tunnel operational control

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT

Doc. No. EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00220 Page i

Rev. D02

Control Sheet

IA/12-13/D/003/ST

Pre Contract Professional Consultancy Design Services

for AI Rayyan Road & AI Bustan Street South (P007)

AL RAYYAN ROAD

Al Rayyan Road

Junctions R6 Road Tunnel

Tunnel Operational Control Concept Strategy

Prepared by:

Doc. No.: EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00220

Rev. D02

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT

Doc. No. EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00220 Page iii

Rev. D02

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1.Purpose of Document ............................................................................................................................... 1

2. STAKEHOLDERS ....................................................................................................................................... 1

3. RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION.................................................................................................................. 1

3.1 Relevant Documents ................................................................................................................................ 1

3.2 Relevant Drawings ................................................................................................................................... 2

4. TYPE OF ROAD ......................................................................................................................................... 2

4.1.Junction R6 and R9 ................................................................................................................................... 5

5. TUNNEL SYSTEMS .................................................................................................................................... 5

6. USE CASE REVIEW FORMAT ..................................................................................................................... 5

7. SYSTEM ACCESS ....................................................................................................................................... 6

8. MODES OF OPERATION OF THE SYSTEMS (CONTROL HIERARCHY): ......................................................... 8

9. AUTOMATIC ............................................................................................................................................ 9

9.1 TMC .......................................................................................................................................................... 9

9.2. TOA terminal ........................................................................................................................................... 9

9.3. TOA terminal (Tunnel Service Building) ................................................................................................... 9

9.4. Smoke Control Panel (SCP) ...................................................................................................................... 9

9.5. Local control at individual equipment panels ....................................................................................... 10

10. USE CASES ......................................................................................................................................... 11

10.1.Fire Service ........................................................................................................................................... 11

10.2. Police ................................................................................................................................................... 15

10.3. Ambulance .......................................................................................................................................... 16

10.4. Road user ............................................................................................................................................ 17

10.5. TMC Operator ..................................................................................................................................... 19

10.6. Maintenance engineer ........................................................................................................................ 32

11. SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................ 37

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Doc. No. EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00220 Page iv

Rev. D02

GLOSSARY

CCTV Closed-Circuit TeleVision

EDP Emergency Distribution Panel

EP Emergency Panel

ERT Emergency Roadside Telephone

IRT Incident Response Team i.e. Emergency Services

TMC Traffic Management Centre

TOA Tunnel Operating Authority/Maintainer

TSB Tunnel Service Building

HMI Operator Interface

FDS Functional Design Specification

PMCS Tunnel Plant Monitoring and Control System

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

PLC Programmable Logic Controller

MET Metrological/Environmental/Traffic

MV Medium Voltage, voltage above 1000 Vac

LV Low Voltage, Voltage below 1000 Vac and above 50 Vac.

LCP Local Control Panel

LCS Lighting Control System

SCP Smoke Control Panel

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Rev. D02

1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose of Document This document represents the highest level of description of the interaction between stakeholders

and the tunnel systems. The tunnel systems are defined by the System Architecture layout currently

being developed by KEO. Individual Use Cases have a system architecture that depicts the minimal

path for data/voice to be transferred from point to point as outlined within this document.

2. Stakeholders The following parties use or hold a stake in the Tunnel systems:

Civil Defense

Police

Ambulance

SSD, MoI

Road user

TMC Operators

TOA/Maintainer(s)

3. Relevant Documentation

3.1 Relevant Documents

Document Number Title

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00209 Tunnel SCADA PMCS Control Concept

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00210 Tunnel TMC/TSS SCADA/PMCS Control Interface

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00211 Tunnel PMCS Smoke Control Panel Control Interface

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00212 Tunnel PMCS Plant I/O Control Interface List

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00213 Tunnel CCTV Camera Specification

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00214 Mechanical, Electrical and Systems General Specifications

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00215 Tunnel Pumped Drainage Installations

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00216 Tunnel Fire Safety Systems Specification

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00217 Tunnel Panels

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00218 Tunnel Cross Passage Doors

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00219 Tunnel Way Finding Signs

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00220 Tunnel Operational Control Concept (This Document)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00221 Tunnel Ventilation Control Concept

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00222 Junction R6 Road Tunnel Detailed Design M&E Systems

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00223 Contract 2 Underpasses Detailed Design M&E Systems

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00224 Not used

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00225 Underpass Pumped Drainage installations

