turkey’s foreign policy challenges - rethink · pdf filethe conference examined...

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

750 First St., NE, Suite 1125

Washington, DC 20002

[email protected]

Phone: 202-842-2026

www.rethinkinstitute.org

RETH

INK

CO

NFER

EN

CE 0

4 /

NO

VEM

BER

2013

TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY

CHALLENGES

RETHINK CONFERENCE 04

November 2013

The Rethink Institute is an independent, not-for-profit,

nonpartisan research institution devoted to deepen

our understanding of contemporary political and

cultural challenges facing communities and societies

around the world, in realizing peace and justice,

broadly defined.

The Institute pursues this mission by facilitating

research on public policies and civic initiatives

centering on dispute resolution, peace building,

dialogue development, and education. Toward these

goals, the Institute sponsors rigorous research and

analysis, supports visiting scholar programs, and

organizes workshops and conferences.

© Rethink Institute. All rights reserved

ISBN: 978-1-938300-15-8

Printed in the USA

Rethink Institute

750 First St., NE, Suite 1125

Washington, DC 20002

Phone: (202) 842-2026

[email protected]

This publication can be downloaded at no cost at

www.rethinkinstitute.org

CONTENTS

1 Summary

3 Session I: Parameters, Priorities, and Prospects of Turkish

Foreign Policy

20 Session II: Turkey’s Middle East Conundrum

Turkey’s Foreign Policy Challenges

1

Summary The following is the transcript of the conference on Turkey’s foreign policy challenges held at the Rethink Institute on September 24, 2013. The conference examined Turkey’s foreign policy challenges against the backdrop of the current developments in the Middle East and addressed the following questions: How will Turkish foreign policy play out in the near future? What are Turkey’s options in the Middle East? What should be the nature of the model partnership between Turkey and in the United States? How about Turkey’s other significant interests in the European Union, the Caucasus, and Central Asia?

Rethink Institute

2


3

Session I

Parameters, Priorities, and Prospects of Turkish

Foreign Policy

Ihsan Dagi

Professor of International Relations, Middle East Technical

University, Ankara, Turkey

Michael Werz

Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress

Fevzi Bilgin

Executive Director, Rethink Institute

Rethink Institute

4

FEVZI BILGIN: Hello and welcome to the Rethink Institute. Today, we are going to discuss Turkey’s foreign policy and the challenges it faces, and we are joined by very prominent and distinguished experts on Turkish foreign policy, from Washington and from Turkey. Let us start with Mr. Werz. MICHAEL WERZ: Thank you for the invitation; it is great pleasure to be here. Obviously, I am taking an outsiders’ perspective on Turkish foreign policy, and this is especially true since it is not easy to make sense of the recent dramatic occurrences in the country. For that reason I will take a step back and try to look at the broader picture to better understand what has happened in Turkey.

When it comes to the way the major players in the AKP are looking at the world and the neighborhood—including their own country—there are different parameters that are being applied. It is my impression that two groups exist: one of which has more of a cultural worldview that is infused by religion, not in the sense of political Islam that many observers try to detect in Turkish foreign policy, but more in a way to look at the world in cultural distinction. I think that group includes, and I am speaking in very broad terms

and in a superficial way here, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and some of their advisors. And on the other hand, you have a segment within the AKP, probably the most prominently represented by the President, who are looking at the world in more differentiated political terms. And the question is, how do these worldviews shape Turkish policy over the past few years? I would like to share two or three observations. First of all, there is only a limited tradition of multilateral foreign policy in Turkey, because for one, the country was frozen into the Cold War limiting regional ties to the North, most of the South, and the East until 1989. In addition, the domestic situation was characterized by arrested development, especially in central and eastern Anatolia, until the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when the economic opening came with President Özal’s policies. These included a political decision not export peasant labor to Germany, France, and Denmark anymore but rather provide political and economic opportunities within the country. So the end of the Cold War produced converging trends that pushed Turkey


5

into an entirely new environment during the 1990s and the following decade. As we know, these domestic changes contributed to the 2002 electoral victory of the AKP. I would even go so far as to question whether it is correct to say that the AKP is much more a result of massive domestic changes in Turkey, particularly the process of communities in the central and eastern part of the country finding a political voice that had not existed previously. These social and economic changes produced an environment in which the AKP could become the political engine it is today. And in parallel to those domestic transformations in the 1990s, all of a sudden, Turkey had to answer a lot of questions with regard to its neighbors—because the Levant opened up; it became a geopolitical entity once again. The questions that arose were (and are) not easy to answer, because it became a very complex neighborhood. If Greece is your most stable neighbor, you know that you are living in a challenging environment. Contrary to some perceptions, there is not really a deep experience of regional policy in Turkey. During the 1990s and the early 2000s, relatively few think tanks and not that many foreign service officers had extended capacities and experiences in the surrounding countries. The Ankara based think tank USAK did a study recently looking at the diplomatic officers in Turkish embassies in the Arab world and found that only a small number of them speak fluent Arabic. This shows that there is a limitation of capability and capacity to cover the territory and explains why Foreign Minister Davutoglu is so adamant about pushing the foreign service forward into those new discussions. Again, those internal and external processes are intertwining and make for a complex set of challenges. Turkey has undergone tremendous domestic changes and at the same time the country was thrown into regional policy with an astonishing intensity. Just one example: In the 1970s, Turkey was only 30 percent urbanized; but it was 60 percent urbanized only a generation later—such experiences tend to turn traditions upside down and stir a lot of interesting questions about how you interpret the reality around you. This is not to say that any other country in the world, including Europe and the United States, has a better clue of what is going on in the region. But Turkey is more exposed, because it is neighboring so many countries. Given these social and cultural experiences, in the early 2000s, a political and somewhat universalist mood within the AKP led Prime Minister Erdogan to declare in 2009 that, “We are not the country surrounded by the enemies anymore,” trying to overcome the notion that everybody is trying to hold the country down. Foreign Minister Davutoglu, of course,

Rethink Institute

6

formulated the “zero problems with our neighbors,” policy with the declared attempt to turn old enemies into friends. This was also designed to push back against some Turkish phobias, which tended to see Western imperialism behind every regional dynamic. Instead, a fairly modern political position emerged which defined a conservative perspective with universalist ingredients and defined political possibilities as well as the regional context in mostly political terms. However, an undercurrent existed back then to look at the region and the broader environment from a more religious or cultural standpoint. It is important to remember that, again contrary to many prevailing arguments, religious worldviews in a secular age are the byproducts of modernization, providing meaning and orientation in times of disorientation and change. Such worldviews are not something ancient that someone reconnects to, but are quintessentially modern and contemporary. If one looks at the way in which some of the leading figures within the AKP have conceptualized the world, culture and religion seemed to play a more prominent role, especially for those subscribing to the notion of a global Muslim community as political entity that is culturally defined. This mentality coincides with persisting ambiguity vis-à-vis Israel, as an entity that does not entirely belong to the region because of cultural difference. Such culturalizing worldviews tend to provide simplifying explanations for political dynamics—if I am not mistaken, they also account for some of the wild mood swings that we have seen among Turkish leaders. A few years ago, Bashar al Assad was a family friend to the Prime Minister. Just a few months later he turned into an archenemy you cannot speak of anymore. The fallout is not only limited to personal relationships as another, less known example proves. The Turkish government meddled in the 2012 war crimes tribunal in Bangladesh with astounding self-consciousness. The Turkish ambassador was interfering into the domestic affairs of a foreign country because there were representatives of a Muslim party on trial. The request for clemency for the accused Jamaat-e-Islami leader Ghulam Azam not only angered the Bangladeshi government but also documented it’s the Turkish government’s willingness to take sides in a foreign war crimes tribunal based on some loosely-defined idea of religious solidarity. These are just a few of the pieces of a much larger puzzle that one needs to put together. There is a shift from a rather universalist notion of seeing political opportunity and formulating a differentiated view of the neighborhood to a foreign policy that today resembles the deeply polarized situation within Turkey. And there is the fact that the Prime Minister seems to follow a political strategy that is set to


