trust in god and trust in man

8/9/2019 Trust in God and Trust in Man

1/28

Trust in God and Trust in Man: The Ambivalent Role of Religion in Shaping Dimensions ofSocial TrustAuthor(s): Michael R. Welch, David Sikkink, Eric Sartain, Carolyn BondSource: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 317-343Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Society for the Scientific Study of ReligionStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1387629

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2/28

Trust

in

God and Trust

in

Man:

The

Ambivalent

Role of

Religion

in

Shaping

Dimensions

of Social

Trust

MICHAELR.

WELCH

DAVID SIKKINK

ERIC SARTAIN

CAROLYNBOND

We use data

from

the National Election

Study

(2000)

to

analyze

relationships

among

measures

of religious

orientation

and commitment

nd

three

aspects

of

social trust.

Results

rom

OLS and ordered

ogistic

regression

models indicate that individualsaffiliatedwith specific denominations e.g., Pentecostaland other Christian)

tend to

display significantly

ower levels

of

certain

types of

social trust than members

of

mainline Protestant

denominations,

nce

a

varietyof

controls

have been

applied.

This

pattern

s

reversed,

however,

mong respondents

who attendchurch

more

requently

and who

report

hat

religionprovides

them

substantial

guidance

in

their daily

lives.

During

the last

decade,

social scientists devotedconsiderable

attention o the

study

of

social

trust

(e.g., Fukuyama

1995;

Sztompka

1999;

Cook

2001;

Hardin

2002),

particularly

s it relates

to the formation

of social

capital

(Yamagishi

and

Yamagishi

1994;

Brehm

and Rahn

1997;

Heam

1997;

Smith and

Kulynych

2002).

Although

there s some

disagreement

boutthe

exact natureof

therelationship e.g., see the distinctionbetween trust nd assurance nd othercomplexities

raised

by Yamagishi

2001),

most tend to

view social trust as

having

an

important

nfluence

on the

level

of

social

capital

that exists

within a

group

or

society (e.g.,

Misztal

1996;

Hear

1997;

Wilson

2000;

Hardin

2002).

Indeed,

Putnam

(2000:19)

actually

defines social

capital

as

representing

he

sum total of connections

among

people-[particularly]

social networksand the

norms of

reciprocity

and trustworthiness hat arise

from them. This increased interest

in

the

nature

and

consequences

of social trust has also

led scholars to

begin

to examine

empirically

the

forces that

shape

social trust tself

(e.g.,

Wilson

2000).

Until

recently,

ew

empirical

studies had

provided

validated

nsights

about

the

type

of

group

or

community

contexts

thatfoster social

trust

among

individualsand even

now

many

of

the

most

well-establishedfindingsaboutthe determinants f trustarebasedprincipallyon experimental

data

from small

groups

(e.g., Macy

and

Skvoretz

1998; Molm, Peterson,

and Takahashi

1999;

Molm, Takahashi,

ndPeterson

2000).

Although

several

survey-based

tudieshavefoundthatboth

the

scale

(Putnam

2001)

and social

diversity

Knight

2001;

Rice

and

Steele

2001)

of communities

affect

the

levels

of trust

esidents

display,

ew

studies

havefocusedon

specific

nstitutional ontexts

and

examined

the

magnitude

of

these effects. Even fewer studies

(see

Smidt

1999;

Veenstra

2002 for notable

exceptions)

have

directly investigated

he connection between

an

individual's

involvement

n

religious organizations

nd the

level of social trust

one

exhibits towardothers.The

relative

absence

of research

on this

topic

is

especially surprisinggiven

the

presumed

heoretical

Professor

Michael

Welch an be

found

at 810

Flanner

Hall,

Department

of Sociology,

University

of

Notre

Dame,

Notre

Dame,

IN

46556.

All

correspondence

egarding

his

article should be addressed o

Professor

Welch.

David

Sikkink,

810

Flanner

Hall,

Department

of Sociology,

and Fellow

in the

Center

or

Research on Educational

Opportunity,

Universityof

Notre Dame.

Eric Sartain

s a

graduate

student n the

Department

of Sociology,

810

Flanner

Hall,

University

of

Notre Dame.

Carolyn

Bond,

13B St. John's

Road, Cambridge,

MA 02138.

Journalfor

the

Scientific

Study

of Religion

43:3

(2004)

317-343


3/28

JOURNAL

FOR

THE

SCIENTIFIC

TUDY OF RELIGION

connectionbetween

religious

values and

the

views we come to hold aboutothermembers

of our

community

and

people

in

general.

Our current

view of the

linkage

between

religion

and

social trust s influenced

by

a

largely

untested heoretical iterature. n particular,he literature rguesthatreligion,especiallyconser-

vative

religion,

may

not be conducive

o

effective democratic

participation

Macedo

1986,

1990).

Civic

participation

s facilitated

by

social

capital,

as

reflected

n

social

networkscharacterized

y

norms of

reciprocity

and trust

(Putnam2000:19),

but not all

forms of

social

capital

contribute

to

healthy

civic

participation.

Bonding

social

capital

is

inwardly

ocused and

exclusive,

creating

potential

barriers o democratic

participation

and

cooperative

behavior outside the immediate

group.

In

contrast,

bridging

social

capital

is

inclusive,

creating

ties

of trust

and

reciprocity

hat

extend across social distancesbetween

groups

(Putnam

2000:20-22).

Thus,

the

existing

stock

of

bonding

social

capital

available within a

group

may

hinder

or

eventuallypreclude

the

develop-

ment of

bridging

social

capital.

Built on

symbolic

boundariesused

to

define

groupmembership,

bondingsocialcapitalmayincreasemembers' ntoleranceandprejudice owardout-groups.This

represents

he

so-called darkside

of

social

capital

(Portes

and Landolt

1996),

one that

promotes

tight

social ties marked

by in-group

rustand

reciprocity

but also often reinforces anaticismand

undemocratic

deologies

(Fiorina

1999;

Levi

1996).

The

resultingproliferation

f countercultural

groupsfragments

he

polity,

exacerbates

conflict

within

civil

society,

and undermines

he

ability

of democratic nstitutions o foster

persuasive

debate based on rationaland universal

principles

(Coser

1974;

Macedo

2000).

For our

purposes,

he main

point

is that

bonding

social

capital

may

accentuate

symbolic

boundariesbetween

in-groups

and

out-groups, hereby reducing

tolerance

for

social differencesand

making

t

difficult

to establish social trust.

Religion

bears

an

important

elation o

bonding

and

bridging

social

capital

(Wuthnow

1999,

2002).Forexample, hestrongbondingsocialcapitalgeneratedbyconservative eligiousgroups s

often

used

to

epitomize

the dark

ide

of

social

capital

Apple

1996;

Provenzo

1990).

Such research

would lead

us

to

expect

that,

n

general,

conservative

eligious

groups

undermine ocial trust

and

thereforeharmdemocratic

processes.

In

this

article,

we

examine this claim

by

investigating

he

relationship

between

religious

traditionand

social

trust,

an essential element of social

capital

that

facilitates the

cooperation

and

sociability

necessary

for the

functioning

of

democraticsocieties

(Putnam

1993,

2000).

We focus

particularly

n the connection

between

heightened

nvolvement

in

conservative

religious

groups

and

the

degree

of trustone

bestows

on

neighbors,

co-workers,

and

people

in

general.

