4.

As is evident in Table 3, I see not only variants but first-order combinations

of primary emotions as crucial. Following Kempers (1987) lead, emotions arecombined in first-order combinations revolving around the mixing of two

primary emotions in varying proportions or ratios (Turner, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a,

1997b, 1999, 2000). Thus, the emotions that humans use in their role taking



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and role making efforts are variants of primary emotions and combinations of

these basic emotions; it is the capacity to combine primary emotions that makes

humans emotional repertoire so large compared to other animals. Table 3

presents my current candidates for some first-order combinations.

In Table 3, each of the primary emotions is combined with another primaryemotion to form a first-order combination. This process is very much like the

mixing of colors, as Plutchik (1980, 1993) has made explicit in his theory of

basic and derived emotions, but I do not think that the mixing is quite as orderly

and systematic as implied by Plutchiks emotions wheel. Rather, the neural

mechanisms that perform the mixing are, themselves, complex systems, revolving

at a minimum around feed forward and feed back relations among (1) thalamus

and hypothalamus, (2) cortical and subcortical motor areas, (3) subcortical visceral

responses and neurotransmitters like dopamine, norepinephrine, serotonin, and

acetylcholine, (4) subcortical emotion centers such as the septum, cingulate

gyrus, and amygdala, (5) basal forebrain, (6) hippocampus, and (7) neocortex.

Thus, the neurological capacity to generate and mix emotions is vast, far greater

than the actual numbers and range of emotions that structure human interaction.

The neuro substrate of emotions is an important topic itself, but for my purposes

here, the critical point is that humans emotional repertoire revolves around a

complex process of activating interconnected systems in the brain and the body

in ways that generate mixes among primary emotions.

Table 3 lists combinations that involve one dominant primary emotion mixed

with lesser but varying proportions of a second primary emotion. For example,

when the more intense variant of satisfaction-happiness is dominant, but mixed

with varying levels of aversion-fear, emotions such as wonder, hopefulness, relief,

gratitude, reverence and, most importantly, pride are generated. As a first-order

combination of mostly happiness (toward self as an object), tinged with a small

amount of fear (about potential failure), pride needs to be emphasized because,

following Cooley (1916) and Scheff (1988, 1990), its activation will be very

important in understanding self and the relation of self to other emotional states.

By looking down the right side of Table 3 under stiuations where one primaryemotion is dominant, the varieties of first-order combinations of emotions can

be seen. I am not sure that the combinations presented in Table 3 are exactly

right, but the general point is that humans have the neurological capacity in

their covert thoughts, in their self presentations and role making, in their self

talk, and in their role taking to draw upon a very large repertoire of first-order

combinations of primary emotions, thereby giving human interaction, thought,

decision making, sanctioning, and moral coding a subtle and fine-tuned quality.

But one critical difference with Kempers and my earlier work with first-order

combinations is that some of the most important emotions in human interactionare what I term second-order combinations of three primary emotions mixed in

different ratios. As Table 4 emphasizes, the emotions of shame and guilt are the

most important combinations of three primary emotions. Shame is an emotion



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Table 4. The Structure of Shame and Guilt

Rank-order of primary emotions Second-order emotionsShame

1 Disappointment-sadness (at self)2 Assertion-Anger (at self)3 Aversion-fear (about consequences to self)

Guilt

1 Disappointment-sadness (at self)2 Aversion-fear (about consequences to self)3 Assertion-anger (at self)

in which self is highly salient; the most prominent emotion in shame is

disappointment-sadness at self for behaving inadequately in the eyes of others

and in ones own self-assessments, coupled with anger at self and some fear

about the consequences to self for having engaged in behaviors are seen as

inadequate and, perhaps, incompetent. Guilt activates the same three primary

emotions but in a slightly different combination: the dominant emotion is still

disappointment-sadness at self for having failed to meet expectations, but the

second most important emotion is now fear about the consequences of this

failure, coupled with some anger at self for having so failed. Many have argued

(e.g., Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1988) that guilt is simply extreme shame, but the

subjective feelings for shame and guilt are quite different, especially in extreme

form. Others have suggested different ways to combine or distinguish shame,

guilt, and related emotions like embrarrassment (e.g., Sabini & Silver, 1997,

1998; Tangney, et al., 1996). I may be wrong in this conclusion, but the general

point remains the same: shame and guilt are at least a second-order emotion,

mixing three primary emotions; and the different rankings among the primary

emotions give shame and guilt distinctive guidelines and make their experience

by an individual distinctive. Moreover, the causes of the two emotions vary:guilt is activated with failure to meet moral expectations, while shame is

generated when one has behaved incompetently. Because shame and guilt are

such unpleasant emotions, they are very likely to mobilize defense mechanisms.

