tullos v. 12th man foundation 7-19-13

Cause Number: 2011-70365

TOM G. TULLOS ANDDELMA C. TULLOS

vs.

TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY12th MAN FOUNDATION a/k/aTHE 12th MAN FOUNDATION

§§§§§§§§

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

334TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FOURTH AMENDED

ORIGINAL PETITION OF PLAINTIFFS

Now come Tom G. Tullos and Delma C. Tullos, “plaintiffs,”

complaining of Texas A&M University 12th Man Foundation, a/k/a The

12th Man Foundation (“defendant”), and would show:

I.

DISCOVERY LEVEL

Pursuant to Rules 190.1 and 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure, discovery is intended in this lawsuit to be conducted under

Level 3.

II.

PARTIES

Plaintiffs are and have been citizens of the State of Texas at all

times material hereto.

Defendant is a corporation doing business in the State of Texas.

Defendant was served with citation herein by serving W. Miles Marks,

its registered agent for service of process, at Joe Routt Blvd. at Clark

Street, Texas A&M University Campus, College Station, Texas, 77843.

Defendant has previously appeared and answered herein; accordingly,

no service of citation is requested at this time.

III.

VENUE

Venue is proper in Harris County, Texas under § 15.002(a)(1) of

the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because all or a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

made the basis of this lawsuit occurred in Harris County, Texas (“Harris

County”). In particular, at the time plaintiffs were solicited by

defendant to enter the agreement involved in this suit, they were

residents of Harris County. When defendant telephonically made

representations to plaintiff Tom Tullos regarding the details of the

benefits which are made the basis of this claim, plaintiffs were located

in and resided in Harris County. Thereafter, defendant mailed written

materials summarizing the agreement to plaintiffs at their residence in

Harris County, where plaintiffs received them. In reliance upon the

representations made and the written materials sent, plaintiffs, while

located in and residing in Harris County, mailed to defendant their

initial payments under the agreement. Following that, defendant

mailed to plaintiffs at their residence in Harris County receipts for

those payments plus a writing to be signed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs

received, signed, and returned the writing to defendant while they

were residing in Harris County. Over the next few years, all of the

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Original Petition of 27

remaining payments due from plaintiffs were mailed to defendant

from, and while plaintiffs resided in, Harris County. Thus, plaintiffs’

entire performance of their financial obligations under the agreement

occurred in Harris County and while plaintiffs were residents of Harris

County. Before, during, and after this performance by plaintiffs,

defendant made representations to and communicated with plaintiffs

while plaintiffs were located and residing in Harris County.

Further, defendant’s wrongful actions that constituted a breach

of its obligations occurred partly in Harris County. In 2008, plaintiffs

appealed the location where defendant assigned their parking. The

committee defendant had established to adjudicate such appeals was

composed of five persons, three of whom (including the Chair) reside

or work in Harris County. Such committee failed to discharge its

obligation to fairly investigate and adjudicate plaintiffs’ appeal.

Instead, its members conducted no investigation and merely rubber-

stamped the Chair’s summary conclusion that the appeal should be

denied. The committee’s actions in this instance occurred by email.

Accordingly, some of the actions constituting defendant’s misconduct

herein, and of which plaintiffs complain, apparently occurred in Harris

County.

There is no county of mandatory venue.

Finally, transfer of venue under § 15.002(b) of the Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code would be improper. It would substantially


risk that plaintiffs would not receive a fair trial in a county dominated

by defendant’s affiliates (which are by far the largest employers in

Brazos County).

IV.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In or before December 1994, plaintiffs Tom G. Tullos and Delma

C. Tullos were solicited to participate in the Texas A&M University 12th

Man Foundation Permanently Endowed Scholarship Program. Under the

terms proposed to Mr. and Mrs. Tullos, in exchange for making a

$20,000 scholarship endowment to defendant, they were promised

various endowed benefits for a 30-year term, without the necessity to

pay further for those benefits. These benefits included “the opportunity

to purchase two endowed football season tickets for home and road

games for a period of 30 years” “in the endowed seating area”; in

addition, certain parking benefits were promised to them. Specifically,

they were promised football season “parking privileges in the endowed

parked [sic] area” on game day for the 30 year term of the agreement.

Defendant represented this to consist of the “best available” parking at

Kyle Field.