RELIGIOUS

GROUPS

AND

THE

FORMATION OF

SOCIAL TRUST

Concernsabout undamentalist

eligion

aside

(Diamond

1995;

Peshkin

1986;

Provenzo

1990;

Rose

1988),

most

religious

congregations

and

groups

have been

viewed

by

several

scholars

(Tocqueville

1945;

Coleman

1988;

Leege

1988;

Putnam

1993, 2000;

Greeley

1997;

Wuthnow

2002)

as

contributing

mportant

resources that

help

sustain the

vitality

of civil

society.

These

groupsprovide

heir

members

with

manypractical

rganizational

kills thatcan

be

applied

usefully

in

a

variety

of othersocial or

institutional

ettings

Leege

1988;

Wuthnow

1991;

Smidt

1999;Verba,

Schlozman,

and

Brady

1995).

Moreover,

and what

is

perhaps

more

important

or our

purposes,

they

also

promote n-groupbonding

and nstill a sense of social

connection hatcan extend

beyond

group

boundaries

Smidt

1999;

Wuthnow

2002).

It

is these latteroutcomes that

would

seem to

relate most

directly

to the formationof social trust.If we consider the natureof

many religious

congregations

and

the

types

of interactions hat occur within

them,

it

is

easy

to understand

why.

With the

exception

of

Catholic

parishes,

Jewish

synagogues,

and Protestant

mega-churches

(Thumma1996),

most

congregations

are

relatively

modest

in

size

(see

Chaves et

al.

1999:468),

making

it

comparatively asy

for

congregants

o interact

requently

and become familiar

with

one another.1

Congregants

also share sets

of

basic

religious

and moral beliefs that

they

hold in

common

by

virtue of

their

membership.Finally, many congregations

are also

characterized

by

318


4/28

RELIGION'SAMBIVALENTROLEIN

SOCIALTRUST

ethnic or

socioeconomic

homogeneity

(Emerson

and Smith

2000)

and

low

levels of

membership

turnover.

Taken

ogether,

hese conditionstend

to createa

group

environment hatseems

likely

to:

(1)

foster a

relativelyhigh

level

of value

consensus and

attitude

imilarity

among

most

members,

(2)promotealongstandingamiliarity mongmembers,and(3)conferahighlevel ofpredictability

on

interactionswithin the

group

context. Previousstudiesof

group

and/or

community

nteraction

(Kollock

1994;

Macy

and Skvoretz

1998; Molm, Peterson,

and

Takahashi

1999;

Nee and

Sanders

2001;

Rice and Steele

2001)

have demonstrated hat

all these

attributes-especially perceived

predictability,

member

similarity,

and

familiarity-are strongly

associated with the

formation

of

social

trust.

This

suggests,

of

course,

that

many congregationsmay

representhighly

conducive

environments

n which

individuals

can learn to trustone

another.But what is

the natureof such

trustand how far does it

extend?

Here

we must consider

differences

among

religious

traditions.

Differences

by

Religious

Tradition

Thus far

in

our

discussion,

it is

clear that involvement

n

a

religious

congregation

would

offer a conducive

setting

for

generating

social

trust,

which

may

create the kind of

sociability

that allows us to extend this trust to

others,

such

as

neighbors

and work

colleagues.

But

we

would

expect,

consistent

with

the thesis that contends there is a

darkside of

social

capital

(Fiorina

1999;

Portes and Landolt

1996),

that all

religious

subgroups

are

not created

equal

in

their

capacity

to

generate

social

trust.

In

particular,

everal scholarshave

raised

concernsabout

fundamentalist

eligion

(Diamond

1995;

Peshkin

1986;

Provenzo

1990;

Rose

1988).

From

their

perspective,

conservative

religion

and

bonding

social

capital

may

combine to foster

prejudice

and mistrust

of

outsiders.We note

particularly

he

differences

n

views of

humannature.

Though

thesetheologicalpreceptsmayhaveonly a minoreffect on theeverydaypracticesof conservative

believers

(e.g.,

Williamsand

Blackburn

1997),

it

is

likely

that he

extentand

rigidity

of boundaries

differentiating

he

congregation,

he

believer,

and the world

would

substantially

educe

social

trust.

Thus,

following

theories that

identify

liabilities

associated

with

bonding

social

capital,

we would

predict

that members of

those

religious

traditions

hat have formed

their collective

identities

through

he constructionof

strongsymbolic

boundariesbetween

the

religious

in-group

and

surrounding

ut-groups

are

likely

to

display

diminished

rust

n

neighbors,

co-workers,

and

people

in

general.

Catholic

traditions,

at least since Vatican

II,

would not

be

expected

to

depress

general

so-

cial trust.

Although

Putnam

argues

that the vertical or

hierarchicalbonds

of

dependency

and

exploitation

that

typify

the

Catholic

Church n

Italy clearly

hinderedthe

development

of

trust

and

cooperation

within Italian

society

(Putnam1993),

the

organizational

ultureof the

American

Catholic Church

s

quite

different,

owing largely

to

featuressuch as the

ratheractive

role

played

by

the NationalCouncil of Catholic

Bishops

and the relative

ndependent-mindedness

f the

laity

(D'Antonio

et al.

2001).

Moreover,

most U.S. Catholicsdo not hold

highly

negative

views of hu-

mannature

nor

do

they

reside

n

parishes

hatmaintaina

rigid

boundary

between

the

congregation

and the outside culture

(Gremillion

and

Castelli

1987;

D'

Antonio et al.

2001).

Thus,

it

seems

unlikely

that

we

should

expect

Catholics as a whole

to

display

lower levels of

social trustthan

members

of other

religious

groups.

One

could

argue

hat older

Catholics

may

differ

substantially

from

younger generations

on these

dimensions,

given

that

older

cohorts

of Catholics were so-

cialized

initially

into

pre-Vatican

I

religious

traditions,

onfronted

directlyby

the

experience

of

religious

discrimination,

nd influenced

stronglyby

the

socially

centripetal

orces that

formerly

operated

withinmost

Catholicethniccommunities

Abramson

1973;

Gleason

1987;

Hoge

2001

.2

Such circumstances

may

indeed

have

combined

to foster lower levels of social

trust-especially

generalized

social trust.

MainlineProtestant

denominations re

relativelyeasy

to

categorize

on these

dimensionsand

have

generally

been viewed as

exhibitinghigh

levels

of

bridging

social

capital,especially

as it is

manifested

n

social outreach

e.g.,

Wuthnowand Evans

2002).

We would

expect

that

a

theology

319


5/28

JOURNALFOR

THE SCIENTIFIC

TUDY OF

RELIGION

that

tempers

he doctrine

of humansinfulness with that of common

grace,

human

potential,

and

goodness

would lead to

higher

levels of social trustrelative

to

conservative

Protestant

eligious

subgroups.

Furthermore,

mong

members

of

mainline

denominations,

he social and cultural

boundaries

between the

congregation,believer,

and

the

outside

ociety

and culture are much

more

permeable Hoge,

Johnson,

and Luidens

1994;

Wuthnow

and Evans

2002).

In

contrast,

most of the varieties

of

conservativeProtestantism

maintain

relatively strong

views on

the sinfulness

of

human

beings,

which is

only mitigated

by

God's

gift

of

special grace

to

the believer

and,

in some

evangelical subgroups,

God's

provision

of common

grace

to

society

and

nonbelievers.Conservative

Protestant hurches

n

general

also maintaina

relatively

strict

form of

congregational

organization,

which

includes

high

demandson

participants

n

exchange

for collective and

symbolic provision

of

goods

(lannaccone

1994;

Starkand

Finke

2000).

But at

this

point,

the social life and

religious styles

of

different

conservativeProtestant

roupsdiverge.

