Name: TRIBESS, Camila1

Email: camila.nusp@gmail.com

Country: Brazil

Institution: Universidade Federal do Paraná

Panel: Overcoming Regime Crises: Survival and Demise of Au tocracies

The crisis of authoritarian regimes in Argentina an d Brazil, a comparative study

Abstract:

Several explanations are given to the dynamics of the crisis process in the

authoritarian regimes, which took place in several countries and in different ways.

These crises were the initial step to the political transition to democracy. The research

highlights the importance of conflicts within the regime (between "hard" and "soft"

groups), along with several other factors, such as economic crises, wars, social

mobilization and international pressure. This paper presents a theoretical return of

some of these various explanations, focusing mainly on a historical and comparative

context, attempting to understand the different dynamics of political transition

processes to democracy in Brazil and Argentina, that happened by the crisis in the

authoritarian regime. We compare the transition in Argentina, which occurred to rupture

and rapidly, with a catastrophic crisis inside the regime and beyond it with the transition

process in Brazil, which was developed by transaction and lasted more than a decade

to be materialized. We found to understand the similarities and differences of both

processes.

1. Presentation

This article was intended primarily as a way to expose part of my master's

research, in which I analyze the differences between the military dictatorships in Brazil

and in Argentina in the 1980s giving special focus to the differences and similarities of

these two cases that can help them understand their spillover and their transitions to

democracy, which had very different dynamics.

The Argentinian case is a quite short dictatorship of about 7 years since the

military seized power in 1976 (when they deposed the president Isabelita Perón) until

1 The author is master student in Political Science in Federal University of Paraná (UFPR) and is

researcher of the “Center for Research in Political Sociology” (NUSP) and “Center for Studies and

Research in International Relations” (NEPRI), both in the UFPR.

President Raul Alfonsín taking office in 1983, after free and direct elections. The

Argentine dictatorship had a strong military repression, popular mobilizations and

serious economic and foreign policy crises, including a war with England in 1982.

As we reflect on Brazilian case, the military dictatorship lasted more than 20

years since the coup of March 1964 (when the military withdrew the power of President

João Goulart), until the transitional civil government of President José Sarney, who was

elected in 1985 also indirectly. The first free and direct election of the new republic was

just in 1989, electing Fernando Collor de Melo. The Brazilian dictatorship was the only

one that had a institutionalized way in the continent, based on regional elections, and

repression but also in many economic plans to cope with various crises.

The way this article is organized search guidelines requested by entering the

coordinators of the panel, thereby dividing the text to underline the importance of three

basic concepts in the study of dictatorships, which are: legitimacy, repression and

cooptation. I present the theoretical approach I adopt, as well as temporal

contextualization and methodological research. Then, presenting partial data from my

research according to the division suggested by teachers Schmotz and Merkel.

2. Methodology

In this article we seek to understand the political dynamics of two transition

processes in a historical perspective, trying to get items to a broad vision of social and

political context which triggered the process of transition to democracy. We chose two

Latin American countries as a basis for a comparative study, they are Brazil and

Argentina. For the Argentine case the clipping is from 1980, the beginning of political

liberalization by the end of 1983, with the democratic election of Raul Alfonsín. For the

Brazilian case the chosen time period that we consider the transition is 1979, start of

the government of João Figueiredo, until 1989, the year of "founding elections"

(O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. 1988). The moment of political opening in Brazil, or

"liberalization" (O'Donnell, Schimter and Whitehead 1988; Martins, 1988, Linz and

Stepan, 1999) occurred from the government of Ernesto Geisel, also in 1974, however,

this liberalization has been partial and very limited (Dahl, 1997 p. 56). In 1977 there is

a major lack in this process of liberalization, with the recess of the House of

Representatives, the “Pacote de Abril” and “Lei Falcão” (political acts of restrictive

electoral laws) and the “Bionics Senators” (indicated by the military government and

with life tenure) constituted one third of the Senate. Because these facts, in this

research, we consider therefore that the political transition towards a democratic

system actually begins in Brazil only in 1979, with the return of multiparty politics, the

amnesty law and the end of the Institutional Act no. 5 (law of censorship). Is that we

can consider that the political opening of the dictatorship in fact progresses and

becomes almost irrevocable (Fausto and Devoto, 2004).