In response to and in reliance upon the representations made to

them, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos began making payments toward the

endowment. Thereafter, defendant sent them a writing entitled “Texas

A&M University 12th Man Foundation Permanently Endowed


Scholarship Agreement,” which they signed and which was later signed

by defendant.

Wrongful denial of home game seating benefit.

Before entering the endowment agreement, defendant

represented that plaintiffs’ seats for home football games would not

change location during the term of their endowment. Upon entering

the contract, plaintiffs got seats 8 and 9, row 11, section 204 (second

deck), on the south 16 yard line, where they have sat every year since,

in accordance with their expectations.

In 2013, defendant announced its intention to commence a

capital campaign called Redevelopment of Kyle Field, in conjunction

with which it launched, in June 2013, a “reseating process” for football

games effective beginning in 2015. The reseating process involves a

reallocation of seats for all members. Defendant’s application of this

process to plaintiffs breaches their endowment agreement in two,

independent ways.

First, it would require plaintiffs to pay a net additional sum of

about $30,000 over the remaining term of their endowment just to

retain, possibly, the ability to purchase tickets in the same location to

home games from 2015 to 2024.

Second, the process would impose the Priority Point Program

upon plaintiffs’ efforts to purchase seats in the same location, such

that plaintiffs would have to pay defendant yet additional, and


indeterminate, sums of money in an effort to earn sufficient points to

compete effectively to retain their seats.

Defendant created, apparently in 2006 (twelve years after the

contract involved in this case was entered into), a “point” system to

allocate, among other things, parking for home football games and

tickets for away games. In 2013, Defendant announced an expansion

of the application of the Priority Point Program to the Kyle Field

reseating process. The program, which is designed to increase

defendant’s revenue, operates by awarding points to members

generally on the basis of dollars paid to defendant in the form of

“contributions.” Defendant’s members, including endowed donors,

then compete for benefits on the basis of their point totals.

Defendant announced that the reseating process will begin in

July 2013, when endowed donors may first designate (and must begin

paying for) unspecified seats within a named section of the planned,

redeveloped Kyle Field. Other fans will designate sections beginning in

August 2013. Each section has unique capital campaign contribution

and annual seat fees and term. The first installment of the capital

contribution is due at the time of the bid in 2013. As each section is

filled by designations, it will be closed to further designations.

Defendant has named the section that will encompass the

location of plaintiffs’ current seats “Prime West Club,” and it is said to

extend from the 5 yard line to the 20 yard line, all rows, on the second


deck, on the west side. (Plaintiffs’ current seats are on the 16 yard

line, row 11, second deck, west side.)

The total additional sum that would be due from plaintiffs, net of

the “credit” defendant would give them because of their “endowed

donor” status, to have unspecified seats in the section that includes

their current location, Prime West Club, over the remaining term of the

endowment, using defendant’s figures, is about $30,000.

Defendant has further announced that it will determine on

January 15, 2015 each member’s priority point total. It will then allow

those persons whose section designations were accepted to select, by

section, in order of priority point total, their seats. As a result,

assuming plaintiffs were to be among those who are able to designate

Prime West Club before it is filled and closed (but which designation

would also thereby incur the above-described capital contribution

obligations that accompany such designation), if any person who has

greater priority points than do plaintiffs as of January 15, 2015 selects

plaintiffs’ current seat location, plaintiffs would be denied the

opportunity to select those seats and would be left to select from

whatever seats remain in the section when it would be their turn to

select. Moreover, even were plaintiffs to pay the additional,

approximately $30,000 in capital campaign and annual seat

“contributions,” they could still end up on the 5 yard line on the back

row of the section.


Defendant’s proposed reseating process, as above described,

violates the contract defendant entered with plaintiffs.


Wrongful denial of parking benefit.

After their payments, and consistent with defendant’s

representations about the nature and location of their endowed “best

available” parking benefit, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos for a number of years

beginning in 1995 received parking passes in the “Endowed Parking”

lot immediately behind the Kyle Field south end zone scoreboard. This

was the best available parking, as defendant had represented, because

of its proximity to game day activities and tailgating capability.

After several years, however, Texas A&M University engaged in

construction projects which eliminated the parking area behind the

south end zone scoreboard. During this transition period, Mr. and Mrs.

