trial by fire final-r1 - wri indonesiatransitional president b.j. habibie. in mid-1999, indonesians...

TRIAL BY FIREF O R E S T F I R E S A N D F O R E S T R Y P O L I C Y I N I N D O N E S I A’ S E R A O F C R I S I S A N D R E F O R M

CHARLES VICTOR BARBER

JAMES SCHWEITHELM

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE

IN COLLABORATION WITH

WWF-INDONESIA & TELAPAK INDONESIA FOUNDATION

I N D O N E S I A ’ S F O R E S T C O V E R

Notes: (a) Hotspots, showing ground thermal activity detected with the NOAA AVHRR sensor, represent an area of approximately 1 square kilometer. Data from August - December 1997 were processed by IFFM-GTZ, FFPCP

(b) Forest cover is from The Last Frontier Forests, Bryant, Nielsen, and Tangley, 1997. "Frontier forest" refers to large, ecologically intact and relatively undisturbed natural forests. "Non-frontier forests" are dominated by eventually degrade the ecosystem. See Bryant, Nielsen, and Tangley for detailed definitions.

A N D 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 F I R E H O T S P O T S

CA, and FFPMP-EU.

ondary forests, plantations, degraded forest, and patches of primary forest not large enough to qualify as frontier forest. "Threatened frontier forests" are forests where ongoing or planned human activities will

TRIAL BY FIREF O R E S T F I R E S A N D F O R E S T R Y P O L I C Y I N I N D O N E S I A’ S E R A O F C R I S I S A N D R E F O R M

CHARLES VICTOR BARBER

JAMES SCHWEITHELM

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE FOREST FRONTIERS INITIATIVE


WWF-INDONESIA & TELAPAK INDONESIA FOUNDATION

TO COMEPublications Director

Hyacinth BillingsProduction Manager

Designed by: Papyrus Design Group, Washington, DC

Each World Resources Institute report represents a timely, scholarly treatment of a subject of public concern.WRI takes responsibility for choosing the study topics and guaranteeing its authors and researchers freedom of inquiry.

It also solicits and responds to the guidance of advisory panels and expert reviewers.Unless otherwise stated, however, all the interpretation and findings set forth in WRI publications are those of the authors.

Copyright © 2000 World Resources Institute. All rights reserved.

ISBN 1-56973-408-9

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 00-103990

Printed in the United States of America on chlorine-free paper with recycled content of 50%, 20% of which is post-consumer..

C O N T E N T S

Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................... V

Foreword ................................................................................................................................. VI

PART I: THE 1997-98 FOREST FIRES IN INDONESIA: IMPACTS, COSTS, AND CAUSES

I. An Inferno in Waiting: Indonesia’s Forest Policy ................................................. 1Suharto’s Regime and the Fate of the Forest ............................................... 1Forest Fires: The Policy Connection ............................................................. 4

II. Historical Perspectives.......................................................................................... 5A Recurring Phenomenon ............................................................................. 5The Great Kalimantan Fire of 1982-83 ........................................................ 6

III. The 1997-98 Fires ............................................................................................... 8The Government Response ............................................................................ 8The Politics of Fire ....................................................................................... 12

IV. Counting the Cost: Impacts of the 1997-98 Fires ................................................ 15Effects on Forest Fauna and Flora................................................................ 16Effects on Water Flows and Water Quality.................................................... 17Effects on the Atmosphere............................................................................. 17Effects on Human Health.............................................................................. 17

V. Direct Measures to Counter Future Fire Outbreaks: Recommendations ........... 21

Notes for Part I .................................................................................................................... 25

PART II: BEYOND THE FOREST FIRES: REFORMING INDONESIAN FOREST POLICY

VI. The Political Economy of Forests in the Suharto Era ......................................... 28Logging Practices in the Suharto Era .......................................................... 29Industrial Timber Plantations ...................................................................... 31The Oil Palm Boom ...................................................................................... 32The Transmigration Program ...................................................................... 33The Million-Hectare Peat-Swamp Project in Central Kalimantan ............. 33

VII. Prospects for Forest Policy Reform .................................................................... 38Is Real Reform Possible? .............................................................................. 33

VIII. Recommendations for Forest Policy Reform ...................................................... 42

About the Authors ................................................................................................................. 53

Notes for Part II ................................................................................................................... 54

References ............................................................................................................................. 54

W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E I I I FOREST FRONT I ERS IN I T IAT IVE

W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E IV FOREST FRONT I ERS IN I T IAT IVE

Appendixes

Appendix A: BAPPENAS-ADB Methodology for Estimating Economic Costs of the 1997-98 Fires in Indonesia.......................... 62

Appendix B: What is Known (and Not Known) About the Ecological Impacts of the 1997-98 Fires ............................................................ 64

Appendix C: Certification Procedures of the Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute (LEI) ... 67

Maps

Map 1: Indonesia’s Remaining Frontier Forests ............................................... 68 Map 2: Distribution and Intensity of “Haze” from Forest Fires

in Indonesia, September-November 1997 ........................................ 69 Map 3: Distribution of Wild Orangutan Population, Accumulated Hot Spots,

and Protected Areas in Kalimantan, 1997-98 ................................. 70 Map 4: Forest Uses and Areas Burned in 1997-98,

East Kalimantan Province ................................................................ 71 Maps 5a-c: Land Clearing and Fire on the Central Kalimantan

Million-Hectare Rice Project, May 1995-July 1997 ......................... 72

List of Boxes

1. Indonesia’s Forest Resources ................................................................... 2 2. Indonesia’s Economic and Political Crises ............................................ 3 3. El Niño, Drought, and Forest Fires in Indonesia .................................. 5 4. Fires in Tropical Forests .......................................................................... 6 5. Shifting Cultivation and Fire in Indonesia .......................................... 7 6. What Burned and Where? ...................................................................... 11 7. The Politics of Data Manipulation:

How Much of East Kalimantan Burned During 1997-98? .............. 14 8. Human Health Effects of Smoke from Forest Fires .............................. 18 9. The Forests of Kalimantan and Sumatra Before the Suharto Era ....... 28 10. Megaproject Madness: The Mamberamo Basin Project in Irian Jaya .. 37 11. Forest Policy Reform Conditionalities in the IMF Economic

Bailout Package ................................................................................ 39 12. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects in Indonesia ....... 43 13. Community Mapping Strategies and Techniques ................................. 44 14. Traditional Resource Rights and Conservation .................................... 45 15. Forest Watch Indonesia: An Experiment in Citizen Monitoring

of Forest Status and Development .................................................... 46 16. Timber Certification in Indonesia:

The Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute (LEI) ................................... 49

List of Tables

1. Estimated Extent of Spatial Damage by Fire, 1997-98 ........................ 10 2. The Economic Costs of the 1997-98 Fires and Haze ............................. 15 3. Health Effects from Fire-Related Haze Exposure in

Eight Indonesian Provinces, September-November 1997 ................ 19 4. Timber Plantation Development to 1998 .............................................. 31 5. Oil Palm Plantation Development in Indonesia, mid-1980s to 1998 ..... 32 6. Losses Incurred by Seven Villages in the Mengkatip Watershed

Resulting from Land Appropriation and Fires Associated with the Million-Hectare Rice Project ...................................................... 35

W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E V FOREST FRONT I ERS IN I T IAT IVE

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

e would like to extendour thanks to themany people and

institutions who contributed to thedevelopment of this report.

At WRI, valuable comments,support, and guidance came fromCristina Balboa, LauraLee Dooley,Antonio La Viña, Anthony Janetos,Nels Johnson, Kenton Miller,Frances Seymour, and Nigel Sizer.At Telapak Indonesia, AbdonNababan, A. Ruwindrijarto, RezalKusumaatmadja, and Wardiyono allprovided crucial input and guidance.At WWF-Indonesia, we were greatlyassisted by Agus Purnomo, TimJessup, Fernando Gonzalez, MartinHardiono, Mariani Pangaribuan,and Carey Yeager.

The report greatly benefitedfrom external reviews provided byEmily Harwell, Hira Jhamtani,Hariadi Kartodihardjo, Tahir Qadri,and Michael Ross.

Valuable information andideas were also provided by MubariqAhmad, Longgena Ginting, EmyHafild, Derek Holmes, JohannesHuljus, David McCauley, JamesTarrant, and Tom Walton.

Finally, we would like to thankthe production staff at WRI:Siobhan Murray for preparing themaps, Debbie Farmer, Carol Rosen,and Nancy Levine for their fine editing, and Hyacinth Billings formanaging production.

C.V.B.J.S.

W

W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E VI FOREST FRONT I ERS IN I T IAT IVE

F O R E W O R D

he forest and land fires thatengulfed vast areas ofIndonesia in 1997 and 1998

were an unprecedented human andecological disaster. A prolonged dryseason caused by the El Niño climaticphenomenon created the conditionsfor the conflagration. But the fireswere mostly ignited deliberately byplantation companies and otherseager to clear forest land as rapidlyand cheaply as possible, no matterwhat the consequences. This wasnot a “natural” disaster.

Nearly 10 million hectaresburned, including parts of 17 pro-tected forest areas, shrouding manytowns in darkness at noon andexposing some 20 million peopleacross Southeast Asia to harmfulsmoke-borne pollutants for monthson end. Economic damages fromthe resultant breakdown of trans-portation, destruction of crops andtimber, precipitous decline intourism, additional health carecosts, and other impacts have beenconservatively estimated to havetotaled around $10 billion. The tollon Indonesia’s rich forest biodiversityis unknown, but is thought to havebeen extremely high as well.

Disastrous as the Indonesianfires were, they were only one symp-tom of a far greater disaster–thesystematic plunder and destructionof Southeast Asia’s greatest rain-forests over the past three decadesunder the rule of the avaricious andauthoritarian “New Order” regimeof former President Suharto. As thisreport details, the fires of 1997-1998were the direct and inevitable out-come of forest and land-use policiesand practices unleashed by theSuharto regime and perpetuated bya corrupt culture of “crony capital-ism” that elevated personal profitover public interest, the environment,or the rule of law. Top Suhartoregime officials and their businesscronies treated Indonesia’s forests astheir personal property for more than30 years, liquidating valuable timberthrough reckless and destructivelogging practices, clear-cuttingforests for oil palm and pulp plan-tations, and running roughshodover the interests of the millions offorest-dependent peoples living intraditional communities throughoutthe archipelago. As a result,according to a 1999 remote sensingstudy, Indonesia lost at least 1.5million hectares of forest every yearfrom 1986 to 1997. Total forest losssince the advent of the Suharto erain the mid-1960s is thought to be atleast 40 million hectares–an areathe size of Germany and theNetherlands combined.

The pillage of Indonesia’sforests proceeded despite repeatedwarnings from a handful of coura-geous and public-spirited governmentministers and officials who did theirbest to reform the forestry sector butfound their efforts repeatedly stymiedand their hands tied. Hundreds ofmillions of dollars in developmentaid was also spent on well-meaning“forestry policy reform” efforts duringthe Suharto era, but with little effect.As a recent World Bank assessmentof the tens of millions of dollars itloaned to Indonesia for forestry andforestry-related projects since themid-1980s concluded “the Bankhas so far been unable to influencethe rate of deforestation or thedegradation of forests in Indonesia.Extremely weak governance hasbeen the most debilitating problemin the sector. . .[and has]. . .resultedin corruption and illegal activity.”

As Indonesia embarks on thisnew millennium, however, theprospects for meaningful forest policyreform have greatly improvedbecause of the dramatic economicand political convulsions of the pasttwo years. While the flames ragedacross Borneo and Sumatra in 1997and 1998, smouldering politicaltensions and economic stresses alsoignited. Long a star performer inthe East Asian “economic miracle”of the 1980s and 1990s, Indonesia’seconomy came crashing to earthduring late 1997. As the WorldBank’s 1998 report on Indonesia’seconomy concluded, “no country inrecent history, let alone one the sizeof Indonesia, has ever suffered sucha dramatic reversal of fortune.”Stripped of the gloss of rapid eco-nomic growth, Suharto was forcedfrom office in mid-1998 by a tidalwave of demands for reformasi,turning over the government totransitional President B.J. Habibie.In mid-1999, Indonesians voted intheir first free election in fourdecades, and reformist PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid assumedoffice in October 1999.

T

W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E VII FOREST FRONT I ERS IN I T IAT IVE

The stage is now set for athorough house-cleaning inIndonesia’s forestry sector, and government officials, academics,environmental activists, and a rein-vigorated press are now debatingproposals that would have beenconsidered absurd–or even sedi-tious–in the mid-1990s. But manyinterest groups and practices fromthe Suharto era are well-entrenched,and change has been slow in coming,as the renewed outbreak of fires inMarch 2000–deliberately set to clearland for plantations, as in1997–illustrates.

Many long-suffering forest-dependent Indonesians are not will-ing to wait for the government toact. In March 2000, for example,the Indonesian media reported thatsome 50 logging concessions covering10 million hectares had been forcedto suspend operations because ofconflicts, sometimes violent, withaggrieved local communities, manyof whom had occupied concessionsand thrown the loggers out. It seemsvirtually certain that sweepingchanges in the relationships betweenlocal communities, logging andplantation companies, and the government are imminent. The keyquestion is whether government forestpolicy will lead and smooth the wayfor these changes, or will be draggedalong by popular action–which islikely to turn increasinglyviolent–at the grassroots.

Trial by Fire: Forest Firesand Forestry Policy in Indonesia’sEra of Crisis and Reform, writtenby WRI’s Charles Victor Barber andWWF-Indonesia’s James Schweithelm,uses the 1997-1998 fires as thestarting point for a detailed critiqueof forest policy in the Suharto eraand an elaboration of the keyreforms needed to both slow the lossof Indonesia’s forests and preventfuture fire disasters. The report firstanalyzes the 1997-1998 fire disaster,reviewing the fires’ impacts, costs,and causes. The authors go on toplace the fires within the largercontext of the destructive forest andland-use practices and policies thathave characterized Indonesia forthe past three decades. It is futile,they convincingly demonstrate, tobelieve that the recurrent andincreasingly severe Indonesia fireproblem can be solved in isolationfrom more general reforms of theforestry sector and other sectors thataffect the use of forest lands andresources. The specific reforms thatthey recommend, therefore, not onlyserve the goal of ensuring thatSoutheast Asia is not periodicallyshrouded in a choking haze, but alsosupport forest biodiversity conserva-tion, sustainable forest-based fiberproduction, and recognition of therights and interests of forest-dwellingpeoples.

This report is the latest in aseries produced by WRI’s ForestFrontiers Initiative (FFI), a five-year,multidisciplinary effort to promotestewardship in and around theworld’s last major frontier forests byinfluencing investment, policy, andpublic opinion. It has beenresearched and written in collabora-tion with WWF-Indonesia and theTelapak Indonesia Foundation, twoof the most active and respectedIndonesian nongovernmental organizations working on forestpolicy reform. WRI is pleased toacknowledge the German FederalMinistry for Economic Cooperationand Development (BMZ), and AVINAfor their support for this project.

Jonathan LashPresidentWorld Resources Institute

PART I

T H E 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 F O R E S T F I R E SI N I N D O N E S I A :

I M PA C T S , C O S T S , A N D C A U S E S

W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E 1 FOREST FRONT I ERS IN I T IAT IVE

ndonesia received unaccus-tomed attention in the world'sheadlines during the latter

part of 1997 as forest and land firesraged in Kalimantan (IndonesianBorneo) and Sumatra. The firespumped enough smoke into the airto blanket the entire region in haze,reaching as far north as southernThailand and the Philippines, withMalaysia and Singapore being par-ticularly affected. The fires burnedout of control again in early 1998,the second year of perhaps the worstEl Niño-related drought ever recordedin Indonesia.

Fires broke out once again inJuly-September 1999 in parts ofSumatra and Kalimantan, withsatellites detecting over 500 “hotspots” in Sumatra’s Riau provincealone over one week in late July.Haze from the fires obstructed airtransport, forced school closures,and raised pollution to hazardouslevels.1 By mid-September, the sunwas completely obscured for days inparts of southern Kalimantan,hampering daily activities andcausing a rise of respiratory-relatedmedical complaints.2 The 1999 fireswere not of the same magnitude asthose of 1997-98, but they raisedfears that another prolonged dryseason, expected by some experts for2000, could soon lead to a repeat ofthe 1997-98 disaster.3

The health and economiceffects of the 1997-98 fires and hazeon Indonesia and surroundingcountries, in addition to the enor-mous impacts on tropical forestecosystems, biodiversity, and theEarth's atmosphere, prompted someobservers to label the fires a globalnatural disaster. Two elements ofthe catastrophe were of particularconcern to many observers. First,preliminary evidence indicated thatmost of the fires were set intention-ally by timber and agribusinessfirms intent on clearing land ascheaply as possible. Second, theIndonesian government’s responseto the disaster was perceived as gen-erally weak, uncoordinated, anddefensive, with the exception of theMinistry of Environment’s monitor-ing and public information effortsand its forthright identification ofthe role of big business in settingmany of the fires.

Disastrous as they were, thesefires, and the weak governmentresponse, are only a symptom oflong-standing forestry and land-usepolicies and practices that havedegraded and deforested vast areasof Indonesia and brought hardshipto millions of indigenous and localpeople while enriching a smallgroup in the ruling circle. Withsome 75 percent of the nation’sland area legally designated asforestland, these policies and prac-tices have had profound effects onthe nation as a whole, the forestfires being only the most recent andvisible.

SUHARTO’S REGIME ANDTHE FATE OF THE FOREST

Indonesia is currently in tran-sition from the iron-fisted 32-yearrule of President Suharto, whose“New Order” regime ended with hisresignation in May 1998. In theforest and natural resources sector,the New Order political economywas characterized by a heavily cen-tralized bureaucracy and industry,effectively dominated by a smallnumber of corporate conglomerateswith close connections to top politi-cians. These business groups andtheir bureaucratic cronies wereessentially above the law for threedecades, seeking short-term profitsat the expense of the environmentand local communities while enjoy-ing the protection of a legal andpolitical system in which neitherindustry nor the bureaucracy couldbe held accountable.

Indonesian forest policieshave provided powerful legal incen-tives for “cut-and-run” resourceextraction and have failed to createeffective mechanisms for enforcingeven minimum standards of forestresource stewardship. In addition,Indonesia has regularly been ratedby businessmen as one of the mostcorrupt countries on Earth, wherebribery and payoffs are anentrenched way of life.4 Humanrights abuse has been widespread(and has been frequently linked toconflicts between local people andelites over natural resources). Localpolice and military units have oftenserved as a kind of private army torepress popular resistance to theexploitation of forests and othernatural resources.

Reinforcing this forestexploitation system was an officialideology that excluded local andindigenous communities fromaccess to forest lands and resourceswhile at the same time using themas scapegoats for the negative con-sequences of government policy andprivate sector behavior—such asforest fires. Although Suharto wasforced from office in May 1998,much of his heavily entrenched sys-tem and the elite that profited fromit remain.

I . A N I N F E R N O I N W A I T I N G : I N D O N E S I A’ S F O R E S T P O L I C Y

I Indonesian forest policieshave provided powerfullegal incentives for “cut-and-run” resourceextraction and havefailed to create effectivemechanisms for enforcingeven minimum standardsof forest resource stewardship.


Although some 143 million

hectares (ha)—nearly three-fourths of

Indonesia’s land area—are legally classified

as “forestland” of various types, estimates

from the early 1990s of actual forest cover

range from 92.4 million to 113 million

ha.1 A 1997 World Resources Institute

(WRI) analysis warned, however, that only

about 53 million ha of “frontier

forest”–relatively undisturbed areas of for-

est large enough to maintain all of their

biodiversity–remain in Indonesia.2

Although various sources had estimated

the country’s annual deforestation rate at

between 0.6 million and 1.2 million ha,3

a mapping effort carried out with support

from the World Bank during 1999 con-

cluded that the average annual deforesta-

tion rate since 1986 has actually been

about 1.5 million ha, much of it “caused

by forest fires, often ignited by people

clearing land cheaply for plantations.” 4

Some 30 percent of Sumatra’s forest cover

vanished during this period, according to

the World Bank study. (See the Table

below.) It is probable, therefore, that the

WRI figure is closer to the truth than earli-

er estimates. If current trends continue,

virtually all nonswampy lowland forests in

Kalimantan and Sumatra will be destroyed

by 2010.5

Biologically, these forests are

extremely diverse. Although Indonesia

occupies only 1.3 percent of the world's

land area, it possesses about 10 percent of

the world's flowering plant species, 12 per-

cent of all mammal species, 17 percent of

all reptile and amphibian species, and 17

percent of all bird species.6 The lowland

forests of Sumatra and Kalimantan are

among the most species-rich on Earth,

and there is a wide range of other forest

types, each with its own flora and fauna.

In addition to acting as a store-

house of biological riches, Indonesia's

forests yield products that have helped

develop the nation's economy and provide

income for millions of people living in

and around forests. At the end of 1995,

585 logging concessions held 20-year

rights to cut timber from approximately 62

million ha,7 producing some $5.5 billion

in annual export revenues (15 percent of

the national total), in addition to supply-

ing the large domestic market.8 In

October 1998, the chair of the Indonesian

Forestry Society reported that there were

421 logging firms, 1,701 sawmill compa-

nies, 115 plywood firms, and 6 pulp and

paper companies. In mid-1999, the area

covered by active concessions had

decreased to 51.5 million ha.9 The report

noted that plywood exports in 1997

totaled 7.85 million cubic meters (m3), or

80 percent of total Indonesian plywood

production, and were worth $3.58 billion,

making Indonesia the world’s biggest ply-

wood producer in that year.10 In 1996,

total output from forest-related activities

was about $20 billion, or about 10 percent

of gross domestic product (GDP). Forest-

related employment amounted to about

800,000 in the formal sector and many

more in the nonformal sector, and royal-

ties and other government revenues from

forest operations exceeded $1 billion per

year.11

Indonesia's forests yield many

nontimber forest products, the most valu-

able of which are rattan canes, which had

an export value of $360 million in 1994.12

The forests also provide valuable environ-

mental services such as protecting the

hydrological balance of watersheds and

storing carbon that would otherwise

increase the concentration of greenhouse

gases in the Earth's atmosphere.

Indonesia's forests are home to a

large but undetermined number of forest-

dwelling or forest-dependent communities.

Estimates of the precise number of these

communities vary wildly—from 1.5 mil-

lion to 65 million people, depending on

which definitions are used and which

policy agenda is at stake.13 Many of these

forest dwellers live by long-sustainable

“portfolio” economic strategies that com-

bine shifting cultivation of rice and other

food crops with fishing, hunting, gather-

ing forest products such as rattan, honey,

and resins for use and sale, and cultivating

tree crops such as rubber. Many of these

local values of the forest are poorly appre-

ciated, however, because they are not

reflected in formal market transactions.

Notes:1. GOI, 1991: 9.2. Bryant, Neilsen, and Tangley, 1997: 21.3. Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996.4. World Bank, 1999c. The 1999 map-ping exercise upon which the World Bankbased its new deforestation estimates wascarried out by the mapping and inventorydivision of the Ministry of Forestry andEstate Crops as one of the conditionsrequired by the World Bank for its PolicySupport Reform Loan II to the govern-ment. The mapping was done at recon-naissance level only based on interpretationfrom digital Landsat imagery at a scale of1:500,000, without field checks, and there-fore must be regarded as provisional. Theproject used imagery from 1996 or laterwherever available, although in someareas imagery from 1994 and 1995 had tobe used. The methods used do not permitan analysis of the quality of forest cover,only current distribution and regions andrates of removal. 5. Ibid. 6. BAPPENAS, 1993.7. Brown, 1999. 8. Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996.9. World Bank, 1999c.10. “Many Timber Firms Facing Closurein Indonesia,” Cable News Network,October 7, 1998. 11. World Bank, 1999a.12. De Beer and McDermott, 1996: 74.13. Zerner, 1992: 4.

1 I N D O N E S I A’ S F O R E S T R E S O U R C E S

Deforestation in Sumatra and Kalimantan, 1985–97

1985 1997 DEFORESTATION

FOREST PERCENT OF FOREST PERCENT OF DECREASE PERCENT HECTARESTOTAL AREA TOTAL AREA 1985-1997 LOSS PER YEAR

SUMATRA 23,324,000 49 16,632,000 35 6,691,000 29 558,000

KALIMANTAN 39,986,000 75 31,029,000 59 8,957,000 22 746,000

TOTAL 63,310,000 63 47,661,000 47 15,648,000 26 1,304,000

Source: World Bank, 1999c.Note: These figures should be taken as provisional and subject to future revision following further analysis of satellite data and ground-checking being carried out in 1999-2000.


The economic and political crisesthat have wracked Indonesia since mid-1997 have transformed the political andeconomic context for natural resourcemanagement. They have profound impli-cations for efforts to prevent future forestfires and for broader forest policy reforms.

The East Asian economic crisisthat began with the devaluation of theThai baht in July 1997 affected Indonesiamore severely than any other country inthe region. By July 1998 the value of itscurrency had fallen by 80 percent, infla-tion had risen to more than 50 percent,and urban unemployment had soared tounprecedented levels. The Food andAgriculture Organization of the UnitedNations (FAO) estimated in that monththat about 40 million people, or 20 percentof the population, were vulnerable to foodscarcity. The government reported that 40percent of the population was living belowthe official poverty line, up from only 11percent in 1996. Coming after nearlythree decades of uninterrupted rapid eco-nomic growth, these developments repre-sent a unique historical debacle. In thewords of the World Bank’s mid-1998assessment,

“No country in recent history, letalone one the size of Indonesia, has eversuffered such a dramatic reversal of for-tune. The next years will be difficult anduncertain.” The economy is expected tocontract this year [1998] by 10–15 percent,inflation could exceed 80 percent, and thenumber of poor could well double.1”

While political unrest had beengrowing throughout 1996 and 1997, theeconomic crisis was a major catalyst forthe crescendo of opposition and violencethat drove President Suharto from office inMay 1998. The legitimacy of his 32-yearauthoritarian rule was largely dependenton the delivery of continued economicgrowth, in exchange for which many ele-ments of society were willing to toleraterampant corruption, regular abuses ofhuman rights, and the absence of democ-ratic political processes. With the economyspiraling into depression and prices ofbasic foodstuffs and other commoditiesskyrocketing, support for the aging presi-dent—even among many who had longserved in his government and military—evaporated in an explosion of student-ledprotests and violent riots.2

The demise of the New Orderregime left Indonesia in a state of politicallimbo under the transitional governmentof Suharto protégé President B. J. Habibie.Parliamentary elections—the first rela-

tively free and fair elections in 44 years—were held in June 1999. In October 1999,the People’s Consultative Assembly 3 elect-ed Abdurrahman Wahid president, andMegawati Sukarnoputri vice-president.4

Wahid lost no time in appointing a newcabinet reflecting the broad range of political parties that contested the Juneelections, elements of Suharto’s oldadministrations, and representation fromthe armed forces. Hailed by the press as a“national unity” government, it is unclearat this writing how the change in govern-ment may affect forest policy.5

Virtually all elements of the politicalspectrum have adopted the rhetoric ofreformasi—democratization of politics,respect for human rights, and the elimina-tion of “corruption, collusion, and nepo-tism” (KKN). But reformasi means verydifferent things to different people. For themany holdovers from the old regime who arestill in power or are biding their time, itmeans removing the rough edges and themost blatant corruption from the currentsystem but generally continuing business asusual. For students and other more radicalreformers, it means nothing less than thecomplete burial of the New Order regimeand the creation of a democratic politicalsystem. In Aceh and Irian Jaya—restiveprovinces with long-standing separatistmovements—many view reformasi as anopportunity to gain at least a greater mea-sure of autonomy, if not independence,from the central government. And in vir-tually all provinces, reformasi is equatedwith greater decentralization of politicalpower and increased local access to theprofits of natural resource exploitation.

The economic crisis and politicalupheavals have been accompanied by anincreasing crescendo of civil violence.Much of it is directed against Indonesia’sethnic Chinese minority, long perceived bymany Indonesians as unfairly dominatingthe economy and benefiting from thelargesse of the Suharto regime.6 In mid-May 1997, just before Suharto’s resigna-tion, riots destroyed Jakarta’s Chinatown,left some 1,200 people dead, and wereaccompanied by horrifying rapes andother atrocities directed at the Chinese.Other incidents of anti-Chinese violencehave taken place since then in a numberof cities across the country. Christian-Muslim violence in the eastern province ofMaluku left hundreds dead in the first partof 1999 and flared up again in July andOctober 1999. In March 1999, hundredsof migrant settlers from Madura, an islandclose to Java, were killed by local ethnicgroups in West Kalimantan.

Generalized looting, arson, andtheft have increased dramatically through-out the country, sometimes driven by thedesperation of a populace sinking intopoverty and hunger, but sometimes car-ried out by well-organized gangs takingadvantage of the general chaos.7 Strikesand protests over the price of food andbasic necessities have become increasinglycommon throughout the country.

Just as law and order are breakingdown in many areas, the legitimacy of thearmed forces (ABRI), long a powerfulpolitical player, is at an all-time low, fol-lowing revelations of its role in kidnappingand torturing democracy activists, theuncovering of mass graves of ABRI victimsin the province of Aceh (where a long-sim-mering separatist rebellion was brutallyput down in the early 1990s),8 and themid-1999 debacle in East Timor.9

Adding to Indonesia’s woes, the1997–98 drought caused by the periodic ElNiño climatic phenomenon was perhapsthe worst the country had experienced insome 50 years. Rice production droppeddrastically as a result,10 just as millions ofnewly unemployed urban workers werereturning to their villages in search oflivelihood. The drought also set the stagefor the forest fires, although it was just oneof many aggravating factors.

Notes:1. World Bank, 1998a .2. For accounts of the growing political tensionsduring 1996 and 1997, see Forrester and May1999; for detailed accounts of the fall of Suharto,see Forrester and May 1999; “Indonesia’s MayRevolution, ” Far Eastern Economic Review,May 28, 1998; “Indonesia after Suharto,” FarEastern Economic Review, June 4, 1998; and M.Scott, “Indonesia Reborn?” New York Review ofBooks, August 13, 1998.3. The People’s Consultative Assembly (MajelisPermusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) is composedof the elected members of the parliament, for-mally known as the People’s RepresentativeAssembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR),and a number of members appointed by the gov-ernment to represent various groups in society.Under Indonesia’s constitution, the MPR electsthe president and vice-president every 5 years,and lays down “Broad Guidelines of StatePolicy” for that period.4. Abdurrahman Wahid, commonly called GusDur in Indonesia, is a widely respected moderateIslamic leader, while Megawati, the daughter offounding president Sukarno, was a key leader andfocal point of opposition to the Suharto regimein the mid-1990s. Her party polled the most votesin the June parliamentary elections and waswidely expected to win the presidential race.

President Habibie withdrew from the race justdays before the vote, in large part because ArmedForces Chief Wiranto declined to stand as vice-president. As a result, Habibie’s party, Golkar, didnot field a candidate at all, leaving a two-wayrace between Gus Dur and Megawati. Gus Dur, alegendary political deal-maker, made deals withboth the military and Golkar sufficient to ensurehis election. Megawati, whose distaste for politicalhorse-trading is well known, apparently expectedher immense popularity with rank-and-file vot-ers to carry the day in the presidential poll. Hersupporters rioted throughout the country thenight of her defeat, but appear to have been mol-lified by her election as vice-president and thewarm embrace she has received from Gus Dur ashis “full-partner” in overcoming Indonesia’seconomic and political troubles.5. Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the new Minister ofForestry and Plantations installed in late October1999, told the press in his first interview onlythat “I will consolidate the personnel of the min-istry, strengthen morale and attitudes and securetheir commitment to manage the country’s nat-ural resources in the public interest.” (“NewMinisters Look Ahead.” Jakarta Post, October 27,1999.) Trained in agriculture in the UnitedStates, Ismail is the co-founder and chairman ofthe Justice Party, one of the new reform-orientedparties established during 1998.6. “Turning Point: Indonesia's Chinese Face aHard Choice—Stand Up for Their Rights or Seeka New Life Abroad,” Far Eastern EconomicReview, July 30, 1998.7. “Police Say Indonesia Faces Rising Tide ofUnrest,” Reuters, September 25, 1998;“Lawlessness Spreads as Looters Defy Army,”Straits Times (Singapore), July 20, 1998.8. “Indonesia: The Disappearing Army,” SydneyMorning Herald, August 15, 1998.9. A referendum on independence for this smallex-colony of Portugal, occupied by Indonesiasince 1975, gave rise to a spasm of violenceagainst independence supporters perpetrated bythe Indonesian military through the “militia”gangs it armed and trained. At present writing,Indonesia has formally renounced its claim onEast Timor, troops have left, and a three-year UNTransitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET)has been established. The East Timor debaclewas both a humiliation for the armed forces—which had vowed for decades never to give upthe territory—and a major international expo-sure of its casual and systematic use of terror,arson, and murder to enforce its vision of “inter-nal security.”10. In mid-1998, the Indonesian CentralBureau of Statistics estimated rice harvest failureresulting from the drought at 13 percent. Anagriculture climatologist at the BogorAgricultural Institute reported, however, that hisresearch indicated a shortfall of 40 percent as aresult of the drought (“‘Horrific’ Rice Forecast,”Reuters, July 25, 1998).

2 I N D O N E S I A’ S E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L C R I S E S


Most official reaction to the1997–98 fires by the Indonesiangovernment and the internationalcommunity has been technical andmanagerial in nature, focusing onimproving drought-predicting tech-nologies, strengthening administra-tive coordination, acquiringmodern firefighting equipment, andthe like. While these measures arecertainly necessary, they will haveonly marginal effects unless theunderlying political economy of for-est resource use and management issignificantly restructured.

Indeed, the focus on technicaland bureaucratic responses to theforest fires may become an obstacleto meaningful action, to the extentthat it turns the debate away fromthe broader forest policy issues thatlie behind them. The officialresponse to the fires mirrors decadesof government efforts to justify andmaintain the status quo and theconcurrent promotion by donoragencies of incremental and tech-nocratic “forest sector reforms” in afashion palatable to the Suhartoregime and its favored clients in theforest and agribusiness industries.

Until recently, one could justifythese incremental, technocratic,and depoliticized approaches as thebest to be expected, from either thegovernment or donors, in theatmosphere of the New Order. Theeconomy was growing rapidly,Indonesia was repaying its debts,and opposition to New Order poli-cies was disorganized, muted, andrapidly silenced by Suharto’s strongand stable regime. But all that haschanged.

The fires dramaticallyannounced to the world that some-thing was seriously wrong inIndonesia’s forests. The fate ofthese forests, the third largest tractof tropical forests on the planet andthe largest in Asia, has always beenof international concern. (See Box1 and Map 1.) But the effects ofthe 1997–98 fires on neighboringcountries made it clear that bad for-est management in Southeast Asia’slargest nation was an issue onwhich the international communitymight demand—not just suggest—reforms. At the same time, thecountry’s economic collapse and theresulting need for massive interna-tional assistance have increasedinternational leverage for pressingfor forest policy reforms.5 Finally,Suharto’s departure has trans-formed the political landscape andcreated, at least for the time being,an unprecedented window of oppor-tunity for domestic critics to influ-ence forest policies. (See Box 2.)

FOREST FIRES: THEPOLICY CONNECTION

This report argues that thefires of 1997 and 1998 were just thelatest symptom of a destructive sys-tem of forest resource managementcarried out by the Suharto regimeover 30 years. If the government—and the international donorcommunity on which it so greatlydepends in this period of economiccrisis and recovery—are seriousabout preventing future infernos,the solution lies not so much instrengthening technical capacitiesfor fire prediction, prevention, andmitigation as in a major restructur-ing of relationships between thestate, the private sector, and the mil-lions of forest-dependent peoplesliving in and on the fringes of thenation’s forestlands.

The reform agendas for reduc-ing the threat of fire and for trans-forming forest policy from a catalystfor forest destruction into a guaran-tor of forest sustainability overlap toa great extent, and the first agendacannot succeed without substantialprogress on the second. This reporttherefore addresses both the imme-diate causes and the impacts of the1997–98 fires and the broader ques-tion of how Indonesian forestry andforest land-use policies have con-tributed to forest degradation anddeforestation processes—forest firesbeing an important element ofthese processes.

The fires of 1997 and1998 were just the latestsymptom of a destructivesystem of forest resourcemanagement carried outby the Suharto regimeover 30 years.


lthough the forest andland fires (simplytermed “forest fires” in

this paper) of 1997–98 wereunprecedented in their scale andeffects, fire has been a regular featureof Indonesia’s forest ecosystems foras long as humans have inhabitedthe archipelago.6 The nation has atropical climate with an annual pattern of wet and dry seasons—theresult of monsoon winds that alter-nate seasonally between westerly andeasterly directions. The westerlymonsoon usually brings heavy rainsto the western portion of Indonesiafrom September to April; drier easterlywinds blow the rest of the year. Everyfew years this pattern is disrupted bythe El Niño phenomenon (see Box3), resulting in a prolonged dry sea-son that, during severe El Niñoepisodes, may extend into the nextregular dry season.

Normal “dry” seasons areactually relatively wet. Monthly dryseason rainfall on the islands ofSumatra and Borneo usually exceeds10 centimeters (cm), providing themoisture needed to sustain the lushevergreen tropical rainforests. During

severe El Niño events, however, monthsoften pass with no appreciable rainfall.Spells of one to two weeks with no raincreate conditions dry enough forintentional burning of degradedforest and brush areas, but matureintact rainforests will burn onlyafter considerably longer dry periods.

A RECURRINGPHENOMENON

Despite the common puzzle-ment at the idea of “rainforests”burning (see Box 4), scientific evi-dence based on radiocarbon dating ofcharcoal deposits found in the soilsof East Kalimantan indicates thatforest fires have repeatedly burnedareas of lowland rainforest, startingat least 17,500 years ago.7 The ear-lier fires are believed to have beennaturally caused during severedroughts, probably during the longerdry seasons that appear to havecharacterized Quaternary glacialperiods.8 Studies of buried pollen inQueensland, Australia, support theexistence of alternating wet and dryclimate phases in the past.9 Thesestudies indicate an almost completeabsence of charcoal during more

humid climate phases that correspondto the heights of the interglacialperiods over the past 190,000 years.Climatologists believe that the Earth'sclimate is currently in a relatively wetphase that is not believed to be associ-ated with major fires in tropicalrainforests.

Humans probably had a role instarting forest fires in recent millenniaand for tens of thousands of years mayhave deliberately burned forests toimprove hunting. As prehistorichuman settlers of the Indonesianarchipelago began to switch fromhunting and gathering to growingcrops, they used fire to clear agricul-tural plots in the forest, a practicethat has persisted until the present.(See Box 5.)

Forest fires on the islands ofBorneo and Sumatra have beenreported a number of times over thepast 150 years. Large forest fires arereported to have occurred in what isnow Central Kalimantan, on Borneo,in 1877, seriously affecting large areasof forest.10 Grasslands still cover the80,000-ha Sook Plains in Sabah(Malaysian Borneo) as the result of adrought-related forest fire in 1915.11

Periodic fires have been reported inthe Danau Sentarum Wildlife Reservein West Kalimantan since the middleof the last century.12 The relativelyfire-prone heath forests of Sabah andSarawak (Malaysia) burned sponta-neously or by human action in the1880s, the early 1930s, 1958, 1983,and 1991.13 The rainforests ofPapua New Guinea are known tohave burned during droughts, asindicated by the oral histories ofindigenous peoples, charcoal buriedin the soil, and historical accountsover the past century.14

The burning of Sumatra’s andKalimantan’s forests is clearly not arecent or geographically uniquephenomenon, but in the past neithernaturally caused fires nor human useof fire led to significant deforestation;both islands remained largely foresteduntil recent decades. Earlier fires wereundoubtedly smaller in area and wereprobably more spread out over timethan the fires of the past two decades.A 1924 forest map of what are nowthe provinces of Central, East, andSouth Kalimantan showed that 94percent of this large portion of Borneowas still covered by forest. It is only

El Niño is a periodic climatic phe-

nomenon caused by interaction between the

atmosphere and abnormally warm surface

water in the eastern Pacific Ocean off the coast

of South America. This sea temperature

anomaly affects global climate, but its effects are

particularly pronounced in Indonesia and

other parts of the western Pacific, where

droughts often result. El Niño events occur

every 2 to 7 years, usually last about a year,

and are sometimes followed by an unusually

wet year.1

The severity of drought in Indonesia

varies significantly from one El Niño to

another. Particularly severe events result in

major shortfalls in agricultural production,2

scarcity of surface water, and impacts on

forests, including tree mortality and disrupted

cycles of flowering and fruiting.3 Over the past

three decades the El Niño phenomenon has

occurred in 1972, 1976,1982–83, 1987, 1991,

1994, and 1997–98. As an indication of the

severity of the 1997–98 event, the Wanariset

Forest Research Station in East Kalimantan

received only 300 millimeters (mm) of rain

in the 12 months ending April 1998, whereas

annual precipitation averages 2,700 mm in

that area.

Indonesian rainfall records dating

back to the beginning of the 19th century

reflect periodic droughts believed to have

been caused by El Niño, but only recently

have scientists understood the mechanism

that causes these events. Colonial records

indicate that severe droughts affected agri-

culture and livestock production in the 19th

century and resulted in forest fires.4 Unlike

the fires of the past two decades, earlier fires

were usually caused naturally or were used for

small-scale land clearing near what were then

sparse forest settlements. During the 1997–98

drought, not only was the fire hazard very

high as a result of extreme drought and

heavy fuel loads in logged forests, but the

risk that fires would spread out of control

was higher because of the large areas of

disturbed forest and scrubland close to

extensive land-clearing operations. The El

Niño drought indeed increased the fire haz-

ard, but human actions were the direct

cause of uncontrolled fires. Poor forest

management resulted in heavy fuel loads

in logged or otherwise disturbed forest, and

undisciplined use of fire for land clearance

provided the flame that ignited the fuel.

Notes:1. Nicholls, 1993.

2. Malingreau, 1987.

3. Wirawan, 1993.

4. Allen, Brookfield, and Byron, 1989.

3 E L N I Ñ O , D R O U G H T, A N D F O R E S T F I R E S I N I N D O N E S I A

I I . H I S T O R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E S

A


since the advent of systematic loggingand other forms of forest degradationin the late 1960s, coinciding withthe establishment of the New Orderregime, that fire has loomed as alarge-scale and recurrent disaster.