We take two cases that can be considered as model cases. We compare the

transition in Argentina, which occurred due to rupture and rapidly, with the transition

process in Brazil, which was per-transaction and lasted more than a decade to be

made. The comparison between the processes of transition to democratic rule is

explained when we consider that the transition in Argentina lasted 18 months since the

Falklands War until the 1983 elections and is typically classified as a "transition by

collapse" (O'Donnell et al, 1988 p.25), whereas, by contrast, we have the Brazilian

transition, which lasted about a decade and is classified as "transition by pacts" (ibid. p.

22). In the first case, there is a sudden fall of the regime, in the second case, the

transition is controlled by the military elite and occurs gradually.

Thus we have the following picture: both countries experienced a transition from

a dictatorship to a democracy, but in completely different conditions, despite their

geographical proximity and similarities of the historical, cultural and economic. In this

regard, studies on historical and political processes, especially in a comparative

perspective within political science in general can be extremely enriching for

understanding these differences. Furthermore, we believe that this type of study leads

to understanding political processes and their dynamics in different Latin American

countries, assisting in the reflections on the social and political context of these

countries. It is therefore of great importance for all research on the topic

comprehensively understand the transition process, even before test any theory or

hypothesis. We seek to understand, therefore, the similarities and differences in the

process of democratic transition in Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s by mapping the

situation of their countries before and during the political transition. We do this from

historical research and literature on the subject.

The comparison allows us to think wider models that explain situations, causes

and political phenomena, and emphasizes similarities and differences that may be

useful for thinking about the cases surveyed. To Sartori (1994), the comparison is a

way to control our generalizations, which allows to think of laws of "if..., then...". By

comparison we can have a broader view of problems and concepts, and thus our

studies do not end in only one case or a country, which makes the research more

robust and explanatory.

To Panebianco (1994), more general comparisons are those that have the

same logic of statistical comparison, but the similarities that we found cannot be

considered full explanation of our cases. These comparisons, when made for small

universes are very important and we can merge historical comparisons with statistical

comparisons whenever possible. However, historical comparisons are more complex

and can offer greater results explanatory, as pointed out by Collier (1994), which says

that when we have only two or three cases to compare, but with many variables,

comparisons become more complex and more depth. Thus, the comparative method

is most suitable for studies with few cases.

3. Theoretical approach

Since 1980, when dictatorships were replaced by democratic regimes in a large

number of Latin American countries, the issue of transitions of political regimes has

become an important object of study for Political Science and related fields. Several

explanations are given to the dynamics of the transition, which occurred in several

countries and in different ways. One of the main lines of research highlights the

importance of conflicts within the regime, along with several other factors such as

economic crises, wars, social mobilization and international pressure etc. (O'Donnell,

G. and Schmitter, P. 1988; Rouquie, A., Lamounier, B. and Schvarzer, J. 1985, Linz, J.

and Stepan, A. 1999 etc.).

Various associations and organizations (businessmen, politicians, intellectuals,

artists and students) have influenced these processes of transition, as well as the

dynamic economic crises, external pressures, wars and various political, economic and

social conditions can be used as explanatory variables transitions. The comparative

studies on democratic transitions, especially regarding cases in Latin America, confirm,

in large part, what O'Donnell and Schmitter (1988) propose as the main causes of the

transitions, which are: conflicts within and outside the regime and the start of the

liberalization that makes civil society to be politically revitalized; pacts between elites,

organized political groups, military, business and society in general.

