turkey and the kurdish problemaei.pitt.edu/58900/1/pw_30_en.pdfthe kurdish problem – i.e., the...
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Krzysztof Strachota
30
Turkey and The kurdish problem
new approacheS in the face of the Middle eaSt criSeS
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NUMBER 30WARSAWFEBRUARY 2013
Turkey and The kurdish problem NEW AppRoAchES iN thE FAcE oF thE MiddlE EASt cRiSES
Krzysztof Strachota
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© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies
content editorAdam Eberhardt
EditorAnna Łabuszewska
co-operationKatarzyna Kazimierska
translationMaciej Kędzierski
co-operationJim todd
Graphic design pARA-BUch
dtp: GroupMedia
MapWojciech Mańkowski
photograph on coverKrzysztof Strachota
pUBliShERośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. marka karpia centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, polandphone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl
iSBN 978-83-62936-19-9
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Contents
MAiN poiNtS /5
thE KURdiSh pRoBlEM. iNtRodUctioN /7
I. KURdS – toWARdS SElF-GoVERNANcE /11
II. thE MAiN ActoRS oN thE KURdiSh politicAl ScENE /14
III. thE KURdS – chAllENGES ANd thREAtS /19
IV. tURKEY’S AttEMptS to RESolVE thE KURdiSh pRoBlEM /21
V. thE cRiSiS oF tURKEY’S policY toWARdS thE KURdS – NEW chAllENGES /25
VI. thE KURdiSh iSSUE – thE oUtlooK FoR tURKEY /30
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Main points
• For almost ahundredyears (sinceWorldWar I and thedis-integrationoftheOttomanEmpire)stability–orrather, thepermanent threat tostability–hasbeenakeychallenge fortheMiddleEast.Oneofthecentralelementsofthisthreathasbeen the so-called Kurdish problem, that is, the issues thatcontinually arise between the states of the region and theKurdishminority living in the area, aswell as the tensionsamongtheindividualstatescausedbyarangeofissuesrelatedtolocalKurds.ThecountrymostaffectedbytheKurdishprob-lemisTurkey.
• The last decade has been a period of deep tensions and re--evaluations across theMiddle East, with both domestic aswellaswider,geopoliticalramifications.This,inturn,hasledtoarapiderosionoftheregionalorderthatuntilnowhaden-suredat least somedegreeof stability.TheArabSpringandthecivilwarinSyria(since2011)arethetwomoststrikingex-amplesofthechangingreality.ThereturnoftheoldpoliticalorderacrosstheMiddleEastappearsratherunlikely.
• In the context of the Arab Spring, little attention has beenpaid to thechangesundertakenbyboth theKurdsandTur-key.Inbothcasesthepastdecadehasusheredinsignificantinternal transformations, and in both cases these changeshavereflectedthebroaderprocessesoccurringintheregion.Whatismore,inbothcasesthesetransformationshavebeenanimportantfactordrivingfundamentalchangesacrosstheMiddleEast.
• Attheendof2012,theKurdishpeople(regardlessoftheirin-ternalheterogeneity)arethestrongesttheyhavebeenintheirrecent history: they havemanaged to take effective controlovertheareastheyinhabit inIraqandSyria,andtheyhaveobtained significant political andmilitary power in Turkey.
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Consequently,theKurdishpeoplearenolongerperceivedonlyasanobjectandatoolintheMiddleEasternpolitics,butareincreasinglybeing seenas an independent entity on the re-gion’spoliticalscene.
• The changeswitnessed in Turkey over the last decade havehadanevengreater impacton theregion:namely,Ankara’sevolutionarybutconsistentprocessofre-modellingthestateanditsforeignpolicy,includingTurkey’sgrowingengagementintheMiddleEast,withthehopeofsecuringthepositionoftheregion’s leader.Consequently,TurkeyhasadoptedanewapproachtotheKurdishissue:domestically,byliberalisingitspreviouslyuncompromisingpositionon theKurdishminor-ity,andinitsforeignpolicy,byidentifyingthe(Iraqi)KurdsasoneofAnkara’skeypartnersinregionalpolitics.
• TheprocessoftheempowermentoftheKurdishpeopleisnotcompleteyet,and itsoutcomecannotbeguaranteed.At thisstage, Turkey’s position on its ownKurdishminority leavesmuchtobedesired,whileAnkara’sachievementsinitsMiddleEastpolicyremaindebatable.Moreover,Turkey’sspectacularprogressinitsrelationswiththeIraqiKurdshasbeentintedbynewthreats,includingthosegeneratedbytheKurdsthem-selves.TheKurdishminorityandtheTurkishstatearebothsubjecttoandthemaincausesofregionaltensionswhicharedynamic,turbulentanddifficulttoresolve–astateofaffairswhichislikelytocontinuewellintothefuture.InviewofthescaleofthechallengesfacedbyTurkey,asolutiontotheKurd-ishproblemisnotonlyaconditionforrealisingAnkara’sre-gionalambitions,butalsoforensuringthecountry’sinternalstabilityand thenatureof the transformations.And for theKurds, good relationswithTurkeyarenecessary if theyaretomaintainandstrengthentheirexistingaccomplishments.Pastexperienceshows,however,thatalthoughthiswillnotbeaquickandeasyprocess,apositiveoutcomeisnotimpossible.
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the Kurdish probleM. introduction
TheKurdishproblem– i.e., the deep and on-going tensions be-tweenKurds and the countries inwhich the Kurdishminoritylives(Turkey,Iraq,Iran,Syria)–hasoverthelastcenturybecomepermanently inscribed in thepolitical specificity of theMiddleEast1.Toagreateror lesserdegree, theKurdsareactivelyseek-ingtoexpandtheirpoliticalpowers,includingcallsforindepend-ence. In order toprotect their territorial integrity and internalcohesion,thecountriesintheregionhavetreatedKurdishaspira-tionsasathreat,andhavethereforeactivelyopposedthem.
box 1. Kurdistan Ageo-culturalregioninhabited,noworinthepast,bytheKurdishpeople,whoconstitutetheregion’sdominantethnicgroup.ItincludestheeasternareasofTurkey,northernIraq,westernIranandnorthernpartsofSyria.Dependingonthemethodology,Kurdistan’sareahasbeenestimatedatbetween200,000km2and530,000km2.DespitetheKurds’richhis-toryandculturalidentity,‘Kurdistan’hasneverexistedasaseparatestate;untilthetwentiethcentury,onecouldspeakofsemi-autonomousKurdishprincipalitieslocatedwithintheOttomanandPersianempires,andlatertheKurdishautono-mieswithinIraq.ProvincesnamedKurdistancurrentlyexistinbothIraqandIran,althoughthesedonotcoverallthear-easinhabitedbytheKurds.InTurkey,meanwhile,theuseofthenameKurdistan,withreferencetothecountry’seasternandsouthernprovincesinhabitedbyKurds,hasbeencon-sistentlyopposedinordertomaintaintheunitarynatureoftheTurkishRepublic.Inthepresentarticle,thetermKurdis-tanisusedinitsbroadsense,anddoesnotimplytheregion’spoliticalautonomyorpowersofgovernance.