Tullos were moved several times from lot to lot, ultimately in 2007 to

Lot C. At that time, Lot C, because of its proximity to game day

activities and tailgating capability, was considered to be the best

parking then available.

In 2008, however, defendant changed plaintiffs’ parking

assignment again, this time to Lot D, a much less desirable location

because, as a multi-level parking garage, it does not provide tailgating

(which is prohibited there) and socializing opportunities. After that,

defendant informed them that Lot H would become the new “Endowed

Parking” area. Lot H is even worse: it is many times the distance of the

original parking location, the Corps of Cadets does not parade there,

nor does the band lead the football team to Kyle Field through that


area, unlike the previous parking location that had been represented to

and, for a number of years, provided to Mr. and Mrs. Tullos.

Mr. and Mrs. Tullos then learned that defendant had created the

“Aggie Access Priority Point Program.” Designed to increase

defendant’s revenue, this system, when applied to endowed donors,

takes “best available” parking privileges previously sold to endowed

donors and resells them to those who pay the most money to

defendant. Essentially, defendant is double-selling its parking

privileges: endowed (“best available”) parking privileges were first sold

to donors like Mr. and Mrs. Tullos; but now, because parking

immediately adjacent to the stadium is scarcer, defendant has

required, and persists in attempting to require, endowed donors like

Mr. and Mrs. Tullos to “contribute” still more money simply to maintain

what was previously sold to them. Based upon current trends, the

value of this denied benefit could amount to one hundred thousand

dollars or more.

Plaintiffs promptly appealed their 2008 parking assignment; their

appeal was initially ignored. When it did address the appeal, defendant

failed to adjudicate plaintiffs’ appeal in a good faith, commercially

reasonable manner. Defendant conducted no investigation. Instead,

defendant summarily denied the appeal, citing no basis in law or fact

for its decision.


In 2011, defendant, using the Aggie Access Priority Point

Program, again assigned plaintiffs’ parking to Lot D, where tailgating is

actually prohibited and socializing is impractical. This was another

breach of its obligation. Again, plaintiffs appealed. Plaintiffs sought to

resolve this breach amicably and privately. Their efforts included, but

were not limited to, submitting, after being solicited to do so, written

evidence signed by defendant’s former employee (among other things)

supportive of their position. Defendant wholly ignored such evidence

and refused to assure plaintiffs that it would continue to perform all its

obligations under the endowment agreement. Such refusal was

knowing, intentional, in bad faith, and in disregard of its contractual

obligations and its obligation to treat its members in good faith and in

a commercially reasonable manner.

In 2012, defendant, despite plaintiffs’ repeated written request

(again supported by written evidence corroborating plaintiffs’

statement, and again wholly ignored), again assigned plaintiffs parking

to an inferior location, viz., Lot H. Defendant did so intentionally,

knowingly, in bad faith, and in disregard of its obligations under the

endowment agreement and its obligations to treat its members in good

faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.

Defendant has known, at least since 2011, that its own former

employees have either confirmed, not denied, or both, endowed

donors’ statements that, at the time some endowment agreements


were made, best available parking had been promised to prospective

endowed donors. Despite such actual knowledge, defendant has

knowingly, intentionally and in bad faith persisted in denying “best

available parking” benefits to endowed donors such as plaintiffs,

opting instead to continue applying the Priority Point Program to such

persons, all as a means of increasing its revenue.

Wrongful imposition of parking fee.

From 1995 through 2006, plaintiffs received parking passes

without defendant’s attempting to charge any additional sum.

Beginning in 2007, however, without any contractual authority,

defendant, acting unilaterally, has charged plaintiffs an additional

“Parking Fee” in its annual ticket and parking application.

Plaintiffs’ objected in writing in 2012 and 2013, reminding

defendant of its contractual obligations.

Defendant ignored plaintiff’s written objections. It did not deny

the basis for plaintiffs’ assertion of its contractual rights; it did not even

acknowledge receipt of plaintiffs’ letter. Instead, although having

plaintiffs’ unrebutted statements that defendant had represented that

the endowment benefits would be received without necessity to pay

anything additional, defendant required, and continues to require,

plaintiffs to pay such fee (in 2013, $120) to obtain their parking

benefits. Requiring payment of such charge is a further, knowing and


bad faith violation of defendant’s contractual obligations and its

obligation to deal in good faith with its members.


