REC. TRESPASS ACT STATE CASE LAW

Alabama………………………………………………….3 Alaska……………………………………………………3 Arizona………………………………………………….. 3 Arkansas………………………………………………….4 California…………………………………………………4 Colorado………………………………………………….4 Connecticut……………………………………………….5 Delaware………………………………………………….5 District of Columbia……………………………………...5 Florida…………………………………………………….5 Georgia……………………………………………………5 Hawaii……………………………………………………..6 Idaho………………………………………………………7 Illinois……………………………………………………..7 Indiana…………………………………………………….7 Iowa……………………………………………………….7 Kansas……………………………………………………..8 Kentucky…………………………………………………..9 Louisiana…………………………………………………..9 Maine………………………………………………………9 Maryland…………………………………………………..10 Massachusetts……………………………………………...10 Michigan…………………………………………………...10 Minnesota…………………………………………………..11 Mississippi………………………………………………….12 Missouri…………………………………………………….12 Montana…………………………………………………….13 Nebraska…………………………………………………….13 Nevada………………………………………………………14 New Hampshire……………………………………………..15 New Jersey…………………………………………………..16 New Mexico…………………………………………………17 New York……………………………………………………17 North Carolina……………………………………………….17 North Dakota………………………………………………...18 Ohio………………………………………………………….18 Oklahoma…………………………………………………….18 Oregon………………………………………………………..19 Pennsylvania………………………………………………….19 Rhode Island………………………………………………….20 South Carolina………………………………………………...21 South Dakota………………………………………………….22 Tennessee……………………………………………………...22 Texas…………………………………………………………..23

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Utah…………………………………………………………25 Vermont……………………………………………………..25 Virginia……………………………………………………...26 Washington………………………………………………….26 West Virginia………………………………………………..26 Wisconsin……………………………………………………27 Wyoming…………………………………………………….27 Alabama

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Clark v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 606 F. Supp. 130 (N.D.Ala.1985) -Sections 35-15-20 through 35-15-28 apply to noncommercial public recreational landowners and provide them with even tighter limitations than §§ 35-15-1 through 35-15-5 as to their exposure to liability to recreational users; §§ 35-15-20 through 35-15-28 recognize a public policy in Alabama to encourage public owners to allow the opening up and promotion of their facilities without exposing themselves to law suits. Russell By and Through Russell v. TVA, 564 F.Supp. 1043 (N.D.Ala.1983) -This section was enacted to insure that landowners were not to be held to a standard of due care toward persons upon their land with permission for hunting, fishing and recreational purposes. -Licensee's entrance on the land carries with it no right to expect the land to be made safe for his reception, but he must assume the risk of whatever may be encountered. Once he is there, the law only requires the landowner to refrain from wantonly, maliciously or intentionally injuring him; in other words, the landowner is not liable unless he does some act which goes beyond mere negligence. Poole v. City of Gadsden 541 So.2d 510 (Ala.1989) -City and construction company which built boardwalk along banks of river in city park, were shielded from prosecution for the wrongful death of a swimmer who drowned after hitting his head on a submerged object while diving off the boardwalk. George v. U.S., 735 F.Supp. 1524 (M.D.Ala.1990) -In action for loss of consortium where alligator attacked swimmer in swimming area of national park, where park officials had actual knowledge of the alligator and the fact that he was large and had lost his natural fear of humans and was, therefore, dangerous, and where swimmer had no such knowledge, defendant's defense predicated on recreational use statute failed. Ex parte City of Geneva, 707 So.2d 626 (Ala.1997), on remand 707 So.2d 631 -In order to achieve express purpose of recreational use statutes, those who permit public upon their lands for noncommercial recreational purposes must not be exposed to greater potential liability under recreational use statutory scheme than they would have faced at common law. Alaska Arizona Newman v. Sun Valley Crushing Co. 787 P.2d 623 Smith v. Arizona Board of Regents 195 Ariz. 214 -Carnival-type apparatus temporarily placed on university property, combining a trampoline and bungee cord, did not constitute “premises,” nor was a student injured on the apparatus a “recreational user,” within the meaning of the recreational use statute, and thus, the statute did not apply to shield the university or related entities from liability; the legislature did not intend to immunize a landowner for injuries on

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such a transient apparatus, and the student was not engaged in the type of recreational activity contemplated by the statute. - Arkansas Mandel v. U.S. 545 F.Supp. 907(overturned) -The statute in effect only required a showing that the condition was dangerous. The statute now requires the condition to be ultra-hazardous. Jenkins v. Arkansas Power & Light Co. 140 F.3d 1161 -Arkansas recreational use statute, which provided immunity from liability to landowners who opened their lands to public recreational use, applied to electric utility which opened its lake to public pursuant to its license from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, notwithstanding injured swimmer's claim that applying statute to utility defeated goal of statute of encouraging landowners to open their land through immunity. -Malicious conduct exception to immunity provided under Arkansas recreational use statute to landowners permitting public recreational use of their land did not apply to utility who opened lake to public, based on its failure to mark or warn users of submerged island; given obvious danger associated with diving into water without first testing its depth, shallow area caused by island was not ultra-hazardous condition and failure to warn was at most negligent. California Graves v. U.S. Coast Guard 692 F.2d 71 -Federal government was not shielded from liability for injuries sustained when plaintiff was injured as he dove off cabana into river under California statute restricting liability of landowners who allow public to use their land for recreation, where cabana was located on property leased from government and consideration was given in exchange for permission to camp on property. Colorado Smith v. Cutty's, Inc., App.1987, 742 P.2d 347. -Fact that individual injured on land and his group were not paying customers of resort which owned land did not render individual's use of land unrelated to commercial activity being carried on there, such as would preclude injuries from being within exception to general statutory relief for landowner from liability for injuries received by people using property without charge for recreational purposes. - There must be nexus between commercial or business enterprise and use giving rise to injury to bring injury within exception to general relief afforded landowners for

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injuries received by people using property without charge for recreational purposes, where property is owned by commercial or business enterprise. Connecticut Conway v. Town of Wilton 238 Conn. 653 -Municipality and its employees do not come within term “owner” of land, as used in Recreational Land Use Act, and thus are not entitled to immunity under Act for injuries sustained on municipal land available to public for recreational purposes Delaware Gibson v. Keith 492 A.2d 241 -Invitation or permission direct or indirect, extended by landowner to public to enter without charge for recreational purposes is sine qua non for invoking the Recreational Use Act's protective benefits, but to secure such benefits, owner is not required to make explicit “offer” of land or water area for recreational use. -Landowner who undertakes affirmatively either to warn or bar public from entry cannot assert the Recreational Use Act as bar to tort claim brought by person who has entered premises either with knowledge or in disregard of owner's efforts to keep public out. -Land or water area's particular conduciveness to use and owner's positive efforts to make such areas available without charge to public for recreational use determine landowner's right to invoke protection of the Recreational Use Act; however, application of Act is limited to recreational use of essentially undeveloped land and water areas, primarily rural or semirural land, water or marsh, and Act does not apply to urban or residential areas improved with swimming pools, tennis courts and the like. District of Columbia Florida Abdin v. Fischer 374 So.2d 1379 -In boater's action against lessee of boat ramp and lessee's principal for injuries sustained when the boater slipped and fell on algae which had grown on the ramp, genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether commercial activity was taking place on property alleged by lessee and its principal to be recreational “park area” so as to prevent application of statute limiting liability of owners or lessees who provide public with park area for outdoor recreational purposes, thus precluding summary judgment. Georgia McGruder v. Georgia Power Co. 191 S.E.2d 305 North v. Taco Hills Inc. 286 S.E.2d 346 -Where property owner neither invited nor charged for the use of land for recreational purposes, plaintiff, who slipped and fell on a roll of metal fencing or reinforcing bar concealed in heavy underbrush while using the property for recreational purposes,

