trigger, b. (aims in prehistoric archaeology)

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Essays in Archaeo log ica l In terpre ta t ion

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it is accepted that British and American archaeology areproducts of different historical traditions. These traditions arecharacterized by much convergence in practical matters relatedto the analysis of archaeological data but view archaeologywithin different academic and social contexts. Such differencesoften prevent a straightforward understanding and evaluationof what is going on in the other tradition and contribute to aneedless and harmful sense of alienation. There is also thedanger that enthusiasm for the New Archaeology amongyounger British archaeologists (Spriggs 1977) may lead themto reject the British approach without considering its merits.Ao effort to understand the peculiarities of both of thesetraditions seems justified if it permits archaeologists on bothsides to recognize what is culturally-specific in their own think-ing and facilitates a two-way transmission of ideas which allowsthem to handle their data better.

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11Aims in Prehistoric Archaeology

NOT LONG AGOTHE THEORETICAL literature in archaeologydealt mainly with excavation techniques and the processing ofarchaeological data. In recent years, the successful realizationof many of these empirical objectives, plus a rapidly increasingcorpus of data, have motivated a younger generation ofarchaeologists to investigate more carefully the problems thatare involved in the explanation of the data and the study ofprehistory in general. This concern has produced a spate ofpublications which, although they often disagree radically aboutparticular issues, are attempting a ) to investigate the theoreticalstructure of prehistoric archaeology, b ) to formulate a morerigorous canon for the interpretation of archaeological data, andc) to pioneer new methods of analysis (S. and L.Binford 1968;Chang 1967b, 1968; Clarke 1968).One has to be conservative indeed to fail to appreciate thepositive value ofthese studies. However sectarian and polemicalsome of them are, and however much they may bristle with anoften superftuous terminology, they promise a better under-standing of the significance of archaeological data. One cannotjustly regard these studies as an aberration that serves only todivert professional interest from more important objectives(cf. J . Hawkes 1968). On the contrary, whether their authorsadmit it or not, most of these studies are based very solidlyupon the previous achievements of prehistoric archaeology. Thefact that they are compelling archaeologists to become increas-ingly explicit and self-conscious about their goals is surelyevidence of the maturation of the discipline.The most vital problems that these studies pose for the

profession as a whole concern the general orientation ofprehistoric archaeology. Until recently, it generally was takenfor granted that prehistoric archaeology was an historical19


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discipline that aimed to investigate man's past for those periodsfor which written records are absent or scarce. Lacking thetools of history proper, prehistorians attempted to learn aboutthe past from the artefacts and other traces of human activitythat survive in the archaeological record, much as palaeonto-logists strive to extract information from fossils, and historicalgeologists search for it amongst geological strata. It is noaccident that the links between these historicizing disciplineshave been dose, and that they have shared much the sameconceptual basis for their methodology.It is fashionable today to say that archaeology has three

aims: to reconstruct culture history, to reconstruct prehistoricpatterns of culture, and to explain cultural processes (S. andL.Binford I968 : 8-I6). However, most ofthe 'New Archaeo-logy' has tended to place considerably more emphasis on thesecond and third of these goals than on the first; and, in somecircles, this has given rise to a divergent view of the aims ofarchaeology. L. R. Binford (I967a : 234-5; I962) for example,considers that archaeology should be 'an objective comparativescience involved in the explication and explanation of culturaldifferences and similarities'. In an address to the AmericanAnthropological Association, F. Plog (I968) advocated a similarrole for archaeology, as an 'experimental social science'capable of testing hypotheses that are relevant to the theories ofthe social sciences and therefore contributing to the explanationofhuman behaviour. In what is undoubtedly the most rigorousand systematic single programme for archaeological interpre-tation outlined to date, D.L.Clarke (I968 : 20-24) defines theprimary aim of archaeology as being to explain the regularit iesthat the archaeologist observes in the archaeological recordoHe argues that this will make archaeology a generalizingdiscipline studying material culture, structurally similar andsubstantively complementary to social anthropology.Each of these scholars seems to view archaeology as being

ideally a nomothetic or generalizing discipline having goalsidentical to those of ethnology and cultural anthropology.These goals, like those of the social sciences in general, are toformulate laws that will explain socio-cultural processes andassociated human behaviour.It isno surprise that these same archaeologists express