Some studies on democratic transitions (O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. 1988;

Rouquie, A., Lamounier, B. and Schvarzer, J. 1985, Linz, J. and Stepan, A. 1999,

among others) point the transitions in two steps: one, the end of the authoritarian

regime and two, the "consolidation" of democracy. These studies indicate that the

reason for the transitions is not only in one of the parties, or just in "hard" or "soft"

groups, in government or opposition, but we must analyze the complex relations that

take place both within the regime. Moreover, one cannot just put the "elites" or "the

masses" as responsible for the transition, in all cases, the process and relations are

given in both directions. The question of how the transitions occur is also important in

comparative studies on these processes and there appears to be a consensus that the

transitions occur for reasons more complex than simple divisions in the regime. Thus,

O'Donnell et al (1988) analyzed that transitions can occur for different models: by

"break", it is, the regime falls and the political and social context change completely (as

in Argentina); or by "reform", it is, the transition is slow and the regime change until the

political context change too (this was, for example, the case of Brazil, where the

transition has lasted almost 10 years). In addition, there are also intermediate models

to them, they can be when the scheme rules do not change immediately or when the

rules change, but the rulers of the former regime can negotiate his departure. Another

important aspect is when the transition occurs. Several of the authors attempt to set a

specific date or event, but the explanations are in a complex relationship between the

divisions of the scheme together with the social changes and the internal problems of

the country. There is also the possibility of a calculation by the rulers of opportunity in

society, but the explanations cannot yet specify exactly why regimes change and when

they do.

However, the transitions do not mean the consolidation or institutionalization of

democracy. The type of authoritarian regime that the country had before and the

transition dynamics have great influence in the new political system and its

consolidation. In addition, the economic crises and needs of countries influence the

way in which the transitions occur.

To consult the primary literature that is dedicated to the study of political

transitions in Brazil and Argentina (O'Donnell, Schimter and Whitehead, 1988; Quiroga,

2001, Romero, 2004 and Fausto and Devoto, 2004), one gets the impression that this

transition in both countries at that time was indeed a result of a complexity of political

events, economic, cultural and social. The political elite would not decide if the

transition will occur, but it fell to the elite to decide how to do it.

The social, economic, political and cultural scenario figured prominently in the

transition process, even if policy decisions are actually made by a political elite, this is

also often pressured or influenced by social movements caused by other factors. We

have examples of these social pressures in Argentina, with "Madres de la Plaza de

Mayo” (The May Square Mothers), as in Brazil, with the movement “Diretas Já"(Direct

Elections now), among others (Quiroga, 2001, Romero, 2004 and Fausto and Devoto,

2004).

The Brazilian transition was very long and, in the speech of the political elite

actors themselves of that time: "slow, gradual and safe". This slowdown occurred in

large measure by the control that the regime had on the transition, the control achieved

by both directions of the scheme (a relative economic success in the first time) and by

the historical lack of social mobilization in Brazil (O'Donnell, Schimter and Whitehead

1988 - p. 22). By contrast, in Argentina this process was relatively short and has

virtually no control over the members of the regime transition. Until there was a certain

extent, an attempt by the military to negotiate his exit from power, which proved

fruitless since the fall of the regime was predictable at all, especially after a severe

economic crisis and the defeat in a foreign war (Cavarozi, 1988, Fausto and Devoto,

2004; Palermo and Novaro, 2007).

4. The authoritarian regimes three pillars

4.1 Legitimacy

The Brazilian military dictatorship was undoubtedly one of the most successful

in terms of maintaining their legitimacy facing the population. On 1th. April, 1964 the

Brazilian military government took power from President João Goulart and established

an authoritarian regime. Between the years 1964 and 1985 several generals have

succeeded in the presidency, but remained elections for legislative office and the

municipal administration (with the exception of capitals and border cities). The

electoral law was changed dramatically with the disappearance of the old parties, the

establishment of bipartisanship and closing of various representative bodies (such as

unions).