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could not recover for injuries on ground that property owner failed to warn him of the danger or that conditions on property constituted a private nuisance maintained by property owner. Bourn v. Herring 225 Ga. 67 (1969) -Corporation which made picnic grounds and lake resort available for Sunday school picnic that 14-year-old boy was attending when he drowned was “owner” within act limiting liability of owners of land and water areas who make such areas available to public for recreational purposes. -Benefits derived by corporation from allegedly making picnic grounds and lake available for Sunday school picnic, at which 14-year-old boy drowned, for advertising purposes and to promote sale of corporation's products were not a “charge” which would make such corporation and its general manager liable for other than wilful and malicious failure to guard or warn against dangerous condition under act limiting liability of owners who make land and water areas available to public for recreational purposes. Anderson v. Atlanta Committee for Olympic Games 273 Ga. 113 -The Recreational Property Act (RPA), providing immunity to owner who made property available without charge to public for recreational purposes, was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to suits against local Olympic committee, as lessee of Centennial Olympic Park property from public authority, and against sublessee of area within park, for wrongful death and personal injuries caused by bombing in park during 1996 Olympic Games; RPA provided fair notice that park created to celebrate spirit of historic athletic and cultural event and to provide gathering place for visitors was available to the public for “recreational purposes.” -The Recreational Property Act (RPA), providing immunity to owner who made property available without charge to public for recreational purposes, did not violate due process or equal protection clauses; RPA did not disadvantage a suspect class or interfere with fundamental right, and was rationally related to legitimate governmental purpose of making recreational property more accessible to the public. Hawaii Howard v. United States 181 F.3d 1064 (applying Hawaii law) -That harbor and dock on which sailing student was injured was not open to “general” public, but rather was open only to military personnel, their families, and guests, did not preclude government from qualifying for immunity from negligence liability under Hawai‘i recreational use statute, which generally granted immunity to landowners who allowed “any person” to use their property for recreational purposes without charge; statute did not require landowner to allow every member of general public access and use of land. Proud v. United States 723 F.2d 705 (applying Hawaii law)

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-The exception of government land from Hawaii's recreational use statute did not render the federal Government liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained by a minor in diving accident in national park because the Government's liability under the Act was that of a private individual, regardless of what a state intended that liability to be. Idaho Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., Inc. 106 Idaho 866 -Motorcycle riding on private land was activity for “recreational purposes” within meaning of statute which limits landowner's liability to nonpaying recreational users. -Statute which limits landowner's liability to nonpaying recreational users does not distinguish between active or passive conduct of owner in creating hazardous condition. Illinois Miller v. U.S. 597 F.2d 614 -Illinois Recreational Area Licensing Act applied to areas such as national wildlife refuge which were maintained primarily for recreational purposes while Illinois Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act applied only to lands which were used on casual basis for recreational purposes; thus, United States was not entitled to protection against liability provided to landowner under Recreational Use Act. -the central purpose of the Recreational Use Act is “to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes . . . .” By contrast, the Licensing Act applies to areas of land that are specifically maintained for recreational use Indiana Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc. 712 N.E.2d 1002 -By denying certain persons legal recourse for personal injury or property damage, the Indiana Recreational Use Statute is in derogation of common law and must accordingly be strictly construed against limiting the claimant's right to bring suit. -Indiana Recreational Use Statute shielded owner of unimproved parcel from liability for injuries to six-year-old child who was struck on head by tree limb, previously cut down by owner, that child and older brothers were attempting to move prior to playing baseball; injuries resulted from acts of child's brothers in moving limb so they could play baseball in exactly same area where they had previously played, not from any negligence on owner's part. Iowa Hegg v. U.S., C.A.8 (Iowa)1987, 817 F.2d 1328. -Definition of “land” in subd. 1 of this section was intended to distinguish between rural and urban land and recreational area near reservoir was within the scope of this section.

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-Plaintiff who was using swing-set when she was injured was engaged in a recreational use for purposes of this section, even though swinging is not specifically mentioned in the list of activities included within subd. 3. Op.Atty.Gen. (Spencer), April 26, 1977. -A landowner is exempt from liability under this chapter for injuries occurring on his properly sustained by those using his property for snowmobiling recreational purposes where landlord charges no consideration for such land use; landowner may be liable to those recreationally using his property for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn and may be liable for the attractive nuisance created by such recreational activities which injure children thereby attracted. Peterson v. Schwertley, 1990, 460 N.W.2d 469 -This section designed to encourage property owners to make land available for recreational uses, by relieving property owners of any duty to keep premises safe for “entry or use by others for recreational purposes,” did not require, either explicitly or implicitly, that such use be permissive; this section also relieves property owners of liability for injuries sustained by trespassers. Scott v. Wright, 1992, 486 N.W.2d 40. -Statute relieving property owners of duty of care if property is used for recreational purposes did not apply where action against property owner rested on vicarious liability for tractor driver's alleged negligence in connection with hayride and not on duties addressed in recreational use statute; intervening act of negligence on part of the driver took case outside purview of recreational use statute. Bird v. Economy Brick Homes, Inc., 1993, 498 N.W.2d 408. -Landowner did not “willfully or maliciously” fail to guard against dangerous condition, for purposes of exception to landowner immunity in recreational land use statute, by placing cable across access road. Kansas Bingaman v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 1993, 1 F.3d 976 -Under Kansas Recreational Use Statute (RUS), landowner who bars public access to its property has not directly or indirectly invited or permitted public to use that property for recreational activities and thus is not entitled to immunity under statute. K.S.A. 58-3201 to 58-3207. -In wrongful death action, issues of material fact existed as to whether power company invited or permitted public to use area of lake in which fisherman drowned, for purposes of determining whether company was covered by Kansas Recreational Use Statute (RUS), precluding summary judgment; although area may technically have been part of easement agreement allowing lake to be used by public for recreational purposes, testimony suggested that fishermen were routinely removed from area, and company conceded that it installed exclusionary buoys and fencing to keep public out of area.