Since disappointment-sadness is the dominant emotion in shame and guilt,

the depression that often accompanies shamed and guilty individuals may not

reflect the use of repression and other defense mechanisms; rather, the depression

may simply be an artifact of the dominance of disappointment-sadness in both

shame and guilt. Yet, as I will argue below, the activation of defense mechanisms

accelerates and strengthens this depressive effect. For, it takes a great deal ofemotional energy to repress; and when one uses other defense mechanisms, such

as attributions to others and situations, projections onto others of ones own

emotions, and displacement of the anger and fear contained in shame and guilt



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onto others, one also tends to receive back negative sanctions, making self feel

even more disappointed and angry as well as fearful about the consequences of

ones actions. In the end, the effort to control these unpleasant feelings and

responses of others lowers the overt emotional energy in interaction.

ACTIVATION OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS

Subcortical systems generating emotions are, to a degree, controlled by the

centers for rational and purposive thinking in the neocortex, especially the

prefrontal cortex; and this was probably so long before Homo sapiens sapiens

emerged on the hominid line. And it may well be that the hominid neocortex

became ever larger over the last few million years not so much for language-

production and comprehension as for cortical control of hominids expanding

emotional capacities.

Such control enables humans to present self and fronts in ways that do not

disrupt the flow of interaction; and in fact, cortical control of emotions as well

as the inadvertent leaking of emotions from such control facilitates interpersonal

attunement and sanctioning. Yet, as hominids ability for seeing self as an object

(an ability that is probably an unselected by-product of an expanding of the

neocortex, especially the prefrontal neocortex), cortical control could also be

used to defend self from particularly unpleasant emotions, especially those

building upon and combining fear, anger, and sadness. If surprise was also

involved, neocortical efforts to protect self from unpleasant emotions would

simply intensify. Emotional variants of happiness and first-order combinations

such as pride did not generate such protective reactions, and so the cortical

system of defense that evolved was designed to protect individuals from highly-

charged elaborations and combinations of fear, anger, and sadness. As a relevant

aside, I think that humans can read in others anger and fear as well as all of its

variants far more readily and subtly than they can read satisfaction-happiness

because these are the emotions that bring pain. Such emotions are activated bynegative sanctions from others as well as failures to meet expectations; and as a

result, these emotions activate powerful subcortical limbic responses (principally,

the systems revolving around the amygdala) which, in turn, can activate efforts

at cortical control.

The most commonly discussed defense mechanismsrepression, projection,

and displacementare simply ways to protect self from experiencing negative

emotions, particularly second-order emotions such as shame and guilt (Freud,

1900 [1960]; Horney, 1950; Sullivan, 1953). Ironically, these are also the very

emotions that are essential for social control, because if individuals do not feelshame at themselves for disassociative and inadequate behaviors or for failing

to meet order-sustaining expectations as well as guilt for such behaviors, social

organization would not be possible. The world would be filled with sociopaths



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who would soon become extinct. Thus, defense mechanisms are maladaptive to

the social order only if they keep individuals from experiencing those very

emotions that are essential to the smooth flow of interaction, while being

maladaptive to the individual only if they depress emotional energy and lower

the capacity to role take and role make effectively. Although the causes of shameand guilt as well as the subjective experience of these emotions differ, they are

both subject to the same defense mechanisms. Let me offer some general and,

I grant, fairly obvious generalizations as they relate to understanding defense

mechanisms and emotional energy in human interaction.

Activation of defense mechanisms such as projection and displacement in the

face of either guilt and shame tends to be counterproductive in the long run

because use of these mechanisms invites negative sanctions from others. If an

individual is seen as imputing his or her own negative emotions on others or as

venting on others negative emotions, especially versions of anger, people will

respond in ways that increase an individuals sense of shame and guilt, or

alternatively, force a person to repress to an even greater degree. Repression is

often necessary before other defense mechanisms can be activated, but it also

operates by itself. Highly repressed individuals often have episodes of emotional

outburst, typically anger but anxiety as well, which once again invite negative

responses from others, thereby heightening the shame for engaging in such

outbursts and the guilt over having done so.