In 1967 the National Congress promulgated the new Brazilian Constitution that

officialized some tricks of government, such as the "bionic senators” (senators

indicated directly by the military with whole life mandate) and indications of a federal

executive for state government. Direct elections to the Chamber of Deputies were held,

although very limited, since it served to maintain under control the regional elites, and

socially legitimize the regime. These elections had changed the rules several times,

focusing on the representation of states in which the party of the regime (National

Renewal Alliance - ARENA) had more votes. The Congress was closed several times

during the dictatorship and the legislative powers were very limited. However, the

discourse that sought to legitimize the military government was a democratic

restructuring through the doctrine of national security. The coup was made amid a

serious economic and political crisis in Brazil, so, the military vowed to return peace to

society and restore economic growth.

The combination of: a reprimand; great economic growth achieved by the

scheme with the "Brazilian miracle", abstaining from much of the opposition in

elections, and support of regional elites, who were placed in positions of government or

parliamentary elections, among other factors, guaranteed the legitimacy of the regime

at the polls by the year 1974, the year that the opposition party (Brazilian Democratic

Movement - MDB) began to be stronger. In these elections the opposition won a

significant victory in legislative elections and General Ernesto Geisel took the

presidency with a speech of liberalization. However, this liberalization has been

contradictory. With each advance in one respect, there was a regression in others,

alternative forms of manipulation by the regime. This was only possible by great control

over the transition process and that the scheme was also exerted such control that

allowed the system would guide the next election. With multiple devices, laws, decrees

and control tools, the most known “Lei Falcão” (Falcão Law; 1976) and the “Pacote de

Abril” (April Pack; 1977), which limited the possibility of opposition having elected

representatives and to do political campaigning. The scheme thus secured their

legitimacy through the ballot boxes.

At the end of 1982 with a serious economic crisis and allegations of corruption,

internal crises arise from the scheme. The dictatorship had been relatively stable until

this point, however, the growing criticism, even within the regime itself, speeding up the

opening process. So in 1985, the regime changed the rules of composition of the

electoral college to elect the next Brazilian president. The agrarian states were

overrepresented, because in there had a strong dominance of the ruling party,

guaranteeing the majority in the presidential elections of 1985. However, with the

internal crisis in the regime and dissident strongly organized in the “Frente Liberal”

(Liberal Front Party), the electoral college elected the opposition leader Tancredo

Neves as the first civilian president since 1964. As vice-president it was elected José

Sarney, a dissident of the regime. Despite a massive mobilization for direct elections,

manifested in the movement “Diretas Já", the first civilian government was elected

indirectly, by the electoral college. Moreover, due to illness, Tancredo Neves died

before taking office. Then José Sarney assumed the government, who was formerly

political support of the military dictatorship. In 1986 direct elections were called for

representatives in the Constituent Assembly, which was established in 1987 and

promulgated the new constitution in 1988.

In Argentina - after the hard repression from 1976 to 1978 - at the beginning of

1980 the opposition began to manifest itself again, the military's economic plan for

Argentina was already showing signs of failure and full at the end of 1980 rose to CGT

(Confederación General del Trabajo, the big union of the country) and the party leaders

(of Peronist Party, PJ and the Radical Civic Union, UCR, mainly), reappeared on the

political scene. Unlike the Brazilian dictatorship, the Argentine military dictatorship was

not institutionalized their instruments, finally ended with all parties and canceled the

elections. At the same time, did not succeed in the economic success, which further

increased the antipathy of the population by the government.

Followed in the presidency of the country, General Roberto Viola, Leopoldo

Galtieri, after which in 1982 began the process of the Falklands War, and quickly lost

the war against England in June 1982. Here, then, the process of transition has

become clear (DEVOTO and FAUSTO, 2004 p. 457/458). When Gen. Reynaldo

Bignone assumed the presidency in the following month (July 1982), it can already be

considered a transitional government, not civil. Convened free and direct election for

the following year, in October 1983. In December of that year, just 18 months after the

end of the Falklands War, Argentina was already ruled again by a civilian president

elected directly. The elections brought to power Raul Alfonsín.