1 FollowingtheOttomanEmpire’sdefeat inWorldWarI (1918), thedivisionof its land (including the allocation of areas to the Kurds) was sealedbythe1923TreatyofLausanne.
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Theso-calledKurdishproblemisparticularlyvisible inTurkey.ThisisduetothefactthatTurkeyishometoabouthalfoftheen-tireKurdishpopulation(betweenafifthandaquarterofallTurk-ishcitizensareofKurdishorigin2).ThetraditionallynationalisticandcentralisednatureoftheTurkishRepublicmakesthisconflictparticularlypronounced,andthepossibilityofapoliticalsolutionto theproblemremainssmall.Since 1984,nearly40,000peoplehavebeenkilledinthetensionsbetweentheTurkishstateandtheKurdishminority,whilethecostoftheunresthasbeenestimatedatnolessthan$300billion.
Untilrecently, theKurdishproblemhadbeenquitesuccessfullycontainedbyall countriesacross theregion (includingTurkey).Thiswaspossibleduetothecountries’powerandconsistencyintheirnationalpoliciestowardstheKurds,aswellasthankstoef-fectivecooperationbetweenvariousregionalactors in thefightagainstKurdishseparatism.Overthe lastdecade,however,andespeciallyintheaftermathoftheArabSpring(early2011),therehasbeenasignificantchangeintheapproachtotheKurdishprob-lemacrosstheMiddleEast.Thischangehasbeenfuelledprimar-ilybyaseriesofcrisesandre-evaluationsintherespectivecoun-triesoftheregion.Theseareasfollows:theoverthrowoftheIraqiregime following US military intervention, which sparked theturbulentdisintegrationofIraq(since2003);ancivilwarinSyr-ia,ongoingsince2011;amountingcrisisinIran(causedbyIran’snuclearprogrammeandTehran’sattemptstoprotectandextenditsinfluenceacrosstheMiddleEast);andfinally,adeepre-eval-uationofgoalsinTurkey’sdomesticandregionalpoliciesfollow-ingthetakeoverofpowerbytheJusticeandDevelopmentParty(AKP)in2002.Allthissignalsanongoingandlong-termshiftintheregionalorder,whichatthisstagemakestheKurdsnotonlythekeyobjectofthesechanges,butis increasinglyencouraging
2 Estimatesrangebetween 11and25millionKurds,witha totalpopulationof Turkey at nearly 75million;moderate estimates suggest 13-19million.Formore,seeBox2.
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themandtransformingthemintoapoliticalplayer,especiallyinIraq and Syria,whereKurds exercise real control over denselypopulatedareas.
Over thepastdecade, theKurdish issuehasalsobecomea cen-trepoint inTurkishpolitics.TheAKP’spolicy of reforming thecountry’s political system (including a shift from a nationalistideology centred on the army to an ideology developed aroundcitizenshipandculture,particularlyIslamicculture)andariseinindependentgovernanceintheMiddleEasthaseffectivelyturnedtheKurdishpeopleintoasignificantpoliticalpartnerforAnkara.Thecomplicationslinkedtotheimplementationofthispolicy(thelackofpolitical consistencywithinTurkeyandanescalationofthecrisisinSyria)haveledtoanunexpectedexacerbationoftheKurdish issue inTurkeyandmade itakeyprobleminAnkara’sMiddleEastpolicy.Currently,itappearsthatbothTurkey’sinter-nalstabilityandthedirectionofitsdomesticreforms,aswellasTurkey’sfuturepositionintheMiddleEast,willdependtoagreatextentonasolutiontotheKurdishproblem.
box 2. the Kurds
TheKurdsareanIranicpeople(unliketheTurksandArabs),thevastmajorityofwhomareSunniMuslim(whichdistin-guishesthemfromShiitePersiansandAzeris inIran).MostoftheKurdishSunnisinIraq,TurkeyandIranbelongtotheShafi’i school,whichdistinguishes them fromHanafiTurksandArabs,aswellasthenewultra-conservativemovementsinspiredbyWahhabismandSalafism.Others adhere to Im-mami and Alevi Shiism, and Yazidism. The population islinguistically diverse (with Kurmanji and Sorani being twomain dialects), and shows historical and cultural heteroge-neity(includingsuggestionsthatZazaKurdsandYazidisfalloutsidetheKurdishethnicgroup).Throughoutthetwentiethcentury (andespecially in the last fewdecades) theKurdishpeoplehave beenundergoing a process of identity building,
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shapedbydynamicmigration(i.e.internalmigrationtolargeurbancentres,especially inTurkey,andeconomicandrefu-gee migrations to theMiddle East and theWestern world).
There are no reliable data on the exact number of Kurds.EstimatesplacethesizeoftheKurdishpopulationat30-45mil-lion,ofwhich13-19millionliveinTurkey(18-25%ofTurkey’spopulation),6.5-8millioninIran(7-10%ofIran’spopulation),about 6.5 million in Iraq (15-23% of Iraq’s population), and1.7-2.2million inSyria (6-9%ofSyria’spopulation).TherestoftheKurds live inothercountriesacrosstheregionandinEurope(including800,000inGermany).
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i. Kurds – toWards selF-GoVernance
Attheendof2012,theKurdsfindthemselvesinthestrongestpo-sitiontheyhavebeeninforacentury,thatis,sincethecollapseoftheOttomanEmpireandtheemergenceoftheso-called‘Kurdishproblem’.Sofar,despitetheirdemographicpower,astrongsenseof distinctiveness and sustained resistance to the centralist ac-tionsofTurkey,Iraq,IranandSyria(usuallydrivenbynationalistsentiments),theKurdshaveremainedpoliticallyweak.Thiswascausedby,amongotherthings,disproportionatepowerrelationsbetweentheKurdsandthemodernstatesintheregion,aswellasregionalcooperationinthefightagainstKurdishseparatism(de-spiteoccasionalshort-termtensions),andnotleasttensionsandseriousconflictsamongtheKurdsthemselves.
Currently,theKurdshavetheirownstateinsideIraq(anautono-mousregionofKurdistan,whichremainsafederalentitywithinIraq–seebelow).Theyalsocontroltheareastheyinhabitinwar-tornSyria,andforthelastyearandahalftheyhavebeenengagedin armed struggle against Turkey, which occasionally allowedthemtotakefullcontroloftheirterritory(atthelocallevel).
TheriseintheKurds’politicalcapacityandaspirationshasbeeninfluencedbyaseriesofprocessestakingplacewithintheKurd-ishethnicgroup,namelytheirpositivedemographictrends(par-ticularly the ethnic proportions inTurkey,which are changinginKurds’favour),aswellascontinuedmodernisation(including,rising levelsofeducation), thegrowingaspirationsof theKurd-ishpeople,andthematurationandstrengtheningresolveoftheKurdish elites3. Although at times complicated, the democratic
3 The twomain centres ofKurdishpolitical activity are the elites runningIraqi Kurdistan (primarily associated with the Barzani family) and theKurdistanWorkers’Party(PKK)togetherwithitsassociatedorganisationsthroughoutKurdistan.The formerhasexperienceofovereightyyearsofstruggle,andthelatternearlyfortyyears.Bothhavebeenengagedinlarge-scalesocial,organisational,andpoliticalactivity(alsointernationally).
