transportation equity in kansas city

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Moving Forward?:

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri

Jamie Ferris

Anne Dunning, Ph.D.

Urban Planning 750

14 December 2012


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ABSTRACT

The early 20th century saw great development in the midtown area of Kansas

City. The 1947 Master Plan made assumptions about the allocation of public

services, roads, and other amenities based on a valuation of communities as to

their normality. The layout of the city *was+ perceived in terms of whitedistricts and Negro districts (2011). The construction of the Kansas City

Loop, the connecting interstates and highways surrounding downtown, cut

through many neighborhoods, promoted the demolition of many buildings, and

further encouraged sprawl. Kansas Citys vast urban renewal efforts dislocated

poor and primarily African-American neighborhoods and subsequently

relocated them into higher concentrations in the urban core.

Although Americas population is 65 percent white, 12 percent African

American, 16 percent Latino, and 4. 5 percent Asian, the composition of Kansas

City is 59 percent White, 30 percent Black, 10 percent Latino, and 2. 5 percentAsian in a city of nearly 500,000 (compared to 81 percent white and 6 percent

black for Missouri as a state), which shows a higher concentration of minorities

located in the urban areas (Census Bureau, 2010). (396)

Gentrification associated with some efforts to mitigate the transportation

problem, such as commuter rail, often displaces residents by increasing property

values, forcing residents who have few alternative housing options to farther

away from their jobs and social networksa problem that is compounded by

limited transportation options (2003). Transportation policies favoring

highways over transit have also helped to create spatial mismatch the

disconnect that occurs when new entry-level and low-skill jobs are located on the

fringes of urban areas that are inaccessible to central-city residents who need

those jobs (2003). (253)

In attempt to address this problem, the federal government passed various

legislation; ISTEA was the first major federal transportation policy to give any

consideration to the health, economic, and social effects of transportation policy

on racial minority and low-income communities (2003). (199)

Because the Kansas City urban core has experienced negative effects of urban

sprawl, the city has, in recent years, supported downtown revitalization efforts,hoping to minimize the effects of previous policies as well as the great sprawl

prevalent in the area, by promoting the development of not only business but

residential and entertainment areas an attempt to re-grow the tax base and bring

residents, art, culture and tourism to the area, including the contentious streetcar

transit proposal.


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Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri 1

TRANSPORATION EQUITY IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

A Historical Framework

Kansas City, Missouris*henceforth Kansas City+ transportation history begins

in 1821, the year Missouri entered the Union. The city was chartered as Town of Kansas

in 1850, becoming Kansas City in 1889, by which time the population had grown to over

60,000 (KCMO). Growth in the city was rapid and prosperous, located along the

lucrative Missouri River. In the 1880s, Kansas City built the country's third-largest cable

car system, which over time was replaced by electric streetcar lines with over 64 miles

of rail lines and 34 million riders yearly by 1885 (KCMO).

As ridership grew, an interurban network began to appear that sought to connect

more distant cities such as St. Joseph and Liberty in Missouri and Leavenworth,

Lawrence, and Olathe in Kansas. By the 1920s ridership was reaching 375,000

passengers a day and the system consisted of over 319 miles of track and 740 cars

(KCMO). Slowly, and with the advent of the automobile, the system integrated trolley

busses into the network.

Concurrently, landscape architect George Kessler's assessment of Kansas City

was published in 1893 as the first park board report; it appeared at what is generally

considered the beginning of the City Beautiful movement. He planned the citys

renowned parks and boulevards system, resulting in some of Kansas Citys most

impressive and famous neighborhoods and vistas including Hyde Park and Armour


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Boulevard (Kessler Society of Kansas City). Much of this development revolved around

the ever-more-prevalent mode of transportation in Kansas Citythe private

automobile. On January 4, 1959 Kansas Citys last trolley bus was pulled from service.

Buses had slowly replace streetcars and automobiles became a status symbol; public

transportation became associated strictly with the poor, a challenge it still faces today

(Kelly, 2011). It was about this time as well that racial segregation became a tangible

element of Kansas City development (2011).