7

deepen internal as well as external divisions, while hinting at a bipolar worldview that divides Turkish society and the world into good and bad camps, into “us” (with the Prime Minister) and the “others”. Looking back at recent U.S. history the first comparison that comes to mind, and an attitude that structured U.S. foreign policy in a similar way, is that of the Neo-Conservatives. When I hear the current Turkish government speaking about Egypt, about Israel, and about Syria, I hear a conservative Islamic version of American neo-conservatism; it is all about change or, rather, recreating the world in one’s own image. This outlook means that foreign governments cannot be accepted the way they are and even justifies intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. Just to be clear, I am not trying to make a judgment here. And I am sympathetic to the AKP’s paranoia, given the history of military coups in Turkey and the recent coup against Egypt’s President and his party, which is hardly acceptable even given the massive mistakes made by the Muslim Brotherhood when they were in government. And I am very sympathetic to the notion that Bashar al Assad has to go and the slaughter house that he has created in Syria is absolutely unacceptable by any political standard. However, the question for Turkey is: How do the constant interferences in the region and the lack of cooperation with Israel serve Turkish national interest? And what effect do they have on the country’s foreign policy leverage? Let me formulate this from a different angle. Look at the top four or five problems in Northern Africa and the Levant and ask yourself the following question: Compared to the 2003 to 2005 timeframe, has Turkish leverage increased or decreased? Are there more or less instances when people in the White House or the Department of State will pick up the phone and say, “Turkey is a central player to help solve this problem”? My argument here is that if your culturally infused worldview and, as a consequence, one-dimensional political positions begin undermining the vital national interests of your country, then it might be time to rethink policy and come up with a more differentiated notion of what has happened in the region and how you conduct Turkish foreign policy. In addition, such an attitude would almost automatically bring the Turkish government into closer alignment with the United States. Right now, many people seem to be reassessing the U.S.-Turkey relationship. In addition to the divergences with regard to regional policy, a complicating matter for the Obama administration is that Prime Minister Erdogan and his family had a high level visit in Washington, including extensive time with President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary of State Kerry, a number of public meetings and photo ops.

Rethink Institute

8

But, upon Erdogan’s return to Ankara only a few days later, they saw an unnecessary confrontation of the Turkish state with a public protest that began at Gezi Park and morphed into a much broader expression of unease with the direction of the country. Let me end with the following observation: There is a parallelism between the Gezi Park protests—which I think were misinterpreted and terribly mismanaged by the Turkish government which entirely subscribed to a “us against them” logic—and the extent to which external affairs of Turkey and bilateral relationships have been framed in a similar bipolar way by the AKP government. From a Washington perspective it is important to assess whether this culturalizing worldview will continue to inform Turkish domestic policy and foreign relations, if it will persist over the next few years, or if it will be replaced by a more enlightened and measured attitude. In other words, can Washington realistically expect the Turkish government—one of its important strategic partners in the region which commands a massive majority in parliament—to overcome its disregard for the public sphere domestically and its very confrontational stance vis-à-vis its neighboring countries and regional powers more broadly? Ultimately, this is what is going to decide not only the outcome of the elections that we will see in 2014 and 2015, but also the legacy of Prime Minister Erdogan, who deserved considerable credit for pushing the military out of the political realm in Turkey and moving the country towards greater diversity and pluralism in the early years of his tenure. People looking at Turkey from a humanitarian and democratic perspective will hold these early achievements in high regard. However, over the past two or three years, some of the accomplishments have been halted or reversed, and the creation of an atmosphere of fear in Turkey has severely damaged the Prime Minister’s and the AKP’s legacy; as long as no one in the party stands up and speaks this hard truth, doubts will continue to grow. If my impression is correct—that the uncompromising domestic policies are related to the same mindset as the confrontational foreign policy with regard to Syria, Israel, Egypt and the European Union—then it is important to discuss the chances of domestic changes being a catalyst for a more open-minded way of running Turkish foreign affairs. Turkey has been a key ally of the United States in the region and will continue to be the prime target of U.S. cooperation, given the country’s strong economic and political role, in years to come. But given the experiences of Turkey’s political inability to manage domestic disagreements and diverging interests within the neighborhood, it is important to think about how Turkish society can contribute in redefining and reframing those conversations to move towards a more constructive context.


9

FEVZI BILGIN: I would like to take you twelve years back to 2001-2002, when the current Minister Davutoglu published his book Strategic Depth. It was an interesting time. I think the period between the years 1999 and 2001 was one of the darkest periods in the recent history of Turkey, plagued with political and financial crises. It is interesting that when I visited him as a graduate student at the time when he was a professor at a small private university, he told me that he has written a book as such. The book was very interesting, sophisticated, brilliant and unprecedented in analysis of Turkey’s strategic options. So far the book has hold 80 thousand copies, which is a big deal for Turkey. It is an academic book and it is not an easy read. It sort of provided guidelines for Turkey’s foreign policy in the upcoming years. There is no question that Davutoglu was the architect of the new Turkish foreign policy, first as advisor between 2002 and 2009 and then as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The biggest paradigmatic shift in the last ten years during the AKP rule is the emergence of the notion that Turkey is an idea, a project, a vision of a Muslim, democratic, economically strong country that is in peace with its own people, powerful but peaceful and cooperative in its region. And to a great extent, the reformulation of Turkish foreign policy by Davutoglu greatly contributed to that very idea until recently. The book or the argument itself was criticized as neo-Ottoman or Islamist

or whatever. But I think, it is neither neo-Ottomanist, nor Islamist, and he actually argues against those visions in the book. It is rather promoting a proactive policy, not pro-Western or pro-Eastern but in all directions, as Turkey getting out of its shackles. And, based on his assumptions, Davutoglu claimed in the book that Turkey’s international legal boundaries are much narrower than its geocultural, geopolitical boundaries. So that the tension Turkey faces most of the time in international politics is because of this disparity. This is kind of an assertive claim, not necessarily aggressive or expansive, or neo-Ottomanist or imperialist, but more of emphasizing Turkey’s potentials. He was also very critical about the conventional Turkish foreign policy. He characterized it as passive, parochial, bound by agendas set by other powers, lacking political will and foresight.

Rethink Institute

10

It is interesting that these ideas were expressed in one of the darkest periods by a person who has no official position in the government. It was not even clear that the AKP would come to power at the time. So, in that respect, it was a great contribution in terms of planting these ideas, especially for the next generation. In the book, Davutoglu developed an interesting formula for international power. He argued that, for a given country, there are fixed assets such as history, geography, culture, and population, which you cannot change. And then there are potential assets such as economic capabilities, technological capabilities, and military capabilities. You can modify these and improve them. All these assets appreciate only and only if they are multiplied by strategic conception and planning, and political will. And there comes the originality in the sense that it is conventional to talk about Turkey’s geopolitical location, being a bridge between continents, and having access to multiple sea and land basins, but as long as you do not have the strategic conception (informed by history) and strategic planning (informed by contemporary realities), and well-educated, enlightened political and diplomatic cadres, you cannot really take advantage of those assets. It is important to emphasize these ideas because they were very unconventional given the Turkish strategy at the time. Imagine where Turkey was and where it is right now. When we talk about Turkey’s foreign policy challenges, we are talking about Egypt, we are talking about Syria, or we are talking about issues in Somalia. But at the time, the number one issue was Greece or Cyprus, and that was the parochialism he was referring. And he talked about near land basins of the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the sea basins of Black Sea, the Adriatic, East Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Caspian, and the near continental basins. This was a very extensive outlook, not conventional in Turkey at the time. He even claimed that if you want to hold Turkey together territorially, you need to be active in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. These were radical ideas at the time. We have seen a lot of developments vis-à-vis promoting Turkish foreign policy in terms of these principles and ideas. For example, when Davutoglu was an advisor, he made frequent trips to Africa, observing the lands from the air, checking areas for agricultural or trade developments. As a result, I think in 2011, Turkey opened 34 new embassies in Africa. This was part of his vision. So, when we were talking about Turkish foreign policy two or three years ago, there were very interesting developments. And if we had to host this event then we would probably be celebrating rather than discussing the challenges of the new Turkish foreign policy.