Table 1: Document list

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3.2 Relevant Drawings

Drawing No. Title

EXW-P007-0201-JF-KEO-DG-00100-001

RAYYAN ROAD KEY PLAN M&E LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00106-001

RAYYAN ROAD FIRE SAFETY TYPICAL PLAN & SECTIONS (SHEET 1 OF 2)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00106-002

RAYYAN ROAD FIRE SAFETY TYPICAL PLAN & SECTIONS (SHEET 2 OF 2)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00107-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES LOCATION (SHEET 1 OF 8)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00107-002


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00107-003


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00107-004


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00107-005


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00107-006


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00107-007

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES SECTION (SHEET 7 OF 8)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00107-008

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES SECTION (SHEET 8 OF 8)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00201-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION 6 TUNNEL TU1 ILLUMINATED EMERGENCY WAY FINDING SIGN LOCATIONS (SHEET 1 OF 4)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00201-002


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00201-003


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00201-004


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00301-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 EDP, EP, CCP & TULDB LOCATIONS (SHEET 1 OF 7)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00301-002


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00301-003


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00301-004


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00301-005


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00301-006

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL- TYPICAL SINGLE EMERGENCY PANEL ARRANGEMENT (WITHOUT HYDRANT) (SHEET 6 OF 7)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00301-007

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL- TYPICAL INDIVIDUAL LIGHTING DISTRIBUTION PANEL (SHEET 7 OF 7)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00302-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 EDP, EP &CCP GROUP ARRANGEMENT (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00401-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET 1 OF 6)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO- RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET 2

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Rev. D02

Drawing No. Title

DG-00401-002 OF 6)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00401-003

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET 3 OF 6)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00401-004

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET 4 OF 6)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00401-005

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET 5 OF 6)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00401-006

AL RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL PA/VA CONFIGURATION (SHEET 6 OF 6)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00402-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 PA/VA SCHEMATIC SHEET (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00501-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 GENERAL FIRE DETECTION & WARNING (SHEET 1 OF 4)`

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00501-002


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00501-003


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00501-004


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00601-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VENTILATION LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 4)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00601-002


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00601-003


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00601-004


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00701-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 LANE CONTROL SIGNS LOCATION LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 4)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00701-002


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00701-003


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00701-004


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00702-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL PMCS/SCADA COMMUNICATION NETWORK SHEET 1 OF 1

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00800-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 CCTV CAMERA SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00801-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 CCTV CAMERA LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 5)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00801-002

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL CCTV CAMERA SCHEMATIC (SHEET 2 OF 5)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00801-003


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00801-004


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00801-005


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO- RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VAID CAMERA LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF

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Rev. D02

Drawing No. Title DG-00802-001 5)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00802-002

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL VAID SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (SHEET 2 OF 5)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00802-003

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL VAID CAMERA CONFIGURATION (SHEET 3 OF 5)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00802-004

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VAID CAMERA LAYOUT (SHEET 4 OF 5)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00802-005

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VAID CAMERA CONFIGURATION (SHEET 5 OF 5)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00803-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VAID CAMERA SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00901-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL ERT NETWORK (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00902-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL LHD DTS SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1 OF 2)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00902-002

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL LEAKY FEEDER (SHEET 2 OF 2)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00903-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00904-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL LANE CONTROL SIGN SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1 OF 2)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00904-002

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL DMS/LCS CONFIGURATION (SHEET 2 OF 2)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00905-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL IMPOUNDING SUMP VENTILATION SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00906-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL SCP GA PANEL LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 3)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00906-002


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00906-003


EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00907-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL TYPICAL SMOKE CONTROL PANEL LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 1)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00908-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL - CROSS PASSAGE DOORS (SHEET 1 OF 3)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00908-002

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL - TYPICAL CROSS CONNECTION DOORS (SHEET 2 OF 3)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00908-003

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL - DETAIL OF FIRE BRIGADE CONNECTORS (SHEET 3 OF 3)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-DG-00909-001

RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL - DETAIL OF FIRE BRIGADE CONNECTORS (SHEET 3 OF 3)

EXW-P007-0201-CD-KEO-DG-00212-005

Al RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL ATTENUATION TANK SECTIONAL DETAIL (SHEET 5 OF 6)

EXW-P007-0201-CD-KEO-DG-00212-006

Al RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL ATTENUATION TANK/PLANT ROOM INSTALLATION SCHEMATIC (SHEET 6 OF 6)

EXW-P007-0201-CD-KEO-DG-00208-001

Al RAYYAN ROAD UNDERPASS DRAINAGE CHANNEL DETAILS

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4. Type of road

4.1. Junction R6 The following table shows the type of highway carried by Junction R6:

Structure Junction Highway Highway Type

Road Tunnel R6 Al Bustan Street Urban Distributor Dual Carriageway Table 2: Type of Highway at Structure

5. Tunnel systems The tunnel is served by a number of systems, some of these essential and critical for the tunnel

operation.