Evangelicals,

who

emphasize engagement

with American

society

and culture rather

than

countercultural

eparation

Smith

et al.

1998),

are the closest to the mainline

in

terms

of

a

less

rigid boundary

between

the

faithful

and the world.

Many evangelical

churches,

while still

relatively

strong

in

bonding

social

capital

(Putnam2000),

do not maintain

he level of strict

organizational

tyle

found

in

other conservativeProtestant

groups.

We

would

expect

that this

setting

allows the

development

of

sociability, amiliarity,predictability,

nd so on that enhances

trust,

while

not

combining strong

social

bonding

with

exclusive

boundariesthat

separate

the

religious community

rom the broader

ociety.

Fundamentalists,

owever,

emphasize

the creationof alternative nstitutions

n

order o

sep-

arate

from the world

(Ammerman

1987;

Carpenter

1997;

Marsden

1980;

Smith et

al.

1998;

Woodberry

and Smith

1998),

which

enhances

bonding

social

capital

and combines

the

strict

churchmodel

with

rigid,

less

permeable

boundariesbetween

the

religious

(countercultural)

om-

munity

andthe outsideworld.It seems

likely

that he

strong

boundary

betweenthe fundamentalist

community

and

the

surrounding ociety

and culture would overcome

any positive

effect of

the

strong

social

bondingcapital

that accrueswithin

fundamentalist

ongregations.

Finally,

unlikemost studies

e.g.,

Smidt

1999;

Wuthnow

1999;

Smith

et al.

1998),

we consider

the

Pentecostal

onservativeProtestants s distinct

rom

evangelicals

n

ways

that

may

affect evels

of social trust.3

In

terms of

religious

belief,

the Pentecostals

erect

perhaps

the

highest

cultural

barrier

of

all

conservativeProtestants

n

relation

to the

dominant

society

and culture

(Sikkink

1999).

The distinction

between the faithful

and

the secular

s made more

vivid

for Pentecostals

in

theologies

that

emphasize

the conflict

of

personal

forces

of evil

and

good

within

everyday

life. There

is

no doubt a

strong

social

bonding capital

exists within

Pentecostalism,

but we note

thatthe role of the indwellingof the spiritwithin Pentecostalism Wacker2001) createsa further

individualizing

effect of Pentecostalismon the believer. We would

expect

that the

independent

effect of Pentecostalism

s

likely

to be

negative

on various

orms of social trust.

Moderating

Effects of

Involvement and Salience:

The

Importance

of Immersion

in

Functional

Religious

Communities

The

preceding

discussion and

previous

research

raise the

question

of how the effect on

social

trust

of

membership

n

religious

subgroups

s conditioned

by

one's level

of involvement n

congregations

ndthe salience

of one's faith.Workon social

capital

and

religion

(Wuthnow

1999)

would lead us to expectthatgreatercommitment o a conservative eligious congregationwould

make

t

moredifficult

o have time

for

developingbridging

ocial

capital.

Moreover,

he

formation

of

strong bonding

social

capital

at

the

expense

of

bridging

social

capital may

be detrimental o

social trust.

This

implies

an nteraction f

religious

attendance

nd

religious

subgroup,

ut

previous

researchhas not examined his

possibility

in

regard

o social trust.

Greater nvolvement

n

a

mainline or

Catholic

congregation

seems

unlikely

to

affect

the

relationbetween

membership

n

those traditions ndsocial

trust,

given

that

he boundaries etween

these traditionsand

society

and culture

are

not

rigidly

exclusive. To the extent that mainline

and

320


6/28

RELIGION'S

AMBIVALENT

ROLE

IN

SOCIALTRUST

Catholic

congregations

are not

as

strict,

nd marked

by

lower

levels of

bonding

social

capital

in

general,

higher

evels of involvement n

Catholic

and

mainline

raditions

may only

increase he

positive

effects of

these traditionson individualsocial

trust.

The effect of involvement n conservativeProtestant ongregationson social trust is much

more difficult

to discern.

There are at least two

competing

predictions.

The

first

is

that

greater

involvement or commitment to conservative

Protestant

congregations

increases the

exclusive

effect of

the

boundary

between

the

religious

community

and the outside

world,

which

should

lower one's level of

general

social trust as

well as levels

within

specific

domains of

trust.

A


who

is more embedded

n

his or

her

religious

tradition

perhaps

onstructs

identity

over-against

he outside

world,

which

almost

by

definitionwould lead to

diminished ocial

trust.

This

effect would be

expected

to be

especially strong

for

fundamentalists nd

Pentecostals,

though perhaps

ess

strong

among evangelicals.

A

second

explanation

s that

exposure

o

strong

social

bondingcapital

within

strict

eligious

organizations

ends to

mitigate

any negative

effects that

pessimistic religious

beliefs abouthuman

nature

might

have on

social trust. The

experience

of a functional

surrounding

ommunity-a

community

marked

by relatively

dense

social

networks,

a

sense of mutual

respect,

anda

legitimate

normativeorder

Coleman 1988)-even

a

religious community,may

be an

important

ntidote o

the lack

of

social trust hat s

generated

when

one remainswithin a

privatized

and isolated

family

or individual ife. This thesis runs counter to the

claim that involvement

n

groups

with

strong

bonding

social

capital

may

be

detrimental o

an

individual's

exercise

of

democratic

citizenship.

For the

person heavily

involved in

a

congregation,

he

sociability, predictable

nteractions,

and

value consensus

he

or she

experiences

all

contribute

o the

formationof

greater

social trust-at

least relative o otherswho are more

nominally

affiliated

with

a conservativeProtestant

eligious

subgroup

and thus less involved

in the

day-to-day

nteractionsof a strict

ongregation

hat are

most

likely

to foster social trust.

Perhaps

commitment o conservativeProtestant

ubgroups

hat

emphasize

human

sinfulness,

without

the

mitigating

effects

of

immersion within a

functional

religious community,

creates the conditions that most

strongly depress

social

trust. Under

this

line

of

argument,

we would

expect

that

the vivid

and

personalized

contrast

of

good

and evil

embodied

n

Pentecostaldoctrines

would

tend to create

the

greatest

difference n

levels of social

trustbetween

high-attending

nd

low-attending

affiliates.

The interactiveeffect

of

religious

traditionand

congregational

nvolvement s not

the

only

interaction

hat

we

would

expect

to

shape

social trust.As

explained

above,

many

social

theorists

view the true

believer,

especially

the

religious

conservative,

as a threat o

democracy

because

bonding

social

capital

and

rigid symbolic

boundarieswith

out-groupsmay

increase

ntolerance

andprejudice Gutmann1987, 1998;Macedo2000;Putnam2000).Thus,wewouldexpectthat he

effects of

religious group

membership

n social trust

would

be intensified

among

those

for whom

religious

faith has

great

salience

in

everyday

life. From

this

perspective,

the

easily

accessible

aspects

of a conservative

religious

faith,

such as the culturalconstructionof a

boundary

between

the believer

and the nonbelieverand the sinfulness

of

human

beings,

would be enhancedfor

an

adherent

who is

more committed

to

incorporating

he tenets of

conservative

religious

faith

into

everyday

ife. But we must also consider he

alternative:

amely,

hat

morecommitted ndividuals

in

each

religious subgroup develop

a

deeper

understanding

of other

aspects

of the

religious

doctrine,

one that

s

more nuancedand

may temper

he

superficial

understanding

f the faith that

is more

prevalent mong

hose who

are

ess committed.

A

positive

nteractive ffect of conservative

religionand the importanceof faith wouldprovideevidence for this latter nterpretation.