The early 20th century saw great development in the midtown area of Kansas

City. Developer J.C. Nichols, who is widely regarded as one of Americas most

influential entrepreneurs in land use during the first half of the 1900s pioneered the

development of sustainable, mass market residential neighborhoods built for

permanence, and automobile-oriented shopping centers, (ULI) began reshaping the

environment and influencing trends on a national scale. Nichols vision included

creating housing in ideal neighborhoods (See Figures 2 and 3) that were characterized

by residential and racial stability, comfort, and security (University of Missouri

Kansas City).

Nichols developed restrictive covenants to ensure the quality of his

neighborhoods. While most of the covenants restricted the lands to residential uses,

and contained other features such as setback and free space requirements, homes in

the Country Club District were restricted with covenants and deeds that prohibited


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African Americans and Jews from owning or occupying the homes, unless they were

servants (University of MissouriKansas City).

Nichols was influential on a local level, but he was also instrumental in the

National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB). Nichols influence was present at just

the time when public monies were being allocated for single-family housing (Kelly,

2011). He and other urban planners in Kansas City were not just perceiving or

expressing an objective reality but, in a normative and strategic sense, were

constructing an urban future that prescribed how and where specific racial groups

should live (2011). Notably, Kansas Citys 1947 Master Plan made assumptions about

the allocation of public services, roads, and other amenities based on a valuation of

communities as to their normality. The layout of the city [was] perceived in terms of

white districts and Negro districts (2011). Ultimately, the 1948 Supreme Court

decisionShelley v. Kraemermade such covenants unenforceable, however they remained

in place for many years, solidifying the designation of such neighborhoods,

predominately those located east of Troost Avenue, as minority enclaves.

The 1930s era Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was the first federal

program to introduce, on a mass scale, the use of long-term, self amortizing mortgages

with uniform payments (2011). Under this system the valuation of homes depended

upon their desirability and associated value, and the ranking resulting from the racial

and socioeconomic features of the community where the properties were located. There
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Supreme_Courthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelley_v._Kraemerhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelley_v._Kraemerhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelley_v._Kraemerhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelley_v._Kraemerhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Supreme_Court


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were four color codes, and the color code of red, the category that highly African-

American occupied neighborhoods received, were not eligible for HOLC loans:

consequently the term redlining (2011).

The increased availability and use of automobiles, beginning in the 1930s, and

federal subsidies through such instruments such as FHA (Federal Housing

Administration) and VA (Veterans Administration) loans contributed to the growth of

suburbs (Sanchez, Stolz, and Ma, 2003). The construction of the Kansas City Loop, the

connecting interstates and highways surrounding downtown, cut through many

neighborhoods, promoted the demolition of many buildings, and further encouraged

sprawl. Kansas Citys vast urban renewal efforts dislocated poor and primarily African-

American neighborhoods and subsequently relocated them into higher concentrations

in the urban core. Kansas City proper sprawled to 320 square miles; the bi-state

metropolitan area became even vaster, extending in all directions, most densely to the

Racial segregation for blacks in the Kansas City area became

an institutionalized phenomenon, supported by government policy,

developers, real estate boards, legal codes and market

dynamicsand fair housing codes were not consistently enforced.

This simultaneously created a condition of written and unwritten

policy that excluded blacks from residential areas and created

conditions of relative housing shortages for blacks at various

periods of time due to population growth and associated housing

needs. While redlining and other discriminatory practices were not

uncommon throughout the 1970s and beyond, patterns of

residential segregation based on historical and socioeconomic

factors shape the landscape of the Kansas City metropolitan area to

the present (2011).


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North and South, creating far-reaching suburbs.

The housing boom in the suburbs lead to the relocation of businesses, which

sought environments of relatively unorganized labor, and therefore the ability to affirm

more control over labor, and also lower occupancy costs (2011). The change of the urban

economy from one based less on manufacturing and focused more service-oriented jobs

exacerbated the problem of segregation (2011). First white, single-family housing,

moved from urban center to the outlying suburbs, then companies and jobs followed

suit. The division of jobs between Kansas Citys urban core and the metropolitan area

outside the core in 1970 was approximately 58 percent and 42 percent, respectively

(2011) In 1990, Kansas Citys urban core had 41 percent of the areas jobs, compared with

59 percent in the suburbs (2011). Compounding the division, black residential housing

in the suburbs had obstructed for so long, suburbs were just generally seen as more

available to white residents (2011).