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anddecentralisingprocesseswitnessedinthecountriesexercis-ingsovereigntyoverKurdistanhaveplayedanimportantroleinencouragingtheKurdishpeople.InthecaseofIraq,theUSmili-tary interventions in 1991 and 2003 imposed federalisation anddemocratisationon thecountry; inTurkey, thedemocratisationofthenationwasintensifiedundertheAKP;whileinSyria,thechangeshavebeenbroughtaboutbyacivilwarlaunchedonthebackoftheso-calledArabSpring4andfoughtundervaguedemo-craticsloganssince2011.
Kurdistan has also benefited from recent geo-political develop-ments in the region: a substantially weakened position of IraqandSyria,problemsinIran,anddifficultiesinpan-regionalcoop-erationagainstKurdishaspirations.TheKurdsmightalsobenefitfromthegradualcollapseoftheexistingregionalorder,especial-lyintheareaofnationalsecurity.AfterplayinganinstrumentalroleincreatingandsolidifyingtheKurdishAutonomousRegioninIraq,TheUnitedStatesispullingoutofitsroleastheregion’spoliceman,and thealliancebetweenTurkeyand Israel, seenasapillarofUSpolicyandakeyelementstabilisingtheregion,hascollapsed5.Dynamicchangesaretakingplaceintherelationsbe-tweenthecountriesoftheregion6,whilecrisesintheindividualstates are allowing radical Islamic movements and ethnic mi-noritiestoenterthepoliticalarenaasimportantplayers.Inviewofthegrowingchaosandcrisisofconfidence,theKurdsarein-creasinglybeingtreatedasavaluabletoolinthepoliticalgamesplayedbySyria,IranandTurkey,amongothers.Forexample,the
4 The mass-scale and turbulent political and social protests that sweptthroughalltheArabstatesin2010-2011,initiatingtheon-goingprocessofredefiningdeepideological,geopoliticalandpoliticaldevelopmentsintheArabworld(lastingachievementsincludetheoverthrowoftherulingre-gimesinTunisia,EgyptandLibya).
5 Fighting forastrongerposition in theArabworld, theAKPturnedTurkeyintoachampionofthePalestiniancauseandasharpcriticofIsrael’spolicies.
6 Examplesincludetheso-calledSunni-Shiiteconflict,i.e.,betweentheGulfStatesandtheirallies,andIran,SyriaandIraq;andSyriaandTurkey’stran-sitionfromcloseco-operationtobitterconflict.
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chaoticstateofaffairspresentinIraqsince2003hascontributedto the dynamic development of relations between Ankara andErbil (theadministrativecapitolof Iraq’sKurdishregion)at theexpense of previously good relations with Baghdad. FollowingtheoutbreakofacivilwarinSyriain2011,TurkeybecameavocalopponentoftheregimeinDamascus,whichendedthecountries’cooperationintheirfightagainsttheKurds(theso-calledAdanaagreementof1998),anddroveawedgebetweenTurkeyandIran,whichhasactivelysupportedDamascus.ThishasalsoincreasedtheattractivenessoftheKurds(especiallyinthecaseoftheIraqiKurds) to other countries interested in influencing geopoliticaldevelopmentsintheregion(includingtheUS,Israel,Russia,EUmemberstates,andPersianGulfstates).Theincreasedinterestinestablishingdialogueand cooperationwith theKurdshasbeenexemplifiedbyaseriesofstatevisits,includingofficialvisitsbythe head of Iraqi Kurdistan,Massoud Barzani, toWashington,Moscow,DohaandseveralEuropeancapitals,aswellasthemush-roomingofforeignconsulatesinErbil7.
7 Thewider context for today’s contacts had been created through severaldecadesofrepeatedinvolvementbyRussia(orrathertheformerSovietUn-ion), Israel and theUS, leading to speculationabout arms supplies to theKurds,especiallybyIsrael.
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ii. the Main actors on the Kurdish political scene
Currently,theKurdshavetwomainpoliticalcentres:theIraqire-gionofKurdistanandtheKurdistanWorkers’Party(PKK).
The former is a real Kurdish autonomous region within Iraq,whichwascreatedafterthefirstGulfWar(1991),bolsteredbythe2003AmericanmilitaryinterventioninIraq,andenshrinedintheIraqiconstitutionof2005(KurdistanisdejureapartoftheIraqifederation;however, it isde factoavirtually independentstate).Theareawasseparatedpolitically fromIraq,and incontrast toIraq proper, the situation in Kurdistan remains stable. The re-gionboastsawell-developedandfunctioningadministration,itsownarmedforces(atleast100,000troops,defactoindependentfromBaghdad);italsopursuesanindependentforeignpolicyandeconomicpolicy8,whichisperceivedasresponsibleandcrediblebyotherstates(includingTurkey)andbyenergycompanies.De-spiteobjectionsfromBaghdad,KurdistanhaswelcomedforeigninvestorssuchasChevron,Total,ExxonMobil,andGazpromNeft’,whichconfirmsErbil’scredibilityandcanalsobeseenasanex-pressionofsupportforKurdistanfromcountriessuchastheUSInaddition,foreigninvestmentprovideslong-termprospectsforthedevelopmentof an IraqiKurdistan independent fromBagh-dad.ThedominantpositioninIraqiKurdistanhasbeentradition-allyheldbytheBarzanifamily9;thepresidentoftheautonomousregion,MasoudBarzani,hopestopositionhimselfastheleaderoftheKurdishcauseoutsideIraq10andinthewiderworld.
8 Oneparticularmanifestationofthiswasthedevelopmentoftheenergysector.9 Since the beginning of the twentieth century, they have led rebellions
againsttheOttomans,theBritish,andIraq.TheBarzanifighterswerethearmyofanephemeralandpro-SovietKurdishRepublicofMahabadbasedinIran(1945-1946);afterthefalloftheRepublic,Barzaniwasofferedasy-lumintheSovietUnion.AfterreturningtoIraqin1958,BarzanionceagainheadedthepoliticalandarmedstrugglefortheindependenceofKurdistan.
10 In2011-2012BarzaniledtotheunificationofmostKurdishpartiesinSyria(resulting, in 2011, in the establishment of the KurdishNational Council
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box 3. (autonomous) region of (iraqi) Kurdistan – Kurdish regional Government
area: 40 643 km2 [the Kurdish autonomous region andBaghdad have so far failed to reach agreement on the sta-tus of Kirkuk province and parts of Nineveh and Diyaladistricts, all of which remain under Baghdad’s control].
population: 5.2million[lackofdataontheethnicmake-upoftheregion;alongsidethestronglydominantKurds,Kurd-istan is inhabited by Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidisandothers]11.
capital: Erbil(Kurdish:Hevler).armed Forces: officially 100,000 Peshmerga troops (formerguerrillafighters,nowcharacterisedasatypeofnationalde-fenceforceorinteriortroops;reducedfrom300-400,000around2005);thefiguredoesnotincludetheZerevani(themilitarisedtroopscontrolledbyKurdistan’smainpoliticalparties),northeAsayesh(theparty-controlledintelligenceagency).
