trends in maritime trafficking, ship registration

8/11/2019 Trends in Maritime Trafficking, Ship Registration

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TRENDS INMARITIME

TRAFFICKING, SHIP

REGISTRATION

Group: NguynHongNam

Hong ChinNguynTunHipNguynVan MinhTrn TrngNgha

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CONTENT

1. Methods used to evade detection

2. Iran and North Korea: evading sanctions and surveillance

on arms shipments

3. Flags of convenience providing clean new identities fortargeted ships and fleets

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THE WAYS TO BYPASS THEDETECTION

Based on containerization.

Grows rapidly and it is legitimate international trade in recentdecades.

The major methods for traffickers who are wishing to do

transport illicit commodities, especially weapon.

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The use of container ships in reported destabilizing

commodity transfers by sea, 2001-11

Source: SIPRI Vessel and Maritime Incident Database

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WHY COULD CONTAINERSHIPS EVADE THEDETECTION?

Sealed container could not be opened and inspected by thecarrier or the other individuals and companies that associatedwith the ships operation and ownership.

Anonymity

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IRAN & NORTH KOREA

The usually way tocamouflage shipments is theuse of

Circuitous voyages

One or more transshipmentpoints and vessels

False declarations on cargomanifests and bills of lading.

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NORTH KOREA

North Korea were disguising their ships under other states flag

Weapon shipments were in shipping containers whose

contents were misdeclared on the bills of lading.

In a number of cases, the banned cargoes were hidden behindother items matching the declared contents of the container

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NORTH KOREA SINCE 2011

North Korea has not owned nor chartered any ships since2011.

Discouragement from foreign PSC inspections acts forcedNorth Korean Government stop using North Korean flaggedships to transport illicit cargo

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(SEPTEMBER, 2009)

UK-flagged container ship

A search found four containers of nuclear-biological-chemical

protective clothing from North Korea, apparently meant forSyria

The vessel stopped previously in Nampo (DPRK), was sailingfrom Dalian (China)

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CMA CGM MUSCA (NOVEMBER

2009)

South Africa seized armstraveling from North Korea byway of China.

Amounted to two containersfilled with tank parts and othermilitary equipment from NorthKorea

Concealed in containers linedwith sacks of rice andshipping documents identifiedthe cargo as spare parts for abulldozer

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IRAN TO PALESTINE

The ship normally depart from Bandar Abbas port.

Then it goes through the Persian Gulf and the Arab Sea,

around the Arabian Peninsula and beyond Bab el -MandebStrait before arriving at Port Sudan.

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IRAN - CHANGE OF STATE

FLAG

The Israeli army said they arrested a Panama flagged cargoship in international waters off the coast of Sudan and Eritreain 2011 .

The ship transported M-302 missiles which originated fromSyria.

Iran tried to "hide traces" by transporting weapons togetherwith the container filled with bags of cement.

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FLAG OF CONVENIENCE

Business practice ofregistering a merchant shipin a sovereign state different

from that of the ship's owners,and flying flag of shipbuildingstates .

Ships are registered underflags of convenience to

reduce operating costs oravoid the regulations of theowner's country.

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TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FOCSTO WEAPON TRAFFICKING,CRIMINAL

The vessel flag is ofparticular importance for thecontrol of destabilizing

commodity flows.

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Figure shows the 14 flag states most frequently associatedwith ships reported as being involved in destabilizing militaryequipment, dual -use goods and narcotics transfers between1991 and 2011.

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CONTROLS WEAPONS TRAFFICKING

UNDER FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE

After The Sept. 11 attacks the dangers of traditional mode oftransport - a ship on the sea

At Now, when North Korea's nuclear ambition is causing world-wide concern, any vessel suspected of trying to exportdangerous materials to rogue states and terrorist groups wouldbe interdicted

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THE CASE IRISL

This company targeted under UN Security Council.

In September 2008 the US Department of the Treasurys Office

of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions banningUS companies, along with foreign companies operating in theUSA, from doing business with IRISL (Islamic Republic of IranShipping Lines) or with companies designated as supporting itIRISL has adopted new vessel registration patterns.

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THE CASE IRISL

Most of IRISLs fleet has now left the Iranian national shippingregistry and been reregistered in Barbados, Cyprus and Malta(all ITF-designated flags of convenience) and Hong Kong

Unfortunately, the vessel registered with open registries thatare on the current Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU flag stateblacklists to reduce the likelihood of them being targeted byPSC (port state control) authorities.

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REFLAGGING

The name and flag changesare an attempt to evadedetection in order to facilitate

transfers of militaryequipment.

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THE CASE OF BU YON 1

This Individual ships registered in North Korea have beensubject to multiple reflagging. For example, the North Korean-registered Bu Yon 1, IMO 8415433, was reflagged to Belize

2010 and was renamed Light.In May 2011 the US Government forced the Light to abandon avoyage to Myanmar, to which it believed the ship wastransporting North Korean military equipment.

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CONCLUSION

Sea transport plays a major role in global flows. It is also themain mode of transport for other illicit and potentiallydestabilizing commodities.

A majority of the flagsof convenience under which thesevessels sail have been consistently targeted for inspection byport state control (PSC) regime.

Significantly, more than half of reported destabilizing transfers

to or from Iran and North Korea have resulted in seizure ,regions or groups in Africa have been very low.

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THANK YOU.

The End.

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