varying degrees of hostility towards the traditional, particu-20

larizing view of prehistory, which they stigmatize as beingdescriptive and lacking theoretical contento L. R. Binford(I967a : 235) denies that 'reconstruction of the past' can bethe ultimate aim of archaeology. If it were, archaeology wouldbe 'doomed to be a particularistic, non-generalizing field'. The'reconstruction and characterization of the past' is viewed asmainly having a 'role in the general education of the public'.Binford, apparently, does not believe that historical objectiveshave scholarly value in their own right, although here his standmay be polemical. He has himself produced historical work of ~ tr-.high quality (I967b) and elsewhere has expressed moremoderate views on historical objectives. Plog (I968) draws asimilar distinction between 'processual as opposed to strictlyhistorical analysis' and champions the use of the past 'as alaboratory for testing hypotheses concerning social and culturalprocess'. Clarke (I968 : 635-64) appears to entertain a moremodest view of archaeology's scientific goals and to be moresympathetic to particularizing than is either Binford or Plog.There are, however, few references to historical objectives inClarke's Analytical Archaeology, and it is clear that in this bookat least, Clarke's interest in cultural process greatly exceeds hisinterest in history.Most British archaeologists still appear to believe that such

views about the aims of prehistoric archaeology lack adequatefoundations or motives. This is especially so among archaeo-logists whose work brings them into dose contact with profes-sional historians and who share with them, consciously orunconsciously, many of the same views about the generalnature and goals oftheir respective disciplines. By contrast, theviews of the New Archaeology have substantial roots in theAmerican anthropological tradition. In his A Study 01Archeo-logy, W. W. Taylor viewed 'synthesis and content' (palaeo-ethnology and historiography) 'as middle range objectiveswhich logically precede a study of the nature and working of.culture'. Of this finallevel he wrote 'When the archaeologist. collects his data, constructs his cultural contexts and ... pro-ceeds to make a comparative study of the nature of culturein its formal, functional and/or developmental aspects, then heis doing cultural anthropology' (I948 : 4I). Likewise, inMethod and Theory in American Archaeology, Willey and2I Aims in Prehistoric Archaeology

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Phillips (1958 : 9) classified culture-historical integration as adescriptive operation preceding explanation, which in turn theyequated with processual interpretation. In both these works, asin the writings of the anthropologist Leslie White (1945b),historical activities tend to be viewed as essentially descriptive,while the ultimate aims of archaeology are characterized asbeing processual, that is to say, concerned with the formulationof general rules of cultural behaviour. In addition to reflectingthe prestige of nomothetic or generalizing activities in contem-porary American social science, this insistence upon generalizingas the ultimate goal of archaeology reflects the strength of theAmerican commitment to the idea that prehistoric archaeologyand ethnology are branches of anthropology and thereforeshould share common goals.The lip-service paid to these common goals was of little

importance so long as American archaeology was interestedprimarily in the recovery of data (Taylor 1948 : 13; Willey1968; Schwartz 1968). The main thrust of the theorizing wehave been discussing was clearly at the level of 'culrure-historical integration'. It is significant that neither Taylor norWilley and Phill ips bothered to examine the ult imate objectivesof archaeology in any detail. A comfortable degree of ambiguitypersisted between the concepts of historical and processualexplanaton at this level and the distinction between general i-zing and particularizing was not seen as being of great impor-tance. These distinctions only became so as archaeologists paidincreasing attention to problems of explanat ion in archaeology,which in turn has required that the goals of explanation beconsidered more carefulIy. Archaeologists are now faced withdemands that they should use their findings, alongside ethno-logical data, as building blocks in a single generalizing scienceof culture. Iee this not as an erratic demand, but rather as thelogical culmination of one line of thought that long has beenimplicit in American archaeology. Unfortunately, the objectionsthat have been raised against this point of view have notsucceeded so far in coming to grips with the main issues.Instead, they have revealed that a great lack of clear thinkingabout major theoretical issues lies behind the facade of muchtraditional archaeology.In an article in Antiquity, Jacquetta Hawkes (1968 : 255)reaffirmed her faith that the final aim of archaeology is 'the22

reconstruction of individual events in time', but in so doing sheunfortunately adopted the very phraseology that exponents ofthe New Archaeology use when they wish to imply that thetraditional aims of archaeology are purely descriptive. Further-more, as we shalI see below, her identification of history with avaguely defined humanist approach seriously misrepresents thenature ofhistorical enquiry as it is understood by most modernhistorians and implicit ly by many archaeologists. Indeed, herview of history is not dissimilar from the views that are held ofit by the most violent anti-historicists in archaeology. Hercondemnation of natural science methods has to be interpretedas a crit icism not only of current developments but of alIprehistoric archaeology since the days of Christian Thomsen.Another paper that exemplifies the limited view ofthe nature