Transportation and Access Implications

The ultimate objective of transportation equity is to provide equal access to social and economic

opportunity by providing equitable levels of access to all places" (2003).

Although Americas population is 65 percent white, 12 percent African

American, 16 percent Latino, and 4.5 percent Asian, the composition of Kansas City is

59 percent White, 30 percent Black, 10 percent Latino, and 2.5 percent Asian in a city of


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nearly 500,000 (compared to 81 percent white and 6 percent black for Missouri as a

state), which shows a higher concentration of minorities located in the urban areas

(Census Bureau, 2010).

Transportation policies that support highway development over public transit

have numerous indirect adverse effects; such policies encourage housing development

increasingly farther away from the central cities, which has played an important role

in fostering residential segregation and income inequalities (2003). Additionally, the

locating of major highways in minority and low-income communities has reduced the

available housing in those areas (2003). Gentrification associated with some efforts to

mitigate the transportation problem, such as commuter rail, often displaces residents by

increasing property values, forcing residents who have few alternative housing options

to farther away from their jobs and social networksa problem that is compounded

by limited transportation options (2003).

Transportation policies favoring highways over transit have also helped to

create spatial mismatchthe disconnect that occurs when new entry-level and low-

skill jobs are located on the fringes of urban areas that are inaccessible to central-city

residents who need those jobs (2003). Research implies that the average distance

between a residents home in the center city and prospective employment locations has

been increasing over time (2003). Because public transportation systems operate most

effectively in densely populated urban areas and do a poor job of serving the dispersed


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populations of the suburbs, workers who have or could have a job requiring a reverse

commute and are transit-dependent are put at a definite disadvantage (2003).

In attempt to address this problem, the federal government passed various

legislation; The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) was the first

major federal transportation policy to give any consideration to the health, economic,

and social effects of transportation policy on racial minority and low-income

communities (2003). ISTEA, enacted by Congress in 1991, included clear (if easy-to-

circumvent) requirements for public participation in transportation planning (2003).

Passed in 1998, TEA-21 significantly strengthened the opportunities for public

involvement and required greater responsiveness to the concerns of minority and low-

income communities in the transportation planning process (2003). TEA-21 also

created grant programs to serve the transportation needs of minority and low-income

communities. For example, it established the Job Access and Reverse Commute grant

programs to provide federal monies to local governments and transit agencies, and

nonprofit organizations. Job Access grants were proposed to provide new and increased

transportation services to help welfare recipients and eligible low-income persons get to

jobs and employment-related services (2003).

Income levels generally correspond with the form of transportation they use.

Most Americans rely on private automobiles to meet their transportation needs, but

many minorities do not have access to a car. Only 7 percent of white households do not


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include cars, 24 percent of African-American households, however, own no cars (2003).

Relatedly, in 2003, only 3 percent of whites relied on public transportation for

work-related trips, compared with 12 percent of African Americans (2003).

Compounding this problem, a Surface Transportation Policy Project report in 1998 fond

that those in the lowest income quintile spent 36 percent of their household budget on

transportation, compared with those in the highest income quintile, who spent only 14

percent on transportation (2003).

Relatedly, in 2003, only 3 percent of whites relied on public transportation for

work-related trips, compared with 12 percent of African Americans (2003). For those

individuals who do utilize public transportation, there are substantial inequities

between bus service, which tends to serve lower-income riders, and rail service, which

tends to serve more affluent riders. These inequities are reflective of, if less severe than,

the differences between governmental support for highway systems and for public

transit systems. Many transportation planners and policymakers, concerned primarily

with the needs of suburban commuters, have focused on constructing highways and

commuter rail lines that do little to serve the needs of minority and low-income

communities that depend on public transportation(2003).