ThemainpoliticalforcesintheKRGaretheKurdistanDem-ocraticParty(KDP),headedbyMasoudBarzani(alsothere-gion’spresident)andthePatrioticUnionofKurdistan(PUK)led by Jalal Talabani (the president of Iraq). The PUK wasformedfollowingasplitwithinKDP;formanyyearsthetwopartieswerepoliticalrivals,butnowtheyformthepillarsofthe rulingKurdistanList coalition).Kurdish Islamic groupsareseenaspotentialrivalsto/bythecurrentpoliticalestab-lishment.
madeupof15parties)andinIran(the2012allianceoftheKurdishDemo-craticPartyofIranandKomala).ErbilhasbeentrainingandarminggroupsofSyrianKurdslinkedtoKurdishNationalCouncil.
11 Source:KurdistanRegionalGovernmentwebsitehttp://www.krg.org/?l=12
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Selected consular offices and chambers of commerce are lo-catedinErbil:Egypt,theUnitedKingdom,France,Germany,Iran,Jordan,Palestine,Russia,Turkey,theUSA,Italy,Korea,Romania,Sweden,Greece,andtheUAE.
The second political centre is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party(PKK),aradicalnationalistpartyespousingMarxistideology.Formorethan30yearsthePKKhasbeenengagedinterrorist/guer-rillawarfarethroughouttheregionnowknownasKurdistan.ItsstrengthliesinthelevelofsupporttheyreceivefromtheKurd-ish people and in its organisational skills, as evidenced by, forexample, anetworkof localpartyoffices indifferent countries,andanetworkoforganisationsthroughouttheKurdishdiaspora,especiallyintheEU.ThePKKalsohasaveryefficientarmysta-tioned in Iraq’s QandilMountains (moderate estimates suggest3000-10,000militantsand40,000familymembersandlogisticssupport),whichisreadyforactioninTurkey,SyriaandIran.Al-thoughthePKKisregardedasaterroristorganisation(forexam-plebyTurkey,theEUandtheUSA),inrealityithasbeenviewedasapartnerinpoliticalnegotiations(includingtheTurkey-PKKnegotiationsheldinOslobetween2005and2011).Atthemoment,thePKKiscarryingoutalarge-scaleguerrillawarinTurkey,andhas seized political control over Syrian Kurdistan through theDemocraticUnionParty (PYD).This reaffirms thepowerof thePKK,aswellasitsattractivenessasapotentialallyorpoliticaltoolforSyriaandIran.
box 4. pKK – Kurdistan Workers’ party Strictlyspeaking,thePKKwasanillegalKurdishnationalistandMarxistpartyfoundedin1978byAbdullahÖcalan(akaApo), which was engaged in terrorism and guerrilla war-fare,predominantlyagainstTurkey(significantlyincreasingthescaleofitsactivityafter1984),butwhichalsooperatedinotherareasofKurdistan.In2002,thepartybecametheCon-gress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK).
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Inabroadersense–asusedinthepresentarticle–theKurd-istanWorkers’Partyisacomplexanddynamicnetworkofor-ganisationsoperatingasemanationsofthePKK,evolvedtore-flectthechangingcontext.FormalauthorityoverthenetworkliesinthehandsoftheKurdistanCommunitiesUnion(KCK;foundedaround2005),whichwasconceivedasaplatformforcivilandurbanactivityandanumbrellaorganisationforthelegislature (Kongra Gel), the People’s Defence Forces (HPG),and the judiciary. The PKK has been dominated by TurkishKurds,withtheFreeLifePartyofKurdistan(PJAK)andtheDemocraticUnionPartyofSyria(PYD)asitslocalbranches.Kurdishemigrantorganisations–especiallyintheEU(e.g.theKurdishNationalCongress[KNK]),aswellasactivistsofthelegalPeaceandDemocracyParty(BDP),operatinginTurkey–havebeensuspectedofcloselinkswiththePKK.
Despite its complicated structure, the substantial autonomyofthe individual organisations and occasional tensions and con-flicts, the PKK remains a coherent and effective force, capa-ble of organising and coordinating activities in various areas.ThePKKiscurrentlyheadedbyMuratKarayilan;Öcalan’sau-thority,however,isstillvisibledespitethefactthattheformerleaderisbeingheldinaTurkishprisonandhiscontactwiththeoutsideworld is limited tomessages sent throughhis lawyers,familymembersandvisitors.
ThePKK’s strongposition inKurdistanresults from theparty’ssizeable, professional, highly ideological andmotivatedmilitia,recentlyestimatedatanythingbetween3000and10,000fighters.ThetroopsarebasedintheQandilMountains,northernIraq,attheintersectionofthenationalbordersofIraq,IranandTurkey.NumerousattemptsatdestroyingtheirQandilstronghold(espe-cially by Turkish forces) have proved ineffective. PKKmilitarypersonnel are seen as the core of both themilitary operationscarriedoutbythePKKagainstTurkey,aswellasthebaseofthearmedforcesofSyria’sPYD.
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ThePKKhasbeendesignatedaterroristorganisationbyanum-berofgovernments, includingtheEUandtheUS(however, thePKKwasremovedfromAustralia’slistofterroristorganisationsin2012–amoveseenasareactionbothtoeffortstoimprovetheimageofthePKK,aswellasarecognitionofthePKK’simportanceintheregion).
Both political centres are competing for influence, butwithoutoverlooking the pragmatic importance of resolving the currenttensions,andbothhopetodevelopwaysofworkingtogether,es-peciallyinSyria12.Itmustbenoted,however,thatneithertheau-tonomousKurdishgovernmentinIraqnorthePKKhavedecidedtokeepupthenowcontroversialcallsforKurdistan’sindepend-ence: In Iraq, the political struggle between Erbil and BaghdadcentresaroundtheissueofrespectfortheconstitutionalrightsoftheKurdishminority,whileinTurkeyandSyriathePKKhasbeenofficiallydemandingextensiveautonomy.Nonetheless,thePKK’slong-termgoal(oftenomittedfortacticalreasons)stillseemstobeanindependentKurdishstate.
12 InErbil,on11July2012,BarzanioversawtheformalmergeroftheKurdishNationalCouncilandtheDemocraticUnionParty(PYD),theSyrianbranchofthePKK,intotheKurdishSupremeCouncil.Althoughthenewbodyhasnotbeenparticularlyeffective, themergerof thepartiessignificantlyre-ducedtensionsamongSyrianKurds.