THE GREAT KALIMANTANFIRE OF 1982–83

The first collision between theperiodic El Niño phenomenon and theSuharto regime’s forest exploitationpolicies occurred in 1982–83 in the210,000 square kilometer (km2)province of East Kalimantan. Startingin 1970, this vast province—almostcompletely covered by various typesof rainforest, including dense standsof commercially valuable dipterocarpspecies—experienced an explosivetimber boom. Nearly all of theprovince was divided up into largelogging concessions, and by 1979 theannual cut had reached 9 millioncubic meters (m3) of logs. Loggingpractices were wasteful and destructive,taking about 30 percent of basal area,damaging up to another 40 percent offorest stands, and leaving an enormous

accumulation of logging waste in theforest. Pioneer and secondary speciessprouted rapidly in logged-over areasand on abandoned logging roads,forming a dense ground vegetation inplace of the generally sparse groundcover found in primary rainforests.

A severe El Niño-induceddrought struck the province betweenJune 1982 and May 1983. At threesites where measurements weretaken during this period, rainfallwas only 30–35 percent of the nor-mal amount. Lakes dried up, cropsfailed, river transport was cut off formany remote areas, and cleandrinking water became scarce. ByNovember 1982, most of the nor-mally evergreen canopy trees hadlost their leaves, and many treeshad died. Temperatures wereunusually high—an average 3˚Chotter than normal at one monitor-ing station—further intensifyingdrought stress on the vegetation.15

In November-December 1982,fires started almost simultaneouslyacross vast areas of the province.Since the forest was still relatively

moist at that point, these were rela-tively cool ground fires, creepingslowly along the forest floor and notcausing a great deal of damage. After a brief respite from drought atthe end of December, the situationrapidly deteriorated. The first waveof fires had amplified the effects ofthe drought, drying out the groundvegetation and the understory of theforest and increasing the amount oflitter. Accumulated logging wasteadded to the easily combustiblelayer of material that covered muchof the forest floor. When the firesbegan again, much of the provincebecame an inferno. Canopy treesburned like torches, and whole treesexploded when their resin vaporizedand was ignited. By April 1983, aerialtransport in the province had cometo a complete halt, and the sun wasblotted out in a perpetual shroud ofsmoky haze.16

By the time rains finally camein May 1983, 3.2 million ha—anarea the size of Belgium orTaiwan—had burned; of this, 2.7million ha was tropical rainforest.

Damage from the fires varied in dif-ferent areas, from creeping groundfires in primary forests to completedestruction of newly logged areasand peat-swamp forests. Some730,000 ha of the commerciallyvaluable lowland dipterocarp forestswere badly damaged, and another 2.1million ha were lightly or moderatelydamaged.

Droughts and fire have been afeature of East Kalimantan’s landscapefor millennia. What caused thesefires to metastasize into what was,at the time, the largest forest fireever recorded? A comprehensivefield study of the fires carried out in1983–89 with the support of theGerman Agency for TechnicalCooperation, pointed out that “itwas not the drought which causedthis huge fire, it was the changedcondition of the forest” due to wide-spread and reckless logging activitiesover the previous decade.17 Loggingtransformed the fire-resistant primaryrainforest into a degraded and fire-prone ecosystem. The droughtthen set the stage for catastrophe as

Television viewers around the world

were perplexed to see dramatic pictures of

Indonesia's rainforests burning. These images

clashed sharply with the lush green tropical

rainforests featured in nature programs.

Rainforests burn because of a number of

interdependent natural and human-related

factors. These complex factors are often

obscured by politically charged rhetoric,

oversimplifications, and lack of factual

information.

The danger that a forest will burn

depends on the levels of fire hazard and

fire risk, terms that are precisely defined by

scientists who study forest fires.

4 Fire hazard is a measure of the amount,

type, and dryness of potential fuel in the

forest. Combustible fuel includes leaf litter,

low vegetation, grass, and dead wood in the

form of logging wastes or fallen trees. The

dryness of the fuel is related to how long

vegetation has been dead or drought stressed,

the period without rain, the relative humidity

and temperature of the air, and wind speed.

4 Fire risk is a measure of the probability

that the fuel will ignite. It is usually related to

careless human actions, such as deliberate

burning when fire hazard is high. Fire risk

can be increased by natural factors such as

lightning and by coal seams that catch fire.

Abandoned logging roads provide easy access

to otherwise remote forests, greatly increasing

fire risk when settlers use fire for land

clearance near forests.

Fire hazard can be rated with a rea-

sonable degree of scientific accuracy.

Assessing the level of risk is much more

subjective because human attitudes and

motivations must be taken into account.

In the absence of drought, undis-

turbed mature rainforest is highly resistant

to burning because of the high humidity

below the forest canopy and the scarcity of

fuel such as ground vegetation, leaf litter,

and fallen branches.1 Fires can start

naturally in rainforests during periods of

extreme drought; disturbed forest is much

more fire prone. Forests adapted to growing

on sandy and limestone-derived soils are

more susceptible to fire than forests growing

on other soil types. Peat-swamp forests are

particularly vulnerable to above- and

below-ground fires when water levels drop

during droughts.2

Tropical rainforests recover even

after a severe fire if they are left undisturbed

and if there are seed sources nearby.

Hundreds of years may be required to reach

a successional stage approximating the

species composition that existed prior to

the fire. High-intensity fire followed by

frequent burning leads to conversion of

forest to grassland. The slow recovery of

tropical rainforests after burning indicates

that they are not well adapted to fire, unlike

monsoon forest formations in seasonally

dry parts of eastern Indonesia that recover

quickly from frequent fires.

Notes:1. Whitmore, 1984.

2. van Steenis, 1957.

4 F I R E S I N T R O P I C A L F O R E S T S


“small agricultural fires . . . escapedtheir bounds into nearby dry sec-ondary and logged-over forests.”18

Burning for land preparationis practiced as part of many agricul-tural activities in the area, includingcash-crop farming, subsistenceupland rice cultivation, and prepa-ration of garden plots.19 (See Box5.) Although some of the fires wereundoubtedly started by traditionalsubsistence farmers, many were setby peppercorn and other cash-cropgrowers and by land speculators.Between 1970 and 1980, EastKalimantan’s population had dou-bled as a result of the timber and oilbooms, and many spontaneousmigrants had arrived in theprovince to stake out cash-cropplots on the forest frontier, often fol-lowing logging roads into the inte-rior.20 This influx was intensified bythe beginnings of the government’stransmigration program, whichbrought about 91,000 new settlersfrom Java and Bali to the provincebetween 1970 and 1983.21

Evidence from the German-assisted survey demonstrates con-clusively that logging was theprimary reason for the extent andseverity of the 1982–83 fires. Only11 percent of undisturbed primaryforests in the areas affected by thedrought and fires actually burned.Even there, only ground vegetationburned, and the forest had com-pletely recovered by 1988. By con-trast, in an area of nearly 1 millionha of “moderately disturbed” forest(80 percent of which had beenlogged prior to the fires), 84 percentof the forest burned, and the dam-age was much more severe.According to the study, “The stand-ing stock is heavily reduced, futureexploitation of these stands, withthe exception of the dead hard-woods, will not be possible within70 to 100 years and even then therate of exploitation will be far belowthe exploitation rate of undisturbedforests of today.”22 In an area cover-ing 727,000 ha of heavily disturbedforests (70 percent of which hadbeen logged within 8 years beforethe fires), 88 percent burned, andfire completely destroyed the forest

structure, meaning that “naturalsuccession will need several hun-dred years to reach the stage of atypical tropical rainforest ecosys-tem.”23 The researchers concludedthat “it is obvious that loggingshortly before the fire had the mostinfluence on the degree of damage.”24

Widespread fires reoccurred anumber of times in the decade fol-lowing the great Kalimantan fire,burning an estimated 500,000 ha in1991 and nearly 4.9 million ha in1994.25 Haze from the fires blanket-ed Singapore and Malaysia, as wellas large areas of Indonesia, disrupt-ing air and sea transportation. Inthe aftermath of both fire episodes,the government adjusted its policiesand established a variety of newfire-control programs and commit-tees, at least partly in response toconcerns voiced by neighboringcountries. A number of internation-al aid agencies provided support forfire-related programs.26 In 1997,however, it became painfully evidentthat while these efforts had boostedcapacities to predict and monitorfires, they had done virtually noth-ing to strengthen Indonesia’s ability

to prevent or combat fires. Evenmore important, the two basic causesof recurrent fires—changes in vegetative cover caused by deforesta-tion processes and the practice ofusing fire to clear land—had notbeen dealt with at all.

By 1997, the processes ofdeforestation and land degradationunleashed by the Suharto regimehad intensified and diversified intothe clearing of vast areas for timberand oil palm plantations, in addi-tion to the continuing destructionwrought by logging operations.When the fiercest El Niño-relateddrought in at least a century sweptacross the archipelago in mid-1997,it heralded a conflagration thatwould dwarf the East Kalimantandisaster and dismay the world.

The agricultural system based on a

cycle of forest clearing, cultivation, and

fallowing, called swiddening or shifting

cultivation, has been adopted throughout

most of the Indonesian archipelago over a

period of thousands of years.1 Swidden

cultivation has continued into this century

in parts of Indonesia where soils are too

poor to support permanent cultivation of

annual crops. Until recently, swiddening

was the dominant form of cultivation in

Kalimantan, and it is still practiced there,

as well as in Sumatra and other areas of

Indonesia outside the densely populated

islands of Java and Bali.

A major labor effort is required to

clear mature forest, so swidden plots are

usually limited to less than 1 ha when

hand tools are used for clearance. In

recent years, chain saws have made it possible

for one family to clear significantly larger

plots. Typically, swidden plots are cultivated

for one to three years. They are then left

fallow for several years to allow natural

vegetation to regrow, creating a mosaic of

pioneer and secondary vegetation patches

in the mature forest.

Suppression of swidden cultivation

and its replacement by irrigated rice was a

major feature of Suharto-era forest and

agricultural policy. Traditional swidden

systems are well adapted to poor soils, low

land-to-labor ratios, and the livelihood needs

of rural communities in the areas outside

Java and Bali. These systems, however,

contradict the irrigated rice-based system

of the dominant Javanese culture, and they

presented an obstacle to the exploitation of

forest lands and resources by outsiders that

was promoted by the regime. Echoing

colonial assessments and Javanese cultural

biases, the government has long maintained

that swidden cultivation and its practitioners

are environmentally destructive, backward,

and wasteful and has often blamed swid-

deners for outbreaks of fire in forest areas.2

As traditional swidden systems have eroded

or become more intensive, shifting cultiva-

tion has become a much more negative envi-

ronmental factor. In areas with growing

populations of forest dwellers, the number

of years that a swidden plot lies fallow has

been shortened so much that regeneration

does not progress beyond pioneer vegetation.

This trend has been accelerated by the desire

to grow cash crops. Traditional swidden

farming at low population densities has only

a slight impact on forest biodiversity compared

with the accelerated system currently prac-

ticed in many places. Extreme shortening of

swidden cycles can result in the conversion of

forest to grassland, which may then be burned

annually to maintain grassland for improved

cattle grazing or to facilitate hunting.

Notes:1. Marten, 1986.

2. Dove, 1985.

5 S H I F T I N G C U LT I VAT I O N A N D F I R E I N I N D O N E S I A


I I I . T H E 1 9 9 7 – 9 8 F I R E S

y early 1997, oceanographersand atmospheric scientistswere predicting that 1997

would be an El Niño year. In Junethe trade winds reversed their directionacross the Pacific, and by early Julysea surface temperatures off the coastof South America were already 4°Cabove normal—clear signs that anEl Niño was starting.27 These phe-nomena coincided with the normaldry season in Indonesia. Despitewarnings by the environment min-ister, burning continued across vastareas of Sumatra and Kalimantanto clear vegetation in preparation forplanting crops and trees, a practicethat had escalated dramatically inrecent years. The first fires werepicked up on satellite images inJanuary 1997 in Sumatra’s Riauprovince, and the fires increased innumber and distribution as the dryseason began.

The use of fire for land clear-ance is not restricted to Borneo andSumatra—fires were reported from23 of Indonesia’s 27 provinces in1997-98—but by July the largenumber of fires set on those twomassive islands by plantation firmsand government projects clearingtens of thousands of hectares at atime had produced enough smoketo create a blanket of haze thatspread hundreds of kilometers in alldirections. Deliberately set fires ingrasslands and scrublands escapedinto adjacent logged forests thatburned with greater intensity. Thefires eventually reached drained peatswamps, where fires burned beneaththe surface long after above-groundfires had exhausted their fuel supplies.

Fires on other islands such asJava and Sulawesi were smaller andhad more localized impacts. IrianJaya, a vast Indonesian provinceoccupying the western half of theisland of New Guinea, was badlyaffected by the drought, whichcaused hundreds of deaths fromwaterborne diseases, malaria, andfood shortages. Fires also burnedthere, but the total area affected wasmuch smaller than in Kalimantanand Sumatra. Haze from the Irianfires, however, periodically spread asfar as Darwin in northern Australia.(See Map 2.)

Large-scale burning has pro-duced persistent haze over largeareas of Sumatra and Kalimantanduring every dry season, but thehaze normally dissipates inSeptember, when heavy rains extin-guish the fires. This was not the casein 1997. The rains failed, the firesintensified, and the haze thickenedand spread to neighboring countries.Haze reached Malaysia and Singaporein July, and air quality deteriorateddramatically in September, triggeringan outburst of complaints that drewglobal media attention.

By late September approximately1 million km2 were haze covered,affecting about 70 million people.Land, air, and sea transport accidents,including a ship collision in theStraits of Malacca that killed 29people, were linked to the poor visi-bility caused by the haze. Hospitalsand clinics were filled with peopleseeking treatment for a variety ofrespiratory, eye, and skin ailments.Schools, businesses, and airportsclosed, and tourists stayed away,inflicting severe economic hardshipon the region.

THE GOVERNMENTRESPONSE

Even as fires burned out ofcontrol into surrounding forests, peatswamps, and agricultural lands,plantation owners and farmersstarted new fires to take advantage ofthe extremely dry conditions. Thiscaused the haze to intensify andspread further, resulting in healthalerts and transportation disruptionsacross the region. The governmentannounced a total ban on burningin mid-September, followed by threatsto punish offending firms. PresidentSuharto publicly apologized on twooccasions to neighboring countriesfor the haze and demanded thatIndonesians stop illegal burning.These apologies were particularlyembarrassing because in 1995Suharto had assured Malaysia andSingapore that transboundary airpollution such as had occurred duringthe 1994 El Niño drought would notbe repeated.

In late September the ministerof forestry released the names of 176plantation, timber, and transmigra-tion land-clearing firms suspectedof deliberate large-scale burningwithin their work areas. The suspectfirms were identified by comparinghot spots identified by U.S. NationalOceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA) satelliteswith Ministry of Forestry maps oftimber and plantation concessionareas. The firms were given twoweeks to prove that they were notguilty of illegal burning or riskrevocation of their timber-cuttinglicenses (essentially, a land-clearinglicense in this context). A number oflicenses were revoked but were mostlyreinstated in December. As of mid-May1998, not a single company or personordered by a company to clear landby burning had been brought to trial. 28

In an important test case inOctober 1998, PT Torus Ganda, afirm with operations in Riauprovince, was taken to court by theMinistry of Forestry for destructionof the forest by burning. Expert tes-timony by the EnvironmentalManagement Bureau (BAPEDAL) ofthe Ministry of Environment wasreportedly not taken seriously by thecourt, which exonerated the planta-tion owners on all charges. Thefirm’s operations were then frozenby decree of the Riau governorpending action by the company torectify its land-clearing practices,but in July 1999 the local pressreported that the company wasignoring the decree and conductingbusiness as usual.29

In another test case, in 1998the Indonesian Forum for theEnvironment (WALHI), a coalitionof Indonesian nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs), brought acivil suit under the new 1997Environmental Law against 11 firmsalleged to have illegally burned toclear land in southern Sumatra.WALHI sought damages of Rp 11trillion (more than $1 billion) to bepaid to the state to rehabilitate burnedareas. Detailed geographic informa-tion systems (GIS) information waspresented but was thrown out by thecourt, leaving only eyewitness testi-mony. Two of the firms were foundguilty, but the court merely directedthem to pay court costs, correct theirfire management, and establish afire brigade.30

B During the fires, hospitalsand clinics were filledwith people seekingtreatment for a varietyof respiratory, eye, andskin ailments.


The message of these cases isclear, as noted by the study on thefires by Indonesia’s NationalDevelopment Planning Agency(BAPPENAS) and the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB): “Thesecases could well have far-reachingconsequences and may seriouslyundermine other attempts at furtherprosecutions. Even more significantly,the first case calls into question thecapacity of the government to issueinstructions with sanctions againstenvironmental damage if theseinstructions cannot be properlyenforced in the courts.”31

Sporadic firefighting efforts bythe Indonesian government withassistance from Malaysian volunteersand fire suppression aircraft fromAustralia and the United States werelargely ineffective. Poor coordination(especially between air and groundoperations), lack of equipment, lackof funds, insufficient training, lackof water, and the remote location ofmany of the fires were often cited asthe reasons for failure. Aerial suppression by water bombers washindered by the lack of accurateland cover maps and infrastructuralsupport, and land-based efforts wereimpeded by the reluctance of manyrural people to fight fires on landthat was not theirs.32 The number offires began to decline during Octoberand November, probably partly dueto mounting pressure exerted by thegovernment on plantation firms butalso because the firms had burnedas much land as they needed bythat time. Peat swamps were stillburning in late November, but thesefires were partially extinguishedwhen rain finally began to fall inDecember.

In December, the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)adopted a Regional Haze Action Planunder which Indonesia pledged toimprove its firefighting capability. 33

The rainy season, which usuallylasts at least six months in westernIndonesia, began to taper off in lessthan two months. By mid-January1998, new fire hot spots began toappear on NOAA weather satelliteimages as the drought carried overinto a second calendar year and anew rainfall cycle. The pattern of1997 was repeated in the coastalswamps on Sumatra’s east coastfrom January through April. InKalimantan the fires were concen-trated in East Kalimantan, a provincethat had not been extensivelyburned in 1997. The drought wasalso beginning to cause food short-ages due to below-normal harvestsand total failure of the rice crop insome areas. The plight of ruralcommunities, already reeling fromthe effects of the fires, haze, anddrought, was worsened by the growingeconomic impact of the dramaticdevaluation of the Indonesian cur-rency over the second half of 1997.34

Farmers began to clear even moreland by burning, in the hope thatthey could increase the next harvestto make up for 1997 losses. Fearsarose that forest exploitation andrelated burning would increase asfirms tried to offset the effects of theeconomic crisis.35

By the end of January 1998,hundreds of hot spots, concentratedin coastal areas of East Kalimantanand the coastal peat swamps of Riauand North Sumatra provinces, wereevident on satellite images. These hotspots indicated the locations of newlyset fires, smoldering peat that hadburst into flame, and continued under-ground burning of coal seams. Themost extensive burning in Januarytook place in East Kalimantan’s KutaiNational Park, already badly damagedby previous fires, logging, mining,and agricultural encroachment.

By mid-February the fires wereheadline news internationally againas haze returned to parts of Borneoand Sumatra, resulting in respiratoryproblems and domestic airport closures.36 Neighboring countriesbegan to fear a return of the hazethat had blanketed the region onlythree months earlier and were notreassured by the Indonesian govern-ment's weak efforts to prevent orextinguish new fires. The army hadagreed to take a more active role infighting the fires than it had in1997, but it later reduced the num-ber of troops assigned to this duty inorder to prepare to combat civilunrest resulting from the economiccrisis.37

Fires continued to spread dur-ing March, and at the end of themonth a Japanese remote-sensingsystem indicated that there were asmany as 5,000 hot spots on theisland of Borneo, while othersources reported over 1,000. TheSoutheast Asian environment min-isters met in Brunei during the firstweek in April to discuss the fires, thethird such meeting in four months.The ministers concluded that fire-fighting efforts should be focusedon containing existing fires andpreventing new outbreaks.

Efforts to fight fires were ham-pered by increasing water scarcitybecause the drought caused surfacewater to dry up and the groundwa-ter level to sink below the reach ofwells. In mid-April, a UnitedNations Disaster Assessment andCoordination team estimated thatan effective firefighting effort wouldrequire at least 10,000 firefighterssupported by water bombers, butthat sustained rain provided theonly hope of extinguishing the firescompletely. The difficulty of fire-fighting under such extremedrought conditions is illustrated bythe experience of the staff of theWanariset Forest Research Stationin East Kalimantan in fightingrepeated fires in the station's 3,500-ha research forest. Despite theirvigilance, only 20 ha remainedunburned by mid-April.38

Neighboring countriesbegan to fear a return ofthe haze that had blan-keted the region onlythree months earlier andwere not reassured by theIndonesian government'sweak efforts to preventor extinguish new fires.


The newly installed environmentminister, Juwono Sudarsono, estimatedthat effectively fighting the EastKalimantan fires would cost $2 billion.39 The minister compared thelack of government control over thefires in East Kalimantan to the law-lessness of the American Wild Westin the 19th century and regretted hisinability to create a sense of urgencyamong government officials.40 Aweek later he admitted that the forestfires were a low priority for theIndonesian government, which wasmore concerned with counteringthe effects of the economic crisis.41

Beginning in March 1998,Sarawak and Brunei were affectedby the haze, and Malaysia andSingapore worried that the normalshift of the monsoon winds from westto east in May would again blanketthe Malay Peninsula in smog. Brunei,which had escaped the haze in 1997,took strong health precautions,including closing schools for twoweeks. By mid-April, authorities inSarawak were again consideringdeclaring a state of emergency becauseof the soaring air pollution levels,and schools were closed in severaltowns in the state.42 The WorldMeteorological Organization reportedat the end of March that El Niñoconditions would abate sometimeduring June–August, but since thosemonths correspond to the middle ofthe Indonesian dry season, somemeteorologists feared that rainsheavy enough to extinguish the firesmight not fall until October.

Heavy rains did fall during thefirst part of May, extinguishing manyof the fires in Kalimantan andSumatra, but drought conditionsreturned toward the end of the month.By late May, consensus was growingamong oceanographers and atmos-pheric scientists that El Niño condi-tions were abating and there was ashift toward ocean conditions thatusually precede La Niña, a climaticphenomenon that usually causesabove-average rainfall in Indonesiafor a year or more.43 Heavy rainsbegan in June and led to floods inEast Kalimantan in July.

In late 1998, hot spots againbegan to appear on NOAA and othersatellite data for Sumatra and EastKalimantan, indicating that fire-setting behavior had not changedmuch despite the recent experience.44

Meanwhile, haze briefly reappearedin Singapore, Sarawak, and southernPeninsular Malaysia in late November.45

It is difficult to determine pre-cisely the total area burned during the1997–98 fires or to estimate whatvegetation types burned in which areas.(See foldout map on inside cover.)On the basis of the most recent esti-mates available in early 1999, itseems certain that at least 9.7 millionha burned. (See Box 6 and Table 1.)

The extent of the area affectedby air pollution from the fires iseasier to determine. Indeed, theinternational news media were ini-tially attracted to the 1997 fires bythe dramatic spectacle of a “thou-sand-mile shroud” spreading overan area of 1 million square kilome-ters inhabited by hundreds of mil-lions of people. Ramon and Wall(1998: 3) observed that “whereasthe impact of fires concerns mainlyforesters and conservationists, it isthe smoke that causes politiciansand economists to react.” In oneIndonesian town, it was reported,schoolchildren were tied to a rope toprevent them from becoming lost inthe haze on their way to school. InApril 1998, the 1,788-room palaceof the Sultan of Brunei was reportedto have been almost invisiblebehind a thick curtain of smog,46 aswas Kuala Lumpur’s landmarkPetronas Twin Towers, the tallestbuilding in the world. Haze-relatedtransportation accidents were widelyreported, as well.

Mixtures of visible suspendedairborne chemicals normally asso-ciated with urban air pollution arecalled smog, but government offi-cials in the region were anxious todownplay the connection by callingit “haze.” Malaysian informationminister Mohammed Rahmat wenta step further in April 1998 by

warning his nation's broadcastmedia not to use the word hazeeither, or risk having their operatinglicenses revoked.47 In August 1999,the Malaysian government wenteven further, making informationon air quality an “official secret”and directing the firm awarded theconcession to monitor air pollutionto make its readings available onlyfor “private consumption.” Theenvironment minister stated thatthe measure was taken so as “not todrive away tourists.”48

Indonesia does not routinelymonitor air pollution levels, butMalaysia and Singapore do. A read-ing of 100 on the standard air pol-lution index (API) is consideredunhealthy; 300 is hazardous. APIreadings remained in the hazardousrange for long periods in Septemberand October 1997 in the Malaysianstate of Sarawak, with a high of 849recorded. A reading of 1,000 wasrecorded in the interior of EastKalimantan in early October 1997,a level that was probably notunusual in areas close to the fires.49

Malaysians and Singaporeans wereinformed when air pollution reachedunsafe levels and were warned totake appropriate protective measures,but most Indonesians were unawareof the level of health hazard.

TABLE 1Estimated Extent of Spatial Damage by Fire, 1997–98 (hectares)

ISLAND MONTANE LOWLAND PEAT & SWAMP DRY SCRUB TIMBER AGRICULTURE ESTATE TOTALFOREST FOREST FOREST & GRASS PLANTATION CROPS

Kalimantan 0 2,375,000 750,000 375,000 116,000 2,829,000 55,000 6,500,000Sumatra 0 383,000 308,000 263,000 72,000 669,000 60,000 1,756,000Java 0 25,000 0 25,000 0 50,000 0 100,000Sulawesi 0 200,000 0 0 0 199,000 1,000 400,000Irian Jaya 100,000 300,000 400,000 100,000 0 97,000 3,000 1,000,000Total 100,000 3,100,000 1,450,000 700,000 188,000 3,843,000 119,000 9,756,000

Source: BAPPENAS, 1999.


Obtaining accurate data about the

spatial distribution of the 1997–98 fires, the

total area burned, and the proportion of

different vegetation or land-use types that

burned is difficult because of the size and

wide distribution of the burns, the remoteness

of many of the sites, the inability of most

satellite remote-sensing devices to penetrate

the thick haze while the fires are burning, and

the need to verify interpretations of images.

The 1982–83 fires in East

Kalimantan, for example, were not detect-

ed by remote-sensing satellites for almost

three months.1 Basic descriptive informa-

tion was not compiled until 1984, when a

relatively rapid aerial and ground survey

of the affected area was completed.2 The

findings were revised after a later and

more thorough analysis in 1989.3 The

1997--98 fires occurred over a much wider

area of the country, and compiling author-

itative data on exactly what burned, where,

and how badly will take years.4

During the 1997–98 fires, the Ministry

of Environment and several other organi-

zations tracked where fires were burning

each day by monitoring hot spots that

appeared on NOAA weather satellite images.

These data are received directly from the

satellites at several stations in Indonesia.

The NOAA data (also used to monitor the

1982–83 fires in East Kalimantan) can be

used to assess hazard by revealing the dry-

ness of vegetation and ground temperature

patterns.5 Hot spots that appear on NOAA

satellite images provide a general picture

of the distribution of fires on a given day

but indicate little about the size of the area

burned and nothing about what burned.

Remote-sensing experts working on

a European Union–funded Forest Fire

Prevention and Control Project (FFPCP)

made a preliminary estimate, using satellite

imagery in sample areas, that the 1997 fires

burned 2.3 million ha in South Sumatra

province alone.6 The fires were almost

evenly divided between wildfires and con-

trolled burns. The project found that the

types of vegetation that burned, in descending

order of importance, were wetland vegetation

being cleared to prepare rice fields, secondary

brush, scrublands and herbaceous swamp-

lands, dryland shifting agriculture plots,

and grassland in coastal peat swamps.

The Singapore Centre for Remote

Imaging, Sensing, and Processing (CRISP),

using SPOT (Système pour l’observation de

la Terre) satellite imagery, calculated that

in 1997 approximately 1.5 million ha had

burned in Sumatra and approximately 3.0

million ha in Kalimantan.7 CRISP conclud-

ed that most burning occurred in lowland

areas near rivers and roads; montane forests

were virtually untouched by fire in 1997.

Another analysis, carried out by

experts collaborating with WWF-Indonesia

calculated that between 1.97 million and

2.3 million ha burned in Kalimantan

during August-December 1997.8 The Ministry

of Forestry and Estate Crops, however, officially

estimated that in the country as a whole,

only 165,000 ha of designated forestlands

had burned in 1997.9 Forestry officials,

however, kept track of fires on the basis of

unverified reports from timber concession-

aires and plantation owners, who have no

incentive to report fires accurately.

The WWF-Indonesia study found

that the 1997 Kalimantan hot spots were

most frequently found in peat swamps and

other wetlands but that lowland forests

had the highest number of detected fires.10

Using GIS to correlate hot spots with

human and natural features, they found

that fires tended to be clustered near rivers

and agricultural lands, not necessarily

close to settlements—supporting the

hypothesis that the fires were set to clear

land for commercial plantations. Ground-

based observations and interviews with local

people indicate that smallholder plantations

and home gardens, as well as oil palm and

other commercial plantations, were con-

sumed by the fires.11

In late 1998, CRISP announced that

its analysis of satellite data of the 1998 fires

revealed that 2.5 million ha had burned in

East Kalimantan and 500,000 ha in Sabah,

Malaysia. Combined with CRISP’s estimates

of area burned in 1997 in Kalimantan and

Sumatra, the total for both fire episodes

approaches 8 million ha.12 The East

Kalimantan-based Integrated Forest Fires

Management Project estimated that between

4 million and 5 million ha had burned in

East Kalimantan alone, mostly in 1998.13

This figure was revised upwards in 1999 to

5.2 million ha, based on the results of a

detailed mapping exercise.14 (See Box 7.)

The discrepancies between the findings of the

two groups reflect the technical constraints

inherent in this type of remote-sensing

analysis. The important points are that

very large areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan

burned in 1997 and 1998 and that many

different types of vegetation burned.

In the first part of 1999, a technical

team funded by the ADB and working

through BAPPENAS aggregated and ana-

lyzed all available data sources and esti-

mated that the area burned during

1997–98 totaled more than 9.7 million

ha, as noted in Table 1.

Notes:1. Malingreau, Stephens, and Fellows, 1985.

2. Lennertz and Panzer, 1984.

3. Schindler, Thoma, and Panzer, 1989.

4. For a discussion of the difficulties inher-

ent in accurately determining areas

burned, see Fuller and Fulk, 1998.

5. Malingreau, Stephens, and Fellows, 1985.

6. Ramon and Wall, 1998.

7. Liew and others, 1998.

8. Fuller and Fulk, 1998. The discrepancy

between the CRISP and Fuller and Fulk

estimates may be due to differences in

data, methods, and coverage between the

SPOT and NOAA satellites.

9. GOI, Ministry of Forestry and Estate

Crops, 1998.

10. Fuller and Fulk, 1998.

11. Gonner, 1998; Vayda, 1998; Potter and

Lee, 1998a.

12. Straits Times, November 23, 1998.

13. Schindler, 1998.

14. Statement of Lothar Zimmer, German

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation

and Development, Consultative Group on

Indonesia Meeting, Paris, July 28-29, 1999.

6 W H AT B U R N E D A N D W H E R E ?


THE POLITICS OF FIREAs soon as the Indonesian for-

est fires and the resulting hazebecame headline news in September1997, a fierce political battle beganabout who was to blame for the dis-aster and what the most effectiveresponse would be.

The Indonesian governmentand its allies in the forestry andagribusiness industries have tradi-tionally blamed forest fires onsmall-scale shifting cultivators andon periodic droughts and othervagaries of nature. In the aftermathof the 1982–83 fires in EastKalimantan, despite ample evidencethat poor logging practices were themain factor in creating the condi-tions for the huge conflagration,Forestry Minister Sudjarwo told thepress that “nomadic cultivators whouse the outdated [slash and burn]techniques” were the primary causeof the fire and that logging compa-nies were “not responsible.”Queried on the role of the vastquantities of waste and dead treesleft in the wake of logging opera-tions, he countered that “to be fairto them, it is not economical forthem to clear the forest [after log-ging]. The cost of clearing is veryhigh.” He went on to suggest thatthe fire might be a blessing in dis-guise, since the government wantedto clear a great deal of land in theprovince, and with the fires “whatyou have is land clearing for free.”50

By 1997, the attitude of manygovernment officials had becomeless defiant, but Sudjarwo’s line wasstill being echoed by Bob Hasan, anoutspoken timber baron and cronyof President Suharto. In October,Hasan told the press that the extentof the fires had been exaggeratedand that logging concessions boreno responsibility for the burning.51

Later that month he said thatactivists calling for sanctions oncompanies found to be using fire toclear land were influenced by com-munist agents.52

The power of Hasan and otherentrenched timber industry cronieslargely blunted the good-faith effortsof Forestry Minister DjamaluddinSuryohadikusumo to take actionagainst companies accused of settingfires, and Djamaluddin was widelyrumored to be close to resigning overthis predicament. (Suharto appointedBob Hasan minister of forestry soonthereafter, in the short-lived cabinetthat took office in March 1998.)

The forest fires of 1997 openedthe way for a number of politicallymarginalized actors to take onimportant roles in influencing publicperceptions and opinions about thefires and about Indonesia’s naturalresource management policies ingeneral. For a brief period (August-October 1997), Indonesia’s mass mediawere dominated by marginal actors,including the minister of state forenvironment, the EnvironmentalImpact Assessment Agency(BAPPEDAL), the Meteorological andGeophysical Agency, the nationalspace agency (LAPAN), and a varietyof NGOs. Statements coming fromtimber and plantation firms, theMinistry of Forestry, and the DirectorateGeneral for Plantations in the Ministryof Agriculture took on a defensiveand reactive character. TheTransmigration Ministry and thearmed forces chose to keep silent.

The most outspoken and con-sistent opinion leader in this periodwas the minister of state for environ-ment, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja.Beginning in early September, andtaking advantage of the pressurefrom Malaysia and Singapore to dosomething about the haze, Sarwonowas able to push the issue of theforest fires to the top of the publicand media agenda. As a result,Indonesia was obliged, for the firsttime, to take the fires seriously. OnSeptember 8, President Suharto offi-cially ordered that use of fire toclear land be stopped, and onSeptember 16 he publicly apologizedto neighboring nations at the open-ing of an ASEAN environment min-isters’ conference. These actionsput government agencies on noticethat they had to act.

Building on this momentum,Sarwono took the lead in fingeringoil palm and timber plantationcompanies as the major culprits increating the disaster, using overlaysof NOAA hot spot maps with mapsthat showed the location of theplantation concessions. At the outsethe encountered stiff resistance fromgovernment forestry and plantationagencies. But public and mediapressure grew, and in mid-Septemberthe Ministry of Forestry announcedthat 176 oil palm plantations,industrial timber estates, and trans-migration sites were suspected ofintentionally and systematicallyusing fire to clear land in Sumatraand Kalimantan.53 In early October,the ministry canceled 166 timber-cutting rights held by these firms,though it did not suspend or cancelany actual concession agreements.

This action gave rise to consid-erable resistance from the industries,and 121 firms sent rebuttals to theministry.54 But the efforts of the timberand plantation industries to influencepublic opinion tended to be defensivebecause the public had in large partalready judged them to be the guiltyparties. Like some government offi-cials, many firms continued to accuseshifting cultivators of setting the fires.But, in October, several of the biggesttimber barons—and also members ofthe Indonesian Business Council for Sustainable Development—announced that they would contribute20 billion rupiah (about $5.5 millionat the exchange rate at that time)toward efforts to fight the fires andprovide assistance to affected com-munities. Details on the actual dis-bursement and use of these fundswere never made public, however.

Apart from the two environmentagencies, a number of other previouslymarginal government agenciesassumed important roles in shapingpublic opinion during this period.While ultimately unsuccessful, thecloud-seeding projects carried outby the Technology DevelopmentAgency (BPPT) and the armedforces across parts of Sumatra andKalimantan that began inSeptember served as a public symbolthat the government was actuallydoing something about the fires.The activities of BMG and LAPAN inproviding remote-sensing and otherdata on the drought and the firesgave those two agencies an unac-customed public role. Indeed, itwas their work, in cooperation withthe environment agencies, that provided convincing evidence thatplantation owners were major cul-prits behind the fires.


NGOs in Jakarta played anunprecedented role in influencingpublic opinion and policy throughthe mass media. WALHI, for example,produced a widely reported streamof press releases rebutting governmentand industry statements concerningwho was setting the fires, their extent,and the probable economic losses.The fires gave WALHI and other NGOsa useful platform for their long-standing critique of the government’sindustry-oriented and destructiveforest policies.55 While WALHI andother Jakarta-based groups played animportant role in advocacy, manylocal NGOs and youth groupsundertook the distribution of facemasks and medicine in the country-side at a time when governmentrelief efforts were largely paralyzed,and many groups physically foughtfires in the field. In addition, manyNGO staff volunteered to help theEnvironment Ministry operate forestfire “command posts” to monitorreports from the field, analyze satel-lite data, and coordinate distribu-tion of assistance.

The role of the press in shap-ing public opinion and influencingpolicymakers about the fires wasextremely important and probablyrepresented the Indonesian newsmedia’s most outspoken and influ-ential performance to date, at leastsince Suharto came to power. Presscoverage reached a peak of intensityfrom mid-September to mid-October, with events such asSuharto’s September 16 apology toASEAN, release of the list of compa-nies suspected of intentionally set-ting fires, the arrival of Malaysianfirefighters in Sumatra, declarationof a state of emergency in Sarawak,the crash of an Indonesian airlinerin Sumatra, and the outbreak ofnumerous fires on the island of Java.

By the middle of October, how-ever, press coverage fell off,although the fires continued toburn until the end of November.One journalist noted that “the firesjust weren’t news anymore,” and atthe same time the governmentdecided to place the blame for thefires squarely on El Niño. Duringthe first week of October, senior fig-ures from the print and electronicmedia were summoned to a meetingwith a number of key ministers heldat the Ministry of Information.56

The editors were told that henceforththey were to blame the forest fires onEl Niño and cease the “polemics”that had characterized news coverageof the disaster up to that point. Onlythe Ministry of Environment and itsEnvironmental Impact Agencyresisted this line, telling the press inmid-November that “the 1997 forestand land fires are largely due toland clearance activities using thismethod [fire]. El Niño is only anadditional factor. El Niño does notstart fires, but only makes forestssusceptible to fire.”57

The evolution of public opin-ion about the forest fires had threedistinct phases. First came realizationthat there was a serious problem andthat it was affecting neighboringcountries. In the second phase thepress and public blamed the timberand plantation companies (and, byextension, the government agenciesresponsible for regulating them),and the industries concernedmounted strenuous efforts at rebut-tal. In the final phase, faced with itsown apparent inability to respondeffectively to the fires, the govern-ment made a vigorous effort to con-vince the public that the fires werethe result of a natural phenomenonoccurring on a global scale andthus were legitimately outside thescope of human intervention.

Preventing and fighting fireson forestlands outside of denselypopulated Java has never been avery high priority for the govern-ment, and its regulatory approachhas been reactive rather than pre-ventive. Despite provisions in the1967 Basic Forestry Law calling fordevelopment of regulations to dealwith forest fires, the governmentonly began this effort in the mid-1980s, in the aftermath of the greatEast Kalimantan fire of 1982–83.Additional regulations were issuedfollowing renewed large outbreaksof fire in the early 1990s. As late asApril 1997, however, the ministryissued a regulation specifying pro-cedures for “controlled burning” toclear land and only voided it inanother flurry of reactive decreeswhen haze from the fires envelopedthe region in September 1997.

The on-the-ground governmentresponse was also weak and equivocal.By October 1997, the governmenthad essentially given up trying toput out the fires and was waiting forthe rains to return. Assistance effortsoffered by a number of nations (planesfrom the United States, firefightersfrom Malaysia) were dogged by poorsupport and coordination on theIndonesian side. Thousands of facemasks donated by the United NationsChildren’s Fund (UNICEF) in Octobersat in the National Disaster ReliefOffice in Jakarta for weeks due tobureaucratic snafus in the distribu-tion. An October 14, 1997, editorial inthe Bangkok Post entitled “Indonesia’sShame Won’t Blow Away” summedup the impatience and anger in theregion at the government’s ineffectualand defensive performance:

“For weeks, Indonesian big business cleared forests for palm oilcultivation, creating pollution thatenshrouded neighboring states,causing inestimable damage to thehealth of millions, devastating agri-culture and local economies alike.After trying to pin the blame on ElNiño, an apology of sorts came butwithout a pledge to stop the season-al devastation of the forests. And sothe region can expect varyingdegrees of airborne delayed deathnext year too, and the year afterthat, and the year after that. It isabundantly clear that the regionwill be laid to waste as long as gov-ernments remain enslaved to bigbusiness.”

NGOs in Jakarta playedan unprecedented rolein influencing publicopinion and policythrough the mass media.


Meanwhile, international aidagencies fell over each other trying torespond to the disaster, with each, itappeared, attempting to establish itselfas the agency taking the leadershiprole in the crisis. One senior govern-ment official complained privatelythat many of the bilateral offers of aidwere just “attempts to get Indonesiato buy expensive firefighting equip-ment from firms in their country.”A July 1998 review listed more than adozen projects by as many agencies, allclaiming to be responding to the fires.58

Viewed through a political lens,the forest fires presented an unprece-dented opportunity for hithertomarginalized actors to publicly raisefundamental questions about thedestructive relationship betweengovernment natural resource policiesand the crony cartels that dominatenatural resource exploitation in

Indonesia. This window of opportunityfor the critics did not last long,however, and basically slammed shutwhen the rain began to fall. The firesvanished from the press, and theeffects of the fires on the health ofthe millions of people in Sumatraand Kalimantan who for monthslived under a blanket of smog largely

vanished from policymakers’ radarscreens. The fall of Suharto in mid-1998 and the advent of the reformasimovement have once again openedthat window of opportunity. Theextent to which this opening is likelyto be used to carry out meaningfulforest policy reforms is discussed inPart II.

The official position of the govern-

ment, as of August 1999, was that some

520,000 ha had burned in East Kalimantan

province, and this figure was used by then-

President Habibie in a speech in East

Kalimantan that month. Unfortunately,

extensive remote sensing work, confirmed

by ground-checks carried out by the

German-supported Integrated Forest Fires

Management Project based in East

Kalimantan, produced convincing and

comprehensive data in mid-1999 showing

that the fires had in fact covered some 5.2

million ha, ten times the government’s

official figure.1

Informed of this considerable dis-

crepancy, the Minister of Forestry and

Estate Crops, in early July 1999, wrote to

the governor of East Kalimantan with respect

to this “data gap,” and in essence instructed

him not to allow the new data to be made

public: “Remembering current political

developments, we think it is necessary to

protect national stability. Let’s not cause

further debate [by making the data public]

that could harm preparations for the

upcoming session of the People’s

Consultative Assembly [MPR].”2

In a meeting with staff of the

German-funded project several days later,

the governor indicated that he found the

results of the new study credible, but

requested that they not be made public in

order to maintain “peace in his province.”