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Kan. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 2003-27 -Under the Land and Recreational Area Act, an owner of agricultural land may operate under statutory protection from liability for ordinary negligence whether or not a fee is charged for recreational use of the land, but an owner of nonagricultural land operates under this statutory protection only if a fee is not charged. "Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited to, hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites. Klepper v. City of Milford, Kansas, 1987, 825 F.2d 1440 -Term "willful," as used in Kansas recreational use statute, is defined as intentionally causing injury or doing wrong, rather than intentionally acting or failing to act in way that merely allows wrong to occur. K.S.A. 58- 3206 Kentucky Sublett v. United States 688 S.W.2d 328 (Applying Kentucky Law) -United States was “owner” of public land under control of Army Corps of Engineers for purposes of statute limiting liability of landowner who makes land available to public for recreational purposes without payment of fees. -Statute providing that owner of land made available to public for recreational purposes without payment of fees is under no general duty and that person entering upon premises takes land as he finds it but, that owner of land would be liable if failure to guard against or warn of dangerous condition is willful or malicious, creates class of users which are neither “trespassers” nor “invitees” and does not thereby unreasonably interfere with constitutionally guaranteed right to recovery and access to courts. Louisiana Ratcliff v. Town of Mandeville 502 So.2d 566 -For immunity provided by statute to those who open up their property for recreational use to be applicable to given set of facts, property where injury occurred must be undeveloped, nonresidential rural or semi-rural land area and injury itself must be result of recreation that can be pursued in “true outdoors.” -Town that owned boat dock located in recreational area within populated city, adjacent to frequently travelled lakeshore drive and within stone's throw of residential area, was not free from liability for injuries occurring on that dock under statute providing immunity to those who opened up their property for recreational use. Maine Dickinson v. Clark (2001) Me., 767 A.2d 303 -Recreational Use Statute did not bar minor injured while operating log splitter from bringing negligent supervision of machinery claim against landowner, as statute only limited claims alleging premises liability, and minor did not allege failure to disclose hazardous activity on land. Coffin v. Lariat Associates (2001) Me., 766 A.2d 1018

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-A landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to provide safe premises to all persons lawfully on the land, and a duty to use ordinary care to ensure the premises are safe and to guard against all reasonably foreseeable dangers, in light of the totality of the circumstances. Stanley v. Tilcon Maine, Inc. (1988) Me., 541 A.2d 951 -Limitation of liability under this section may apply to owners who manifest intent that property not be used for recreational purposes. -This section precluded 14-year-old injured while tobogganing in sandpit from recovery for injuries from owner and operator of sandpit under attractive nuisance doctrine. -Limitation of liability for recreational use created by this section applies to claim of minor entering or using land of another for recreational purposes. Robbins v. Great Northern Paper Co. (1989) Me., 557 A.2d 614 Lessee's payment of $95 per year to lessor, which represented a fee for lessee's right to use leased lot for certain purposes but which did not entitle him to a greater right than held by general public to pursue recreational activities on lands other than his lot, did not constitute “consideration” so as to fall within an exception to recreational immunity rule. Maryland Fagerhus v. Host Marriott Corp., 2002, 795 A.2d 221, 143 Md.App. 525 -A property manager with a contractual duty to manage and maintain premises that a landowner makes available for recreational use is an “owner” who is entitled to invoke the protections of recreational use statute -Phrase “other interest in real property,” as used in recreational use statute that confers protection from negligence liability on the owner of an estate or other interest in real property, includes nonpossessory interests that give a person control of the premises, even if that control is not the exclusive or primary control usually exercised by owners of a fee or leasehold estate. Massachusetts Seich v. Town of Canton 426 Mass 84 (1997) -Recreational use statute applies equally to publicly and privately owned land. -Term “land,” as used in recreational use statute, includes indoor areas. Michigan Burnett v. Adrian 326 N.W.2d 810 -In action under recreational use statute, complaint adequately alleged claim for willful and wanton misconduct where complaint included allegation of facts essentially equivalent to assertion that city, in its acts and omissions, was indifferent to likelihood that catastrophe would come to member of public using lake, and such alleged indifference was essentially equivalent to willingness that such catastrophe occur.

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Estate of Thomas v. Consumers Power Co. 231 N.W.2d 653 -Affirmed in part, reversed in part. Court’s construction of Michigan RTA upheld. Court held that Statute governing liability for injuries to gratuitous recreational users of land does not change the common-law duty of owners and occupiers of property owed to those who come upon such property as mere licensees. Veeneman v. State 373 N.W.2d 193 -Negligence action brought by personal representative of decedent who was fatally injured when dune buggy in which he was riding overturned in state park was barred by governmental immunity, as State's operation of park was an activity which was expressly mandated or authorized by statute, and the activity was not proprietary in nature and did not come within any of the statutory exceptions to governmental immunity. Minnesota Kastner v. Star Trails Ass'n, App.2003, 658 N.W.2d 890 -Snowmobile trail-user organization was “owner” entitled to recreational-use immunity from personal injury actions brought by two snowmobilers, where organization controlled land on which trails ran. Louis v. Louis, 2001, 636 N.W.2d 314. -The duty of reasonable care is imposed on both the landowner and the entrant. -While a landowner generally has a continuing duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all entrants, this duty is not absolute. Watters v. Buckbee Mears Co., App.1984, 354 N.W.2d 848. -Where owners of property, formerly used to mine gravel, did not directly or indirectly invite or permit people to use the property for recreational purposes, the recreational use statute did not apply to preclude an action by trespassers against the landowners for injuries sustained while they were driving on the land. Hovet v. City of Bagley, 1982, 325 N.W.2d 813. -Minnesota recreational use statute did not apply to land owned by a city and therefore city could not rely on the statute to avoid liability for injuries sustained due to allegedly negligent operation of a municipal beach. Razink v. Krutzig, App.2008, 746 N.W.2d 644 -Recreational land use statute, providing that a landowner who gives permission for recreational trail use of land is entitled to immunity from a trespasser action, required that permission given for recreational trail use be oral or written, and thus statute did not preclude trespasser action, brought by snowmobile operator who was injured when he collided with a sign on landowner's land while using the land as a recreational trail, against landowner, landowner's agent, and parties who had option agreement to buy the land, who had passively permitted recreational trail use but who had not given any oral or written permission for the use.