Kansas Citys Attempt at Solutions

Because the Kansas City urban core has experienced negative effects of urban


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sprawl, losing much of the metropolitan population, particularly those affluent

residents of the urban core, to surrounding suburban areas on both the Missouri and

Kansas sides of the city, the city has, in recent years, supported downtown

revitalization efforts, hoping to minimize the effects of previous policies as well as the

great sprawl prevalent in the area, by promoting the development of not only business

but residential and entertainment areas an attempt to re-grow the tax base and bring

residents, art, culture and tourism to the area. Much of this development is currently

struggling, however, due to the weak economy and therefore a hesitant consumer base

in the metro area. The static tax income causes further problems for the city that is

already facing a revenue shortage.

The prevalence of TIF (Tax Increment Financing)-based incentives for business

and economic development has been great throughout Kansas City due to the

availability of program implementation and the allowance of discretion in approving

TIF projects. The use of both TIF and Economic Activity Taxes (EAT) practices increased

over 200 percent between 2000 and 2004 (Kelsay, 2007). Based on maps (see Figure 4) of

TIF district demographics, [2007], 88 percent of TIF projects have occurred in KCMO

Council Districts one, two, four and six. These districts are the most highly populated,

and maintain the highest level of educated, affluent, non-minority residents. In contrast,

Kansas City Council Districts, three and five which are the lowest income, highest

minority districts, hold only 12 percent of TIF projects. This unequal TIF project


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distribution is counter-intuitive considering the existence of [physical] blight as

common criteria for project approval, though.

The fact that socio-economic status or distress is not a factor in determining

the location of incentive-based projects contradicts much of the literature on

planning to incorporate consensus, or promote equality. The Kansas City Greater

Downtown Area Plan (2010) specifically calls for community building, infill and

rehabilitative development, and focus[ing] this initiative on under-served areas

surrounding the Downtown Core such as 18th and Vine (63). As Peter Marris,

Professor Emeritus of social planning at the University of California Los

Angeles stated in his article on professional advocacy planning (1994) in regard to

advocating for the underserved urban residents in the process of comprehensive

planning, the problems of the city were to be tackled, not piecemeal, but by

coordinating investment in schools, social services, business, police and

probation, housingever relevant agency, in a concerted attack on poverty and

central-city decline (145).

As can be seen by the distribution of incentive-based projects in the urban

core *the Mid America Regional Council, MARC, considers the Urban Core to

consist mainly of the third and fourth districts] (MARC), the more distressed

areas are not truly given priority in redevelopment and renewal efforts. In order

to successfully grow the population and economy of the urban Kansas City area,


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particularly when attempting to reverse the damage done by the recent recession,

the most severely distressed areas must be stabilized and made to prosper; if

incentive use will increase once again in order to do this, it must be done

equitably. The Greater Kansas City Downtown Area Plan (2010), however,

denotes areas of development opportunity where the potential to revitalize and

grow business is encouraged. Many of those areas are located along central

corridorsand on the East side of Troost road, a historically significant racial

dividing line in the city (See Figure 5).

In an effort to improve public transportation in the center-city, after years

of failed ballot initiatives for a bi-state, inter-city light rail system, the City of

Kansas City, Missouri proposed a streetcar initiative (Hudnall, 2012). After

months of studies and public discussion, route linking the Crown Center/Union

Station area just South of Downtown to the City Market area, the northernmost

point before the Missouri River, was proposed (see Figure 6). For streetcar

advocates, it is about growing business: tech business, bring in the so-called Creative

Class. In theory, a streetcar's fixed route provides businesses and property owners

along its path with financial security (2012).

In 2009, the KCATA determined that a streetcar project would cost

approximately $150 million and applied for a starter grant from TIGER to help with

funding. The proposal was rejected. From there was the idea to create a Transportation


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Development District (TDD) that encompasses roughly everything south of the

Missouri River, east of Broadway, west of Locust, and north of Union Station (2012). A

key element to the proposal was that it allowed the city to circumvent a proven-loser

citywide vote by confining the streetcar ballot to residents within the TDD (2012).

Within the TDD are approximately 3,600 registered voters, most of whom are not

property owners, and only a small fraction of whom returned ballots in the election

about whether to create the TDD (2012). This juxtaposition of voters and property

owners (on whom the increased property tax would be increased) caused opposition

from some of the area property and business owners, skeptical of the potential

economic development benefits being touted as the impetus for the transit line (2012).