11

But, later on, the things began to falter, and it is important to find out the culprits to be able to suggest some solutions. I believe that the idea of Turkey that I referred to in the beginning was well alive until 2010. Since then it is seriously challenged. I can think of three things that led to this change: (1) Centralization of power in the hand of the prime minister and domestication of foreign politics (as observed during the recent Egyptian crisis, some foreign policy issues turned into domestic issues and they were debated and processes in the like manner), which usurped the vision and foreign policy that has been realized in the preceding decade; (2) Conflicts like Syria proved to be too complex, too difficult to deal with given the experience of Turkey, or the expertise in Turkey; (3) The unpredictable dawn and dramatic retreat of the Arab Spring has seemingly disrupted Turkey’s plans. Despite all these, however, was the vision that shaped up between 2002-2010 wrong? I do not think so. For example, “zero problems with neighbors” principle, was it a bad policy? I doubt it. Everybody was excited at the time, everybody was proud of it. People were celebrating that this was a great idea. Was it wrong to reconcile with Armenia? I do not think so. It did not work but it was a good try. How about mediating between Israelis and Syrians? I think that was good policy. Was it wrong to mediate between the West and Iran? I do not think. Maybe that effort delayed a potential war against Iran. I think these were noble efforts, even if they failed. They failed because of the above reasons and other reasons that I will mention. Do I think that Turkey punched above its weight? Occasionally yes, I think we can say that. But when it comes to the most important thing that Davutoglu mentions in the book as the most strategic asset, the human factor, the proactive political and diplomatic cadres, enlightened, educated, polyglot, knowing history, geography, culture of the countries they work, not much has been done. Are such people now present among the Turkish diplomatic circles? No, far from it. There is a growing generation that live up to these expectations in twenty years or so, but at the moment we cannot talk of that. Michael mentioned about the survey about Arabic speakers among Turkish diplomats. The least known languages in Turkey are Arabic, Russian, Persian. These are the languages of the neighboring countries. Everybody is supposed to speak English for some reason. Even the experts on the Middle East learn about the region from English-language publications. Maybe we have brilliant Turkish diplomats around us here today, but the old generation of diplomatic cadres is very incapable of advancing that vision. This is one the area that Turkey can invest more than anything else right now. The culprits that I mentioned, which distorted Turkish foreign

Rethink Institute

12

policy, will not disappear overnight. We have to wait; the next year is critical for Turkey. But if Turkey would like to invest in future, it needs to invest in people, the human factor, so that it can realize this vision. And I believe that despite all these challenges, if you move beyond the Syrian quagmire, the idea of Turkey is still very well received in many parts of the world. And it will continue to do. That’s how I feel when I travel, when I talk to people and that is what people from various nations who visit our office frequently express. I think, this is Turkey’s greatest asset, and it should not be squandered. IHSAN DAGI: Thank you for inviting me to this meeting. I think it is going to be a good platform to rethink Turkish foreign policy at the Rethink Institute. And it seems like Turkish foreign policy needs some rethinking. We, I think so far, had a general view of the Turkish foreign policy and how Turkish foreign policy evolved, especially in last 10 years. Basically we are talking about foreign policy of a ruling AK Party. In the past the conception of the Turkish foreign policy was somehow

different. We used to think foreign policy belongs to the state. So we used to talk foreign policy as of the state policy, independent of political parties and independent of political preferences. So political parties that came to power did not really have major differences about the main orientation of and implementation of major policies of Turkish foreign policy. Foreign policy was supposed to follow the tradition, the lines set up by the state bureaucracy, the military. So political actors were not really in the position to redefine foreign policy.

Of course they responded to the circumstances, and especially after the end of the Cold War, political actors, governments that were responsible came up with initiative to have an impact on the formulation and implementation of their foreign policy. This became even more evident under the AK Party rule. So we can safely talk on Turkish foreign policy as a formula implemented solely by AK Party – the government in charge and responsible of the Turkish foreign policy. This impact started in the late 1980s under the leadership of Turgut Ozal in middle and late 1980s. There economic scheme came into the picture


13

of Turkish foreign policy. Foreign policy regarded as an area to be shaped by Turkish security concern only. When Turgut Ozal started to add economic dimension to Turkish foreign policy, he was criticized for kind of watering down the seriousness of Turkish foreign policy. So with Ozal, new dimensions like trade, expansion of Turkish foreign trade economic actors inviting foreign companies to Turkey to invest, came in to the picture of making Turkish foreign policy. But in 1990s, especially in middle and late 1990s, the rise of political influence on foreign policy came to a “hold”. Especially, when Welfare Party under the leadership of Erbakan won elections in 1995 and he became Prime Minister. When he was Prime Minister, for instance, in 1997, he decided to visit Iran. It was his first foreign trip and it was a huge debate in Turkey. When his state visit to Libya again became the controversy in Turkey, because public and institutions in the country they are not really accustomed to idea that the government can pursue a foreign policy independent from preferences of the state establishment. So that was really background to the AK Party when it came to the power in 2002. It was extremely difficult for the AK Party to formulate and pursue its own foreign policy. So it stuck with major tenets of Turkish foreign policy like membership in NATO, being part of the Western Alliance, and seeking membership to the European Union. These were major parameters of Turkish foreign policy at the onset of the AK Party rule. When AK Party came to power it was really weak vis-à-vis the state institutions military, bureaucracy, judiciary, universities, civil society, media etc. The party was regarded as a kind of anomaly in the Turkish politics, not really representing genuine forces in Turkey. The party at the beginning, I think, felt tremendous insecurity vis-à-vis those institutions and prevailing mood of the society. So out of this insecurity the AK Party had to really perform well. Especially in two realms: economic development and democratization. The economic development was essential to AK Party to sustain support of the people that they manage to generate in 2002 elections. Second one was democratization. Democratization was important for AK party in 2002 because it was a survival matter for AK Party. All those institutions military, judiciary high bureaucracy treated AK Party as anomaly and exercise extra political power on political process and actors. Thus in such a domestic context AK Party needed an environment conducive to economic development in order to sustain its popular support and it needed an environment conducive to democratization. And there we had a foreign policy I think we all praised. The idea of cooperation instead of conflict, seeking alliances, mediation, engagement, non-zero sum prospective in Turkish foreign policy – they all came out of this search by the AK Party for security. The

Rethink Institute

14

priority of the party at that time was to expand its political realm in Turkish politics. For that foreign policy was an instrument to empower the AK Party vis-à-vis military, vis-à-vis judiciary and high bureaucracy in Turkey. So they abandoned the old paradigm of Turkish foreign policy based on security, skepticism, animosity or distrust towards the neighborhood. So we moved from being pro-conflict to cooperation; from security-centrism to economics, from hard power to soft power. These were really the features of AK Party foreign policy at the beginning. As a result in its foreign policy AK Party tried to minimize political problems with neighboring countries like Greece, attempted to resolve Cyprus question, started initiative to reconcile with Armenia etc. They tried to minimize political problems, and also tried to maximize political dialogue with every actor in the neighborhood and in the globe as a whole. We saw the policy of prioritizing cooperation over conflict. The tried to expand Turkish trade in the world and especially in the neighborhood. And they did, they did achieved a significant increase in the trade volume in the neighborhood. Moreover, in these early years under the AK Party Turkey opened up and increased social interaction in the neighborhood. Turks started to visit the Middle East, Russia etc. The notion of “zero problems policy in the neighborhood,” cooperation-based foreign policy, abandoning the siege mentality, were significant changes. Then I termed these change as a paradigm shift in fact. Because what I observed then was that AK Party was abandoning these old security-centric perspective that viewed environment as surrounded by enemies, and moving to a new perspective that saw in this neighborhood not adversaries but allies, friends, and partners. That was a significant shift. And that shift was important because that old siege mentality and conflict-centered foreign policy in the past securitized Turkish politics and served as a ground to justify authoritarian politics. So as Turkey engaged in the neighborhood pursued the policy of zero problems and tried to resolve those old issues such as Cyprus and Armenia. All these de-securitized Turkish politics enabling the party, the government and the people to deepen democracy and democratization, while releasing or relieving the AK Party from pressures of judiciary, military, and high bureaucracy. So that was really something new and revolutionary in the Turkish context. In that context, the main instrument that appeared being used by the ruling party was soft power. Turkey claimed to set an example in the neighborhood with its democracy, market economy, Islamic identity (having no problem with democratic experimentation – they are all fine) and trade, economy development, companies, think tanks were all around the neighborhood. So in those early years AK Party presented


15

itself as a soft power in the region, intent to set an example to be emulated. But after 2010 and 2011, what I see was that they shifted from soft power policy to attempts to coerce change in the Middle East. This was perceived in some quarters of the region as Turkey attempting to dominate the region or induce changes in the region. What happened in 2011? In 2011 the AK Party was at zenith of its power in domestic politics. A year earlier in 2010 a constitutional amendment was passed and it eliminated serious judicial and bureaucratic obstacles for the AK Party. After the constitutional amendment the AK Party leaders understood that they had total control over the state. This is not something bad; I have always advocated that civilian government should have ultimate and absolute power over institutions. There is nothing wrong with this, but that created a particular perception among the AK Party leadership and built their confidence that they can do whatever they want. That is important. Second, in 2011, the Arab Spring took place. The Arab Spring turned to be a challenge for the AK Party. But initially the revolutionary changes from Tunisia to Egypt and Syria appeared as an opportunity for the AK Party. They look like an instrument by which AK Party could induce change in the Middle East. From then on the AK Party started to think that instead of using soft power to influence regional developments they could revert to hard power elements, trying to coerce things in the neighborhood. But this Arab Spring story didn’t really go well. Turkey and the Arab Spring got stuck in Syria. And it turned out that the AK Party, shifting from soft power to hard power, did not really have means to materialize change in the Middle East by using hard power elements. So they realized their limits. This realization of the limits of the AK Party made them even further nervous and aggressive in their pursuit of change in the Middle East according their political preferences. Then came the counter-revolution coup in Egypt. This development also underlined the limits of the AK Party in the Middle East politics and showed that they are not really able to induce changes in the Middle East. They have certain limits and they cannot really go forward. But the reaction of the AK Party was not to rethink foreign policy in the Middle East, but rather turn inside and exploit foreign policy in order to maximize its political support at home. That was I think the strategy, which is being implemented at the moment. And I think it will continue, because in the next two years we will have three elections. As we approach to those three very critical elections in Turkey, I do not see Turkish domestic politics will cool down. I do not expect that Turkish foreign policy in the region would be revised after