It

is

difficult o

answer he

question

of how

membership

n

religious

subgroups

elates o social

trust-independently

and

in

interaction

with

religious

attendanceand

religious

salience-based

solely

on the

limited

empirical

vidence thatcan be culled

from

existing

studies.

In

a

cross-national

telephone survey

of

Canadiansand

Americans,

Smidt

(1999)

examined

relationships

between an

index of

generalized

social trust and measures of

respondents'

religious

traditions

and level

of

church attendance.He found that

the

religious

traditionmeasure showed

only

a moderatenet

relationship

o the

degree

of trust

respondents

attributed o

others,

with American

evangelicals

321


7/28

JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFIC

TUDY

OF

RELIGION

tending

o exhibit ower levels

of

trust han heir

religious counterparts.

midt

also

reports

a

weak

curvilinear

elationship

between

attendance

and

trust,

net of othercontrols.

Using

data from the 1992

NES,

Wilson

(2000)

focused on selected

subsamples

of

women,

AfricanAmericans,andevangelicals, analyzing generallevels of trust and trust n government

displayed

by

respondents

n

each

category.

Among

evangelicals,

he

reports,

hose

who

identify

strongly

with their

religious group

are

significantly

ess

likely

to

profess

trust

in

generalized

others than

evangelicals

who

display

a lower

degree

of

identification

Wilson

2000:14-15).

This

strength

of

identification

with

one's

religious

subgroup

may

also be reflected

in

levels of

participation

r involvement

n

religious

activities,

but Wilson did not include

such measures

n

his

analyses.

Given the

findings

that

emerged

from both of

these

studies,

it seems reasonable

to infer that

repeated

exposure

to the

specific

beliefs and norms

that characterizea

particular

religious

group

s

crucialto

the

degree

of trustone

places

in

others,

especially

those

encountered

outside

of faith

communities.

NeitherSmidtnorWilson nvestigated theraspectsof trustmoresystematically.nparticular,

they

did not

investigate

how the effects

of

religious

tradition re modified

hrough

nteraction

with

level of

involvement

n

a

religious

congregation

or the

degree

to which a

set of

religious

beliefs

provides

guidance

in

one's

everyday

life. Wuthnow

(1999)

provides

a

cogent argument

hat

conservativeProtestants

generate

bonding

social

capital

within the

congregation,

but he

notes

that this crowds out

opportunities

or

bridging

social

capital

that would

link

congregants

o

the

wider

community

and

society.

This

seems to

imply

that

social trustwould be

generated

within

the

congregation

but would

not extend

beyond congregational

borders.But Wuthnow

does not focus

explicitly

on social

trust

and,

as

with

other

research,

does not

investigate

he

interactionbetween

religious

denominationand

degree

of

commitment o that

denomination.

Drawingfrom this existing literature,but necessarilygoing beyond it, we would expect

thatconservativeProtestant

ubgroups, specially

fundamentalists nd

Pentecostals,

would

show

lower levels of social trust

(in

their main

effects)

compared

o

religious

groups

such as

mainline

Protestants ndCatholics.For

reasons

we

discussed

above,

we would not

expect

the interaction

f

mainliners

and

Catholics with attendanceat

religious

services or commitment o

one's

religious

faith

to

affect levels of social trust.

For

conservative

Protestants,

we do not have a solid

theoreticalor

empirical

basis to

predict

how

membership

n

religious

subgroups

would interact

with

religious

commitment o affect social

trust.We do

argue,

however,

hat or

any particular

onservative

Protestant

ubgroup,

he

effect of

greater

attendance

depends

on

the relative

balanceof an

increased ense of social

trustattributable

to the

experience

of a functional

community,

and the

reinforcement f

religious

beliefs

thatraise

the

boundary

between the

faithful

and the

world.Evidence

of

a

positive

interaction ffect on trust

between conservativeProtestant

affiliation-especially

if the

interactiveeffect is

stronger

for

fundamentalists nd Pentecostals-and

attendanceat

religious

services

would

lend

credence to

the

theory

that

conservative

eligious

doctrines

may

in

themselves be a hindrance o

social

trust,

although

functional,

conservative

religious

communities of faith are

not.

Put another

way,

the

least

trusting

are most

likely

to be

those

who

adhere o

conservative

Protestant

eligious

doctrines

without

communing

with a


eligious community,

ince involvement

n

the

bonding eligious

community

would

help

to

mitigate

the

negative

effect that conservative

religious

beliefs exert on

trust.

In

this

article,

we use

data

rom

the

2000 NationalElection

Study

(NES)

to examine

inkages

between an individual's

religious

orientationand involvementand the level of trust he or she

displays

toward

co-workers,

neighbors,

and

people

in

general.

DATA AND

METHODS

Toexamine he

relationship

etweenan

ndividual's

eligious

orientation ndhis

or

hertrust n

others,

we

used data rom the 2000 NationalElection

Study

(NES).

This

survey

contained everal

322


8/28

RELIGION'SAMBIVALENT

ROLE

IN

SOCIALTRUST

specific

questions

that addressed

ssues

of

social

trust,

as well as other

relevant

demographic

and

religious

items,

and was

thus

well suited for our research.

Measures

of

Social

Trust

The

2000

NES

includes

several

sets

of items

that

represent espondents'

evels of social trust.

One set

of items

(V1475-V1477)

was

especially

useful

in

measuring

the

generalized

level

of

social

trust hat

respondentsdisplay

in

their

daily

interactions. ndividuals

were asked to

respond

to the

following questions

by selecting

one of the two alternative

esponses

that were

provided:

(1)

Generallyspeaking,

would

you say

that most

people

can be

trusted,

or

that

you

can't be

too careful

in

dealing

with

people?

(1

=

most

people

can be

trusted,

0

=

can't be too

careful);

(2)

Do

you

thinkmost

people

would

try

to take

advantage

of

you

if

they got

the chance or would

they try

to be

fair?

(1

=

try

to be

fair,

0

=

take

advantage);

3)

Would

you say

that

most

of

the

time

people try

to be

helpful,

or that

they

are

ust

looking

out

for

themselves?

1

=

try

to

be

helpful,

0

=

just looking

out for

themselves).

We

summedeach

of

these

binary

tems to

create

a

composite

index of social trust

(alpha

=

0.73).

Another set

of items

(V1695-V1698)

reflected

the level of social trust

respondentsplaced

in

their

co-workers.

Respondents

ndicated

their

responses

to the

following

questions

on either

a

four-point

or

five-point

Likert scale:

(1)

In

general,

with these

people

in mind

[co-workers],

would

you say

that

they

are

ust looking

out

for

themselves

all of the

time,

most of the

time,

some

of the

time,

hardly

ever or never?

1

=

all of the

time,

5

=

never);

(2) Would

you

say

that those

people you

see

regularly

at

work

try

to take

advantage

of others

all

the

time,

most

of

the

time,

hardly

ever

or

never? (1

=

all of

the

time,

5

=

never);

(3)

Would

you say

that

they

treatothers

with

respect

all of thetime,most of thetime,someof thetime,

hardly

everornever? 1 = never,

5

=

all of

the

time); (4)

Would

you say

that

honest describes he

people you

work with

extremely

well,

quite

well,

not

too

well,

or not well at all?

(1

=

not

well

at

all,

4

=

extremely

well).

These

items

were

summed

to create an index of trust

n

co-workers

alpha

=

0.76).

A

third

set of items

(V1737-V1740)

represented

he level of social trust

respondents

placed

in their

neighbors.