Romero (2008) argues that at no time, even in the soccer world cup (1978), in

which Argentina was the champion, the scheme has achieved the agreement of the

population. The Argentine government has become ineffective, corrupt and

fragmented, as the three arms divided up offices, ministries and officials, making the

state apparatus was paralyzed by power games and lack of a control limit. Not even

the president and his role escaped this division, since the formation of the junta that the

power was limited by the performance thereof.

In the brief government of Viola, the businessmen, who for a long period were

fragmented and distrustful of the military government, were included in the government,

but that ended with the conclusion of government Viola. Thus, entrepreneurs, much

affected by economic crisis, supported increasingly strongly, in opposition to the

regime. With the internal conflicts between the military itself, there was no cohesion of

thought, speech and actions, making the businessmen give even more legitimacy to

the movement against the dictatorship.

In 1981 ended the ban of parties and a organization was formed, called

“Multipartidária” (multiparty organization). It was formed by peronists (PJ), radicals

(UCR) and small parties - however fragile and without strong leaders, this organization

has undertaken not to collaborate with the regime and not accept a guided democracy.

Along with the other movements that were taking breath, the opposition grew until 1982

and it was noted.

Since 1980 the military sought a political solution, but with internal divisions,

which worsened during the presidency of Viola, which the Navy opposed, this output

was becoming increasingly distant. Viola started the dialogue with society - especially

businessmen - and worried about a possible political transition. But he failed in do not

to halt the crisis and nor to negotiate with the businessmen, that were very unhappy

with the serious economic crises in the country. In late 1981, Viola became ill and was

forced to renounce from office by his opponents and became president General

Leopoldo Galtieri. He did not have political tradition, but he had spent time in the United

States and pointed to close ties with that country, which guaranteed him a picture of

someone who could "save" the dictatorship. His economy minister was Roberto

Alemann, which deepened the crisis spilling over the protests of business and trade

unions. Alemann announced a privatization program (including the basement and

subsoil) that aroused the opposition of the military itself. Thus, the Galtieri government

was violently opposed, culminating in a major demonstration of the CGT in March 1982

(cf. Palermo and Novaro, 2007, Linz and Stepan, 1999; Devoto and Fausto, 2004,

Romero, 2001).

In this context, the conflict with Britain by the question of the Malvinas Islands,

which existed since 1833, comes back. Argentina had never prioritized these subject

because the opponent's strength and the inability of Argentina to actually act in this

sector. With Galtieri and the alleged U.S. support this idea seemed the solution to

several problems: the unification of the armed forces for a common goal, to win

legitimacy of the regime by obtaining a ancient claim of population, the conquest of

passage to the Pacific – that was lost in the conflict with Chile in 1978. Furthermore,

military planners did not was a war, but only an occupation, with the active support of

the United States and then a negotiation with England.

The occupation took place on April 2, 1982, the Argentine army won few troops

for the defense of England that were in the islands. After this and after a visit by U.S.

Secretary of State, there was broad support for social initiative. However, the war was

against Britain of Margaret Thatcher, who needed as much as the Argentine military

the legitimacy. The reaction against Argentina came hard. England had the support of

the European community and United Nations (UN), were placed severe economic

sanctions on Argentina and believes it was the aggressor nation. The United States

withdrew from negotiations with the early English attacks and has placed sanctions on

Argentina, also offering logistical support to England. The war began, but the

information that arrived for the Argentine population were only victories, which at first

caused the population support for the government. The opposition, at that time, has

raised the question of a transitional government after the war, especially the Radical

Civic Union and its leader, Raul Alfonsin. On June 14 Argentina was unsuccessful and

the government announced the surrender, which left over 700 dead soldiers. The

military demanded the resignation of Galtieri.

After this defeat the Argentine dictatorship loosed completely its legitimacy and

can no longer make any negotiations with the opposition and parties. Then convene

elections and the Argentine military government ends abruptly and traumatic for the

whole country. Unlike what happened in Brazil, the lack of legitimacy of government

has meant that negotiations were not viable, and even today the heads of the

dictatorship has been tried and convicted.