Rethink Institute

16

seeing the limits. Instead these foreign policy issues are increasingly used for domestic reasons, which takes us to the place we started – the securitization of the Turkish domestic politics via foreign policy issues. This is what we see in Turkey at the moment and that really concerns me. Because that risks the gains of democratization Turkey experienced by making peace and cooperation in the neighborhood. Once Turkey feels threatened and insecure, it goes invert and justifies authoritarian policies domestically. For instance, the Turkish Foreign Minister commented on Gezi Park events that “they tried to make a coup in Turkey, they couldn’t, and then they moved and did it in Egypt”. So, that old siege mentality is coming back to Turkey, seriously risking democratic gains that Turkey achieved under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan, the current prime minister. Thank you. MICHAEL WERZ: I’d like to challenge Mr. Bilgin’s characterization of Turkey’s “zero problem policy”. While I appreciate your analysis and think you have a strong argument—saying that this active foreign policy produced leverage with regard to the domestic situation in Turkey during the early years of the AKP—ultimately, foreign policy is measured by its capacity to shape outcomes. After 10 years of this policy, one could exaggerate and say that Turkey has only two friends left: the United States and the Kurds. And that is not enough in a complex and instable neighborhood. From my perspective, the “zero problems” policy had been more ambivalent than you admit. There was always a tendency—and let me again exaggerate a bit for the sake of the discussion—that relates to the core of what we have been debating here: a culturally induced vigorous criticism of Israel, a religiously informed reluctance to talk about human rights violations in Sudan or Syria when there was still a close relationship between Prime Minister Erdogan and Mr. Assad, clear references to Ottoman colonial traditions and at the same time strong anticolonial rhetoric, for example when it came to the Palestinian conflict. At the same time, one could see the strong desire to increase Turkish influence within NATO combined with an astonishing role as spokesman for anti-Western attitudes in the neighborhood. It seems to me that, early on, there was a big desire in the AKP and its leadership to be recognized by autocrats and citizens in the region. But you can have it both ways only for so long. And what we have seen over the past two years is the fallout from a policy that ultimately lacked strategic depth and normative foundations beyond the notion that Muslim traditions are potentially superior to others. You rightly insist that the situation in Syria is complex. And I agree, it is very complicated now, but it wasn’t in 2002, 2003, or 2004. Assad ran an authoritarian regime with little to no respect for human rights, and he still does. However, the Prime Minster still described him as a “good


17

friend of mine” in February of 2011. In October of 2013 he called him a “terrorist”. I think such rapid shifts are owed to a religiously and culturally infused worldview that lead to misperceptions that have political consequences. QUESTION: Mr. Bilgin, you mentioned that Turkish foreign policy is primarily the work of Foreign Minister Davutoglu and one of the reason that foreign policy is so much restrained is because of the centralization of power in the hands of the prime minister. Do you think that for change in the foreign policy, that power need to be broken in some sense and do you see a realistic chance for that? FEVZI BILGIN: I do not envision a change of people. I think nobody knows what will happen in Turkey next year. We hope the best. But in terms of fixed assets, potential assets and what have you, these are still there and they could be utilized again and again as long as Turkish foreign policy is not used for domestic gains. That is the key. Whoever is doing it is not doing a favor to Turkey. QUESTION: Which course Turkish foreign policy will take in the near future? Do you think there will be a recap of zero problem policy? MICHAEL WERZ: That is not for anyone outside the country to decide, but Turkish society need to figure this out. However, I would argue that, from the perspective of Turkish national interest, the current situation is not sustainable. The country’s leverage in the region has decreased, which will, in the long term, affect the Turkish economic development that has driven much of the outreach to Central Asia and Africa. And it is clear that Turkish-American relations, which are still at the core of Turkish foreign policy strategy and Turkish NATO membership, need to be reinvigorated. Imagine only how Iraq or Iran would look at Turkey, were it not a member of NATO. I feel that this dimension is sometimes underestimated in public policy debates in Turkey and I hope that political leaders highlight this nexus more forcefully in the future. Again, you cannot have it both ways. It is easy to criticize the United States for having double standards in its foreign policy—sometimes the criticism is legitimate, and we are no strangers to that discussion here in Washington. But to try to be on both sides on so many issues is not producing results for Turkey. IHSAN DAGI: I have one point to add. The central question for Turkish foreign policy is at the moment is the Syrian question. Syria is very pressing for Turkey and it produced multifaceted problems for Turkish politics, Turkish social fabric, security of Turkey, let alone the image of Turkey not capable of projecting its power in the Middle East. The

Rethink Institute

18

Syrian question presents tremendous economic burden, security challenges, and ethnic challenges within Turkey. So priority in the near future will be how to handle the Syrian question. For that matter, I think Turkey is prepared to work with Western allies, such as the United States or NATO. But sometimes, these allies are criticized by our prime minister. But again, they are looking to Western allies to solve the problem and stabilize the region. While working with these Western allies and looking for a common ground, Turkish officials, primarily the prime minister, continue to challenge the international order, the UN order. When Erdogan speaks about the need to change the global order, he sounds like a revisionist leader in the region. So, it is really difficult to combine, on the one hand, this revisionist language, and, on the other hand, expect them to help solve the Syrian crisis. That is the big dilemma for Turkey. The government keeps doing that for political gains in the domestic politics, because Turkey is pushing to very important elections in the coming year. Elections are very important everywhere, but elections next year in Turkey are especially important, because Turkey will elect its first popularly elected president and the prime minister seems to be only candidate from his party. Thus, because of this domestic pressure, expect to hear such discourses in the coming year. MICHAEL WERZ: Professor Dagi, you made the case that Syria is relevant and might in fact be the most important issue for Turkey—and I agree with you. But the Prime Minister and the government seem to have dug themselves into a very deep hole with regard to Syria. Even now they are showing very little flexibility. I am not sure this is wise given the understandable reluctance of the U.S. administration and the American public to get involved in this crisis any more deeply. Because we might have a very unstable Syria with a nominal Assad government for some time to come. Given this scenario, what is your suggestion for a smart Turkish Syria policy over the next half-year or year? I understand that domestic issues may make inflammatory positions attractive, but doesn’t that mean that you are running a tremendous risk with regard to national security of Turkey just for domestic reasons? IHSAN DAGI: It is a tough question, and I am lucky that I am not in a position to decide. It is now too late. We have around 500 thousand Syrian refugees in Turkey. They spread out all over Turkey and they present significant demographic, economic, and security related problems for Turkey. Turkish borders have become porous. Fighting fractions come and go and this is a serious problem. The only thing that Turkey can do is to keep Kurdish peace and engage with Kurdish elements in Syria and also in Turkey. That is perhaps the only stabilizing leverage it can control. Apart from that Turkey has to deal with radical, militant, Al Qaida type of organizations active in Syria. Haw


19

can Turkey deal with this? Turkey itself became open to activities of those organizations. To reduce the risk of terrorism targeting Turkey, Turkey should look for ways to establish dialogue with Assad. Turkey is a target for both Hizbullah and Al Qaida at the moment. And they have not really started their assault yet in terms of exporting their terrorist activities into Turkey. Turkey has to consider the fact that it made mistakes about the longevity of Assad regime. I think the US was also expecting speedy fall of Assad regime. I think now everybody would be happy to see the current situation in Syria stabilized, including Assad. QUESTION: Michael, given the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the possibility of doubling refugees, what will the US do? Will the US watch Jordan and Lebanon collapse under the refugee pressure? MICHAEL WERZ: There is no appetite in the U.S. administration or the broader public to get involved more deeply in Syria. It was indicative how President decided to ask for Congressional support for his decision to engage in military action a few months ago. One cannot overestimate how sensitive this issue is domestically here in the United States. For that reason it is very unlikely that the U.S. will get involved in a more substantial way in Syria. But I don’t think that it is an option for the White House to stand by and look at Jordan and Lebanon running into deeper and deeper problems either. For that reason it will be important to step up all humanitarian and diplomatic initiatives and dedicate more substantial financial resources to the region. Everything short of a military intervention needs to be done to stabilize the Levant and provide security to its peoples. Such a policy is in Turkey’s interest, it is in Israel’s interest, and it is in the U.S.’ interest—and, most of all, it is in the interest of the people in Syria and the many refugees. Turkey is doing a fairly good job with regard to the refugees, but it should ultimately allow international NGOs to do some work as well. In my opinion, we have been too slow in the United States and in other countries to help refugees, provide aid, and help manage the crisis. Money has not been flowing quickly enough; UN agencies are overwhelmed. For me, it is unimaginable to see even greater destabilization in the Levant.