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Hughes v. Quarve & Anderson Co., 1983, 338 N.W.2d 422. -In order for 16-year-old trespasser to recover from landowner for injury sustained from artificial dangerous condition, trespasser was required to establish that place where condition existed was one upon which owner knew or had reason to know children were likely to trespass, that condition was one owner knew or had reason to know and which he realized or should have realized would involve unreasonable risk of death or serious injury to children, that children would not discover condition or realize risk involved, that utility to owner of maintaining condition and burden of eliminating danger were slight as compared to risk, and that owner failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate danger. Mississippi Dumas v. Pike County, Miss. (S.D.Miss. 1986) 642 F.Supp. 131 -Nothing in Mississippi statute providing that citizen shall have the right to engage in water sports in public waterways at their own risk relieved landowner of liability for maintaining a dangerous condition on his land. -Provision of Mississippi statute entitled “Application of Chapter,” providing that chapter of statute protecting from liability, landowner who allowed his land to be used by public, would not be available unless public notice of availability of lands for public use was published once annually in newspaper of general circulation, and thus landowner's failure to comply with statutory notice provisions resulted in protections of statute not being available to him. Missouri State ex rel. Young v. Wood (Sup. 2008) 254 S.W.3d 871. -To invoke the Recreational Use Act (RUA), the general requirements are: (1) an owner of the land; (2) entry upon the land; (3) entry upon the land without charge; and (4) entry for recreational use. -Immunity under the Recreational Use Act (RUA) does not require that land be opened to the entire general public. -Under the Recreational Use Act (RUA), farmers, who gave permission, separately, to two hunters to enter the farm for the purpose of hunting wild turkeys, owed no duty to warn first hunter, who was accidentally shot and killed by second hunter, that second hunter was present on the farm. Wilson v. U.S., C.A.8 (Mo.)1993, 989 F.2d 953 -Fee of two dollars per night paid by boy scouts for right to stay overnight in building on Fort Leonard Wood was not a “charge” and did not deprive United States of benefit of Missouri recreational use statute in suit under Federal Tort Claims Act for death of one boy scout and injury to two others while on the post. Foster v. St. Louis County (Sup. 2007) 239 S.W.3d 599. Missouri Recreational Use Act did not violate equal protection by granting immunity to landowners who open land to public at no charge for recreational use while not extending liability to landowners who charge fee to access land; classification was

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rationally related to legislative purpose to promote free use of land for recreational purposes. Lonergan v. May (App. W.D. 2001) 53 S.W.3d 122 -Portion of lake where boat accident occurred did not fall under “noncovered land” exception to the Recreational Use Act (RUA), and thus electric utility company that owned lake had immunity against negligence action by relatives of boat passenger killed when boat collided with dock on lake, although another portion of the lake was used by company for commercial purposes, where part of lake where commercial activity was carried on was far from accident site, company opened lake to public free of charge for recreational purposes, and passengers came to lake intending to use it free of charge for recreational purposes. -In enacting Recreational Use Act (RUA), legislature meant to protect lake owners from liability when accidents occur on the lake by those who are engaging in boating activities, water sports or any other “pleasure” on the water. Fields v. Henrich (App. W.D. 2006) 208 S.W.3d 353 -Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) did not apply to action brought against landowners by parents, whose child was visiting landowners' neighbor and wandered off and subsequently was found unconscious in sewage pond located on landowners' property and later died, and therefore, submission of verdict directing instructions consistent with RUA was erroneous; landowners' property was an eight-acre residential lot, they maintained unfenced sewage aeration pond at front of their property, and they did not allow their front yard or any part of their lot, including pond, to be used for recreational purposes. Henderson v. U.S., C.A.8 (Mo.)1992, 965 F.2d 1488 Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether release of water through dam was ultrahazardous activity, precluded summary judgment on issue of whether Army Corps of Engineers negligently failed to guard or warn against “ultrahazardous condition” within meaning of Missouri Recreational Use Statute. Montana Saari v. Winter Sports Inc. 314 Mont 212 - Family of deceased child brought negligence action against ski resort owners, asserting, inter alia, wrongful death, negligence, and attractive nuisance theories of liability. The District Court, 11th Judicial District, Flathead County, Ted O. Lympus, J., granted summary judgment in favor of owners. Family appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) owner was immune from liability pursuant to recreational use statute; (2) owner's actions did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct, so as to preclude application of recreational use statute to shield owner from liability; and (3) recreational use statute does not require that property be available for public use in order for landowner to be shielded from liability Nebraska

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Cassio v. Creighton University, 1989, 233 Neb. 160, 446 N.W.2d 704. -Recreational Liability Act does not apply to independent indoor recreational facilities, including indoor swimming pools. Bronsen v. Dawes County, 2006, 722 N.W.2d 17, 272 Neb. 320 -Attendee of historical fur trade celebration, who stepped into a hole or depression in county courthouse lawn, fell, and broke her ankle, was "picnicking," which was a recreational purpose under Recreational Liability Act (RLA), and thus private entity that organized event was immune from liability under RLA for attendee's negligence claim; just prior to attendee's accident, she and her family obtained food and beverages for lunch, took those items to picnic table located on courthouse lawn, and sat and visited while consuming their food, and attendee was in process of disposing of trash associated with meal when accident occurred. -Limited immunity afforded to owners of land by the Recreation Liability Act was intended to apply only to private landowners who make their property available to the public for recreational purposes, and not to governmental entities -County, as a governmental entity, was not immune from liability, under the Recreation Liability Act, for injuries sustained by attendee of historical fur trade celebration, who stepped into a hole or depression in county courthouse lawn, fell, and broke her ankle. Dykes v. Scotts Bluff County Agr. Soc., Inc., 2000, 617 N.W.2d 817, 260 Neb. 375 -Viewing of livestock exhibits at a county fair is not a "recreational purpose" for purposes of statute limiting liability of property owners for injuries to persons using property for recreational purposes. Holden By and Through Holden v. Schwer, 1993, 242 Neb. 389, 495 N.W.2d 269 -Recreation Liability Act does not require landowner to fully dedicate his property to public before he comes under protection of Act, but, rather, in order to facilitate purpose of Act, landowner need allow only some members of public, on casual basis, to enter and use land for recreational purposes to enjoy protection of Act. Nevada Frasure v. U.S., 2003, 256 F.Supp.2d 1180 -Although the Nevada recreational use statute does not specify what type of property is covered, the intent of the legislature is that the property should be rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential, so that it can be used for recreation. - Under Nevada law as predicted by the district court, the test to determine whether a landowner willfully failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, as exception to immunity under the Nevada recreational use statute, asks whether the landowner had: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to be apprehended; (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is a probable, as opposed to a possible, result of the danger; and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid the peril. Boland v. Nevada Rock and Sand Co., 1995, 894 P.2d 988, 111 Nev. 608