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iii. the Kurds – challenGes and threats
DespitetheimpressivepoliticalachievementsoftheKurdishpeo-ple,andfavourableprospectsforgainingfurtherpowers,itisun-likelythatthecurrentstateofaffairswillremainunalteredforlong. Kurdistan’s problems are linked to the dynamics and thescaleoftheeventstakingplaceintheregion.InIraq,thebrew-ing conflict between the political leaders in Erbil and the cen-tralgovernment inBaghdadhasbecomemorepronounced; thisisheightening theprospectof amilitary confrontation13,whichcouldpotentially ruin thecurrentachievementsof theKurdishleaders.InSyria,avictoryfortheopposition(madeupofradicalMuslimsandArabs)woulddoubtless startafight for theresto-rationoffullcontrolovertheareascurrentlyinKurdishhands;meanwhile,avictoryforthecurrentregimewouldincreaseten-sionswithTurkey,deprivingtheKurdsofroomforpoliticalma-noeuvre. InTurkey, thespectaculardemonstrationof thePKK’sstrengthanddetermination isunlikely to translate into lastingpoliticalgainsinthenearfuture.Despitesignificantprogressto-wardstheconsolidationoftheKurdishpeople,divisionsandten-sionsbetweenthevariousKurdishethnicgroups–whichothercountriesoftheregionhavetraditionallycapitalisedon–remainamajorproblem14.Althoughnoneofthescenariosdescribedear-lierofferssecuritytotheKurdishminority,itshouldbestressed
13 2012sawanumberofseriousdisputesbetweenErbilandBaghdadovertheextentoftheirautonomy(regardingpoliticalandenergyissues)andoverdisputedareasaroundKirkuk.StatementsbyPresidentBarzanisuggestedsecession.TherewerealsoseveralseriousincidentsbetweenKurdishforcesandtheIraqiarmyattheregion’sborders.
14 IncludingtensionsinIraqiKurdistanbetweenBarzani’sKurdistanDemo-craticPartyandthePatrioticUnionofKurdistancoalitionledbyIraq’scur-rentpresident,JalalTalabani.ThelatterisintentonpreservingIraq’sinteg-rityandisastaunchallyofIran,whichcontinuestosupportIraq’sShiiterulers;radicalMuslimpartiesandpoliticalsocietieshavebeenoperatingonthefringesofthecountry’spoliticalscene.Inrecentmonths,SyriahasseenanumberofviolentoutbreaksbetweenthePYDandtheKNC.TensionsandconflictsarealsovisibleintheTurkishandIranianPKK(theTurkishPKKisbelievedtobebenefitingfromIran’ssupport,butitslocaloffshoot,PJAK,hasbeenstronglyopposedbytheIranians).
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thatpotentialattemptstobreakupanyoftheKurdish‘bastions’(i.e. their autonomous regionwithin Iraq, thePKKbases in theQandilMountains,or thePYD-controlledareas inSyria)wouldcertainly prove very challenging for any of the regional states,andwouldsignificantlycontributetoafurther,radicaldestabili-sationacrosstheentireregion.
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iV. turKeY’s atteMpts to resolVe the Kurdish probleM
When theAKP formed a government in 200215, Turkey entereda period of evolutionary but radical restructuring of the stateandarevisionof itsforeignpolicy.Consequently,theKurdsliv-ingbothinTurkeyandtheneighbouringcountrieshavebecameimportantplayersinthisprocess.
TheAKPstartedbyeffectivelydismantlingthebasisoftheKemal-istrepublic,andhasfocusedparticularlyonthepoliticalstandingofthearmedforces–seenasapillaroftherepublic,aguardianofthecountry’ssecularandnationalistcharacter–whichuntilthenhadremainedexemptfromthedemocraticprinciplesoftheTurk-ishpoliticalscene16.TheAKPalsosubstantiallydepartedfromtheideologyofanationalistrepublic,infavourofIslamandthecon-ceptof fundamentaldemocraticvaluesand the liberalisationoftheeconomy.TheshiftinTurkey’sdomesticpolicydirectlyben-efitedtheKurdishminority,amongothers.
Democraticchangesinthecountryputanendtothedomesticpol-icieswhichhadignoredtheexistenceoftheKurdishminority,ledtoagradualremovalofanti-Kurdishlaws,andsawunprecedentedmovestocondemnAnkara’spolicytowardstheKurdsinpreviousdecades.The liberalisationofpolicies alsopermittedpublicuseoftheKurdishlanguage,thelaunchofKurdish-languagemedia,privateorelectiveKurdishlanguageclasses,theuseofKurdishinprisons,andevenplanstopermittheuseoftheKurdishlanguage
15 Insubsequentelectionsin2007and2011,theAKPsuccessfullyexpandeditselectorate,furtherstrengtheningitspositionasTurkey’spoliticalhegemon.
16 Overa10-yearperiod,theAKPmanagedtoneutraliseinstitutionalinfluenceonpolicy-making(withthehelpoftheSecurityCouncil);italsoeliminateditsmainpolitical opponents, andgained influenceovermilitaryappoint-ments.Finally, it succeeded indiscrediting thearmy’spoliticalambitionsbyrevealingflagrantabusesofpower,includingprovokedandstagedactsofterrorism(theErgenekontrial),andattemptstoescalatetensionswithGreeceinordertocarryouta coup d’etat(theBalyoztrial).
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by local government officials in provinces inhabited by Kurds.The new policy towards the Kurdishminority reached its pin-naclewiththeannouncementoftheso-calledDemocraticOpen-ing(2009),andearlier(2005)bylaunchinginformalnegotiationswiththePKK17onapossibleamnestyforthemilitants,amongoth-erquestions.OneoftheconsequencesofthisnewapproachwasahighlevelofsupportfortheAKPamongKurdishvoters.
AlongsidethechangestoTurkey’sdomesticpolicies,theAKPgov-ernment also significantly revised the country’s foreign policy,especiallywithregardtoitsrelationswiththeMiddleEast–are-gionwhichtheTurkishRepublichadtendednot toengagewithtooclosely.UndertheAKP,Turkeyoptedforapolicywhichwouldlead to amore active and independent role in the region,withclear ambitions tobecomeapolitical leader in theMiddleEast,andinthelongerterm,toraiseitsstatusinrelationswiththeUS,NATO and the EU18. The new approachwas to be implementedthroughgreateropennesstopoliticalandeconomictieswiththecountriesandpeoplesof theregion.Domestically, theAKPhar-nessed discourses of civilisational ties (with the Islamicworld)andhistoricallinks(datingbacktotheOttomanEmpire),whichhas ledpoliticalanalysts torefer toAKP’spoliciesas ‘neo-Otto-man’.Onaregionalscale(bothfornationalgovernmentsandtheArabpublic),Turkeyhasaspiredtobecomearolemodelformod-ernisationanddomestictransformation,aswellasamediatorinrelationswiththeWest(especiallywithregardtotensionswithIran) and an arbitrator in regional disputes (especially, in thePalestinian-Israeliconflict).
17 Theexpressions‘PKK’and‘KCK’areusedinterchangeablybyboththeTurk-ishmediaandinKurdish-publishedmaterials.
18 ThisincludeseffortstotakeoverasarepresentativeofWesternpoliticalin-terestsintheregion,andtherathersuccessfulattemptstobeseenasastra-tegicpartner,ratherthanapassiveactor,intheEU’sSouthernGasCorridorfromtheCaspianSeaandtheMiddleEasttoEurope.