Rethink Institute

20

Session II

Turkey’s Middle East Conundrum

Cagri Erhan

Professor of International Relations, Ankara University, Turkey

Savas Genc

Professor of International Relations, Fatih University, Istanbul,

Turkey

Alan Makovsky

Independent Analyst, Former Senior Staff Member, US House

Foreign Affairs Committee


21

SAVAS GENC: So, in this second panel we are going to try to concentrate ourselves on the Middle East policy of Turkey and on Turkish foreign policy. In this panel we have, again, three speakers, plus one moderator. And we are going to begin with Professor Cagri Erhan from Ankara University. Then, Alan Makovsky is going to continue. And at last I am going to talk about one of the interesting field studies in the Middle East on Turkish foreign policy. So, Professor Erhan. CAGRI ERHAN: Thank you, Savas. Good afternoon everyone, I would like to start with thanking Rethink Institute for inviting me here for timely conference. In the first session we heard a lot about the Turkish foreign policy, how it changed in the last ten years. My main argument is that - contrary to what has been said in the first session by some of the speakers – I do not believe that the Arab Spring or the recent developments around us are the main causes of the failure of the Turkish foreign policy in its neighborhoods. I will say –as I said four years ago or five years ago – the same thing all and over again: the main argument, the essentials of the so-called “new foreign policy” were problematic from the beginning. In order to make an assessment of this argument I would like to remind everyone the main principles of the so-called “new Turkish foreign policy”. I am sure, many of the Turkish experts already know those.

In 2009, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu became the Turkish Foreign Minister and launched a new Turkish foreign policy based on six main principles. You can reach easily these principles at the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These principles are: (1) To strike a balance between freedom and security; (2) Zero problems approach (when you talk about the new Turkish foreign policy, many people think the only principle is zero problems, but it is only one of those six principles; (3) Effective diplomacy towards

neighboring regions (such as the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Black Sea, East Mediterranean); (4) Harmony with the global actors; (5) Effective use of international fora for Turkey’s priorities; and (6) Creation of a new perception of Turkey. Now, let’s look at these six principles and let’s try to understand why we have some shortages, some failures in our foreign policy. Because,

Rethink Institute

22

mainly - this is my evaluation - there are some real problems and contradictions between those principles. Let’s look at the first one - To strike a balance between freedom and security. If your neighbor is a dictator – Assad was a dictator 10 years ago; he didn’t turn to be a dictator just two years ago or three years ago when the Arab spring started – if you speak about freedom and democracy to him, how does he perceive your explanation of what is democracy and freedom? And look at the neighboring regions around Turkey. All those Arab Spring incidents erupted in republics. Tunisia was a republic, Egypt was a republic, Libya was a socialist republic, Syria is a republic. Why don’t you question that in the monarchies we do not see such an incident? And how can Turkey export the very notion of democracy to those countries and then keep good friendly relations with them? If your country is a kingdom, do you think the notion of democracy is a good thing for you or not? Or how a king in the Middle East when Turkish minister or prime minister is speaking about democracy, perceive this notion of democracy? Do you think it’s a good thing or a bad thing for him? Secondly, what if your neighbors do not like each other? Okay, Professor Dagi made a reference to Armenian-Turkish peace or reconciliation initiative. I also was a supporter of this process; it, unfortunately, failed. Not because of Turkish or Armenian sides’ reluctance, but because of Azerbaijani attitude. Because Azerbaijan is our neighbor, Armenia is our neighbor and how can you pursue zero problems with both of your neighbors when these two countries have a lot of problems with each other? Twenty percent of Azerbaijani’s soil is under the Armenian occupation, so you want to have good relation with Armenians, at the same time with Azerbaijanis, but they do not like each other. So from the beginning this was a problematic principle. What if your neighbors have problems with your allies? Turkey is one of the best friends of United States in the region, and they have been allies since 1952, a strategic partner, a model partner, whatever you call. We have high-level relations, but our ally – the Unites States - has problems with Iran. So when you try to have good relations with Iran, at the same time, is it possible to keep the same level of good relations with the United States? When Turkey and president of Brazil visited Iran in May 2010 and they signed the agreement with Mr. Ahmadinejad - then president of Iran - it was highly reacted by the United States. And just 15 days later the United Nations Security Council imposed new sanctions on Iran, in which Turkey and Brazil voted against it. Then Turkey was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. But at the end, we had to comply with the new sanctions. So, this principle also was problematic; and it is valid for Syria as well. Syria and United States had also many problems from the beginning.


23

Finally, what if the global actors have diverse objectives? One of the principles was to have a harmony with the global actors. What are the global actors? Are they P5 of the United Nations Security council? Yes, you may say: The U.S., UK, France, China and Russia. When we look at our region, they have a lot of conflicting policies - towards Syrian problem, towards Iranian nuclear problem, to energy balances in Eastern Mediterranean. So, how can you be in a harmony with all of the global actors at the same time, if they are conflicting with each other? You have to be either with this side, or this side. Or keep your own side and try to persuade them to come with you and pursue your position, or direction. Therefore I totally reject the notion that Turkish foreign policy was in a good order in a good direction with the new principle then this Arab Spring happened and we started to have some problems with our foreign policy. No! From the beginning there was a structural problem with this new Turkish foreign policy. And let’s look at the new instruments of the foreign policy. I have taken them from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs publications. I didn’t invent them, I just copied and pasted, here. These were provided as the main foreign policy instruments – multiperspectivity; proactive foreign policy line supported by a rhythmic diplomacy; presence on the ground, in particular during times of crisis; all-inclusive and equal distance policy; total performance foreign policy (cooperation with the business, NGO, etc.) These were given as the main instruments of the new Turkish foreign policy. Now, take Syrian crisis and apply it here. Which kind of instruments do you see that Turkey had used in Syrian crisis from the beginning - from the late 2010? Equal distance to all parties? Do you see it? Do you see all-inclusiveness in the Syrian crisis? Do you see presence on the ground? Yes, we are present; we hold meetings only with the opposition. These instruments were very well defined; when you read they sound good. It is new. It is totally different from the old times foreign policy. But when it comes to implement it, we didn’t use them. There is a saying in Turkish: “Hocanın söylediğini yap, yaptığını yapma!” - “Do what your professor says not what he does!” So when it comes to theory, it’s very good. But when it comes to application, we don’t see it; particularly in this Syrian crisis. Therefore, the reason for the current situation is the problematic nature of the essentials of new Turkish foreign policy. But it is not only limited to those. I may say a second reason is the miscalculation of Turkish capabilities or capacities. In the first session, it was quite interesting to learn that only six diplomats in hundreds of the Turkish representation can speak fluent Arabic. If you have only a handful number of diplomats

Rethink Institute

24

who can speak Arabic, you cannot pursue a healthy policy in Arab countries. How the Middle Eastern rulers perceived democracy and the Turkish model is a big question. We thought that “Turkish model” is a good thing for everyone in the region. For many opposition circles, liberals it was a good thing. They want a Turkish-type democracy in their countries. Or they want their country turn into a democracy, to have good relations with the West. But look at the rulers and their supporters. Not only those in bureaucracy, but also intellectuals. Let’s look at Saudi Arabia. Is Turkish model good for Saudi Arabia? If you go and ask the Saudi intellectual, what will he say to you? What about Bahraini? Or Qatari one? I mean, in Turkey we have such an illusion that Turkish model is something good; everybody wants Turkey to be leader of this region. No, it totally failed because of this misperception. Let’s ask ourselves, which revolutions or Arab spring incidents did Turkey supported from the beginning and which it did not? We supported revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, and we take part in operation in Libya, and we are a party in revolution in Syria. What happened to Bahrain revolution? Turkey did not say anything about it. And Saudis, Qataris, through the Arab League decision, they’ve sent their tanks and just pushed down the revolution. All opposition that gathered in the square called Pearl Square. There is no Pearl Square any more in Bahrain, they just destroyed it - not let to people come together again. So, Turkey did not give any reaction to what happened in Bahrain. Do you know why? Because Turkish economy needs a lot of indirect investment which means cash inflows, some percentage coming from Gulf countries. When you need Qatar money, or Saudi money, or United Arab Emirates, Dubai money, Bahraini money to come to Turkey and immerse in Turkey, can you criticize them? It’s not reasonable. If you do that or link it with something else as we recently witnessed in the Egyptian situation, when some of the Turkish, not the prime minister, but ministers or MPs started to criticize the Saudis for not giving support to Morsi, but having good relations with the new-comers, then some direct and indirect investments from Gulf to Turkey were put under threat. I will give a concrete example: The United Arabic Emirates Investment Bank just stopped investing in Turkey. Another reason for the current situation I think it is the internalization of the Middle Eastern developments. We at least in two years began to equate every development of the Middle East with our domestic politics. When I listen to Turkish TV I thought: “Oh, this coup did not happen in Egypt, but in Ankara.” Because we very much keep the links, the direct links, with it. I mean if you are against coup or you are against