Medium Voltage & Low Voltage Supply System (MV & LV)

Tunnel Lighting System (LCS)

Tunnel Ventilation System (Vent)

Tunnel Drainage and pumping system

Smoke Control Panels (SCP)

Tunnel panels (EDPs, EPs with hosereels, portable extinguishers)

Cross Passage Doors/Inter-bore doors

Fire Main and Hydrants

Public Announcement System (PA)

Video Automatic Incident detection System (VAID)

Linear heat detection system

Radio Re-Broadcast System

Emergency Telephone System (ERT)

Wayfinding Signage

Service Maintenance Telephone System

Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV)

Radio Systems and leaky feeder system

Traffic Management Systems, LCS/DMS, Weather stations, Tunnel Flooding detection, Traffic

Lights.

Fibre Optic Tunnel Communication trunk system

To visualise what range of systems are installed in relation to the tunnel, and the categories with

which the stakeholders will interact are listed below.

6. Use case review format The stakeholders each need to interact with the tunnel systems in different manners. These

interactions can be defined as use cases.

A use case will follow the format of:

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Objectives

Pre-conditions

Actions and mitigation measures

Post-conditions

Alternative scenarios

All use cases are accompanied by system architecture drawings particular to the use case. These

drawings depict the complete route of the signal in the integrated systems allowing system

integration and resilience tests to be drawn up.

7. System access Not all plant systems are accessible to all control interfaces. Below is a diagram (Fig. 1) indicating

which plant systems are available to which control interfaces.

Tunnel Ventilation

LCP SCPSCADA/

PMCSTMC AUTO

Tunnel Lighting

Tunnel Drainage

Electrical Systems

VAID

SCPs

Cross Passage

Doors

Wayfinding

Signage

PA System

Limited

Control

Fig. 1

Plant System Control Access

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8. Modes of operation of the systems (Control hierarchy): a) Local control at individual equipment panel.

b) Smoke Control Panel (SCP)

c) TOA terminal, (Tunnel Service Building)

d) TOA terminal, Traffic Management Centre

e) TMC terminal, Traffic Management Centre

f) Automatic control, (Non-incident controls)

This listing defines the levels of priority from the lowest (Automatic) to the highest (Local control) for

control of some of the systems within the tunnel. These are:

Tunnel Ventilation system

Tunnel Lighting system

Tunnel Drainage System

Tunnel Electrical Systems

Tunnel Fire/smoke alarm, VAID etc.

Tunnel ERTs, SCPs and EPs

Tunnel Cross Passage Doors

Tunnel Wayfinding Signage (Escape Signs)

Public Address system

Automatic mode is the default mode i.e. on absence of any other control mode requests, Automatic

mode will be assumed. In each mode if a higher priority mode is invoked by a control request for a

particular device, then the control request of the higher priority system will be executed.

On execution of a command the device status will remain the same until further request for control

is made. [Safety requirement]

In all modes of control all devices are monitored by the pair of Master PLCs and all events and

alarms are logged on a pair of SCADA duty/hot standby servers.

a) At the same time all data is passed to TOA for the attention of the TOA operator in respect

to plant availability status and maintenance issues.

b) At the same time all data is passed to TMC for the attention of the operator in respect to

tunnel traffic operational issues. In all modes of control the task of operational monitoring

and control of all highway devices remains with the TMC.

It is assumed that the services of the maintainer is available on a 24 hour per day 7 days a weeks

basis. The repair times for individual devices are of critical importance in order to maintain the

availability figures expected of devices.

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9. Automatic In Automatic Control all tunnel devices are controlled by a pair of duty/hot standby master PLCs. In

this mode these functions are executed automatically as listed below:

a) Air pollution control via pollution sensors and ventilation fans,

b) Lighting control through the dedicated Lighting Control Unit whereby the level of lighting in

the tunnel is adjusted in tandem with the ambient light outside the tunnel measured by light

photometers and internal photocells.

c) Drainage pumping control where the level in the attenuation tank is controlled by 3 pumps.