As Lewis (1971) and Scheff (1988) have emphasized, repression operates at a

number of levels, from simply bypassing shame and not acknowledging it to

burying negative feelings about self from conscious reflection. If individuals

habitually bypass shame, and I would add, guilt, as well, repressive responses

must become ever more mobilized. The end result is that persons are drained

of emotional energy, except for disproportionate and typically inappropriate

outburst of emotion, especially anger but fear as well, that escape the cortical

censors. These emotional outbursts only feed back and require the censors to

increase their pressure which, in turn, lowers peoples emotional energy in ways

that can disrupt interaction. A biography of such cycles will, in the end, decreasethe modal levels of emotional energy generated by individuals, even when they

are in situations, such as those giving them power and authority, that normally

produce positive emotional arousal.

Self thought and self talk are important elements in these dynamics. If second-

order variants of primary emotions causing shame and guilt are only experienced

in the brains mode of processing information as images and gestalts, there is a

greater likelihood that the emotional arousal will go unacknowledged or that

more active repression will occur. The key to dealing with negative emotions is

self talk, where the blur of cognitive-emotional images can be slowed down formore careful inspection and introspection. Of course, the goal of most therapy

is to get individuals to engage in such self talk, but the difficulties that therapists

have are really built into the very nature of human thinking.



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The key to using self talk effectively is seeing the sources of emotional reactions

and recognizing the differences between guilt and shame. Ultimately, these

sources are the expectations listed in Table 1 as well as the degree to which

experiences, especially those which make self highly salient, correspond to

expectations. If self talk can be reflectively analytical, seeing incongruities forwhat they are and making selfattributions about failures to meet expectations,

then the emotional reactions can be culled from the brains mode of organizing

cognitions in terms of fields and gestalts. In turn, if open and honest, such

reflection can stave off the activation of defense mechanisms, with the result

that the negative emotions experienced, particularly anxiety, shame and guilt,

can be managed and become a part of an individuals cultural capital and

used to more effectively present self and role make in future interactions. Such

analytical reflection, as it creates cultural capital, raises emotional energy in

subsequent interactions. One way in which analytical self reflection works is to

lower or alter expectations, and as a result, the emotional stakes are lessened

because incongruities between expectations and experiences, even those where

self is salient, will be either eliminated or, at the very least, greatly reduced.

Self talk can also focus on more positive emotions, especially those variants

and combinations of primary emotions that generate pride. Pride not only

enhances peoples sense of well being, it charges emotional energy because pride,

like its more negative counterparts, becomes a part of the cultural capital of

individuals that can be invested in interactions (Collins, 1988). Indeed, high

levels of pride are often necessary for individuals to engage in self talk about

shame or guilt, and under ideal circumstances, frank self talk about shame or

guilt can become yet another source of pride. For this to occur, however, a

persons cultural capital must have an existing reservoir of prideful cognitions

accumulated in past interactions of a given type or, more generally, in his or

her cumulative biography. Highly depressed individuals, who have cultural

capital filled with shame and guilt, generally have such lowered pride that they

cannot engage in effective self talk; and indeed, their self talk can often turn

into self-recriminations which, in the end, will reactivate defense mechanisms.Moreover, self talk can also be used for self deception; and as a result,

individuals can simply employ talk to impose a defensive regime that protects

self. When confronted with shame and guilt, especially a biography of bypassed

and repressed experiences, talk can make external or internal attributions of

emotions, projecting them onto particular people, categories of people, and

situations; self talk can justify displacement, once again through internal and

external attributions to others and situations; and self talk can jabber around

guilt and shame in order to drown out awareness of those emotions that have

been pushed below conscious reflection (such individuals are often compulsivetalkers not only to themselves but to others as well).