25

democracy. So we lost our traditional balanced approach to the conflicting parties. Let’s talk about the apology and compensation and other things with Israel. We set the bargaining line too high, therefore after, even after apology, we couldn’t normalize our relations with Israel. And unfortunately, I said unfortunately, if this situation keeps continuing anti-semitism, will have some leverage, which in history we didn’t have. But if you keep Israel as a scapegoat for everything and if you are not satisfied with the apology and if you talk about the removal of Gaza blockade as a third precondition for the normalization of the relations, which is impossible currently, then some radical instruments or force will take advantage of this. Finally falling apart from the internal target, we do not give too much reference to the EU issue anymore, but we should not forget that the slowdown in the negotiation process bring Turkey closer to the Middle East and far from the EU. And we should not forget that the main motive behind democratization and reforms in Turkey was the EU candidacy and negotiation process. I personally do not believe that in 20 years or 25 years Turkey will become a EU member, but I do personally believe that without the EU anchor it is not easy for Turkey to go further with the reforms. So this should keep continuing. We need a reassessment and renovation of Turkish foreign policy. Apart from the intellectual value these six principles mostly lost their validity now. So we need to reassess and renovate. Internalization of Middle East developments for multiple purposes does not serve domestic tranquility, and Turkish foreign policy has been imprisoned by the Middle Eastern turmoil for three years now. Ankara should immediately resume its EU negotiations which made a genuine impact on democratization and transformation for Turkey. Thank you ALAN MAKOVSKY: First of all, I just wanted to say thank you to the Rethink Institute for inviting me to this very interesting session with these very eminent people in the field. I’m not sure I’m worthy, and I’m not sure I have all that much to add, but maybe just a few wrinkles. First of all, regarding the Arab Spring, I think I’d agree, it’s not completely clear—I think people can still argue—whether the Arab Spring ultimately will have good or bad implications for the Arabs. But I think it is fairly clear that it has had negative implications for Turkey’s relations in the region and for Turkey’s relations with the United States. Not all of this was Turkey’s direct fault. Turkey certainly had nothing to do with starting the Arab Spring, but some of the approaches that Turkey took probably exacerbated the problems. And also, I would just say that certainly Turkey’s problems with the region, and its problem with the United States regarding the region, have not been

Rethink Institute

26

spawned exclusively by the Arab Spring, but the Arab Spring has certainly highlighted and intensified those problems. And I think it (the Arab Spring) has hastened the deterioration of Turkey’s stature in the region over the past several years. One area where I might disagree a little bit with some of the previous speakers—I think with Cagri, perhaps a little with Michael, although I only heard the end of the first panel—is on how we periodicize this deterioration. Because, I think that deterioration really is primarily a phenomenon of the last 4 to 5 years, not the entire period of the AK Party government. Let me just list a few of the ways Middle East issues have impacted US-Turkish relations. First of all, just as somebody said in the previous panel that Syria is the most important issue today for Turkish foreign policy and for Turkey generally, it has also been the most important issue in US-Turkish relations and certainly so since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria.

I think there have really been two, maybe three areas of disagreement regarding Syria. First of all, from the very beginning of the formation of the Syrian opposition in an organized way, the United States has been unhappy that Turkey has been seen as primarily supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood element in the Syrian opposition, which seemed to be, indeed, the dominant element. For those of you who follow the Syrian issue relatively closely, you know that towards the end of last year, actually in December of last year, at US

initiative, a new organization was founded to supersede the Syrian National Council. It has a long name, but the shorthand reference is the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), and it was devised specifically to try to dilute the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey was not seen as a supporter of that effort. But when we’re talking about the Muslim Brotherhood, we have to say that the United States certainly saw them as a part of the legitimate opposition. However, a second problem, which I think a more serious one, has been the issue of the use of Turkish territory, particularly through the traversing of Turkish territory, by the Nusra Front and by similarly radical Islamist groups.


27

Now I think there is some disagreement as to why Turkey allows that. I think that some people say there are certain ideological affinities between Turkey and these radical groups. There are others who see Turkey as taking a very pragmatic view, which Qatar and some other states who sympathize with the Syrian opposition also took. When the United States first declared Nusra a terrorist group in December, the Turks said “Hey, why are we doing this now? OK, these may be bad actors, but they’re good fighters. Let’s get rid of Assad first and then we’ll sort out the issues of who’s a terrorist and who’s a moderate, and make sure that the good guys come out on top.” So that’s another theory about why Turkey may have been acquiescent to extremists’ using its territory. And yet I think there are also some who believe that Turkey saw Nusra extremists as a good club to beat the PYD with, the PYD being generally seen as a close affiliate of the PKK, sometimes seen as a subsidiary of the PKK. Actually in recent times Turkey itself, I think wisely, has opened up its own dialogue with the PYD. But for a long time, most of the time, during the Syria conflict, Turkey has been concerned about the PYD role, about its growing strength on the Syrian side of the Turkish border. And some people believe that the Turks wanted to use Nusra against the PYD. Whatever the reason, whichever of those theories is right, the use of Turkish territory by Islamist extremists has been a serious point of disagreement with the US. And I believe some people think this was, in fact, the major point of contention when Prime Minister Erdogan visited Washington D.C. in May. There is a third element of US concern regarding Turkish policy on Syria. There has been some suspicion that Turkey has been a cheerleader for strong action against the Assad regime—that is, strong US action--without Turkey itself actually being willing to shoulder responsibility. It’s been a suspicion. There was a very interesting Wall Street Journal article about the development of the US policy toward Syria, published about six or seven months ago, which said that Hillary Clinton, in June 2012, made a visit to Turkey to talk about the no-fly zone that Turkey had been advocating so avidly. And she discovered that Turkey really was not interested in participating in any way, even if the US itself were willing to do a no-fly zone. I don’t like to say one newspaper article proves everything, and, who knows, newspaper articles make mistakes, too, but my sense is that article was accurate insofar as it goes. And I think there has been a general feeling on the part of some in the administration that, regarding Syria, Turkey has not been willing to put its money where its mouth is. Look, I think, to be fair, we have to say that the Syria crisis has been a horrible situation for Turkey. It’s been repeated at this session—we don’t have to go into it again—everybody is familiar with the two

Rethink Institute

28

hundred thousand refugees in the camps, the possibly five hundred thousand Syrians overall now in Turkey. It’s not talked about so much, but I have to imagine that with all of the generals and admirals who have been indicted, and convicted and put in jail, I can’t imagine that the Turkish military is at its strongest right now and particularly that is in a good position to join in any kind of major action. Look how long it took for Turkey to respond recently to the shoot-down of a Turkish jet-fighter. By the way, I’m not saying these generals should or should not be in jail, that’s not my point. Societies can’t do everything based strictly on foreign-policy considerations. That’s not the point. Let’s grant they should be in jail, that they should be indicted. Nevertheless, it undoubtedly has an impact on a military when you remove so many senior officers in such a short span of time, so I don’t think Turkey is at its militarily strongest right now. And of course Erdogan, in reacting to Syria, was reacting very much to the Libya template. He was slow to join the US team on Libya. He finally came around; he did a one-eighty. On Syria, I think, he felt that it was going to follow a similar dynamic, and he got on the team earlier, not on day one, but quite early. He decided to align his policy with the United States view that Assad must go, only to discover that the U.S. policy that the Assad regime must go is simply a declaratory policy for the most part, not something that the U.S. would operationalize in any active way. There were other issues between Turkey and U.S. regarding the Middle East. Israel is an obvious one, which we could talk about for a long time. When Erdogan recently said that Israel was responsible for the coup in Egypt, the White House response was very strong: “offensive, unsubstantiated and wrong.” That was the strongest reaction that the U.S. administration has had to anything that Turkey has said so far. And I think it reflects not only the fact that what Erdogan said was an outrageous statement and could have had a rabble-rousing effect in the region, but I think it also reflects the administration’s building exasperation with Turkey over a number of issues, Syria being number-one, but also Israel and Iraq, where Turkey is seemingly intent on building a pipeline, directly to the Kurdistan Regional Government, bypassing Baghdad’s concerns. Turkey has bad relations with Maliki, which is a change from the days when Turkey was able to talk to everyone in Iraq. And I think Gezi Park also sent a negative message in terms of making it difficult for the U.S. to promote Turkey as a model democracy in the Middle East. Let me elaborate. Turkey and the US are fated to remain close allies. That will continue. Turkey is a strategically vital piece of real estate for the US, and I think it is very important for the United States to have a formal alliance with a Muslim-majority nation. And Turkey is, in many ways,