9.1. TMC In this mode the TMC traffic operator takes over the control of some devices in the tunnel via setting

up of emergency plans or directly commanding the devices on the TMC terminals.

In this mode the TMC traffic operator is NOT capable of controlling the Drainage Pumping Station in

any way.

a) TMC directly controls highway devices

Details of the requirements of each mode to be defined by TMC.

9.2. TOA terminal In this mode either the operator or the TOA maintainer will be able to access the systems and

control them by:

a) Putting the device into Maintenance,

b) Then accessing and controlling the device either at the panel or via screens on the SCADA

terminal at the TMC

c) Control of drainage pumps and valves (Divert flow/Inhibit pumps)

9.3. TOA terminal (Tunnel Service Building) In this mode either the operator or the TOA maintainer will be able to access the systems and

control them by:

a) Putting the device into Maintenance,

b) Then accessing and controlling the device either at the panel or via screens on the SCADA

terminal at the TSB.

9.4. Smoke Control Panel (SCP) In this mode the Incident Response Team would have accessed the Smoke Control Panel. The

following devices are available for control through the SCP:

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Ventilation fans

Cross Passage Doors

Lighting

Drainage pumping station (Divert flow/Inhibit pumps)

The Incident Response Team must request control on the SCP and must release control on the SCP

after having dealt with the incident. Only one SCP can be in control at any point in time. [Safety

Requirement]

9.5. Local control at individual equipment panels The maintainer should always put the device into maintenance before attending to the device at its

respective panel. (Subject to work permit procedures, H&S requirement) Once maintenance has

been completed control can be reinstated at the device panel. During this period access to that

device is not available at any other control level.

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10. Use Cases

10.1. Fire Service

10.1.1. Use case 1 Objective: Incident Response teams may if other communication has failed use one of the four

Smoke Control Panel (SCP)s located at the entrance to each bore at both portals. The Incident

Response Team officer can use the SCPs in order to control the ventilation fans at the fan stations

(0%, 50% and 100%), select impound/inhibit under the spillage heading on the SCP panel and

thereby containing the spillage in the impounding sump/inhibit the pumps and to set the lighting

level (Full or Normal).

An indication on the SCP will show which zone the incident has been detected in.

Precondition:

There is no other SCP in control of the tunnel. Only one SCP can be in control of the tunnel at

any one time. An SCP has a higher priority in the control hierarchy than Automatic Control,

TMC control and TOA terminals at both the TMC and the TSB, but has a lower position in the

control hierarchy than local control at the systems local control panel.

The power to the SCP panel is on and there is no fault indicated on the panel.

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Incident Response Team operate SCP

Maste

r P

LC

A

Maste

r P

LC

B

Fibre Optic

Ethernet Switch

Fibre Optic

Ethernet Switch

Ethernet

PLC

Data link

Fibre Optic

Ethernet Switch

Fibre Optic

Ethernet Switch

Maste

r P

LC

A

Maste

r P

LC

B

Fibre Optic

Ethernet Switch

Fibre Optic

Ethernet Switch

Data linkData link

Tunnel

LightingFans

Pumped

Drainage

Discrete I/O

SCPSCP

Actions & Mitigations: The Incident Response Team (IRT) Officer presses the CRTL REQ push

button on the SCP to take control of the SCP.

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The Control System checks that no other SCP is in control. Control is granted to the SCP by displaying

which SCP is in control. The other SCPs will also show which SCP is in control. The individual

equipments control buttons will light up indicating availability of equipment.

The Incident Response Team Officer uses the available equipment to manage the situation in the

tunnel. When complete the IRT Officer releases control from the SCP.

Post-condition: The SCP is released.

Alternative Scenario: The Incident Response Team Officer leaves the SCP without relinquishing

control from the SCP station. The TMC operator at the TMC can release the SCP in question remotely

by a password controlled function at the TMC terminal.

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10.1.2. Use case 2 Objective: The Incident Response Team makes use of the radio system in order to contact the TMC

traffic operator and other emergency services. The Radio Rebroadcast system provides repeaters for

wireless communication from within the tunnel to outside.

Precondition: The Fire service Radio rebroadcast system functioning.

TMC

Tunnel Bore

Tunnel Service Building

Dual Hot Standby Leaky Feeders

Incident Response Team

Base Station

TMC operator

Actions & Mitigations: None that relates to the system.

Post-condition: None that relates to the system.

Alternative Scenario: The Fire service radio Rebroadcast system is in a fault condition. The TOA/

Maintainer respond to the alarm and initiates repair.