If humans did not have the capacity to bypass minor moments of shame and

guilt, however, they would be overwhelmed by emotions. Any given moment



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of emotionally-charged interaction or any legacy of accumulated emotional

experiences in an individuals biography would make a person too emotionally

charged to function effectively in interactions. Thus, defense mechanisms evolved,

no doubt, as part of the neocortical package to keep emotions from getting out

of control and for enabling individuals to use them in associative ways. Moreover,most emotions are read visually, bypassing the translation boxes for speech

comprehension and production, and feeding directly into the brains mode of

organizing memories and images, thereby keeping emotions from becoming

ready topics of slow self talk. Again, this is a useful way to avoid being

overwhelmed by emotions. It is, therefore, a matter of how active defense

mechanisms are. As a rule of thumb, if the activation of defense mechanisms

and the natural operation of the brain in terms of imaging prevent individuals

from retrieving painful cognitions and making them available for self talk, a

decrease in modal levels of emotional energy will ensue.

CONCLUSIONS: STATING THE THEORY FORMALLY

I have delayed to the end presenting the theory because the dynamics of

emotions discussed thus far are interrelated in direct, indirect, and reverse causal

patterns, thereby requiring that I first describe the operative processes behind

the labels presented in Figure 1 before pulling these together into a more formal

and parsimonious theory.

The propositions enumerated below formalize the basic lines of argument

stated discursively thus far. Given the highly speculative nature of the argument,

however, these propositions should only be considered tentative hypotheses,

although they do summarize various empirical findings from well-known

theoretical traditions. As speculative extensions of existing theories and research

findings on these theories, the proposition do not represent a refined theory.

Rather, the propositions are only a first step in trying to develop a more general

sociological theory of emotions in interpersonal encounters. When stated aspropositions, however, the argument can more readily be assessed and criticized

in light of other theoretical positions or empirical findings, thereby paving the

way for correction and increased refinement. I offer these sixteen propositions

in the hopes of stimulating critique and theoretical cumulation.

1. The greater is the number of expectations that form an individuals

definition of a situation and the higher is the salience of these expectations

in an encounter, the greater is the potential for emotional arousal by an

individual and for affective displays of emotions to others in the encounter.2. If individuals have received positive sanctions from others and have met

or exceeded expectations, or both, in an encounter, they will experience at

least satisfaction and more typically happiness; and, as a consequence, they



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will display associative affect towards others and will receive similar affect

from others in the encounter.

2a. If self is salient in an encounter and if attributions for success in

meeting expectations and/or for receiving positive sanctions are placed

on self, then these individuals will experience pride; and, as a consequence,they will seek to develop and sustain associative relations with others in

this encounter.

2b. If attributions for success in meeting expectations and for receiving

positive sanctions are attributed in an encounter to the internal states of

others or categories of others, then these individuals will experience

variants of satisfaction-happiness; and, as a consequence, they will display

towards and receive from others these positive emotions, and, thereby,

develop and sustain associative relations with others in this encounter.

2c. If attributions for success in meeting expectations and for receiving

positive sanctions are attributed in an encounter to external causes in the

situation, then the level of satisfaction-happiness expressed by individuals

towards others will be lower, but nonetheless, individuals will still

seek to interact and to create associative relations with others in the

encounter.

3. Both hapiness and pride under conditions of positive attribution increase

the level of associative affect emitted by an individual towards others in an

encounter who, reciprocally, will tend to increase their display of affect to

the individual in an escalating cycle of ever-more associative and emotionally-

charged relations until fatigue and satiation set in, or the encounter is

terminated.

4. Self talk about interactions in which variants and combinations of

satisfaction, happiness, and pride have been experienced will sustain the

positive flow of emotions previously displayed and become a part of

individuals cultural capital which, in turn, will set expectations for the

subsequent interaction, making individuals more inclined to pursue associat-

ive interaction with particular others in encounters now and in the future;and, as a consequence, the level of associative affect displayed towards and

received from others will increase in these encounters.

5. Such self talk of variants and combinations of satisfaction-happiness will

often be generalized to similar others or similar encounters, thereby raising

the expectations for positive emotions and making individuals more likely

to seek associative relations with others or to enter encounters like those

which, in the pasts, were rewarding to the individual; and, as a consequence,

the level of associative affect displayed towards others and received from

others will increase in such encounters.6. If, however, individuals receive negative sanctions from others or are

unsuccessful in meeting expectations, or both, in an encounter, they will

experience varying combinations of assertion-anger, aversion-fear, and



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disappointment-sadness, which, in turn, will activate the converse of processes

(2) through (5) above.

6a. If self is salient in an encounter and if attributions by individuals for

failure to behave competently and for receiving associated negative

sanctions are placed on self, then these individuals will experience shamewhich will eventually lower their modal level of emotional arousal; and,

as a consequence, their modal level of affective display will decline and,

thereby, dampen the associative affect in relations with others in the

encounter.