These items used

basically

the same stem

questions

and

Likert

response

scales

that were used to

represent

rust

n

co-workers,

except

that the

focus was on the

people

you

see

regularly

n

your neighborhood

nstead

of co-workers.These items were summed to create an

index of trust

n

neighbors(alpha

=

0.74).

Measures

of

Religion

To examine the

relationship

between

religion

and social

trust,

we

include three different

measures

of

religion

in

our

analyses.

The first

representscategories

of

religious

subgroups

o

which individuals

belong.

This measureof

religious

affiliation

was built

from

NES item

V0904 and

the

accompanyingappendix.

Using

this

categorization,

we created

10

separatedummy

variables

(1

=

specific

denominational

radition,

0

=

other)

to

represent

he

following

denominational

groupings:

1)

fundamentalist,

2)

nontraditional

undamentalist,

3)

Pentecostal,

4)

evangelical

Protestant,

5)

black

Protestant,

6)

Catholic,

(7)

Jewish,

(8)

other

religions,

(9)

none,

and

(10)

mainline

Protestant.4

The

classification

of

specific

denominations

s

reported

n the

Appendix.)

MainlineProtestantwas usedas the reference

category

n all

analyses.5

A measureof attendance

was built

from

responses

o three

questions

V0877-V0880)

that

askedwhether

a

respondent

ver

attended

religious

services

apart

rom

the

occasional

weddings,baptisms,

or funerals

1

=

yes)

and

how

frequently

he or she attended

eligious

services

(1

=

never,

6

=

more thanonce a

week).

We

also include

a measureof the amountof

guidance

that

religion provides

for an

individual

n

his or her life.

This

measure

was

built

from the

following

two items

(V0872

and

V0873): (1)

Do

you

consider

religion

to

be

an

importantpart

of

your

life,

or

not?

(1

=

important);

2)

Would

323


9/28

JOURNALOR

THE

SCIENTIFIC

TUDY

OFRELIGION

you

say

that

religion provides

some

guidance

in

your day-to-day

living,

quite

a bit

of

guidance,

or

a

great

deal of

guidance

in

your day-to-day

life?

(1

=

some,

2

=

quite

a

bit,

3

=

a

great

deal).

Other Measures

Demographic

variables

representing

age

(coded

in

years),

education

(highest grade

com-

pleted), gender

(1

=

male),

marital status

(1

=

married),

and annual income

(reported

in thou-

sands

of

dollars)

were included in our

analyses.

In

addition,

we

included three

dummy

variables

to

represent

the

race and

ethnicity

of

respondents

(1

=

African

American,

1

=

Hispanic,

1

=

other),

with white

respondents representing

the reference

category.

Geographic

region

was sub-

divided into northeast

(coded

1),

north central

(coded

1),

west

(coded

1),

and south

(the

reference

category).

We also

categorized respondents

as suburban

(coded

1),

small town

(coded 1),

and

rural

(coded 1)

residents,

comparing

them

to residents of urban

areas.

Dummy

variables

representing

individuals who

are

employed

part

time

(coded 1)

or

who

are

unemployed

(coded 1)

were

included

and

compared

to individuals who are

employed

full

time.

In

addition,

individuals whose

occupation requires

that

they

work with others

(coded

1)

were

also

represented.

These three

measures were used to control for the

level and

frequency

of

workplace

contacts individuals have with

co-workers. We also

used

two

dummy

variables to

designate

homeowners

(coded 1)

and those who

indicated that

they

had worked

with

a

neighbor

on an issue or

problem

of

common interest

(coded

1).

These measures were

used

to

represent

the

degree

of commitment

an individual

displays

toward the

neighborhood

in

which he or

she

lives

and

the

person's

level of

involvement

in

that

neighborhood.

Descriptive

statistics

for

all the variables

used

in

our

analyses

are

reported

in

Table 1.

TABLE 1

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR

VARIABLES USED

IN THE

ANALYSES

Dependent

Variables

Coded Variables %

Mean

SD

Social trust ndex

Range:

0-3

(low

trust o

high

trust)

1.879

1.159

Trust

n

neighbors

Range:

1-19

(low

trust o

high

trust)

14.130

2.489

Trust

n co-workers

Range:

1-19

(low

trust o

high

trust)

13.756 2.487

Dependent/Control

Variables

Age

Coded in

years

47.206 16.962

Education

Highest gradecompleted

13.616 2.570

Male

I

=

Male 43.72

Married 1= Married 52.15

Northeast I

=

Resident

of

northeast

egion

17.49

North central

=

Residentof midwest

region

24.90

West

I

=

Resident

of

western

region

21.25

Employed,

part

ime I =

Employedpart

ime

2.77

Unemployed

I

=

Unemployed

32.60

Workswith others

I=

Works

with

others

63.97

Black =

Black

11.63

Hispanic

1 =

Hispanic

5.20

Other 1 = Otherrace 5.26

Income

Annual ncome in

dollars

(thousands)

53.029 38.469

Homeowner

I

=

Homeowner 67.24

Neighborhoodproblem

solving

1

=

Worked o

solve

problem

24.37

Suburban I =

Reside

in

suburb

40.66

Small town 1 =

Reside

in

small town 26.24

Rural

1

=

Reside

in

ruralarea

4.87

324


10/28

RELIGION'SAMBIVALENTROLEIN

SOCIALTRUST

RESULTS

Because of the

relatively

imited

range

of variation

n

the

general

trust

ndex,

we use ordered

logistic regressionto examine the net relationshipsbetween our measures of an individual's

religious

orientationand

general

social

trust,

controlling

for the effects of the other variables

included

in

the

analysis

(Borooah

2001).6

Table

2

presents

the unstandardized

oefficients

for

models

predicting

evels of

generalized

social trust.

It

is clear

from Model

1

that,

net of other

factors, older, wealthier,

and more well-educated

individuals end to show

higher

evels of social

trust,

as do

those who are

married,

own

theirown

homes,

and

are

required

o work

with

others

within

the

context

of

theirjobs.

Individuals

who

have

cooperated

with their

neighbors

n

working

on local

problems

or

issues

of

common interestalso

tend to be more

trusting

when other factors are controlled.

Compared

o residents

of

the

south,

individuals

residing

in the

western

region

of the United States exhibit more

trust,

net of

other

effects. African

Americans,

however,

show lower

levels of trust than their white

counterparts.

Similar

demographic

ffects are also observed

n

Model

3,

with

the

exception

that

the effects of

marital tatusare

nonsignificant.

The coefficients

representing

he net

effects of one's

religious

orientation re somewhatmore

surprising.

n both Models 1 and

3,

individuals

rom

a

variety

of

denominational

backgrounds

do not differ

appreciably

rom their mainline

Protestant

ounterparts

n the

levels

of trust

they

display.

Catholics

do

not

differ

from the

mainliners,

and a

separateanalysis

(available

on

request)

did

not show that older Catholics

(those

socialized

prior

to

Vatican

II)

differed

from

younger

Catholics.

There s one

important

xception

to the

similarity

n trustacross

religious subgroups:

Pentecostals

show

significantly

lower levels

of trust

compared

to mainline

Protestants,

when

othervariables

are controlled.

Otherstudies thathave not accounted

or the distinctivenessof the

Pentecostal radition

appear

o have missedthis

important

elationbetween conservative

eligion

and

trust.

The coefficients

reported

n

Models

2 and

4

are also

quite

similar

n

directionand

magnitude.