Wrongful denial of road game ticket benefit.

Defendant also determined to use the Aggie Access Priority Point

Program to allocate its members’ ability to purchase tickets available

for away football games, without excepting from the application of

such program those persons, such as endowed donors, who have pre-

existing contractual rights to purchase away game tickets.

Defendant’s applying such program to plaintiffs effectively has

deprived plaintiffs of another contractual right that they purchased in

1994, since to “qualify” under the priority point system for eligibility to

purchase some away game tickets would require plaintiffs to pay

defendant additional money. In doing so, defendant is double-selling

(to persons who have purchased more priority points from defendant)

benefits previously sold to plaintiffs, knowingly and intentionally

breaching its contract with plaintiffs.

Indeed, in 2013 defendant is using the priority point system in an

attempt to deny plaintiffs’ their right to purchase tickets to the Texas

A&M - LSU football game scheduled to occur Nov. 23, 2013 in Baton

Rouge, LA.

More specifically, plaintiffs, adhering to all procedures

established by defendant for ordering away game tickets for the game

in question, in March 2013 timely submitted their application and

tendered payment. Defendant received and accepted such application

and payment. In June 2013, defendant notified plaintiffs that their


application had been denied, claiming plaintiffs to have been “not

eligible” to purchase tickets due to their insufficient priority point total.

This denial occurred despite defendant’s actual knowledge that

plaintiffs, as endowed donors in good standing with defendant, had

purchased from defendant in 1994 (twelve years before defendant

established the Aggie Access Priority Point Program) the express right

“to purchase 2 endowed football season tickets for home and road

games for a period of 30 years.”

Additionally, defendant, when accepting away game ticket

requests from endowed donors, has refused, and continues to refuse,

to designate an endowed seating area at away games from among

those tickets allocated by host schools so that endowed donors would

receive preferred seating commensurate with their endowed donor

status. This, again, violates the endowment agreement.

Misrepresentation.

Since 2008, defendant has, in its mailings, literature and

application forms, consistently misrepresented to plaintiffs (and to

other similarly situated endowed donors) that competing in the Aggie

Access Priority Point Program (paying defendant more money to

purchase additional priority points in an opaque effort to outbid other

members) is the only means by which they can qualify for eligibility to

purchase tickets for away football games (either at all or in an

endowed seating area). Defendant has engaged in such deception for


the purpose of increasing its revenue and knowing, inter alia, that

some endowment agreements (like that of plaintiffs) expressly provide

that endowed donors’ benefits include the right (not conditioned on

priority point totals) to purchase season tickets in an endowed seating

area for home and road games.

Further, defendant has, in its mailings, literature and application

forms, consistently misrepresented to plaintiffs (and to other endowed

donors who were promised best available parking) that competing in

the Aggie Access Priority Point Program (again, paying defendant more

money to purchase additional priority points in an opaque effort to

outbid other members) is the only means by which they can qualify for

eligibility to obtain the best available parking at home games.

Defendant has engaged in such deception for the purpose of

increasing its revenue. It has done so despite knowing that some

endowed donors claim to have been told by defendant’s former

employees at the time of endowment that their endowed parking

benefit would consist of the best available parking, which claims have

been either confirmed or not denied, or both, by defendant’s former

employees.

Denial of member access to information/false claims of

transparency.

Still fu rther, in September 2011, and well before commencing

this litigation, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos, exercising their rights as Foundation


members in good standing pursuant to a specific provision of

defendant’s bylaws, made a written request to the Foundation to allow

them to inspect and copy certain Foundation records. Defendant

ignored plaintiffs’ request, failing even to reply. Such conduct violated

defendant’s bylaws and defendant’s duty to treat its members in a

commercially reasonable manner and in accordance with its bylaws.

Ironically, defendant’s various mailings to endowed donors

regarding the Priority Point Program and Redevelopment of Kyle Field,

among others, have made the self-serving claim that defendant

operates with transparency. Such claims are false, misleading and

deceptive.

Defendant’s foregoing actions and omissions violate the terms of

plaintiffs’ agreement with defendant, and of defendant’s duty to its

members. Defendant’s breach of its agreement, its

misrepresentations, and its bad faith, have been a producing cause of

continuing damages suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Tullos.

V.