of historical enquiry that is held by many archaeologists isSabloff and Willey's 'Collapse of Maya Civilization in theSouthern Lowlands' (1967). In that paper, the authors defendan historical approach in archaeology by attempting to showthat a single event may explain the colIapse of Maya civilizat ionbetter than do current 'processual theories' that attribute it toecological or social factors. The event which they choose is anhypothesized invasion of the Maya lowlands from the highlandsof Mesoamerica. FolIowing the interpretative procedure alreadyoutlined by Willey and Phillips in their book Method andTheory in American Archaeology, they argue that 'by firstgaining control of the historical variables, we will then be in anexcelIent position to gain control of the processual ones'.This identif ication ofhistory with events but not with process

has provoked a well-rnerited response from Erasmus (1968)and L. R.Binford (1968a). Both point out that historical eventscannot be understood apart from their processual contexts, andthat the mere demonstration of a sequential relationship doesnot constitute a meaningful explanation of that relationship.Even if Maya civilization did colIapse folIowing an invasion,the reasons for its colIapse must be sought in the social andeconomic condit ions that permitted such an invasion to occurand to have such far-reaching consequences. Erasmus concludesthat historical events should not be given priority over process,but has nothing to say about the implications ofthis conclusionfor an understanding of the structure of historical explanation.23 Aims in Prehistoric Archaeology


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Binford comes dose to eliminating the dichotomy betweenhistory and process by defining a proper historical approachas one that embraces a concern with processo He daims that hismain disagreement with Sabloff and Willey, and with othertraditional archaeologists, is over method. According toBinford, traditional archaeologists are content to use an induc-tive rnethodology, which means they formulate propositionswhich they believe explain the past. Binford argues that,instead, archaeologists must employ a deductive approachwhereby these propositions are tested. Binford's apparentsympathy for an historical approach that embraces a concern forprocess is offset, however, by a tendency to characterizeinductive approaches as being particularizing and deductiveones as generalizing. The deductive method is seen as leading,through a knowledge of the operation of past cultural systems,to the formulation of laws of cultural dynamics and culturalevolution. Rather than being explicitly rejected, the concept ofhistory is lost sight of within Binford's general theoreticalframework.We are thus presented with the unhappy spectade of the

supporters and foes of an historical archaeology in seemingagreement that historical objectives can be satisfied at thedescriptive leveI. This is not the first time that such a condusionhas been arrived at in American anthropology. Kroeber onceaccused Leslie White of having appropriated for his concept ofevolution alI that was significant in history while refusing toaccept the resto 'It wilI not do', Kroeber wrote, 'to gut historyand leave its empty shelI standing around; there might be theembarrassment ofno one's daiming it' (!952 : 96). The currentemphasis on processual studies in archaeology again seems tobe threatening historical approaches with such a fate.Here it is necessary to pose a few hard questions. The first is:

granting that archaeology traditionally has conceived of itself asan historical discipline, is it true that archaeologists havesought only to reconstruct and describe the past? Or have theyalso sought to explain it? Secondly, is any attempt to justify anhistorical approach merely a semantic exercise, or is the conceptone of vital significance for prehistoric archaeology and forunderstanding the relationship between it and other disciplines?

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What is History ?To begin to answer these questions it is obviously necessary todarify what is meant by historical investigation and to do thisthe archaeologist needs to look beyond his own discipline. Inthis and in the following section I have restr icted my observa-tions to the fields of archaeology and history proper (i.e.documentary history), although similar observations couldhave been made with reference to historical geology, palae-ontology, and cosmogony. Historical analysis is not lirnited tothe study ofhuman behaviour but also is an integral part ofthephysical and biological sciences (Kroeber 1952 : 66-78).It is simply not true that historical disciplines have only

descriptive objectives or are interested only in deterrniningmatters of fact and discussing chronological relationships. Inthe last century, partIy as a protest against the moralizinginterpretations of history that were popular prior to that time,historians tended to conceive of facts as constituting the hardcore of history, while interpretations were regarded as littledifferent from personal opinion. According to the greathistorian L. von Ranke, the aim ofhistory was simply 'to showhow it was', ('w ie es eigentZichg ewesen'). Objectivity of this sortwas a congenial goal during the later nineteenth century,which E. H. Carr (1962 : 2-3) has described as 'a great age forfacts'. Unfortunately, the image that history developed ofitself at this time has influenced the view that other disciplineshave held of it ever since. Yet, even then, it was scarcely anaccurate reflection of what was going on in history. Mosthistorians were aware that interpretation played a vital role inthe wri ting of history, even if this was based on some cornmonly-held view of man or society masquerading as the historian'sown philosophy. Works such as Mommsen's H istory of R om edearly derive much of their value from the manner in whichtheir authors were able to use their personal insights intocurrent social and polt ical problems to explain the past (Carr1962 : 29-38).For a long time now, most historians explicitly have rejected

the empiricist dichotomy between fact and explanation. It isgenerally recognized that pure description is not only a25 Aim s in Prehis toric Ar chae oZogy