29

quite democratic. And the United States, for arms sales and many other reasons, remains critical to Turkey. But what has happened over the past several years (and I would really date it since about 2008) is, first, that the idea of Turkey as a model for the region, and, more than that, as an answer to our problems, America’s problems, with Islamist extremism, I think that idea has particularly eroded in recent times as a result of Gezi Park. Second, as we all know, President Obama has talked openly about his close personal relationship with Prime Minister Erdogan. Last year he listed him of one of five leaders with whom he “shares bonds of friendship and trust.” We know of all of the phone calls he made to the Prime Minister over the years, particularly at the beginning of the Arab Spring. I think we have to conclude from that, that Obama saw Prime Minister Erdogan not just as a friend and ally, but as an authority on the Middle East. That perception also now is inevitably eroded by the seemingly wrong bets that Turkey has made, primarily on the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. And so I think it’s not that the alliance will suddenly disintegrate, not at all, but I think it is coming under stress as some of the bonding elements—Erdogan’s friendship with Obama, the respect to Erdogan from Obama, even to the extent that despite Turkey’s problems with Israel, Obama and Erdogan maintained excellent relations—have disintegrated. I think these problems represent and encapsulate some of the challenges for the bilateral relationship in the years ahead. SAVAS GENC: I will try to tell you about our survey. On one side, we see that Middle East is changing after the Arab awakenings and, on the other side, Turkey would like to change its foreign policy in the Middle East. Some of the experts are discussing Turkish position with negative descriptions and some of them with positive. The groups who want to make a revolution actually are not all for democracy in the region. And the groups who would like to have democracy in the Middle East have a different perception of democracy. The main question of the survey is that how the Turkish foreign policy is perceived among the Middle Eastern elites. We used two different scales. Vertically, we distributed these elites according to ethnicity, such as in Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Israel and so on, or according to their religions or sects. And horizontally, we tried to distribute these elites according to their political preferences. For instance, if the conservatives in Syria are twenty percent of the population, we tried to represent twenty percent of conservative elites or Islamic elites. What kind of questions did we ask? We asked whether Turkey is neo-Ottoman or imperialistic? Are they in competition with Turkey in terms

Rethink Institute

30

of regional balance of power? How close did the foreign policy of zero problems with neighbors achieve its goals? Is Ankara following a denominational Sunni vs. Shia foreign policy in the region or not? We ask these and other questions. We did this survey between March 15th and June 1st, 2013. So, we have done this field study before the coup in Egypt, the chemical attack in Syria, and Gezi Park protest in Istanbul. But we believe that the perception of the Turkish foreign policy did not change dramatically after these incidents. But, of course they would make an impact on all questions and answers, so keep that in mind.

We had actually more than twenty questions, and I am going to talk about several of them, which are much more important. First question measured the perception of whether Turkish foreign policy shifted recently. About 40% of the Middle Eastern elites agreed that Turkey had begun to pursue a more balanced foreign policy with both Western and Eastern countries. The percentage was higher in Egypt and Palestine. 35% agreed with the statement that Turkey has moved away from the West and started to pursue an Eastern-oriented foreign policy. And

this statement was overwhelmingly supported in Israel, Libya, and Iraq. The rest claimed no change or little change in direction. The second question was, “Do you agree with the statement that Turkish foreign policy has come closer to Muslim world?” 87% said “yes” including Israel. But this answer is not enough to say something about it, since it does not tell us whether it is perceived negative or positive. Then we posed another question, “Do you agree with the statement that Turkey has begun to have more say in international politics? Again we can see more or less similar answers except Israel here, the total of 80% of the elites say “yes”. But, 30% of the Israeli elite disagreed that Turkey is becoming an important actor in international politics. The following question is about being the leader of the Muslim world: “Do you believe that the ultimate objective of Turkey’s foreign policy is to become the leader of the Muslim world?” As the Arabs would like to have freedom from their own dictators, I believe that this is something negative if Turkey perceives a leadership in the region. But, on the other hand, the countries or the regions like Palestine and others


31

might think that we need some leadership in the region. The Syrian opposition sees Turkey as a leader. We found that Libya (84%) and Israel (71%), including Lebanon (66%), Palestine (58%) think that Turkey has this motivation. A parallel question about the neo-Ottomanism of Turkish foreign policy or Turkish foreign policy decision makers: Whether Turkey acts as if the protector of the Ottoman geography. We asked this question because in some countries the legacy of the Ottoman Empire is not seen positively. So, Israelis (77%) and Libyans (72%) answered the question more or less by the same percentages, but I believe that their motivation is a little bit different. In total, more than 50% Arab elites think that Turkey has this aspiration. Only 30% of the Arab elites say “No”. Dominantly Egypt of course (52%), the leader of Arab world cannot say that they are part of the Ottoman Empire or think about this term positively. And the following question is whether “Turkey focuses on foreign policy goals which exceed its economic and military ability”. So Turkey in a soft power era used its instruments very well to have visa regimes with these countries, to increase trade, open the borders. This made a positive impact on tourism and so on. But, when it comes to hard power, the zero problems policy of AKP are in question. Since Turkey does not have ample energy resources to sell, it can only benefit from peace, freedom, democracy, which would bring more trade relations with the regional governments or states and such positive interaction can make a direct or indirect impact on Turkish tourism. Turkey earns its own money from this. So over 40% of the elites disagreed with the above statement while 38% agreed. The next question is “Which country would you name as the regional power?” It is surprising that Palestine elites dominantly said that Israel is the regional power (35%). In Tunisia (73%) and Libya (80%) we see that the regional power they see is Turkey, they are more or less the so-called successful Arab Spring countries. And in Iraq they get some positive answer from the Sunni Kurds and Sunni Arabs. But the Shi’a Arabs dominantly answer negatively no, not Turkey - Iran is the regional power. And In Lebanon we see dominantly that Iran is strong there. You see that if you ask a question about Iran and Turkey the answers come according to the sectarian references. Overall, 32% identified Turkey as the regional power, 25% Iran, 10% Israel. The follow up question is more interesting, “In 10 years, who is going to be regional power in the Middle East?” The percentage of Turkey is not changing much but that of Iran drops. In ten years most of the elites think that Iran is not going to be so powerful as it is today. The survey

Rethink Institute

32

was before “Rouhani” era, it was made during Ahmadinejad era. But even the elites who support or see Iran as a regional power the answer in the total “I have no answer and no idea,” but the elites who saw Turkey actually as a regional power they continue that in ten years Turkey is going to be an important state in the region. It is debatable of course. We don’t know what will happen there. We don’t know if Turkey can continue the economic success, but the picture is so today. Overall, 33% percent of the elites said Turkey, and 18% said Iran. Again another important question, which is discussed in scientific journals or in media outlets by politicians and experts too, is the Turkish model. Turkey has an aim to have Brussels as a model for reforming its own democracy. So we cannot talk about a unique Turkish model; but maybe an experience, Turkish experience with the Muslim society with secularism and democracy. That’s why we are asked the question, “Do you think that Turkish democratization or Turkey’s democratization experience can be source of inspiration in the Middle East or Middle East countries?” In total, we see that elites in the Middle East (67%) think that they can have something to get from Turkish experiments or experiences. In Iraq, there are some negative answers, much more than the other countries, but they are not over than 40%. They have the same forty percent because they have their model in Iran. Here we see again sectarian references. “Do you think that Turkey follows a sectarian – Sunni – foreign policy towards the Middle East?” The answers were shaped accordingly to elites’ denominational and ethnic origins. In Libya 95%, Israel 89%, Lebanon 60%, and Iraq 55% of elites stated that Turkey follows a sectarian foreign policy. Arab Spring countries like Syria, Egypt, Tunisia didn’t agree with this statement. But as we look at total answers “yes” is over 50%. It is one of the most important results that we find in the survey that I believe that Turkey should care about. The last question is about Kurdistan in the region, which is indirectly related to the Turkish foreign policy. We asked, “Do you think that there should be an independent Kurdish state in the region?” In total we see that more that 50% said “No”, 35% said “Yes”. For the people who said “yes” we posed another question. “If you say “Yes” then where should be the territories of the Kurdish state?” In Turkey, Iraq, Iran, or Syria, or a combination of them? 34% answered that the Kurdish state must be carved out of all four countries. Another 30% said it should be established on Iraq only. And last question is about Syria: “If you think that Turkey should be involved in the restructuring of the post-Assad period, which of the following internal systems of governance should Turkey provide


