Congo Intervention AgainAuthor(s): George ShepherdSource: Africa Today, Vol. 14, No. 4, Trends in African Liberation Movements (Aug., 1967), p.3Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184808 .

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in South Africa could not afford to make nice distinctions between ideologies; that its paramount and primary aim was to create a just and non- racial society, and afterwards political ideas could regroup. Nelson Mandela was to reaffirm this at his solo trial, i.e. before Rivonia, and to state his

belief that ultimately communism would become irrelevant in a South Africa society. In the mean- time, the PAC has sought and received financial assistance from Peking.

Ezekiel Mphahlele

Congo Intervention Again The Congo (Kinshasa) has become the major

area of unilateral American intervention in Afri- ca; and several influential American Senators are concerned that it may become another Carribean.

The occasion for the latest intervention has been the White Mercenary-led rebellion in the North Eastern section, beginning in Kisangani this summer. When news of its disbandment reached Commando No. 6 simultaneously with the arrest of Tshombe in Algiers, they rebelled, tak- ing a numer of pro-Tshombe Katanganese (1500) with them. The Armee Nationale Congolaise was not able to constrain the strongly-armed rebel column and President Mobuto called upon the U. S. to assist in the transportation of re-inforce- ments. The U. S. promptly complied by sending three C-130 transports with 150 American service- men. However, at least two of these transport planes were soon withdrawn when a storm of pro- test arose among United States Senators.

Whether U. S. intervention of this kind is justified is related to the history of our interven- tion in the Congo. Initial U. S. Intervention was in close association with the United Nations Peace Keeping Operation, 1960-64. At a cost of some $400 million to the U. S. and the- supply of Globe- master planes we helped hold the Congo together by defeating the Katanga secession. This has been widely hailed as an effective and justified action in support of world peace and Congolese unity.

The second phase of U. S. intervention came in 1964 with the Stanleyville rebellion and the elevation to power of Maurice Tshombe. This took a strictly unilateral turn, as the UN departed from the Congo in June 1964. The United States condoned and supported with money, planes and pilots the Tshombe Government's drive against the Stanleyville rebels, culminating in the famous Stanleyville drop in November 1964 of Belgian paratroopers from American planes. This action aroused empassioned protest at the United Nations bv even moderate African leaders. Many informed Western observers questioned its necessity. The State Department attempted to defend this action in terms of humanitarian concern for hostages and the legal request of the Congolese Government. But the essential difference was the unilateral and "colonial character" of the operation.

The present rebellion has quite a different origin and direction. These are White Mercenaries without significant outside support who have seized territory and are making threats against the national Government of the Congo. Despite

the confusion of the Congo, certain propositions, derived from past experience, offer guidelines to conducting our policy. The first should be alle- giance to the general concept of non-intervention as defined by the United Nations Security Council following the last Congolese crisis. The UN reso- lution endorsed intervention only as a multi- lateral operation. It clearly opposed the unilateral support action of the Stanleyville and recent C-130 type.

The U. S. and Congolese Governments have not to date sought to bring the dispute before either the OAU or the United Nations. Neverthe- less, an attempt to revive the old Katanga seces- sion by foreign mercenary nationals is clearly within the jurisdiction of both these agencies.

Interventionists argue there is no time for such deliberations that may result in no action. In the meantime anti-white riots may generate in the Congo, and secession is stirred in Katanga.

This, then, raises the second proposition that Senators Fulbright, McCarthy and Russell have put before us. Is it the role of the United States to help police every insurrection and civil war involving countries friendly to the United States? They argue that it is not. We do not, they believe, have the resources to cope with the innumerable insurrections of this type and moreover, it is the function of newly-established governments to deal with these problems. They will either resolve them for themselves in time or they will create for themselves new governments.

This Congo incident illuminates the principles of non-intervention more clearly for us because the Cold War is not involved. The mercenaries have no direct outside support though they may have sympathy from the White Supremacy regimes. The Congo Government can deal with the insurrection itself and if it needs outside sup- port, let other African states or the United Na- tions supply what is necessary to bring to an end this unsavory episode of white hired guns gone amok in the Congo. They should receive no mercy or sanctuary from the West. Africans might re- member it was an African Government who first sickened the body politic by employing this virus.

If, as a result of this affair, a consciousness of the limits of our military interventionary power dawns on the American society, we will have something to be grateful for, even to White Mer- cenaries.

George Shepherd

The Meaning of African Liberation Movements Change in Southern Africa is dependent upon

two sets of forces, one endogenous and one exo- genous. The liberation movements, although in- digenous, must be classified among the exogenous

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