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10.2. Police

10.2.1. Use case 1 Objective: Police personnel make use of the radio system in order to contact the TMC operator and

other emergency services. The Radio Rebroadcast system provides repeaters for wireless

communication from within the tunnel to outside.

Precondition: The Police Radio rebroadcast system functioning correctly.

TMC

Tunnel Bore



Police

Base Station

TMC operator



Alternative Scenario: The Police radio Rebroadcast system is in a fault condition. The Maintainer

responds to the alarm.

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10.3. Ambulance

10.3.1. Use case 1 Objective: Ambulance personnel make use of the radio system in order to contact the TMC operator

and other emergency services. The Radio Rebroadcast system provides repeaters for wireless

communication from within the tunnel to outside.

Precondition: The Ambulance Radio rebroadcast system is functioning correctly.

TMC

Tunnel Bore



Ambulance

Base Station

TMC operator



Alternative Scenario: The Ambulance radio Rebroadcast system fault. Maintainer responds to the

alarm.

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10.4. Road user

10.4.1. Use case 1 Objective: The road user only interacts with the system at a time of emergency. He/she can get in

touch with the TMC by mobile phone, by Emergency Roadside Telephones (ERT), by accessing the

fire extinguishers or by using the cross passage doors, all of which will raise an alarm except for the

mobile phone, to which the TMC operator must respond manually.

Precondition: The aforementioned systems are functioning correctly

The TMC Operator is Notified of a Hazard or

Incident by a Road User

TMC Terminal

Tunnel Service

Building (Ethernet)

PLC

Eth

ern

et

TMC Terminal

TMC LAN Ethernet

TM

C L

AN

Eth

ern

et

Mast

er P

LC

A

Ethernet

Ethernet

Mast

er P

LC

B

Ethernet

TSS Server

TSS Server

Emergency

Telephones

Fire

Extinguisher

Cross

Passage

Doors

Ethernet Switch

FO

Tru

nk

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

Actions & Mitigations: The operator at the TMC will receive an alarm/a call and/or indication on the

mimics. The SCADA system activates preset CCTV camera positions and the operator confirms the

incident or the operator confirms the incident by directing CCTV camera/s at the incident position.

The operator responds according to what he ascertains through CCTV monitors.

Post-condition: The TMC operator is aware of the incident and has acted appropriately.

Alternative Scenario: The TMC operator cannot ascertain the incident through the CCTV cameras. If

the alarm is persistent but no visible confirmation can be made through the CCTV system, then the

problem is a maintenance issue, due to faulty equipment.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.5. TMC Operator

10.5.1. Use case 1 Operator is informed of an incident via radio or

telephone message. Objective: Operator to locate incident to decide what action to take.

Pre-condition: CCTV/VAID availability the TMC operator will not be giving the CCTV output

monitors his full attention. His attention will only be turned to them if an incident is detected by the

system itself and alerts him. Dealing with an incident reported over a call from a radio or telephone

message means the system has not yet detected the incident and it may prove difficult to locate /

deal with. See elsewhere for details of communication with the TOA via radio and for details of how

an ERT is used to connect to the TOA.

Actions and mitigation measures: TMC operator to locate incident from either vocal description, or

if an ERT is used to make the call, the phone will be highlighted on the TMC Operator display when

the user opens the ERT door.

Post conditions: TMC operator successfully locates the incident using the CCTV/VAID system and

proceeds to implement a suitable action plan to deal with it.

Alternative scenarios: TMC operator is unable to locate the incident as the camera nearest the

scene of the incident is undergoing maintenance. The incident will be confirmed with the operator if

any one of the Incident Response Teams (IRT) confirms the incident on the ground.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.5.2. Use case 2 System detects incident, informs operator and

offers an appropriate emergency plan Incidents are detected by the system are by the following sensors:

1) VAID

a) Smoke

b) Pedestrian/animal in the tunnel

c) Objects in tunnel

d) Slow moving vehicle

e) Stopped vehicle

f) Vehicle wrong way

2) EDPs, EPs, SCPs.

a) ERT door

b) Fire Extinguisher door

c) Fire Hydrant door

3) Crosspassage doors

a) Door is open

Objective: Operator is alerted of incidents in tunnel e.g. Smoke

Pre-conditions: SCADA link to TMC and TMC operator terminal is available and the VAID systems

availability.