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-All that is required for recreational use statute to apply is that the defendants be owners, lessees, or occupants of premises where plaintiff is injured, that land be of the type that legislature intended to be covered, and that plaintiff have been engaged in the type of activity which legislature intended to cover. N.R.S. 41.510. -Commercial gravel pit which was described as “big piles of sand in the middle of flat nowhere” was the type of land intended to be covered by recreational use statute. - To be covered by recreational use statute, property should be rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential so that it can be used for recreation. Neal v. Bently Nevada Corp., 1991, 771 F.Supp. 1068 -Unless willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against dangerous condition can be shown, landowner does not owe duty even to inspect its rural, semirural or nonresidential property to persons who may enter thereon for recreational purposes. - To determine landowner's constructive knowledge that rope swinging on his property existed and that conditions at site made rope swinging dangerous, court would use objective standard whether reasonable person under same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of the conduct. - Under Nevada law, for purpose of recreational use statute, “willful misconduct” is intentional wrongful conduct, done either with knowledge that serious injury to another will probably result, or with wanton or reckless disregard of possible results. Ducey v. U.S., 1983, 713 F.2d 504 -Consideration exception to Nevada recreational use statute is not limited to situations involving strict charging of “fee” for “permission” to recreate. -Consideration, within meaning of consideration exception to Nevada recreational use statute, must be tendered directly or indirectly to person who has power to grant or deny permission to participate in recreational activities. New Hampshire Collins v. Martella, 1994, 17 F.3d 1 -The New Hampshire recreational use statutes do not contain any language suggesting a requirement that the land at issue must be either undeveloped or open to the general public. Kantner v. Combustion Engineering, 701 F. Supp. 943 (D.N.H. 1988). -This section limits, but does not eliminate, liability of owners, lessees, and occupants to recreational users, while encouraging increased use of recreational areas without charge to users. - Where evidence in action seeking damages arising out of drowning deaths indicated that defendants had some ability to limit access to river where drownings occurred, fact that public had a pre-existing right to use river did not preclude application of this section. Estate of Gordon-Couture v. Brown (2005) 152 N.H. 265, 876 A.2d 196

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-The terms “others” and “another” in the recreational use statute providing that landowners who opened up their property for hunting, fishing, trapping, water sports, and other activities owed no duty of care to those who entered the property to engage in such activities means those persons who are members of the general public, and does not extend to persons who are personally invited onto the property by the landowner for private activities. Kenison v. Dubois (2005) 152 N.H. 448, 879 A.2d 1161 -Non-profit snowmobile club that maintained trail and operator of club's grooming machine were not “occupants” under recreational-use statutes and thus were not immune from liability regarding claim that arose from fatal collision between snowmobiler and machine; club and operator had neither ability nor authority to make land available for recreational purposes, but rather merely had ability and authority to make that land more easily usable than it might otherwise have been. New Jersey Hallacker v. National Bank and Trust Co. 806 F.2d 488 -New Jersey statute, which precludes grant of immunity to landowner of recreational park, if permission to engage in sport or recreational activity on premises is granted for consideration, did not require injured visitor to pay consideration in order to enjoy protection from exception to grant of immunity and, therefore, applied due to payment of consideration by cottage lessees whose guests were permitted to use cottage and whose guests invited injured visitor. Krevics v. Ayers 358 A.2d 844 -The Landowner's Liability Act was intended to protect landowners from liability only when it would be unreasonable to expect the landowner to maintain supervision over the property in question, and the key is the size and nature of the property as well as the quality of the hazard. -Size of 11-acre tract of woodland was such as to qualify its owner for protection under the Landowner's Liability Act, and the recreational activity of motorbiking fell within the requirement of a “sport and recreational” activity so as to invoke the protection of the Act; but the “quality” of the hazard created by landowner in placing a cable across the motorbike trail was such that landowner was not entitled to invoke the protection of the Act with respect to injuries sustained by person who was riding along trail on motorbike and came in contact with the cable at dusk, when the cable was indistinguishable from the surrounding woodland. -Under the Landowner's Liability Act, permission granted to use lands for sport and recreational activity does not include assurance that the premises are safe for such use, nor does it raise licensee to the status of an invitee; but such protections do not apply when the landowner deliberately creates the hazard. Tallaksen v. Ross 167 N.J. Super 1 -Despite land's zoning classification as residential lands and its proximity to developed residential areas and fact that ice on which infant plaintiff fell resulted from freezing of waters diverted to land by man-made drains, landowner was immune

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from liability by virtue of Landowner's Liability Act for injuries sustained by infant plaintiff while on privately held undeveloped land for recreational purposes. New Mexico Maldonado v. U.S., 1990, 893 F.2d 267 -New Mexico recreational use statute applied to lands owned by federal Government and set aside for recreational purposes. Lucero v. Richardson & Richardson, Inc., 2001, 131 N.M. 522, 39 P.3d 739 -Phrase “or any other recreational purpose” in recreational use statute, which limits liability of landowners who allow the public to use their land for hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, or any other recreational use, did not include organized competitive team sports, and thus public school was not immune from personal injury claim by parent injured on school grounds during organized baseball game, where other activities listed in recreational use statute were outdoor recreational activities, not structured contests with rules, uniforms, and coaches, and recreational statute was placed within game and fish acts. New York Schoonmaker v. Ridge Runners Club 99 Inc. 500 N.Y.S.2d 562 -Membership dues paid to recreation club in exchange for rights to use property, to cut trees, and to take wood from club's property constituted “consideration” for permission of members to cut trees which injured members' guest on club's property and, therefore, brought recreation club within exception to immunity for injuries caused by noncommercial woodcutting on its property if permission was granted for “consideration.” Hulett v. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. 1 A.D.3d 999 -In action seeking damages for injuries sustained by infant plaintiffs when they were struck by trains operated by Railroad defendants, after having ridden their bicycles on paths and access roads on adjacent property, cause of action alleging that Railroad defendants were negligent for failing to prevent access to their property dismissed-General Obligations Law § 9-103 (1) (a) grants immunity for ordinary negligence to landowners who permit members of public to come on their property to engage in certain recreational activities, including bicycle riding-activity that infant plaintiffs were engaged in at time they were injured, i.e., walking across tracks, was “sufficiently related” to their bicycle riding such that they were engaged in covered activity at time of accident-further, based on evidence of past recreational use, property was suitable for bicycle riding. North Carolina Estate of Ledford ex rel. Jarnigan v. U.S., 2004, 299 F.Supp.2d 544 -Under North Carolina's recreational use statute, landowner has no duty to warn trespassers or indirect invitees of artificial or unusual hazards on premises of which landowner is aware.

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-North Carolina's recreational use statute, which provides that landowner allowing others to use land for educational or recreational purposes without charge owes such persons same duty of care as that owed to trespasser, imposes upon landowner duty to refrain from willful or wanton infliction of injury. -To establish willful injury, under North Carolina law, there must be actual knowledge, or that which the law deems to be the equivalent of actual knowledge, of the peril to be apprehended, coupled with a design, purpose, or intent to do wrong and inflict injury. Clontz v. St. Mark's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 2003, 157 N.C.App. 325, 578 S.E.2d 654, review denied 357 N.C. 249, 582 S.E.2d 29 -Landowners who allow their land to be used for recreational purposes owe a duty to refrain from the willful or wanton infliction of injury. -Landowner gratuitously permitted church members to use his farm, which was generally used for routine farming activities, for recreational purposes, and thus landowner had no duty except to refrain from willfully or wantonly inflicting injury, where there was no indication that purpose of invitation was to promote a commercial enterprise. North Dakota Cudworth v. Mid Continent Communications 380 F.3d 375 -North Dakota's recreational use immunity statute, as predicted by the Court of Appeals, did not condition statutory immunity on landowner's “opening” of property for public recreational use; -fact that portion of rope barrier across prairie road may have been illegal did not affect defendant's immunity from liability for conditions and structures on his land; -North Dakota's recreational use immunity statute does not explicitly require that landowners open property to public use before receiving immunity, nor does it specify that immunity applies only where entrants are invitees or licensees. Ohio Moss v. DNR 62 Ohio St.2d 138 -Term “premises” as used in statutes granting owner, lessee or occupier of premises immunity from suit by recreational user who pays no fee includes state-owned lands. -Where recreational user of state-owned lands pays fee or consideration for such use, state is not immune from liability. -A person is not a “recreational user” as defined in statutes granting owner, lesser, or occupier of premises immunity from suit by recreational user of premises if such person pays a fee or consideration to enter upon the premises to engage in recreational pursuits. -Parties who did not pay any fee or consideration to enter state-owned lands to engage in recreational pursuits were recreational users even though they made other purchases and state was immune from liability for injuries sustained by such parties. Oklahoma