To aid in funding, Kansas City Mayor Sly James and city officials were able to

locate about $17 million in other grants, but the city plan[ed] to issue and to back about

$80 million in bonds to pay for the construction of the streetcar line. Most of that

repayment would come from a 1-percent sales-tax increase for businesses in the TDD

(2012). On December 11, 2012, Election Day, the TDD measure passed 351 to 198,

demonstrating just how small the population was, deciding such a costlyand risky

measure. This is has not proven the lines worth to critics, however. Opponents of the

plan such as Crosby Kemper III, downtown resident and director of the Kansas City

Public Library, claims that Bus routes actually serve the working poor. They help them

get to work. This streetcar will be used by tourists, shoppers and lawyers who can


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afford to bill a two-hour lunch (2012). Regardless of continued opposition, the

projected completion of the streetcar lines first phase is June 2015.

There is potential that this project will act as a catalystor at least a connecting

elementfor other transit projects in the area. A study released in December 2012

recommends that if and when commuter rail service connects downtown Kansas City

with Jackson County, those commuter cars would run along existing tracks that roughly

parallel Interstate 70 (See Figure 7), the Westernmost point being the City Marketthe

northernmost point on the streetcar line (Hendricks, 2012). Additionally, building on

the momentum of the streetcar lines approval, project managers are already conducting

studies and facilitating public discourse on a second phase expansion (2012).

However, there isn't enough property value to capture anywhere outside of downtown

to rely as heavily on local funding. More federal funding will be required, which adds

both time and cost. Phase 2 studies will likely be funded entirely by city funds, as

opposed to the downtown streetcar study, which was mostly paid for by federal funds

(2012).

It not clear what affect, if any, this new emphasis on downtown area transit will

have on the lack of equitable options and opportunities for Kansas Citys minority

groups.There are mixed findings on whether improved access to public transportation

results in higher levels of employment. A 1997 study in Dade County, Florida did not

find a strong relationship between public transportation access to employment locations


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and rates of employment of minorities (2003). Conversely, a study examining Atlanta

and Portland found that access to bus transit had beneficial effects related to increased

employment for all races (2003).

Recent research suggests, however, increased automobile ownership rates may

have beneficial impacts on low-income workers and their familiesas autos not only

improve job search activities, but also job retention, especially in cases where public

transit service is unavailable (2003). This unsurprising finding reinforces that the role

of cars not be ignored in consideration of transportation mobility strategies for low-

income and minority groups (2003).

Between the objectives set forth in the Master Plan and the recent actions taken to

make transit more accessible, the implementation of such goals has, as of yet, left

much to be desired. To make strides in overcoming the racial and socio-economic

divisions in Kansas City, planners must take on a greater advocacy role, viewing

the underserved minority groups as a client whose interests must be represented

in a legal matter (Davidoff, 1965). Such planners must ensure that programmatic

goals are not only placating citizens and providing them with token participation

or inclusion (Arnstein, 1969, 217) for as Stafford and Ladner (1969) wrote, *often+

programs relay a false expectancy to the black communitythe reality is that

they are not intended to give blacks any significant power in determining

planning prioritiesthey are programs which are designed to fulfill the cities


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vested interests (71).

Goals expressed in the area plan (2010) include growing innovative

industries as well as decreasing unemployment by seven percent and increasing

Median Household Income by over 10 thousand dollars by 2020 (67). Much of the

opportunity to grow in such a way must include sufficient and equitable access to

employment. To make such goals feasible, care must be taken to consider and

positively address the interests of all citizensincluding those who have been

historically underrepresented in and adversely affected by planning efforts.

Downtown streetcars and commuter rail may not be the solution. Privately

owned cars may not be the solution either, however it is an issuetying together

transportation systems, social inclusion, and repair of historical faults that is

vital for the improving and continued success of Kansas City.


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APPENDIX

Figure 1

Figure 2


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Figure 3

Figure 4


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Figure 5


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Figure 6


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Figure 7


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transportation equity in kansas city

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