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grotesque goal, but also impossible of attainment. ldeally, apurely descriptive history would aim to recount in the mostminute detail what happened to every person living at aparticular period. Every particle of information would have tobe judged as being as important as every other, and no attemptcould be made to suggest the overall significance of what washappening. Such a caricature is the very antithesis of all realhistorical investigation, which is based upon a selection ofthosefacts which the historian deems are significant (Carr 1962 :. 4-14). The selection ofthese facts is influenced by the opinionsor theoretical orientation ofthe historian. ln earlier times, as wehave already suggested, this orientation was preferably implicitand frequently unconscious.ln an otherwise admirable discussion of explanation inarchaeology, Spaulding (1968 : 33-9) sees the chief differencebetween scienceand history as being the latter's dependence oncommonsense explanations, but this clear1y does injustice tothe work of many modern historians. ln the zoth century thetendency has been for this sort of history to be replaced by onein which explanations are based not on personal impressions ofhuman behaviour but on solid bodies of social science theory.This development has led to the emergence of social and eco-nomic history as flourishing sub-disciplines, closely linked withsociology and economics. G.R.Elton, in his The Practice ofHistory (1969 : 38-56) gives a stimulating, if not alwaysoptimistic, assessment of these developments. Likewise, thefindings of psychology are being used with growing effective-ness to interpret the behaviour of particular historical figures(Erikson 1959). While the significance of chance and deter-minism for history is still a subject for debate, it is accepted thatindividual behaviour is not random and must be viewed interms of a social and cultural matrix which is itself subject toorder1y development, that is, which can be explained, if notpredicted, by general rules (Carr 1962 : 81-102).History differs from the generalizing social sciences on1yinthat its primary aim is to explain individual situations in alltheir complexity rather than to formulate general laws forindefinitely repeatable events and processes. That is what ismeant by saying that history is idiographic, the social sciencesnomothetic (Nagel 1961 : 547; Elton 1969 : 22-24,41). Thisdoes not mean that historians deny the existence of general26

rules; rather they seekto employ them to gain an understandingof individual (i.e. unique and non-recurrent) situations. Thegeneralizing social sciences, on the other hand, extract recurrentvariables from their socio-cultural matrix so that relationshipsof general validity can be established between them. AsKroeber (1952 : 63) has pointed out, in history process istreated as a 'nexus' among phenomena, not as a thing to beextracted from them.The use of general rules to explain a concrete situation is noless an act of creative skillthan is the formulation of such rulesto explain repeated correlations. Because the aim is to explaina particular situation in all its complexity, the application ofsuch rules serves as a test of theory, and, because a variety of ~different bodies of theory may have to be applied in conjunctionwith one another, historical interpretation serves as an inter-disciplinary arena in which the explanatory power of differenttheoretical approaches may be ascertained. As Carr (1962 :84) has said 'Every historical argument revolves round thequestion of the priority of causes'.Moreover, the fact that historians set as their goal the detailedexplanation of particular historical events does not mean thatthey do not perceive regularities that occur repeatedly in theirdata or attempt to formulate general rules to explain theseregularities. Such efforts are the primary motives under1yingthe work of historians such as Spengler and Toynbee, which,however, not all historians recognize as history (Elton 1969 :83). For the most part, professional historians tend to regardattempts to discover 'historicallaws' as contributions to socio-logy or to one of the other social sciences, rather than tohistory proper (Nagel 1961 : 551). This in no way denies the

right of an historian simultaneously to pursue generalizing andparticularizing objectives.Current trends in history proper thus reveal the irrelevanceof the traditional dichotomy between history and science.Historians use social science theories to interpret their datawhile social scientists, in turn, use the findings of historians asone means of formulating and testing general theories. Historyand the generalizing social sciences are like the two sides of acoin - complementary rather than antithetical. Under thesecircumstances it is difficult to maintain that the apparent27 Aims in Prehistoric Archaeology


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distinction between science and history is equivalent to tbatbetween tbe sciences and tbe humanities. In Th e Structur e ofScience Nagel (1961) broadly has defined science as tboseactivities concerned with determining and explaining relation-ships between objective phenomena, as opposed to tboseconcerned witb making aestbetic or moral judgements. Theterm humanities is best used to refer to tbe latter disciplines.Witb a definition of science tbat includes botb idiographic andnomotbetic goals, a growing number of historians are willing toregard tbemselves as scientists and to make use of tbe findingsof tbe otber social sciences.