Among

the

demographic

variables,

only

the effects

of

marriage

and

western

residence fail to

reach

the level

of

statistical

ignificance,although

neither he directionnor

the

magnitude

of

these

effects

varies

n

any

other

appreciable

way

from the effects

reported

Models

1and 3. The net

effect

of Pentecostal

affiliationalso

operates

n these models to

produce

a lower level of trust than is

seen

among comparable

membersof mainlinedenominations.

Although

he

sense

of

guidance

an

individualreceives

from

religion generally

appears

o have

no

meaningful

connectionto the level

of social

trustone

reports

Models

1

and

2),

the

statisticallysignificant

nteraction erm ndicates

thata moderating ffect is observedamong ndividualsaffiliatedwithPentecostaldenominations.

Thus,

Pentecostals

who

report

hat

they

receive

high

levels of

guidance

actually

tend to be

more

trusting

han heir

counterparts

n

mainlinedenominations.There

s

also

a

pronouncedmoderating

effect

among

Pentecostal

affiliates

who

attend

religious

services more

frequently.Figures

1

and

2

show the

predicted

evels

of trust

as

attendance nd

guidance

ncrease

or

the Pentecostalsand the

comparisongroup

(i.e.,

mainliners).

Although

our

analysis

cannot sort out the

precise

reasonfor

this

finding,

t

is consistentwith

the

theory

hata little Pentecostalism s a bad

thing,

butthose who

delve

deeper

into the

religious

tradition

ind

other culturalresources that

mitigate

a

superficial

view of sin and

separation

rom the world with

religious support

or

social trust.

Figure

1 shows that

the

highest

attending

Pentecostals

are

actually

somewhatmore

trusting

than theirmainlinecounterparts.Althoughlevels of trust increasesubstantiallyamong Pente-

costals

who

report

that

they

receive

higher

levels

of

guidance

from their

religious

beliefs,

the

levels

of

trust

only approach-but

never

surpass-those displayed

by

theirmainline

counterparts.

(Main

and

interaction ffects

for fundamentalists how

similar

patterns, hough

he effects are not

quite significant

at the

conventional

evels.)

The

Pentecostal

effects

provide

additionalevidence

for the

alternative

heory

that

religious

beliefs

may

lead to a lack of trust

in

the

abstract,

but

the concrete

social

experience

of a

functional

religious community

overrides he

negative

effect

Pentecostal

religious

traditionshave

on social trust.

325


11/28

TABLE 2

UNSTANDARDIZED

NET

COEFFICIENTS FOR ORDERED

LOGISTIC

REGRESSION

M

OF

GENERALIZED

TRUST

(n

=

1,346)

Measuresof

Religious

Influence

Religious

Guidance

Model

I

Model

2

Mo

b

z-value

b

z-value

b

Age

0.022

5.72***

0.022

5.74**

0.022

Education

0.191

7.98***

0.192

7.97**

0.188

Income

0.004

2.21*

0.004

2.15*

0.004

Male

0.095

0.87

0.101

0.93

0.108

Married

0.230

1.98*

0.210

1.80

0.221

Northeast 0.035 0.21

0.020 0.12

0.054

Northcentral

0.255

1.79

0.245

1.71

0.252

West

0.307

1.99* 0.278

1.78

0.314

Rural

0.174

1.15

0.174

1.13

0.179

Small town

0.154

1.07

0.143

0.99 0.152

Suburb

0.308

1.73

0.298

1.66

0.302

Part-time

work

0.442

1.49 0.389

1.31

0.437

Unemployed

0.106 0.74

0.101 0.70

0.111

Worksw/others

0.278 2.17*

0.270

2.10*

0.280

Black

-1.045

-4.02***

-1.125

4.29**

-1.068

Hispanic

-0.432

-1.71

-0.451

-1.77

-0.438

Otherrace -0.493 -1.86 -0.467 -1.75 -0.503

Homeowner

0.339

2.69**

0.357

2.82**

0.331

Neighborhood

problem

solving

0.374

2.94**

0.373

2.92*

0.379


12/28

TABLE

2

(Continued)

Measuresof

Religious

Influence

Religious

Guidance

Model

1 Model

2

Mo

b

z-value

b

z-value

b

Denomination

&

Religiosity

Fundamentalist

-0.117

-0.38

-0.967

-0.95

-0.148

Nontraditional

undamentalist

-0.004

-0.01

0.143

0.12

-0.063

Pentecostal

-0.878

-2.91**

-3.047

-2.85**

-0.911

Evangelical

-0.164

-0.90

-0.791

-1.48

-0.189

Black Protestant

0.170

0.05

-0.508

-0.57

0.155

Catholic

-0.083

-0.52

-0.253

-0.61

-0.105

Jewish

-0.443

-1.25

-0.373

-0.49

-0.442

Other

religion

-0.407

-1.04

-1.217

-1.11 -0.395

None -0.117 -0.61 -0.091 -0.22 -0.078

Religious

guidance

-0.000

-0.01

-0.082

-0.77

Attendance

0.027

Religiosity

Interaction

with Denomination

Fundamentalist

0.273

0.91

Nontraditional undamentalist

-0.021

-0.06

Pentecostal

0.657

2.14*

Evangelical

0.206

1.24

Black

Protestant

0.229

0.93

Catholic

0.060

0.43

Jewish

-0.068

-0.21

Other

0.280

0.80

None

-0.078

-0.46

Log

likelihood

-1593.08

-1588.67

-1589.32

Probability

0.000

0.000

0.000

Pseudo-R2

0.092

0.095

0.094

*p

<

0.05;

**p

<

0.01;

***p

<

0.001.


13/28

JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF

RELIGION

FIGURE

1

GENERALIZED TRUST-PENTECOSTAL

BY

RELIGIOUS

GUIDANCE

__

_w_

1

2

3

Guidance

-.-

. Mainline

Pentecostal

Because of the

greater range

of variation

(0-19)

in

the indices

measuring

evels of trust

extended

towardco-workersand

neighbors,

we use OLS

regression echniques

to

analyze

those

measures. Table 3 presentsthe unstandardized oefficients for models predictingthe levels of

trust ndividuals

place

in

their

co-workers.

Coefficients

reported

n

Models

1

and 3 are similar n

magnitude

and direction

o

those that

appeared

n

Models

1

and

3 of Table

2,

although

here are some notable differences.

Controlling

for other

factors,

older

individualsand those

with

at least

a

high

school educationtend to have a

higher

evel of

trust

n

theirco-workers.

Compared

o those who workfull

time,

part-time

workers

FIGURE

2

GENERALIZED

TRUST-PENTECOSTAL

BY

ATTENDANCE

'~ ' ~ -~~---.-_

__-

o

I-

N

-

1.