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Hughey v. Grand River Dam Authority, Okla., 897 P.2d 1138 (1995) -In light of Government Tort Claims Act's (GTCA) requirement that government and private tort liability be coequal or coextensive, Grand River Dam Authority could claim immunity afforded under Recreational Land Use Act (RLUA). - To be entitled to immunity under Recreational Land Use Act (RLUA) type of commercial activity which takes landowner out of purview of immunity has to be connected with invitee's recreational use of lands or waters. Mustain v. Grand River Dam Authority, Okla., 68 P.3d 991 (2003) -Dam authority's collection of dock permit fees and other miscellaneous rents did not create profit-related nexus to admitted public's presence on premises, for purposes of exception to Recreational Land Use Act for commercial or other for-profit endeavors, where dock permit fees were issued against, and paid solely by, dock owners, not by admitted public, boaters could launch water craft onto lake without using either public or private dock, and authority's enabling legislation required that public's recreational use of water and land be without charge. Oregon Waggoner v. City of Woodburn 196 Or.App. 715, 103 P.3d 648 -Statutory immunity for owner of land used for recreational purposes is not limited to rural and undeveloped land, but also applied to city park so as to immunize city from liability for injuries to person who was injured while using swing at park. Tijernia v. Cornelius Christian Church 273 Or. 58 -By defining the word “land,” in statute relating to public recreational use of private lands, to mean, inter alia, “agricultural land,” legislature intended to limit application of statutes and land holdings which tended to have some recreational value but which would not be susceptible to adequate policing or correction of dangerous conditions, so that “agricultural land” should be interpreted narrowly in light of the legislative purpose. -Defendant church's land, on which injury occurred to plaintiff during softball game, was not “agricultural land” so as to immunize church from liability for dangerous condition under statute relating to public recreational use of private lands, since such land was not used for commercial farming, the grain which grew on it was volunteer and intermixed with weeds, and since the “crop” had been cut to comply with fire regulations but was not harvested until 1974, after initiation of lawsuit, and then only in the sense that person who cut it was allowed to take it away in return for his labors. Denton v. L.W. Vail Co., Inc. 23 Or. App. 28 -Road construction contractors and Department of Transportation breached no duty to trespasser-motorcyclist, who rode into a barbed wire fence stretched across one end of project, by putting up the fence or by not posting some kind of warning that the fence was there. Pennsylvania Stone v. York Haven Power Co. 561 Pa. 189 (2000)

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-The intention of the Legislature to limit the applicability of the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (RUA) to outdoor recreation on largely unimproved land is evident not only from the Act's stated purpose but also from the nature of the activities it listed as recreational purposes within the meaning of the statute; specifically, with the exception of “swimming,” which may be either an indoor or outdoor sport, the recreational activities enumerated in the statute are all pursued outdoors -Consistent with the obvious purpose and intent of the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (RUA), where land devoted to recreational purposes has been improved in such a manner as to require regular maintenance in order for it to be used and enjoyed safely the owner has a duty to maintain the improvements. -The need to limit owner liability under the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (RUA) derives from the impracticality of keeping large tracts of largely undeveloped land safe for public use. Mills v. Com. 534 Pa. 519 (1993) -Nonprofit municipal corporation was not entitled to immunity from personal injury actions under Recreation Use of Land and Water Act (RUA), where land which corporation had leased was highly developed recreational area, vastly altered from its natural state, containing attractions for which entry fees were required. - Landowner must bear responsibility of maintaining improvements placed upon land to which general public is permitted access. -Ordinary users of developed recreation area could reasonably expect area to be maintained in manner safe for their normal recreational pursuits. Rhode Island Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035 (2006). -After discovering a recreational user in a position of peril, landowners must guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. -To encourage landowners to open their property to the public for recreational use, Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute limits landowners' liability for personal injuries sustained by the users of such properties. -Recreational Use Statute applies to state and municipal property; amendment to statute clearly defined owner to include the “person in control of the premises including the state and municipalities.” -The Recreational Use Statute modifies the common law to change the legal duty that owners owe to users of recreational property; this change from the common law treats users of public and private recreational properties as trespassers, thus reducing the duty of care owed to recreational users. Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707 (2003) -Recreational use statute afforded immunity to state-owned public park, regardless of when the property was made available to the public for recreational use. Gen.Laws 1956, § 32-6-1 et seq.) -State was immune under recreational use statute from liability for injuries suffered by camper in fall that occurred while she was walking on roadway in a State park that

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was open for public use; camper did not allege willful or malicious conduct by the state. -Existence of statutory immunity under recreational use statute does not depend upon the specific activity pursued by the plaintiff at the time of the plaintiff's injury, but rather, the inquiry should focus on the nature and scope of activity for which the premises are held open to the public; the goal is to determine the character of the premises, and if the premises qualify as being open to the public for recreational activity, the statute does not require a distinction to be made between plaintiffs depending upon the activity in which each was engaged at the time of the injury Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455 (2006). -Recreational use statute afforded immunity to state park where minor was injured while riding his bicycle, and willful or malicious exception to statutory immunity was not applicable because minor pointed to no evidence that the State discovered minor in a position of peril and then failed to warn him against the potentially dangerous condition. South Carolina Brooks v. Northwood Little League, Inc. (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 400, 489 S.E.2d 647 -Recreational use statute barred spectator's claims against little league, school, and school district for injuries sustained in trip and fall on grounds of school while attending T-ball game; T-ball qualified as “summer sport” for purposes of recreational use statute and spectator's permission to attend game was clearly implied by lack of admission fee. Corbett v. City of Myrtle Beach, S.C. (S.C.App. 1999) 336 S.C. 601, 521 S.E.2d 276. -Contractor whose franchise agreement with city required contractor to furnish lifeguards for city-owned beach front was not “occupant” or “person in control of the premises,” and thus, contractor was not “owner” and was not entitled to protection under Recreational Use Statute in wrongful death action arising from drowning; franchise agreement reserved to city considerable control over contractor's operations, going so far as to schedule lunch breaks for lifeguards and provide specifications for guard towers, and contractor lacked power to either provide or prevent public access to beach. Cole v. South Carolina Electric and Gas, Inc. (S.C.App. 2003) 355 S.C. 183, 584 S.E.2d 405 -Landowners owe no duty of care to keep the premises safe for recreational users and need not give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on the property. - Parking fee paid by driver of vehicle in which swimmer was passenger was not “charge” for swimmer's right to use swimming area of lake, within meaning of exception to immunity from liability under Recreational Use statute for injury to invitees or licensees that were charged by landowner for recreational use thereof, where not everyone in vehicle had to pay for admission to swimming area, and persons who walked or rode bicycles to swimming area were not charged admission.