Archaeology as HistoryEspeciaIly in recent times tbe development of prehistoricarchaeology has been characterized by growing interest inusing explicit models borrowed from tbe social sciences and byinsisting upon tbeories whose validity is subject to verificationtbrough furtber testing. One important breaktbrough in thisdirection carne early in tbe history of archaeology whenChristian Thomsen rejected tbe antiquarian conviction tbat hadbeen current prior to tbat time, tbat tbe ruins of tbe past couldbe 'explained' adequately: only by determining which histori-cally-known tribes had produced tbem. ln place of this,Thomsen, and later Worsaae, posed tbe question: from whatpoint ofview can man's past best be explained, given tbe natureof tbe archaeological record? The current demand for inter-pretations of prehistory tbat are susceptible to furtber testingstands squarely in tbe Thomsen-Worsaae tradition and shouldnot be construed as an attack upon established principles ofarchaeology. Value judgments and aestbetics have a place inboth history and prehistory, but should be distinguished forwhat tbey are. In botb of tbese disciplines tbe search for newmetbods to understand tbe past better and tbe constantendeavour to distinguish fact from fiction are not professionalvirtues: tbey are duties (Carr 1962 : 5).G.M. Trevelyan (1949, I : xii ) recaIled Thomas Carlyle'sobservation tbat tbe smaIlest real fact about tbe human past ismore poetical than tbe best of poems and more romantic tbanthe best novel. 1endorse this viewand aminfuIlagreement witbtbe criticisms tbat have been leveIled against archaeologists28

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who seekto round out tbeir data witb unwarranted speculationsin a desperate effort to produce sometbing resembling narrativehistory. Whatever qualities of imagination or literary skill suchworks possess and however much tbey may appeal to tbe public,tbey no more qualify as serious works of prehistory tbanhistorical fiction qualifies ashistory. Long term respect must bereserved for tbe scholar who distinguishes between his inter-pretations and tbe evidence on which tbey are based and tberebymakes clear tbe limits of his knowledge.Moreover, by using explicit models and by formulatingtestable hypotbeses, archaeologists are helping to makearchaeology an experimental, albeit idiographic, discipline.Every scrap of new data tbat is recovered not only permits amore detailed reconstruction of tbe past but also serves to testearlier expectations. When a particular mode of explanation isfound to generate explanations tbat fail to stand up underrepeated testing of this sort, tbe chances are that it wiIl beabandoned or at least used witb an awareness of its limitations.The declining favour with which archaeologists view migrationas an over-alI explanation of change in the archaeologicalrecord is one example of this (Rouse 1958). While personalprejudice or a scientific understanding of tbe nature of culturewilI influence an archaeologist's sense of problem and hispreference for particular types of explanation, no wrong, orwrongly-applied, tbeory can forever survive repeated testingagainst new archaeological data. ln this sense, W.Y.Adams(1968 : 213) is right (but looking at only one aspect of thedata-interpretation problem) when he states that 'only solidevidence can ultimately serve as tbe building blocks of history'.Drawing an analogy between tbe development of history andprehistory, one can foresee tbe latter profitably continuing toevolveas a particularizing discipline tbat seeks to determine andexplain tbe course of cultural development in prehistoric timesin alI its detail and local colour. By its very nature, this en-deavour embraces tbe first two goals of prehistoric archaeologytbat were enumerated at tbe beginning of this study. Nohistorian can hope to explain events in a satisfactory mannerwitbout a detailed understanding of tbe socio-economic milieuin which these events took place. Rebels and great men are nolonger viewed by historians as operating apart from this29 Aims in Prehistoric Archaeology


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setting, but rather as acquiring their noteworthy characteristicsin terms of it (Carr 1962 : 47). In a similar manner, if aprehistorian wishes to provide an explanation of the develop-ment of any culture, it is necessary for him to determine, as faras possible, the nature of the social and political system atsuccessive phases in that culture's development. Only in thismanner is it possible to understand the changes that take placewithin such systems.Specialized techniques are now being developed for thereconstruction of various features of prehistoric cultures.