4.2 Repression

The repression carried out by the dictatorships of Brazil and Argentina is seen

in very different ways. Consensus, the repression imposed by the Argentine military

was tougher and more general. Some interpretations allow us to relate the intensity of

repression to a lack of social legitimacy of the Argentine regime, while the Brazilian

system, gaining legitimacy through other means, would be less need to resort to violent

repression. Another possible interpretation is the force that the opposition (parties,

movements, guerrillas and every political organization in general) had in both countries.

In Argentina since the 1930s, as a legacy of the movement that led to

Peronism, the Argentine politics was divided, with parties and movements with broad

social base. A leftist guerrilla group better known in the 1970s in the country, called

“Montoneros" came to mobilize support from important people in politics and society in

Argentina, before being completely decimated by the military that came in power since

1976. Also the command of Argentine repression was kept underground, forming a true

"state terrorism". Almost all the military government staff was allowed and free to run

the torture and murder, in addition, political arrests and prosecutions were rare, The

murder and disappearance were the rule.

The military dictatorship implemented with a program that placed itself as the

solution to the conflict in Argentine society, bringing the monopoly of violence only to

the state. Such violence would be heavily used to exterminate the conflict in society.

There were about 9,000 cases of "disappeared" confirmed and investigated, but the

human rights commissions to assess the correct number 30,000. All this in just three

years of heavy repression (1976/1978), after that, from 1980 this should be considered

a transition period. The guerillas left-wing organizations, such as "Montoneros”, were

extinct, but even after that the violence has spread to several union leaders, clergy,

lawyers, human rights activists, intellectuals and political leaders in general.

All parties, unions, associations and any political activities were banned, and

the repression of artists, writers, and intellectuals against the press. Thus, only the

voice of the state existed against isolate individuals. The ideal of the authoritarianism,

in most cases, was internalized and brought up the culture of fear. The most extreme

group within the armed forces, mainly composed of Luciano Menendez, Carlos Mason

and Ramon Camps argued that the prosecution (they ruled) should follow to its logical

conclusion (in fact, there were no rules or limits for it). They were thus in constant

conflict with the group of Generals Videla and Viola, considered the group of “soft”

ones.

From 1976 until April 1979 the unions were subjugated to the absence of fact,

there were only formally, because their leaders were arrested, banned strikes and

wage negotiations ended (cf. Palermo and Novaro, 2007). Only in 1979 when the

regime was taking its first breaths of exhaustion, is that the extremists union succeeded

in organizing a general strike, which the moderates not heeded, the strike ended with a

lot of repression and several arrests. In 1981, the new CGT organized general strike,

getting more repression, and in late 1981 (November) made a motion calling for "bread,

peace and work", being supported by some businessmen and students. From that

period strikes and stoppages began to appear more frequently, culminating in March

30, 1982, at a rally in Plaza de Mayo, the government cracked down heavily, with about

2,000 prisoners in Buenos Aires.

The "Madres de la Plaza de Mayo”, using the call of motherhood and family,

who could not be denied or placed by the military as subversive, soon became the

center of the questioning of the regime, the focus of attention also abroad, with a

moving appeal on the agenda that placed the prosecution that the military wanted to

hide. Thus, opposition movements gained steam. The "Madres de la Plaza de Mayo”

gained gradually international repercussions, placing the issue of torture and

disappearances under discussion, just like the military did not want, which further

weakened the regime. With the return of democracy, as the first democratically elected

government in 1983, the military responsible for the disappearances, torture and

crimes went to trial, the most recent was in July 2010 with the trial and subsequent

sentencing to life imprisonment of Jorge Videla, who, despite being considered a

component of the ward "soft" scheme, has been blamed as commander of the scheme.