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Chrisley v. U.S. (D.C.S.C. 1985) 620 F.Supp. 285 -Landowner's failure to post sign warning fishermen that they may fall from rocks along shoreline into river below does not constitute grossly negligent, willful, or malicious conduct. South Dakota Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Ass'n, 1994, 514 N.W.2d 693 -Softball was not activity contemplated by recreational use statute and, thus, statute did not provide softball association and city that leased softball complex to association immunity from liability to injured softball player for alleged negligence. -Under recreational use statutes, land occupier is granted immunity when entrant comes upon occupier's land for recreational purposes without conferring any economic benefit or consideration upon occupier. Musch v. H-D Elec. Co-op., Inc., 1990, 460 N.W.2d 149, 8 A.L.R.5th 921. -Definition of “owner” in statute describing power to exclude persons from land did not apply to electrical utility which held right-of-way easement but only occupied land for limited purpose not including power to exclude persons from land so that utility was not entitled to take owner's defense of owing no duty of care to licensee. Kern v. City of Sioux Falls, 560 N.W.2d 236, 1997 SD 19. -Roller-skating on bike trail in city park was use of land for “recreational purposes” within meaning of Recreational Use Statutes, and thus, city was immune from liability in action brought by skaters who fell on uneven section of trail. -Term “recreational purposes,” as used to determine scope of Recreational Use Statutes, is not limited to activities performed or enjoyed only on undeveloped land. Tennessee Shaver v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 1982, 565 F.Supp. 12. -Recreational user of property owned by Tennessee Valley Authority could not recover from the Authority for injuries sustained when boulders fell on him during a rockslide while he was fishing, because Tennessee landowner liability statute provided that a landowner owed no duty of care to keep land safe for entry or use by others for fishing, recreational user could not assert the status of invitee to confer duty upon the Authority, and there was no evidence that Authority's conduct was willful or malicious. Sumner v. U.S., 1992, 794 F.Supp. 1358 -Where personal injury occurred in rear area of United States military base which was open to public recreation use, applicable standard of care was that found in state's recreational use statute. Cagle v. U.S., 1991, 937 F.2d 1073.

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-Under Tennessee's recreational use statute, absent “willful or malicious” conduct, landowner otherwise shielded by statute does not waive immunity simply by inspecting his property. -Section of Tennessee's recreational use statute providing that statute does not limit liability for injury caused by persons granted permission to recreate was drafted to prevent statute from being used as shield by third-party tort-feasor who, while on landowner's property with landowner's permission, injures someone else on landowner's property. -Provision in Tennessee's recreational use statute stating that statute does not limit liability for injury caused by acts of persons who have been granted permission to recreate did not deprive Government of immunity for injuries caused to child in national park by other children who were playing on cannon while injured child was under it; statute would not be read to subject landowners to tort liability if they did not monitor conduct of recreational users of their land and actively supervise actions of such users. Parent v. State, 1999, 991 S.W.2d 240. -State could raise recreational use statute as a defense to cause of action brought by seven-year-old bicyclist and his family, alleging that state's negligence in creating or maintaining state park bike trail caused bicyclist's injuries. Bishop v. Beckner, 2002, 109 S.W.3d 725 -Landowner's failure to place a “no trespassing” sign on boundary of her property, or to place warning sign outside cave located on her property, did not amount to grossly negligent behavior such as would trigger exception to immunity defense set forth in Recreational Use Statutes, and thus landowner was immune from liability in action arising from death of child who fell from ledge in cave. Texas Dubois v. Harris County 866 S.W.2d787 -Term “premises” as used in recreational use statute includes components of the recreational area which are of the same kind or class as those listed in the statute, and a structure used within a recreational area to provide parking for persons visiting the area is within the meaning of the term “premises.” - Recreational use statute applied to claim of user of park against county which owned the park for injuries sustained when she tripped in a hole, where there was no fee charged for her use of the park and the area where the injury occurred was a park which she frequented in order to take walks along a nature trail. -Recreational use statute mandates only that county not cause injury to users of park through wantonness, wilfulness, or gross negligence. Stephen F. Austin State University v. Flynn (Sup. 2007) 228 S.W.3d 653. -State university had protection, under recreational use statute, from tort liability to bicyclist who was injured while riding bike on community trail which crossed university's campus, i.e., force of water from oscillating sprinkler, which was part of university's in-ground irrigation system, allegedly knocked bicyclist off her bike,

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though university had granted city an easement for use of trail for cycling; despite grant of easement, university retained ownership of underlying fee, so that university, as owner of the property, retained its status as member of class protected by recreational use statute. -Recreational use statute, which provides that owner of real property is entitled to the statute's protection when it gives permission to another to enter for recreation, does not require that owner contemporaneously acknowledge each use; rather, permission may be implied from owner's knowledge of, and acquiescence in, public's use of its land for recreational purposes. Kopplin v. City of Garland (App. 5 Dist. 1993) 869 S.W.2d 433, -Playing on playground equipment on city playground is “recreational activity” contemplated under recreational use statute. -Statutory definitions of “recreation” for recreational use statute are not exclusive and do not exhaust the class. City of Bellmead v. Torres 89 S.W.3d 611 Tex.,2002 -Fact that park patron came to city park with intent to participate in softball game was not determinative of whether Recreational Use Statute applied, where patron was injured on swing, not while playing softball; question was whether sitting on a swing, not playing softball, was recreational activity within meaning of Statute. Flye v. City of Waco (App. 10 Dist. 2001) 50 S.W.3d 645. -Provision of Recreational Use Statute stating that liability is not limited for property owner who has been grossly negligent or has acted with malicious intent or in bad faith did not create liability where none would exist in its absence, and thus, provision merely confirmed that liability-limiting provisions of statute did not limit liability that otherwise existed for contemporaneous acts of gross negligence or acts committed with malicious intent or bad faith. State of Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept. v. Morris (App. 13 Dist. 2004) 129 S.W.3d 804. -Allegations by family of three-year-old child who suffered burns from falling into campfire pit in State park which contained smoldering coals from a previous fire, that failure to have waist-high fire grills or rings around campfire pit involved extreme degree of risk, and that Parks and Wildlife Department had actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved but nevertheless proceeded in conscious indifference to rights, safety, or welfare of others, stated a claim of gross negligence, under recreational use statute. State v. Shumake (Sup. 2006) 199 S.W.3d 279, -“Gross negligence,” for purposes of recreational use statute, requires that the landowner be subjectively aware of, and consciously indifferent to, an extreme risk of harm. -Under recreational use statute, landowner may assume that the recreational user needs no warning to appreciate the dangers of natural conditions, such as a sheer cliff, a rushing river, or even a concealed rattlesnake; however, a landowner can be liable