While the resul ting cultural profiles are essential for historicalpurposes, it is clear that they may also be of non-historicalvalue, particularly for structural comparison in social anthro-pology and ethnology. Despite this, the interpretative 'recon-struction' of prehistoric cul tures remains as integral- a part ofprehistory as the reconstruction of the anatomy of a dinosaurdoes of palaeontology.

Archaeology in Relat ionship to the Social SciencesIhave been arguing that a discipline ofprehistoric archaeologythat is idiographic, but not merely descriptive, not only ispossible but has been developing successfully during the pasthundred years. General ly speaking, the goal of reconstructionalways has implied explanation, and, as more evidence hasaccumulated and the basic cultural chronology for differentparts of the world has been worked out, growing attention hasbeen paid to it. The question we rnust now ask is whetherprehistoric archaeology, as a discipl ine, must choose betweenconcentrating on historical explanation or developing anomothetic approach in which archaeological data are used inthe same manner as ethnological data to generalize about thenature of culture. Or are both of these legit imate and profitableactivities within archaeology ?

It is at this point, I believe, that those who support historicalobjectives can take the offensive. Only when these objectivesare recognized as ~g the very core of prehistory will it bepossible to establish the productive working relationshipbetween archaeology and anthropology which many archaeo-logists are seeking. Insofar as archaeology is searching to definea productive role for itself as part of a broader science of man,30

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the question we must consider is fundamentally a heuristic one:in what way can the study of the past serve best to advance ageneral understanding of human behaviour ?ln the biological sciences evolution long has been recognized

as the key unifying concept, as many argue it should be inanthropology (Harris 1968). Yet, in biology, the success ofevolution seems to lie in its being more broadly defiued than inanthropology, the latter having tended to equate it with ideasabout progress and increasing cultural complexity. In biology,the term is used in two conceptually distinct ways to refer todiffering, but clearly interrelated, approaches or fields ofinterest (Mayr 1963 : 9).In the first place, evolution is used to denote al l the processes

that effect heredi tary changes in li fe forms, the main ones beingmutation and selection. The study of evolutionary processesclearly is nomothetic, that is , i t aims to formulate generallawsthat explain hereditary change regardless of the particularenvironrnent, period, or l ife form that is involved. For obviousreasons, most of the research on such processes of change iscarried out on living plants and animais.Secondly, biologists use the term evolution to refer to theactual development of life forms, as distinct from the processeswhich explain this development. The study of this constitutesthe discipline of palaeontology, which most biologists wouldcharacterize as being idiographic and historical. Palaeontologystudies extinct species of plants and animaIs and seeks byunderstanding them and their geological context to reconstructand explain the lines of development that link them together.Charles Darwin made evolution the key concept in biology

when he proposed an explanation for processes of changeobserved among contemporary plants and animaIs which, ifextended to the past, was also capable of explaining moreadequately than any previous theory the changes that wereapparent in the fossil recordo The concept that linked his twolines of argument together was that of uniformitarianism: the assumption that the products of processes that went on in thepast (in this case fossils ) can be interpreted in terms of processesthat can be observed at work at the present time. Uniformi-tarianism does not necessarily imply Lyell 's further assumptionthat these processes need go on at the same rate at all times.31 A im s i n P r eh is to ri c A r ch ae ol og y


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has assessed rhe importance ofpalaeontology in the followingterms: 'If the fossil record were not available, many evolutionaryproblems could not be solved: indeed many of them would noteven be apparent'.The structure of biology provides a mo de! for integrating

idiographic and nomothetic objectives that the archaeologistwould do well to consider . I do not advocate that anthropologists-borrow ideas about process uncritically from the biologicalsciences; on1y.~atJill:~consid~r..!heir .overall schemeof.organj-_zaJ:!.oJ)..:.he study of process in biology may be viewed asroughly analogous to the study of innavation and adaptation inthe social sciences; processes that in a broad sense embrace allof the generalizing studies of structure and function undertakenby these disciplines. By means of the generalizations arrived atin their various branches, the social sciences hopefully areadvancing towards an overall understanding of socio-culturalprocesses, and of the behaviour patterns underlying them, thatis valid regard1ess of time and place. ~-..__f; " ( ; J f .; > , ,-As in biolagy, it is impossible to 40recas~ the past retro-