Actions and mitigation measures: If the incident detected is smoke, then the fans are shut down in

the relevant bore. TMC operator confirms the hazard is genuine on the CCTV monitor and not a false

alarm. If the incident is genuine, the TMC operator takes appropriate action relevant to the hazard,

by either accepting the proposed plans or directly taking over devices in the tunnel according to the

established procedures.

PMCS terminals display TMC Control mode.

If maintainer is known to be working in the tunnel then the operator informs the maintainer of the

incident by using the All Call facility of the maintenance telephone system or using the radio

system. This facility calls all maintenance telephones in the service buildings and in the pump

plantroom area at the same time, while in the tunnel the radio system will be used.

During contraflow the Vehicle Wrong Way will be deactivated.

Post conditions: If the incident is genuine, operator takes appropriate action relevant to the hazard

according to established procedures.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

The TMC Operator is Notified of an Incident.

TMC Terminal

Tunnel Service

Building (Ethernet)

PLC

Eth

ern

et

Cross

Passage

Doors

FO

Tru

nk

TMC Terminal

TMC LAN Ethernet

TM

C L

AN

Eth

ern

et

Maste

r P

LC

A

Ethernet

Maste

r P

LC

B

Ethernet

VAID

Indiv

idual C

onnection

for

Each Z

one

Air

Quality

Sensors

TMC Server

TMC Server

Emergency

Telephones Fire Ext

Alternative Scenario:

The plan chosen cannot be implemented because the devices needed for the task are not available.

A CCTV camera malfunction which leads to operator not being able to confirm the incident. In this

case the Operator has to seek confirmation from Emergency Services or Incident Response Team

Officer in or near the tunnel.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.5.3. Use case 3 Weather station/MET subsystem sets signals

automatically Objective: An incident is detected and signals set without human input e.g. Fog.

Pre-condition: The Fog detection device is operational and the communications link to SCADA/PMCS

is functional.

Weather

station

TCB Engineering Terminal

SCADA Servers

MET server

North

Fog

detector

Weather

station

Met server

South

Fog

detector

Tunnel Service

Building (Ethernet)

TMC servers

FO TrunkEthernet Switch

Ethernet Switch

Actions and mitigation measures: The Weather stations are located above the tunnel (2 off) each of

these is equipped with a FOG detector that is connected to the MET PC server subsystems. When

visibility drops below a certain level, the MET PC server subsystems will request the setting of the

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

reduced speed signals through the SCADA/PMCS to the TMC operator. The operator can confirm the

drop in visibility through the CCTV cameras at the weatherstation to verify the reduced visibility and

accept the request or deny the request. All actions will be logged by the SCADA system.

If the request is accepted then the TMC servers will then set the relevant ITS traffic plans.

Post conditions: When visibility is restored to an acceptable level, the signals are automatically

reset to their original state.

Alternative scenarios: Defective detection devices triggers signal setting when reduced speed

settings are not required. The request for setting of the traffic plans due to adverse weather

conditions can be confirmed through the roadside CCTV or weather station CCTV system, this will

also confirm if an false setting of traffic plans due to faulty equipment has been requested.

The TMC Operator is to deactivate device(s) and alert TOA/maintainers operatives to facilitate repair

of the weatherstations.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.5.4. Use case 4 TMC operator sets and clears plans to set Traffic

Management devices and signs. Objective: Devices show desired messages within desired time

Pre-condition: Devices required to implement plan are operational and not in maintenance or under

SCP control. Communication link between TMC Operator Terminal and display devices is available.

TMC Operator sets & clears Traffic

Management Signs and Signals

TMC operator terminal

Dual (Hot Standby)

TMC Servers

ITS Application server

Ethernet Switch

Ethernet Switch

FO Trunk

Roadside ITS devices for implementing

traffic plans controlled through the FO trunk

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

Actions and mitigation measures: Operator selects a plan on the TMC Operator terminal to execute

what display devices are required to be set.

Once implementing the plan has achieved the desired effect then the operator clears the plan so the

devices will return to their normal state.

Post conditions: The traffic plan is cleared and the control devices are set to normal values.

Alternative scenarios: The devices do not obey the plan selected. An alarm is raised at the TMC and

roadside maintainer is dispatched.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.5.5. Use case 5 TMC operator sets fans Objective: Fans settings change within desired time

Pre-condition: Availability of the TMC to fan system communication link. The fans must not be in

maintenance or under control of an Incident Response Team Officer at an SCP.