In contrast, in Brazil, political persecution was commanded by the higher ranks

in the military hierarchy and the arrests were common. The Brazilian dictatorship, in

principle, not characterized by violence as explicit as the Argentine dictatorship (which

was one of the most violent of the continent), but it was still marked by arrests,

disappearances and torture. Some authors (see Pereira, 2010 and Fausto and Devoto,

2004) point to the fact that the opposition in Brazil was not as organized and combative

as in Argentina, with some notable exceptions, such as the Araguaia guerrilla, who was

brutally exterminated and urban guerrilla groups such as the one led by former

congressman Carlos Marighella. Brazil's violence, including torture, was more

institutionalized and legitimized by the regime and not done clandestinely as in

Argentina, but this does not exclude the existence of numerous records "disappeared."

By trying to maintain appearances of democracy, with institutions that forge

legitimacy of the government, the military dictatorship went their prisoners by including

trials in civilian courts. That does not mean that Brazil had "less" torture or killings,

including the fact that until today we do not know what actually happened in relation to

these arrests, trials and torture and death behind them, as official files were never

published. Several prominent persons were persecuted, imprisoned and tortured.

Others managed to flee into exile. Many students, workers and people working with

social movements and unions have disappeared and many others were arrested. The

idea they have sometimes in Brazil that the dictatorship would have been a

"ditabranda" (a smoother dictatorship) probably due to the failure of investigating the

atrocities committed, and the fact that in Brazil, territorially much larger than Argentina,

the prosecution focused on larger southeast cities. With the exception of the Araguaia

guerrilla group (guerrilla army who served in the north, in the region with this name),

the other resistance groups acted mainly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

Chronologically, was promulgated in 1966 the Institutional Act No. 5, which

limited intensely the individual freedoms of speech and press. Several public officials

and politicians (university professors, mayors, governors, deputies, etc.) were removed

from office and stripped of every kind of expression was severely repressed, with the

passage of time and the various institutional acts that were performed, arrests for

political reasons have multiplied. The so-called "leaden years" (anos de chumbo) of the

dictatorship were from 1966 to 1974, the year in which the discourse of the generals

pointed to a slowdown of the system. The Amnesty Law was only enacted in 1979 and

today those responsible for crimes of the dictatorship were not held accountable yet.

4.3 Cooptation

To understand the processes of cooptation that occurred in Brazil and in

Argentina it is first necessary to understand the political and economic situations

experienced by these countries prior to their respective military coups. Both countries

lived hard economic downturn, serious social problems and crises, which implied

political instability, high social demands and populist political movements. In Brazil the

coup took place against the government of João Goulart, after a controversial speech

in which the President has pledged a comprehensive agrarian reform in the country. In

Argentina, the coup was made to finish the government of Isabel Peron, who, after the

death of Juan Domingo Peron came to power, but without political support.

In Brazil, as Celso Lafer (1975) said, it was formed a pact between the military

and businessmen around a policy of economic stabilization. So with the promise (in

fact fulfilled for a certain period) of economic growth, the military government was able

to unify around the support of the wealthiest strata of society. Moreover, the military

coup was given in a context of profound social reforms. Goulart and his supporters

spoke in agrarian reform and tax modifications in the country, which made the big

businessmen and landowners, as well as the urban and rural elite supported the coup

of 1964. The military has won and retained the support of the ruling classes to ensure

the interests of capitalists (Cardoso, 1975). These interests were represented on an

informal but very effective way. As for the middle class have also been coopted by

promises of stability and economic growth, but also by moralistic rhetoric, as was made

explicit in the march "of the family with God for freedom", led by the conservative urban

middle class against the government of João Goulart, who was developing closer ties

with communist Russia and China and honored Che Guevara, among other positions

openly pro-communist.

Political elites (of various parties) were added in the official party (ARENA) and

were honored with legislative or bureaucratic positions, especially in states outside the

region of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, where ARENA got less legitimacy in legislative

elections. Still, these states, many offices were distributed to conform political leaders

who supported the regime. Besides these actions, the universities were under constant

watch of the dictatorship and censorship of the media, the artists and writers. It brought

in the country a false impression of consensus, which only begins to be broken in 1974.