The project representatives reported that

“the Governor refused to accept that a pro-

active role of the Government, by accepting

and using the results to implement the

further necessary steps, would be beneficial

to all parties” and concluded that “the letter

of the Minister as well as the position of

the Governor are difficult to comprehend

and could cause serious problems for the

future implementation of both [German-

assisted fire-related] projects.”3

This concern was reiterated by

Germany’s representative to the 1999

Consultative Group on Indonesia—the

annual meeting of Indonesia’s international

donors—in Paris several weeks later, where

he stated:

“All in all, the forestry sector is the

most important of the focal areas of our

cooperation. . . . It would therefore be highly

irritating if recent reports from Indonesia

were even just partially accurate: . . . .We are

puzzled as to why the extent of recent fire-

inflicted damage to the forest differs by a

factor of 10, i.e. official estimates refuse to

acknowledge the full extent of this cata-

strophe, namely that the burning of 5 million

hectares in 1997-98 produced nearly one

third of the world’s total CO2. . . .The EU

Commission has prepared a draft resolution

on this matter and I strongly appeal to you

to give it the highest attention. Failing

this, my government would be obliged to

reconsider the future of our ongoing

forestry projects. . . . I need not elaborate

on the ecological but also international

implications of such a reversal in the—-

so far—reform-oriented forest policy.”4

Despite the exposure of this cover-up

and the serious concerns publicly expressed

by a senior official of one of Indonesia’s

major aid donors, the government had not,

as of October 1999, made the accurate data

public and retracted its erroneous figure of

520,000 ha.

Notes:1. “Permerintah Disinyalir Memanipulasi

Huas Hutan Yang Terbakar.”

[“Manipulation of Burnt Area Pointed Out

to Government.”] Suara Pembaruan, 10

August 1999.

2. Letter from D.M. Nasution, Minister of

Forestry and Estate Crops, to the Governor

of East Kalimantan, “Re: Clarification of

the 1997–98 forest and grasslands fire

data,” SK 718/Menhutbun-V/1999, July 5,

1999. [Unofficial translation.]

3. Minutes of Meeting with Governor of

East Kalimantan, Head of the Provincial

Forest Office and German-assisted forest

and forest fires project staff, July 8, 1999,

Samarinda, East Kalimantan.

4. Statement by Lothar Zimmer, German

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation

and Development, Consultative Group on

Indonesia Meeting, Paris, July 28-29, 1999.

7 T H E P O L I T I C S O F D ATA M A N I P U L AT I O N :H O W M U C H O F E A S T K A L I M A N TA N B U R N E D D U R I N G 1 9 9 7 – 9 8 ?


o date there have been threemajor attempts to value thecosts of the 1997-98 fires

and haze. One by WWF-Indonesiaand the Singapore Economy andEnvironment Programme for SouthEast Asia (EEPSEA), covering August1 through October 31, 1997, yieldeda figure of nearly $4.5 billion.59 TheEnvironment Ministry’sEnvironmental Emergency Project(EEP) gave a figure of $2.4 bil-lion.60 Neither estimate includedlosses incurred from the 1998 fires.

Building on these earlier studies, a technical assistance teamfunded by the Asian DevelopmentBank (ADB) and working with thenational development planningagency (BAPPENAS) concluded thattotal losses from the 1997–98 firesand haze were between $8.9 billionand $9.7 billion (based on two setsof assumptions about the value offorest loss), with a mean value of$9.3 billion.61 These figures aresummarized in Table 2; method-ological notes are provided inAppendix A.

The WWF-EEPSEA valuationstudy, which estimated losses of nearly$4.5 billion for 1997 alone, providessome sobering comparisons on themagnitude of losses. It noted thattotal 1997 damages are:

4 more than the damages assessedfor purposes of legal liability in theExxon Valdez oil spill and the Bhopal(India) chemical release disasterscombined;4 more than the amount neededto provide all of Indonesia's 120million rural poor with basic sani-tation, water, and sewerage services;4 more than double the total for-eign aid to Indonesia annually; and4 equal to 2.5 percent of Indonesia'sgross national product (GNP).

In some cases it is impossible todisaggregate from other factors thelosses directly due to the fires and haze.For example, the decline in Indonesia’sagricultural production during 1997and 1998 was caused by drought aswell as by fire, while declines intourism are attributable to the Asianeconomic crisis and the politicalunrest in 1998 as well as to the haze.

All three analyses of the costsincurred by the fires and haze wereconservative in their assumptions anddid not take into account a numberof probable but difficult to quantifycosts such as long-term healthdamage, increased risk of cancer, andcrop losses due to reduced photo-synthesis and pollination. Researchby the Malaysian Rubber Board’sresearch institute, for example,indicates that the fires reduced photosynthesis by 10 percent.

According to one researcher, becausethe haze of the fires weakened photosynthesis activity, rubber treegrowth was affected and the volumeof latex produced dropped noticeably.62 If these less quantifiablecosts could be reliably counted, it islikely that they would more thanoffset distortions caused by the difficulty of disaggregating fire anddrought economic losses in thecases of agriculture and tourism. Atotal economic loss in the range of$8 billion to $10 billion thereforeappears to be the most reliable estimate to date, based on currentdata and methodologies.

Much of the cost of the firedamage probably cannot be estimated.Assigning a dollar value to thedestruction of some of the last intactlowland forest in Sumatra, thedeath of a large percentage ofIndonesia's remaining wild orang-utans, or the shortened life span ofmedically vulnerable people madeterminally ill by the haze is impos-sible. But even this conservative andpartial assessment of the monetarycosts gives policymakers and thepeople of the region a tangible wayof understanding the destructionwrought by the fires and haze.

TI V. C O U N T I N G T H E C O S T: I M PA C T S O F T H E 1 9 9 7 – 9 8 F I R E S

TABLE 2

The Economic Cost of the 1997–98 Fires and Haze (million U.S. dollars)

SECTOREstimated Economic LossesMinimum Maximum Mean

AGRICULTURE

Farm crops 2,431 2,431 2,431Plantation crops 319 319 319FORESTRY

Timber from natural forests (logged and unlogged) 1,461 2,165 1,813Lost growth in natural forests 256 377 316Timber from plantations 94 94 94Nontimber forest products 586 586 586Flood protection 404 404 404Erosion and siltation 1,586 1,586 1,586Carbon sink 1,446 1,446 1,446HEALTH 145 145 145TRANSMIGRATION AND BUILDINGS AND PROPERTY 1 1 1TRANSPORTATION 18 49 33TOURISM 111 111 111FIREFIGHTING COSTS 12 11 12TOTAL 8,870 9,726 9,298

Source: BAPPENAS 1999.

Much of the cost of thefire damage probablycannot be estimated.Assigning a dollar valueto the destruction ofsome of the last intactlowland forest inSumatra, the death of alarge percentage ofIndonesia's remainingwild orangutans, or theshortened life span ofmedically vulnerablepeople made terminally illby the haze is impossible.


EFFECTS ON FORESTFAUNA AND FLORA

The effects of the 1997–98fires on the rich forest biodiversity ofKalimantan and Sumatra are largelyunknown at this time, for severalreasons. First, only a few preliminaryfield surveys have been carried out inthe affected areas. Second, basicunderstanding about the functioningof rainforest and peat-swampecosystems, and about the basicbiology of most species in thoseecosystems, is extremely limited.Third, it is difficult to disaggregate theimpacts of fire from those of droughtand land-clearing activities. Finally,the direct effects of fire may bedwarfed in the long term by theindirect impacts of acceleratedhuman occupation and use of for-merly forested areas that, having beenburned, became more accessible tohumans.

What is known about the effectsof the most recent fires on wildlife isderived from a few preliminary fieldassessments and what can beextrapolated from more extensivestudies carried out after the 1982–83Kalimantan fires. These findings aresummarized below and are discussedin detail in Appendix B.

Forest vegetation. Wherefires are very hot, the soil surfacehardens, making it difficult forseeds to sprout and causing nutri-ent-rich ash to be washed away bythe first heavy rain. Damage tendsto be greater in logged and other-wise disturbed forests. Peat-swampforests are particularly vulnerable tofire. Repeated cycles of burning,such as those Indonesia has experi-enced, can completely transformforest into grassland or scrubland.Apart from the direct effects of thefires, the opening of new areas forcultivation and settlement in previ-ously forested burned areas intensi-fies degradation of adjacentunburned forest areas by humanactivities.

Primates. The fires had a particularly severe impact on theorangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), particularly in Kalimantan. (SeeMap 3.) Studies after the 1982–83fires concluded that orangutanswere able to alter their diet andrecovered fairly well, but the scale ofthe 1997–98 fires exceeded theirability to adapt. Hundreds of adultorangutans were killed by villagersin Kalimantan as they fled from thedrought and fires, and hundredsmore orphaned juveniles were cap-tured and sold on the illegal wildlifemarket. Primatologists believe thatthe most recent fires mark thebeginning of a steep decline in theBorneo orangutan population,which was already dropping due tohabitat loss and poaching.

The proboscis monkey(Nasalis larvatus), a threatenedspecies found almost exclusively inriverine and coastal habitats, wasprobably the primate species thatlost the greatest percentage of itshabitat to the fires. Some other pri-mate species do not appear to be sobadly affected in the short term. 63

Birds. Bird populations wereprobably seriously affected by thefires. Many birds become disorient-ed in smoke and fall to the ground,while fruit-eating species such ashornbills lose their source of food.Hornbills disappeared completelyfrom study areas in East Kalimantanafter the 1982–83 fires, presumablyfor this reason. Insect-eating speciesof birds tend to do well after firesbecause populations of wood-eatinginsects increase in response to theenormous supplies of dead wood.

Reptiles and amphibians.With the exception of species thatlive in relatively deep water, reptilesand amphibians are extremely sen-sitive to fire and appear to have suf-fered severe population declines inareas burned during 1997–98.

Insects and invertebrates.Wood-eating species increase afterfires. Studies of the 1982–83Kalimantan fire indicate that but-terfly populations also increasedand that the number of soil- andlitter-dwelling invertebrates recov-ered within three years. The richbut little-studied invertebrate faunaof the forest canopy, however, is pre-sumably completely destroyed alongwith the canopy.

Summarizing all the dataavailable by early 1999, the BAPPENAS-ADB study offered thefollowing general conclusions:

4 Drought-assisted fires in 1997–98caused major biodiversity losses,particularly in Sumatra andKalimantan, although the vastspread and remoteness of manydamaged areas makes it impossibleto obtain a precise estimate of losses.4 The massive areas burned inKalimantan resulted in large lossesto the already shrinking lowlandevergreen and semievergreen forestsand to swamp and peat forests, withthe most serious damage takingplace in areas previously subject tologging and fire.4 Some 17 protected areas weredamaged by fire, including thenationally and internationallyimportant Kutai National Park inEast Kalimantan, which was severelydamaged. Much of the park hadpreviously been logged and burned,making it more susceptible to firedamage in 1998.4 Deaths of rare and endangeredanimal species due to the fires wascompounded by the hunting of dis-oriented animals for food and saleand the killing of some that strayedinto human settlements.4 Severe damage was not limitedto natural biodiversity but alsoaffected the biodiversity of agricul-tural ecosystems, including locallyevolved cultivars, many of whichwere probably lost. 64


EFFECTS ON WATER FLOWSAND WATER QUALITY

As with fauna and flora, theimpacts of the 1997–98 fires onwater flows and quality have not yetbeen systematically studied. A gooddeal is known, however, about thegeneral effects of fire on water flowsand quality, and considerable dataare available from the 1982–83fires in East Kalimantan. The mainpoint is that fires greatly increaseerosion potential. When a fire episodeis followed by a period of heavy rains,the amounts of ash, soil, and vegeta-tive matter carried into water systemsincrease dramatically.

El Niño-related drought eventsare sometimes followed by a year ofabove-average rainfall, called La Niña.65

This was the case in Indonesia duringthe rainy seasons of 1983-84 and1998-99.66 In 1983-84 the rainsresulted in much heavier floodingalong East Kalimantan’s rivers thanwould be expected from the amountof rain.67 The reason was that thefires had impaired the hydrologicalperformance of the forest. In thetwo previous dry seasons, the firesdestroyed ground vegetation and leaflitter (which usually slow surfacerunoff), hardened the surface of thesoil (thus restricting water infiltra-tion), and reduced the capacity ofthe peat swamps to retain water.Runoff from burned areas carriedsoil, ash, and woody debris into riversand lakes, causing heavy sedimentloads and biological pollution.68

(The magnitude of postfire erosioncan be staggering. Researchers esti-mate that in southeastern Australia,a moderate day-long rainfall thatoccurred a week after a forest firewashed at least 22 metric tons ofsoil and ash from each hectare ofburned-over forest.)69

When large sediment loads arewashed into streams and rivers,aquatic life is smothered in mud.The sediment brings with it largeamounts of nutrients, especiallynitrogen and phosphorus, that pollutethe water and cause algal blooms.Two years after the 1982–83 fires,nutrient levels in streams drainingareas of burned forest in Sabah weretwice as high as those of streamsdraining adjacent unburned forest.70

Changes in water chemistry after the1982–83 fires reduced fish populationsalready affected by a year of below-normal water levels. The incidenceof disease in fish rose, and fish catchesfell. The endangered MahakamRiver dolphin, a marine mammaladapted to living in rivers, sufferedan outbreak of disease.71 The loss offorest cover over streams also exposesthe water to direct sunlight, increasingwater temperatures to levels that areunfavorable for some fish and aquaticorganisms.

EFFECTS ON THEATMOSPHERE

Most of the gases present inthe haze created by the 1997–98fires play direct or indirect roles inregulating the Earth’s atmosphere,72

and their release made a large contribution to the atmosphericconcentration of the greenhousegases that are generally acknowledgedto cause global warming. Severalstudies have attempted to quantifythe volume of biomass that wasburned in the 1997 fires in order toestimate accurately the amount ofcarbon dioxide released from above-ground vegetation.73 But below-ground burning in peat-swampforests may in fact be the greatercontributor to carbon releasebecause of the special characteristicsof peat swamps.

Peat forests cover about 400million ha of the Earth’s surface.About 90 percent of peat swamps liein temperate and boreal latitudes.The remainder are in the tropics,and Indonesia contains about 60percent of those tropical peat forests(20 million to 30 million ha).Unlike forests and grasslands, peat-lands accumulate carbon overthousands of years and thus repre-sent an important carbon sink. Thetotal global carbon storage capacityof peat is 240 to 480 gigatons(Gt)–-about 20 percent of the totalglobal organic carbon store and 200times more than the amount of car-bon released annually from thecombustion of fossil fuel and fromdeforestation.74

The total amount of carbon intropical peat is at least 20 Gt. Theombrogeneous lowland forest peatsof Kalimantan (6.8 million ha) andSumatra (8.3 million ha) store thehighest amounts of carbon perhectare in the world—10 times thatof tropical forest biomass.75 Thecosts of carbon storage via afforesta-tion are estimated to be in the rangeof $3 to $4 per ton of carbon.Assuming that the average depth ofIndonesian peat is 5 meters (m), thecarbon store could be as high as2,500 tons of carbon per hectare.The value of these peatlands as acarbon sink—in the framework ofthe Clean Development Mechanism(CDM) being developed under theKyoto Protocol to the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change, forexample—is obviously very high,ranging from $3,600 per ha to asmuch as $18,000 per ha for deeppeats.76

Burning peat releases vastamounts of carbon that has beenstored for thousands of years. Smokefrom peat fires contains high levels ofsulfur oxides. The BAPPENAS-ADBstudy estimated that the total amount of

carbon released into the atmosphereduring the 1997-98 fires was 206.6million tons, over 75 percent of whichwas derived from the combustion ofpeat. Unlike the case of above-groundvegetation, carbon emissions due topeat fires are not offset over time byvegetation regrowth. In mid-1999 theWorld Bank claimed that

“Indonesia’s fires in 1997 were esti-mated to have contributed about 30percent of all man-made carbonemissions globally—more than theentire emissions from man-madesources from North America.”77

EFFECTS ON HUMAN HEALTHAnyone unfortunate enough to

have suffered in the choking gloomthat enveloped the region intuitivelyunderstands that the smog was badfor health. A resident of Sumatra’sJambi province told a reporter, “Thismorning, like most mornings, Iwoke with a headache. In my stom-ach I feel very strange, and my eyes,they sting. Jambi cannot handle thesethings. This has gone on too long.We have not seen the sun for morethan a month. We are suffocat-ing.”78 Assessing the health impactsin a systematic and quantitative way,however, presents serious method-ological problems.

A resident of Sumatra’sJambi province told areporter, “This morning,like most mornings, Iwoke with a headache.In my stomach I feel verystrange, and my eyes, theysting. Jambi cannothandle these things. Thishas gone on too long.We have not seen the sunfor more than a month.We are suffocating.”


The severity of effects on humanhealth from a “haze episode” such asthat caused by the 1997–98 firesdepends on the level of the constituentpollutants and the length of exposureof the population to them. (See Box8.) It is not possible at this writingto give a comprehensive and reli-able account of how many peoplewere exposed to what pollutants, atwhat level, and for how long duringthe 1997–98 fires. Without thosedata, it is not possible to accuratelyassess the magnitude of healthimpacts. Nevertheless, the data thatdo exist provide a sobering snapshotof the likely health consequences.

Indonesia. Unfortunately, thespottiest and least reliable datacome from Indonesia, where thehaze was heaviest and the mostpeople were affected. Air qualitymonitoring in Indonesia is carriedout by three government agencies,independent of each other.79 The 10Indonesian government stations inSumatra and Kalimantan thatmonitor air quality—like thosethroughout the country—onlysample for total suspended particles

(TSP), which range up to 35 or 50micrometers (µm) in diameter andthus cannot be used directly to assessrespiratory concentration of particles.80

Heil (1998) reports that a field checkof Indonesian sampling methodsrevealed various methodologicalflaws that significantly bias TSPsampling results downward. Sheconcludes, however, that the datastill “reflect approximately the rangeof concentrations that occurred during the 1997 Indonesian haze.”

It is possible to estimate levelsof PM10 (particles with a diameter ofless than 10 µm) in Indonesia fromgeneral data on TSP levels, basedon sampling done at locations inneighboring countries where bothtypes of data were collected duringthe fires. Samples taken inMalaysia indicate TSP/PM10 ratios of70 to over 80 percent. When parti-cles are transported long distances,the heavier ones tend to fall out ofthe mix, elevating PM10 levels. Still,Ferrari (1997) concludes that if theIndonesian TSP samples were takenat locations “30–50 km from thesource of the fires, then it may beappropriate to assume that TSP val-ues would translate to PM10 levels ofat least 50 percent.”

Emissions from forest fires are a

complex mixture of solid, liquid, and

gaseous compounds, and their composition

varies depending on the chemical compo-

sition of the burning biomass and the con-

ditions and efficiency of combustion.

Forest fires produce gaseous compounds,

including carbon monoxide, sulfur diox-

ide, methane, nitrogen oxides, and various

organic compounds. From a human

health perspective, the most important

component of smoke from forest fires con-

sists of suspended particles (a combination

of solids and liquids), mainly composed of

organic and elemental carbon.1

Of particular concern are particles

with a diameter of less than 10 microme-

ters (µm), termed PM10. When people

inhale particulate matter, particles are

retained in various parts of the respiratory

system according to their size. Particles

over 10 µm in diameter come to rest in the

nose, throat, and larynx and remain there

only for several hours. Particles below 10

µm in diameter are able to advance into

the thoracic region (chest), generally

come to rest in the trachea-bronchial area,

and are removed over several hours to a day.

Finer particles, below 6 µm, penetrate into

the air cells and passages of the lungs

(alveolae), and their elimination takes

from days to years.2 Particles below 2.5 µm

(PM2.5) have the most serious and long-

lasting effects because they can most easily

reach the lower regions of the lungs.3

Total particulate matter (TPM) emitted from

forest fires with flaming combustion contains

80 to 95 percent fine particles (PM2.5); that

from smouldering combustion contains

from 90 to nearly 100 percent.4

The health effects of breathing

particulate matter depend not only on the

size of the particles but also on the nature

of the toxic compounds adsorbed (gath-

ered in a condensed layer) on their sur-

face. In the case of smoke from forest

fires, a class of more than 100 compounds

called polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons

(PAHs), many of which are known to be

carcinogenic, are of particular concern.

PAHs are formed when combustion is

incomplete because of an insufficient supply

of oxygen. Burning of wood and charcoal

yields a higher level of PAHs than does

combustion of gas, petroleum, or coal.

PAHs tend to adsorb on particles of 10 µm

or less, and thus they penetrate deeply into

the lungs along with the particles.5

Elevated levels of PM10 particles in

the ambient air, especially when a signifi-

cant proportion of PM2.5 particles is pre-

sent, are associated with an increase in

acute health hazards ranging from “acute

respiratory symptoms and illness including

bronchitis, asthma, pneumonia and upper

respiratory infection, impaired lung func-

tion, hospitalization for respiratory and

cardiac disease to increases in mortality.

The organic constituents have been shown

to induce some inflammations and suppress

the defense capability toward bacteria”6

The United States has set standards

of 150 micrograms (µg) per m3 for PM10

and 65 µg/m3 PM2.5. Concentrations above

these levels are considered unhealthful or,

at higher levels, hazardous. At particular

risk are children, the elderly, and those with

preexisting conditions such as asthma and

heart disease.7 Given the well-known car-

cinogenic properties of PAHs and the

potential long-term effects on lung and

heart function of extended exposure to them,

it can be assumed that long-term negative

health effects are a probable outcome of

elevated levels of exposure to these pollu-

tants. Malaysia and Singapore use the

same standard for PM10 as does the United

States (150 µg/ m3 ). Indonesia only has a

standard for total particulate matter

(TPM): 260 µg/ m3 in a 24-hour period.

Notes:1. Heil, 1998.

2. Ibid.

3. USEPA, 1998.

4. USDA, 1997.

5. Heil, 1998.

6. Heil, 1998: 4.

7. USEPA, 1998.

8 H U M A N H E A LT H E F F E C T S O F S M O K E F R O M F O R E S T F I R E S


Using that ratio—PM10 levelsat 50 percent of TSP—the figuresrecorded for Indonesia inSeptember-November 1997 areextremely high. In late September,TSP levels of 4,000 µg/m3 andabove were reported for Jambi andCentral Kalimantan provinces, andanother peak of around 3,500µg/m3 was reached in mid-October.Levels in other provinces were notas high, but they nevertheless roseat least an order of magnitudeabove Indonesia’s maximum 24-hour TSP standard of 260 µg/m3. 81

Several efforts to directly mon-itor PM10 levels in Indonesia werecarried out during the fires:

4 A short-term study conductedby BAPEDAL in Jambi province during October 3–5, 1997, reportedPM10 levels of more than 1,000µg/m3—nearly seven times the maximum level considered safe bythe United States.82

4 The U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency monitored particulate matter (PM) at twohaze-affected sites in Sumatrabetween November 4 and 8, 1997.Levels of both PM10 and PM2.5

exceeded U.S. national ambient airquality standards (NAAQS) by largemargins on all five days, with val-ues on several days reaching haz-ardous levels. Most of the particleswere PM2.5, and “the specific compo-sition of the particles and presenceof particular PAH compounds arecharacteristic of wood smoke.”83

These sketchy data probablyunderestimate pollution levels expe-rienced in some provinces becausemonitoring stations are located inprovincial capitals, some of whichare not representative of theprovince’s experience with the haze.84

Data on the health impacts ofthe haze in Indonesia are sparse andare based only on 1997 observations.A report from West Kalimantan’sprovincial health office noted significant increases in respiratorydiseases in the capital city ofPontianak.85 Heil (1998: 13)observes that “health statistics registered a considerable increase ofupper respiratory infection, asthma,bronchitis and pneumonia, as wellas eye and skin irritation. Besidesthe physical effects, depression andanxiety syndromes occurred morefrequently. . . .The persistence ofexceedingly high particle levels leadsto an overload of deposited particleswithin the respiratory system, whichis most likely to induce chronic,long-term respiratory diseases.”

The Environment Ministry’sfire and haze study estimated, onthe basis of data from eight affectedprovinces, that about 12.3 millionpeople were exposed to the hazeduring September-November 1997.Of these, 527 died, nearly 16,000were hospitalized, and more than36,000 received some form of out-patient treatment. (See Table 3.)

While data from hospitaladmissions and outpatient visits todoctors indicate significant healtheffects from the haze, these figuresprobably underreport the actualimpacts by an order of magnitude,for three reasons. First, unlike the

situation in Malaysia and Singapore,“almost no information was given tothe public concerning the level of airpollution and the ensuing healtheffects.”86 Second, because of thedifficulties of access, cost, and the“chronic inadequacy of services,”87

Indonesians living in rural areas areunlikely to visit a hospital or healthclinic unless they are sufferingacute symptoms of illness. Third,Indonesians, particularly those livingin rural areas of islands such asKalimantan and Sumatra, dependon traditional healers and herbalmedicines for a great deal of theirhealth care.88

TABLE 3

Health Effects from Fire-Related Haze Exposure in Eight Indonesian Provinces, September–November 1997

HEALTH EFFECTS NUMBER OF CASES

Death 527Asthma 298,125Bronchitis 58,095Acute respiratory infection (ARI) 1,446,120Daily activity constraint (number of days) 4,758,600Increase in outpatient treatments 36,462Increase in hospitalizations 15,822Lost work days 2,446,352

Note: The provinces studied were Riau, West Sumatra, Jambi, South Sumatra, West

Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and East Kalimantan.

Source: State Ministry for Environment and UNDP, 1998.


Faced with chronic (rather thanacute) symptoms, such as respiratoryillness or skin and eye irritation,many rural Indonesians simply willnot visit a doctor. That leaves onlythe inferences that can be drawnfrom the fact that as many as 21million people spent months breath-ing undetermined but extremelyhigh levels of pollutants known tocause both acute and long-termhealth effects. (The figure 21 mil-lion is the number of people livingin 1995 in the six provinces mostaffected by haze from the 1997fires–-South Sumatra, Riau, Jambi,Central Kalimantan, SouthKalimantan, and WestKalimantan.)

Not all of the health effects ofthe haze were caused by breathingpolluted air; for example 26 peoplewere killed on a river in SouthKalimantan when a water taxi col-lided with a tugboat towing a coalbarge in visibility reduced to lessthan 5 m by the haze.89 In NorthSumatra the haze was suspected tohave been at least partly responsiblefor the deaths of 234 people in theSeptember 1997 crash of anIndonesian Airbus near the city ofMedan. Haze from the fires wasreported to be thick at the time inthe area, and the Medan airportclosed shortly after the crashbecause of poor visibility. Aviationexperts noted that thick smokecould also have caused the crash bycreating turbulence or cutting oxy-gen flow to the engines.90

Malaysia, Singapore,and Thailand. Haze from the1997 fires raised air pollution inMalaysia to alarming levels. In lateSeptember, the API reached valuesof over 800 in Kuching, Sarawak,and 300 in Kuala Lumpur. API val-ues of 101 to 200 are categorized as“unhealthy,” values of 201 to 300as “very unhealthy,” and values of301 to 500 as “hazardous.” Valuesof 501 or more are considered topose risks of “significant harm.”These high values were caused byelevated levels of suspended parti-cles in the air.91 Normal nonhazePM10 levels are about 50 µg/m3 inKuching and 65 µg/m3 in KualaLumpur. At the height of the hazethese levels went as high as 931µg/m3 in Kuching and 421 µg/m3

in Kuala Lumpur.92

In Sarawak, as the smogreduced visibility to a meter or less,a state of emergency was declaredon September 19, closing factoriesand schools. The press reported thatat least 5,000 people had soughtmedical help for haze-related com-plaints; one report noted that 3,000people had sought treatment on asingle day. At one point the govern-ment began to make contingencyplans for evacuating all 2 millionresidents of the state.93

A World Health Organizationconsultant, assessing the healthimpacts of the haze, noted that thelimited availability of baseline mor-bidity and mortality information inMalaysia makes quantitative assess-ment difficult. However, theMinistry of Health monitored theincidence of acute respiratory infec-tions, asthma, and conjunctivitis atthree hospitals in PeninsularMalaysia during August andSeptember, and similar data werecollected in Sarawak duringSeptember. Comparison of thesedata with same-day API datashowed a clear relationship betweenthe incidence of illness and concen-trations of inhalable particulates(PM10) at hospitals in the KualaLumpur area and for the state ofSarawak.94 In early October,Malaysia’s deputy health ministertold members of Parliament thatthere had been a 65-percentincrease in asthma cases recentlyand that conjunctivitis cases hadrisen by 61 percent among adultsand by 44 percent among children.95

Singapore, at the southern tipof the Malay Peninsula, also experi-enced high levels of haze-relatedpollution, although the situationwas not as extreme as in Sarawakand in much of Indonesia.Monthly PM10 values, which usuallyfluctuate between 30 and 50 µg/m3,increased to between 60 and 110µg/m3 during September-October1997. The incidence of medicalcomplaints related to the haze roseabout 30 percent during this period,but there was no significantincrease in hospital admissions ormortality, indicating that the short-term health effects in Singaporewere relatively mild. Of concern forthe longer term was the finding that94 percent of the particles in thehaze in Singapore were below 2.5µm in diameter—that is, they werethe fine particles that settle deepestin the lungs and take the longesttime to eliminate.96

One measure of the severity ofthe haze was its effects on southernThailand, which lies some 1,200km from the nearest major clustersof the 1997 fires in Kalimantan andsome 800 km from the major fireareas in Sumatra. Although PM10

levels only reached an average highof 69 µg/m3 during September,analysis of health data for the period“showed elevated and widespreadshort-term respiratory and cardio-vascular health effects in the sameperiod. Approximately 20,000 visitsand 1,000 admitted cases are esti-mated as a lower end of excesshealth effects from the 1997 haze insouthern Thailand. The numbermay increase or double if visits oradmissions in private health facilitiesare included.”97

As many as 21 millionpeople spent monthsbreathing undeterminedbut extremely high levelsof pollutants known tocause both acute andlong-term health effects.


V. D I R E C T M E A S U R E S T O C O U N T E R F U T U R E F I R E O U T B R E A K S :R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S

s stated at the outset, themost effective policyreform measures that

Indonesia can take to preventanother fire catastrophe during thenext El Niño-induced drought areessentially congruent with thebroader forest policy reform agendadiscussed in Part II of this report.This does not mean that incremen-tal and technical steps to deal withthe proximate causes of forest andbrush fires in Indonesia should notbe taken; such steps are urgentlyneeded, and must be integrated intothe larger forest reform agenda. AsVayda (1998) has noted:

There is a tendency . . .certainly present among academics,policy analysts, and environmental-ists, to highlight allegedly deeper orunderlying causes and to be dismis-sive towards proximate and, espe-cially, so-called accidental causes. . .. While it may be fairly argued thatwe need a 30-year perspective tounderstand why, under the Suhartoregime, vast areas of Indonesia’s pri-mary rainforests were degraded andthus became more fire-susceptible,future fire prevention will of courseneed to take place not in the rain-forests as they were prior to threedecades of predatory resourceexploitation but rather in a world ofdegraded and more fire-susceptibleforests [which argues for] seriousattention to the proximate causes. . ..These two arguments are not mutu-ally exclusive, and policymakers, envi-ronmentalists, foresters, and otherconcerned people would do well toheed both.

Following this advice, thischapter recommends steps directlyrelated to fire prediction and sup-pression that the government andits supporting donor agencies canand should carry out immediately. 98

Part II then moves on to the broaderforest policy reform agenda that isthe context for effective fire control.

4 Study and learn from the1997–98 fires.

Although a commendableeffort was made to study theimpacts of the 1982–83 fires, manyof the resulting policy and proce-dural recommendations were notadopted by the government, andthose that were adopted were gener-ally not adequately funded orimplemented. More important,causal factors were not thoroughlyanalyzed, especially the attitudesand motivations of the majorgroups thought to be responsible forthe fires. Some management needsand fire causes are already docu-mented well enough to guide initialgovernment actions. It is critical,however, that data analysis and fieldinvestigations be continued andthat the government incorporate thefindings into policy. The followingquestions have been partiallyanswered in this and other reportsbut merit further investigation:

4 How much of each vegetationtype burned?4 What are the relationshipsamong fire occurrence, vegetationtype, land use, and land ownership?Specifically, what constellation ofeconomic incentives, propertyrights, land and forest exploitationpractices, and human settlementpatterns was most conducive to theignition and spread of the fires?4 What human actions directlycaused or exacerbated the fires;what categories of people or firmswere linked to each type of action;and what were their motivations?4 What were the most seriouseffects on human health, forestecosystems, and wildlife, and whatare the likely long-term impacts?4 What specific institutional andpolitical factors led to the ineffectivegovernment effort to prevent andcontrol the fires?4 What were the roles of droughtand other natural factors in raisingfire hazard, and to what extent werethese factors predicted and moni-tored? Would better forecastinghave mattered?

4 Establish coordinatedand flexible institutionalmechanisms for fire preven-tion and suppression.

Government responses to the1997–98 fires were poorly coordinatedboth vertically and horizontally,leading to serious ineffectiveness. Atthe central level, the governmentneeds to appoint one agency as “fireczar,” with the authority to coordinateand compel action from otheragencies, particularly when a fireemergency has been declared. Asimilar structure needs to be createdat the provincial and district levels,especially in areas identified as havinghigh levels of fire hazard and risk.Communications between levels ofgovernment, in technical as well asorganizational terms, need to bemodernized and streamlined.99

NGOs played an importantrole in both monitoring fire impactsand distributing assistance to fireand haze victims during 1997–98,and at least some governmentagencies accepted NGOs as full part-ners in dealing with the disaster.With the fire emergency ended forthe time being, government anddonor efforts have gone back to“business as usual,” with NGOs leftout of decisionmaking processes,except for token “consultations”from time to time. The valuablerole of NGOs should be more for-mally recognized by the govern-ment and specifically funded bydonor agencies.

4 Identify high fire hazardareas.

Fire hazard is a measure ofthe amount, type, and dryness ofpotential fuel in an area. There aretwo steps in identifying high firehazard areas: assessment of theamount and type of potential fuel,and assessment (and prediction) ofdrought. A fire danger rating systemfor monitoring fire hazard has beendeveloped by the German-fundedIntegrated Forest Fire ManagementProject and is already in place inEast Kalimantan.100 The systemproved its effectiveness in 1997, andother provinces prone to wildfiresshould set up a similar system assoon as possible.101

A


Areas where there is likely tobe a high level of potential fuelinclude logged-over concessionareas, newly cleared timber and oilpalm plantations, and transmigra-tion sites. As these are also areas ofhigh fire risk, they must receive spe-cial attention in monitoring hazardlevels.

The science for predictingmajor El Niño-related droughts hasdeveloped to the point where theseevents can be foreseen months inadvance,102 as was true for Indonesiain early 1997. Local drought condi-tions can vary considerably howeverand need to be monitored in tan-dem with potential fuel loads.

4 Reduce fire hazard byreducing logging and land-clearing waste.

Fire hazard must be not onlymonitored but also reduced.Drought cannot be mitigated, butquantities of potential fuel can cer-tainly be decreased. On loggingconcessions, the government needsto demand and enforce better log-ging practices and to change thecurrent system of taxing log pro-duction to one that will provideincentives to minimize the amountof waste wood left behind by log-ging operations. A great deal of ille-gal logging occurs on loggingconcessions. Making concessionholders legally and financiallyaccountable for suppressing illegallogging on their concessions wouldhelp minimize fuel loads.

On oil palm, timber, and pulpplantations, the government shouldphase in a requirement that planta-tions be established (and rotated)using the “zero-burning” tech-niques long utilized in Malaysiaand accepted in principle by theIndonesian government.103

Indonesia is already developing asystem to certify logging operations,as discussed in Part II. Certificationof responsibly produced palm oiland paper products would providean additional incentive for firms tofind alternatives to burning.Plantation firms must also be madelegally and financially responsiblefor the actions of contractors hiredto clear their lands. And a strongpolicy commitment to siting planta-tions only on already degraded landwould help as well.

Regulatory approaches canonly go so far, however. Plantationfirms need concrete economicincentives to reduce potential fuelloads, which will happen only whenthere are uses for vegetative wastemore financially attractive than thesavings derived by burning them. A1998 study by the World Bank’sEconomic Development Institutepredicts that a wood-chip market“will soon emerge in both Sumatraand Borneo due to new andexpanded pulpmill operations,which require wood supply in excessof existing plantation establishmentand growth rates.” The study notesthat two large pulp and paper millsin Sumatra are already utilizing“virtually all of the wood from landclearing.”104 Increased incentivesfor this kind of waste wood utiliza-tion, combined with a strong “zero-burning” policy and the phaseoutof current policies allowing pulpmills to cut surrounding forest forfeedstock until their plantationsbegin to produce, could changefirms’ economic calculus and sig-nificantly reduce fuel loads.

In addition, technologies existin the United States and otherindustrial countries for convertingwood residues from land clearinginto mulch used as fertilizer, nurserypotting soil, and a soil enhancementmedium for land reclamation.105

These technologies have not beentested in Indonesia and would prob-ably require initial subsidies to getestablished. This would be a goodarea to integrate into one or moreof the many donor agencies’ initia-tives on fire control.

4 Reduce fire risk.Fire risk is the measure of the

probability that fuel will ignite. Thelevel of risk is usually related tonegligent or deliberate human action,and reducing fire risk is therefore amatter of managing people andinstitutions, not managing fire. Thetotal exclusion of fire from naturalvegetation and agricultural areaswould impose economic hardship,could disrupt natural ecologicalprocesses, and is impossible toachieve, in any case. But currently,the use of fire to clear vegetationand dispose of agricultural wastes isvirtually unregulated in Indonesia.

The circumstances underwhich fire may be legitimately usedfor these purposes need to be clearlydefined in law and policy. Withinthat framework, Indonesia needs tointroduce and strictly enforce aburning permit system. Permitsshould specify the area to be burned,the term for which the permit isvalid, requirements for firebreaksand other control measures, and theidentity of the responsible owner ormanager of the land. During periodsof high fire hazard, permits shouldnot be issued, and any burning duringthat period should be presumed tobe in violation of the law. 106

Fire education and awarenesscampaigns are greatly needed inIndonesia. Both smallholders andcommercial operators need to betaught proper methods for conductingcontrolled burns. (Traditional shiftingcultivators are already skilled in thisregard, and their techniques mightbe transferable to the majority ofIndonesia’s shifting cultivators, whoare not from such traditional cultures.) Indonesia, like othercountries, requires people who wishto acquire drivers’ licenses to knowhow to drive safely. At least the samelevel of care should be exercised ingranting people permission to setfires.

Children need to be targetedas well, through the school system.The careless use of fire is a learnedbehavior, transmitted from genera-tion to generation. Fire preventionawareness campaigns in the schoolsare an important step in ensuringthat the next generation has agreater appreciation for the damagethat fire can do and a greaterknowledge of how to use it safely.107

Although increasing the cer-tainty and severity of criminal pun-ishment for unlawful use of fire isnot a total solution to reducing firerisk, it should be part of the govern-ment’s approach. The laws areprobably strict enough; the prob-lems lie in detecting violations andobtaining convictions in court.Detection of violations can beimproved through strengthenedgovernment fire-monitoring pro-grams, both on the ground and viaaerial and remote-sensing methods,and through independent citizenforest-monitoring efforts (discussedin Part II).


The problems in proving lia-bility that prevent cases from beingsuccessfully tried in court point to aneed for legal and procedural changes.The Regional Environmental ImpactAssessment Agency (BAPEDALDA) inEast Kalimantan, for example,obtained strong evidence of unlawfulburning against three oil palmplantation firms in early 1998,including extensive eyewitnessreports and photographic evidence.But, in May 1998, the provincialpolice made it clear that they woulddrop their investigation of the firms,ostensibly because there was notenough proof to take them tocourt.108 Whether this was an evidentiary problem or a simple caseof collusion between the police andthe firms is unclear. 109

4 Monitor and mitigatehealth impacts.

As noted, Indonesian capacityto monitor fire-induced air pollu-tion levels proved to be extremelyweak in 1997–98. It needs to besubstantially upgraded over the nextfew years. Relatively simple andinexpensive technologies exist formonitoring the levels and composi-tion of pollution from fires.Monitoring capacity should bedeveloped particularly in thoseareas that were shown to be atgreatest risk of high pollution levelsin 1997–98. Monitoring, however,requires much more than wider dis-semination and use of monitoringdevices. Monitoring stations need tobe staffed with well-trained techni-cians, and systems need to be put inplace to ensure that data can berapidly collected, analyzed, andmade available to relevant agencies,the press, and the public. Hospitalsand health clinics in high-riskareas should ensure that their staffkeep accurate records of haze-relatedcomplaints and admissions.

If this information is madeavailable during periods of fire-induced pollution, people will beable to take action to protect them-selves. They need to be informed,however, on what actions to take.In 1997–98 a great deal of atten-tion was focused on the distributionof ordinary surgical masks, butthese do not block inhalation of thefine particles that are of most con-cern, and the kind of mask thatdoes block such particles is probablytoo expensive for mass public use inIndonesia. Simple measures suchas remaining indoors and avoidingstrenuous exertion are more realis-tic self-help options.110

Since haze greatly reduces vis-ibility, risks of transportation acci-dents rise dramatically, as was thecase in 1997–98. During suchtimes, the public—and publictransportation operators—should beencouraged to avoid all unnecessarytravel and to take extra precautionswhen driving or when piloting riverand seagoing vessels.

4 Freeze issuance of “salvage felling” permits forburned-over forest areasuntil the government caneffectively monitor andenforce implementation ofpermit provisions andrestrictions.

Indonesian regulations allowlogging firms to conduct limited“salvage felling” in burned-overforest areas. Following on the 1998fires in East Kalimantan, however,logging companies have blatantlyabused these regulations, using the“salvage felling” exception to cutlarge areas of undamaged forestrather than to conduct a final cut oftruly damaged areas. Despite policystatements to the contrary, the gov-ernment has done nothing toenforce these salvage regulations.At the same time, there are in factmore than 1 million ha of severelydamaged forests in East Kalimantanwhere no action at all has beentaken, whether salvage felling orrehabilitation efforts.111 Until effective monitoring and enforcementcan be carried out, issuance of “salvage felling” permits should bestopped, and logging firms should beprohibited from conducting suchoperations.


hose who do not learn fromhistory, it is often said, arecondemned to repeat it.

Twenty El Niño episodes haveoccurred since 1877. There is cur-rently much debate about whetherthe frequency and intensity of theseepisodes are increasing. A compre-hensive statistical analysis conductedin 1997112 concluded that the tendency toward more El Niñoevents—and related droughts inIndonesia—since the late 1970s ishighly unusual and is unlikely tobe accounted for solely by naturalvariability. Prudence dictates thatpolicymakers should assume thatanother severe El Niño-triggereddrought will occur in Indonesiawithin the next several years andshould act accordingly.