TMC Operator Terminal

Tunnel Service

Building (Ethernet)

PLC

Fan Controls and starters in LV Panel


TMC LAN Ethernet

TM

C L

AN

Eth

ern

et

Mast

er

PLC

A

Mast

er

PLC

B

Fibre Optic

Ethernet SwitchFibre Optic

Ethernet Switch

TMC Server

TMC Server

PLC

Fibre Optic

Ethernet SwitchFibre Optic

Ethernet Switch

FO Trunk

Field fitted fans

Actions and mitigation measures: The TMC operator implements fan override to 0% or 100%

output. The operator relinquishes control.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

Post conditions: Fans to return to automatic operation.

Alternative scenarios:

a) More than 2 fans are unavailable either defective or undergoing maintenance. This means

100% output ventilation response is not possible. An alarm will be raised at the TMC

Operator Terminal and TOA/Maintainers terminals. The maintainer to attend within 24

hours. The TMC operator will have to assess the risk of the situation and if deemed

necessary implement mitigating safety measures for continued tunnel operation.

b) Either the maintainer or IRT at the SCP take over control of fans. This will be indicated to the

operator at the TMC Operator Terminal. The situation where the maintainer takes over the

operation of the fans would be under an agreed procedure in response to a maintenance

requirement.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.5.6. Use case 6 TMC operator sets tunnel lighting Objective: The lighting level changes within desired time

Pre-condition: Availability of TMC to lighting communication link. The tunnel lighting control system

must not be in maintenance or under control of a Incident Response Team Officer at the SCP.

TMC Operator Sets Lighting

Lighting Management Unit

(LMU)

TMC OperatorTerminal

Tunnel Service

Building (Ethernet)

Eth

ern

et


Ethernet

Eth

ern

et

Mast

er P

LC

A

Ethernet

Mast

er P

LC

B

Ethernet

TMC ServerTMC Server

Ethernet Switch

Ethernet Switch

Ethernet Switch

FO Trunk

Actions and mitigation measures: The TMC operator implements an override to the lighting system

to maximum output. The TMC operator relinquishes control.

Post conditions: The lighting has been set to maximum and returned back to Automatic control

when the TMC Operator relinquishes control.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02


a) The TMC operator is overridden by the maintainer or by an Incident Response Team Officer

at the SCP. The TMC Operator will be made aware of this on the TMC Operator terminal by

visual alarm indication.

b) The lighting does not go to maximum and an alarm is raised at TMC operator terminal and

the maintenance terminals. The maintainer to attend within 4 hours.

c) Loss of power supplies A and B will cause the Lighting Controller to deselect the booster

lighting. Confirmation is sent back to SCADA/PMCS terminals.

d) Loss of power supplies A and B and loss of Diesel Generators will cause the Lighting

Controller to select Emergency Lighting i.e. Stage 1 Lighting. Confirmation is sent back to

SCADA/PMCS terminals.

e) In response to item d) the SCADA/PMCS must raise a priority alarm, as this is an area wide

supply failure and also loss of local supply facilities i.e. generators, the tunnel will have to be

closed (shut down) as emergency lighting and control facilities only will be maintained in a 2

hour window. The tunnel cannot be operated during a total loss of power situation. The

maintainer can be dispatched to try to restore the local supplies i.e. re-starting the

generators, however this cannot be guaranteed.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.5.7. Use case 7 TMC operator controls Public Address (PA)

system Objective: The PA system responds within desired time

Pre-condition: The TMC Operator terminal to PA speaker communications link is available and the

speakers are not in maintenance. The operator can select only one message.

PA

Control

TMC OperatorTerminal

Tunnel Service

Building (Ethernet)

Eth

ern

et


Ethernet

Eth

ern

et

Maste

r P

LC

A

Ethernet

Maste

r P

LC

B

Ethernet

TMC ServerTMC Server

Ethernet Switch

Ethernet Switch

The TMC Operator sets a PA message

Ethernet Switch

FO Trunk

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

Actions and mitigation measures: The TMC operator selects a preset message from a menu within

the TMC Operator Terminal and applies it to the 2 zones (One zone for each bore) within the tunnel.

The TMC operator selects to stop the message playing.

Post condition: The message is played continuously until the TMC operator instructs the system to

stop playing the message.


a) The message does not stop when instructed. Alarm is raised at the TMC Operator

Terminal and the maintenance terminals. The maintainer is to attend.

b) A message is played unsolicited. The operator will try to stop it. An alarm is raised at

the TMC Operator Terminal and the maintenance terminals. The maintainer is to

attend.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.6. Maintenance engineer

10.6.1. Use case 1 Setting of contra flow operation Objective: To set contra flow operation

Pre-condition: It is assumed that this scenario is covered by a risk assessment and a traffic control

plan such that appropriate Signs, Message Signs and speed limits can be set up by the TMC Traffic

operator including the deployment of traffic management control measures and plans.