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Turkey’snewpolicytowardstheregionacceleratedthedisman-tling of the current system,whichhad guaranteed the region’sprecarious stability. By doing so, Ankara distanced itself fromthe US and effectively ended its alliancewith Israel (followingaseriouscrisisofconfidencebetweenthepartiesandpersistentpolitical tensions in bilateral relations, leading to a breakdowninmilitarycooperation).Ontheotherhand,Turkeyestablishedcloser tieswithSyriaand Iran, andbegan toworkcloselywithnon-stateactors, suchas theKurds,Hamas,and lateralsowithSyria’sarmedoppositionforces19.TheArabSpring,andespeciallytheoutbreakofcivilwarinSyria(2011),ledtoafurtherdestabi-lisationof the regionandalteredAnkara’s relationswith statesacross theMiddleEast (forexample,openhostility towards theauthoritiesinDamascus,anddeepcrisisinrelationswithTehranandBaghdad).
TheradicalnatureofthechangesandthestrengthofTurkey’sin-fluenceintheMiddleEastcanbeseenmostclearlyinAnkara’sre-lationswithIraqiKurdistan.Afterdecadesofconsistentopposi-tiontoeventheslightestsignsofseparatistambitionsamongtheKurds,in2007–thatis,afterofficiallyfreezingallrelationsbe-tweenErbilandthePKKforcesbasedintheQandilMountains20–TurkeyestablishedclosepoliticalandeconomiccooperationwithIraqiKurdistan.Kurdistan(subsumedunderIraqintradestatis-tics)hasbecome the leadingmarket forTurkishgoods (a sharprisefrom$2.8billionin2007to$8.2billionin2011madeIraqthesecond biggest importer of Turkish goods, after Germany). Thesamewas true for services and investment, especially in infra-structureprojectsandtheoilandgassector.Energycooperation
19 After unsuccessful attempts to mediate between the government in Da-mascusand theopposition in thefirstmonthsofprotests in2011.TurkeyofferedrefugeandsupporttothepoliticalandarmedSyrianopposition,andremaineditsmainbenefactoratleastuntilthesummerof2012.
20 Until2006,TurkeyhadnopoliticalrelationswiththeKurdishautonomousregion.ThedynamiccooperationbetweenKurdistanandTurkeycoincidedwiththe2007appointmentofAhmetDavutoğluasForeignAffairsMinister(thearchitectoftheneo-Ottomanpolitics).
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withKurdistanwill,inprincipleatleast,allowAnkaratodiver-sify itsoil imports (and in future, also itsnaturalgas imports).ItalsobolstersTurkey’sambitionstobecomeastrategicinterme-diaryforenergyimportstotheEU.Atthesametime,Kurdistan’scooperationwithTurkeysignificantlystrengthensitspositioninthebrewing conflictbetweenErbil andBaghdad.This isdue totwo factors: first, the region’s growing economic independenceand thepossibilityof economicdevelopmentwithoutBaghdad’shelp,andsecond,thepossibilitythatAnkaramightbecomeErbil’spoliticalprotector(anunprecedenteddevelopment).ThebenefitsofestablishingclosetieswithKurdistanhavecostTurkeyitspre-viouslygoodrelationswithBaghdad,andwiththegrowingthreatofanarmedconflictbetween IraqiKurdistanand Iraq’scentralgovernment,AnkarahasimpliedthatitmayhavenochoicebuttosidewithKurdistanintheeventofhostilities.ItthereforefollowsthatIraqiKurdistanhasbecomethemostspectacularandtangi-ble embodiment of Turkey’s new domestic and foreign policies:thatis,aclearbreakwithitspreviouspolicyparadigmtowardstheKurdsandtheneighbouringstates;theprojectionofeconomicinterests, resulting in a significant expansion of political influ-ence;andatangibleattempttorevisetheexistingregionalorderwithaviewtoincreasingTurkey’sinfluence.
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V. the crisis oF turKeY’s policY toWards the Kurds – neW challenGes
Problems with the implementation of Ankara’s new policy to-wards theKurdsbegan toappearasearlyas2009, andbecamefully visible in 2011 and 2012. The liberalisation policy towardstheKurds,andespeciallythelaunchoftheDemocraticOpeningprogrammein2009,encouragedfurtherdemandsbytheKurdsandledtoarathertriumphalistmood21,whichprecipitatedare-turntoacarrot-and-stickpolicybyAnkara.ThissparkedawaveofarrestsofKurdishactivistssuspectedofhavingtiestothePKK/KCK;around8,000peoplewerearrested.(Atthesametime,how-ever, thegovernmentcontinued itsefforts to increase thepres-enceoftheKurdishlanguageinthepublicsphere,includingthemediaandtheeducationsector).ThetensionswereexacerbatedbyparliamentaryelectionsinJune2011,seenbybothsidesasatestof their real intentions. Therewas clear frustration among theKurdswhenthemainKurdishpartyandtheAKP’smainpoliticalrivalinsouth-eastTurkey–thePeaceandDemocracyParty(BDP)–wasforcedtorunintheelectionsafterhavingbeensignificantlyweakenedbyearlierarrests.SomeBDPMPswhowontheirballotswereunabletoclaimtheirseatsandweresubsequentlyarrested.AllthishastranslatedintogrowingsupportforPKK’sarmedac-tivity(whichhadbeenincreasingsincethespringof2011).
Contrary toAnkara’shopes for a completedisintegrationof thePKK–signsofwhichhadbeennoticedinthepreviousdecade22–theorganisationhasonceagainshownthatitcontinuestowieldseriousmilitarypower(includingincreasinglymodernweapons,
21 Exemplifiedbylarge-scalecelebrationsheldon24October2009inhonourofPKKmilitantsreturningtoTurkey,whichcausedextremeirritationinAnkara.
22 ExemplifiedbythearrestofPKKleader,AbdullahÖcalan,hissubsequentcommitmenttoapoliticalsolutiontotheKurdishproblem,andthestrongsupportoftheKurdishpeoplefortheAKP(backin2011,uptohalftheKurd-ishelectoratehadvotedfortherulingparty).
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trainingmethodsandcombattactics)coupledwithbroadpublicsupport.Foroverayear,thePKKhasnotonlysurvivedrepeatedattacksbyTurkishforces,buthaseffectivelymountedoffensivesagainst government troops, periodically taking control of areasandroadsinsouth-eastTurkey.IthasalsocarriedoutbombingsoutsidetheareastraditionallyinhabitedbyKurds.Sincethesum-merof2011,nearlyathousandpeople(soldiers,civiliansandPKKfighters)havebeenkilledinthehostilities.