Each El Niño-related fireepisode from 1982–83 to the pre-sent has triggered calls for govern-ment action. In recent years, foreigngovernments and multilateraldonor agencies have provided sub-stantial financial and technicalassistance for fire monitoring, pre-vention, and suppression.113 Thisassistance had little or no effect onthe severity of the 1997–98 firesbecause the Indonesian governmentfailed to heed advice or take mea-sures to reduce fire risk and hazardthrough improved land manage-ment and agricultural practices.The renewed outbreak of fires inmid-1999—and the government’sfailure once again to respond tothem effectively—shows that littlehas changed in this regard.

Most Indonesians, govern-ments and residents of neighboringcountries, and the global commu-nity now believe that rapid and firmaction must be taken to control theindiscriminate and careless use offire in Indonesia, reduce anthro-pogenic fire hazard and risk factors,and improve the nation's ability tomanage fire by developing appro-priate policies and laws for preven-tion, preparedness, and suppression.

Given the dramatic negativeimpacts of the 1997–98 fires onneighboring countries, these mat-ters can no longer be consideredpurely domestic policy issues. EvenASEAN—legendarily cautious about“interference” in member-states’“internal affairs”—has systemati-cally taken up the subject ofIndonesia’s forest fires.114 When thedeliberate actions, or negligentinaction, of one government poses aserious threat to the health and welfare of citizens in neighboringcountries, both the governments ofthose countries and the internationalcommunity at large have the rightand duty to demand action.

If the government ofIndonesia takes action forthrightly,it can and should expect the contin-ued financial and political supportof the international community. Ifthe government does not do so, andthe forests of Indonesia repeatedlyburst into flames, polluting the airand blotting out the sun acrossSoutheast Asia in coming years,Indonesia must expect angergreater than that occasioned by thefires of 1997–98 and the possibilityof substantial international politicaland economic sanctions.115

T Despite Indonesian decrees against the use of fire to clearland and international principles against causing environ-mental harm to neighboring countries, little has changed . . .The fires and haze have their roots in cronyism and nepo-tism amongst corporate citizens–-the same problems thatcontinue to beset relations between government and busi-ness in Indonesia and which contributed to Mr. Suharto’sdownfall. Laws and decrees against the use of fires to clearland are on the books, but remain unenforced.

Simon S.C. Tay, Chairman Singapore Institute of International AffairsInternational Herald Tribune, August 31, 1999


1 “Indonesian haze hits hazardous lev-els.” AFP, August 4, 1999.

2 “Haze from Indonesian forest andground fires creeps over south Borneo,” AFP,September 20, 1999.

3 Forest Fire Prevention and ControlProject, “Current Sumatra Fire Situation,”updated August 31, 1999. Available onlineat: http://www.mdp.co.id/ffpcp/overvw2.htm;“Tahun 2000 hutan Sumatera akan kembaliterbakar.” [“Sumatra’s forests will burnagain in 2000.”] Republika, July 28, 1999.

4 In Transparency International’s 1998Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a “pollof polls” on perceptions of the level of cor-ruption in 85 countries, Indonesia ranked80th, nearly as low as Nigeria and Tanzania,and only marginally ahead of the three low-est-ranking countries, Honduras, Paraguay,and Cameroon. The CPI for Indonesia wasbased on a composite of 10 separate polls ofbusinessmen concerning their perceptions ofcorruption. For further information, seehttp://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html.

5 In the early 1990s, for example, theWorld Bank was pressing for a number oftimber concession management reforms,including performance bonds, auctioning ofconcessions, changes in the ways stumpagefees are paid, and other measures. At thetime, the Forestry Ministry, flush with cashand investments, resisted these reforms andessentially ended the World Bank’s forest sec-tor work in the midst of the preparation of alarge forest sector loan, the third in a series.In negotiating the International MonetaryFund–World Bank–Asian Development Bank$43 billion economic bailout package duringthe first part of 1998, however, the govern-ment essentially committed to implementingmuch of the World Bank’s long-standingreform agenda as a condition of the bailoutpackage.

6 The Indonesian government has adoptedthe term “forest and land fires” for the typeof fires that ravaged the country in 1997–98to emphasize the fact that many of the firesactually occur in areas that have beencleared of forest vegetation. Indeed, it is thisprocess of agricultural clearing that is amajor cause of the fires. For purposes of thisreport, “forest fires” should be taken to meanfires occurring either in forests or in areasrecently cleared of forest vegetation for agri-cultural purposes.

7 Goldammer and Siebert, 1990.

8 Verstappen, 1980.

9 Kershaw, 1994.

10 Michielsen, 1882.

11 Whitmore, 1990.

12 Giesen, 1996.

13 Bruenig, 1996.

14 Johns, 1989.

15 Schindler, Thoma, and Panzer, 1989:68–70.

16 Ibid.: 70.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.: 75.

19 Mackie, 1984.

20 Vayda, Colfer, and Brotokusomo, 1980.

21 Pangestu, 1989: 155.

22 Schindler, Thoma, and Panzer, 1989.

23 Ibid.: 113.

24 Ibid.: 113.

25 BAPPENAS, 1999.

26 State Ministry for Environment andUNDP, 1998.

27 “An Act of God,” The Economist, July19, 1997: 77–79.


29 “Pemda Riau Membiarkan KasusPembakaran Hutan” [ Riau provincial gov-ernment ignoring forest arsonist cases],Republika, July 29, 1999.

30 BAPPENAS, 1999.

31 Ibid.: 91.

32 David Wall, personal communication,1998.

33 ASEAN, 1997.

34 The rural impacts of the 1997 currencydevaluation varied a great deal betweenareas. In regions where export commoditiesconstitute a significant proportion of thelocal economy, farmers received a windfallfrom the devaluation. In areas where thiswas not the case, however, the rising priceshad severe negative economic impacts. SeePoppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett, 1999.

35 “Borneo Ablaze,” BBC, February 20,1998.

36 “Renewed Indonesia Fires WorrySoutheast Asia,” International HeraldTribune, February 13, 1998.

37 “Smog decends as fires rage again,”The Age, February 22, 1998.

38 International Herald Tribune, April22, 1998.

39 Kompas Online, April 18, 1998.

40 “Minister: Fires Out of Control inIndonesia,” Reuters, April 14, 1998.

41 “Forest Fires Low Priority SaysMinister,” South China Morning Post, April21, 1998.

42 “Forests Die as Borneo Prays for Rain:Drought Has Turned Forest into Tinder,”International Herald Tribune, April 20, 1998.

43 “Dry season boosts smog fear in S.E.Asia,” Reuters, May 22, 1998.

44 The European Union-funded Forest FirePrevention and Control Project picked up294 hot spots in the provinces of NorthSumatra, Jambi, Riau, and South Sumatraon November 24, 1998. The German-fundedIntegrated Forest Fire Management Projectdetected 41 hot spots in East Kalimantan onOctober 23, 1998.

45 “KC Hopes to Identify Cause of SuddenHaze,” Straits Times, December 1, 1998.

46 “Sultan’s Brunei Palace Invisible inHaze,” Associated Press, April 11, 1998.

47 “Malaysian TV News Cautioned to StayQuiet on Haze,” Associated Press, April 21,1998.

48 “Haze: Air Quality an ‘Official Secret.’”South China Morning Post, August 7, 1999.

49 Ferrari, 1997.

50 “Wound in the World,” Asiaweek, July13, 1984, p. 43.

51 “Bob Hasan: ‘Bodoh, Pengusaha HutanMembakar Hutan’” [Bob Hasan: ‘It would bestupid for loggers to burn the forest’],Kompas, October 10, 1997.

52 Vidal, 1997.

53 “Perusahaan Pembakar Hutan Jadi176,” [“176 Firms Have Set Forest Fires”]Republika, September 18, 1997.

54 “Dephut suda Cabut 166 IPK,”[“Forestry Ministry Cancels 166 TimberCutting Licenses”] Suara Pembaruan,October 8, 1997.

55 “Kebakaran Makin Hebat PenangananTetap Sama,” [“The Fires Increase butResponse Remains the Same”] Kompas,October 15, 1997.

56 The meeting was attended by the minis-ters of information, forestry, agriculture,transmigration, public works, and trans-portation.

57 “Environment Agency Denies El NiñoResponsible for Fires,” IndonesianObserver, November 13, 1997.

58 Dennis, 1998.

59 WWF Indonesia Programme andEEPSEA, 1998.


61 BAPPENAS, 1999.

62 “Smog Cut Sun to Malaysia Rubber,”Reuters, September 25, 1998.

63 Yeager and Fredriksson, 1999.

64 BAPPENAS, 1999.

65 Nicholls, 1993.

66 “Rains Bring Hope, Concern toIndonesian Commodities,” Reuters, October1, 1998.

67 Wirawan, 1993.

N O T E S F O R PA R T I


68 Boer, 1989.

69 Leitch, Flinn, and van de Graaff, 1983.

70 Grip, 1986.

71 Wirawan, 1993.

72 Wirawan, 1993.

73 Liew and others, 1998; Ramon and Wall,1998.

74 Rieley and Page, 1997.

75 Ombrogeneous peats are “true” peatswamps with an organic accumulationgreater than 50 cm and receiving their waterand nutrient supply from aerial depositiononly. Almost all of the Indonesian peats areombrogeneous; “topogenous [<50 cm andreceiving nutrients from river flow] peatoccurs only in a few isolated locations and iscomparatively insignificant” (Radjagukguk,1997).

76 Diemont and others, 1997.

77 World Bank, 1999a.

78 “ ‘We Are Suffocating’: No Escape forthe People of Jambi,” Asiaweek, October 10,1997, p. 38.

79 The Meteorological and GeophysicalAgency (BMG) monitors total particulatematter (TPM) every sixth day; the provincialdepartments of the Ministry of Health moni-tor TPM, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,ozone, and carbon dioxide at weekly inter-vals; and the Ministry of Social Welfare mea-sures TPM, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,ozone, and carbon monoxide irregularly (Heil, 1998).

80 Ferrari, 1997.

81 Heil, 1998.

82 Ferrari, 1997.

83 Ferrari, 1997.

84 For example, South Kalimantan’s capi-tal, Banjarmasin, sits on the south coast,where prevailing winds in September-November 1997 blow from the sea. InOctober the city was relatively clear during avisit by one of the authors, while only 40 kmaway in the interior the haze was so thickthat the sun was completely blotted out atmidday and visibility was reduced to 30 m orless.

85 Cited in National Institute of HealthResearch and Development, 1998.

86 Ibid.: 13.

87 Iskandar, 1997: 205–31, 221.

88 Zuhud and Haryanto, 1994; De Beerand McDermott, 1996: 59–62.

89 “26 Found Dead in S. Kalimantan BoatCrash,” Jakarta Post, October 22, 1997.

90 “Airbus Crash on Sumatra Kills 234,”International Herald Tribune, September27–28, 1997.

91 USEPA, 1998.

92 Brauer, 1997.

93 “Heavy Smog in Malaysia Puts OutsideOff-Limits,” International Herald Tribune,September 20–21, 1997; “On Borneo, Angerat Lack of Haze Help,” International HeraldTribune, September 27–28, 1997;“Malaysia’s Kuching Blinded as Smog RisesSharply,” Reuters, September 23, 1997.

94 Ibid.

95 “Under the Haze, Illness Rises,”International Herald Tribune, October 7,1997.

96 Singapore, 1998.

97 Phonboon and others, 1998: 35.

98 For more detailed technical recommen-dations on preventing and suppressing forestand land fires, see State Ministry forEnvironment, 1998; BAPPENAS, 1999.

99 For details on how communicationssystems for fire prevention and suppressioncan be improved, see Hansen, 1997.

100 Pickford, 1995; Ridder, 1995.

101 Bird, 1997.

102 Goldammer, 1997; see also Goldammerand Price, 1997.

103 On zero-burning techniques for oil palmplantation development, see Golden HopePlantations Berhad, 1997; Wakker, 1998.

104 Blakeney, 1998.

105 Ibid.

106 Prohibiting all burning during severedroughts would undoubtedly visit hardshipon traditional shifting cultivators, who wouldbe effectively prevented from planting theircrops under such conditions—at least wherefire is an integral part of their cultivationsystem, as is the case in many traditionalIndonesian societies. The inequities thatsuch a ban would inflict on traditional shift-ing cultivators could, however, be ameliorat-ed through the use of food subsidies given inexchange for forgoing burning. This is not aperfect solution, but the Indonesian govern-ment, like most other governments, regularlyprovides a wide range of subsidies to differentsocial groups in order to achieve importantsocietal objectives and could do so in thiscase during periods of extreme drought.

107 Indonesia already has a fire preventionmascot similar to “Smokey the Bear”—“Pongi the Orangutan.” Pongi, however, hasnot yet been utilized in the intensive andeffective way that Smokey has in the UnitedStates.

108 GTZ (German Technical Cooperation)Sustainable Forestry Management Project,“Forestry Highlights from the IndonesianPress,” April/May 1998.

109 Even if this were a case of police-firmcollusion, it still points to a need for proce-dural legal reforms. The problem would notarise if the provincial environment agencypossessed authority to bring a criminal caseto court on its own, rather than having toconvince the police to do so.

110 GTZ, 1998.

111 Personal communication, GTZIFFM/SFMP, Samarinda, Indonesia, October23, 1999.

112 Trenberth and Hoar, 1997.

113 For a review of donor-funded fire projectsin Indonesia, see Dennis, 1998.

114 See “Joint Press Statement, Fifth ASEANMinisterial Meeting on Haze, Malaysia, 30July, 1998.” ASEAN efforts to develop aregional haze action plan were funded in1999 by a $1.2 million grant from the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB, “TechnicalAssistance for Strengthening the Capacity ofthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations toPrevent and Mitigate TransboundaryAtmospheric Pollution.” Manila, February1998, TAR:OTH 32019). A related ADB grantof $1.2 million funded specific activities inIndonesia (ADB, “Technical Assistance to theRepublic of Indonesia for Planning for FirePrevention and Drought Management,”Manila, March 1998, TAR: INO 31617).

115 As fires once again spread inKalimantan and Sumatra in August 1999,Brunei was threatening to sue Indonesia(“Brunei Threatens to Sue Jakarta if FiresNot Contained,” Television Corporation ofSingapore, July 29, 1999), and WALHI, theIndonesian Forum for the Environment, wascalling on Malaysia, Singapore, and Bruneito take Indonesia to the International Courtof Justice over its inability to prevent firesand its tolerance of fire-based land clearingby forestry and plantation firms (“ExpertsCall for Indonesia to Face Court over Smog,”Jakarta Post, August 6, 1999).

W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E FOREST FRONT I ERS IN I T IAT IVE

PART II

BEYOND THE FOREST FIRES:

R E F O R M I N G I N D O N E S I A N F O R E S T P O L I C Y


great deal of reporting onthe 1997–98 fires in theinternational media con-

veyed the impression that vast areasof Indonesia’s primary rainforestswere going up in smoke. Numerousresearchers have pointed out, to thecontrary, that most of the burningoccurred in secondary and logged-over forests, scrublands, plantations,and agricultural plots.116 Viewed ina time-bounded perspective, this istrue: at the time the fires started, theareas that burned were, for the mostpart, not primary forest.

But almost all of the areasthat burned in 1997–98 had, infact, been covered by primary rain-forest as recently as 30 years ago.(See Box 9.) Narrowing the per-spective to the situation circaAugust 1997 leaves us unable toexplain the factors that degradedand cleared these vast areas of pri-mary rainforest and reduced themto such a fire-prone state. We arethen also unable to explain why somany of the fires were set intention-ally and why so little was done toprevent or extinguish them.

Since the beginning of theSuharto regime in the late 1960s, aprogression of bad policies andpractices concerning land andresource allocation and use has broughtabout rapid forest degradation andthe wholesale conversion of manyforested areas to either agriculturalland or to unproductive and biolog-ically impoverished brushland andgrassland. These factors have inter-acted synergistically to open anddestroy the country’s forest frontier in

one region after another. Typically,large and poorly managed timberconcessions first open the forest andprovide access via logging roads.Illegal loggers and small slash-and-burn farmers soon follow, complet-ing the degradation begun by poorharvesting practices. The areas thusdegraded are then converted to tim-ber or agricultural plantations or totransmigration resettlement sites.Fire is the cheapest way to clear theremaining vegetation, which is also

much more prone to accidental firesthan the intact forest had been. Inaddition, Indonesian peasants havelong used fire as a defensive weaponagainst the takeover of their lands byoutsiders, and fire has been used as aweapon of conquest by commercialinterests seeking to take over forest-lands from local communities.117

In short, the fires of 1997–98were the logical and inevitableresult of long-standing strugglesover the control of forestlands andresources and a reflection of theimbalances and abuses of power thatcharacterized New Order naturalresource policies for three decades.The result is a situation in whichvast areas of degraded, fire-proneforestlands already exist andprocesses are at work that areincreasing the amount of suchdegraded land.

V I . T H E P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y O F F O R E S T S I N T H E S U H A R T O E R A

A The forest fires in Indonesia are the visible symptom ofstructural problems that can only be solved by addressingthem at policy, legal, and institutional levels. Clearly spoken:the investment in costly fire emergency operations this year willnot stop the fires nor solve the problems. They are only justifiedin order to save the lives and belongings of people and to protectunique reserves of biodiversity which are global commons.

Gerhard Dieterle,

Haze Emergency Coordinator,

German Technical Cooperation (GTZ),

Indonesia, April 23, 1998

Until the mid-20th Century,

Sumatra and Kalimantan were for the

most part forest-covered. They were only

sparsely populated by forest dwellers who

subsisted by hunting, practicing swidden

agriculture, and gathering food and natur-

al products from the forests. Since some of

those forest products were in demand in

Java, other parts of Asia, and later Europe,

trade networks developed on major river

systems, usually under the control of a

ruler based at a trading center at the river’s

mouth. Forest-dwelling communities

established use rights to large areas for

hunting and collecting.

Around the beginning of the 20th

Century, the Dutch colonial administration

began a long-running debate on the right

of forest-dwelling communities to harvest

and sell nontimber forest products versus

the right of the state to control and tax

these products.1 At that time, however,

timber from the interior forests was not

valuable enough to justify the cost of har-

vesting it and transporting it to market.

Several firms attempted to log the most

accessible forests during the later colonial

period, but only a few relatively small tim-

ber concessions were commercially viable.

Aside from the establishment of

tobacco and rubber plantations in eastern

Sumatra, oil and coal extraction in East

and South Kalimantan, and limited timber

harvesting in Kalimantan, the forests

remained unaffected by commercial

exploitation until the late 1960s. This is

not to say that the forests were untouched

or that the two islands shared the same

land-use history; land-use practices and

population densities of forest dwellers

developed differently on Kalimantan and

on Sumatra. In general, Sumatra led

Kalimantan in growth of rural population

density, intensification of agriculture, and

orientation toward market crops. Within

Kalimantan, West and South Kalimantan

developed more rapidly than Central and

East Kalimantan.

During the violent years of World

War II and the subsequent turbulence of

the independence movement and the early

postindependence period, the forests of the

outer islands were not logged, due to political

and economic instability. After World War II,

rainforests began to be harvested elsewhere in

Southeast Asia, and demand grew for timber

species of the dipterocarp family. The chain

saw, together with modern harvesting and road-

building equipment, made logging tropical

rainforests technically feasible and profitable.2

Notes:1. Potter, 1988.

2. Whitmore, 1984.

9 THE FORESTS OF KALIMANTAN AND SUMATRA BEFORE THE SUHARTO ERA


The four most important factorsin the recent and ongoing degradationof Indonesia’s forests are:

4 the logging industry, which sincethe early 1970s has laid claim to nearlytwo-thirds of the nation’s land area;4 the government’s push, since1990, toward rapid development ofindustrial timber plantations to supplyraw materials for the growing pulpand paper industry;4 the rapid development of oilpalm plantations;4 the government’s transmigra-tion program, which resettles peoplefrom densely populated Java ontothe forest frontiers of the country’slarger, less populous islands.

As a result of these ill-advisedland-use policies, East Kalimantanhas since 1985 lost the single great-est amount of forest of any province.In 1985, satellite mapping revealedthat some 90 percent of the provincewas still forested. By 1998, that figurewas down to 68.5 percent, represent-ing a loss of at least 4.5 millionha.118 A survey during 1998 and1999 concluded that the 1997–98fires by themselves affected 5.2 million ha (see Map 4), so the totalarea of forest lost between 1985–2000may well be significantly higher.119

All four of these factors areanimated by the same cross-cuttingcharacteristics of Suharto-era naturalresources policy:

4 centralized, top-down decision-making processes made by sectoralbureaucracies strongly biased towardthe interests of a small group ofbusinessmen with close ties to theSuharto family and other membersof the ruling circle;4 lack of effective legal oradministrative mechanisms to holdbureaucrats and their corporateclients accountable for violations ofthe law, usurpation of local accessto resources, corrupt practices, andother abuses of power;4 a systematic abdication of thecentral government’s role in moni-toring use of natural resources, infavor of private sector “crony capitalists.” These interests weregranted large natural resourceexploitation concessions, often incollaboration with provincial governorsand other local officials intent onpromoting rapid economic growth(and their own enrichment);4 policies and practices that havesteadily eroded the legitimacy andfunction of customary (adat) rightsand management systems related tonatural resources, and have thusdeprived forest-dependent commu-nities of their long-standing accessto forest resources.

LOGGING POLICIES ANDPRACTICES IN THESUHARTO ERA

When the Suharto governmentcame to power in the mid-1960s,economic planners took immediatesteps to develop Indonesia’s weakeconomy and began to develop thelegal framework to permit privatefirms to harvest and export timber.Sumatra and Kalimantan were thefirst targets of forest exploitationbecause they had the largest stocksof commercially valuable tree speciesand were closest to Asian markets.

The Forestry Act of 1967 pro-vided the legal basis for awardingtimber harvesting rights, and manylarge 20-year concessions weregranted soon afterward. Exports ofunprocessed logs rose dramaticallyin the 1970s, providing foreignexchange, capital to build Indonesia’semerging business empires, andemployment. From 1969 to 1974, forexample, nearly 11 million ha oflogging concessions were granted inEast Kalimantan alone.120 Whereasin 1967 only 4 million m3 of logs werecut from Indonesian forests—mostlyfor domestic use—by 1977 the totalhad risen to approximately 28 mil-lion m3, at least 75 percent of whichwas for export.121 Gross foreignexchange earnings from the forestsector rose from $6 million in 1966to more than $564 million in 1974.By 1979, Indonesia was the world'smajor tropical log producer, with a41 percent share ($2.1 billion) ofthe global market, representing agreater export volume of tropicalhardwoods than all of Africa andLatin America combined.122

Roads, towns, and other infra-structure were built in Sumatra andKalimantan in the wake of the timberbonanza, and the populations ofthese islands grew substantially.The population of East Kalimantan,where a simultaneous oil boom wasoccurring, doubled between 1970and 1980, transforming the land-scape as agricultural settlers fol-lowed the loggers into the forests.123

The timber industry wentthrough a period of consolidationin the early 1980s when a ban onlog exports was imposed, creating afew enormous vertically integratedtimber firms that concentrated onplywood production. The number ofplywood mills in the country grewfrom 21 in 1979 to 101 in 1985.Plywood production rose from624,000 m3 in 1979 to nearly 4.9million m3 in 1985 and to more than10 million m3 in 1993, nearly 90percent of which was exported. Atthe same time, the industry becameincreasingly concentrated in thehands of a small number of firmswith connections to the regime. By1994, the top 10 groups controllednearly 24 million ha (37 percent)of the 64 million ha of logging concessions in the country; the sharewas 64 percent in timber-rich EastKalimantan. These big firms formeda cartel that made Indonesia theworld's largest plywood producerand succeeded in raising interna-tional plywood prices.124


By mid-1998, more than 69million ha of forest area had beenallocated to 651 concessions. Ofthat area, 49 percent was operatedby concessionaires who were in theirfirst 20-year term and 22 percent byconcessionaires whose term had beenrenewed. The remaining 29 percent(21.2 million ha) remains mostlyin limbo: 9.5 million ha are slatedfor “rehabilitation,” 8.3 million haare reserved for as yet unallocated“other uses” (timber and oil palmplantations and transmigration sites),and 3.3 million ha are to be restruc-tured as joint private sector-stateforestry corporation concessions.Overall, forest degradation fromlogging concessions totaled some16.6 million ha by mid-1998.125

The most basic problem withthe government’s management oflogging is that land was designatedas production forest with littleknowledge of the characteristics ofthe land, the traditional rights ofcommunities already living there,or the conservation importance offorest ecosystems. The negativeeffects of uninformed land allocationdecisions were exacerbated whenconcessions were awarded to companies and individuals with noexperience in timber harvesting,supervised by forestry officials wholacked the political support, incentives,and resources to provide meaningfuloversight of harvesting operations.126

These weak forest managementinstitutions have resulted in inefficientextraction of timber, unnecessarydamage to the remaining trees,excessive waste wood left in the forest,unnecessarily severe impacts onanimal populations, soil erosion, andstream pollution.127 Low governmentroyalties on timber and weak perfor-mance supervision give the conces-sionaires little incentive to reducetimber waste, mitigate environmentalimpacts, or manage their concessionssustainably.128 Virtually all of thelowland forest in Sumatra and mostof the economically harvestablelowland forest in Kalimantan hasbeen logged, leaving behind a legacyof social and ecological disruption,with little thought to managing thelogged forests sustainably.

The state-sponsored expansionof the plywood industry in the 1980screated considerable overcapacity inrelation to the amount of timberIndonesia’s forests can sustainablyproduce. In September 1998, theminister of forestry and plantationspredicted that the wood-processingindustry would face an annual logshortage of at least 25 million m3

over the next five years. As of mid-1998, that industry officially included1,701 sawmill companies, with acombined annual production of 13.3million m3, 115 plywood firms withinstalled capacity of 8.1 million m3,and 6 pulp and paper companieswith production capacity of 3.9 millionm3. Taken together, and producingat full capacity, these industries need57 million m3 of timber, while theofficially designated annual cut forthe next five years is set at 31.4 million m3.129 This cutting target isin fact much higher than other estimates of a sustainable cut. TheWorld Bank’s 1993 IndonesiaForestry Sector Review, for example,argued that a realistic level wouldbe only 22 million m3 per year.130

In any case, the rate of cuttingis widely thought to be much higherthan that officially reported. TheWorld Bank sector review reportedthat for every cubic meter cut, atleast an equal amount of usablewood is left behind and that at least8 million m3 are left rotting in theforest every year.131 In addition, illegallogging is widespread and systematicin many parts of Indonesia. Illegalremovals are thought to be in therange of 30 million m3 per year,exceeding legal cutting.132 Illegaltimber brokers flourish throughoutthe country, supplying processors whocannot obtain adequate supplieslegally.133 Logging concession roadsoften provide illegal loggers withaccess to the forest, encouraged bythe lack of meaningful access controlsby either the logging firms or localforestry officials. Widespread andsystematic illegal logging in two ofIndonesia’s showplace national parks,carried out in collusion with localauthorities, was extensively docu-mented by a research team andreported in the media during1999.134 The two parks, GunungLeuser in northern Sumatra andTanjung Puting in southernKalimantan, are the two mostimportant protected habitats for theorangutan in Indonesia.

A 1998 analysis by the Centerfor International Forestry Research(CIFOR) predicted that the economiccrisis is likely to intensify forestdegradation from logging.135 Inearly 1998, demand for Indonesianplywood from its major markets inEast Asia had collapsed, and theinternational price of plywood hadplunged from $500 per m3 in 1997to $300 per m3. But, in April,demand for Indonesian plywood inChina and other Asian countriessurged, while Malaysia, anotherimportant supplier, was curtailingits exports. Prior to the crisis and theforest fires, the plywood sector wasalready facing severe supply difficul-ties due to overharvesting and poorlogging practices. The forest firesdestroyed significant amounts of thetimber stock, and, as noted above, asignificant supply shortfall for woodprocessors is predicted for the nextfive years. “The combined effect ofthe low price for Indonesian plywoodand potentially high demand, andrestricted supply resulting from thefires means that producers willsearch for stems in ever more remoteand inappropriate places. Thepotential for increased damage inproduction forests and unauthorizedlogging in recently logged productionforests and some protection forestsappears to be high.”136 There arealso indications that the rising priceof kerosene is causing many peopleto turn to wood fuel.

In short, logging has been amajor factor in degrading Indonesia’sforests and will continue to be sounless fundamental policy reformsare enacted and implemented. Butlogging has been only the first stagein the process of deforestation.

By mid-1998, more than69 million ha of forestarea had been allocatedto 651 concessions.

The most basic problemwith the government’smanagement of logging isthat land was designatedas production forest withlittle knowledge of thecharacteristics of the land,the traditional rights ofcommunities alreadyliving there, or the con-servation importance offorest ecosystems.


INDUSTRIAL TIMBERPLANTATIONS

About the time of the FourthFive-Year Development Plan(1984–1989), the Indonesian government launched an ambitiousplan to establish vast areas ofmonocultural fast-growing timberplantations, particularly in Sumatraand Kalimantan. The plan wasaccelerated around 1990. At theoutset the government justified theprogram as a way to augment supplies of timber from natural forestsand promote nature conservation.137

To this ostensible end, timber plan-tation entrepreneurs have receivedinterest-free loans from the“Reforestation Fund” collected fromlogging concessions. In addition,under a joint program of the Ministriesof Forestry and Transmigration,introduced in 1992, the governmentcan supply 40 percent of investment,plus labor from specially establishedtransmigration settlements, whileinvestors supply the remaining capital.By the end of 1994, almost 39 percent ofthe area planted was in transmigrationestates.138

The timber estate program gotoff to a slow start. In the late 1980s,the government was planning toopen 1.5 million ha annually andto reach a total of between 4.4 millionha and 6 million ha by 2000. By1998, 2.4 million ha had beenestablished.139 (See Table 4.) As ofMay 1998, the government hadapproved applications for 4.6 millionha in timber and pulp plantations,nearly 70 percent of which would befor pulp production.140

Despite its professed intentions,the timber estate program has in factbecome a powerful engine of defor-estation and is currently almost totallydevoted to providing feedstock forthe rapidly growing pulp and paperindustry, which is annually addingsome 13 million m3 of demand thatwould not exist without this industry.141

Plantations have often been estab-lished on degraded timber concessionsby the very same firms whose poorlogging practices degraded the forestin the first place. As the World Bankpoints out, “logging operations candegrade a site with little risk of seriouspenalty, and in the process set them-selves up to receive a license to convertthe site so damaged into a HTI [timberplantation] or tree crop estate.”142

Indonesia’s ambitious plan tobecome a major pulp and paperproducer is thus multiplying indus-trial demands on the forest resourcebase. Pulp production rose from 1.1million tons in 1991 to 3.1 milliontons in 1996, with pulp plantationprojects covering some 5.1 millionha.143 An added 10 million tons ofnew pulp capacity is planned by2005, according to the executivedirector of the Indonesian Pulp andPaper Association, although thattarget is unlikely to be met in thecurrent climate of economic crisis.144

Feedstock for this intensiveprogram will eventually come fromshort-rotation plantations on alreadydegraded forestlands. By 1993, 33potential pulpwood plantation concessions of 200,000 ha to 300,000ha each had been identified, althoughas of June 1997 the government hadallocated only 2.63 million ha to 13firms.145 In reality, only 60,000 hato 80,000 ha of each concession areactually being planted with new trees.The remainder of these plantations,usually logged-over but sometimesunlogged primary forest, are cut tosupply the designated mill operationuntil the rotation planting can supplypulpwood.146 Demand for pulp feed-stock thus competes with timberdemand in firms’ investment deci-sions on plantations (pulp versustimber species). If all planned pulpand paper mills actually come onstream, as much as 30 million m3 ofnatural forest will have been usedfor pulpwood by the end of 2000.147 TABLE 4

Timber Plantation Development to 1998 (hectares)ALLOCATED REALIZED BY 1998

Sumatra 2,148,964 893,463 Kalimantan 2,928,414 956,261 Sulawesi 255,791 85,455 Maluku 64,775 77,656 Irian Jaya 153,250 39,996 Other 48,730 352,215 Indonesia 5,599,924 2,404,364

Source: World Bank, 1999c.

Despite its professedintentions, the timberestate program has infact become a powerfulengine of deforestation.


The rapid expansion of pulp-wood and other timber plantationshas led to numerous conflicts withlocal communities. Although theeffects of logging concessions onlocal communities can be onerous,people are still able to retain someaccess to forest resources in the con-cessions. Plantations, however, andthe clear-cutting that accompaniesthem, impose a much higher levelof deprivation on communities thatdepend on the forest areas in questionfor their livelihoods.148

As noted above, industrial timberplantation firms were blamed forintentionally setting fires to clearland in 1997. Of the 176 plantationfirms identified as culprits by theForestry and EnvironmentMinistries in September 1997, 28(16 percent) were industrial timberplantations.149 In light of theEnvironment Ministry’s statementthat “it has been proven that 85percent of the fires were set by oilpalm and industrial timber planta-tion firms,”150 one can conclude onthe basis of that estimate thatapproximately 14 percent of the fireswere set to clear land for timberplantations.

THE OIL PALM BOOMPalm oil, extracted from the

fruit of a species of palm originatingin Africa (Elaeis guineensis), is widelyused as cooking oil and as an ingredient in soap, margarine, anda variety of other products. Globalproduction grew from 14.7 milliontons in 1994 to nearly 16 milliontons in 1997. Production in that yearwas dominated by Malaysia, thelargest producer (with 50.6 percent),and Indonesia (28.8 percent), thesecond largest. Global production isexpected to grow by more than 7percent annually for the foreseeablefuture, and by 2005 Indonesia isexpected to produce some 12.2 milliontons, or 41.4 percent of the total.151

Expansion of oil palm planta-tions is probably the largest singlecommercial force behind deforesta-tion in Indonesia; the area coveredby these plantations grew fromabout 843,000 ha in the mid-1980sto nearly 3 million ha in 1998.152

(See Table 5.) Of this area, 46 per-cent was held by private companies,with smallholders and older state-run plantations making up therest.153 Most plantations are current-ly in Sumatra, but Kalimantan isbeing rapidly developed, and IrianJaya is the primary target for futureexpansion. According to a recentstudy, “it can be said that almost allof the existing oil palm plantationareas result from the conversion ofproduction forest.” This is becausethe procedure for acquiring forest-land is relatively easy and the firmcan clear-cut and sell standing tim-ber, a profitable side business. As of1997, the agreed area of productionforest to be converted for plantationshad reached 6.7 million ha, in addi-tion to 9 million ha proposed forfurther development of tree cropplantations on other lands.154

The Suharto government aimedto reach a total of 5.5 million ha of oilpalm plantations by 2000—a targetthat was not met. Three million hahave been established, and an annualconversion rate of 200,000 ha to250,000 ha per year seems likely.155

Indonesia's oil palm industryis dominated by some of the samedomestic conglomerates that controlthe logging, wood-processing, andpulp and paper industries. Just fourcompanies held 68 percent of the 1million ha of estates in private handsin 1997.156 There is also considerableforeign investment: as of the end of1998, 50 foreign firms were involvedin the oil palm sector, with totalinvestments valued at $3 billion.157

As with timber plantations, therapid expansion of oil palm planta-tions has given rise to widespreadconflicts with local communities.

TABLE 5

Oil Palm Plantation Development in Indonesia, mid-1980s to 1998 (hectares)

OIL-PALM AREA, OIL PALM AREA, NEW OIL PALM AREA OUTSTANDING APPLICATIONS

MID-1980S 1998 SINCE MID-1980S FROM DEVELOPERS, 1995Sumatra 805,800 2,240,495 1,434,695 9,395,697Kalimantan 0 562,751 562,751 4,760,127Sulawesi 11,800 101,251 89,451 665,379Maluku 0 0 0 236,314Irian Jaya 23,300 31,080 7,780 590,992Other 1,800 21,502 19,702 1,777TOTAL 842,700 2,957,079 2,114,379 15,650,286

Source: World Bank, 1999c.

Expansion of oil palmplantations is probablythe largest single com-mercial force behinddeforestation in Indonesia.


Indonesia's haste to expandthe industry, and the privilegedpolitical position of the major firms,has made land clearing for oil palmthe largest single forest fire risk factorin Sumatra and Kalimantan. Formerminister of agriculture Baharsjaestimated that 550,000 ha could havebeen cleared by burning in 1997, asthis was the amount of land targetedfor conversion to pulp and palm oilplantations and for agriculturalland settlement schemes.158 Burningis attractive to plantation firmsbecause it removes waste wood andvegetation rapidly and requires rela-tively little heavy equipment ortechnical expertise.159

The minister of forestry at thetime, Djamaluddin Suryohadikusuma,announced that 46 percent of thehot spots appearing on satelliteimages on September 28, 1997, werein lands granted for plantations.160

Ironically, plantation firms sufferedheavy losses later in 1997 and in1998 as fires spread out of controlinto established plantations. In earlyApril 1998, the minister of state forenvironment, Juwono Sudarsono,estimated that 160,000 ha of plan-tations had been damaged in EastKalimantan during the previousthree months.161 A researcher investigating the role of plantationsin the fires found that it was notuncommon for local people to pur-posely set fire to tree crops to protestloss of their land to plantationfirms.162 The same researcher alsointerviewed farmers who believedthat plantation firms deliberately setfire to their crops to reduce thecompensation owed the farmers forbeing displaced by plantations.

THE TRANSMIGRATIONPROGRAM

Between 1969 and 1993, transmigration—the government’s program for resettling people fromdensely populated Java and Bali toSumatra, Kalimantan, and theother “outer islands”—opened 1.7million ha of agricultural land andtransported some 8 million people.163

The program affects a much greaterarea, however, due to poor site choicesand the land-clearing practicesemployed. A 1994 World Bank evaluation of the $560 million inloans it made to Indonesia for theprogram during the 1970s and 1980sconcluded that land clearing wasnot carried out according to agreedlegal guidelines. Slopes of over 8percent had been cleared, trees hadbeen bulldozed into waterways,anti-erosion measures along con-tours had not been taken, and noattempt had been made to harvestthe commercial timber left partlyburned in the field. The effects onlocal communities, particularly traditional indigenous groups, havebeen extremely negative. In the caseof the forest-dwelling Kubu of Sumatra,for example, the report concluded that“there has been a major negative andprobably irreversible impact.”164

Over the past decade, theemphasis of the transmigration program has shifted away from subsistence agriculture and towardwage labor on industrial timberestates and oil palm plantations. Asnoted above, almost 39 percent ofthe timber estate area planted liesin transmigration sites,165 and some956,257 ha of oil palm plantationswith a formal link to transmigrationsites had been established by theend of 1995.166

THE MILLION-HECTAREPEAT-SWAMP PROJECTIN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN

Beginning in 1995, theSuharto regime embarked on its lastand most disastrous megadevelopmentproject—a scheme to transform peatforests covering more than 1 millionha in the heart of Kalimantan into arice-growing region colonized bymore than 1.5 million transmigrantsfrom Java. The region in questionconstitutes a large part of the largestpeat-swamp floodplain in westernIndonesia and contains some of theoldest and deepest peat deposits onthe planet. It is home to the largestcontiguous population of orangutanin the world, as well as countlessother rare and endangered speciesof flora and fauna. Thousands ofindigenous Dayak people have livedin the region for centuries, benefitingfrom the rich fish harvests in theswamps and rivers and harvestingnumerous nontimber forest productssuch as rattan.

Peat swamps are complex andfragile ecosystems that are essentiallyunsuitable for large-scale agriculturebecause of their hydrology, which is“very difficult to manage,” and theirextremely acidic soils on which “it

is impossible to grow economicallyviable crops.” In addition, their highrates of subsidence when the area isdrained for crops causes “considerabledifficulty in the establishment ofsuccessful plantation agriculture”particularly for “top-heavy” cropslike oil and coconut palm.167

This was, nevertheless, the placethat Suharto decided was suitablefor massive, intensive settlement andagricultural development. Such wasthe nature of his regime that not oneof his ministers dared point out thatthe project was doomed to fail–-aconclusion that virtually anyonewould reach after an hour’s readingin the extensive literature on devel-opment in tropical peat swamps.168

The project, commonly knownby its Indonesian acronym PLG,perfectly illustrates the close linkagesbetween New Order forest and land-use policies and the fire disaster of1997-98. The regime’s ill-advisedpolicies on forestry, plantations,transmigration, and land claims byindigenous people all came togetherin this debacle, causing untoldenvironmental damage, extensivehuman suffering, and one of theworst single concentrations of firesin 1997, with massive releases ofcarbon into the atmosphere.


The PLG project was promotedby Suharto himself and was madestate policy in 1995 by PresidentialDecrees No. 82 and 83. Situated inCentral Kalimantan province, thearea intended for the project coveredabout 1.4 million ha. Of this, some500,000 ha was to be converted frompeat-swamp forest to rice and othercrop cultivation (adding to theexisting 80,000 ha of rice land inthe project area), with the remainingareas left under forest cover. Morethan 700 km of large canals, 25 mwide and 5–6 m deep, as well asnumerous secondary and tertiarycanals, were to be constructed to supply irrigation water and transport.(See Maps 5a and 5b.) Some672,000 transmigrants from Java wereslated to be settled in the area, nearly400,000 of them by the end of 1999,169

with the total eventually rising to1.75 million (350,000 families).170

Forest clearing and constructionof canals began in late 1995, sixmonths before the required environ-mental impact analysis (EIA) wasinitiated. The EIA concluded that onlyabout 30 percent of the project areawas at all suitable for agriculture—a finding ignored by the governmentand its contractors.171 By 1997, some13,500 transmigrants had beenbrought in, and the project area hadbecome a free-for-all zone for illegallogging facilitated by deals betweenthe companies building the projectinfrastructure (canals, transmigrationsites, and roads) and small loggingcompanies. Among the contractorswas PT. Rante Mario, owned by thepresident’s youngest son, and sub-sidiaries of the Salim Group, con-trolled by a long-time Suhartobusiness partner, Liem Soe Liong.172

By October 1997, floats of hundredsof logs of the area’s best timber werebeing continuously sent downriver tothe coast from the project area.

Meanwhile, dozens of portablesawmills worked constantly along theriverbanks to turn poorer-qualitywood–-that would rot in a few years–-into housing for transmigrants.173

Fire was used systematicallyand pervasively to clear project lands.(See Map 5c.) Hundreds of tempo-rary migrants moved up the riversand canals into the area, seekingwork with the construction compa-nies or the illegal loggers andsawmills. Many were hired by thecontractors to set fires. One projectforeman estimated that about 90percent of the workers moving aroundhis canal construction site were notofficially working for the project.