In Argentina's dictatorship was initiated with the purpose of a "National

Reorganization Process", also promising end the country's ills, such as social conflict

and economic crisis. There the legitimacy of the scheme was different, as

entrepreneurs wary of the effectiveness of the military government from the beginning,

however, against the economic chaos in that country was not protested against the

coup.

With regard to acts of military troops to co-opt support, the depoliticization of

Argentine society was most evident. This depoliticization occurred trying to avoid

opposition to the dictatorship, but also promises a future scenario of low social

mobilization. In addition to the repression, as discussed above, the closure of political

parties and to put people's trust arrangements in senior positions in trade unions made

the major representative bodies of the people had been submitted directly to

government power. Universities, schools and cultural institutions were also targeted in

this policy of demobilization, many books were burned in almost every city in the

country. Artists who did not show agreement with the regime were persecuted, but the

more subtle co-option occurred with the gradual dismantling of public education in the

country, which until now seeks to rebuild the pressures imposed by the dictatorship.

Unlike the Brazilian dictatorship, the Argentine did not use elections and

positions to capture the political elites. Its base was formed by more repression than

cooptation. The government positions were hard disputed by three army forces. Thus,

there is clearly the cornerstone of the appointment system in Argentina was in deficit,

getting more an atmosphere of silence and inertia of large populations (at least until

1980) than an explicit or even latent support. Even the most important economic

fractions of the country were excluded from negotiations and political decisions. Only in

the Videla’s government was attempting to cooptation of big businessmen, which was

soon abandoned by the end of the Videla’s government. Even within the military

conflicts were common and often co-opt not getting the desired effect, making the

diverse groups in the armed forces to start fighting constantly.

5. Final Thoughts

We realized, by contextualizing the dictatorial regimes of Brazil and Argentina,

that these three pillars of the regimes: legitimacy, repression and cooptation, allow for

an analysis of these schemes that lighten the complexity of each sphere in question,

allowing comparisons and generalizations, leaving the analysis "Every case is

different". However, despite the pedagogical and methodological division in three

spheres, it is clear from our analysis that these three pillars are intertwined and often

even interdependent. The legitimacy of the regime often depends on the intensity with

which it uses repression and competence that has to co-opt his opponents. Moreover,

these pillars are considered as a process of path dependence, which leads us to

consider as essential to understand the history and the political and social complexity

of each case studied. The institutionalization of these three pillars in time to guarantee

the stability of regimes and their excesses or shortages mean that the regimes are

overthrown.

Clearly in the cases reviewed here, Brazil, in its dictatorship, had a higher

"success", ie, lasted longer and had more control over its end, by a complex network of

actions and decisions that legitimized itself. Meeting within the possible, a balance

between legitimacy, repression and cooptation that allowed its domination over the

society for 20 years and, even with the imminent prospect of an end, the regime still

had good control over the process of liberalization and transition. Also, we realized that

the end of the procedure is done at the time that it loses much of its legitimacy because

of the economic crisis, as well as complaints arising from corruption and torture during

the dictatorship. This breakdown of legitimacy and the excesses of repression that are

to be reported, along with the loss of political office by the electoral growth of the

opposition eventually demarcate the spillover of the regime and their subsequent

transition.

However, in Argentina, we noticed with the analysis proposed above, what

happened was an imbalance between the three pillars. Here we see a serious lack of

legitimacy of the regime, an abuse of the means of repression and almost absolute lack

of means of cooptation that were not directly linked to repression. This mixture was

corrosive to the system that failed their political goals, broke his own armed forces,

strengthened the opposition, mainly from 1980, and moved deeper into an international

conflict that caused his defeat suddenly and without any possibility of negotiating the

political transition. Thus we see that the performance of the political elite in these three

pillars together with the political and social context may define the continuation or end

of an authoritarian regime, which basically depends on balancing the three pillars

discussed here. The desperate search for legitimacy, it has been demonstrated with

the Falklands War, shows that the failure of that aspect (besides the already mentioned

deficiencies in the other two pillars) that the scheme is at risk, so that military defeat

would result in defeat own military government.

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