spectively from a knowledge of the presenf. Even the mostgeneral t rends in cul tural development have been demonstratedsolely on the basis of archaeological evidence. AlI sorts ofspeculations about progress were indulged in prior to the middleof the Iast century, yet without archaeological evidence i t wouldhave been impossiblS ~~p~tW.f!pJ>logists to have demonstratedthat the most ~tendency in hurnan development had notbeen one of degeneration from a higher state or a cyc1icalprocess characterized by no overall progression. An under-standing of what has happened in prehistory requires thedetailed recovery and explanation of the archaeological recordin every part of the world. Because such an understanding onlycan be obtained from the archaeological record, a seriousresponsibility is placed upon archaeologists not to abandonhistorical objectives. Pursuing the analogy with palaeontology,it is possible to view the study of prehistory for its own sake asone important facet of the overalI study of socio-culturalevolution.The desire to make nomothetic objectives the primary goal of

archaeology is rather like a biologist attempting to use thefossilized rernains of Merychippus to study the c ir cu la ti on o f the

I. 33 Aims in Preh is to r ic Archaeology

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The application of uniformitarianism in the field of geologyhad already effected a major revolution in that discipline priorto the development ofDarwin's theory. Withoutthemechanismthat Darwin formulated to explain his observations of contem-porary life, the fossil record could not adequately have beenexplained ; on the other hand, without the fossil record, thesignificant changes wrought over long periods of time byDarwin's evolutionary mechanism - inc1uding the formation ofspecies and higher taxa - almost certain1y would not have beenappreciated. Both approaches had to be interrelated to generatea full-blown theory of biological evolution and they haveremained interrelated ever since.Moreover, palaeontology has not ceased to be an historical

discipline since Darwin's time, in spite of a growing under-standing of evolutionary mechanisms. Even if detailed com-parative studies of living species may be able to suggest with aconsiderable degree of accuracy the historical relationshipsbetween these species (Sokal 1966), proof of such relationshipshas to be sought in the fossil recordo It is impossible, on thebasis of the present conditions and biological processes alone,to retrodict in detail the nature of species that are now extinctor the particular sequence of development that these speciespassed through. That this is so does not reflect any specificweakness in current biological theories of process, althoughthere are large gaps in understanding, particularly aboutmutation. Instead, the situation arises because the factorsinfluencing the evolution of any species are so varied and sodifficul t to control that any substant ial 'prediction' of develop-ments in the past from present-day circurnstances alone isimpossible. To do this, not only would numerousbiologicalvariables have to be controlIed, but the biologist would alsohave to have at his disposal detailed information about geo-logical, climatic, and solar conditions in the past that exceedsanything that the disciplines dealing with these phenomena are

able to provide. Some day enough may be known aboutprocesses in all of these fields so that it will be possible toreconstruct the past on the basis of contemporary circurnstancesalone. Unti l that day arrives, the just if icat ion of palaeontology,or of any other historical discipline, remains the same: thesedisciplines alone can determine and explain what actualIy hashappened in the past. The biologist Ernst Mayr (1963 : I I)32


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I~f ),)'

blood, or the skulls of juvenile and adult australopithecines towork out general principIes of bone development. Both of theseproblems clearly are studied best on living animaIs in thelaboratory, although the general understanding that results,will no doubt be useful for interpreting fossil evidence. Thelogicofthis has longbeen recognized (perhaps toa dogmatically)by social anthropologists, who, wishing to generalize about thenature of society, have tended to reject all but living societiesas suitable objects ofstudy. The archaeologist who is interestedprimarily in formulating laws about socio-cultural processesmight better become a social anthropologist or an ethnologistand work with living or historically well-documented peoplesrather than with the more refractory material of archaeology.Recent developments in prehistoric archaeology do notdissuade me from this opinion. Most studies aimed at explain-ing archaeological data employ a direct historical approach, inwhich ethnographic data are projected into the past by tracingcontinuities and slow chaoges in the archaeological record(Deetz 1965; L.Binford 1967c; Longacre 1968), or elseethnological examples are used to formulate relationships thatit is hoped later can be applied to archaeological evidence(Dethlefsen and eetz 1966; Clarke 1968). Even where theproblem being ackled is wholly prehistoric, the terminologyand the conceptual apparatus are derived from the study ofcontemporary societies (L. and S.Binford 1966; S.Binford1968), the application of which to the past appears to beprimarily a process of particularization, not one that leads tothe formulation of general principIes.Nor am I impressed by aoother argument in favour ofnomothetic goals, which states that certain types of society nolonger exist and our understanding of cultural variation isincomplete without them. This argument rests on the question-able assumption that all types of society that have ever existedneed to be known before adequate generalizations can be madeconcerning humao behaviour. This is clearly a confusion ofnomothetic aod idiographic objectives. To understand thespecific conditions under which various state-orgaoizedsocieties evolved, archaeological data obviously are required,aod the more data we have the better are our opportunities forunderstanding concrete sequences of development. Yetunderstaoding these sequences is clearly different from34