CAUSES OF ACTION: BREACH OF CONTRACT,

MISREPRESENTATION, BAD FAITH

Defendant made representations to Mr. and Mrs. Tullos

concerning the rights and benefits they would enjoy as a result of

entering the “Texas A&M University 12th Man Foundation Permanently

Endowed Scholarship Program.” In reliance upon those


representations, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos entered an agreement, paid the

amounts due, and signed a writing. Defendant has failed and refused,

and continues to fail and refuse, to honor the terms of that agreement.

Defendant has further made repeated, knowing misrepresentations,

and acted in bad faith, all as enumerated above. Mr. and Mrs. Tullos

are entitled to recover their actual damages, specific performance and

to receive the benefit of the bargain. In addition, plaintiffs are entitled

to recover their attorneys’ fees. The sum of plaintiffs’ damages is

within the jurisdictional limits of the Court.

VI.

TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Defendant’s actions in June 2013 relating to their denial of

plaintiffs’ right to purchase tickets to the 2013 Texas A&M - LSU game

and the commencement of the Kyle Field reseating process will

additionally cause probable, imminent and irreparable injury to

plaintiffs. Accordingly, injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the

status quo and to prevent probable, imminent and irreparable injury.

Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Temporary Injunction and

incorporate same herein by reference as though fully set forth.

Regarding the LSU game tickets, plaintiffs have demonstrated a

cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiffs also have

demonstrated a probable right to the relief sought, with defendant

having not even asserted in this suit a valid defense to plaintiffs’ long-


standing claims herein regarding plaintiffs’ right to purchase away

game tickets. Finally, plaintiffs have demonstrated that injury is

probable (certain, actually), imminent (defendant says it will ship

tickets in August), and irreparable (game experience, sitting among

other Aggies, is unique, and it cannot be compensated adequately in

damages, or damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary

standard). See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex.

2002).

Unless ordered by the court to set aside two tickets in an

endowed seating area from among the ticket allotment Texas A&M

receives from LSU, and to sell those tickets at face value to plaintiffs,

defendant’s planned sale of LSU game tickets to its other members,

but not to plaintiffs, will occur before this matter can be tried, final

judgment entered and any appeals exhausted.

Regarding the Kyle Field reseating process, plaintiffs have

demonstrated a cause of action for breach of contract. They also have

demonstrated a probable right to the relief sought, as defendant,

acting without any contractual authority, is unilaterally attempting to

extract additional, substantial money from plaintiffs simply for the

ability to enforce their contractual rights to their seating. Finally, they

have demonstrated that injury is probable (defendant has persisted in

applying the process to plaintiffs), imminent (the designation process

begins in July 2013), and irreparable because, by the time this


litigation concludes, designations for Prime West Club seating

allocations will have occurred, and, when that section is fully

designated (and payments for same begun), all seat allocations

therein will be taken, making plaintiffs’ current seat location

unavailable. Were plaintiffs to timely designate in that section before

it fills and closes (and have to pay additional sums, as explained

above), still, because of the opaque and indeterminate nature of the

Priority Point Program, it would be impossible for plaintiffs to know how

many additional priority points they would have to also purchase in

order to have the highest point total of all persons designating in that

section. As a practical matter, plaintiffs would lose their seat location.

Unless ordered by the court to set aside and preserve tickets

from the upcoming reseating process for the redeveloped Kyle Field

and that are equivalent to section 204, row 11, seats 8 and 9, for the

2015-2024 football seasons, defendant’s plan to commence the

reseating process in July 2013 will make plaintiffs’ current seat location

unavailable before this matter can be tried, final judgment entered and

any appeals exhausted.

VII.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

As a result of defendant’s breaches of its agreement and

misrepresentations, it became necessary for Mr. and Mrs. Tullos to

retain attorneys to investigate, present and litigate their claims.


Accordingly, in addition to their actual damages, plaintiffs are entitled

to recover their attorneys’ fees from defendant.

VIII.

RULE 54

Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,

plaintiffs aver that all conditions precedent have been performed or

have occurred, and that every notice required by law to be given has

been properly and timely given.

IX.

PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE

Plaintiffs hereby request and demand that defendant preserve

and maintain all evidence pertaining to any claim or defense related to

the incident made the basis of this lawsuit, or the damages resulting

therefrom, including contracts, lists of donors, email, minutes of

meetings, memoranda, correspondence, financial records, diagrams,

maps, photographs, videotapes, audiotapes, recordings, invoices,

checks, files, facsimiles, voice mail, text messages, calendar entries,

log books, or information related to the reference claim. Failure to

maintain such items will constitute a “spoliation” of the evidence.