By mid-1997, the combinationof drought, large amounts of loggingwaste, and intentional burning hadcreated an inferno that raged acrosshuge areas of the million-hectareproject site from July throughNovember. Because of the area’shigh concentrations of peat swamp,

these fires were particularly smokyand largely accounted for the intensehaze that blanketed Malaysia’sSarawak state during September. Ifthe project was not the single largestsource of haze, it was certainly oneof the largest. Yet the governmentdid not officially acknowledge the keyrole of the president’s pet project inpolluting much of Southeast Asia.174

A journalist reporting from thePLG area in October 1997 accuratelydescribed the devastation:

“Suharto’s grand project is todayone of the most desolate spots onearth–a vast, stinking, blackened,smouldering and toasted place.Thousands of square kilometers ofland are shrouded in smog, as theearth itself burns from deep belowin the peat of would-be paddy fields.. . . The whole hydrology of the areahas been affected, with the watertable dropping several feet. The riverhas turned a bright green and is

mostly undrinkable. And everywherethe land has been systematicallyand deliberately torched.” 175

Meanwhile, the project hadfailed spectacularly as a rice-growingeffort. Suharto’s 1995 decree hadspecified that rice had to be harvestedfrom the project within two years, andabout $350 million had been spentto that end (much of it, ironically,taken from the Reforestation Fund).176

“That is an order that must beobeyed,” observed peat swamp expertTejoyuwono of Gadjah MadaUniversity. “[Officials charged withimplementing the project] have justbeen making it up as they go along.They have ignored all establishedtechnical procedures.”177 Becausethe soils are unfit for agriculture,transmigration site officials confidedto one of the authors that they hadto use up to 6 tons of lime per hectareto improve the pH of the soil enoughto support crops, which still were notgrowing very well. Rieley (1999)reported that by mid-1999, “not onefruiting head of productive rice hasbeen grown and a landscape of onemillion hectares (the size of NorthernIreland) lies devastated and useless.”

Lack of water was anothermajor problem; the poorly plannedcanals had actually cut off watersupplies to many planned agriculturalareas. Ignoring the information ofhis own subordinates—the districtchief had told the press two days beforethat “most of the irrigation canalsin the area have gone dry”178 —thegovernor of Central Kalimantan inearly September asked, “Who saysthere is a lack of water? The agricultureproject director there has alreadyfixed the problem.”179

"How could a grossly stupid project of this magnitude hap-pen in this modern age of advanced agronomic technologyand environmental awareness in which sustainable develop-ment is the watchword? The answer lies with the autocraticgovernment of President Suharto..."

Jack Rieley, Director

Kalimantan Tropical Peat Swamp Forest Research Project

School of Geography, University of Nottingham,

United Kingdom

(Rieley, 1999)

“Frodo and Sam gazed out in mingled loathing and wonder onthis hateful land. All seemed ruinous and dead, a desert burnedand choked. . . . Smoke trailed on the ground and lurked inits hollows, and fumes leaked from fissures in the earth.”

J.R.R. Tolkien,

The Lord of the Rings


Of the planned 2,500 ha ofrice that were to be harvested inmid-October—with Suharto inattendance—only 279 ha weregrowing by the end of August.180 Aftermuch suspense in the local press,the president did not show up for theharvest after all; the “thick smoke”blanketing the region made travel toodifficult, it was explained.181 Indeed,by October 1, about 5,000 ha in thearea immediately around the twoalready inhabited transmigrationareas were aflame. Local residentsreported to the press that the fires hadbeen burning since early August butthat they had observed “no effortswhatsoever” to put out the fires byeither the government or the projectcontractors. The PLG project director,however, told the press that this firewas in the “small category” andhence not much of a problem.182

Difficult as life has been in thePLG transmigration areas, it has beeneasy compared with the suffering ofthe indigenous Dayak people in thearea. The Dayaks in the seven villagesalong the Mengkatip River–-the firstsector to be developed within theproject area—have seen their liveslargely destroyed by the project andby the fires that it caused. Until 1996,these people had lived a relativelyprosperous life practicing traditionalagriculture, cultivating and sellinglarge quantities of rattan from carefully tended forest gardens, andexploiting the bountiful fish stocksfound in peat-swamp pools (beje).When construction of the PLG canalsand the associated land clearingbegan in April 1996, the first resultwas that the beje dried up and thefish died. The massive runoff of limefrom the transmigration sites turnedthe Mengkatip River bright green,and, according to local fishermen, allbut two species of the formerly plentifulriver fish stocks completely vanished.

Traditionally, the Dayak haveclaimed an area 5 km back from bothsides of the river as their traditional(adat) land, using it for intensiverattan cultivation, farming, fishing,hunting, and collection of grassesand other useful products. With thearrival of the PLG project, fully 50percent of their land was confiscated,and many areas of rattan and othercrops were destroyed by the construc-tion of canals. Then, in mid-1997,the fires set to clear land for theproject spread out of control anddestroyed most of the rattan areasin the narrow strip along the riverthat the government had spared.

Local village leaders conducteda systematic inventory of their losses.Together with the Indonesian Forumfor the Environment (WALHI), theymade a conservative estimate—since many people’s losses could not

be included in the survey—of Rp20,910,533,000, or nearly $7 millionat mid-1997 exchange rates.183

(See Table 6.)When aggrieved local leaders

sent a delegation to the district head(Bupati) to demand compensationfor at least some of their losses, hetold them (and the press) that “inline with policy from the Centerconcerning this national project,there will be no compensationwhatsoever paid,” since the projectwas for the good of the people anyway.He noted, however, that the com-plainants would be given the chanceto become “local transmigrants” inthe nearby transmigration site—theone where agriculture had almosttotally failed and houses were beingbuilt with substandard timber.184

This pronouncement flatly contra-dicted a formal April 1996 agreement,signed by the heads of the provincialand district development planningagencies, to pay compensation forstanding rattan and other crops atstated rates.185

By mid-1998, the economiccrisis and the fall of Suharto hadplaced the eventual fate of the PLGproject in question. In May 1998,at the request of the minister ofpublic works, a World Bank waterresources engineer conducted ashort survey of the PLG project area.His report described in detail thescope of the disaster caused by theproject. Noting that almost all ofthe primary canals were alignedover deep and medium-depth peatconservation areas, the engineerwarned that subsidence of the peatwould occur rapidly near thecanals, compromising theirdrainage functions and causingincreasing susceptibility to fire. Healso noted that no information wasavailable on damage to wildlifehabitat or about the impacts on thelocal indigenous people. He con-cluded by calling for a halt to fur-ther expansion of the project and acomplete reevaluation, including anew EIA. Other sobering conclu-sions included the following:

TABLE 6

Losses Incurred by Seven Villages in the Mengkatip Watershed Resulting from Land Appropriation and Fires Associated with the Million-Hectare Rice Project

NATURAL RESOURCE AMOUNT ANNUAL PRODUCTION FINANCIAL LOSS (RUPIAH)Rattan burned 3,492 ha 17,463 tons 4,017,375,000Rattan confiscated 4,070 ha 20,351 tons 4,680,667,000Fruit tree orchards 226,870 m3 6,816,111,000Fishponds confiscated 487 tons 487 tons 730,500,000Fishponds burned or dried up 1,200 tons 1,200 tons 1,800,000,000Purun grass 75 stands 432 bundles/ ha 1,701,000,000Rice fields 382 ha 764 tons 1,146,000,000Rubber 504 ha 5 tons 18,900,000TOTAL Rp 20,910,553,000

US$6,970,184a

Note: a. Calculated on a rate of Rp 3,000 = $1, the exchange rate in mid-1997. Source: WALHI, 1999.

One million hectares, onemillion wounds.

Graffiti in Dadahup village,

Central Kalimantan


“The whole water system needs to be redesigned and made compatiblewith soil and topographic constraints.It is not unlikely that—to reversethe damage done—the majorcanals will have to be filled in . . .

At least Rp1.5 trillion ($500 million) has been spent on the pro-ject to date. Redesign of the projectmeans an even greater expenditurethan ever foreseen. At the same timethe agricultural area will be reducedto below 500,000 ha while rice yieldsand agricultural economics areuncertain. No benefit-cost engineer-ing-economic and sensitivity analy-sis has been undertaken to date,especially one that includes settle-ment and environmental mitigationcosts as well as other irreversiblelosses. GOI [Government ofIndonesia] owes itself such ananalysis in order to determine thedesirability of further major expen-diture on this project.”186

Further analysis of the pro-ject’s canal system has revealed thatrather than irrigating the peatareas, the canals have served to sys-tematically drain their moistureinto the sea because the land’stopography was not taken intoaccount.187 As a result, the watertable is falling, the remaining vege-tation is dying off, and the peat isshrinking by 1 to 2 centimeters peryear—releasing large amounts ofcarbon and increasing fire risk asthe land dries out. Poor design,construction and maintenance havealso resulted in rapid silting-up ofthe canals, and many will be filledin with peat within five years. Inthe words of another expert:

“The channels have not, and never could function, owing to thecontours of the land surface and theconstraining physical properties ofthe peat itself. After only two yearsthe main channels are losing theirwater, their banks are collapsingand they are silting up with peatmud. They are already in a state ofdisrepair but are still being used asconduits along which people gainaccess into the interior. As a resultall remaining timber is beingremoved and, in the process, debrisis set alight and the surface peatcatches fire generating the denseunhealthy haze that has besetSoutheast Asia in recent years.” 188

In June 1998, the minister fortransmigration and resettlement offorest encroachers (the actual nameof the ministry) announced that thegovernment would resurvey the wholeproject area before making a decisionabout the project. He acknowledgedthe numerous calls to halt the project(based largely on the findings of theWorld Bank survey) but argued that“if we stop the project just like that,it would be the same as throwingaway Rp1.4 trillion.”189

In August 1998, over 120 representatives from communitieswhose livelihoods had been destroyedby the project (including manyfrom the Mengkatip River area)occupied local government officesin the Central Kalimantan capitalof Palangkaraya for a full week.They demanded that the project behalted, all lands returned to theirrightful owners, damaged ecosystemsrestored, and compensation paid forlocal financial losses. Local government officials replied that theproject was run by the central, notthe local, government and so wasnot their affair.190

The following month, theminister for transmigration andresettlement of forest encroachersconfirmed to the press that reevalu-ation of the project was under way.But rather than announcing theecological restoration and carefulassessment favored by the WorldBank’s evaluator, or the completehalt and payment of reparationsdemanded by the local people, hestated that the areas originally slatedfor rice and other food crops would beoffered to foreign investors to developoil palm plantations. “Right now, wealready have one Japanese investorwho is interested. . . . We have toadmit that this step will be difficult,because our NGOs are fierce. Butaccording to me, exploiting the peatforests [for oil palm] constitutesnature conservation.”191

As criticism of the projectmounted—and the government ranout of funds due to the economiccrisis—then-President Habibiefinally issued a decree (No.80/1999) in July 1999 that formallyrecognized the failure of PLG,revoked Suharto’s 1995 decrees, andessentially ended the project in itspresent form. Future developmentof the devastated PLG area has beenincorporated into development of asurrounding 2.8 million ha “eco-nomic development zone” estab-lished by Presidential Decree No.170 in 1998. Like PLG, the overrid-ing premise in this new strategy isthat of land conversion to foodcrops and plantations, especially oilpalm and rubber. There is little ref-erence to environmental protection,and what is mentioned, accordingto Rieley (1999), is “inappropriate,insufficient and of low priority.” No

mention has been made of rehabili-tating the nearly one millionhectares that is a “wasteland withlittle prospect for either economicdevelopment or hydrological andwildlife conservation.”192 And noplans have been announced tocompensate local communities forthe immense losses they have suffered.

In mid-1999, however, theIndonesian Forum for Environment(WALHI) brought a lawsuit againstthe government, including the pres-ident and eight cabinet ministers,seeking damages for the destructioncaused by the PLG project. The suitalleges that the project misappropri-ated Rp 527.2 billion (US$65.9 mil-lion) from the Reforestation Fund,while ignoring an environmentalimpact analysis and the aspirationsof local indigenous communities.193

At this writing the case is in progress.The wasteland left in the wake

of the PLG project has set the stagefor another massive conflagrationin the next long dry season.Indeed, fires broke out again in thePLG area in August 1999; the mediablamed farmers who were burningwaste from earlier land clearance toget rid of rats threatening their riceharvests.194 It seems more likely,however, that this renewed burningwas at least in part a continuationof the cycle of illegal logging, burn-ing, and land clearing by commer-cial interests that has characterizedthe area since 1996.


The PLG megaproject is onlythe most egregious of many similarprojects that have degradedIndonesia’s forests over the past threedecades and have provided the tinderand the spark for the worsening cycleof megafires during that period.Indeed, an even more implausiblemegaproject has been planned forIrian Jaya’s 7.7 million haMamberamo River basin. (See Box10.) The suffering and losses of theMengkatip River Dayak people areunique only in that the situationhas attracted a larger than usualshare of attention from journalistsand environmental activists.195

The project is emblematic ofSuharto-era policies and theirimpacts on forest ecosystems andforest-dependent communities, andit neatly sums how flawed develop-ment policies in the hands of anauthoritarian and unaccountablegovernment, riddled with corrup-tion, set the stage for fire disasterslike that of 1997–98. The steps thatthe government of President Wahidtakes, or fails to take, to makeamends for this disaster in the heart

of Borneo, and whether it cancelssimilar disasters in the makingsuch as the Mamberamo megapro-ject and the proposed “Kakab” suc-cessor to PLG, will serve as a usefultest of the extent to which thereforms discussed in the next chap-ter are being carried out over thecoming years.

Look, if we don’t changeour ways, we won’t surviveas a nation, all right? Ihope by this time it’sclear to everybody.

Sarwono Kusumaatmadja

Minister of State for Environment

October 6, 1997

The Mamberamo basin is a huge

river system of more than 7.7 million ha

stretching from the central mountains of

Irian Jaya across lowlands and marshes to

the north coast. Most of the area is still

covered with tropical rainforest, although

two-thirds has been allocated to timber or

plantation concessions. Its unique wildlife

includes crocodiles, tree kangaroos, cas-

sowaries, parrots, and birds of paradise.

According to Indonesian government figures,

the area has about 7,000 inhabitants, mostly

indigenous communities living a semino-

madic life of hunting, fishing, practicing

horticulture, and harvesting sago palms.

In an echo of the Central

Kalimantan rice project (PLG) debacle, the

Indonesian government has set in motion

plans to carve up Mamberamo for heavy

industry, smelting, plantations, rice culti-

vation, and logging. Dreamed up by former

President B.J. Habibie when he was minister

of science and technology, this megaproject

is expected to take 20 years to complete.

The terms of reference for the project pub-

lished in 1996 show that the scheme, like

the PLG project, promises to be a logistic

nightmare, with 10 government departments

and bodies named as executing agencies

and with 12 subprojects.

The project centers on harnessing

the power of the 650-km Mamberamo

River through a series of large dams to

produce electricity that will transform the

region. Upstream areas will be used for dams,

agroindustry, and logging, while industrial

estates, new settlements, and transport and

other infrastructure will be created down-

stream. Plans include a steelworks, metal

smelters, a pulp and paper factory, and a

petrochemicals plant, forming the biggest

industrial complex in eastern Indonesia.

As in the PLG disaster, the project

area is being touted by its promoters as a

future food supply center of national

importance, with possibly 1 million ha, to

be irrigated from the dam scheme, set

aside for rice cultivation. And as in the

PLG case, there are plans to resettle trans-

migrants—about 300,000 families, or 1.5

million people—from the western parts of

Indonesia to provide the workforce for

agricultural projects.

The idea of building large dams

and industrial complexes in such a geo-

logically unstable zone is questionable. In

February 1996, the island of Biak off the

north coast of Irian Jaya was hit by an

earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter

scale. Another, registering 4.6, struck the

Mamberamo area in September 1997.

Will the project actually happen?

As of mid-1998 the government had

already held two workshops for potential

Indonesian and foreign investors, and pre-

liminary studies are now in progress.

Reports from the region state that the

process of land appropriation has already

begun, with the authorities using bribery,

threats, and trickery to take land from

local people. Some foreign investors have

reportedly expressed interest. In April 1997,

a government workshop on the megapro-

ject was attended by private companies

from France, Germany, Japan, and the

Netherlands, as well as Indonesia. In

February 1998, Barnabas Suebu, a former

governor of Irian Jaya, announced that

Australia, Germany, and Japan had agreed

to invest in the project, and German and,

to a lesser extent, Australian funding has

reportedly been used to support many of

the feasibility studies.

Despite a bad drought, Irian Jaya

did not experience fires during 1997–98

on the same scale as Kalimantan and

Sumatra, in large part because much of

the territory is still forested and the reck-

less land conversion so common on the

other islands is still relatively limited.

The Mamberamo project is so

ambitious and ill considered that it is

unlikely ever to be completed. An official

of the government’s technology office con-

firmed in September 1999 that the project

had been “postponed.”1 Its future now lies

in the hands of the new government that

came to power in October 1999, which is

likely to be far more skeptical than its pre-

decessor: In his first week in office, President

Wahid heaped scorn on another of ex-

President Habibie’s hi-tech megaprojects,

the development of an Indonesian aircraft

industry,2 and is likely to take a dim view

of the Mamberamo scheme as well. But as

the Kalimantan PLG megaproject has

shown, uncontrolled land clearing for a

project, even one that eventually fails and

is abandoned, can fundamentally change

the ecosystem and make extensive fires

and other forms of degradation a virtual

certainty. It can only be hoped that the

lessons of the PLG project will be taken

seriously and that this ill-advised scheme

to pillage one of Indonesia’s last major

blocks of pristine forest will be aborted

before it does too much damage.

Source:Adapted from Carr, 1998.

Notes:1. Agus Sugiyono, personal communication,

September 21,1999.

2. “Indonesia’s Wahid Scorns Habibie Hi-

Tech Dreams.” Reuters, October 26, 1999.

10 M E G A P R O J E C T M A D N E S S : T H E M A M B E R A M O B A S I N P R O J E C T I NI R I A N J AYA


eversing 30 years of ill-considered forestry andland-use policies and

repairing the damage they have doneto Indonesia’s forests is a dauntingtask. Much of the damage cannever be repaired within a timescale meaningful to humanity. Thegreat lowland forests in much ofKalimantan and Sumatra, forexample, are gone for good, andcountless species have been drivento extinction in the process. Thepeat-swamp forest areas devastatedby the million-hectare rice debaclewill remain, for all practical pur-poses, a vast, grim monument to “acrackpot, Stalinist-style plan toreorder nature” that was “certain tofail because of its unmanageablescale and the unforgiving, little-understood peat terrain.”196

An important place to start iswith immediate measures to reducefire hazards and fire risks andstrengthen firefighting capacitiesbefore the arrival of the next extendeddrought and burning season, whichis likely to be associated with thenext El Niño. Ninety-three percentof all droughts in Indonesiabetween 1830 and 1953 occurredduring an El Niño event, as havemost of the droughts since then,including those associated with theextensive fires of 1982–83, 1994,and 1997–98.197 Recent experienceseems to indicate that El Niñoevents are occurring more frequent-ly. The exceptionally long El Niñoevent that began in 1991 peakedonly in 1994 and did not end untilearly 1995, for reasons not yet wellunderstood.198 This was followed,just two years later, in 1997, by oneof the strongest El Niños ever recorded.If this El Niño frequency continues,Indonesia could begin this new mil-lennium in flames once again unlesspreparatory measures are taken.

Taking immediate action toaddress the proximate causes ofIndonesia’s periodic infernos is in noway inconsistent with addressing themuch broader agenda of reformsneeded to deal with the root causesof the fires and other key forestdegradation processes identified inChapter VI. The broader policy reformagenda needs to be carried out inphases, as the World Bank suggests.199

Some steps can be and need to betaken immediately to secure theremaining forests from pressuresthat are intensifying as a result of theeconomic crisis and to respond to thestrong and growing political demandfor reforms giving indigenous andother forest-dependent communitiesgreater access to the benefits thatforests provide. Other steps must betaken immediately because of government pledges to the IMF as acondition of the economic bailoutpackage. (See Box 11.)

Other reforms will take a gooddeal more time, in part because theissues are so complex and the changesbeing discussed are so sweeping.Moreover, these major policy andinstitutional shifts can succeed onlythrough an open and transparentprocess of public dialogue amongcompeting interest groups—a political phenomenon that Indonesiahas not experienced in over threedecades, if ever. And finally, Indonesiamust get its political house in orderso that forest policymakers who possess the mandate, political credibility, and long-term vision cancarry out a reform program. Thegovernment that took power underPresident Wahid in October 1999has strong reformist credentials, butits capacity to actually implementforest and land-use policy reform isuntested and unknown as of thiswriting.

IS REAL REFORM POSSIBLE?A 1998 World Bank memoran-

dum on forest sector reformacknowledged that for the first timesince 1966 a consensus in favor ofsweeping reform has indeed formedamong elements of the government,the private sector, donor institutions,and many NGOs. But neither theold systems of power and privilegenor the actors who benefited fromthem have left the scene.

“There remains a strong element in the forest industry, andin the official forestry agencies, thatwill resist reform, or at best will giveit token acceptance while attemptingto preserve the privileges of the past.All that can be said, at this point, isthat the political predominance of anindustry based on vested interest andinstitutionalized market distortioncan now be seriously dealt with, ina manner that was not previouslypossible.” 200

Is substantial reform reallypossible? One can only answer thatthe prospects for reforming the forestsector are better than they have beenfor three decades but that reform is byno means assured. Suharto has beenousted from office, but much of hisregime and the people who have runand profited from it—from Jakartato the most remote villages—arestill in place. Old-guard forestrybureaucrats and the greater part ofthe industry oppose the reformasimovement to the extent that it aimsto weaken their power and diminishtheir profits, and “both these groupsstill retain great control—both dejure and de facto—over decisionsdetermining the disposition andconversion of forest areas.”201

At the same time, the economiccrisis has lent renewed urgency andlegitimacy to policymakers’ calls forintensified short-term exploitationof the country’s natural resources,to provide both food security andexport income. This dynamic createsfurther barriers to forest policyreforms that are accused of slowingrecovery from the crisis and ofhampering economic growth.

In the countryside, the significant proportion of the populacethat cannot benefit from favorablecommodity terms brought about bycurrency devaluation is not waitingfor policy pronouncements on thetopic. Facing massive layoffs in theurban manufacturing and servicesectors, and drastic rises in the pricesof basic commodities, millions haveturned to the forest as a ready sourceof income. For example, illegal capture and export of wildlife, dri-ven both by economic need and byhigh export prices, has become anepidemic unlike anything seen inthe country in the past. “Now, it’sback to every species for itself,” informer environment minister EmilSalim’s words.202

The economic crisis has alsocrippled the government’s alreadyweak capacity to supervise andmonitor logging and plantationoperations and enforce forestry lawsand regulations. Department bud-gets have been slashed across theboard, while the cost of travel hasincreased. Simultaneously, the levelof respect for (or fear of) the law–-or at least of those who enforce it–-that existed in the Suharto era haslargely evaporated, owing, in greatpart, to the low esteem into whichthe Suharto regime brought “therule of law.”203 The current situa-tion presents parallels to what hap-pened in the then-rich teak forestsof Java when the Japanese conqueredthe island in 1942:

V I I . P R O S P E C T S F O R F O R E S T P O L I C Y R E F O R M

R


“The Dutch colonial governmentin Java, and the mystique that hadpermitted it to rule for nearly 150years, fell within ten days of theJapanese invasion. Forest villagersbelieved that the end had come to therestrictions keeping them out of theforest [and they] responded vehe-mently to the sudden change in theforest custodians. They ransackedremaining logyards, administrators’housing, and the forest itself.” 204

In an eerie echo of those violenttimes, mobs in East Java began lootingthe government-owned teak forestsaround several villages in August1998. In the police operationmounted in early September inresponse to the mass timber thefts,one villager was killed, several wereseriously injured, and hundreds wereforced to flee their homes.205

Similar events are occurringincreasingly frequently across thearchipelago, fueled by economic

desperation, anger at the government,and, in many cases, opportunisticexploitation of the situation by well-organized gangs of full-time looters,with all parties using reformasi asthe justification for their actions.206

The legitimacy of Suharto-era localofficials has been called into questionacross the country, and thousandsof village heads have been forced tostep down.207

Rebuilding the legitimacy andcapacity of the government bureau-cracy at the local level will clearlybe a long and troubled process, butsuch renewal will be essential foreffective implementation of forestpolicy reforms at the local level.

As Indonesia’s economy crashed in

1997, the government opened negotiations

with the IMF for a financial assistance

package. Agreement was initially reached

in November 1997 on a wide-ranging set

of basic economic and fiscal reforms that

the government agreed to undertake in

return for assistance totaling about $40

billion. The assistance was to be provided by

a consortium of donors, including the IMF,

the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank

(ADB), and various individual governments,

notably Japan.

The policy conditionalities and their

deadlines have been repeatedly revised since

then. The changes reflect the roller-coaster

nature of Indonesian political and economic

developments and, according to some

observers, the flip-flops of the IMF and other

donors, who steadfastly stuck to economic

analyses even though the mixture of the

economic crisis and the country’s volatile

politics was clearly the key dynamic that

needed to be dealt with. (See Box 2.)

For one of the first times in its history of

prescribing structural adjustment measures

in return for emergency infusions of capital,

the IMF (and its partner institutions) in January

1998 prescribed among the conditions for the

bailout a number of forest policy reforms

including:

4 An increase in the forest land tax.

4 Direction of inflows to the Reforestation

Fund (collected as a production levy on log-

ging operations) to the official government

budget, rather than retention under the

unmonitored control of the minister for

forestry and other political leaders. Fund

monies had been misallocated for numerous

nonreforestation projects, including the

state aircraft corporation, which former

President Habibie previously headed.

4 Abolition of existing forestry levies and

their replacement by a resource rental tax.

4 Removal of the restrictive forest

products marketing arrangements embodied

in APKINDO, the exporters’ cartel run by one

of Suharto’s cronies, Mohamed “Bob” Hasan.

4 Reform of logging concession

regulations to allow for periodic review of

stumpage charges, lengthening of

concession terms beyond the current

20-year limit, and authorization to trade

concession rights. The latter two provisions

were intended to give concessionaires a

commercial incentive to practice better

forest operations and management.

4 Competitive auctioning of concession

rights.

In April 1998, the World Bank

followed up with further policy reform

requirements. Specific measures proposed

in the loan for the forest sector (supple-

menting or elaborating on those in the IMF

program) were:

4 linkage of forest royalties to world prices;

4 reduction of export taxes on forest

products to 30 percent ad valorem imme-

diately and to 20 percent by the end of 1998;

4 introduction of an independent sys-

tem for monitoring forest resources, including

participation of local communities, by the

end of 1998;

4 a moratorium on issuing new logging

licenses until these new measures are in place;

4 introduction of performance bonds

on forest operations; and

4 development of sustainable forestry

land management targets.

Some progress has been made on

implementing these conditions, but for

most, the very tight deadlines have not

been met. In general, Indonesia is not to

blame; the unrealistic deadlines arose

from the political pressures on the IMF by

the governments that fund it to specify

benchmarks on which to base disburse-

ment of successive tranches of funding.

The IMF was understandably concerned to

release funds as soon as practically and

politically possible to forestall further

meltdown of the Indonesian economy and

the feared regional and global “conta-

gion” effects. But donor governments,

sensitive to political resistance to using

taxpayer money to bail out faraway foreign

countries, demanded tangible indicators of

reform by the recipient government. For

many of the conditions, such as setting up

a banking restructuring agency, a short

time frame was workable. Forest policies,

however, are complex, and many of the

actions mandated by the IMF, such as auc-

tioning concessions, have no precedents in

Indonesia. Thus, the deadlines for many

of the forest policy-related conditions have

been allowed to slip, although pressure to

complete the reforms continues.

It is worth noting that another set

of IMF-mandated reforms lifts export and

external investment restrictions on oil palm,

a move that is sure to increase forest con-

version. In a recent policy memo the World

Bank distanced itself from these measures,

referring to them as “IMF-originated poli-

cies,” but went on to say that those policies

are not intended, and should in no way be

interpreted, to mean that viable natural

forest areas should be converted to oil

palm. This is perhaps a well-intended

argument, but in fact those IMF-mandated

policies are indeed intensifying pressures

for conversion of natural forests, and there

are virtually no restraints on such conver-

sion in the current policy environment.1

Source: World Bank, 1998b.

Note:1. Potter and Lee, 1998a.

11 F O R E S T P O L I C Y R E F O R M C O N D I T I O N A L I T I E S I N T H E I M F E C O N O M I C B A I L O U T PA C K A G E


Despite these considerableproblems, there are real signs ofhope that effective forest policyreform may indeed be possible inthe post-Suharto era. Already, anumber of broad-based groups havebeen formed to debate forest policyissues and devise agendas for change.

In June 1998, the minister offorestry and estate crops issued adecree establishing the Committeefor the Reform of Forest and EstateCrop Development, a group composedof officials, academic forestry experts,forest industry representatives, andseveral environmental NGOs. Thecommittee’s mandate is sweeping,covering the formulation of a broadforest policy and an institutionalreform agenda and monitoring ofprogress in implementing reforms.208

It is unclear to what extent thereform-minded views of its membersrepresent the general views offorestry officials: at least one memberand a number of observers haveexpressed frustration that recentofficial decisions and policy movesbear little resemblance to the com-mittee’s recommendations andinstead more or less perpetuateexisting policies,209 and one NGOmember has resigned in protest.But the very existence of this body isa considerable departure from pastpractice in the ministry.

Another group, theCommunication Forum forCommunity Forestry (FKKM), anindependent group of academics,NGOs, forestry officials, and somedonor agencies, met for the first timein June 1998 and produced a state-ment articulating the outlines of areformist vision. The statement,which was delivered to the ministerof forestry and the parliament,argues that for reform to succeed,

“First of all, parties and stakeholders involved in the implementation of national forestmanagement should realize thatthe condition of the nation’s forestsis now very poor, as indicated byincreasing areas of cleared land,land disputes, poor spatial planning,low productivity, limited access forlocal communities, and lack of gov-ernment recognition of local com-munities’ right to utilize the forest.” 210

In his report on the June 1998meeting, the Forum’s chair stated that:

“During the last three decades,management of Indonesia’s forestshas neither contributed to the people’swelfare, especially local and indige-nous peoples, nor has it guaranteedthe conservation of forest resources.The government has consciouslydeviated from its constitutionalmandate to manage forest resourcessustainably and allocate as much aspossible for the prosperity of theIndonesian people. The currentforestry crisis is not merely the resultof mismanagement, but rather isnone other than the result of thegovernment’s adherence to the wrongparadigm of forest management.”

His statement went on to notethe “criminal” misappropriation ofmoney from the Reforestation Fund todestroy vast areas of forest for themillion-hectare rice project inCentral Kalimantan and argued that:

“This carelessness demonstratesto us that the government has pro-moted stupid development processeswhich cause disasters both in termsof forest resources and suffering forthe generations to come. This cata-strophe is the result of both expertconsultants and the governmentapparatus adhering to inherentlyflawed knowledge which has alsoresulted in the economic crisis, politi-cal crisis, food crisis, forest fires crisis,and moral crisis.”

It is worth noting that asrecently as early 1998 it would havebeen unthinkable for any but themost daring environmental activitiststo present publicly this kind ofrhetoric—which is now coming frommainstream academics in the leadingforestry schools and from some government officials themselves.

The 1997–98 fire catastrophehas lent additional momentum toreform. The fires marked the firsttime that the government officiallyacknowledged the link between thefires, with their disastrous effects,and the actions of private firms inthe forestry and plantation sector—a link that was widely reported andcondemned within the country. Inaddition, the sharp internationalreaction to the haze that spreadacross the region embarrassed thegovernment. Most significant perhaps, was that ASEAN took upthe haze problem as a legitimateregional issue, without objectionfrom Indonesia. As fires againbegan to burn in mid-1999, ASEANmember Brunei, concerned aboutthe threat to the Southeast AsianGames it was about to host inAugust, threatened to sue Indonesiaif it did not control fires onSumatra and Borneo. 211

Rebuilding the legitimacyand capacity of the government bureaucracyat the local level willclearly be a long andtroubled process, butsuch renewal will beessential for effectiveimplementation of forestpolicy reforms at thelocal level.

Adding a realpolitik element tothe pressure for forest policy reformis the package of forest sector reformmeasures agreed to by Indonesia aspart of the massive IMF bailoutpackage. (See Box 11.) The IMF,the World Bank, and the ADB—thethree main partners financing therecovery initiative—need to be sensitive about seeming to bullyIndonesia and raising nationalistichackles. (Tommy Suharto, the formerpresident’s son, for example, calledthe agreement with the IMF “neo-colonialism.”212) But there can beno doubt that Indonesia must dependon these institutions to keep thecountry from spiraling into totalfinancial chaos and that they there-fore have immense power to influencevarious policy choices, comparableto their power in the early days ofSuharto’s rule in the late 1960s.

A key element for success willbe to engage and enlist the privatesector in the process of reform. Thevalue of Indonesia’s forest-basedexports is expected to top $8 billionfor 1999,213 and the timber, pulp,and paper industries, as well as thefast-growing oil palm sector, will bean important part of the Indonesianeconomy for the foreseeable future.

Most of the hundreds of loggingand plantation firms hold legalcontracts with the government tooperate their concessions. Althoughit would be possible for the currentgovernment to abrogate these contracts, it is not politically or economically feasible, at least in theshort term, and would most likelyresult in a massive number of courtcases that could drag on for years.In any case, it is a much wiser courseto provide firms that have existingconcessions and are obeying the termsof their contracts with an opportunityto carry out a transition to moreenvironmentally and socially sensitiveways of operating, in line with reformpolicies as they evolve.

Such an approach does notmean that companies that are vio-lating their contracts and degradingthe forest should not have theirlicenses revoked—something entirelywithin the law and the terms of theiragreements. But the brighter prospectlies in assisting progressive companiesto change their practices toward amore sustainable and equitable modelof forestry. The recently formed

Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute(LEI), the country’s official timbercertification body, will be a keyinstitution in drawing the privatesector into the reform agenda. (SeeBox 16.) Already, a number of log-ging companies are seeking LEIcertification and are cleaning uptheir practices to that end.

As of mid-1999, a considerablenumber of new forest laws and regulations had been passed or wereunder discussion, including a newBasic Forestry Law, passed byParliament in September 1999, anda new government regulation onlogging and timber plantation concessions, passed in early 1999,that included a number of the provisions required by the IMFbailout conditions. An analysis by amember of the Forest and EstateCrops Development ReformCommittee, however, asserts that thesevarious regulations were hurriedlypassed to meet the IMF conditions andthat forestry bureaucrats freely admitthey will have “no implementationconsequences.”214

The new Forestry Law has pro-voked widespread condemnationand opposition from, among others,a coalition of 125 NGOs and twoformer ministers. DjamaluddinSuryohadikusumo, a former forestryminister, argued that “no part ofthis draft recognizes or protects therights of local tribes living in theforests” and that the bill “will notchange the mind-set adopted by ourtimber companies of exploiting theforests to the maximum,” notingthat logging concessions haddestroyed nearly 17 million ha offorests over the past three decades.Former environment minister EmilSalim also spoke out against thebill, arguing that it would “result inthe rampant felling of trees in pro-tected forests and cause a boom inthe illegal timber trade.”215 Inanother interview, Salim said, “Thewhole law is very much governmentcontrolled, very much top down.Where is the role of the people?Where is the role of civil society?It’s not there.” A World Bank officialin Jakarta said that the law did notfulfill the reforms required by theBank as a condition of an economicbailout loan approved in May andpointed out that recommendationsby the National Forest and EstateCrops Development ReformCommittee had been ignored. Theofficial added, “We have been urg-ing [the government] to set upsome kind of consultative bodywithin the Forestry Department butthey obviously haven’t.” 216


The international community is giving Indonesia a hand inits recovery from the Asian financial crisis. The forest fires,and the underlying economic and political policies, shouldbe on the international agenda. The International MonetaryFund and the World Bank must see this as an issue of unjus-tified subsidies, unsustainable development and poor gover-nance that is clearly withinin their mandate.

Simon S.C. Tay, Chairman

Singapore Institute of International Affairs

International Herald Tribune,

August 31, 1999


V I I I . R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S F O R F O R E S T P O L I C Y R E F O R M

With a new parliament andpresident in power since October1999, however, the fate of the newforestry law is in doubt. A wholesalerevision by the new parliament, in amore reformist direction, is possible,especially if Indonesia changes itsconstitution to become a federal state,something that President Wahid hasspoken out in favor of. 217 A morelikely scenario in the short term,however, is that reformist pressureswill lead to issuance of implement-ing regulations that encompass a sig-nificant proportion of the forest policyreform agenda promoted in 1998-99by the various forest policy reformcommittees and groups notedabove. The new law is certainlyvague enough on many points toallow for a significant degree of cre-ativity in its legal elaboration andits implementation in the field.

All in all, the climate for forestpolicy reform is better than it hasbeen in more than three decades.But, as the World Bank assessed thesituation in its presentation to theJuly 1999 meeting of the donors’Consultative Group on Indonesia(CGI):

“The political changes of 1998 and 1999 have resulted in veryimportant changes for forestresources. Government has putunprecedented energy into forestrypolicy reform over the past year, butthere has been inadequate consulta-tion and acute uncertainty persists.This uncertainty amplifies the risk forforest resources because it inducesfurther exploitative activity.” 218

The next few years thus providean unprecedented window of oppor-tunity during which the new gov-ernment, NGOs, reform-mindedelements of the private sector, and theinternational community must act.

STABILIZE, LEGALLY PROTECT,AND DEFEND THE REMAININGFOREST ESTATE.

4 CARRY OUT AN ACCURATE

INVENTORY OF VEGETATIVE COVER

AND LAND USES LYING WITHIN THE

LEGALLY DEFINED FOREST ESTATE.

One of Indonesia’s immediatepriorities is to complete an accurateinventory, using both spatial andstatistical methods to present the data,of the vegetative cover lying withinthe 143 million ha of land officiallydesignated as state forestlands. Thetechnical difficulties are not great,and some of the work has alreadybeen carried out. A national forestinventory was completed in 1995, butthe government has never officiallyreleased the full results. There are,however, significant gaps and needsfor updates. Existing data are scatteredamong various projects and offices;and significant data collected by thetimber industry have been withheldfrom the public and even from theMinistry of Forestry, in some cases.The World Bank-assisted nationalforest cover mapping effort carriedout in 1998-99, discussed above,should provide a useful baseline.The government should make animmediate and nonnegotiabledemand that the private sector publicly release, at its own expense,information on the timber industry.In turn, the government should makethe inventory public, in forms usefulto the academic community, themedia, NGOs, and the citizenry.Donor agencies and NGOs shouldlend their support to the publicationof the inventory and its disseminationto as broad an audience as possible.

4 GRANT CLEAR LEGAL PROTEC-TION AS PERMANENT FOREST ESTATE

TO ALL REMAINING FORESTED AREAS.

On the basis of the inventory,all remaining forest areas should begiven unambiguous legal protectionas permanent forest estate notavailable for conversion to other uses(such as timber and oil palm plantations) except in unusual circumstances and through a transparent and accountable decisionmaking process. Conversely,an accurate accounting of areas thatare available for conversion to otheruses (truly degraded forestlands andlands already stripped of forest butstill classified as forest) needs to becarried out as part of this process.

4 STABILIZE KEY PROTECTED AREAS.

Stabilizing and defending theboundaries of those protected areasthat are most important in preservingrepresentative samples of Indonesia’sglobally important biodiversity mustbe given a high priority. By March1998, Indonesia had (on paper)established 36 national parks (14.5million ha), 177 smaller StrictNature Reserves (2.4 million ha), 48Wildlife Sanctuaries (3.5 million ha),and a variety of smaller recreationaland hunting parks totaling about 1.3million ha, a total of 21.7 million ha.An additional 34.6 million ha weredesignated as Protection Forests dueto their watershed values, steep slopes,or fragile soils.219 Thus, some 56million ha of the country’s forestlands—more than a quarter of itsland area—are in theory off-limitsfor any activities that degrade orremove their forest cover.

Unfortunately, only a very smallpercentage of this vast area is effectively protected. Most parks andprotection forests are subject to pervasive encroachment for small-scale agriculture, conversion (legalor not) to plantation crops, illegallogging, wildlife poaching, andmining. Even large, well-knownparks such as Kerinci Seblat andLeuser in Sumatra—which togetherrepresent the last relatively pristinelarge forest areas on the island andhave been supported with millionsof dollars in international aid—arebeing rapidly degraded.

Halting the degradation of allthese areas should be the ultimategoal of Indonesian forest policy, butin the short term, this is realisticallyimpossible. Rather, as the WorldBank has recommended, the gov-ernment should give priority to alimited number (the World Banksuggests 10) of protected areas thatcontain the country’s largest, rela-tively undisturbed expanses of forestand should initiate an intensive cam-paign, in collaboration with inter-national and national conservationNGOs, to raise international fundsfor stabilizing the boundaries ofthese areas and developing effectiveprotection regimes. Conflicts betweenprotected areas and local communitiesare common throughout the country,and efforts to reconcile communityand conservation efforts have metwith mixed success. (See Box 12.)


RECOGNIZE AND LEGALLYPROTECT FOREST OWNERSHIPAND UTILIZATION BYINDIGENOUS AND FOREST-DEPENDENT COMMUNITIESAND ASSIST THEM INMANAGING THE FORESTSUSTAINABLY ANDPRODUCTIVELY.

Once the true forest is legallysecured, a process of reordering itsuses—and users—can begin inearnest. And once there is an accurateaccounting of unclaimed degradedforestland available for other uses,decisions can be made on the mostefficient and equitable distributionof those areas among various stake-holders. But before any zoning orallocation takes place on these lands,the long-standing wrongs committedby the Suharto government againstthe rights and livelihoods of indige-nous and other forest-dependentcommunities must be corrected.

Redressing the continuouserosion of local and indigenouscommunity access to, and use of,Indonesia’s forests has long been akey objective of the Indonesian andinternational NGO community. TheSuharto government steadfastlyrefused to acknowledge the customaryrights of Indonesia’s numerousindigenous forest-dwelling peoples(and, indeed, denied that Indonesiahad distinct, minority indigenouspeoples) or to recognize the plight ofthe millions of other forest-dependentlocal people impoverished by itslogging, plantation, transmigration,and mining policies.220

In the aftermath of the collapseof the Suharto regime, a broadspectrum of reformers is arguingthat a reordering of the relationsbetween the government, local andindigenous communities, the privatesector, and the forest is a central ele-ment of a more just and sustainableforest policy. The World Bank, forexample, maintains that at least 30million people are highly dependenton forests for important aspects of theirdaily livelihood, that the economiccrisis is likely to increase theirnumbers, and that any workableforest sector reform agenda “mustgive primacy to radically increasedparticipation of forest-dwelling andadjacent communities in the man-agement, utilization, and actualownership of forests and forestedlands.” 221

For its part, the governmentfears that if alternative sources oflivelihood cannot be developed for aburgeoning and increasingly desper-ate rural population, further politicalchaos and civil violence may besparked by rising unemployment inthe manufacturing and services sec-tors, combined with rising prices forbasic goods. Granting local commu-nities greater access to forest lands andresources may thus be a tool for thegovernment’s political survival, aswell as a way to visibly respond tothe growing clamor for reformasi.