determining the general conditions that give rise to states. Thelatter requires a detailed understanding of structure and func-tion that is derived best from the thorough study of livingsocieties, not from an interpretation of the remains of societiespreserved in the archaeological recordo If one's sole aim is togeneralize about states, the information contained in E.R.Leach's Political Systems 01 Highland Burma clearly is moreuseful than volumes of speculation about social organization inthe ancient civilizations. It is illusory to regard the study ofthese aocient civilizations as being primarily nomothetic:although of extreme interest and importance these studies are.fundamentally idiographic.The acceptaoce that tracing and explaining the actual courseof cultural development in all its complexity is the fundamentalaim ofarchaeology does not prevent the individual prehistoriaofrom pursuing nomothetic as wellas idiographic goals. Indeed,the more interested a prehistoriao is in process, the better heis likelyto be able to explain the pastoIn biology, the compara-tive study of the palaeontological record has resulted inimportant questions being asked about rates of development aodrelated matters, which in turn have stimulated important linesof research in genetics aod other nomothetic branches ofbiology. We have already noted this 'feedback' betweennomothetic and idiographic approaches as being characteristicof the study of manoMany archaeologists are interested in learning more aboutthe past for its own sake; others wish their work to be not onlyof antiquarian interest but aiso relevaot for understanding themodern world aod its problems. The idea that the latterobjectives best cao be attained by using archaeological data torepeat the work of the nomothetic social sciences reflects asimplistic view of the social utility of scholarship whichunhappily is all toa common these days. By attempting tounderstand and explain the past, archaeologists are contributingto human self-awareness. By demonstrating that mao aodculture evolved from humble beginnings, the archaeologists ofthe last century effected as revolutionary a change in man'sview of himself and of his place in nature as have Copernicus,Darwin, or Freud.

3 5 Aims in Prehistoric Archaeology


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CONCLUSIONSPrehistoric archaeology has an important role to play as anhistorical discipline within the larger framework of the sciencesof man. To understand its role, however, archaeologists mustcease to think in terms of narrow, straw-man definit ions ofhistory. Historical research embraces an interest in process aswell as in events and chronology. The aim of any historical

-! discipline is not on1yto describe but also to interpret specificevents. For the present at least, archaeology best fulfils itspotential not by trying to duplicate work being done in thenomothetic socialsciences but by providing detailed informationabout the actual course of socio-cultural deve1opment. Theparticu1arizing nature of such a task does not imply a lack ofconcern with theory, but indicates that within prehistorytheoretical formulations should be sought in order to explainevents, rather than as ends in themse1ves. It is highly unlikelythat archaeologists will not make comparisons and formulategeneral theories about processo These theories should berecognized, however, as part of the general domain of socialscience rather than of prehistoric archaeology as an organizeddiscipline.

36

lU

The Future of Archaeologyis the Past

AimsTHIS CHAPTER AIMS TO DEVELOP certain argumentsorigina11ypresented by me in Antiquity (1970a) [Chapter 2,above] concerning the role of so-called scientific and historicalgoals in prehistoric archaeology. More generally, I wish todemonstrate that both idiographic (particularizing or historical)and nomothetic (or generalizing) disciplines are vital com-ponents of a scientificstudy of human behaviour. This kind ofargument must involve some consideration of the role ofidiographic and nomothetic approaches in the biological andphysical sciences, although references to these will be limited toa few analogies. ., ~""".:f Q,'JIn recent years the preference for nomothetic goals hasbecome particular1y strong in the social sciences. It is argued'_,thatprogress toward science is made,,~heii~:y~J:;variablesaresubstituted for proper names - sites, artefact types, or cultures- and that whenever a researcher finds that a generalizationholds for one period, region, or culture and not for another, hisduty is to look for additional variables to explain the difference

instead of being content with mere1yciting it (Przeworski andTeune 1970). This has led certain archaeologists to advocatethat the principal goal of archaeology should be to formulateand test hypotheses regarding social and cultural processes(L.Binford 1962) or, alternative1y, that archaeology should beviewed as constituting the basis of a nomothetic study ofmaterial culture (Clarke 1968 : 20-24).Particular1y in North America, this position has beenreinforced by historical aswell as institutional factors. Archaeo-logy and ethnology share a common interest in the American3 7

trigger, b. (aims in prehistoric archaeology)

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