ThegovernmentinAnkarahasalsobeensurprisedbyunexpect-edlyhighpublic support for thePKK,andby theparty’sabilitytocapitaliseonthisdevelopment.Theseanti-governmentsenti-mentshavebeenfuelledparticularlybythearrestsoflocalactiv-istswithtiestothePKK,andtheviolentconsequencesofalarge-scalemilitaryoperationagainstPKKinsurgents.ThisinturnhashelpedswelltheranksofthePKKfightersbasedinthemountains,andcementedsocialresentmentagainstthestateapparatus.Ontheotherhand,thescaleofthecrisissuggestspenetration,oratleastgreatmutualaffinity,betweenBDPandPKK/KCKactivists–itcanbesafelyassumedthatmuchofthechargesbroughtagainstBDPactivistshadbeenbasedonsolidevidence;afterall,BDPmem-bershadoftenpubliclyvoicedtheirsupportforthePKK/KCK.ThechancesthatthegovernmentwillseetheBDPasapotentialpoliti-calpartnerhavethereforefallensharply,whilethelikelihoodoftheBDPbeingusedbythePKKhavemarkedlyincreased.OneofthemostspectacularmanifestationsofthePKK’sabilitytomobi-lisetheKurdswasahungerstrikestagedinOctoberandNovem-ber 2012 by groups ofKurds held inTurkish prisons (involvingseveral hundred people altogether): the inmates demanded therighttospeakKurdishduringcourtproceedingsandcalledonthegovernment toallowÖcalanaccess tohis lawyers (hehadbeendeniedthisrightsince2011).TheincidentwaswidelypublicisedintheWesternmedia,whichledtoaninterventionbytheEuro-peanCommission,andconsequently toconcessionsby thestate(althoughthegovernmentannouncedbothchangesregardlessofthe strike, thefinaloutcomewas interpretedasa clearwin for
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theKurds).ThemilitaryandpoliticalpowerofthePKK,asdem-onstratedlastyear,hasseriouslycomplicatedtheimplementationofAnkara’sliberalisedapproachtowardstheKurds–itopensupthegovernmenttoallegationsthattheirpolicieshavebeeninef-fective,itstallsthem,andtakesawaythegovernment’sinitiativeinimplementingthem.
However,thecircumstancewhichposesthemostseriousthreatto Ankara’s new approach towards the Kurdish problem (andmorebroadly,toitsentireMiddleEastpolicy)istheongoingcivilwarinSyria,whichbeganinthespringof2011andappearsfarfromover.ThewarisparticularlysignificantforAnkarabecauseTurkeyhad(indirectly)sidedwiththeSyrianopposition23;thisre-sultedinapoliticalconflictbetweentheTurkishgovernmentandtheregimeinDamascus,andbyextensiontheregime’ssupport-ersinTehran.FromAnkara’sperspective,thenegativeinfluencetheSyrianconflicthashadontheTurkishKurdsisnotsomuchanintensificationofTurkey’spre-existinginternalproblemasitisthemaincauseoftheproblem,andthereforeastrategicchal-lengeforthegovernment.Turkeybelieves–notwithoutgoodrea-son–thattherenewedPKKactivityinTurkeyisdirectlylinkedtotheSyriancrisis.ItalsosuspectsthattheactionsbetweentheSyrianandTurkishPKKfightersarecoordinated,andtheescala-tionoftensionshasbeenfuelledbythesupportthePKKhasre-ceivedfromSyriaandIran.TheassumptionthattheactionsofthePKKandPYDarebeingcoordinatedissupportedbythefactthatbothorganisationsoperateunderadefactosinglegroupoflead-ers,aswellasthefactthatthesizeablearmedforcesoftheTurk-ishandSyrianKurdsarepartlymadeupofprofessional troopspermanentlylocatedinIraq’sQandilMountains(forexample,thebulkof thePYD forces ismadeupof a 2,000-strongcontingentsentfromtheQandilstoSyriainthespringof2012).Inaddition,
23 Inspring2011,TurkeyofferedrefugeandsupporttotheSyrianpoliticalop-position(apoliticalbaseforthefutureSyrianNationalCouncil);sincethesummerof2011Turkeyhasprotectedandsupportedgroupsof thearmedopposition(FreeSyrianArmy).
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Turkishanalyseshaveshownthatabout30%ofthePKKmilitantskilledinTurkeywereofSyrianorigin24.Thereisalsosomeevi-dence that the PKKhas been receiving support fromSyria andIran:forinstance,theobviousandacuteconflictofinterests25;anamnestyforPKKmilitantsgrantedbySyriaatthebeginningoftheconflict(forexample,PYDleaderSalihMuslimMuhammadhadalreadyreturnedtoSyriafromtheQandilsin2011);thewith-drawalofSyriantroopsfromtheareasinhabitedbytheKurds(byJuly2012);reportsaboutIran’sdecisiontomakeitsbasesontheIranian-TurkishborderavailabletothePKK26;andfinally,there-portsabout theexpansionand increasedactivityof the IranianspynetworkintheTurkishKurdistan(oneofthespyringswasuncovered in late August/early September 2012). Viewed fromthisperspective,theriseofPKKactivityinTurkeyin2011wouldbetraythePKK’srealintentionstowardstheallies,andtheeffec-tive ‘autonomy’ for theSyrianKurds,granted in thesummerof2012,couldbeseenasarewardfortheircooperation.
Withalltheambiguitiesassociatedwiththeanti-Turkishactivi-tiesofthePKK,thefactremainsthatthePKK/KCKholdssufficientpolitical,socialandmilitaryinfluenceinsideTurkeytoberecog-nisedasaserious,endemicpower.Atthesametime,thekeyfac-torswhichincreasethePKK’spoliticalandmilitarycapacityandprovidesitwithstrongsupportareitsbaseintheQandilMoun-tains,andespeciallythenewpoliticalachievementsinSyriaandtheallegedbackingfromSyriaandIran.TheSyrianKurds’infor-malautonomyhasbeengettingstronger,thePKK’sfreedomtoact
24 InpartthismaybeduetothefactthatalargegroupofSyrianKurdsismadeupofKurdish refugees and their children fromTurkey,who relocated toTurkeyinthe1980s.
25 Turkey’ssupportfortheSyrianoppositionhasinevitablyledtoaconflictofinterestsbetweenAnkara,DamascusandTehran.Evidenceforthisargu-mentcanbefoundinthequiteopenthreatsmadeagainstTurkeybyIran’schiefofstaff,referringtotheconsequencesofTurkey’ssupportfortheSyr-ianopposition.
26 In contrast to the bases in the QandilMountains, these bases cannot bebombedwithimpunitybytheTurkishairforce.
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continuesto increase,andtheeliminationofautonomyappearstobecurrentlyoutofreacheitherfortheSyrianoppositionorthegovernment inDamascus (nordoes it appear tobeamong theirimmediatepriorities).Nor is it likely thatTurkeywouldbeabletocontaintheSyrianKurdsbymilitarymeans.Dueto thecur-rentlystrainedrelationsbetweenTurkey&thePKK,andDamas-cus&Tehran,theonlyactorscapableofsomewhatlimitingPKKoperationsinSyriaareeithertheKurdishautonomousregioninIraq(specifically,theKurdishNationalCongressinSyriabackedbyBarzani,whichnonethelessremainsunabletooffsetthePYD’sinfluence)ortheSyrianopposition27.Currently,thePKK’sunmis-takable sense of power, Ankara’s rejection of this fact, and themutual distrust and the dynamics of the recent developmentsrender the chances for a resumption of a political dialogue be-tweenTurkeyandthePKKratherremote(inboththeTurkishandtheSyriancontexts).