0

C3

0

3

4

5

Attendance

-----^

Mainline

Pentecostal

4.0

lt

a

4

1 2

6

328

.A


14/28

TABLE 3

UNSTANDARDIZED NET

COEFFICIENTS FOR

OLS REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING

TOWARD CO-WORKERS

(n

=

1,132)

Measures

of

Religious

Influence

Religious

Guidance

Model

1

Model 2 Mod

b z-value

b z-value

b

Age

0.014

2.47***

0.014 2.41** 0.014

Education 0.113 3.46** 0.113

3.43***

0.111

Income

0.003

3.46***

0.113

1.24

0.003

Male

-0.548

3.71***

-0.549

-3.71***

0.546

Married

0.222

-0.139

-0.248 -1.55 -0.215

Northeast -0.106 -0.47 -0.097 -0.43 -0.098

Northcentral

-0.097

1.74

0.329 1.69 0.338

West

0.355 1.71 0.368 1.76 0.357

Rural 0.014 0.07 0.041 0.19

0.007

Small town -0.146

-0.74

-0.148 -0.75

-0.155

Suburb

0.013 0.06

-0.003 -0.01 0.010

Part-time

work 1.270 3.21***

1.210 3.05** 1.254

Unemployed

0.441 1.99* 0.249

1.92 0.430

Works

w/others

0.423 1.83 0.443 1.91 0.421

Black

-1.286 -3.36***

-1.344 -3.45*** -1.300

Hispanic

0.174 0.046 0.142 0.38 0.168

Otherrace -0.586 -1.68 -0.562 -1.61 -0.582

Homeowner

0.311

1.75

0.327 1.83

0.310

Neighborhood

problem

solving

0.291 1.74 0.306

1.83 0.293


15/28

TABLE 3

(Continued)

Measuresof

Religious

Influence

Religious

Guidance

Model 1 Model 2

Mo

b z-value

b

z-value b

Denomination

&

Religiosity

Fundamentalist -0.286

-0.62 0.368

0.25

-0.302

Nontraditionalundamentalist

0.339 0.68

0.175

0.12 0.310

Pentecostal

-0.195 -0.44 -3.780 -2.59** -0.219

Evangelical

-0.106 -0.43 0.005

0.01

-0.117

Black Protestant 0.295

0.59 -0.289

-0.20 0.282

Catholic -0.147 -0.70 -0.809

-1.50

-0.155

Jewish -0.735

-1.64 -1.197

-1.26

-0.719

Other

religion

-0.323

-0.63

-0.761 -0.54

-0.319

None -0.132 -0.51 -0.574 -1.08 -0.123

Religious guidance

0.003

0.05

-0.135

-0.98

Attendance

0.018

Religiosity

Interaction

with Denomination

Fundamentalist

-0.167

-0.39

Nontraditional

undamentalist

0.077

0.18

Pentecostal 1.103

2.59**

Evangelical -0.017

-0.07

Black Protestant

0.212 0.52

Catholic

0.245 1.33

Jewish 0.185

0.47

Other 0.159 0.35

None 0.180

0.76

Constant 11.045 11.398 11.071

Probability

0.000

0.000 0.000

Adj.

R2

0.080 0.080

0.079

*p

<

0.05;

**p

<

0.01;

***p

<

0.001.


16/28

RELIGION'S

AMBIVALENT

ROLE

IN SOCIALTRUST

tend

to be more

trusting

of fellow

workers,

net of other effects

(Models

1

and

3).

In

Model

1,

however,

those who are now

unemployed

also

report

higher

levels of trust

(probably

reflecting

feelings

of retired

workers).

Both

African Americansand males show

significantly

ower

levels

of trust n their co-workers han theirwhite andfemalecounterparts.

The

patterning

f the coefficients

presented

n

Models

2

and

4

resemblesthe

pattern

observed

among

the

demographic

variables

n

Models

1

and

3 in this table. The most notable

difference,

however,

s thatsome

of the effects of

religious

orientation ttain tatistical

ignificance

n Models

2

and4.7

Pentecostals,

or

example,

tend to exhibit ower levels

of trust

n

co-workers

han

mainline

Protestants,

but this

pattern

s

again

reversed

among

Pentecostals who attend church

services

frequently

and those

who receive considerable

guidance

from their

religious

beliefs.

Figure

3

indicates that Pentecostals

who believe

they

receive the

highest

levels

of

guidance

from their

beliefs exhibit

higher

evels

of trust hanmainlinersand

Figure

4

shows

that he

highest-attending

Pentecostals

again actually

surpass

mainliners

n

the trust

hey display

toward

co-workers.

Table4 presents he unstandardizedOLScoefficientsfor modelspredicting he levels of trust

individualsbestow on their

neighbors.

The

patterning

f the unstandardized

oefficients

reported

n

both Models

1

and 3 in Table

4

differs

somewhatfrom

preceding

findings.

In

both

models,

older, wealthier,

more well-educated

individuals,

and homeowners

show

higher

levels of trust

n

their

neighbors,

net of

other effects.

(The

effects

attributableo income

probably

reflectunmeasured

differences

n

the

neighborhoods

where

higher

income

respondents

reside.)

In

both

models,

however,

African

Americans and

members of other

races

(i.e.,

Native

Americans,

Asians,

and

non-Hispanics)

end to trust

their

neighbors

ess,

compared

o their white

counterparts;

nd,

relativeto urban

residents,

those who

live

in

small towns tend to trust

their

neighbors

more.

In

Model

1,

individuals

who reside

in

the

western United States

are less

trusting

han

southerners,

et

of

other

effects,

but

the effect fails to

reach

significance

in Model 3.

In

Models

2

and

4,

the effects

of the

demographic

variables

operate

similarly

in

both

mod-

els,

except

for

western

residence

(it

is not

significant

n

Model

4).

Results

for

religious

effects

diverge

somewhat between Models

2

and

4,

however.

In Model

2,

Pentecostals

again

tend to

place

less trust

in their

neighbors

than

do their mainline Protestant

counterparts,

when

other

variablesare

held constant.But individuals

who

report

hat

they gain

substantial

guidance

from

FIGURE

3

CO-WORKER

TRUST-PENTECOSTAL

BY

RELIGIOUS GUIDANCE

4---?~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..

9-

...,_.....

................. ..... . .............. ..... . ... .. ........ . . ..... . .... . . . . . . . . . .

.

......

a)

..

0

I

)

.

**

1 2

3

4

Guidance

Mainline

Pentecostal

331


17/28

JOURNAL

ORTHESCIENTIFICTUDY

OFRELIGION

FIGURE

4

CO-WORKER

TRUST-PENTECOSTAL

BY ATTENDANCE

(I,.

.......

. .. ..... . **...

..

..

....

? --

+--..^.--_.--- ^,: _

X-f

O

C,^....

:

:.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I --------u

.

.

-

*.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Attendance

|

.

.l

ainline

Pentecostal

their

religious

beliefs,

and

who are

categorized

as

being

affiliated

with a Pentecostal or other

nontraditional undamentalist

denomination,

end be more

trusting

of

neighbors

than mainline

Protestant espondents see Figures5 and6). The Pentecostals

with the

highest

level of

guidance

exhibit

greater

rust

n

neighbors

than

their

mainline

counterparts.

n

Model

4,

membersof black

Protestantdenominationsexhibit

lower levels

of trust than their mainline

counterparts,

ut this

effect

is

again

reversed

among

membersof black

Protestantdenominations

who attendservices

frequently

Figure

7).

Finally,

membersof

nontraditionalundamentalist

enominations

who at-

tend services

frequently

also show

greater

rust

n

their

neighbors

han s

displayed

by

mainliners

(Figure

8).

DIsCUSSION

In

regard

o the effects of such

demographic

variablesas

age,

education,race,andregionof

residence,

our results

presented

ew

surprises.

Consistent

with

previous

findings

(Putnam

1995;

Brehm and

Rahn

1997;

Smidt

1999),

older

and more well-educated

ndividuals end

to be more

trusting

of all

types

of

people, including neighbors

and

co-workers,

once

controls

are

applied.

African-American

espondents

also show

consistently

lower levels

on all measures

of trustthan

their white

counterparts, finding

that accords

with

past

research

(Hanes

1985;

Mullen

1991;

Kramer

1994).

The effects of home

ownership

and efforts at

cooperativeproblem

solving

are

more

difficult to

understand,however,

with home

ownershipdisplaying

statisticallysignificant

positive

net

relationships

to all of the

measured forms of trust and

problem

solving

showing

only

a

significantpositive

net

relationship

o the measure of

general

trust.