6b. If self is salient in an encounter and if attributions by individuals for

failure to meet normative expectations and for receiving associated

negative sanctions are placed on self, then these individuals will experience

guilt; and as a consequence their modal level of emotional arousal will

decline and, thereby, dampen the associative affect in relations with others.

6c. If attributions for failure to meet expectations and for receiving

negative sanctions in an encounter are attributed by individuals to the

internal states of others or categories of others, then variants of assertion-

anger toward these others or categories of others will be aroused and

displayed by these individuals up to the point of fatigue, or escalated

negative sanctions by others, or termination of the encounter.

6d. If attributions for failure to meet expectations and for receiving

sanctions in an encounter are attributed by individuals to external causes

in the situation, then variants of assertion-anger will be less intense and

the level of negative emotional arousal and display by these individuals

will be relatively low; and, as a consequence, they will sustain relations

with lessened associative affect with others in the encounter.

7. All of the effects described in (2) through (6) will be magnified under

conditions of increasing surprise; and the greater is the level of surprise

experienced by individuals, the higher wil be their levels of emotional

arousal and display in an encounter.

8. All of the effects listed in (1) through (7) will feed back and changeexpectations; and the more intense are the emotions experienced by

individuals, whether positive or negative, the greater will be the change in

their expectations for subsequent interactions in similar encounters.

9. The more expectations escalate among individuals in an encounter,

whether positive or negative, the more likely are incongruities to emerge in

subsequent encounters, thereby raising the level of emotional arousal and

display towards others in subsequent interactions in similar encounters.

10. To the degree that defense mechanisms have been used by individuals

in an encounter to repress disappointment-sadness, aversion-fear, andassertion-anger, especially as these combine to produce shame and guilt,

then the modal level of overt emotional energy arousal by these individuals

will be lowered in this encounter; and, as a consequence, the level of



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associative affect displayed towards others and received from others will be

correspondingly dampened in the encounter.

11. To the degree that defense mechanisms have been used habitually and

over a long period in an individuals biography, then the modal level of

emotional displays by this individual will be low; and, as a consequence,the individuals level of associative affect displayed towards others and

received from others will be dampened in all encounters.

12. To the extent that attributions for disappointment-sadness, aversion-

fear, and assertion-anger are directed by individuals toward others and

categories of others in an encounter, their modal level of overt emotional

arousal and display will increase, especially episodes of anxiety and anger,

up to the point where fatigue, shame, or guilt about such responses reduce

the level of emotional display; and the more negative sanctions from others

lead these individuals to experience shame and guilt, the more powerful

will be the effect of shame and guilt on reducing their emotional displays

toward others in the encounter.

13. To the extent that disappointment-sadness, aversion-fear, and assertion-

aggression are projected or displaced by individuals on others, the more

likely are such individuals to experience negative sanctions from these

others; and, as a consequence, the more likely are the dynamics in (6a6d)

and (12) above are to be operative.

14. To the degree that the processes described in (12) and (13) have occurred

over a long period of time and typify the biography of an individual, the

less will be this individuals modal level of emotional display in an encounter

when not engaged in periodic outbursts of assertive displays revolving

around attribution, projection, and displacement; and, as a consequence,

this individuals modal level of associative affect displayed towards and

received from others will be dampened.

15. To the extent that individuals can engage in analytical self talk that

correctly targets the sources for their emotional experiences in encounters

whether the target be self, others, or situationsthe greater will be theirsense of satisfaction and, hence, the more this sense of satisfaction will

mitigate the dampening affects of negative emotions and, thereby, raise

these individuals modal level of positive emotional arousal in encounters;

and, as a consequence, they will display toward others and receive from

others associative affect in all encounters.

16. If self talk by individuals is effective in reducing negative emotional

arousal, especially those negative emotions that have accumulated over

longer periods of time and that revolve around anxiety, guilt, and shame,

the more likely will these individuals experience pride in encounters, andhence, the greater will be these individuals modal level of positive emotional

arousal; and, as a consequence, they will display toward others and receive

from others associative affect in all encounters.



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Jonathan A. Turner

Department of Sociology

University of California, Riverside

Riverside, CA 92521-0719

USA

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