33

support for?” Dominantly the answer was a unitary democracy republic that protects Syrian territorial integrity (62%). In Lebanon we see something different: they preferred the Lebanon model (45%). And in Israel we divided opinions. But nearly in all other countries they would like to have a unitary and democratic Syria with territorial integrity. The second popular answer is dividing Syria into independent states established alone ethnic and sectorial lines (18%). Israel would like to have a divided Syria. I believe that because of security understanding of Syria - smaller three Syrias will be easier to deal with. So what can we say about all these? Each of unsuccessful revolution attempt returns to Ankara as a big problem. And as we see that there is not a monolith Middle East, and Turkey should take this into account. The Middle East elites think that Turkey has achieved its success by getting closer to Islamic geography. And the elites see that Ankara still tries to balance its foreign policy in the region. And as we saround Turkey, we don’t see well-organized nation states. We begin to see around Turkey some autonomous regions. In Georgia there are three to four different autonomous regions. In Iraq there are autonomous regions. Syria will have some autonomous regions there, and maybe in the other countries of the Middle East. This will have enormous cost for the Turkish foreign and security policies. QUESTION: There seems to be some evidence, that people in the Middle East are seeing Turkey as divided along sectarian lines, as Sunni-Shia divide, and I was wondering if Turkey itself in its foreign policy has been inching closer to becoming more of a Sunni power. And if there is, you know, I know that in the past it has, it mostly have stayed out of the Sunni-Shia divide and the regional powers were Saudi as the Sunni and Iran as the Shia, but is there some shift now? Is Turkey going more towards one side, is the AKP trying to preserve the divide in the AKP, is there some people who want to and some people don’t? SAVAS GENC: If we look before the Arab Spring era, Turkey had better relations with Assad and with Iran. The regime in Syria was dominantly Alawi, which is a part of the Shia, and Iran of course is Shia. Turkey actually cared about, before the Arab Spring, having better relations with these countries to make more benefit and trading activities. But after the Arab Spring era, it is different. But, I don’t believe that Turkey cares about Sunni-Shia divisions, they might be sensible about Islamism little bit. Turkey would benefit from the democratic countries. As I explained in my presentation, so if there is a democracy, if we can have a future perspective in the region, then Turkey can invest in the region. And Turkey can build better political and economic relations in the region. Also, with regard to energy dependency, Turkey cannot pursue a sectarian agenda.

Rethink Institute

34

ALAN MAKOVSKY: I will say something about the US perception. Prior to the Arab Spring, it was perceived that Turkey wanted to get along with everyone in the region. It wanted to be a diplomatic hub, in a sense. Once it came to be perceived, however, that Turkey was particularly close with Islamic groups, even with non-violent ones, such as the Muslim Brotherhood—in Egypt and Tunisia, and then of course in Syria—that perception began to change. People started to read back in time a little bit, to re-interpret, and they said, “Oh, yeah, you know, they interfered in Iraq, they tried to create a no-confidence vote against Maliki. That could have been a Sunni-Shia thing.” Regarding Bahrain, which Cagri mentioned, even at a time when Turkey really was reaching out to everyone, it stayed totally out of Bahrain. As far as I understood, the Shia parties there really didn’t have much of a relationship with Turkey. So, I think, because of more recent developments, people here in Washington have tended increasingly to see Turkey, as having a sectarian policy. Fairly or not. SAVAS GENC: As Prime Minister Erdogan called Ahmadinejad, “My brother, Ahmadinejad” to support Iran in nuclear crisis… ALAN MAKOVSKY: And he visited Najaf… He also made a deal in Lebanon in 2008, working closely with Hezbollah. Yeah, at that time, people didn’t see Turkish foreign policy that way, i.e., sectarian. Could I just make one more comment? I did just want to take on slightly, as a minority of one, some of the debunking of the “zero problems” policy. Cagri, you did it in a sophisticated way. In this town, though, it’s often joked about as if “zero problems” were something very naive, as if Turkey thought that all you have to do is to say that you want zero problems and you’ll have zero problems. And there is a joke, which accompanies that view, that says that instead of Turkey’s having zero problems with neighbors, Turkey has zero neighbors without problems, meaning that Turkey has problems with all its neighbors. But I really think that it’s the wrong way to look at it. I don’t think “zero problems” should be looked at as a policy; it was a slogan. It was a way of saying to the region, “We want to get along with you, we’re Muslim like you, we don’t see ourselves as better because we’re part of a Western alliance, and we want to do business with you, and we don’t want to interfere in your affairs”. And I think in those early days, I think it was a very effective policy, reinforcing the early years of the AK Party policy, which was activist and with an ability to mediate with parties. It’s when it became an interventionist policy—at least, when Turkish policy became interventionist—that was really the problem. Davutoğlu, believe me, is not a stupid man. He’s an extremely


35

bright man. I think he knows as well than anyone that you can’t just say “zero problems” and that means you’re going to have zero problems; it takes two to tango. But I think, as a slogan, for how it was initially understood, it was something that was effective. So, I just wanted to separate myself a bit from the others on that one. And I also don’t think it’s right to say that the initial phases of AK Party government foreign policy was a failure in the region, especially through the Gul years. It was, for the most part, quite successful. Even where I might have had my own disagreements with those policies, they generally worked successfully. CAGRI ERHAN: On “zero problems” approach, I’m sure, as you know it, the ministry, they has been updating it by each developments. These updates are visible on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is software that allows you trace back to the previous version of the webpages. When I used that I found out that the webpage about Israel was updated frequently in the last three years, and reached the current version. In 2009 the webpage read that “Historically friendly relations between Turks and Jews played an important role in establishment of current foreign relationships between Turkey and Israel”. You cannot find this phrase now. Another one reads: “Based on mutual benefits Turkish-Israeli relations developed in almost all fields recently, legal framework of bilateral cooperation is maintained by a series of agreements and quite a number of high level visits have been done. Turkish-Israeli relations with its transparent multilateral character as well as not direct the third country, continues to its improvement not only to serve mutual interest, but also to contribute to regional peace and stability”. This phrase also disappeared. ALAN MAKOVSKY: When in 2009 did you find that phrase? CAGRI ERHAN: In September 2009. ALAN MAKOVSKY: So, it’s eight months after the end of the Gaza War, which was the real breakpoint in Turkish-Israeli relations. Well, I have a feeling nobody in the prime ministry was monitoring the foreign ministry website! Turkey never defined who “the neighbors” were in the “zero problems with neighbors” policy. I don’t think Turkey intended it to be understood that Israel was one of those neighbors. Instead, criticism of Israel became one of the instruments for building relations with other neighbors, unfortunately. CAGRI ERHAN: How about Turkish-Syrian relations? In January 2012,

Rethink Institute

36

there was a call to Assad to listen to his own people and make reforms. But in August 2013 it’s quite different: “our policy vis-a-vis Syria, supports shaping of the future of this country in line with the legitimate aspirations of its people and maintenance of her territorial integrity.” And there is a justification for “zero problems” approach here, and it’s quite interesting, because most of the criticism for “zero problems” arises out the Syrian policy. They said here: “This is not due to a failure or inconsistency of our ‘zero problems approach’, but the approach of Syrian regime which through its actions made it impossible to continue good neighboring relations”. It’s our guilt, it’s their guilt. It’s not an academic explanation, unfortunately, I may say. And finally The Strategic Depth book was given a lot of references in this panel, and maybe some of you know it. In the early 2000s, just after the book was written, it was adopted as a supplementary book in the Turkish military academy, because it was perceived as a masterpiece of geopolitics and realism. And it is nothing to do with this “new Turkish foreign policy”. The six principles of “new Turkish foreign policy” do not exist in Strategic Depth. The book is different; it is a geopolitically oriented, realistic book. Just read the section about Cyprus, and then think about how a government, in which the foreign minister is a writer of this book, could pursue a very different policy about Cyprus, such as the Annan Plan. On the other hand, if you look at Strategic Depth it reads like this “even if not a single Turk is living on the island, Cyprus is still very important geopolitical target of Turkey.” So, this is, I mean, a very realistic approach, different than actual policy. ALAN MAKOVSKY: Turkey had reason to think that the US was going to take a much more aggressive stance towards Bashar al-Assad than it ultimately did. And part of the reason that Turkey was so forward leaning so quickly in its own Syria policy, was that it thought that the US was in lock-step and willing to do much more than it ultimately did to bring down Assad.

turkey’s foreign policy challenges - rethink · pdf filethe conference examined...

Documents