We would

speculate

that home ownershipis an indicatorof geographicallystable respondentsand those who live

in

more stable

neighborhoods

with less

crime,

which would

tend to increase

reported

evels of

social trust.

Perhapsproblem-solving

activity

is

picking up

some of these

same factors

if

group

problem

solving

is more

likely

in

neighborhoods

and communities

in

which

there are

a lot of

problems

hat

mustbe addressed.

t is also

possible

that he

experience

of a

neighborhood

roblem-

solving group,

unlike a

congregation,

does not include sufficient

value

consensus,

familiarity,

nd

predictability

of

interaction hat

might

contribute

o

building

social trust. Such

neighborhood

332


18/28

TABLE

4

UNSTANDARDIZED NET COEFFICIENTS FOR

OLS REGRESSION MODELS

PREDICTING

TOWARD NEIGHBORS

(n

=

1,290)

Measures of Religious

Influence

Religious

Guidance

Model 1

Model

2 Mod

b z-value

b z-value

b

Age

0.026

5.29*** 0.026

5.22***

0.025

Education

0.099

3.36***

0.091

3.09**

0.091

Income

0.007

3.04** 0.007

3.08**

0.007

Male

-0.259

-

1.98*

-0.250 -1.91

-0.257

Married

0.148

1.01 0.105

0.71

0.136

Northeast -0.370 -1.76 -0.394 -1.88 -0.357

Northcentral

0.047 0.26

0.053 0.030

0.041

West

-0.385

-1.99*

-0.392 -2.02* -0.371

Rural

0.262 1.36

0.279

1.45 0.256

Small

town 0.394

2.17* 0.409 2.25*

0.394

Suburb

0.267 1.19

0.291 1.31

0.263

Part-time

work 0.360

0.99

0.322 0.89

0.328

Unemployed

0.071

0.39 0.084.

0.47 0.071

Worksw/others

0.040

0.24 0.032

0.19

0.036

Black

-1.070 -3.20***

-1.126 -3.64**

-

1.092

Hispanic

-0.416

-1.24

-0.430 -1.28 -0.401

Otherrace -1.031 -3.14** -1.007 -3.08** -1.031

Homeowner

0.614

3.77*** 0.617 3.78***

0.599

Neighborhood

problem

solving

0.071

0.46 0.061 0.040

0.066


19/28

TABLE 4

(Continued)

Measuresof

Religious

Influence

Religious

Guidance

Model

1

Model

2

Mo

b

z-value b

z-value

b

Denomination&

Religiosity

Fundamentalist

0.207

0.50

-1.152

-0.87

0.179

Nontraditional

undamentalist

0.337

0.74

-2.230

-1.71

0.250

Pentecostal

0.364

0.93

-2.824

-2.23**

0.309

Evangelical

0.131

0.58

-0.601

-1.00

0.104

Black

Protestant

0.160

0.37

-0.348

-0.31

0.137

Catholic

0.215

1.11

0.256

0.51

0.182

Jewish

-0.129

-0.28

-0.681

-0.73

-0.107

Other

religion

-0.241

-0.49

0.434

0.34

-0.207

None 0.004 0.01 0.448 0.89 0.068

Religious

guidance

0.046

0.72

-0.020

-0.16

Attendance

0.070

Religiosity

Interactionwith

Denomination

Fundamentalist

0.431

1.11

Nontraditional

undamentalist

0.793

2.11*

Pentecostal

0.972

2.62**

Evangelical

0.253

1.24

Black

Protestant

0.194

2.62**

Catholic

-0.017

-0.10

Jewish

0.256

0.67

Other -0.239 -0.57

None

0.333

-1.56

Constant

10.510

10.835

10.583

Probability

0.000

0.000

0.000

Adj.

R2

0.126

0.134

0.128

*p

<

0.05;

**p

<

0.01;***p

<

0.001.


20/28


21/28

336 JOURNAL

FOR THE

SCIENTIFIC TUDY OF RELIGION

FIGURE

7

NEIGHBOR TRUST-BLACK PROTESTANT

BY

ATTENDANCE

'-

L

o

n

c

z

1

2

3 4

5

6

Attendance

|*

kMainline

Black

Protestant

effects on social trust.The

particular heology

and lower boundariesbetween these

groups

and

the broader

society

and

culture make

religion

less

likely

to

promote

suspicion

about

humanity,

co-workers,orneighbors.We do not find evidence consistent with Wuthnow's 1999) thesis that

most

conservative Protestants ocus

on

bonding

social

capital

to such

an

extent that

bridging

social

capital,

at least as

expressed

in

social trust of

outsiders,

s

compromised.

In

fact,

we

find no

evidence thatconservativeProtestants

e.g.,

fundamentalists r

evangelicals)

are

uniquely

unwilling

to extend trust o those outside their

religious

community-to neighbors

and

colleagues

with

whom

they

work.

Contrary

o

many

social commentators

nd

democratic

heorists,

we would

FIGURE

8

NEIGHBOR TRUST-NONTRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVE

BY

ATTENDANCE

cn

:3

I-

0

.0

z

dr

2

3

4

5

6

Attendance

'Mainline

Nontrad.Conservative

- e ?, 9

1


22/28

RELIGION'S

AMBIVALENT

ROLE

IN

SOCIALTRUST

have

to conclude

that,

on the

whole,


religious

beliefs do not

appear

to

threaten he healthof

democracyby reducing

social trustand

producingdangerous

evels of

social

fragmentation.

n most

conservative

religious

traditions,

he beliefs

in

human

sinfulness and the

normof separation rom a secular world do not reduceappreciably he levels of social trust

affiliates

display.

Further

questioning

the view that conservative

religion

hinders

democracy,

we

find no evidence that more involved or committed

religious

conservativesexhibit

any

less social

trust than the noncommittedor

noninvolved adherent.Nor do we find

that true

believers

in

conservative

religion,

as measured

by

the

importance

of

their

religion

in

their

daily

lives,

are

any

less

trusting

hantheir

nominallyreligious counterparts.

We do find

evidence, however,

suggesting

that the vividness of

the Pentecostal

worldview

provides

a

religious

crucible

in

which the

unsaved an be more

easily denigrated

or,

at the

very

least,

viewed less

charitably.

This

worldview,

which

tends

to

characterize

good

and evil in

personal

ermsand

repeatedly

onnects

daily

events

to an

overarching, early

Manichean

truggle

between SatanandJesusChrist,createsapowerfuldynamic hatseemslikelyto inhibit hegrowth

of social trust. But even this

effect,

as we

argue

below,

appears

much less

threatening

o

social

capital

and the health

of our

democracy

when considered

within

congregational

ettings.

Whatcan we conclude

aboutthe effect of

religiosity

on social

trust?Given

past expectations

(see

Leege

1988),

it seems

surprising

hat

neitherof the

measuresof

personal

religiosity display

statistically significant

main effects.

We do not find

support

or

the common

assumption

n

the

literature hat

religiosity,

especially

church

attendance,

would

indicatea

socially trusting

person-

ality type.

Also,

we do

not find evidence

that

religious

involvement tself

provides

a

mechanism

through

which

individualAmericans are

prepared

or

democratic

participation.

This

may

still

hold for civic

participation

Verba,

Schlozman,

and

Brady

1995),

but it

does not extend

to social

trust.

However,

when we

consider he

patterning

f

significant

nteractions

etween

these measures

andcertain

dummy

variables

epresenting

n

individual's

affiliation,

we are

able to

provide

a more

nuanced

picture

trust in god and trust in man

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