X.

REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE

Pursuant to Rule 194.1 et seq. of the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure, plaintiffs hereby request defendant to disclose (including,


but not limited to, supplementation of prior disclosures) the

information or material described in Rule 194.2(a) through Rule

194.2(l) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:

1. Rule 194.2(a): The correct names of the parties to the lawsuit;

2. Rule 194.2(b): The name, address, and telephone

number of any potential parties;

3. Rule 194.2(c): The legal theories and, in general, the factual bases of the responding party’s claims or defenses;

4. Rule 194.2(d): The amount and any method of calculating economic damages;

5. Rule 194.2(e): The name, address, and telephone number of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, and a brief statement of each identified person’s connection with the case;

6. Rule 194.2(f): For any testifying expert:

(1) The expert’s name, address, and telephone number;

(2) The subject matter on which the expert will testify;

(3) The general substance of the expert’s mental impressions and opinions and a brief summary of the basis for them, or if the expert is not retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to the control of the responding party, documents reflecting such information;

(4) If the expert is retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to the control of the responding


party:

A. All documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations that have been provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony; and

B. The expert’s current resume and bibliography;

7. Rule 194.2(g): Any discoverable indemnity and insuring agreements;

8. Rule 194.2(h): Any discoverable settlement agreements;

9. Rule 194.2(i): Any discoverable witness statements; and

10. Rule 194.2(j): All medical records and bills that are reasonably related to the injuries or damages asserted;

11. Rule 194.2(k): All medical records and bills obtained by

you by virtue of an authorization furnished by any plaintiff to this lawsuit;

12. Rule 194.2(l): The name, address, and telephone number of any person who may be designated as a responsible third party.

Pursuant to Rule 192.3(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the

responses to this request for disclosure upon defendant shall be due

30 days after the service of this request upon defendant.

Wherefore, premises considered, plaintiffs pray that defendant

be cited to appear and answer herein, and that upon final trial plaintiffs

have and recover from defendant their actual damages in a sum within


the jurisdictional limits of the Court, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees,

pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest, costs of Court, and such

other and further relief, at law and in equity, to which plaintiffs may be

justly entitled.


Respectfully submitted,

ABRAHAM, WATKINS, NICHOLS, SORRELS, AGOSTO & FRIEND

Randall O. SorrelsTexas Bar Number: 18855350Clyde J. “Jay” Jackson, IIITexas Bar Number: 10502500800 Commerce StreetHouston, Texas 77002Telephone: (713) 222-7211Telecopier: (713) 225-0827

MCQUARRIE LAW OFFICE

By: ________________________________Claude M. McQuarrie IIITexas Bar Number: 1384955020887 Sweetglen DrivePorter, Texas 77365Telephone: (281) 354-2417Telecopier: (281) 354-2417

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS


VERIFICATION

STATE OF TEXAS §§

COUNTY OF _________ §

BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public, appeared TOM G. TULLOS, whose identity is known to me and who upon being duly sworn deposed and said:

“My name is Tom G. Tullos. I am over the age of eighteen and of sound mind, and I am fully competent to make this affidavit. All facts stated herein are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

“I am a plaintiff in the above-styled lawsuit. I have read the forgoing Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Original Petition. The facts are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.”

Further affiant sayeth not. Tom G. Tullos, Affiant

SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN, BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public, on this day of July, 2013.

SEAL: Notary Public, State of Texas


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This will certify that a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Original Petition has been furnished to the following on this ____ day of July, 2013 via certified mail/return receipt requested, hand-delivery, email, or telephonic document transfer:

Mr. Otway DennyMr. Randall S. RichardsonFULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, L.L.P.1301 McKinney, Suite 5100Houston, Texas 77010Telephone: (713) 651-5100Telecopier: (713) 651-5246

Attorneys for Defendant

___________________________________Claude M. McQuarrie III


tullos v. 12th man foundation 7-19-13

Documents

texas harris county

residents of harris

harris county receipts

time plaintiffs

parties plaintiffs

committee defendant

man foundation defendant

plaintiffs entire performance