It has long been recognized that

traditional western models of protected

areas management—the “Yellowstone”

model in which all human economic

activity is forbidden and penalized—are

counterproductive in countries such as

Indonesia where numerous forest-depen-

dent communities commonly live near

park boundaries or in enclaves within pro-

tected areas and have often occupied those

areas longer than the protected area has

existed. Accordingly, most recent conser-

vation projects in Indonesia have followed

the integrated conservation and develop-

ment project (ICDP) model.1

Unfortunately, the record of ICDP

approaches to slowing degradation of pro-

tected forests in Indonesia has not been

good. A 1997 report commissioned by the

World Bank concluded that “very few of

the ICDPs can realistically claim that bio-

diversity conservation has been or is likely

to be significantly enhanced as a result of

current or planned ICDP activities. . . .

[M]any or the most immediate problems

faced by ICDPs reflect flaws in the basic

assumptions and planning, which are not

well-matched to the real threats and

capacity constraints that conservation

projects face in the field.” 2

Part of the problem with the ICDP

model has been an uncritical acceptance

of the notion that local community use of

forest resources and protection of forest

biodiversity can always coexist. This has

led to an overemphasis on development of

local economic activity in “buffer zones”

around protected areas, an approach

grounded in the dubious assumption that

creating intensified local economic activity

on the borders of parks will somehow keep

people out of it, rather than draw more

people into the area.

At the root of the problem in Indonesia

is the fact that “parks and people” have

been pitted against each other in a struggle

over the small remnants of forestland that

have not been taken over by commercial

private sector interests allied with the gov-

ernment—principally logging, plantation,

and mining concessions. If access to these

lands currently occupied by private firms

were to be shared more equitably with

local communities, as would be the case

under the “community concession” model

recommended in this paper, pressure on

protected areas could be appreciably

reduced. This is the most promising strat-

egy for resolving conflicts between local

communities and priority protected forest

areas, although buffer zone approaches

still have a significant, if subsidiary role.

In addition, the government and

the donors supporting its forest conserva-

tion efforts need to put renewed emphasis

on some of the more traditional funda-

mentals of protected area management. The

World Bank study cited above concluded that

“the largest obstacle confronting ICDPs on

the ground has been the lack of PHPA

[Park Service] capacity,” and stated that

stengthening the PHPA is clearly a key to

more effective forest protection. The study

went on to note, however, that recent

“foreign technical assistance and institu-

tional support have tended to substitute for

capacity development rather than to produce

it.” Building real capacity to police park

boundaries and punish poachers and illegal

loggers—tasks that foreign consultants or

NGOs cannot carry out—is a high priority.

Notes:1. For a review of the theory and practice

of ICDPs, see Wells and others, 1992; for an

analysis of ICDPs in Asia, see Barber, 1995.

2. World Bank, 1997.

12 I N T E G R AT E D C O N S E R VAT I O N A N D D E V E L O P M E N T P R O J E C T S I NI N D O N E S I A

If the state will not recognize us, we will notrecognize the state.

Preamble, Decisions of the First

Indonesian Indigenous Peoples’

Congress

Jakarta, March 21, 1999


Key actions that need to betaken on the customary ownershipissue include the following:

4 LEGALLY RECOGNIZE OWNERSHIP

OF FORESTS LYING WITHIN THE

CUSTOMARY TERRITORIES OF

INDIGENOUS AND TRADITIONAL

(ADAT) COMMUNITIES.

Indonesia’s forestry laws andregulations should explicitly recognizethe principle that traditional (adat)communities own the forest areaswithin their customary territoriesand have the right to utilize themsustainably, provided that the areasare maintained as permanent forestestate. To this end, a process should

be established whereby adat forestsare mapped and a written agreementis concluded between the Ministry ofForestry and the traditional orindigenous community, representedby the leaders of their customaryinstitutions of governance. (See Box13.) The agreement should care-fully specify the obligations of the

community with respect to mainte-nance of the forest (see Box 14),explicitly affirm the government’srecognition of the community’srights, and pledge the government’ssupport in defending the forestagainst encroachment and exploita-tion by actors from outside thecommunity.

Mapping forest areas is an intrinsically

political act.1 Official Indonesian forest

maps establish the territorial claims of the

state over 74 percent of the country’s land

area and demarcate the subordinate claims

of a variety of concession holders who have

close ties to the state apparatus and are

engaged in natural resource extraction.2

These maps exclude the settlements,

resource uses, and traditional claims of

local communities to forest lands and

resources. The unmapped uses and claims,

overlaid with the official maps, pinpoint

the myriad conflicts over forest resources

that have plagued Indonesia for the past

three decades. These conflicts must be

resolved if forest management is to be made

more sustainable and more equitable.

Utilizing community mapping techniques

and integrating them into land-use plan-

ning, allocation, and management of

forestlands is an important avenue for

progress in this regard.

Community-level sketch-mapping

has been widely utilized for some time in

many countries as a tool for rapid rural

appraisal, community forestry efforts, and

advocacy on behalf of traditional land claims

against external threats. The advent of

inexpensive and simple global positioning

system (GPS) technology has made it pos-

sible for such local mapping exercises to

be georeferenced with national mapping

methodologies. Many successful examples

exist around the globe3 and in Indonesia.4

In their efforts to challenge state forest

land-use allocations that ignore their own

claims and interests, local communities now

have the tools to speak the language of

dominant mapping systems and thereby

challenge them.

Traditional communities in Indonesia

can, first of all, use this technology in support

of efforts to gain basic recognition of their

rights over particular forestlands. More than

a map is required for this, of course—there

needs to be some showing of long-term

occupancy and use, for example—but

without a georeferenced map, traditional

land claims remain indeterminate and

difficult to press. Under the Suharto regime,

even a well-made, georeferenced map

supported by well-documented claims of

long-term traditional forest occupancy and

use was unpersuasive in the face of unrelent-

ing government hostility to recognizing such

claims under any circumstances. But times

have changed, and some level of formal

state recognition of traditional forestland

claims appears inevitable in the near future.

Once such claims are accepted,

there remains the problem of demarcating

boundaries on the ground. Older surveying

techniques were so slow and expensive that

they were effectively beyond the reach of

almost all local communities. Indeed, the

Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, riding one

of the world’s largest and most profitable

timber booms, has been unable to demarcate

most of its own claims on the ground.5 GPS

technology promises to make demarcation

far less expensive and time consuming, and

it is a simple technology that can be easily

taught. The terrain in question is a factor,

of course: “Rivers make for fast work, while

forested mountains slow the process down.”6

For community mapping to become

more than a sporadic pilot project phenom-

enon, the government’s regulations on forest

boundary demarcation must change. A

new draft regulation on establishing and

demarcating forest boundaries was under

discussion in early 1999,7 but it is mostly

concerned with the decentralization of

functions from central to provincial and

district government units. It makes no

mention of negotiating boundaries with local

communities. Furthermore, it maintains

the long-standing requirement that

boundaries be marked with concrete posts

of a certain size and dimension before a

forest boundary is officially demarcated.8

Even if the regulations can be

reformed so as to accept and integrate

GPS-based community mapping and

demarcation, a great deal of work is needed

to build mapping capacity at the community

level. As Peluso (1995) notes:

“While counter-mapping has some

potential to transform the role of mapping

from a “science of princes,” it is unlikely

to become “a science of the masses” simply

because of the level of investment required

by the kind of mapping with the potential

to challenge the authority of other maps. . .

What ultimately may be more important

for the “masses” is not the technology

itself, but the content of the maps pro-

duced and the way the knowledge and

information on the maps is distributed.”

Community mapping is not a

panacea, but it is an increasingly important

tool for establishing secure local claims over

forest resources. And securing these claims

is an important prerequisite for reducing

conflict over forest resources and providing

incentives for their sustainable management.

The challenge in Indonesia is to both build

community mapping capacity and reform

government policies so that the results of

community mapping become a part of forest

policy rather than a challenge to it.

Notes:1. “Forest maps pinpoint the location ofvaluable and accessible timber and miner-al resources . . [and] have been an impor-tant tool for state authorities trying toexclude or include people within the samespaces as forest resources.” (Peluso, 1995).2. The first comprehensive forest-mappingexercise in Indonesia was the development,in 1981–85, of provincial consensus forestland-use plans (Tata Guna HutanKespakatan, or TGHK) that divided the for-est estate into various categories such asproduction, protection, and so on.Developed from old data, mostly withoutverification on the ground, these maps notonly excluded all community claims anduses but sometimes placed whole townswithin protected forest zones. A late 1980seffort, the Regional Physical PlanningProgram for Transmigration (RePPProt),was developed from satellite and aerialimagery to determine suitable locations fornew transmigration sites and associatedplantations. Although these maps dramati-cally improved the representation of vege-tative cover, they still did not include dataon local forestland uses and claims.(Ibid.)3. See, for example, the 50 cases discussedin Poole, 1995.4. Momberg, Atok, and Sirait, 1996.5. In 1996, the Ministry of Forestry esti-mated that of the 352,000 km of state for-est boundaries (both outer boundaries andboundaries between functional categories)that needed demarcating, only 113,594 km(32 percent) had actually been demarcat-ed by 1994 (Ministry of Forestry, 1996).The remainder, more than 238,000 km, ismore than five times the circumference ofthe Earth.6. Poole, 1995.7. Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops,1999.8. Poole (1995) cites a boundary demarca-tion effort in the territory of Brazil’sKayapo tribe where the most expensiveitem in the $600,000 budget was the use ofhelicopters to transport cement for boundarymarkers required by Brazilian regulations.

13 C O M M U N I T Y M A P P I N G S T R AT E G I E S A N D T E C H N I Q U E S


4 ESTABLISH A NEW “COMMUNITY

FOREST CONCESSION” RIGHT THAT MAY

BE GRANTED ON STATE FORESTLANDS.

Not all (or even most) forest-dependent communities in Indonesiapossess the long-standing connectionto a particular forest area thatindigenous and traditional peoplesdo. For these groups, a communityforestry concession right should beavailable to legitimize their existingactivities on state forestlands (wherethose activities are sustainable) and toprovide them with long-term incentives for serving as good stewards

of the forest and for carrying outlong-term activities such as treeplanting and agroforestry on degradedlands. These contracts would be legallysimilar to the concessions currentlygiven out for commercial loggingand plantation operations, in thesense that they would be for a fixed,renewable period of time and wouldclearly specify the rights andresponsibilities of the concessionaire.Recipients might be an organizedgroup of “forest farmers,” a family,or a whole community. As with timberconcessions, the contracts shouldspecify permissible uses of forestresources and establish criteria and

monitoring systems to ensure thatthe terms of the contract are met. Asdiscussed below, they should not berestricted to timber exploitation.

While recognition of, and supportfor, local and indigenous forest accessand use are increasingly seen as keyelements of an effective reformstrategy, it is dangerous to romanti-cize the prospects for ecologicallysustainable local management, evenby relatively isolated traditionalcommunities, in a context of pervasiveglobal markets, ubiquitous demandfor modern consumer goods, andeconomic crisis. Vayda (1998) warnsagainst “regarding local people’s

control, by itself, as a virtual panaceafor environmental problems” andnotes that “gaining control overlong-term management of a resourcemay lead local people, especially ifthey have had the past experience ofbooms and busts in particular forestproducts, not to conservation-orientedmanagement but rather to theirown intensive exploitation of theresource as long as it fetches a highprice and remains fairly readilyavailable.” Sanderson and Bird(1998) have similarly warnedagainst the “magic of tenure”notion, whereby giving particular

Proposals—whether by governments

or by environmentalists—to recognize or

compensate traditional forest claims are

usually qualified by the assertion that such

recognition or compensation should be

part of a quid pro quo arrangement in

which the community agrees to certain

conditions and guidelines for “sustainable

resource management.” For their part,

advocates of indigenous rights over forests

have often asserted that recognition of

such rights will invariably lead to forest

conservation, since indigenous people’s

traditions predispose them to sustainable

management. (This argument has been

very successful in recruiting environmental

activists for the indigenous rights cause.)

As indigenous rights over forests are gradually

recognized in various parts of the globe,

however, the argument is increasingly

heard that “ownership is ownership:” if a

community’s traditional claims to a forest

area are indeed valid, then the community

has the right to do as it pleases with the

area, regardless of the impacts on biodiversity

and other factors valued by outsiders.

It is understandable that traditional

communities in Indonesia would be skeptical

of such restrictive arrangements: for

decades, they have watched while the state

parceled out their territories and resources

to outsiders who plundered timber and

other resources without regard for “sus-

tainability” and without interference by

the state. Now, suddenly, just as the state

decides to recognize long-standing local

claims, it puts forward a whole series of

restrictions on those claims. There is no

short-term solution for this problem: it will

take years of good-faith actions by the state

to help traditional forest communities

overcome the legacy of mistrust.

But the assertion that “ownership is

ownership” is a red herring. Whether one

looks to western systems of property law or

to Indonesia’s own rich legacy of traditional

adat property law, there are numerous shades

and varieties of “ownership” over land and

resources. Property rights may be bounded

in time, restricted to certain uses, and limited

in many other ways. And everywhere, the

exercise of property rights is limited by

considerations of public interest. One may

hold full title to a house and land, for exam-

ple, but not have the right to establish a toxic

waste facility in the front yard. Similarly, a

traditional community might be granted a

strong property right over its local forests but

not the right to clear-cut watershed slopes,

set fires during droughts, or exterminate

legally protected species of fauna and flora.

For some indigenous communities

with distinct cultures and territories apart

from and predating the dominant culture

and state system—and many of these exist in

Indonesia—the issue is not the legal issue

of “property rights” but the political issue of

“sovereignty.” The rights that communities

claim in such cases are more like those of

a “state within a state” than a normal prop-

erty right. That is, they seek the autonomy

not only to “own” their territory but also to

be the legitimate political and lawmaking

authority within that territory and in external

relations: “The essence of hak ulayat [tra-

ditional sovereign rights over territory] lies

in ‘autonomy’ and/or ‘sovereignty.’”1

These are demands that the Indonesian

government needs to consider seriously if it

wishes to restore trust and civility to the cur-

rently poor relationships between the state and

forest-based indigenous communities. Very

few communities, however, want to com-

pletely cut themselves off from the modern

economy and the dominant political system

and culture; rather, they seek to recapture con-

trol over their traditional resources and terri-

tories and to ensure that their engagement

with the dominant culture and economy is

within their control rather than forced on

them. Most forest-dependent communities

in Indonesia are not discrete, isolated cul-

tures seeking a “state within a state.” They

seek, instead, recognition of their claims over

resources that are integral to their economies

and cultures, respect for their cultural tradi-

tions, and protection from outsiders who

threaten these things. If the Indonesian gov-

ernment can meet those expectations, negotiat-

ing for sustainable management of forest

resources should not be so great a challenge.

Note: 1. Zakaria, 1999.

14 T R A D I T I O N A L R E S O U R C E R I G H T S A N D F O R E S T C O N S E R VAT I O N


people greater control over particularresources is assumed to “guaranteebetter environmental outcomes.”And the World Bank, while supportinga “radical” shift in the direction ofcommunity access and control,cautions that

“[T]he complexities of entitlingcommunities to forests, no matterhow justified and urgent, cannot berushed: even in countries wherecommunity title to large forests isan undisputed fact and has been inexistence for years, or even centuries,the complexities, disputes and failuresto benefit some people within thecommunity groupings have beenserious and potentially destructiveof the whole idea.” 222

With those caveats in mind, itis important that both the new legalframework for recognition of commu-nity forest rights and the process bywhich that goal is eventually realizedacross the Indonesian archipelagoinclude effective safeguards to ensurethat local forest uses are in fact sustain-able. This will be best accomplishedthrough a system of government-ledoversight assisted by NGOs and themembers of each community.

ESTABLISH EFFECTIVEMECHANISMS FOR INDEPEN-DENT CITIZEN MONITORINGOF TRENDS AND THREATSRELATED TO FOREST LANDSAND RESOURCES.

The current climate of refor-masi provides a chance to bolsterthe role of the institutions of civilsociety—NGOs and community-based groups of forest-resourceusers—as “watchdogs” over forestpolicy and practice. But if civil soci-ety is to assume an enhanced rolein monitoring forestry policies andactivities, the capacity of NGOs

and local communities to gatherand disseminate forest-related infor-mation must be strengthened.

It has long been recognizedthat data and information on forestsand forest policies in Indonesia areflawed and incomplete. Field data onforest cover, deforestation, and theimpacts of logging, plantations,transmigration, and other activitieson forestlands are seriously deficient.Information on the traditional forestmanagement practices of millions offorest dwellers has been sketchy andis often biased toward the interests ofindustrial forestry projects andinvestors, with whom local commu-nities are frequently in conflict. Datacollected by the Ministry of Forestryand the private sector have long beentreated as secret and have been onlyreluctantly, if at all, shared withIndonesia’s citizens. And the long-entrenched bureaucratic culture ofasal bapak senang (“keep the bosshappy”) has meant that local forestryofficials were reluctant to report poorlogging concession performance,illegal logging, or conflicts overresource allocation and use.

For their part, NGOs andaffected local communities have longtried to document abuses of the law bylogging firms and other large-scaleforest resource users, but their effortshave been piecemeal and have oftenbeen hampered in the field by lack oftechnical expertise and by oppositionfrom local authorities. NGOs havealso tried to document forestry successstories, such as the sustainable localmanagement of damar (Shorea spp.)forests in the Krui area of LampungProvince, Sumatra, but have lackedthe capacity to do so systematically.The recent effort by a number of NGOsto develop an independent forestdevelopment monitoring network—Forest Watch Indonesia—illustratesone strategy for developing citizenmonitoring. (See Box 15.)

Since late 1997 a number of

Indonesian NGOs have been working

together to develop Forest Watch Indonesia

(FWI), an independent, decentralized

early-warning monitoring network for

tracking logging, plantation development,

mining, and other large-scale development

activities within and around Indonesia’s

major remaining blocks of natural forest.1

FWI’s core task is to gather and analyze

information on Indonesia’s forestlands and

resources and make it available to all interested

audiences in a useful and accessible form. Key

FWI datasets under development include:

4 baseline data on the status of

Indonesia's forests (type, coverage, condition,

infrastructure such as roads, utilization,

human settlements, population, and

traditional claim areas),

4 existing and planned development

projects (logging concessions, industrial

timber plantation concessions, estate crop

plantations, mining concessions, infra-

structure projects, and transmigration

project areas),

4 conflicts over forestlands and resources

(types of conflicts, parties involved,

description, location, time period, etc.),

4 data and analysis covering the eco-

nomic, political, and legal aspects of forest

policy and related conflicts, and

4 documentation of forestry management

success stories, including both well-managed

logging concessions and local community

forest management systems.

Interest and support among NGOs

and forest policy reformers within the

government for the kind of independent

forest monitoring network that FWI is

developing is strong. Needed now are

working linkages with sympathetic forest

policymakers, technical experts, and donor

agencies. Of particular importance will be

a two-way sharing of data and information

between the FWI on the one hand, and, on

the other, official efforts such as those proposed by the World Bank, to map current

forest status and monitor field performance

of concessions.

Note:1. Forest Watch Indonesia is the national

“node” of Global Forest Watch, an initia-

tive of the World Resources Institute that

supports development of a decentralized,

independent forest monitoring network

spanning the major forest countries of the

planet. Telapak Indonesia, a collaborating

partner of this report, hosts the secretariat

for Forest Watch Indonesia.

15 F O R E S T W AT C H I N D O N E S I A : A N E X P E R I M E N T I N C I T I Z E N M O N I T O R I N G O F F O R E S T S TAT U S A N D D E V E L O P M E N T

Data collected by theMinistry of Forestry andthe private sector have longbeen treated as secret andhave been only reluctantly,if at all, shared withIndonesia’s citizens.


The strong citizen participationcomponent in the newly launchedtimber certification system is anotheruseful example. (See Box 16.)

STRENGTHEN AND INTENSIFYTHE MULTI-INTERESTDIALOGUE ON FORESTPOLICY REFORM THATBEGAN IN 1998.

Effective and durable forestsector reforms cannot take placewithout the participation and supportof key stakeholder groups, includingconcerned NGOs, representatives ofindigenous and forest-dependentpeoples, the various elements of thecommercial forest resources sector,the academic community, and rep-resentatives of local and nationalgovernment. This is a simple andobvious point that has been madecountless times around the globe—but it is worth noting that there hasbeen no such process in Indonesiain the past 30 years. Rather, theforest policy process has been char-acterized by:

4 a centralized, pyramidal hier-archy and secretive processes formaking decisions about projectsand expenditures;4 strong reliance on traditionallytrained professional foresters in topmanagement positions and a corre-sponding lack of social scienceexpertise and perspectives;4 a close relationship betweenthe forestry service and the timberindustry, amounting in many casesto de facto control over policies bymajor industry players;4 an urban and upper-middle-classbias among policy-level foresters;4 a strong colonial forestry traditionand background;4 patterns of forest sector donorassistance that are technically basedand executed in cooperation with theforestry bureaucracy—and thattherefore tend to reinforce existingstructures and ways of doing things;and4 the belief that local land usepractices are destructive and theresulting assumption of a policingrole to limit local access and use.223

The dialogue initiated by theReform Committee established bythe Ministry of Forestry and theCommunity Forestry Forum, discussedabove, is a hopeful sign that thislong-standing paradigm is beginningto change. These efforts need toreceive continuous support fromsenior government officials, especiallyin the Forestry Ministry, andParliament, which is likely to play amuch stronger role in policymakingthan in the past. These groups shouldtake advantage of the news media—now largely free of the heavy-handed censorship of the Suhartoera—to get their ideas and proposalsbefore the public.

Thus far, however, these andother dialogue processes have showna Jakarta-centered bias. It is crucialthat a similar process begin in keyforest-resource provinces as well.Provincial governments are muchless visible as policymakers than arehigh-level Jakarta officials, but theyare often the ones making the defacto decisions about conversion offorestlands to plantations and otheruses. And as pressure for decentral-ization grows, the role of provincialand local governments will increase.

REFORM LOGGINGPRACTICES AND BROADENFOREST UTILIZATION TOINCLUDE MULTIPLE USESAND A WIDER VARIETY OFUSERS.

Commercial logging, as cur-rently practiced, causes the degrada-tion and eventual destruction ofsome 64 million ha of Indonesia’sforests—the area allocated for production. From the perspective ofpreventing fires, logging reform isessential, for two main reasons. First,as was shown in the discussion ofthe impacts of the 1982–1983 EastKalimantan fires, logged-overforests—particularly if largeamounts of slash are left behind—are far more prone to burn thanintact forests. Second, when produc-tion forest areas are degraded bypoor logging practices, they imme-diately become targets for conver-sion to plantations and other uses, aprocess that greatly increases theincentives for, and probabilities of,widespread use of fire to clear land.

Two broad tasks have to becarried out in order to move thecurrent wasteful and inequitableutilization of Indonesia’s naturalforests toward sustainability andequity. First, the existing systemunder which timber is produced—both on legal timber concessionsand illegally—must be reformed.Second, the framework for naturalforest utilization needs to be broad-ened to encompass an ecosystemperspective and to incorporate awider range of forest resource usesand users than has been the case.To that end, the steps describedbelow need to be taken over thenext several years.

4 CARRY OUT FIELD-LEVEL

ASSESSMENTS OF ALL OPERATING

LOGGING CONCESSIONS AND REVOKE

THE LICENSES OF THOSE THAT HAVE

SUBSTANTIALLY VIOLATED THE TERMS

OF THEIR CONCESSION AGREEMENTS.

It is widely recognized that agreat many of Indonesia’s morethan 400 logging concessions areviolating the terms of their concessionagreements.224 One study in the early1990s estimated that only 4 percentof concessionaires followed the regulations, and, in 1991, the minis-ter of forestry himself estimated thatonly some 10 percent of firms obeyedthe law. In 1995, the head of EastKalimantan’s Forestry Service told aresearcher that at least “80 percent[of concession holders] are liars”with respect to their logging practices.225


The legal power to revoke log-ging contracts for violation of theiroperating terms is clearly spelledout in the 1970 GovernmentRegulation on Forest Utilizationand reiterated in the 1999 regulationsthat replaced it.226 The main problemsin the past have been lack of politicalwill on the part of the industry-dominated Forestry Ministry and lackof capacity to monitor concessionperformance in the field, a task thatis made more difficult by pervasivecollusion between logging firms andlocal officials. The huge economicclout of the industry, worth some $8billion in exports in 1999 (for timberand pulp together), creates additionaldisincentives for strong enforcementmeasures, especially in the currenteconomic climate.

But political will to get tougheron errant logging firms seems to begrowing. In September 1998, a topofficial of the Forestry Ministry testi-fying before Parliament was urged bylegislators to clamp down on violators.He responded that the governmenthad revoked the contracts of at least86 firms in the previous 10 years(1988–98) and that many more firmshad been fined for minor violations.The legislators urged the ministrynot only to revoke contracts but alsoto sue violators for breach of contract,pointing out that “where their con-cession permits are revoked, it is thegovernment which in fact suffers thelosses because it has to manage thedamaged forests while the concession-aires have, in a way, benefited fromthe forests.” 227

The capacity to monitor loggingpractices must be drastically improvedif poorly performing concessionairesare to be identified and eliminated.This is a legal as well as a practicalmatter: There are numerous cases inwhich logging firms called to accountby the Forestry Ministry have deniedthe allegations and challenged theministry to provide hard evidence—something the ministry was frequentlyunable to do.

The independent Forest WatchIndonesia monitoring initiative (seeBox 15) is a potentially useful con-tribution to building capacity tomonitor concession performance andviolations, but realistically, this effortcan at best only complement moni-toring by the government itself. Tothat end, the World Bank has floateda proposal to form three or four forestoperation inspection teams led bythe Forestry Ministry but possiblyincluding participation by theIndonesian Ecolabeling Institute (LEI)(discussed in Box 16) and otherinstitutions such as NGOs and univer-sity forestry faculties. Working withan agreed set of criteria and indicators,these teams would carry out fieldinspections of concession operations.

Given the vast areas to be covered and the large numbers ofindividual concessions, these teamswould have to strategically target theirinvestigations toward concessionswith especially bad reputations,areas of high ecological value (suchas those bordering important nationalparks or watersheds), and areaswhere concession operations areknown to be the cause of socialconflicts. In making these strategicdecisions, the government monitoringapparatus could rely in large parton information supplied by LEI andby NGO initiatives such as ForestWatch Indonesia.

4 CHANGE THE ECONOMIC INCEN-TIVES THAT ENCOURAGE WASTE AND

A “CUT-AND-RUN" MENTALITY BY

LOGGING CONCESSIONAIRES.

Many of the timber industry’swasteful practices, including thereckless use of fire, stem from thedistorted economic incentives arisingfrom the current concession system.Reform of the concession system andits taxation and pricing mechanismsis a complex matter that has beendealt with extensively elsewhere.228

Four basic measures, however, seemto be essential prerequisites forimproving concession performance.

Allocate concessions by auc-tion. This measure, also requiredby the IMF agreement, will help giveconcessionaires incentives to main-tain the value of forest resourcesunder their stewardship, since theywill have paid a substantial price toobtain the concession and will havethe right to auction it off in thefuture. Originally, the IMF agreementrequired that such a system be inplace by the end of June 1998. Thiswas an unrealistic goal and was notmet, although auction options areunder active discussion in the ForestryMinistry. The idea is good, but rushingto implement it without adequatediscussion among stakeholders andwithout a period of experimentationmay create more problems than itsolves. There must also be a cleardivision between those forest areasavailable for auction on the freemarket and those reserved for com-munity forest concessions. Localcommunities—even with backingfrom donors and internationalNGOs—will never be able to matchbids from the private sector foraccess to truly valuable forestlands,and a policy that de facto restrictslocal communities to degradedforestlands would work against theobjective of sharing greater forest-based economic benefits with localand indigenous communities.


The Indonesian timber industry has

been overtly concerned with timber certifi-

cation since at least 1990. In that year,

Indonesia hosted a meeting of the

International Tropical Timber Organization

(ITTO) at which member states pledged

that by 2000 all tropical timber in interna-

tional trade would come from sustainably

managed sources.

There was considerable concern in

Indonesia during the early 1990s that bans

and boycotts on tropical timber in importing

countries might mushroom into a significant

problem for the industry, and in 1993 the

Indonesian Forest Industries Association

(APHI) formed a team of experts to develop

principles and criteria for implementing

the ITTO target in Indonesia. At the end

of that year, the minister of forestry sup-

ported establishment of the Indonesian

Ecolabeling Working Group, headed by

former environment minister Emil Salim.

This group worked quietly for four years to

develop and test processes, criteria, and

indicators for an Indonesian timber certifi-

cation system. It brought in representa-

tives from the APHI team of experts, the

Forestry Ministry, the National Standards

Agency, major forestry faculties, and NGOs.

Beginning in 1996, the working

group tested its procedures, criteria, and

indicators in the field with 11 logging con-

cessions that agreed to serve as experimental

subjects. In February 1998, the Indonesian

Ecolabeling Institute (LEI) was formally

constituted as a legal body under the auspices

of the LEI Foundation, the board of which

defines LEI policies. A detailed series of

process, criteria, and indicators documents

were finalized soon thereafter in multi-

stakeholder workshops and were officially

adopted by the National Standards Agency

in June 1998 as the Sustainable Forest

Management Certification System for

Production Forests.

LEI was officially launched in

September 1998. Since that time, five firms

have sought certification. One operation in

Sumatra has been certified, three were in

process as of March 1999, and one in East

Kalimantan failed due to forest fires in the

concession during early 1998.

The LEI system is voluntary at present,

and it applies to specific forest management

units, not entire companies. Procedures,

criteria, and indicators for all steps in the

process are spelled out in the LEI documents

mentioned above. There are essentially

four stages to the process: preliminary

evaluation by an expert panel; field assess-

ments by assessors certified by LEI, with

comments by local stakeholders invited;

performance evaluation by an expanded

expert panel; and certification, good for

five years. (See Appendix C.)

At this early stage (the first official

certification processes began in mid-1998),

LEI is not only acting as a certifying body,

it is also conducting training programs for

assessors and expert panel members, and

carrying out some assessments in the

interim. LEI’s objective over the next sever-

al years is to leave both assessor training

and field assessment to other educational

institutions and certifying bodies and

restrict itself to accrediting and monitoring

the certifying bodies.

Why should Indonesian logging

firms want to seek voluntary certification?

Given the main markets for Indonesia’s

wood—domestic for most sawnwood and

furniture, East Asian for 43 percent of all

exports (mostly plywood)—it seems unlikely

that producers (aside from the small number

that can cultivate special niche markets in

western countries) will receive an appreciable

“environmental premium” for certified

timber.1 Regulatory relief is a more

persuasive incentive; 137 separate regulations

apply to logging concessions, and a recent

ADB study estimated the annual costs of

Indonesia’s onerous and complex regulatory

regime at about $98 million.2 If certification

meant official regulatory relief, the costs of

the certification process might look extremely

attractive to logging firms. One proposal

currently under discussion would link the

degree of regulatory relief granted to a

company to the grade it received in its

certification assessment.

Additional incentives arise from the

pressures for reform shaking Indonesia. It

is becoming more and more difficult for

loggers to conduct “business as usual” in

the face of popular sentiment for fundamen-

tal changes in forest policy and practice.

Certified firms are less likely to find them-

selves in the firing line of populist anger

and policy reforms.

The greatest challenges facing certifi-

cation are to build capacity for assessing

and monitoring logging management

units and to create an efficient and speedy

bureaucracy to administer the certification

system. If the supply of efficient, honest,

and highly regarded certification services

cannot keep up with demand, the system

will wither away. This is an area in which

international aid agencies concerned about

the future of Indonesia’s forests should pro-

vide strong financial and technical support.

Finally, the LEI system needs to

secure international recognition. Many

legitimate and less legitimate certification

schemes have sprung up in the past decade,

and international buyers are increasingly

confused. Allaying this confusion by provid-

ing a “one-stop shop” for international

certification of certifying bodies is one of

the primary missions of the Forestry

Stewardship Council (FSC). But the idea

of an international body “certifying” the

Indonesian system—and therefore being

somehow superior to it—is politically

unacceptable to the logging industry and

to many other stakeholders within Indonesia.

In early 1998, LEI and the FSC signed an

agreement to resolve this issue and find

ways to harmonize the two systems, and

joint technical cooperation and interna-

tional observation began in November

1998. LEI, for its part, wishes to achieve

formal FSC recognition of the Indonesian

system and it believes that opening the

Indonesian system to international scrutiny

will increase its credibility. Given the close

substantive match between the principles

and criteria of LEI and the FSC, and

Indonesia’s status as one of the world’s

most important timber producers, it seems

likely that an accommodation will be

reached, especially since Malaysia, another

major producer, has recently adopted the

same position vis-à-vis “mutual recogni-

tion” with the FSC.

In the longer term, LEI does not

plan to restrict itself to certifying logging

operations. Nontimber forest products,

timber and other plantations, and marine

products are all areas for which certification

has been discussed.

Sources:LEI, 1998a, 1998b; ADB, 1997.

Notes:1. Forty-three percent of Indonesia’s wood

product exports goes to East Asian markets,

mostly in the form of plywood; 26 percent

goes to Europe and North America, mostly

as finished products and molding and

other wood-working products. The

remainder goes to other Southeast Asian

countries, the Middle East, and Africa. The

market for hardwood plywood is rising in

North America, however, in line with the

use of panel products in building materi-

als (personal communication, Mubariq

Ahmad, Executive Director, Indonesian

Ecolabeling Institute, March 28, 1999).

2. ADB, 1997.

16 T I M B E R C E R T I F I C AT I O N I N I N D O N E S I A : T H E I N D O N E S I A N E C O L A B E L I N G I N S T I T U T E ( L E I )


Institute area-based governmentcharges for timber extraction.Currently, concessionaires pay vol-ume-based charges at set rates for thetimber they extract. This has twoprimary negative effects. First, itrequires the government to monitorthe flow of logs in order to assesscharges, or, as is actually done, torely on the estimates provided byconcessionaires. The government’slack of capacity to make its ownaccurate assessments leads to cheatingand to diminished government rev-enues. Second, since loggers aretaxed on what they ship out ratherthan on the volume of trees they cutor otherwise damage, there are noincentives for avoiding waste. As aresult, according to the World Bank,each year some 8 million m3 of timber are left by loggers to rot inthe forest.229

This destructive incentive systemshould be replaced with an area-basedcharge levied on a per-hectare basisfor the whole of a concession.Because timber stand inventories formost concessions are incomplete orinaccurate, it is impossible, for thetime being, to set variable rates onthe basis of local conditions. Arecent report by the Indonesia-U.K.Tropical Forest ManagementProgramme argues that area feesshould initially be set at $20 perhectare, well below the availableeconomic rent from the most productive concessions but probablyclose to total rent for less productiveones. In the longer term, once moredetailed stand inventories are avail-able, the tax liability of each con-cession unit can be based on localconditions.230 Political support forthis reform comes from the IMFprogram, which calls for developmentof a new forestry “resource rent tax”of some kind.

Introduce performance bondingon concession operations.Performance bonds, which are alsomandated by the IMF program,would give the government additionalleverage over concessionaires toensure that their operations are wellmanaged. The World Bank suggeststhat 30 percent of average annualoperating costs be posted as bond orthat 40 percent be collected as adeposit on total resource rents payable.Interest would be returned to theoperator, but the operator would beobliged to immediately replenish thebond if it is collected or drawndown by the government for anybreach of concession conditions.231

Delink logging from processingindustries. During the 1980s, thegovernment, in an effort to boostvalue-added processing, primarilyof plywood, obliged logging conces-sionaires to establish their own processing ventures. The result ofthis policy was to create combinedlogging-and-processing firms with asingle-minded devotion to acquiringenough raw material to keep theiroften inefficient processing facilitiesworking at a profitable proportionof capacity. As timber shortages havedeveloped,232 this arrangement hasboosted incentives for firms both toovercut their own concessions andto acquire illegally logged timber.

Delinking would allow loggingfirms to sell their output to thehighest bidder, rather than subsidizetheir own processing plants, andwould be likely to drive the moreinefficient processing facilities outof business. That, in turn, wouldreduce demand for timber anddecrease the pressures for overcuttingand illegal logging.

4 ACCELERATE THE EVOLUTION OF

THE CURRENT CONCESSION SYSTEM

TOWARD PERMANENT FOREST MAN-AGEMENT UNITS.

Since 1991, the Ministry ofForestry, with assistance from theUnited Kingdom’s aid program, hasbeen developing a wholly new modelfor organizing timber production atthe field level. Essentially, this effortseeks to redraw current concessionboundaries to reflect the actual stateof the forest resource, nonforest landuses, and local community territoriesand needs, and to use this informa-tion to establish permanent forest

management units (KesatuanPengusahaan Hutan Produksi, orKPHPs). The KPHPs would form thebasis for allocating new concessions—and reallocating existing concessions,where necessary—in areas largeenough to be economically viablebut within boundaries drawn througha participatory process. This system,it is hoped, will minimize the pervasiveconflicts with local communities andthe overlaps with other forest and development activities (such asplantations) that have long characterized the sector. Five pilotKPHPs had been established by late1996, and the government appearscommitted to continuing the development of this approach.233

The KPHP model provides thebasis for bringing the macro-scalemapping of the country’s forestresource base and condition, rec-ommended above, to the groundlevel. It also provides a potentialvehicle for incorporating localcommunity interests into decision-making about how the forestresources of a KPHP unit are to beutilized. Once the legal basis forcommunity concessions is in place,these legal understandings couldand should be incorporated into theKPHP system.


RETHINK AND REFORMTHE PLANTATION SECTOR

The fast-growing pulp andpaper and oil palm plantation sectorsare exerting heavy pressure on theforest and were the main culpritsbehind the 1997–98 forest fire disaster.The clear delineation of the nation’spermanent forest estate and theestablishment of unambiguouslegal protection against its conver-sion, as recommended above, are themost important first steps in restrain-ing the destructive role that plantationdevelopment is currently playing.Key additional actions that need tobe taken include the following.

4 INSTITUTE A MORATORIUM ON

GRANTING NEW CONCESSIONS FOR

OIL PALM, TIMBER, AND OTHER

PLANTATIONS UNTIL A NATIONAL

INVENTORY OF PERMANENT FOREST

ESTATE IS COMPLETED.

Freezing the allocation of newlands for plantation developmentwill no doubt be difficult politically,given the current economic crisisand the government’s desire to boostexports of pulp and oil palm.Nevertheless, the only honest andpractical way to ensure that landsnot suited for plantation development(forested lands, areas used by localcommunities, and nonforest landsbetter suited for other purposes) arenot misallocated is to wait until atleast a preliminary inventory offorestlands has been carried out.

One approach that mightameliorate the inevitable industryand political opposition to such amove would be to prioritize for earlyinventory provinces, and areas withinprovinces, slated for plantationdevelopment. The moratorium couldthen be lifted area by area, once aninventory is conducted and areas ofpermanent forest estate and local useare excluded from consideration.

4 BAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

PLANTATIONS ON ALL BUT TRULY

DEGRADED FORESTLANDS.

This is, in theory, already government policy, but it has beenwidely flouted by both timber andoil palm plantations.234 Key tostrengthening implementation ofthis policy is a restriction on thepower of governors to allocate landsfor plantation development. Intheir haste to promote economicgrowth and increase their own wealth,provincial governors have frequentlyallocated permanent productionforest areas, and even protectionforests, for plantation development.The role of provincial governmentsin drawing up provincial land useplans and allocating plantationconcessions needs to be overhauled.Frequently, the concession is grantedand then the plan is changedaccordingly.235 Until reforms thatmake governors more accountableto the Ministry of Forestry—and totheir own citizens—are put inplace, their power to make land-useplans and allocate land for develop-ment should be substantiallyrestricted by the central government.

4 REVISE THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE

FOR TIMBER PLANTATIONS SO THAT

COMPANIES ARE NO LONGER

ENCOURAGED TO CUT NATURAL FOREST.

The perverse system of incen-tives that encourages pulp and paperfirms to rely on natural feedstockrather than on their own plantationwood has been well documented.236

To change this, the following stepsshould be undertaken:

4 Deny timber plantation firmsaccess to large areas of forestedlands as a source of feedstock.4 Utilize the community conces-sion model recommended above totransfer management (or sharedmanagement) of truly degradedlands to local communities thatwould grow pulpwood and supply itto existing mills as part of theirconcession agreement. 4 For firms currently holding validconcession contracts, establish “sunsetclauses” setting specific datesbeyond which they may no longer usenatural forest to supply their mills.237

Further into the future, com-pletion of a reliable forest (anddegraded forestland) inventory willallow siting of pulp mills in areasdistant enough from permanentforest areas that incentives for usingnatural forest feedstock will decrease,and monitoring possible illegaltransport of natural forest timber tothe mill site will be easier.

4 SAFEGUARD THE INTERESTS AND

LIVELIHOODS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES

IN PLANTATION AREAS.

The recent boom in timber andoil palm plantations has caused someof the worst conflicts with localcommunities in forest areas. Toreduce the level of local conflict andthe great economic losses that localcommunities have been forced to bear,the government should establishmeaningful “social acceptability”criteria and mechanisms to ensurethat plantation development is con-tingent on the full and informedconsent of local communities andprovides benefits to the communityequal to or greater than those theyare obtaining from their existingaccess to forest resources. The prin-ciple is that local communitiesmust not be made worse off byplantation establishment. Thedetermination should be made bythe communities themselves, not byactors (the company and the localgovernment) with a vested interestin seeing the plantation go forward.

4 STRENGTHEN RULES AND

PENALTIES AGAINST CLEARING

PLANTATIONS WITH FIRE.

When government satelliteanalyses in September 1997 indicatedthat plantations were responsible fora great proportion of the intention-ally set fires, the government madea big show of threatening to revoketheir operating permits. In the end,this came more or less to nothing,since any company that provided an alibi by a certain date—-hardevidence not being required—wasabsolved of responsibility. Rules arealready on the books limiting theuse of fire for plantation develop-ment, but they are not strict enoughand, judging by the experience of1997, are not much enforced.

The fast-growing pulp andpaper and oil palm plan-tation sectors are exertingheavy pressure on the forestand were the main culpritsbehind the 1997–98 forestfire disaster.