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for gross negligence in creating a condition that a recreational user would not reasonably expect to encounter on the property in the course of the permitted use. Utah De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 1996, 913 P.2d 743. -Utah Limitation of Landowner Liability-Public Recreation Act did not apply to small, improved city park, and thus, did not preclude minor's recovery for injuries he sustained when he fell from toddler swing and injured his head on cement ridge surrounding play area; extending Act's application to improved city parks which, unlike many private wilderness lands, were not opened to public in response to Act, and which were already covered by other laws (i.e., Governmental Immunity Act), would serve neither legislature's intent nor purpose of statute. Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 1991, 822 P.2d 770 -Statute limiting liability of land used for “recreational purpose” could not be interpreted to afford immunity to public entity against user of public road system traveling in on-highway vehicle to recreational area. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irr. Co., 1995, 902 P.2d 142. -A landowner may be liable under the attractive nuisance doctrine for an injury caused by an uncommon, artificially produced, and inherently dangerous condition that attracts children when there is likelihood that a child would not appreciate the danger. - Landowner's failure to warn or guard against dangerous conditions on the land does not constitute willful or wanton conduct for purposes of liability to trespassers under common law or the Limitation of Landowner Liability Act when the conditions are common, obvious, or inherent in the nature of the land or in the use to which the land is put. -Owner of canal in which 17-year-old boy drowned, who neither invited public to swim there nor posted signs prohibiting it, could not be liable based on theory of simple negligence under attractive nuisance doctrine, though boy may have qualified as a child for purposes of doctrine's applicability, as the Limitation of Landowner Liability Act under which boy's father brought action limited owner's liability to breach of a duty to refrain from willful or malicious failure to warn or guard against dangers, regardless of age, maturity, or experience of persons using the land for recreation. Figueroa v. U.S., 1999, 64 F.Supp.2d 1125 -To qualify for immunity under Utah Limitation of Landowner Liability-Public Recreation Act, land in question must be: (1) rural, (2) undeveloped, (3) appropriate for type of activities listed in the Act, (4) open to public without charge, and (5) type of land that would have been open in response to Act. Vermont Garafano v. Neshobe Beach Club, Inc. 126 Vt. 566

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- Where use of corporation's recreational area by individual and his guests, which included plaintiff who was injured in softball game, was to its interest and advantage and was in furtherance of its purposes and functions, the status of persons such as plaintiff would be that of a “business visitor”. Virginia City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 1996, 467 S.E.2d 471, 251 Va. 358 -City was included in definition of “landowner,” in statute that provided landowner owed no duty of care to keep land or premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational use, for the city's maintenance of stairways that were located on private land and that provided public access to beach; city's actions in providing and maintaining public access over private land for recreational purposes was consistent with purposes of statute. Washington Jones v. United States 693 F.2d 1299 (applying Wash. Law) -Liability of United States for snow-sliding accident which occurred in Olympic National Park was controlled by Washington Recreational Use Act, since Government was recreational landowner under Act, area where accident occurred was part of “forest lands,” and dollar charged injured plaintiff to rent innertube was not a fee charged for her use of recreational facilities. -While it was negligent on Government's part not to put up signs or ropes to guard against dangerous slope on which plaintiff was severely injured in snow-sliding accident in Olympic National Park, Government's failure to do so did not rise to status of willful and wanton conduct as required for liability under Washington Recreational Land Use Act. Matthews v. Elk Pioneer Days 64 Wash.App. 433 -“Outdoor recreation” as used in recreational use statute, which protected landowners and occupiers of land who opened their land to the public for outdoor recreation from liability, did not include the activity of attending a weekend celebration or watching entertainment on outdoor stage during a community festival. West Virginia Kesner v. Trenton 216 S.E.2d 880 -Statute limiting liability of landowners who invite or permit without charge recreational use of property by others does not limit common-law liability of landowner, or of lessee in control of premises, to those who enter premises as business invitees and suffer injury thereon. -Where marina operators could have reasonably expected to attract prospective customers and to increase marina sales and rentals by allowing people to swim in lake at no charge, such expectation was sufficient “charge,” within meaning of statute limiting liability of landowners who invite or permit without charge recreational use of property by others, to negate limitations of such statute and left operators with common-law duty of providing ordinary care to business invitees such as 15 and 16-year-old girls who drowned in lake while their father was waiting to rent boat

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Wisconsin Copeland v. Larson 174 N.W.2d 745 Moua by Schilling v. NSP 458 N.W.2d 836 -Recreational use statute immunized electric utility from liability for injuries and drowning deaths which occurred when excess water discharged from dam flowed over river bank area where utility permitted public fishing, even though alleged negligence of utility occurred on part of its property devoted to business use, that hazard causing the injuries and deaths was brought about by nonrecreational activities within utility's control, and not by hazards which were natural or related to recreation use. -With regard to exception to immunity conferred by recreational use statute if owner collects money, goods or services in payment for use of property for recreational purposes and if aggregate annual amount exceeds $500, such pecuniary benefit must come from use of the property for recreational activities, not from owner's business activities unrelated to recreation. -Exception to immunity afforded by recreational use statute if injury is caused by malicious failure of landowner to warn against an unsafe condition on the property of which the owner knew or if the injury is caused by malicious act does not apply to wanton, wilful and reckless conduct, which the law formerly characterized as “gross negligence”; acts are “malicious” within meaning of the statute when they are the result of hatred, ill will, a desire for revenge or inflicted under the circumstances where insult or injury is intended. Urban v. Grasser 243 Wis.2d 673 (2001) -Factors considered by court in determining whether recreational immunity statute applies to protect property owner include the intrinsic nature of the activity, the purpose of the activity, the consequences of the activity, the intent of the user, the nature of the property, and the intent, or lack thereof, of the property owner; none of factors, viewed in isolation, are determinative, and in any give case, one or more of factors may have greater weight, but all should be looked at in their totality. Wyoming Holland v. Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc., 1987, 651 F.Supp. 409 -Wyoming landowner immunity statutes, which provide that landowner owes no duty of care to keep premises safe for entry or use of others for recreational purposes, did not bar action arising from minor's injury in industrial site, although minor entered site to play. Madsen v. Wyoming River Trips, Inc., 1999, 31 F.Supp.2d 1321 -Intent behind the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act was not to preclude parties from suing for a provider's negligence, it was merely to stop people from suing providers for those risks that were inherent to a sport; thus, cause of action still exists for negligence of the provider under the Act. -Under Wyoming law, as predicted by the district court, in determining whether a particular risk is an “inherent risk” within meaning of the Wyoming Recreational

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Safety Act, the court must look to the specific facts of a case and to the abstract character of the risk.