27 Syrian opposition forces strongly oppose the Kurdish calls for autonomyor federalism; Turkey’s direct influence over the opposition has also di-minished (at ameeting inDoha inNovember, theTurkish-backedSyrianNationalCouncilwasreplacedbytheSyrianNationalCoalition,whoseori-ginandcompositionmorecloselyreflectsboththerealbalanceofforcesinSyriaandtheinterestsoftheGulfstates).
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Vi. the Kurdish issue – the outlooK For turKeY
Turkey’spolicytowardstheKurdishminorityhasreachedanim-passe.TheKurdsarebecominganevermorepowerfulandinde-pendentpoliticalplayeragainstthebackgroundofthedeepeningpoliticalcrisisintheMiddleEast(inSyria,Iraq,andpotentiallyinIran).Ifthedynamicsoftherecentdevelopmentsintheregioncontinue,theformationofaKurdishstateinthecomingyearsisno longer justapipedream,particularlyas thecapacity tostopthisprocessbyforceisdiminishing.
ForTurkey,thekeyobjectivesatthemomentarethepacificationofthePKKwithinitsborders,followedbyapoliticalsolutiontotheproblem. Considering the armed offensive launched by the PKKandAnkara’smilitaryresponse,thechancesforapoliticaldialoguehavegreatlydiminished–partlybecauseanyconcessionsmadebythegovernmentatthisstagewouldbeseenaslossofprestigeandapoliticaldefeat.Thechancesforacompromisearealsonothelpedbyregionaldynamics (especially inSyria).Thematter is furthercomplicatedbythepoliticalcalendarshapingAKP’spriorities:theAKPisseekingspeedychangestotheconstitution,andisgettingreadyforlocalgovernmentandpresidentialelectionsin2014.ThisisforcingtheAKPtoseekalliesontheTurkishpoliticalscene(al-thoughinpracticetheAKPisinterestedintheextremenational-istandanti-KurdishNationalistMovementParty[MHP]),aswellasthevotesoftheconservativepartsoftheelectorate–theKurds’mainpolitical forces, theBDP andPKK/KCK, are opposed to theAKP. In the currentpolitical context, a repeat of theDemocraticOpening to theKurds is ratherunlikely, although it is clear thatsuchapolicycoulddistract theKurdishminorityawayfromthePKK.Thisapproachcouldalsobereintroducedduringfutureworkon the constitution. It canbe assumed thatAnkara couldobtainmoreroomformanoeuvreontheKurdishissueifthepositionoftheAKPweretobestrengthenedfurtherfollowingfutureelectionsandchangestothecountry’sconstitution.
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Turkey’spolicyonIraqandthelocalKurdshasalsoreachedadif-ficultpoint.Ontheonehand,theKurdishautonomousregioninIraqhas comeunderTurkey’s political and economic influence,and elevatedAnkara to theposition of Erbil’s protector againstBaghdad.Ontheotherhand,TurkeyisbecominghostagetoErbil’spolicytowardsIraqanditspolicytowardstheSyrianKurdsandthePKK; in effect, the region currentlyoffers theonly solutiontocounterbalancePKK’sinfluenceandtheonlywaytoinfluencetheKurdishminorityfromwithin.InIraq,theconflictbetweentheKurdishautonomousregionandBaghdadhasbeenbecomingincreasinglyseriousforatleastayear,andcouldescalatetocivilwar.This,however,wouldmeanamoreorlessopenconfrontationbetweenTurkeyandIraq(andindirectlyalsowithIran)inthenottoodistantfuture.Consequently,thefateoftheKurdishautono-mousregionwillbeasignificantdeterminantofTurkey’sfuturepositionintheMiddleEastandinrelationtothelocalKurds.
Aseriousandlong-termthreattothestabilityoftheregionwillcontinuetocomefromSyriaandthelocalKurdishminority,whoarecurrentlyenjoyingrealpoliticalindependence.Thisfactcan-notbeignoredregardlessofwhichsidewinsthecurrentconflict.If,followingthecivilwar,Syriaremainsinthehandsoftheoldregime,andiftheregimeacceptsandformalisestheKurdishau-tonomousregion,thatregionwill likelyhaveanexplicitlyanti-Turkishcharacter.If,ontheotherhand,theconflictiswonbytheopposition, formalautonomyfortheSyrianKurdsseemsratherunlikely(withtheexceptionofperhapsatemporaryagreement).SuchascenariowouldleadtoamilitaryconfrontationinSyria,resultinginaseriousarmedconflictonTurkey’sborder,withalltheconsequencesofsuchadevelopment(atleastintheareaofsoftsecurity,suchasamassinfluxofrefugees);alternatively,itwouldleadto thestrengtheningof the independenceofPKK’spseudo-state.So far, the instrumentsAnkarahasused to influence thesituationinSyriahavefailedtoreflecttheseriousnessoftheriskstheconflictcouldposetoTurkey.Ankara’sinvolvementthrougheithertheSyrianoppositionortheIraqiKurdswouldhaveatmost
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an indirect effect on thewar, andwouldnothelp it resolve theconflictinawaythattheTurkishgovernmentwoulddesire.Inthelongrun,anIraq-stylesolutioninSyriawouldbemorefavourabletoTurkey:namely,theoverthrowoftheregimeandalong-term,butnotnecessarilyformal,divisionofthecountry.Asinthecaseof IraqiKurdistan, this outcomewould force theKurds to seekasolutionbyengagingwithTurkey,andgiveTurkeyfarmorebar-gainingpower.However,thisisjustoneofmanyequallyplausiblescenarios.
Takingtheaboveintoaccount,onecouldspeakofaseriouscrisisinAKP’s ‘neo-Ottoman’policiestowardstheKurds:theproblemhasbeenexacerbatedbybothdomesticandinternationaldevel-opments,andopenednewareasofpotential conflict forTurkey–contrarytoitsintentionsandcapabilities.
Ontheotherhand–unlikeinpastdecades–thesituationintheregionhasbeenverydynamic,andthepowerstrugglesandcrisesoccurringintherespectivecountrieshavebeenwidespreadandlong-lasting,affectingtheregion’sgeopoliticalorder.Itisunlikelythatthesituationwillstabiliseintheshortterm;itisalsoimpossi-bletoexpectareturntothestateofaffairsof2010,letalone2002.Comparedtotherestoftheregion,Turkeyisnotonlythestrong-estandmoststablestate,butisalsoanationthathasstarteditsowninternalreformsandinitiatedashiftintheregion’sgeopo-liticalorder.Thisgivesreasontobelievethatthecurrentcrisisislikelytoleaveitevenstronger.Withoutadoubt,theKurdishissueremainsafundamentalpillarofTurkey’sMiddleEastpolicy,andanimportantelementofitsdomesticpolicy;inthiscase,however,therearenofastoreasysolutions.
KrzYsztoF strachota
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