Obtaining evidence strongenough to withstand a legal challengefrom a company accused of burningis a significant obstacle for the gov-ernment, since its capacity to monitorforestry activities in the field is limited.Three steps would help remedy thissituation:

4 The development of governmentand independent citizen monitoringcapacities would provide a muchstronger factual basis for holdingcorporate arsonists to account. 4 A regulatory change in the burden of proof in favor of the government would help: whereremote-sensing data provided primafacie evidence that a company wasusing fire to clear land, the companywould be presumed guilty unless itcould produce sufficient proof thatit had not intentionally set fires.(The standard for such proof wouldhave to be defined.)4 Requiring companies to post aperformance bond similar to the onerecommended for logging concessionswould put some teeth into governmentenforcement efforts and provide afinancial incentive for compliance.

DECLARE A FIVE-YEARMORATORIUM ON THETRANSMIGRATION PROGRAMAND RECONSIDER ITSOBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The transmigration programhas long been bedeviled by many ofthe same deficiencies found in theplantation sector. Incomplete andinaccurate data on the physical andsocioeconomic characteristics ofprospective sites, combined with thegovernment’s casual attitude towardconverting forest and displacinglocal communities, has led to onedisaster after another as sites weredeveloped on inappropriate soils andin areas already being used by localpeople. Poor site preparation methods,such as the complete removal of treecover and the extensive compactionof soil, have characterized the program.

It would therefore be wise todeclare a five-year moratorium onthe establishment of new transmi-gration sites to allow time for com-pletion of the national inventory offorest areas and degraded forest-lands. With that information inhand, new transmigration sites—should the government decide tocontinue the program at all—could be located in areas that aretruly degraded, are unencumberedby private ownership rights, andpose no substantial risks of conflictwith local land uses and resourceneeds.

Both transmigration and plantationdevelopment should be limited tosites within that category and mightbe combined in joint initiatives, asis already the case. Indeed, very littleland meets the tests of being suitablefor rice or other annual crop agri-culture, not covered by forest thatshould be part of the permanentforest, and not encumbered by legalor customary ownership rights.Accordingly, any future transmigra-tion programs should be linked tocultivation of tree crops such asfast-growing pulp species or oilpalm rather than to rice cultivation.

SUMMING UP

This report has intentionallyrefrained from offering detailed rec-ommendations for restructuring theinstitutions that either formallycontrol forest policy (principally, theMinistry of Forestry) or play animportant direct or indirect role indetermining the fate of Indonesia’sforests (such as provincial governorsand officials in the transmigration,mining, and infrastructure sectors).The institutional questions will needto be worked out incrementally onthe basis of needs that arise, institu-tional deficiencies that are identified,and political compromises thatmust be struck in the process of formulating and implementing theforest policy reform agenda.

Three principles related togovernance and institutions, however,should animate the process of insti-tutional restructuring and renewalthat must accompany forest policyreform.

First is the crucial importanceof developing transparent, multi-stakeholder processes—both insti-tutional and political—fordebating, deciding on, and imple-menting policy and institutionalreforms. Freedom of informationfor the public, and effective ways ofholding political leaders and policy-makers accountable for their deci-sions (such as free and fairelections and meaningful legalremedies with which citizens canchallenge and overturn bureaucrat-ic decisions), are essential elementsof such a process. To readers notfamiliar with Indonesia’s recentpolitical history, this may sound likea rather unexceptional point. Butfor more than three decades, sincethe exploitation of Indonesia’sforests began in earnest, key policydecisions related to forests (andalmost everything else, for that mat-ter) have been tightly controlled bysmall groups of unelected officialsand their patrons in the large cartelsthat have dominated the economy.238

Changing this political system andculture, together with recovery fromthe economic crisis, will beIndonesia’s major preoccupationsduring the first decade of politicalreconstruction for the 21st Century.Questions related to forest policy willby no means dominate that process.But with three-fourths of the countrydesignated as “forestland” and withthe increase in violent conflicts overcontrol of those lands and theirresources, debates over forest policywill certainly be an important politicalissue.

For more than threedecades, since the exploita-tion of Indonesia’s forestsbegan in earnest, key policy decisions relatedto forests (and almosteverything else, for thatmatter) have been tightlycontrolled by small groupsof unelected officials andtheir patrons in the largecartels that have dominatedthe economy.


Second, the issue of decentral-ization of governance must be treatedvery carefully or it may acceleratethe rate of forest degradation andincrease the level of social conflictover forest resources. There is sometendency to equate reformasi withdecentralization, since the tendencyof the Suharto regime was to cen-tralize power and decisionmakingas much as possible. But withoutsignificant overhaul of the provincialand local systems of government,unthinking decentralization of landand forest management powers toprovincial and sub-provincial levelsis likely to result in an explosion ofconversion of forests to plantationsand other nonforest uses. In the caseof East Kalimantan, the local gov-ernment “seems to be using reformsentiment to boost its power andspeed conversion. . . .Turningreform sentiment for greater regionalautonomy to his advantage, thegovernor said, ‘In the spirit ofreform, the [central] government isexpected to issue a ruling whichwill allow the local administrationsto do all the licensing work [for newoil palm plantations].’”239

Before decentralization ofdecisionmaking over forest landsand resources is allowed to proceed,the principles of accountable andtransparent governance and multi-stakeholder decisionmakingprocesses that were discussed abovemust be put into practice at theprovincial and sub-provincial levels.In addition, such powers should notbe given to provincial officials untilthe national inventory of permanentforest estate and lands available forconversion is complete. Within thatframework, accountable provincialgovernments should certainly begranted a share of power in decidingwhat investments (a transmigrationsite versus a timber plantation, forexample) should be made on specificpieces of land that have been deter-mined by the national inventory tobe available for nonforest uses. Butdelineation of the nation’s permanentforest estate is a national matterand should not be influenced orcontrolled by the vagaries of localpolitics and vested interests.

Finally, the restructuring ofthe Ministry of Forestry—whichseems very likely to happen over thenext several years—will be a complex and drawn-out process. Asthe World Bank points out, “Ministriesof government—particularly largeand powerful ones like the Ministryof Forestry—cannot be reformed—or replaced—in a short timeframe.”240 But the reform processeshave to be implemented by theexisting bureaucracy; they cannotwait for the bureaucracy to berestructured. Serious thought needsto be given to an interim institu-tional arrangement that taps theconsiderable expertise and experience in the forestry bureaucracybut at the same time provides over-sight and enforcement to ensurethat reactionary elements withinthat bureaucracy do not slow orsabotage reforms embodied in thenew laws and policies that have beenestablished or will soon be in place.

It is important to rememberthat institutions are more than justthe sum total of their organizationcharts and the regulations that theylive by and implement. Anyone whohas worked closely with the Ministryof Forestry on a day-to-day basis (ashave the authors of this report)would agree that many officials are dedicated professionalswho have long been disillusionedwith the policies they were obligedto implement and the behind-the-scenes collusion and corruption thatthey saw but could not do anythingabout. If Indonesia is to embarkupon this new millennium with forestpolicies that ensure a more sustainablefuture for the nation’s forests and amore prosperous life for the country’smillions of forest-dependent people,the forces of reform that are stormingthe walls of the forestry bureaucracymust make common cause withthose inside whose hearts lie withthe reformers and whose skills andexperience are so important for thefuture of the reforms that so manyIndonesians—and their friendsaround the world—fervently hopewill come to pass.

A B O U T T H E A U T H O R S

Charles Victor Barber is a SeniorAssociate in WRI’s BiologicalResources Program. He has beenwith WRI since 1989; since 1994, hehas been based in the Philippines.Dr. Barber is a specialist on SoutheastAsia and has worked extensively on Indonesian forestry policy, conservation of marine biodiversity,and biodiversity policy. He has written numerous publications onIndonesian forestry policy and political economy, strategies forcombating destructive fishing

practices on coral reefs, protectedareas management, the Conventionon Biological Diversity, and onissues relating to bioprospectingand access to genetic resources.Prior to joining WRI Dr. Barberlived in Indonesia for three years,working as a consultant onIndonesian forestry and environmentalissues for a variety of internationaldonor agencies. He received a Ph.D.in Jurisprudence and Social Policy, lawdegree, and M.A. in Asian Studies fromthe University of California, Berkeley.

James Schweithelm, a geographerby training, first visited Indonesia asa doctoral researcher in 1985. Hisresearch focused on watershedmanagement in South Kalimantanprovince in cooperation with theIndonesian Ministry of Forestry andthe East-West Center. Since then, hehas spent eight years in variousparts of Indonesia working on awide range of issues related to forestconservation and management. Hewas the Forest Policy Officer of the

World Wide Fund for NatureIndonesia Programme during the1997-1998 forest fire episode,putting him in a position to closelyobserve the tragedy as it unfolded.He is familiar with forest issuesthroughout the Asia-Pacific regionand worked on forest policy inNepal for two years. He is currentlya freelance consultant living withhis family in Burlington, Vermont.


N O T E S F O R PA R T I I

116 Byron and Shepard, 1998; Vayda, 1998.

117 Tomich and others, 1998. On the histor-ical use of fire as a weapon of resistance inthe forests of colonial Java, see Peluso, 1992.

118 World Bank, 1999c.

119 Personal communication, GTZIFFM/SFMP, Samarinda, Indonesia, October21,1999.

120 GOI and IIED, 1985.

121 Romm, 1980.

122 Gillis, 1988.

123 Mackie, 1984.

124 Gellert, 1998.

125 Kartidihardjo and Supriono, 1999.

126 Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, 1994.

127 World Bank, 1995.

128 Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, 1994.

129 “Wood-Processing Firms to Face LogScarcity: Minister,” Jakarta Post, October 1,1998.


131 Ibid.

132 Indonesia–U.K. Tropical ForestManagement Programme, 1999.

133 “Timber Fencing and Smuggling StillRampant”; “Legislators Urge Government toStop Timber Brokers.” Jakarta Post, July 3,1996.

134 EIA and Telapak Indonesia, 1999.

135 Sunderlin, 1998.

136 Ibid.

137 The 1991 Indonesian Forestry ActionProgramme stated that “the role of planta-tion forests in supplementing natural forestresources will also be very important to con-servation objectives in the country ” (GOI1991, vol. 2: 60).

138 The main subsidy—apart from almostfree access to land—was a seven-year, interest-free loan covering 32.5 percent ofplantation establishment costs, drawn fromthe Reforestation Fund (Potter and Lee, 1998b).



141 “Wood-Processing Firms to Face LogScarcity: Minister,” Jakarta Post, October 1,1998.

142 World Bank, 1998b.

143 “Looking Ahead to the Next Century,”Paper Asia, February 1997, pp. 7–10.

144 “Indonesia Planning a Further MassPulp Capacity,” PPI This Week, July 29, 1996.

145 “Indonesia Prepares to TapPlantations,” International WoodfiberReport, June 1997.


147 Ibid.

148 Barber, 1997.

149 “BUMN, Grup Besar Ikut Bakar Hutan”[State firms, conglomerates, burned the for-est], Media, September 18, 1997.

150 State Ministry for Environment, 1998: xi.

151 CIC Consulting Group, 1997


153 CIC Consulting Group, 1997


155 Ibid.

156 Potter and Lee, 1998b.


158 “Forest Fires Mostly in ‘PlantationAreas,’” Jakarta Post, October 9, 1997.

159 Wakker, 1998.

160 “Forest Fires Mostly in ‘PlantationAreas,’” Jakarta Post, October 9, 1997.

161 Reuters, April 3, 1998.

162 Wakker, 1998.

163 GOI ( Government of Indonesia), 1993.Rencana Pembangunan Lima TahunKeenam (Sixth Five-Year Development Plan).Jakarta.



166 CIC Consulting Group, 1997.

167 Maltby, 1997.

168 See, for example, Rieley and Page,1997; Maltby, Immirzi, and Stafford, 1996.

169 Tim Teknis Pengembangan LahanGambut Di Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah[Technical Team for Peatland Developmentin Central Kalimantan Province], 1997.

170 Boehm, 1999.

171 The initial EIA was carried out by ateam from the respected Bogor AgriculturalInstitute, covering the first-phase area for theproject, approximately 227,000 ha. Whileextremely detailed, the study adopted thecurious device of balancing the serious nega-tive environmental impacts it predictedagainst the “positive impacts” of implement-ing a policy that the government wantedimplemented. Nevertheless, this study wasnot positive enough for the Public WorksMinistry, which produced its own EIA for theentire project in early 1997. (See note 169.)This study came to the conclusion that while

In a quantitative sense [the project] has moreimportant negative impacts than positiveimpacts....the negative impacts are compen-sated for by the positive impacts. This isbecause the positive impacts, although few innumber, are of a strategic character for boththe region and the nation. These includeregional economic development, equalizingdevelopment among regions, and reducingthe burden on heavily populated areas suchas Java and Bali...”

In short—and in clear violation ofIndonesia’s environmental impact laws—the important negative environmentalimpacts were discounted because they stoodin the way of something that the presidentwanted to do.

172 “The Mega-Rice Project, CentralKalimantan, Indonesia: An Appeal forIntervention to the InternationalCommunity,” 1998. Briefing dossier com-piled by SKEPHI Support Office in Europe.Amsterdam.

173 Vidal, 1997.

174 In what may have been a form of silentprotest, the Environmental ManagementAgency (BAPPEDAL) main office in Jakartaput on the wall of its reception area a largeLandsat photo from early September of thePLG project burning and emitting hugequantities of smoke.

175 Vidal, 1997. One of the authors (C. V.Barber) accompanied Vidal on his survey ofthe PLG project area in October 1997 andreturned to the area in November 1997.

176 The amount was Rp 1.1 trillion, equiva-lent to about $350 million at the mid-1997exchange rate of approximately Rp 3,000/$1.“Rp. 1.1 Triliun Habis di Gambut” [Rp. 1.1trillion spent in the peat swamp ], Kontan,October 13, 1997, Jakarta.

177 Ibid.

178 “Di PLG Kapuas, Tak Ada Ganti Rugi”[In the Kapuas PLG Project there is no com-pensation], Palangkaraya Post, September3, 1997.

179 “Optimis, Oktober Ini Panen di PLG”[Optimistic, there will be a harvest thisOctober at the PLG Project], PalangkarayaPost, September 5, 1997.

180 “Akibat Kemerau, Penanaman di PLGtak Penuhi Target” [Because of the drought,the harvest at the peat swamp project will notreach its target], Banjarmasin Post, August28, 1997.

181 “Warga Berharap Presiden PanenPerdana di Dadahup” [Residents hope thepresident will make the first harvest atDadahup], Banjarmasin Post, September29, 1997.

182 “Bara Api Terus Terlihat di PPLG SejutaHectare” [Fires continuously reported at themillion-hectare peat swamp project],Kompas, October 1, 1997.

183 WALHI, 1999.

184 “Di PLG Kapuas, Tak Ada Ganti Rugi”[“In the Kapuas PLG Project there is nocompensation”], Palangkaraya Post,September 3, 1997.


185 “Notulen Rapat Tentang PemantapanPelaksanaan Program Lahan Gambut 1 JutaHectare di Kabupaten Dati II Kapuas”[Minutes of a meeting concerning consolida-tion of implementation for the 1 millionhectare peat swamp project in KapuasDistrict], April 24, 1996. This agreement nar-rowly defined the compensation to be paid asapplying only to standing crops, trees, fish-ponds, and houses destroyed in the construc-tion of canals and set very low compensationrates. At current exchange rates, for example,the valuable rattan gardens and beje fish-ponds were only valued at 5 cents per m3.Even this minimal compensation was neverpaid, however.

186 Herman, 1998.

187 The elevation of the peatland rises grad-ually from the Java Sea to the north end ofthe PLG project area by approximately 12meters, meaning that the canals essentiallycreate paths for water from the peatlands todrain into the sea. In addition, water levelsin the area’s major rivers vary greatly,depending on precipitation and other factors,further accelerating the drainage effect(Boehm, 1999).

188 Rieley, 1999.

189 “Government Proposes Resurvey ofMillion-Hectare Peatland Project,” AntaraNews Agency, June 24, 1998.

190 “Bank Report Exposes Chaos at CentralKalimantan Mega-project,” Down to Earth,No. 39, November 1998, London. Withrespect to the provincial government’s claimthat it had nothing to do with the project, itis ironic to note that the governor’s son iswidely reported to control one of the majorcontracting firms that cut the canals (Vidal,1997).

191 “Diteliti, Proyek Transmigrasi YangDitelantarkan Perusahaan Inti”[Transmigration projects abandoned by theircore companies investigated], SuaraPembaruan, September 16, 1998. The minister’s support for turning the PLG areainto a giant oil palm plantation accords with the statement (made confidentially toone of the authors) by a member of the PLGEnvironmental Impact Assessment team inOctober 1997 that the whole rice-growingjustification for the project was a sham andthat the real purpose was to establish thecanal and road infrastructure necessary toattract oil palm investors.

192 Rieley, 1999.

193 “Walhi sues government over peatland.” Jakarta Post, September 23, 1999.

194 “Smoke from Indonesian Fires Beginsto Cast Pall over Sumatra, Borneo,” AFP,August 3, 1999.

195 The grim fate of Dadahup village on theMengkatip River was featured in TheGuardian, on CNN, and on BBC Television.This was in part because the traditional leaders in Dadahup were in contact withJakarta-based NGOs, which steered journaliststo their village. Of the Dayak villages affectedby the million-hectare megaproject, Dadahupis most easily accessible from the outside world.

196 Vidal, 1997.

197 Goldammer, 1998.

198 Brookfield, Potter, and Byron, 1995.


200 Ibid.

201 Ibid.

202 P. Waldman, “Desperate IndonesiansAttack Nation’s Endangered Species,” AsianWall Street Journal, October 27, 1998.

203 For a detailed discussion of the perver-sion of the concept of “the rule of law” inNew Order Indonesia, see Barber 1997:49–53.

204 Peluso, 1992: 93–94.

205 “One Dead as Police Search for Teak-Wood Pilagers Turns Ugly,” AFP, September11, 1998.

206 “Lawlessness Spreads as Looters DefyArmy,” Straits Times, July 20, 1998.

207 K. Yamin, “Politics-Indonesia: ‘PeoplePower’ to Some, Mob Rule to Others,”Interpress Service (IPS), August 18, 1998.

208 Komite Reformasi PembangunanKehutanan dan Perkebunan [Forestry andEstate Crops Development ReformCommittee], Memorandum No. 1, 1998,Jakarta. The committee’s terms of referenceare included in this memorandum asAppendix III.

209 Kartodihardjo, 1999.

210 Unofficial translation of Statement fromthe Communication Forum for CommunityForestry (FKKM) Meeting, June 22–23, 1998,Jogjakarta, Indonesia, from World Bank, 1998b.

211 “Brunei Threatens to Sue Jakarta ifFires Not Contained,” Television Corporationof Singapore, July 29, 1999.

212 “Suharto’s Son Calls Accord with IMF‘Neocolonialism,’” Kyodo News Service,January 15, 1998.



215 “Revise Forestry Bill, Say FormerMinisters,” Jakarta Post, June 16, 1999.

216 “Indonesia’s New Law Still ExploitsForests and Land Rights,” Straits Times, July23, 1999.

217 “Indonesia’s new president wants feder-alism.” AFP, October 24,1999.


219 Tantra, Basuki, and Dwiyono, 1998.

220 For analysis of Suharto-era policiestowards indigenous and other forest-depen-dent communities, see Dove, 1988; Zerner,1992; Guiness, 1994; and Evers, 1995.


222 Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the trou-bled history of Papua New Guinea’s tradi-tional landowners—who control almost all ofthe country’s forests—and forest exploitation,see Filer and Sekhran, 1998.

223 Barber, 1997: 52.

224 In September 1998 the Ministry ofForestry reported to Parliament that therewere currently some 421 private timber com-panies with concessions totaling 51.5 millionha, while 6 state-owned forestry firms con-ducted logging on another 4.9 million ha.“Ministry Revoked 86 Timber Permits overLast 10 Years,” Jakarta Post, September 25,1998.

225 For a detailed review and analysis oftimber concession noncompliance withapplicable regulations, see Gellert, 1998:210–14.

226 Government Regulation No. 6/1999Concerning Forest Industries and Harvest ofForest Products from Production Forests.The regulation provides sanction for a widerange of violations, including complete revo-cation of concession rights, decrease in thesize of a concession, and monetary fines. Ina significant departure from past practice,concession-holders may be sanctioned forfailing to “build the capacity and include theparticipation of local communities adjacentto and in the forest in concession activities”(Article 34(1)(g)).

227 “Ministry Revoked 86 Timber Permitsover Last 10 Years,” Jakarta Post, September25, 1998.

228 See, for example: Gillis, 1988; WorldBank, 1993; Barber, Johnson and Hafild,1994; World Bank, 1995; Gellert, 1998; WorldBank, 1998b. Indonesia-UK Tropical ForestManagement Program, 1999.


230 Senior Management Advisory Team,Indonesia–U.K. Tropical Forest ManagementProgramme, 1998.


232 In October 1998, the minister of forestrypredicted that the country’s wood-processingindustry would face an annual log shortageof at least 25 million m3, or 45 percent ofdemand, over the following five years. TheIMF-mandated expansion of log exports (viareductions on export taxes), with an annualquota of 5 million m3 in the first year, was amajor factor behind this situation, accordingto the minister. The supply shortage, henoted, “has resulted in rampant wood steal-ing and illegal trade.” “Wood ProcessingFirms to Face Scarcity: Minister,” JakartaPost, October 1, 1998.

233 Natural Resources Institute, 1996.


235 Potter and Lee, 1998a.

236 For a detailed analysis of the destructiveimpacts of the current timber plantationincentive system, see World Bank, 1993.

237 These recommendations are drawnfrom World Bank, 1998b.

238 For a detailed analysis of the closed andnondemocratic nature of policymaking inSuharto-era Indonesia, see Schwarz, 1994;Mackie and MacIntyre, 1994.




R E F E R E N C E S

In addition to the sources listedbelow, the following newspapers,magazines, and news services wereused:

Agence France Press (AFP)The AgeAntara News AgencyAsian Wall Street JournalAsiaweekAssociated PressBangkok PostBanjarmasin PostCable News Network (CNN)Down to EarthThe EconomistFar Eastern Economic ReviewThe GuardianIndonesian ObserverInternational Herald TribuneInternational Woodfiber ReportInterpress Service (IPS)Jakarta PostKompasKompas OnlineKontanKyodo News ServiceMediaNew York Review of BooksPalangkaraya PostPaper AsiaPPI This WeekReutersRepublikaSuara PembaruanSouth China Morning PostStraits TimesSydney Morning HeraldTelevision Corporation of Singapore

ADB (Asian Development Bank). 1997. Strategy for the Use ofMarket-Based Instruments inIndonesia’s EnvironmentalManagement. Manila:Environment Division, Office ofEnvironment and SocialDevelopment.

Allen, B., H. Brookfield, and Y. Byron, 1989. “Frost and Droughtthrough Space and Time. PartII: The Written, Oral and ProxyRecords and Their Meaning.”Mountain Research andDevelopment 9: 279–305.

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). 1997. “RegionalHaze Action Plan.” Annex to thejoint press statement, ASEANMinisterial Meeting on Haze,Singapore, December 22–23.

BAPPENAS (National Development Planning Agency). 1993.Biodiversity Action Plan forIndonesia. Jakarta.

BAPPENAS (National Development Planning Agency). 1999. FinalReport, Annex I: Causes, Extent,Impact and Costs of 1997/98Fires and Drought. AsianDevelopment Bank TechnicalAssistance Grant TA 2999-INO,Planning for Fire Prevention andDrought Management Project.Jakarta. April.

Barber, C. V. 1995. “Integrating Conservation and Developmentin the Asia Pacific Region:Projects, Policies, Problems andPotentials.” In AsianDevelopment Bank and WorldConservation Union (IUCN),Biodiversity Conservation inthe Asia Pacific Region. Manila.

Barber, C. V. 1997. Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity, andCivil Violence: The Case ofIndonesia. Cambridge, Mass.:American Academy of Arts andSciences.

Barber, C. V., N.C. Johnson, and E. Hafild. 1994. Breaking theLogjam: Obstacles to ForestPolicy Reform in Indonesiaand the United States.Washington, D.C.: WorldResources Institute.

Bird, D. M. 1997. “National Guidelines on the Protection ofForests Against Fire.”Consultancy report for theIntegrated Forest FireManagement Project, presentedat the International Workshop onNational Guidelines on theProtection of Forests against Fire,Bogor, Indonesia, December 8–9.

Blakeney, J. 1998. “Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire!” SoutheastAsia’s Forest Fires of 1997/98.World Bank EconomicDevelopment Institute IssuesPaper. Washington, D.C. March.

Boehm, V. 1999. “Problems concerning the Million-HectareRice Project (PLG) and newPresidential Decree 80/1999.”Unpublished Report. KaltengConsultants, Hoehenkirchen,Munich, Germany. August 15.

Boer, C. 1989. “Investigations of the Steps Needed to Rehabilitatethe Areas of East KalimantanSeriously Affected by Fire: Effectsof the Forest Fires of 1982/83 inEast Kalimantan towards Wildlife.”FR Report No. 7. Deutsche ForestService/ITTO/GTZ, Samarinda,Indonesia.

Brauer, M. 1997. “Assessment of Health Implications of Haze inMalaysia. Mission Report to theWorld Health OrganizationRegional Office for the WesternPacific.” November.

Brookfield, H., L. Potter, and Y. Byron. 1995. In Place of theForest: Environmental andSocioeconomic Transformationin Borneo and the EasternMalay Peninsula. Tokyo:United Nations University Press.

Brown, D.W. 1999. Addicted to Rent: Corporate and SpatialDistribution of Forest Resourcesin Indonesia; Implications forForest Sustainability andGovernment Policy. Jakarta:Indonesia-UK Tropical ForestManagement Programme ReportNo. PFM/EC/99/06. September.

Bruenig, E. F. 1996. Conservation and Management of the TropicalRain Forest: An IntegratedApproach to Sustainability.Cambridge, U.K.: CABInternational/University Press.

Bryant, D., D. Neilsen, and L. Tangley. 1997. The Last FrontierForests: Ecosystems andEconomies on the Edge.Washington D.C.: WorldResources Institute.

Byron, N., and G. Sheperd. 1998. “Indonesia and the 1997–98 ElNiño: Fire Problems and Long-Term Solutions.” ODI NaturalResource Perspectives, No. 29(April): 1–4.

Carr, F. 1998. “Mamberamo Madness.” Inside Indonesia, No.55 (July-September).

CIC Consulting Group. Study on Palm Oil Industry andPlantation in Indonesia, 1997.Jakarta: PT Capricorn IndonesiaConsult, Inc.


De Beer, J. H., and M. J. McDermott. 1996. The Economic Value ofNon-Timber Forest Products inSoutheast Asia. 2d ed., rev.Amsterdam: NetherlandsCommittee for IUCN (WorldConservation Union).

Dennis, R. 1998. “A Review of Fire Projects in Indonesia.” Draft.Center for International ForestryResearch (CIFOR). July 30.

Department of Forestry and Estate Crops, Indonesia. 1999.“Pedoman Penataan BatasHutan dan Pengukuhan”[Guidelines for forest boundarydelineation and demarcation].Draft No. 7. Jakarta. January.

Diemont, W. H., G. J. Nabuurs, J. O. Rieley, and H. D. Rijksen. 1997.“Climate Change and Managementof Tropical Peatlands as aCarbon Reservoir.” In J. O. Rieleyand S. E. Page, eds., TropicalPeatlands. Cardigan, U.K.:Samara Publishing.

Doi, T. 1990. “Present status of large mammals in KutaiNational Park after a large scalefire in East Kalimantan.” In H.Tagawa and N. Wirawan (eds), AResearch on the Process of EarlierRecovery of Tropical Rain ForestAfter a Large Scale Fire inKalimantan Timur, Indonesia.Kagoshima University.

Dove, M. R. 1988. “Introduction: Traditional Culture andDevelopment in ContemporaryIndonesia.” In M. R. Dove, ed.,The Real and Imagined Role ofCulture in Development: CaseStudies From Indonesia, 1–37.Honolulu: University of HawaiiPress.

Dove, M. R. 1985. “The AgroecologicalMythology of the Javanese andthe Political Economy ofIndonesia.” Indonesia 39: 1–36.

EIA (Environmental Investigation Agency) and Telapak Indonesia.1999. The Final Cut: IllegalLogging in Indonesia’sOrangutan Parks. London andJakarta.

Evers, P. 1995. “A Preliminary Analysis of Land Rights andIndigenous People inIndonesia.” Draft WorkingPaper. World Bank, Jakarta.

Ferrari, L. 1997. “Haze Disaster Assignment: PM10 InstrumentMeasurement Training andSuspended Particle ConcentrationAssessment.” Report to the WorldHealth Organization (Indonesia)on a Short-Term Consultancy.Jakarta. November.

Filer, C., and N. Sekhran. 1998. Loggers, Donors and ResourceOwners: Policy That Works forForests and People Series No. 2:Papua New Guinea. Jakarta:Port Moresby: National ResearchInstitute; London: InternationalInstitute for Environment andDevelopment.

Forrester, G., and R. J. May, eds. 1999. The Fall of Soeharto.Published in association with theResearch School of Pacific andAsian Studies, AustralianNational University. Singapore:Select Books.

Fuller, D., and M. Fulk. 1998. “An Assessment of Fire Distributionand Impacts during 1997 inKalimantan, Indonesia UsingSatellite Remote Sensing andGeographic InformationSystems.” Unpublished manu-script. World Wide Fund forNature, Jakarta.

Gellert, P. K. 1998. “The Limits of Capacity: The Political Economyand Ecology of the IndonesianTimber Industry, 1967–1985.”Unpublished Ph.D. diss.University of Wisconsin, Madison.UMI Dissertation Services.

Giesen, W. 1996. “Habitat Types and Their Management: DanauSentarum Wildlife Reserve, WestKalimantan, Indonesia.”Wetlands International IndonesiaProgramme/Directorate Generalof Forest Protection and NatureConservation, Ministry ofForestry. Bogor, Indonesia.

Gillis, M. 1988. “Indonesia: Public Policies, Resource Management,and the Tropical Forest.” In R.Repetto and M. Gillis, eds.,Public Policies and the Misuseof Forest Resources, 43–104.Cambridge, U.K.: CambridgeUniversity Press.

GOI (Government of Indonesia). 1991. Indonesia Forestry ActionProgramme. Vol. 2. Jakarta.

GOI (Government of Indonesia), Ministry of Forestry and EstateCrops. 1998. Forestry Statisticsof Indonesia 1996/97. Jakarta.

GOI (Government of Indonesia) andIIED (International Institute forEnvironment and Development).1985. Forest Policies inIndonesia: The SustainableDevelopment of Forest Lands.3 vol. Jakarta.

Goldammer, J. G. 1997. “Forest Fire and Smoke Management andPolicy Issues in Indonesia andNeighboring Countries ofSoutheast Asia.” Paper presentedat the International Workshop onNational Guidelines on theProtection of Forests against Fire,Bogor, Indonesia, December 8–9.

Goldammer, J. G. 1998. “Land Use, Climate Variability and Fire inSoutheast Asia: Impacts onEcosystems and Atmosphere.”Presented at the Asia-PacificRegional Workshop onTransboundary Pollution,Singapore, May 27–28.

Goldammer, J. G., and C. Price. 1997. “Potential Impacts ofClimate Change of Fire Regimesin the Tropics based on MAGICCand a GISS GCM-DerivedLightning Model.” ClimaticChange (in press).

Goldammer, J. G., and B. Siebert. 1990. “The Impact of Droughtsand Forest Fires on TropicalLowland Rain Forest of EastKalimantan.” In J. G.Goldammer, ed., Fire in theTropical Biota: EcosystemProcesses and Global Challenges,11–31. Ecological Studies 84.Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

Golden Hope Plantations Berhad. 1997. The Zero-BurningTechnique for Oil PalmCultivation. Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia.

Gonner, C. 1998. “Conflicts and Fire Causes in a Sub-District ofKutai, East Kalimantan,Indonesia.” Unpublished reportof the GTZ Sustainable ForestManagement Project,Samarinda, East Kalimantan.

Grip, H. 1986. “A Short Description of the Experimental WatershedStudy at Sipitang, Sabah.” Paperpresented at the Workshop onHydrological Studies in Sabah,Kota Kinabalu, April 28.


GTZ (German Technical Cooperation).1998. Haze Guide. Informationand Recommendations on Howto Cope with Haze from Forestand Land Fires. Version 3b.Jakarta. August.

Guiness, P. 1994. “Local Society and Culture.” In H. Hill, ed.,Indonesia's New Order: TheDynamics of Socio-EconomicTransformation, 267-304. St.Leonards, Australia: Allen andUnwin.

Hansen, J. M. G. 1997. “Proposed Communications Systems to beUsed in Forest and Land FirePrevention and SuppressionActivities.” Paper presented atthe International Workshop onNational Guidelines on theProtection of Forests against Fire,Bogor, Indonesia, December 8–9.

Heil, A. 1998. “Air Pollution Caused by Large Scale Forest Fires inIndonesia, 1997.” Unpublishedreport for the German TechnicalCooperation (GTZ) project onStrengthening the ManagementCapacities of the IndonesianForestry Ministry (SCMP) and theIntegrated Forest Fire ManagementProject (IFFM). Jakarta.

Herman, T. 1998. “Million Hectare Swampland Project VisitObservations and Recommend-ations.” World Bank, Jakarta.May 31.

Indonesia–U.K. Tropical Forest Management Programme. 1999.“A Draft Position Paper onThreats to Sustainable ForestManagement in Indonesia:Roundwood Supply and Demandand Illegal Logging.” Report No.PFM/EC/99/01. Jakarta.

Iskandar, M. B. 1997. “Health and Mortality.” In G. W. Jones and T.H. Hull, eds., Indonesia Assessment:Population and Human Resources.Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies.

Johns, R. J. 1989. “The Influence of Drought on Tropical Rain ForestVegetation in Papua NewGuinea.” Mountain Researchand Development 9(3): 248–51.

Kartodihardjo, H. 1999. “Toward an Environmental Adjustment:Structural Barriers to ForestDevelopment in Indonesia.”Draft. World Resources Institute,Washington D.C.

Kartodihardjo, H., and A. Supriono, 1999. “The Impact of SectoralDevelopment on Natural Forest:The Case of Timber and TreeCrop Plantations in Indonesia.”Draft report for the Center forInternational Forestry Research(CIFOR). Bogor, Indonesia.

Kershaw, A. P. 1994. “Pleistocene Vegetation of the Humid Tropicsof Northeastern Queensland,Australia.” Paleogeography,Paleoclimatology, andPaleoecology 109: 399–412.

LEI (Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute). 1998a. LembagaEkolabel Indonesia danSertifikasi Pengelolaan HutanProduksi Lestari [TheIndonesian Ecolabeling Instituteand the certification of sustain-able management in productionforests]. Jakarta. June.

LEI (Indonesian Ecolabeling Institute). 1998b. Minutes ofMeeting between YLEI Board ofTrustees and FSC. Jakarta.

Leighton, M. 1983. “The El Nino-Southern Oscillation Eventin Southeast Asia: Effects ofDrought and Fire in TropicalForest in Eastern Borneo.”Unpublished report, Departmentof Anthropology, HarvardUniversity.

Leighton, M. and N. Wirawan, 1986. “Catastrophic droughtand fire in Borneo tropical rainforest associated with the 1982-1983 El Nino SouthernOscillation event,” in G.T. Prance(ed.), Tropical Forests and theWorld Atmosphere, pp. 75-102,AAAS Selected Symposium 101.American Association for theAdvancement of Science,Washington, D.C.

Leitch, C. J., D. W. Flinn, and R. H. M. van de Graaff. 1983. “Erosionand Nutrient Loss Resulting fromAsh Wednesday (February 1983)Wildfires: A Case Study.”Australian Forestry 46: 173–180.

Lennertz, R., and K. F. Panzer. 1984. “Preliminary Assessment ofthe Drought and Forest FireDamage in Kalimantan Timur.”Report by DFS German ForestInventory Service, Ltd., forGerman Agency for TechnicalAssistance (GTZ).

Liew, S. C., O. K. Lim, L. K. Kwoh, and H. Lim. 1998. “A Study ofthe 1997 Forest Fires in SouthEast Asia Using SPOT QuicklookMosiacs.” Paper presented at the1998 IEEE InternationalGeoscience and Remote SensingSymposium, Seattle, July 6–10.

Lilley, R. 1998. “Reptile and Amphibian Survey in CentralKalimantan with SpecialReference to the Impacts of theForest Fires.” Unpublishedreport, WWF-Indonesia. Nolizards were found in openburned peat swamp, but somesnakes were found in nearbyareas. Three land turtle speciesknown to inhabit the area werenot observed in burned orunburned areas, but frogs andtadpoles were observed in thesurvey area.

Mackie, C. 1984. “The Lessons behind East Kalimantan's ForestFires.” Borneo Research Bulletin16: 63–74.

Mackie, J., and A. MacIntyre. 1994. “Politics.” In H. Hill, ed.,Indonesia's New Order: TheDynamics of Socio-EconomicTransformation, 1–53. St.Leonards, Australia: Allen andUnwin.

Malingreau, J. P. 1987. “The 1982–83 Drought in Indonesia:Assessment and Monitoring.” InM. Glantz, R. Katz, and M. Krenz,eds., Climate Crisis: The SpatialImpacts Associated with the1982-83 Worldwide ClimateAnomalies, 11– 18. Boulder,Colo.: National Center forAtmospheric Research; Nairobi:United Nations EnvironmentProgramme.

Malingreau, J. P., G. Stephens, and L. Fellows. 1985. “RemoteSensing of Forest Fires:Kalimantan and North Borneo in1982–83.” Ambio 14(6):314–21.

Maltby, E. 1997. “Developing Guidelines for the IntegratedManagement and SustainableUtilisation of Tropical LowlandPeatlands.” In J. O. Rieley and S.E. Page, eds., Tropical Peatlands.Cardigan, U.K.: SamaraPublishing.

Maltby, E., C. P. Immirzi, and R. J. Stafford, eds. 1996. TropicalPeatlands of Southeast Asia.Gland, Switzerland: IUCN (WorldConservation Union).


Marten, G. G., ed. 1986. Traditional Agriculture in Southeast Asia: AHuman Ecology Perspective.Boulder, Colo., and London:Westview Press.

Mayer, J.H. 1989. Socioeconomic Aspects of the Forest Fire of1982/83 and the Relation ofLocal Communities TowardsForestry and Forest Management.Samarinda, Indonesia: FR ReportNo. 8, German Agency for TechnicalCooperation (GTZ)/ITTO.

Michielsen, W. J. M. 1882. “Verslag eener reis door de boven dis-tricten der Sampit en Katingenriviersen in maart en april 1880”(Dutch). Tijdschrift voorIndissche Taal, Land-enVolkenkunde 28: 1–87.

Ministry of Forestry, Indonesia. 1996. Indonesian ForestryAction Program. Rev. vers. Jakarta.

Momberg, F., K. Atok, and M. Sirait. 1996. Drawing on LocalKnowledge: A CommunityMapping Training Manual.Case Studies from Indonesia.Jakarta: Ford Foundation,Yayasan Karya Sosial PancurKasih, and World Wide Fund forNature Indonesia Programme.

National Institute of Health Research and Development,Ministry of Health, Indonesia.1998. “A Cohort Study on HealthImpacts of Haze from ForestFires.” Research design presentedat the Bi-Regional Workshop onHealth Impact of Haze-RelatedAir Pollution, Institute of MedicalResearch, Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia, June 1–4.

Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich (U.K.).1996. “A Review of ODA ForestrySector Strategy for Indonesia.”Report prepared for the OverseasDevelopment Administration.October. Jakarta.

Nicholls, N. 1993. “ENSO, Drought and Flooding in South-EastAsia.” In H. Brookfield and Y.Byron, eds., South-East Asia'sEnvironmental Future: TheSearch for Sustainability,154–74. Tokyo: United NationsUniversity Press; Oxford, U.K.:Oxford University Press.

O'Brien, T.G., M.F. Kinaird, Sunarto, A.A. Dwiyahreni, W.H. Rombangand K. Anggraini, 1998. “Effectsof the 1997 Fires on the Forestand Wildlife of the Bukit BarisanSelatan National Park,Sumatra.” Unpublished report,Wildlife Conservation SocietyIndonesia Program andUniversity of Indonesia.

Pangestu, M. 1989. “East Kalimantan: Beyond the Timberand Oil Boom.” In H. Hill, ed.,Unity and Diversity: RegionalEconomic Development inIndonesia since 1970.Singapore: Oxford UniversityPress.

Peluso, N. L. 1992. Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Controland Resistance in Java. Berkeley:University of California Press.

Peluso, N. L. 1995. “Whose Woods are These? Counter-MappingForest Territories in Kalimantan,Indonesia.” Antipode 27(4):383–406.

Phonboon, K., P. Kanatharana, O. Paisarnuchapong, and S. Agsorn.1998. Health and EnvironmentalImpacts from the 1997 ASEANHaze in Southern Thailand.Bangkok: Health SystemsResearch Institute.

Pickford, S. G. 1995. “Fuel Types and Wildfire Hazard in the BukitSoeharto Project Area.” Finalconsultancy report for theIntegrated Forest Fire ManagementProject. Samarinda, Indonesia.August.

Poole, P. 1995. Indigenous Peoples, Mapping andBiodiversity Conservation.Peoples and Forest ProgramDiscussion Paper Series.Washington, D.C.: BiodiversitySupport Program.

Poppele, J., S. Sumarto, and L. Pritchett. 1999. “Social Impactsof the Crisis: New Data andPolicy Implications.” Draftpaper prepared for the WorldBank. Jakarta.

Potter, L. 1988. “Indigenes and Colonisers: Dutch Forest Policy inSouth and East Borneo(Kalimantan) 1900 to 1950.” InJ. Dargavel, K. Dixon, and N.Semple, eds., Changing TropicalForests: Historical Perspectiveson Today's Challenges in Asia,Australia and Oceania.Canberra: Centre for Resourceand Environmental Studies.

Potter, L., and J. Lee. 1998a. “Oil Palm in Indonesia: Its Role inForest Conversion and the Firesof 1997/98.” Report prepared forthe World Wide Fund for NatureIndonesia Programme. Jakarta.October.

Potter, L., and J. Lee. 1998b. Tree Planting in Indonesia: Trends,Impacts and Directions. FinalReport of a consultancy for theCenter for International ForestryResearch (CIFOR). Adelaide,Australia.

Radjagukguk, B. 1997. “Peat Soils of Indonesia: Location,Classification and Problems forSustainability.” In J. O. Rieleyand S. E. Page, eds., TropicalPeatlands. Cardigan, U.K.:Samara Publishing.