Traffic Management set up by the appropriate authority.

All stakeholders are informed i.e. see section 2 on page 1.

TMC PMCS terminal or TSB terminal are available.

Contra Flow operation setting is NOT available at the TMC.

Vehicle wrong way on the VAID system must be inhibited during contraflow operation.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

TOA/Maintainer Initiates Contra Flow

Lighting

Management

Unit

FO

Tru

nk

Remote

Maintenance

Terminal at the TMC

Maste

r P

LC

A

Ethernet

Maste

r P

LC

B

PLC

Serial Link

Eth

ern

et

TCB Engineering Terminal

SCADA Servers

Eth

ern

et

Ethernet

Eth

ern

et

Ethernet

Switch

Ethernet

Switch

Actions & Mitigations:

The maintainer/operator at the TOA/Maintainer terminal chooses Contra Flow operation for a

particular bore. Lighting Controller will adjust portal lighting and internal lighting.

Post-condition: It is assumed that this operation is an extended scenario and the return to normal

operation is described within a formal plan/procedure of execution, it will therefore not be

described here.

Alternative Scenario: Very little possibility for alternative scenarios, since these are major

operations and as such should be covered by major repair planning operation.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

10.6.2. Use case 2 Non-automatic device/system control during

maintenance Objective: To Monitor and Control tunnel devices via SCADA and at the equipment panels. Devices

available for control purposes are:

Ventilation fans at the Motor Control Centres

Cross passage doors at the EDP/EP

Lighting at the LCP

Public Address system PA System rack

Attenuation tank pumping station at the midpoint sump plantroom.

Pre-condition: The planning of an operation must not be taking out plant that may be detrimental to

setting of an emergency plan or if it does then procedures are required to be in place allowing the

operator to reinstate the systems at short notice. [Safety Requirement] Each type of plant has its

own effect on the emergency plans and therefore procedures must be developed to cater for each

type of equipment/system. The FDS should help in determining the consequence of plant

unavailability, so that maximum limits can be set. This is off course not always possible and therefore

we have another case if the maintainer Infringes on the minimum plant availability.

Infringe

Infringe means the tunnel systems lack of availability to perform the tasks required to ensure the

road safety to all attending stakeholders at the tunnel during an incident.

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

Advise TMC Operator

Maintainer to provide Method statement & risk assessment

Infringe Scenario (See below for process chart)

TMC to issue Work Permit

SCADA terminal in TSB & TMC is used.

The equipment is put into

Maintenance and indicated on the

system availability whiteboard.

Carry out maintenance

Procedures for Work Permits to be defined

Sign work permit off as complete

END

Can the equipment

be returned back

into operational

condition?

Sign work permit off as incomplete

Yes

No

Non-Infringe Scenario

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

Post-condition:

1. Equipment to be reinstated back into operation.

2. The operator is informed as to which systems are taken out for maintenance in all stages

of the maintainers work, through the TMC/PMCS system within a set period (Critical

response time) [Safety Requirement].

3. Mitigation measures have to be defined in the Operations manual when extended

maintenance/repair time is required.

Alternative scenario:

Equipment cannot be put back into operation. In case of infringement of the system

availability the Operations & Maintenance manuals should include advice/mitigation

measures for tunnel operation with reduced system availability.

Mitigation measures for the operator to be worked out e.g. reduce speed limit.

If incident occurs when the maintainer is on site, the operator has the duty of care to inform

the maintainer by maintenance telephones All Call facility and/or the radio system. [Safety

Requirement]

Infringe Scenario

Advise TMC Operator

TMC Operator puts the mitigation measures in place (Operation manual)

Operational procedures for every eventuality need to be in place beforehand in the OPERATIONS manual.

TMC Operator informs the TOA maintainer under which conditions he can proceed

Back to Non-Infringe scenario

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT


Rev. D02

11. Summary This document has been compiled to provide a framework for the further development of the

system topology/hierarchy and to provide a guide for the TMC operator in his compilation of

mitigation measures and operational traffic procedures and plans.

It is anticipated that the document will be further developed as tunnel system providers are

appointed and requirement clarifications are developed by Ashghal/TMC/Maintainers.