Ramon, J., and D. Wall. 1998. “Fire and Smoke Occurrence inRelation to Vegetation and LandUse in South Sumatra Province,Indonesia with ParticularReference to 1997.” Unpublishedpaper, European Commission,Forest Fire Prevention andControl Project. Jakarta.

Ridder, R. M. 1995. “Vegetation Inventory, Forest Classificationand Fire Risk Mapping byRemote Sensing and GIS.”Consultancy report for theIntegrated Forest Fire ManagementProject. Samarinda, Indonesia.July.

Rieley, J. O. 1999. “Death of the Mega Rice Project! Creation ofAnother Monster?” Unpublishedreport. Kalimantan TropicalPeat Swamp Forest ResearchProject, School of Geography,University of Nottingham, UK.August. 22.

Rieley, J. O., and S. E. Page, eds. 1997. Tropical Peatlands.Cardigan, U.K.: SamaraPublishing.

Romm, J. 1980. “ Forest Development in Indonesia andthe Productive Transformation ofCapital.” Presented at the NinthAnnual Conference onIndonesian Studies, Berkeley,Calif., July 31–August 3.


Sanderson, S., with S. Bird. 1998. “The New Politics of ProtectedAreas.” In K. Brandon, K. H.Redford, and S. E. Sanderson,eds., Parks in Peril: People,Politics, and Protected Areas,441–54. Washington, D.C.:Island Press.

Schindler, L., W. Thoma, and K. Panzer. 1989. The KalimantanForest Fire of 1982–3 in EastKalimantan. Part I: The Fire,the Effects, the Damage andTechnical Solutions. FR ReportNo. 5. Jakarta: German Agencyfor Technical Cooperation(GTZ)/ITTO.

Schindler, L. 1998. “Fire Managementin Indonesia: Quo Vadis?” Paperpresented at the InternationalCross-Sectoral Forum on ForestFire Management in South EastAsia, Jakarta, December 8–9.

Schwarz, A. 1994. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s.St. Leonards, Australia: Allen andUnwin.

Senior Management Advisory Team, Indonesia–U.K. Tropical ForestManagement Programme. 1998.“Draft Response to Proposed IMFForestry Sector Reforms.” ReportNo. SMAT/98/EC/01. Jakarta.

Shimokawa, E. 1988. “Effects of fire of tropical forest on soil ero-sion,” in H. Tagawa and N.Wirawan (eds), Research on theProcess of Earlier Recovery ofTropical Rain Forest After aLarge Scale Fire in KalimantanTimur, Indonesia pp. 2-11.Occasional Paper No. 14,Research Center for the SouthPacific, Kagoshima University.

Singapore. 1998. “Singapore Country Report on the 1997Smoke Haze for the WHO Bi-Regional Workshop on theHealth Impacts of Haze-RelatedAir Pollution,” Kuala Lumpur,June 1–4.

Sowerby, J. and Yeager, C.P. 1997. “Fire effects on forests, forestwildlife and associated ecosystemprocesses.” Unpublished manu-script, WWF-Indonesia KayanMentarang Project, EastKalimantan, Indonesia. October.

State Ministry for Environment, Indonesia. 1998. “AnalisisKebijakan: PenanggulanganKebakaran Hutan dan LahanTahun 1997” [Policy analysis:response to the 1997 land andforest fires]. Jakarta. March.

State Ministry for Environment and UNDP (United Nations DevelopmentProgramme). 1998. Forest andLand Fires in Indonesia.Volume 1. Impacts, Factors andEvaluation. Jakarta. September.

State Ministry for Environment, Indonesia. 1998. Forest andLand Fires in Indonesia. Vol. 2:Plan of Action for Fire DisasterManagement. Jakarta.

Sunderlin, W. D. 1998. “Between Danger and Opportunity:Indonesia’s Forests In an Era ofEconomic Crisis and PoliticalChange.” September 11, 1998.Available athttp://www.cgiar.org/cifor.

Sunderlin, W. D., and I. A. P. Resosudarmo. 1996. Rates andCauses of Deforestation inIndonesia: Towards aResolution of the Ambiguities.Occasional Paper No. 9. Bogor,Indonesia: Center forInternational Forestry Research.

Susilo, A. and J. Tangetasik, 1986. “Dampak kebakaran hutan ter-hadap perilaku orangutan(Pongo pygmaeus) di TamanNasional Kutai” (Indonesian).Wanatrop 1(2).

Suzuki, A. 1988. “The socioecologicalstudy of orangutans and forestconditions after the big forest fireand drought, 1983 in KutaiNational Park, Indonesia,” in H.Tagawa and N. Wirawan (eds), A Research on the Process ofEarlier Recovery of TropicalRain Forest After a Large ScaleFire in Kalimantan Timur,Indonesia. Occasional Paper No.14, Research Center for the SouthPacific, Kagoshima University.

Tantra, I. G. M., H. Basuki, and A. Dwiyono. 1998. “Managementof the Forest Conservation andProtected Areas of Indonesia.”Presented at the InternationalForest Conservation andProtected Areas Expert Workshop,Canberra, Australia, September8–10.

Tim Teknis Pengembangan Lahan Gambut Di Propinsi KalimantanTengah [Technical Team forPeatland Development in CentralKalimantan Province], 1997.“Analisis Mengenai DampakLingkungan RegionalPengembangan Lahan GambutSatu Juta Hektar Di PropinsiKalimantan Tengah” [Regionalenvironmental impact analysisfor the one million hectare peatland development in CentralKalimantan Province]. Jakarta:January.

Tomich, T. P., A. M. Fagi, H. de Foresta, G. Michon, D.Murdiyarso, F. Stolle, and M. vanNoordwijk. 1998. “Indonesia’sFires: Smoke as a Problem, Smokeas a Symptom.” AgroforestryToday 10(1, January-March):4–7.

Trenberth, K. E., and T. J. Hoar. 1997. “El Niño and ClimateChange.” Geophys. Res. Lett.24(23): 3057–60.

USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture). 1997. “Health Hazardsof Smoke: Recommendations ofthe Consensus Conference, April1997.” Washington, D.C. June.Cited in A. Heil, 1998, “AirPollution Caused by Large ScaleForest Fires in Indonesia, 1997.”Unpublished report for theGerman Technical Cooperation(GTZ) project on Strengtheningthe Management Capacities ofthe Indonesian Forestry Ministry(SCMP) and the IntegratedForest Fire Management Project(IFFM). Jakarta. July.

USEPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). 1998. Reporton U.S. EPA Air Monitoring ofHaze from S.E. Asia BiomassFires. EPA/600/R-98/071.Washington, D.C. June.

van Steenis, C. G. G. J. 1957. “Outline of the Vegetation Typesin Indonesia and Some AdjacentRegions.” Eighth Pacific ScienceCongress, Vol. I Botany, 61–97.


Vayda, A. P. 1998. “Finding Causes of the 1997–98 IndonesianForest Fires: Problems andPossibilities.” Report prepared forthe World Wide Fund for NatureIndonesia Programme, Jakarta.Draft. December 23.

Vayda, A. P., C. J. Pierce Colfer, and M. Brotokusomo. 1980.Interactions between People andForests in East Kalimantan.Honolulu: East-West CenterEnvironment and Policy Institute.

Verstappen, H. T. 1980. “QuaternaryClimatic Changes and NaturalEnvironment in SE Asia.”GeoJournal 4(1): 45–54.

Vidal, J. 1997. “The Thousand Mile Shroud: When the Earth CaughtFire.” The Guardian Weekend,November 8.

Wakker, E. 1998. “Introducing Zero-Burning Techniques inIndonesia’s Oil PalmPlantations.” Report preparedfor the World Wide Fund forNature Indonesia Programme.Jakarta. April.

WALHI (Indonesian Foundation for the Environment). 1999. “NasibHutan Kita, Tidak di TanganRakyat: Studi WALHI KebakaranHutan dan Lahan 1997/1998”[The fate of our forests, not inthe hands of the people: WALHI’sstudy of the forest and land firesof 1997/1998]. Unpublishedreport. Jakarta.

Wells, M., and others. 1992. People and Parks: Linking ProtectedAreas Management with LocalCommunities. World Bank/WorldWide Fund for Nature/U.S. Agencyfor International Development.

Whitmore, T. C. 1984. Tropical Rain Forests of the Far East. 2d ed.Oxford, U.K.: ClarendonPress/Oxford University Press.

Whitmore, T. C. 1990. An Introduction to Tropical RainForests. Oxford, U.K.: ClarendonPress.

Wirawan, N. 1985. Kutai National Park Management Plan 1985-1990. Bogor: WWF/IUCN.

Wirawan, N. 1993. “The Hazard of Fire.” In H. Brookfield and Y.Byron, eds., South-East Asia'sEnvironmental Future: TheSearch for Sustainability,242–60. Tokyo: United NationsUniversity Press; Oxford, U.K.:Oxford University Press.

World Bank. 1993. “Indonesia Forestry Sector Review.” Draft.Jakarta. April.

World Bank. 1994a. “Indonesia. Environment and Development:Challenges for the Future.”Report No. 12083-IND.Washington D.C.

World Bank 1994b. “Indonesia Transmigration Program: AReview of Five Bank-SupportedProjects.” Report No. 12988.Washington, D.C.

World Bank. 1995. “The Economicsof Long Term Management ofIndonesia's Natural Forests.”Unpublished report. Jakarta.

World Bank. 1997. “Investing in Biodiversity: A Review ofIndonesia’s Integrated Conservationand Development Projects.”Draft. Jakarta. June 10.

World Bank. 1998a. Indonesia in Crisis: A Macroeconomic Update.Washington, D.C.

World Bank. 1998b. “World Bank Involvement in Sector Adjustmentfor Forests in Indonesia: TheIssues.” Unpublished memoran-dum. Jakarta.

World Bank. 1999a. “Ensuring a Future for Indonesia’s Forests (orEnsuring a Future IndonesianForest).” Paper presented to theConsultative Group onIndonesia, Paris, July 29–30.

World Bank. 1999b. “Indonesia: From Crisis to Opportunity.”Washington, D.C. July 21.

World Bank. 1999c. “Deforestation in Indonesia. A Preliminary Viewof the Situation in Sumatra andKalimantan.” Jakarta. WorkingDraft, August 16.

WWF-Indonesia and EEPSEA (Economy and EnvironmentProgramme for South East Asia).1998. The Indonesian Fires andHaze of 1997: The EconomicToll. Singapore and Jakarta.

Yajima, T. 1988. “Change in the terrestrial invertebrate communitystructure in relation to a largefire at Kutai National Park, EastKalimantan (Borneo),Indonesia,” in H. Tagawa and N.Wirawan (eds), A Research inthe Process of Earlier Recoveryof Tropical Rain Forest After aLarge Scale Fire in KalimantanTimur, Indonesia, OccasionalPaper No. 14, Research Centerfor the South Pacific, KagoshimaUniversity.

Yeager, C.P. 1998. “Interim Report on Fire Impacts on TanjungPuting National Park.”Unpublished report, World WideFund for Nature–Indonesia.August.

Yeager, C., and G. Fredriksson. 1999. “Draft Paper: Fire Impactson Primate and Other Wildlife inKalimantan, Indonesia during1997/98.” World Wide Fund forNature Indonesia Programme.Jakarta.

Zakaria, R. Y. 1999. “Masalah Agraria & Kelembagaan Adat:Mari Menata Ulang HubunganRaykat-Negara” [The agrarianproblem and adat institutions: a call to reorder society-staterelations]. Paper presented at theDiscussion Dialogue on theDirection and Strategy for AgrarianReform, Bogor, Indonesia,March 16–17.

Zerner, C. 1992. Indigenous Forest-Dwelling Communities inIndonesia’s Outer Islands:Livelihood, Rights, andEnvironmental ManagementInstitutions in the Era ofIndustrial Forest Exploitation.Consultancy Report prepared forthe World Bank IndonesiaForestry Sector Policy Review.Washington, D.C.: ResourcePlanning Corporation.

Zuhud, E. A. M., and Haryanto, eds. 1994. Pelestarian PemanfaatanKeanekaragaman TumbuhanObat Hutan Tropika Indonesia[Conservation and utilization ofthe diversity of medicinal plantsof Indonesian tropical forests].Bogor, Indonesia: BogorAgricultural Institute and theIndonesian Tropical Institute(LATIN).


A P P E N D I X ABAPPENAS–ADB METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE 1997–98 FIRES IN INDONESIA

FORESTS AND TIMBER

The total area burned wasestimated at 9.8 million hectares(ha), 49 percent (4.65 million ha)of which is on forest land (forest ofall categories but excluding planta-tions, both logged and unlogged).Estimates of timber destroyed werebased on average standing volumesby island and forest type from theNational Forest Inventory.1

Estimates of the proportion ofstanding volume burned were basedon a logging residue survey under-taken as part of the BAPPENAS-ADBproject and an extensive field surveycompleted in a national park.From this work it was estimatedthat 30 percent of the basal area inburned areas was destroyed by fires.

The value of the timber destroyedwas based on two estimates of theeconomic rent of the forest byisland group, one based on currentforest practices ($1.4 billion) andthe other assuming reform of thelog market ($2.1 billion).

Losses of trees below harvestage were also included by estimatingreduction in volumes growing intothe exploitable size classes, discountedinto net present volumes, and given avalue based on the two economic rentmodels noted above at $256 millionand $377 million, respectively.

NON-TIMBER FORESTPRODUCTS

A socio-economic surveyundertaken in East Kalimantanconcluded that on average, ruralhouseholds suffered a loss equiva-lent to $722 for the year followingthe fires. It was not possible toextrapolate these data to give thelosses of non-timber forest productsfor area of forest burned becausethe socio-economic survey couldnot be linked to specific areas offorest. Surveys undertaken in anational park, however, which werelinked to a specific and definedextensive area of forest, showed thattotal non-timber forest productionwas estimated at $28/ha/year in1998 prices. Based on the assump-tions derived for the degree ofburned and lost trees, and theassumptions that non-timber forestproduction would gradually be re-established over a 20-year period,the aggregate loss of non-timberforest production from the fires wasestimated at $586 million.

FLOOD PROTECTION,EROSION AND SILTATION

Based on a 1997 report cover-ing 39 river catchments, which esti-mated the protection against flooddamage afforded by forests at$91.60/ha/year, combined with theassumptions about loss of tree coverdescribed above, the value of lostflood protection was estimated at$413 million.

The protection against erosionand siltation provided by forests wasassigned a total value of $6,040/ha.This assumes that when forest isconverted, it is lost forever. By calcu-lating the discounted cashflow thatwould yield a net present value of$6,040, it is possible to estimate theprotective function for the first fewyears. When this figure is multipliedby the area affected by the fires, anestimated loss due to erosion andsiltation of $1.6 billion was deter-mined.

CARBON EMISSIONS

The project team estimatedthat 757.5 million metric tons ofcarbon dioxide (CO2) was producedduring the 1997–98 fires (morethan 75 percent of this as a result ofthe combustion of peat). Powergenerating companies that wish tooffset their greenhouse gas emis-sions by either preventing the loss ofcarbon into the atmosphere or fix-ing atmospheric carbon throughafforestation projects are preparedto pay between $6 and $8 per ton ofcarbon fixed or saved. Based onthese assumptions, the total cost ofcarbon released into the atmosphere(based on $7/ton) was estimated atmore than $1.4 billion. This figureis conservative; other estimates haveput the amount of CO2 produced at3.7 billion tons, nearly five timesthe figure used here.

TIMBER PLANTATIONS

Estimated losses on timberplantations were calculated byassuming that the areas burnedwere evenly distributed over the dif-ferent age classes. Based on fieldobservations, it was determined thatplantations less than 3 years oldwere completely destroyed but thatplantations more than 3 years wereonly 30 percent destroyed. The fig-ures for area burned were multi-plied by the establishment costscompounded to present day terms togive an estimate of the loss in termsof establishment costs. Estimates ofprofit foregone were also included.In this manner, the total loss oftimber plantation value was esti-mated at $94 million.


ESTATE CROPS

Official area estimates of estatecrops destroyed tallied with the esti-mates of the BAPPENAS–ADB study,and thus, the figure of $319 milliondetermined by the Ministry ofEnvironment valuation study2 wasused.

AGRICULTURE

Agricultural losses incurredduring 1997 and 1998 were due todrought as well as fires and haze.By analyzing past trends of agricul-tural production it was possible topredict the level of production for1997 and 1998 had there been nodrought, fires, or haze. Estimates oflost production were derived by sub-tracting the actual production fromthe predicted production. Findingsshowed that rice production hadsignificantly decreased (beyond nor-mal variability) by 2.6 million tonsin 1997 and 7 million tons in 1998.The economic cost is the expense oftrying to grow the crop (i.e., wastedseed, fertilizer, pesticide, labor, etc.)plus the profit foregone by thefarmers—the equivalent of thefarm gate price. The total economiccost of lost rice production was esti-mated at $1.9 billion, to which wasadded the net cost of importing riceas a substitute, for a total estimatedagricultural loss of $2.4 billion.

HEALTH

Official statistics for the healthimpacts of the haze in 1997 weregiven in the Ministry of Environmentvaluation study. The 1998 smokeand haze event covered threeprovinces in Kalimantan for roughlythe same period and to the sameintensity as in 1997. It was thereforeassumed that health impactsincurred in these provinces in 1998would be the same as in 1997. Theimpacts were then multiplied forstandard health care costs and esti-mates for lost productivity to give atotal health impact estimate of $145million.

TOURISM

Tourism, an important eco-nomic sector for Indonesia, declinedsignificantly in 1997 and 1998, butnot all of this reduction can beattributed to the fires; other factorssuch as the Asian economic crisisand the political unrest in 1998 alsocontributed. By analyzing the trendsof tourist arrivals by region of ori-gin, it is possible to predict thenumbers of tourists that would havearrived had these events notoccurred. Subtracting the actualarrivals from the numbers predictedby the trends produced an estimateof the loss in the numbers of touristarrivals. Assuming standard profitmargins and overheads it was thenpossible to estimate the economicloss in tourism due to the fires andhaze, which was determined to be$111 million (cf. the WWF-EEPSEAestimate of $70 million for 1997alone.)3

OTHER LOSSES

The officially reported lossesfor damage in transmigration areas,transport losses, and firefighting costshave also been included, totalling$46 million for these three items.

Source:

National Development PlanningAgency (BAPPENAS), 1999. FinalReport, Annex I: Causes, Extent,Impact and Costs of 1997/98Fires and Drought. AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB) TechnicalAssistance Grant TA 2999-INO,Planning for Fire Prevention andDrought Management Project (April).

Notes:1. Ministry of Forestry, 1996. FinalForest Resources Statistics Report.Jakarta.2. State Ministry for Environmentand UNDP, 1998.3. WWF Indonesia Programme andEEPSEA, 1998.


A P P E N D I X BWHAT IS KNOWN (AND NOT KNOWN) ABOUT THE ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF THE 1997-98 FIRES

The ecological impacts of the 1997–98fires have yet to be systematicallyassessed in the field, except for thepreliminary studies discussed below.Considerable prior information exists,however, about the ecologicalimpacts of forest fires on tropicalforest ecosystems generally—includinga great deal of data concerning theEast Kalimantan fires of 1982–83;these data are used to extrapolateprobable impacts.

FOREST VEGETATION

The effects of fire on the vege-tation in forest ecosystems are com-plex, varying with the type of forest,degree and recentness of disturbance,level of drought, and incidence ofrepeated fire episodes.1 Lowlandrainforests and peat swamp forests,for example, two forest types partic-ularly affected by the 1997–98 fires,react very differently to fire.

The immediate effect of a forest fire is to reduce vegetation tonutrient-rich ash, which can nourishthe beginnings of a new forest.However, if the fire is very hot, thesoil surface hardens, making it dif-ficult for seeds to sprout, and causingthe ash to be washed away by the firstheavy rain.2 Intense burns and sub-sequent soil erosion result in the lossof other soil constituents that facili-tate vegetation regrowth, such asorganic matter, soil organisms thataccelerate plant matter decomposi-tion, and specialized fungi that assistkey tree species to absorb nutrients.A comparison of soil erosion ratesbetween burned and unburned for-est in Kutai National Park after the1982–83 fires showed that erosionhad accelerated more than tenfoldin the burned areas.3 Soil erosiondoes not occur in the aftermath ofpeat swamp fires, but ash and otherfire residues are washed away andthe surface level of burned peat islowered by combustion losses.

As noted above in the discus-sion of the 1982–83 fires, improper-ly logged forests are particularly fireprone because excessive amounts ofwaste wood are left on the forestfloor and the forest canopy is opened,causing ground vegetation and deadbranches to dry out quickly. Heavilydisturbed forest tends to burn almostcompletely, leaving few live trees.Pristine forest is much less likely toburn, and when it does, usually onlyground-level vegetation is consumedleaving the middle and upper treelayers intact. Lightly-burned pristineforest is quick to recover after a fire.Moderately to heavily burned foreststake decades or centuries to regeneratedue to an invasion of pioneer treespecies and the loss of seeds andseedlings of species normally foundin a mature forest. Heavily burnedforest may be converted to grasslandsby repeated intentional burning.The primary vegetation ecologyquestion to be answered is whetherrepeated large-scale fires will upsetthe stability of forest ecosystemsbeyond the point of recovery.

Peat swamp forests present aspecial case, because they are par-ticularly vulnerable to fire and pro-duce the most noxious smog of anyforest type when they burn. A sig-nificant portion of the haze in 1997was generated by peat fires, whichare quite different from fires in low-land forest. Peat fires typically burnunderground as well as above, pro-duce relatively low heat, generatelarge amounts of smoke, eliminatethe seedbank, and destroy the soil,which can take thousands of yearsto replace.4

Research carried out in peatforests affected by the 1997 fires atCentral Kalimantan’s TanjungPuting National Park provides anindication of the impacts of fire onpeat swamp forest vegetation. (SeeTable B-1.) Areas that burned in1991 but were allowed to regeneratewithout disturbance until 1998showed signs of rapid regeneration,whereas areas burned repeatedlywith only short intervals betweenthe fires showed much lower stemdensities and species diversity.5


WILDLIFE

It is difficult to document theeffects of fire on rain forest animalsand insects because their popula-tions can vary seasonally or inmulti-year cycles, and the ecologyof many species has not been wellstudied. Wildlife may be killeddirectly by the heat and smoke offires or may subsequently weakenand die from lack of food and wateror habitat loss.6 Small, slow-mov-ing animals are most likely to bekilled outright by fires, and animalswith highly specific food, habitat,shelter, or climate requirements aremost at risk during the immediatepost-fire period. Some larger crea-tures are capable of moving to otherareas to escape fire but often strayinto territory settled by humans andare captured or killed, as happenedto many orangutans in Kalimantanduring 1997. The loss of key organismsin ecosystems, such as pollinatorsand decomposers, can significantlyslow the recovery of the forestecosystem.7 The changing compo-sition of vegetation in a recoveringforest may provide alternate or evensuperior food sources for someomnivores, generalist herbivores andinsects, sometimes leading to dramaticincreases in their populations afterfires, and thereby changing the faunal composition of the forest.

The fauna of East Kalimantan’sKutai National Park received themost concentrated scientific atten-tion immediately after the 1982–83fires, and in the half decade thatfollowed. These studies showed thatmost large mammals were still inthe area, with wild pigs (Sus spp.)becoming abundant by takingadvantage of new food sources,8

and Banteng (Bos javanicus ) stillcommon because these large wildcattle also adapted their diets.9 Manysambar deer (Cervus unicolor) andbarking deer (Muntiacus muntjak)perished in the fires,10 but theirpopulations appeared to have recov-ered a year later.11 The MalayanSun Bear (Helarctos malayanus)is thought to have declined in Kutai,however, possibly beyond the point ofrecovery, while small carnivores likethe Malay civet (Vicerra tangalunga),otter (Lutra spp.), leopard cat(Felis bengalensis), and flat headedcat (Felis planiceps) are thought tohave increased in numbers in theyears after the fires in response toan increase in prey animals.12

The 1982–83 fires causedhigh mortality among reptiles andamphibians,13 and had a negativeimpact on swamp dwelling reptiles,but most, with the exception of thecrocodile, eventually reappeared intheir former habitat.14 Snakes alsoreappeared in the forest, with theexception of large species such aspythons (Phyton spp.). In 1997,forest lizards were completely absentfrom burned areas of a nationalpark in Sumatra one month after itburned.15 A rapid survey in a peatswamp area of Central Kalimantanimmediately after the 1997 firesyielded preliminary conclusionsthat most land and arboreal reptileshad probably died from the heat ofthe fires, whereas crocodiles, waterturtles, and other species inhabitingrelatively deep water had largelysurvived.16

The charismatic and relativelywell-studied orangutan (Pongopygmaeus) was the animal speciesthat received the most media atten-tion during both the 1982–83 and1997–98 fires. Researchers in Kutaifound that while some orangutansperished in the fires, and others weredisplaced and malnourished in itsimmediate aftermath, these omniv-orous great apes were able to switchto eating bark and young stemsuntil fruit reappeared in the forest.17

Susilo and Tangketasik concludedthat maturing secondary forest offersmore food value to orangutans thanprimary forest. As early as 1984,orangutans were observed carryinginfants born after the fires, provingthe species’ ability to adapt to thenew conditions.18

The scale of the 1997–98 fires,however, exceeded the orangutan’sability to adapt to stressful situations.Hundreds of adults were killed byvillagers in Central and EastKalimantan as they fled from theforest to escape the effects of thedrought, smoke and fires. Immediatelyafter the 1997 fires, a WWF-Indonesiaresearcher encountered 14 liveorangutans in and around TanjungPuting National Park, an area witha large and well-studied populationof orangutans. A farmer outside thepark told the researcher that he hadkilled a large male orangutan witha spear as it ate pineapples in thefarmer's field. Many orphanedjuveniles were sold for the pet trade,but as of April, 161 mostly youngorangutans were in the care of theSemboja Orangutan IntroductionCenter in East Kalimantan. Eventhis safe haven was threatened byfire and food scarcity in the area.Primatologists believe that the1997–98 fires will mark the begin-ning of a steeper downward trend inthe already declining population ofBornean orangutans.

TABLE B-1

Mean Stem Density and Species Richness of Forest Vegetation in Relation toFire Exposure at Tanjung Puting National Park, Central Kalimantan

STEMS/HECTARE SPECIES/HECTARE

Burned in 1994 and 1997 165 11Burned repeatedly, including 1997 113 7Burned in 1991 235 24Unburned 951 35


Other primates fared relativelywell after the 1982–83 fires becausethey adapted their diets to replacefigs and other favored fruits fromtrees that had suffered high levels ofdamage and mortality. Leightonreported that both pig tailedmacaques (Macacca nemestrina)and gibbons (Hylobates muelleri)in Kutai National Park took advan-tage of explosions in the popula-tions of wood boring insectsimmediately after the fires. Hedetected no change in the behavioror activity of two gibbon familiesthat he had studied prior to thefires.19 Leaf eating monkeys(Presbytis spp.) were very difficultto find after the fires, and even sixyears later their densities were low.Proboscis monkeys (Nasalis larva-tus) maintained their populationsin mangrove forest (Boer, 1989), avegetation type not heavily dam-aged by the fires. Two primitive pri-mates, however, western tarsiers(Tarcius bancanus) and slow loris(Nycticebus coucany), were extinctor extremely reduced in number by1986.20 Seven years after the fires,natural succession favored figs,lianas, and other important primatefruit species,21 boding well for therecovery of most primate populations.

Proboscis monkeys are athreatened species found almostexclusively in riverine and coastalhabitats. Because riverine forest washeavily affected by the 1997–98fires, this species has probably lostthe greatest percentage of itsremaining habitat of any primatespecies in Borneo.

Bird populations were reducedby direct impacts of the 1982–83fires. During the fires, birds wereobserved by local people to becomedisoriented in the heavy smoke andfall to the ground.22 Fruit-eatingbirds, especially hornbills, could notbe found in Kutai immediately afterthe 1982–83 fires, presumablybecause the fires had killed a largepercentage of the fruit trees uponwhich they depend for food.23

Insect-feeding birds enjoyed anabundance of food in the aftermathof fires because wood-eating insectpopulations exploded in response tothe enormous supply of dead wood.

Because of the short life cyclesof most insects and other inverte-brates, their populations react rela-tively quickly to ecological changesin the aftermath of fires. As men-tioned above, the 1982–83 firescaused populations of wood-eatinginsects to increase dramatically, andbutterfly populations exploded as aresult of the abundance of nutrient-rich ash.24 One entomologist study-ing the effects of the 1982–83 fireson invertebrate ecology in KutaiNational Park found that the diver-sity and numbers of soil and litterdwelling invertebrates declinedsomewhat after the fire, but recov-ered within three years.25 The rich,but little studied invertebrate faunaliving in the canopies of tropicaltrees are presumably destroyedalong with their habitat. The recov-ery of arboreal invertebrate diversityprobably parallels forest regeneration.

There appear to be no scientificreports describing the effects oncoral reefs and other nearshoremarine ecosystems when the heavyrains of late 1983 flushed fire-gen-erated sediment and polluted waterinto the Makassar Straight. Thiscoastline is largely muddy due tothe normal discharge of sedimentfrom several large rivers, but off-shore islands are ringed by coralreefs. Corals are quickly smotheredand killed by even brief exposure toheavy sediment, and unusuallyhigh levels of fresh water dischargefrom rivers can kill corals by reduc-ing the salinity of ocean water.Coastal ecology can also be nega-tively affected because the impor-tant fish nursery function ofmangrove ecosystems may beimpaired by excessive deposition ofsediment. La Niña brought abnor-mally heavy rainfall towards theend of 1998, but even a normalrainy season would have seriousconsequences for marine ecosystemsas the remains of rain forests arewashed out to sea.

Notes:

1. Sowerby and Yeager, 1997.

2. Wirawan, 1993.

3. Shimokawa, 1988.

4. Yeager, 1998.

5. Ibid.

6. Boer, 1989.

7. Yeager, 1998.

8. Doi, 1990.

9. Wirawan, 1985.

10. Boer, 1989.

11. Mayer, 1989.

12. Doi, 1990.

13. Leighton and Wirawan, 1986.

14. Boer, 1989.

15. O'Brien and others, 1998.

16. Lilley, 1998.

17. Suzuki, 1988.

18. Susilo and Tangetasik, 1986.

19. Leighton, 1983.

20. Boer, 1989.

21. Schindler, Thoma and Panzer, 1989.

22. Mayer, 1989.

23. Leighton, 1983.

24. Wirawan, 1993.

25. Yajima, 1988.


APPENDIX C CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES OF THE INDONESIAN ECOLABELING INSTITUTE (LEI)

Preliminary evaluation. Afirm seeking certification of one ofits units submits an applicationalong with the documents andinformation specified in LEI’sguidelines. If the documents arecomplete, the firm signs an agree-ment with LEI and pays the fees forthe initial assessment of informa-tion contained in the documents.This assessment is carried out byExpert Panel I, which is appointedby LEI. Applicants are given achance to explain and elaborate ontheir documentation before thepanel. If Panel I agrees that themanagement unit is a valid candi-date for certification, it recom-mends implementation of a fieldassessment and notes areas towhich the field assessment shouldpay particular attention.

Field assessments. LEI itselfdoes not carry out field assessmentsbut, rather, certifies assessors whomeet its published criteria. Theapplicant chooses the assessor fromamong those meeting the criteriathrough a process of open bidding.The winning bid is scrutinized byLEI, which, if there are no problems,issues a “no objections” letter. Theapplicant then concludes a contractfor services with the assessor for thefield assessment. Assessors may beprivate firms or NGOs, as long asthey meet the requisite LEI criteria.LEI also designed the standardizedcurriculum and training manualsfor field assessors. The first roundof field assessor training, for 86 pro-fessionals, was held in June 1998.

The field assessment team car-ries out its assessment on the basisof LEI’s set procedures, criteria, andindicators, complemented by thespecial concerns raised by ExpertPanel I. The applicant is required tosend one or more staff to accompa-ny the team and guide it in thefield. The accompanying staff mustpossess adequate knowledge andauthority to directly clarify mattersfor the field assessment team asnecessary. In parallel with the fieldassessment, LEI provides publicnotice (through local newspapers)to all stakeholders in the area thatthe management unit is underassessment and invites stakeholdersto contribute additional views orinformation. LEI also encourageslocal NGOs, communities and otherstakeholders to form a regionalforestry consultative forum to facili-tate the articulation of local con-cerns relating to the certificationprocess.

Within 30 days of completingthe field assessment, the assessorwrites a report according to setguidelines and provides it to LEI.

Performance evaluation.After the applicant makes paymentto LEI to cover the costs of this stageof the process, LEI forms and briefsExpert Panel II, which evaluates themanagement unit’s performance onthe basis of the assessor’s fieldreport and additional informationthat other stakeholders may haveprovided to LEI. Membership of thispanel is the same as for Panel I,with the addition of four experts onthe region where the operation inquestion is located. In addition tostudying the report, the panel isgiven an opportunity to directlyquestion the field assessors. Thepanel then ranks the performanceof the applicant’s management unit(using as grades the terms gold, sil-ver, bronze, copper, or zinc) andmakes its recommendation to LEI.Only those applicants attaininggold, silver, or bronze rankings areeligible for certification. The panelalso makes recommendations to theapplicant on actions it should taketo bring its operation more into linewith the LEI criteria for sustainablemanagement.

The certification decision.LEI then issues a five-year certifica-tion, which is announced in themass media. This decision is final,although an appeals process is pro-vided under which any party canappeal the decision. (The firm inEast Kalimantan that failed itsassessment due to fires in its con-cession area has appealed the deci-sion, giving the appeals process itsfirst real test.) A maximum of threefield audits may be carried out byLEI during the five-year period, butthe first one must be carried outwithin the first two years. Theseaudits can result in upgrading,downgrading, or revocation of thefirm’s certification.


M A P 1 : I N D O N E S I A’ S R E M A I N I N G F R O N T I E R F O R E S T S

Source: Bryant, Nielsen, and Tangley, 1997.

Notes: (a) "Frontier forest" refers to large, ecologically intact and relatively undisturbed natural forests. "Non-frontier forests" are dominated by secondary forests, plantations, degraded forest, andpatches of primary forest not large enough to qualify as frontier forest. "Threatened frontier forests" are forests where ongoing or planned human activities will eventually degrade the ecosystem. SeeBryant, Nielsen, and Tangley for detailed definitions.

(b) This map was completed prior to the 1999 release of the results of a World Bank-assisted forest mapping effort that concluded that deforestation rates since 1986 have been 50 percent greater thanhitherto assumed. Actual forest cover is therefore probably less than shown on this map.


M A P 2 : D I S T R I B U T I O N A N D I N T E N S I T Y O F “ H A Z E ” F R O M F O R E S T F I R E S I N I N D O N E S I A , S E P T E M B E R T O N O V E M B E R 1 9 9 7

Source: Map composition by Y. Martin Hardiono, Telapak Indonesia, reproduced at World Resources Institute, 1999.

Notes: Haze distribution is the mean of cumulative haze distribution from September to November 1997. Derived from Earth Probe satellite data available on the NASA Total Ozone Monitoring Systemsite at: http://jwocky.gsfc.nasa.gov/index.html


MAP 3: DISTRIBUTION OF WILD ORANGUTAN POPULATION, ACCUMULATEDHOT SPOTS, AND PROTECTED AREAS IN KALIMANTAN, 1997-98

Source: WWF–Indonesia, 1999. Orangutan Action Plan. Jakarta.


MAP 4: FOREST USES AND AREAS BURNED IN 1997-98, EAST KALIMANTAN PROVINCE

Source: Map composition by Y. Martin Hardiono, Telapak Indonesia, reproduced at World Resources Institute, 1999.Note: Fires data from German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) Integrated Forest Fires Management Project, Samarinda, Indonesia.


MAPS 5A-5C: LAND CLEARING AND FIRE ON THE CENTRAL KALIMANTANM I L L I O N - H E C TA R E R I C E P R O J E C T. M AY 1 9 9 5 - J U LY 1 9 9 7

The Dadahup area on May 29, 1997.Clearcutting of the peat swamp forestand construction of new canals areshown in red.

Source: Kalteng Consultants, Hoehenkirchen, Germany

LANDSAT-image (30 km x 42 km) of theDadahup area of the Million-Hectare RiceProject, Central Kalimantan, May 10,1996. Green areas are peat swamp forest.



The Dadahup area in flames, July 29, 1997 (SPOT image).



W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E

B O A R D O F D I R E C T O R S

William D. RuckelshausChairman

Julia Marton-LefèvreVice Chair

Manuel ArangoFrances G. BeineckeBert BolinRobert N. Burt David T. BuzzelliDeb CallahanMichael R. DelandSylvia A. EarleAlice F. EmersonJosé María Figueres Shinji FukukawaDavid GergenJohn H. GibbonsPaul GormanWilliam M. Haney, IIIDenis HayesCynthia R. HelmsSamuel C. JohnsonCalestous JumaYolanda Kakabadse

Aditi KapoorJonathan LashJeffrey T. LeedsJane LubchencoMahmood MamdaniWilliam F. MartinMatthew Nimetz Ronald L. Olson Yi QianPeter H. RavenFlorence T. RobinsonJose SarukhanStephan SchmidheinyBruce SmartScott M. Spangler James Gustave SpethRalph TaylorAlvaro Umaña QuesadaPieter WinsemiusWren Wirth

Jonathan LashPresident

Matthew ArnoldSenior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

Anthony JanetosSenior Vice President and Chief Program Officer

Marjorie BeaneVice President for Administration and Chief Financial Officer

Lucy Byrd DorickVice President for Development

Kenton R. MillerVice President for International Development and Conservation

Donna W. WiseVice President for Communications

he World Resources Institute (WRI) is an independent center for policyresearch and technical assistance on global environmental and devel-opment issues. WRI’s mission is to move human society to live in ways

that protect Earth’s environment and its capacity to provide for the needs andaspirations of current and future generations.

Because people are inspired by ideas, empowered by knowledge, andmoved to change by greater understanding, the Institute provide—and helpsother institutions provide—objective information and practical proposals forpolicy and institutional change that will foster environmentally sound, sociallyequitable development. WRI’s particular concerns are with globally significantenvironmental problems and their interaction with economic development andsocial equity at all levels.

The Institute’s current areas of work include economics, forests, biodiversity,climate change, energy, sustainable agriculture, resource and environmentalinformation, trade, technology, national strategies for environmental andresource management, and business liaison.

In all of its policy research and work with institutions, WRI tries to buildbridges between ideas and action, meshing the insights of scientific research,economic and institutional analyses, and practical experience with the needfor open and participatory decision-making.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE10 G Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20002, USAhttp://www.wri.org/wri

T


W O R L D W I D E F U N D F O R N AT U R E

he World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) is one of the world's largest andmost respected private conservation organizations. Based in Gland,Switzerland, WWF has a worldwide network of 27 national organizations,

5 associated organizations and 21 program offices, with over 4.7 million supporters worldwide. WWF has been active in Indonesia since the 1960s, andcurrently runs more than twenty ongoing projects at different field locationsthroughout Indonesia. In September 1996, the WWF Indonesia Foundationwas established as a step towards becoming a WWF National Organization,resulting in a change of name in July 1998 from the WWF Indonesia Programmeto WWF-Indonesia. In the early years, WWF's mission in Indonesia was primarilyto preserve endangered wildlife. But its current mission has expanded, and nowembraces preservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of natural resources,and reduced consumption and pollution. WWF-Indonesia's national office islocated in Jakarta, with additional offices in Bali, East Kalimantan, and IrianJaya, each focusing on one of Indonesia’s major bioregions and working closelywith local governments, NGOs, and communities.

T E L A PA K I N D O N E S I A F O U N D AT I O N

elapak is an Indonesian nongovernmental organization (NGO) based inBogor, West Java. Founded in 1997, Telapak’s objective is to supportand strengthen sustainable and equitable management of Indonesia’s

forest and marine ecosystems and resources. Telapak works through fieldinvestigations, policy analyses, and the provision of information to policymak-ers, the media, and other NGOs. Its primary focus is on exposing policies andpractices of government agencies, the private sector, and international finan-cial institutions that are prejudicial to Indonesia’s living environment and theinterests of future generations, and proposing alternative policies for sustain-able and equitable development. Telapak is strongly committed to workingwith like-minded individuals and organizations at the grassroots level through-out Indonesia, and therefore directs a considerable amount of energy to helpingempower local NGOs and communities to serve as strong defenders of living nat-ural resources in their areas. Telapak is the host institution for Forest WatchIndonesia, an independent forest monitoring network that is affiliated withGlobal Forest Watch, an international initiative hosted by the World ResourcesInstitute.

T

T


T H E W O R L D R E S O U R C E S I N S T I T U T E F O R E S T F R O N T I E R S I N I T I AT I V E

he World Resources Institute Forest Frontiers Initiative (FFI) is amulti-disciplinary effort to promote stewardship in and around theworld’s last major frontier forests by influencing investment, policy,

and public opinion. The FFI team is working with governments, citizens’groups, and the private sector in Amazonia, Central Africa, Indonesia, NorthAmerica, and Russia. We also take part in pressing international discussionson forest policy.

We are motivated by the belief that there is a responsible way to useforests. We also see growing interest in finding alternatives to forest destruc-tion that take advantage of the full economic potential of forests, not justimmediate revenue from logging and forest clearing.

For each frontier forest region, FFI builds a network of policy-makers,activists, investors, and researchers to promote policy reform. Efforts to minimize the negative impacts of road-building and forest-clearing for agriculture and to stop illegal logging are part of this work.

In collaboration with a variety of partners, WRI is creating Global ForestWatch—an independent, decentralized, global forest monitoring network—which will facilitate the collection of all relevant information on forests andhow they are being used as well as provide mechanisms for making this information available to anyone with a stake in the forest.

Business has a leading role to play. WRI is working with the forest products industry and others to create greater production and demand forgoods from well-managed forests. We are developing case studies with innovative firms to demonstrate to others the business impacts and opportunities that sustainability presents.

To get access to information about FFI findings and activities and to find outhow to participate, visit our website at http://www.wri.org/wri/ffi/ or write to:

Forest Frontiers InitiativeWorld Resources Institute

10 G Street, N.E.Washington, D.C. 20002, U.S.A.

Telephone: 202/729-7600Fax: 202/729-7610Email: [email protected]

T

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE10 G STREET NE

WASHINGTON, DC 20002USA

http://www.wri.org


WWF-INDONESIA TELAPAK INDONESIA FOUNDATION KANTOR TAMAN A9, UNIT A-1 J1. SEMPUR KALER NO. 16KAWASAN MEGA KUNINGAN BOGOR 16154, INDONESIAJAKARTA 12950, INDONESIA http://www.wwf.or.id [email protected]

ISBN 1-56973-408-9

trial by fire final-r1 - wri indonesiatransitional president b.j. habibie. in mid-1999, indonesians...

Documents